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The Effects of Oportunidades on Mexican Presidential Elections

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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

THE EFFECTS OF *OPORTUNIDADES* ON MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

By

Chen Yao

A THESIS

Submitted to the Faculty
of the University of Miami
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Master of Arts

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THE EFFECTS OF *OPORTUNIDADES* ON MEXICAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

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The Effects of *Oportunidades* on Mexican Presidential Elections

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This thesis explores the effects of Mexico's most famous Conditional Cash Transfer program (CCT program), *Oportunidades*, on presidential elections in 2006 and 2012. In addition, this paper will investigate this topic from a gender perspective which will lead us to re-think the gender-gap in voting decisions among beneficiary families. In addition, this paper provides a new perspective from which to view remittances' effects on beneficiaries' voting decisions. The majority of research about CCT programs were conducted on the basis of Latin American presidential election results during which time those CCT programs were started at the initial stage or were implemented for a short period. This thesis is concerned with examining the most recent presidential elections. A mixed method will be used to investigate and understand the effects. Using open data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Multinomial Logistic Regression will give more analytic results through data. At the same time, some in-depth interviews will help to better explain this complex situation. This thesis argument is that beneficiaries were more likely to improve the incumbent party's electoral performance than non-beneficiaries in Mexican presidential elections in 2006 and 2012. Further, in terms of gendered aspects, in beneficiary families, women were more likely to vote for the incumbent party because they hold the cash grants directly, while the results were not

consistent in different years. In families that receive remittances and CCT cash grants at the same time, beneficiaries were far more likely to vote for the incumbent party, but only the result of the year 2010 is reliable. Now the incumbent Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, faces unprecedented challenges. It is hard to say whether the beneficiaries of the Mexican CCT program will stick to their vote decisions.

Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfer program, *Oportunidades*, presidential election, gender, remittances, beneficiaries

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Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

This thesis explores how access to *Oportunidades*, a Mexican conditional cash transfer (CCT) program, may affect beneficiaries' decisions to vote. The relevance of this question stems from the fact that CCT programs, a type of social welfare strategy, have been widely implemented in the developing world (Hernandez, 2009). CCT programs basically aimed to promote child education and health among the poorest of the targeted families, as part of a strategy to combat poverty and encourage investment in human capital. The positive effects of CCT programs on the poor have been determined by rigorous evaluations (Attanasio, Fitzsimons & Gómez, 2005; Behrman & Hoddinott, 2000; Maluccio & Flores, 2005; Bourgignon, Ferreira & Leite, 2003). However, the effects of CCT programs on presidential elections have not been studied thoroughly. The likely effects that CCT programs may have on beneficiaries' decisions other than those related to health and education are currently of focus. These other effects likely come from the fact that cash of CCT programs may change several household temporal living conditions, which may have impacts on their voting decisions.

In addition, the topic of migration has been increasingly important in developing countries. As a result, the question of how remittances affect beneficiaries' voting decisions is being discussed in this paper. Moreover, females are the only recipients of beneficiary families, which means that only women in the family can hold the cash grant of CCT programs. Based upon this, I would like to discuss influences on voting decisions through a gendered lens.

Mexican *Oportunidades* is my case study because it is one of the most important CCT programs in Latin America. It is a model for many Latin American countries because of its well-established measurements for selecting beneficiary families and its positive effects on school, nutrition, and to some extent the household's income. Numerous scholars have conducted studies on the topic of *Oportunidades*' effects on human development¹. In contrast, only a very limited number of scholars' works focused on the unpopular influence on the presidential elections' results. Some political scientists (i.e., Queirolo, 2011; Layton and Smith, 2011) argue that CCT programs have a strong pro-incumbent effect among the poor. Most of the studies on how CCT programs affect presidential electoral results have been conducted based on the Brazilian CCT program called *Bolsa Família*, and its influence on the 2006 presidential election. In that presidential election, former President Lula de Silva won and realized his reelection with a considerably better performance in the least developed municipalities (Correa, 2013). Lula's electoral victory was explained as the result of the program (Hunter and Power 2007). Similar stories of presidential elections also happened in Colombia and Uruguay. The tendency to relate presidential performance with CCT programs has become popular among Latin American countries. As a result, the 2006 Mexican Presidential election was also interpreted and involved in this wave. Serdán (2006) claimed that the incumbent party gained votes in the least developed municipalities of the country, compared to Fox's electoral performance in Mexico in 2000. Since Mexico's *Oportunidades*' effects on presidential elections were not systematically studied, I would like to choose this country as my case study setting.

The purpose of the study is to investigate and understand the effects of Mexico's most famous CCT program, *Oportunidades*, on presidential elections. Additionally, choosing the latest data will fill the time gap of previous works. Moreover, it's preferable to more deeply analyze this topic through a gendered lens with migration issues. The effects of *Oportunidades* on beneficiary families are multidimensional; however, most studies only have concentrated on short-term effects, such as health and education after the program's implementation. Very few scholarly works focused on its long-term effects. One of the understudied characteristics is the effect of CCT programs on remittances, which will shed some light on the participating household's voting patterns. In terms of gendered aspects, women are more likely to perform traditional roles in the family and invest more in their family's well-being (Chant, 2008). Under the banner of "women's empowerment" (Burra, Deshmukh-Ranadive, and Murthy, 2005), cash was given directly to women in the household. Given these circumstances, there is still a dearth of studies about the effects of *Oportunidades* on presidential elections that were conducted under a gendered lens in Mexico.

1.2 An Introduction to CCT Programs and the CCT Program in Mexico

What are CCTs? In the late 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s, a new kind of social welfare strategy, Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCT Program), was implemented in order to alleviate poverty in the Global South² (Molyneux, 2006) and to improve poor families' living conditions—especially to improve education and health care for children. While the designs of CCT programs were different, in general, the program provides households who are in need with a cash grant. The members of households must meet the requirements of the program, generally related to regular

health check-ups and children's attendance in school (Handa & Davis, 2006). Though CCTs are popular among developing countries—the idea of conditioning is relatively new—this type of transfer has been used since World War II in Europe to promote population growth through a mechanism that income support was conditional on birth registration (Fajth & Vinay, 2010; and Tirado Alcaraz, 2012).

CCT Programs in the Developing World. The first CCT program was implemented in Romania (Fajth & Vinay, 2010). This was a conditional, universal child allowance to improve school enrollment after their revolution in 1989 (Fajth & Vinay, 2010). In 1994, Bangladesh established the Female Secondary School Assistance Project Program; the requirement was only school attendance of girls remaining unmarried. The program provided their tuition fees (Fajth & Vinay, 2010). In the late 1990s, CCT programs were implemented by Brazil, Mexico, and Honduras. Brazilian and Mexican cases are two relatively successful models that have been replicated by other developing countries, especially countries in Latin America (Rawlings, 2006).

The Impact of CCT programs in Latin America, especially in Mexico.

Overall, CCT programs have an indelible contribution to poverty reduction in countries that implement this type of program. CCT programs have positive outcomes on school attendance and enrollment because beneficiary families need to fulfill the requirement to send the school-aged children to school (Attanasio, Fitzsimons & Gómez, 2005). In addition, CCT programs increase the frequency health check-ups among beneficiary families (Behrman & Hoddinott, 2000). Moreover, CCT programs also increase food consumption in beneficiary families (Maluccio & Flores, 2005).

In the case of Mexico, the universal CCT program was first conducted in 1997 under the name of *Progresa*. In 2002, President Fox changed *Progresa*'s name to *Oportunidades*. In 2014, the incumbent President Enrique Peña Nieto, with a stronger desire to improve poor families' living conditions, changed its name to *PROSPERA*. If the family is determined to be eligible for the program, the family registers all of its members to the program (Skoufias, Favis, & de la Vega, 2001). Two forms of cash transfers are provided to households in order to meet two objectives: a school scholarship and a food grant (Stecklov et al., 2005). Family members need to meet requirements to get the grant. The program requires the physical presence of both adult female and children to receive regular health check-ups. In terms of an additional requirement for children, they must attend school. Other adults in the household only need to have annual health check-ups (Stecklov et al., 2005).

The former *Progresa* was effective in decreasing dropout rates from primary to secondary transition (Berhman, Sengupta, & Todd, 2001). A study suggests that cash grants of *Oportunidades* Program were related to better outcomes in many aspects of children, such as physical, cognitive and language development (Fernald, Gertler, & Neufeld, 2008). Another study concludes that the *Oportunidades* program improved birthweight outcomes.

1.3 Reasons for Choosing the Years 2010, 2012 and 2014

Most studies were conducted on the basis of Latin American presidential election results during which time those CCT programs came up with at the initial stage or were implemented for a short period of time. The years 2010, 2012 and 2014 were chosen because it is necessary to fill research time gaps by investigating recent data.

Additionally, the latest data that I can obtain to test the existing pro-incumbent statements among scholars will shed some light on new aspects of CCT programs.

This study will use data from *AmericasBarometer* surveys which are conducted with rigorous procedures by a professional team of scholars and researchers. These data can be easily accessible from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) website. LAPOP established the *AmericasBarometers* in 2004 with multi-country, multi social aspects that focused on democracy and governance. The reason that I chose the beginning year of 2010 for my study was that the questionnaire included an important question regarding the respondent's family's beneficiary status for the first time in Mexico. In the survey of 2010 there was a question, "For whom did you vote in the last presidential election?", there was no evidence showing that at the time of the 2006 presidential election, the respondent in 2010 was from the targeted family or not. In fact, the survey indicated their beneficiary status at the moment that they responded to the survey. In each survey, the researchers posed a question: "For whom would you vote in your country if a presidential election were to be held this week?". This question nicely fits this research for conducting the correlation between voters' decisions and their family's beneficiary status of *Oportunidades*. Similarly, in the survey of 2012 and 2014, I will not consider responses for the previous presidential election and will analyze responses for the hypothetical upcoming presidential election.

1.4 Research Questions

Given the rising access to *Oportunidades*, remittances and given the substantial requirements of the program, the basic questions addressed in this thesis are related to the extent to which these cash grants may impact beneficiaries' voting decisions. The

questions that are addressed in this paper are the following:

1) Were beneficiaries more likely to improve the incumbent party's electoral performance than non-beneficiaries in Mexican presidential elections?

Based on the antecedents' statements, the hypothesis is that beneficiaries were more likely to improve the incumbent party's electoral performance than non-beneficiaries in Mexican presidential elections.

2) Given that women received cash directly, was there a gender-gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries?

3) Was there a gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* when some of them received remittances?

1.5 Organization of This Study

The thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 explains the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of Mexico to give a general idea of the country. Chapter 3 presents a review of literature to build a theoretical framework. Chapter 4 explains the methodology. The quantitative research method seems to be suitable and applicable to this study. Firstly, an explanation of the methodology will be provided. Since there are a limited number of in-depth interviews, I will present them in the final chapter to support this work. Chapter 5 will make sense of the data using multinomial logistic regression analysis. Chapter 6 shows the results of the statistic model. Chapter 7 forms the conclusions and lists some of the limitations. In addition, advice for probable follow up investigations will be provided in this section.

Chapter 2 Socioeconomic and Demographic Characteristics of Mexico

2.1 The Poverty Problem in Mexico

As a whole, Latin America and the Caribbean have kept relative pace with worldwide development. According to the 2016-2017 Global Competitiveness Report, which ranks 138 countries, Chile (33rd out of 138 worldwide) is the top performer in the region; followed by Mexico (51st out of 138 worldwide); Costa Rica (54th); Colombia (61st); Peru (67th); Brazil (81st) and so on. This report measures their capacity to sustain current and medium term economic prosperity and their ability to provide prosperity to their citizens. Considering the GDP of Latin America and the Caribbean, Brazil ranked first in 2015 followed by Mexico, Argentina, Colombia, and then Chile. In terms of poverty, the situation of Brazil and Mexico is similar in regards to the GINI index (measurement of inequality), and poverty headcount ratio both at the national level and at the international level. Chile performs much better than Mexico in regards to poverty. Chile calculates the poverty headcount ratio at their national poverty line in odd-numbered years, while Mexico in even-numbered years. According to the dataset of the World Bank, in 2014, 53.2% of Mexicans lived below the poverty line as defined by Mexico. There was a slight increase of 1.6% from 51.6% since 2012. In the case of Chile, 14.4% of Chileans lived below the poverty line as defined by the Chilean government in 2013, which represented a huge decrease of 7.8% from 22.2% in 2011.

Since each country has its own poverty measurement, it is worthwhile to compare both nations' situations using a worldwide standard measurement, the 2011 purchasing power parities (PPP). According to the World Bank Dataset, in 2014, 11.0% of Mexicans were considered moderately poor, which means that they lived below the poverty line at

\$3.1 a day (2011 PPP). In addition, 3.0% of Mexicans were considered extremely poor, which means that they lived below the line at \$1.9 (2011 PPP). However, unexpected increases of 0.7% and 0.3% respectively in the indicators at \$3.1 and at \$1.9 levels were found when compared to the data of 2012. In the case of Chile, the situation was much better than that of Mexico. Both of these two indicators (moderate poor and extremely poor) decreased 0.8% and 0.4% respectively from 2011 to 2013. The percentage of Chileans who lived below the poverty line at \$3.1 a day (2011 PPP) and below the line at \$1.9 was much lower than the data of Mexico (2.1% and 0.9%).

With a number of poverty relief programs in Mexico, it's shocking to find so much poverty in this country. The parameters that measure poverty in Mexico include: income, education, health care, social security, living quality, basic services in household, nutrition, social cohesion, and access to paved roads³. The most recent data from the World Bank, as of 2012, indicate that there are less than 3% of Mexicans lived below the international poverty line⁴. In addition, the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line in the same year is 51% (see Table 1.1). This huge difference is explained by the different poverty measurements used by the Mexican government. The direct consequence of Mexican poverty is that more than 12 million people work in the black market without any forms of social protection ("Poverty in Mexico," 2015). Also 4% of the workforce was unemployed as of October 2016 (Taborda, 2016) and 25% was underemployed ("Poverty in Mexico," 2015).

The average salary in rural areas was three to four times less than that of urban areas ("Poverty in Mexico," 2015). Table 2.1 illustrates that the poverty headcount ratio at national line of rural areas surpassed the ratio of urban poor in 2010, 2012 and 2014.

This huge gap between urban and rural average salaries explains the huge amount of emigration from rural to urban areas. Rural migration started to grow since 1950 when 57.4% of the total population lived in rural areas (data from National Statistics and Geography Institute). However, in 2014, more than 76% of the population lived in urban areas (data from INEGI). At times when urban employment reached “saturation,” so northbound emigration broke out. The Mexican case dispels the statement that economic improvement equals poverty reduction. A recent study showed a more complex picture, that economic growth has benefited mostly the rich and deepened the income gap (“Poverty in Mexico,” 2015).

Table 2.1
Poverty data of Mexico, 2010, 2012 & 2014

Series name	2010	2012	2014
Poverty headcount ratio at \$1.9 a day	3.8	2.68	/
Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line	52	51.6	53.2
Rural poverty headcount ratio at national line	65.9	62.8	62.4
Urban poverty headcount ratio at national line	47.8	48.3	50.5
Income share held by highest 10%	38.43	38.86	/
Income share held by lowest 10%	1.75	1.85	/
Income share held by highest 20%	53.89	54.1	/
Income share held by lowest 20%	4.72	4.86	/
Gini index (World Bank Estimate)	48.3	48.07	/

Sources: Open data from World Bank dataset. Table is made by author.

Globalization has made Mexico more open to the international market, but poverty still exists partly because of “corruption, institutional inequalities and drugs” (“Poverty in Mexico,” 2015). As a result, the rich get richer. Thomas Piketty (2014) stated that wealth inequality is always a lot higher than income inequality. However, wealth inequality is less extreme today than a century ago (Piketty, 2014). Gini index measures the equal distribution of wealth. Mexico’s wealth is unevenly distributed where 10% of the wealthiest control more than 38% of all income, while 10% of the poorest only hold 1.85% in 2012 (see Table 2.1). Moreover, 20% of the nation’s wealthiest have

more than half of all income (See Table 2.1). This is a gap between the poor and the rich. A Gini index of 0 means perfectly equal while 100 represents perfectly unequal. The 2012 Gini index of Mexico is 48.07 (see Table 2.1) and means that wealth in Mexico is not distributed well.

Though poverty is prevailing in Mexico, the Mexican government attempted to combat poverty throughout its history. The early effective poverty-alleviating strategy in Mexico was related to the United States. The Mexican government worked with the United States in World War II and gave permits to Mexican laborers to work in the railroad and the agricultural sectors. The bilateral governments agreed that Mexicans could send money back home (Tirado Alcaraz, 2012). This legal, temporary working permit was initiated on August 4, 1942, under the framework of the “*Bracero*” Program, officially called the Labor Importation Program, which guaranteed better living conditions for Mexican workers in the United States (Tirado Alcaraz, 2012). Workers sent money back to their families which at the same time helped the Mexican administration combat poverty (Fennelly, 2007). In the 1930s, Anglo farmers migrated to more industrious cities aiming at gaining more wealth. Considering the huge movement, the U.S. government had to seek solutions to “import” laborers to maintain the balance. The U.S. would bring back some Mexicans it had kicked out since the Great Depression. The number of Mexican international immigrants increased rapidly since World War II; overall, the destination was the United States (Massey, Arango, et al. 1993; Massey and Espinosa 1997; and Tirado Alcaraz, 2012). Accompanied with the increasing number of international immigrants, domestic migration from rural to urban (Massey, 1996) was also popular. Whether it was international migration or domestic migration, they all

contributed to alleviate Mexican poverty but with shattered families and political tensions (Garza, 1999; and Angelucci, 2005). However, there were more and more illegal Mexican migrants during this time and this situation became out of control. Since illegal migrants have no access to the benefits compared to legal migrants, the wages were lower, and employers were more likely to hire illegal migrants. As a result, in 1964, the United States government unilaterally abandoned the program (García y Griego, 1998; Tirado Alcaraz, 2012). The *Bracero* program was relatively unfamiliar history, but the program had an indelible influence on both the U.S. agricultural and Mexican economy, especially on issues of migration.

Another effective poverty-alleviating strategy in Mexico concentrated on the “*Ejido*” program, which used communal land for the purpose of agriculture. “*Ejidors*” are Mexican farms or ranches under the collective control of groups (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). Under Mexican governance, a group of peasants could ask for ownership of the land (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992), and the government would give them land acquired from large private holders or public land. After an *ejido* was formed, part of the land was held as a group enterprise, while the rest was held by individuals (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). This program was fully implemented by 1934 under the presidency of Lázaro Cárdenas. During the presidency of Cárdenas (1934-1940), the percentage of landless laborers decreased by 50 percent (Thiesenhusen, 1996; Tirado Alcaraz, 2012). As a result, it became a national agricultural country “dominated by uneconomically small, undercapitalized farms” (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992, p. 1). The Mexican government followed significant land reforms under the presidency of Carlos Salinas (1988-1994). As a result of the “insufficient

output, low productivity” (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992, p. 2) and “unacceptable living standards” (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992, p. 2), President Salinas suggested the *ejido* owners to give their land to market. Under the framework of new regulations, members of the *Ejido* program can rent or sell land to non-members. From then on, national and foreign corporations can own land property. Foreign investment was encouraged to come into the market. However, *ejido* reform came up against strong opposition in some regions because land reform brought huge relocations of the work force (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). At that time, 26% of the Mexican labor force was engaged in agriculture, while only less than 2% of the U.S. labor force was agricultural (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). Since investment increased dramatically and trade barriers disappeared, competitive forces were more likely to drive mechanization and consolidation (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). Consequently, the lack of technologies and the incomplete implementation process contributed to the end of this reform in 1992 (Ibarra Mendivil, 1996).

Coinciding with the end of the *Ejido* program, was the development of North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA). NAFTA is an agreement signed by the United States, Canada and Mexico building a trilateral trade coalition aiming at: eliminating barriers to trade; facilitating movement of goods and services; advocating fair competition; solving trade disputes; and increasing opportunities for investment. Until now, agriculture is the only area that has not reached a consensus. Although agriculture remained a contentious issue within the framework of NAFTA, Mexico started modernization and the process required a reallocation of resources from agriculture to other goods and services (Schmidt, R. H. & Gruben, W. C., 1992). NAFTA had an effect

on the process, while the strongest concern was migrants leaving Mexico. In a later section of this chapter related to migration and remittances, globalization and NAFTA-caused migration from Mexico will be discussed.

The Mexican government also had made efforts to alleviate poverty at the end of the 20th century. The *National Solidarity Program (Pronasol)* from 1989 to 1994 was designed to fight poverty, although it was criticized that the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) used this program to strengthen their control (Szekely-Pardo, 1996; Levy & Mundial, 1991). In 1997, *Progresa*, a conditional cash transfer program, succeeded *Pronasol*. The differences between *Progresa* and *Pronasol* were significant. The selection of beneficiaries of *Progresa* was stricter rather than a broader selection of *Pronasol*. Moreover, *Progresa* was more transparent and only selected families in need to receive the cash grant. The Secretariat of Social Development (Secretaría de Desarrollo Social in Spanish; SEDESOL) changed the name of *Progresa* to *Oportunidades*, which extended the coverage to urban poor. In 2016, the incumbent President of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto, changed the program's name again to *PROSPERA* aiming at deepening the reform.

Though the Mexican government made efforts to combat poverty, according to Table 2.1, we can find that the results are not as positive as they should be. The total poverty headcount ratio did not decrease; rather, it went up from 2012 to 2014. Though the rural poverty headcount ratio had a slight decrease from 2012 to 2014, the urban poverty headcount ratio increased more than 2%. Since migration, to some extent, has helped Mexico fight against poverty, it is necessary to talk about the money sent back home to Mexico.

2.2 Mexican International Migration and Remittances

The migration circuit between the United States and Mexico can be traced back to the middle of the 19th century. Generally, the migration phases were classified into seven stages (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014):

i. The First Mexican Immigrants in the United States (1845—1854).

The origin of Mexican emigration can be traced back to the loss of the northern territories: Alta California, Texas, and New Mexico that became states of the United States through conquest or purchase (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). After this historic event, despite how many stayed in the United States and how many returned to Mexico, the social networks between relatives was established on both sides of the border. At that time, between forty and sixty thousand Mexicans remained in the United States (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). Furthermore, these networks helped constitute binational organizations involving economic and political factors (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014).

ii. Railroad Expansion with the First Mexican Migration to the U.S. (1855—1900).

Emigration movements from Mexico to the United States could not happen at the end of the 19th century without the connection through railroad networks in both sides (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). Conversely, the railroad was accessible for those who remained in the U.S to travel back to Mexico, as well as those Mexicans willing to move to the U.S. Also at this time period, the concurrent agricultural expansion in the southwest of the U.S. and the development of railroad networks “gave birth to a bilateral labor market” (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014, para 11). During the last

four decades of the 19th century, migration from Mexico to the U.S. was increasing but in a moderate pace.

iii. The *Enganche* (Hook) and Mexican Revolution Refugees (1900—1920).

This period of time was characterized by the labor hiring practice called the *enganche* (the hook). Since the Mexican Revolution⁵, living conditions deteriorated in Mexico along with the economic boom of the southern U.S. and a demand for labor as a result of the U.S.'s entry into World War I. As a result, thousands of unsettled Mexicans sought to settle down in the U.S. As a consequence, Mexican emigration increased dramatically during this period of time and the American agricultural, mining and railroad sectors became highly dependent on Mexican workers who would accept low wages and temporary contracts (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014).

iv. Deportations and Agricultural Reform (1920—1941).

During this period of time, in response of the U.S. Great Depression⁶, the total number of deported Mexicans was roughly calculated to be half a million (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014; Carreras de Velasco, 1974). The Mexican government helped these repatriated Mexicans settle down under the framework of an agricultural reform. In addition, during the same period, Mexican laws prevented and restricted foreign workers in Mexico.

v. The *Bracero* (farm workers) programs (1942—1964).

The *Bracero* program has been discussed regarding the topic of combating poverty in Mexico. Even though this program guaranteed and improved the benefits of Mexican workers, undocumented workers were still a main labor source in the United

States. The number of detentions of these illegal workers surpassed the legal “*Bracero*” workers (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014).

vi. The Era of Undocumented Migrants (1965—1986).

After the termination of *Bracero* program, the United States government started a systematic deportation of these undocumented workers. In addition, the government made a rigorous control of the border (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). The U.S. government established a quota system to regulate migration flows (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). However, the established quotas were deficient considering the demands; the border was relatively easily crossed and deportations did not discourage Mexicans from migrating (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). As a result, numbers of Mexican people entering the United States without proper documentation rapidly increased.

vii. Legalization and Clandestine Migration (1987—now).

The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) introduced an amnesty for 2.3 million undocumented illegal immigrants that lived in the U.S. (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014); during this period, due to the amnesty, Mexicans didn’t necessarily return to Mexico periodically because they were allowed to stay in the U.S. permanently. At the end of the 1990’s, because of the Mexican agricultural reform and the boom of the American economy, millions of jobs in the U.S. could be filled by Mexican immigrants (“Mexico-overview of the history,” 2014). Also at this time, the Mexican government signed NAFTA which promoted business with the United States and Canada. However, NAFTA did not help Mexico raise employment and decrease Mexican emigrants to the United States. Instead it turned into an impetus for Mexicans to leave because products of

Mexico were not competitive compared with foreign products. Peasants from the state of Oaxaca and Veracruz as well as other corn-producing states, joined the stream of migration to the north (Bacon, 2014; Bacon, 2008). These Mexicans formed an important part in the workforce of the United States. In NAFTA's first year (1994), the peso devaluated and about one million Mexicans lost their jobs (Bacon, 2014). A study of the World Bank in 2005 showed that prior to NAFTA, the extreme poverty rate was approximately 37% between 1992 and 1994; however, after NAFTA, the rate elevated to 52% between 1996 and 1998 (Bacon, 2014). This harsh situation pushed Mexicans to maintain their standard of living through migration.

Table 2.2

Bilateral migration data for the top three destinations for Mexican emigrants, 2010 & 2013

Destination (across)	Year	Canada	Spain	United States	The World
Origin: Mexico	2010	58,119	48,483	11,635,995	11,859,236
	2013	69,982	46,139	12,950,828	13,220,345
Destination: Mexico		From Canada to Mexico	From Spain to Mexico	From US to Mexico	From the world to Mexico
	From selected countries to Mexico	2010	8,401	30,580	509,251
	2013	9,131	21,700	848,576	1,103,460

Sources: Open data from World Bank dataset and IMF dataset. Table is made by author.

With over 13 million people (see Table 2.2) born in Mexico living in other countries around the world, predominantly in the United States in 2013, Mexico is currently one of the most significant emigrant countries in the world. In 2013, there were nearly 98% (using data from Table 2.2) of Mexican emigrants living in the United States, and it represented an increase of more than 11% compared to the number in 2010 (using data from Table 2.2). Other top destinations for Mexican emigrants lagged far behind the

U.S. (see Table 2.2). According to Table 2.2, there is a huge deficit between out-migration and in-migration in Mexico.

According to the New Economic of Migration Theory, migration decisions have not necessarily been made by individuals but by larger units of related people, particularly households (Massey et al., 1993). Household members use migration as a mechanism for reducing risk and gaining access to capital in case of market imperfections (Stark & Bloom, 1985). Remittances being sent back will help families to prevent future risks. In addition, extra money from relatives can help poor families to combat against poverty and satisfy their basic needs for nutrition and education.

According to the report of Rhoda Richard and Tony Burton (2016), remittances in 2015 exceeded the national oil revenues. Low oil prices led to a sharp decrease in oil revenues. In 2015, according to the data from World Bank, oil revenues were \$23.4 billion, while remittances were \$25.7 billion (see Table 2.4), which means that oil revenues were lower than remittances as a source of foreign exchange. Before the implementation of NAFTA, oil revenues represented around 80% of Mexican foreign exchange, while in 2015, the number was less than 20% (“Remittances in 2015 exceed oil revenues,” 2016). Since remittances to some extent help combat poverty, this is significant for Mexico.

Given the extensive out-migration of Mexican people, the influence of labor market in the destination countries, especially in the United States, coupled with the huge amount of remittances being sent back, have created strong economic links among these countries. Mexico ranked fourth in 2015 in terms of receiving remittances (see Table 2.4). The United States, the most important country receiving Mexican emigrants, sent remittances of more than \$24.3 billion (see Table 2.3), while the total remittances

received by Mexico in 2015 was \$25.7 billion (see Table 2.4). In 2015, nearly 95% of total remittances received by Mexico was from the United States.

Table 2.3
Bilateral Remittance Estimates for 2011, 2013 and 2015 (Millions of US\$)

Remittance-receiving (across) Remittance-sending (down)	Canada			Mexico			U.S.		
	Year (across)	2011	2013	2015	2011	2013	2015	2011	2013
Canada	/	/	/	112	118	127	654	669	709
Mexico	/	8	8	/	/	/	1,142	1,749	1,899
U.S.	/	786	799	23,174	22,587	24,323	/	/	/

Sources: Open data from World Bank dataset and IMF dataset. Table is made by author.

Table 2.4
Top Recipient Countries of Remittances for 2011, 2013 and 2015 (Billions of US\$)

Country	2011	2013	2015
India	62.50	69.97	72.20
China	61.58	59.49	63.90
Philippines	23.05	26.70	29.70
Mexico	23.59	23.02	25.70
France	22.56	23.34	24.60

Note. Since the rank of Mexico changed in some year, I make the Table listed down the countries based on the ranking in 2015.

Sources: Open data from World Bank dataset and IMF dataset. Table is made by author.

In general, remittances act as a “private safety net” (Cardona-Sosa, 2006) for poor households in Mexico. At the same time, many studies argue that social welfare programs and other “social safety nets” can help politicians avoid political punishment as well as help them gain public support (i.e., Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Aguilar and Pacek, 2000). It is reasonable to believe remittances will to some extent influence the Mexican voters’ decisions. The next section of the study will briefly show some voting results and debates regarding Mexican presidential elections.

2.3 Presidential Elections in Mexico

Mexico has presidential elections on the first Sunday of July every six years. In 2006, National Action Party (PAN) won the presidential election, but people doubted its legitimacy because the vote shares of PAN and Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) were very similar (see Table 2.5) with a very tiny difference of 0.58%. For five months, people disputed the result. The PRD stated that Calderón had violated the negative campaigning restrictions (Klesner, 2007), and the previous President Vicente Fox had inappropriately meddled in the campaign in order to draw in more votes toward Calderón. In addition, the most influential business association Business Coordinating Council had made illegal ads against Obrador (Klesner, 2007).

As Mexico finished its 2006 election, at the same time, it was suffering the collapse of its neoliberal economic model and a political dilemma (Béjar, 2006) in which the presidency lacked sources of support; the parliament's power had been limited by the Supreme Court which was predominantly under the control of PRI. However, the court itself was deteriorating from a lack of consensus on political stances at which time the economic situation was strained, unemployment rate was high, wages were low, and the struggle for enhancing democracy was pervasive. A return to radical populism was the main object for Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO) from PRD. But certain factions of PRI had qualms about the country's issues and sought to regain their legitimacy through the option for populism since the PRI had been eroded by its close association with neoliberalism (Béjar, 2006). Among all these factors, PAN seemed to have strengthened the promise of the political left (Béjar, 2006). The elites in the PAN had realized that populist ideology helped increase its party's electoral clientele (Béjar, 2006).

Under Fox's administration (2000—2006), the legitimacy of PAN had deteriorated. The party had been ruined by the Fox's unfulfilled campaign promises: improving life conditions, combating corruption, fighting against crime as well as drug trafficking, and so on.

PAN had struggled to repair its image in the decisive occasion of the 2006 election year. To understand PAN's strategy for repairing its image, it was helpful to see some of its "populist" initiatives in response to the widespread disapproval of neoliberalism (Béjar, 2006). Although the proposed 2006 financial budget decreased compared to the budget of 2005, there was a slight increase in social spending which focused on programs for indigenous groups and the rural poor. During this period, the most powerful example was the Conditional Cash Transfer Program—*Oportunidades*, a program to give money to people in a status of extreme poverty—that replaced the *Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL)* proposed by the President Carlos Salinas (1988—1994). In 2005, more than half million families were added to *Oportunidades* program (Béjar, 2006). Other increases of budget went to the *Programa de Desarrollo de las Comunidades Indígenas* (Program for the Development of Indigenous Communities) aimed at bringing drinking water, electricity and fuel to almost 800 indigenous communities (Béjar, 2006). Simultaneously, President Fox proposed a new tax decrease with the purpose of benefiting low and medium-income workers, while he introduced a tax increase on *Petróleos Mexicanos (PEMEX)*, a state owned petroleum company, if the production dropped below 3.419 million barrels per day (Béjar, 2006). PAN's efforts during the key point of Mexican leadership transition had been public-spirited.

In 2012, a new round of the presidential election started and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) won. While post-electoral protests of fraud spread, opposition parties argued that the PRI party had bought votes by giving away supermarket credit cards, *Soriana* (“*Sorina-gate: las versiones de los hechos*,”2012).

Table 2.5
Vote Share in 2006 and 2012 Mexican Presidential Elections

	PRI	PAN	PRD
NOMINEE 2006	Roberto Madrazo 22.26	Felipe Calderón 35.89	López Obrador 35.31
NOMINEE 2012	Enrique Peña Nieto 38.21	Josefina Vázquez Mota 25.41	López Obrador 31.59

Note. PRI is the Institutional Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario Institucional*, PRI in Spanish); PRD is the Party of the Democratic Revolution (*Partido de la Revolución Democrática*, PRD in Spanish); and PAN is the National Action Party (*Partido Acción Nacional*, PAN in Spanish). Sources: open data from the National Electoral Institute (*Instituto Nacional Electoral*, INE in Spanish). Table is made by author.

Though voting decisions will be influenced by many factors, it is significant to find the influence of a government cash grant—conditional cash transfer, under the name of *Oportunidades* (from the year 2002 to 2014)—on voter turnout.

Chapter 3 Review of Literature

3.1 CCT Programs' Impacts on Presidential Elections

Many studies have been conducted in many countries, especially in some Latin American countries, regarding Conditional Cash Transfer programs and presidential election behaviors.

What we are familiar with about how CCT programs' influences on electoral results is based on researches of *Bolsa Familia* and its impact in Brazil. After a few months into his presidency in 2003, Brazilian president, Lula de Silva, combined two large and other relative new CCT programs to make the *Bolsa Familia* program (Correa, 2013). Though the emerging program did not have a lot of differences from previous programs, it was strongly bound with Lula and covered twice as many targeted families as previous programs (Correa, 2013). In the 2006 election year, Lula was reelected. After he gained the success of presidency, scholars put more attention on his re-election. Voting share in the least developed municipalities was greater than developed areas (Correa, 2013). Scholars were aware of the strong relationship between the vote share for the incumbent and coverage of the new CCT program—*Bolsa Familia*. Scholars interpreted that *Bolsa Familia* beneficiaries were more likely to have voted for Lula than non-beneficiaries in 2006 (Correa, 2013; Zucco, 2015). The consensus was that Lula took advantage of *Bolsa Familia* to help him get reelected. The same story has been told in other Latin America countries. Marco Manacorda, Edward Miguel and Andrea Vigorito (2009) analyzed an existing survey data from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and found out that beneficiaries of Uruguayan CCT Program *Plan de Asistencia Nacional a la Emergencia Social* were more likely to support for the

incumbent than non-beneficiaries. Oskar Nupia (2011) stated that the incumbent in Colombia had obtained beneficiaries' supports in municipalities with high coverage of CCT program *Familias en Acción*. He made a general statement that "our results suggest that anti-poverty programs in poor countries might be used for incumbents to increase their political support" (Nupia, 2011, p. 20).

In terms of the situation in Mexico, Alberto Serdán (2006) claimed that the candidate of the incumbent party of PAN, Felipe Calderón, gained more votes in the least developed municipalities of the country in 2006, if compared to Vicente Fox's performance in 2000. At the time of the 2006 election year, the coverage of *Oportunidades* was much broader than before. Although Calderón and Fox were candidates from the same party, at the time of 2006, Serdán (2006) argued that vote shares for Calderón had connections with *Oportunidades*. Alberto Díaz-Cayeros, Federico Estévez, and Beatriz Magaloni (2009) analyzed exit poll data and found out that beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were 11% more likely to have voted for Calderón than non-beneficiaries were. In fact, they stated that the triumph of the National Action Party (PAN) "would not have [been] realized without the ample support of the urban poor from different sectors, who voted for the Right as a result of two highly effective programs aimed at them, *Oportunidades* and *Seguro Popular*" (Díaz-Cayeros et al. 2009, p. 229).

De La, O and L. Ana (2013) used a randomized experiment in Mexico suggested that the targeted program, *Oportunidades*, has caused a rise in voter turnout and incumbent vote shares. However, in Latin American countries, the exchange of goods for vote was described as "endemic". The objectives and transparent eligibility criteria as well as an impersonal bureaucracy management of the program, assure that benefits are

not conditional on voting decisions and only families in need are covered (Correa, 2013; De la O, 2013). The direct cash transfer from the national government without the intervention of the local party may lead voters to rethink their loyalties toward the local party (Correa, 2013).

3.2 *Oportunidades*' Influences on Migration and Economic Voting

The second group of studies focuses on the effects of Mexico's *Oportunidades* on migration and remittances as well as economic voting. One work has examined beneficiaries' migration patterns in the *Oportunidades*' early years. Guy Stecklov, Paul Winters, Marco Stampini and Benjamin Davis (2005) evaluated migration among program participants and non-participants of similar background. Based on ENCASEH 1997 data and ENCEL 1999 data, as well as limited use of ENCEL 1998 data, they used a difference-in-difference (DD) estimator and concluded that increasing household income through Conditional cash transfers reduces migration. However, the apparent defect was the short-term influence in the program's initial stage. Based on Mexican Family Life Survey (MxFLS) dataset, Aki Ishikawa (2014) concluded that individuals from participating households have "a net positive likelihood" to migrate to the US using logit models and propensity score-matching models. In addition, the effect was greater for men than for women among beneficiary households (Ishikawa, 2014).

Other than the studies discussed above, very few works have analyzed the program beneficiaries' migration patterns; however, there were numerous researches about low-income households on migration patterns, which were similar to the beneficiaries of the families. Ishikawa (2014) stated that it was important to understand the motivations of low-income households' migration decisions in order to infer how

Oportunidades may alter motivations for beneficiaries. The theories of migration decisions can be divided in three theories—neoclassical theory, new economics theory and social network theory (Lindstrom & Lauster, 2001). The new economic of labor migration theory is more applicable for my concern about migration. Based on this theory, a migration decision is influenced by the household’s utility optimization (Stark & Bloom, 1985). From this point of view, the migrants search for work in order to send remittances back to the family (Stark & Lucas, 1988). “Despite being very poor, respondents who receive remittances tend to view this money as a more stable income in comparison to their neighbors who do not receive this money” (Germano, 2013, p. 875). Because of the limitation of budget and time, Roy Germano (2013) collected a sample of 767 households in the Mexican state of Michoacán and used binomial logit analysis to conclude that when remittances become an enduring and reliable household safety net, recipients are “less sensitive to economic vicissitudes and experience fewer disruptions to their consumption” (Germano, 2013, p. 876). A great deal of literature on Mexican voting patterns and public opinions indicates that Mexicans tend to be economic voters, which means that they are more likely to punish incumbents in bad economic periods and to reward them when the economy recovers or remains stable (Singer, 2009; Buendía, 1996). As a result, recipients of remittances should have fewer grievances than people who do not receive. Germano (2013) states that:

then politicians should expect relatively less pressure from their remittance-receiving constituents in day-to-day governing and less opposition from them on election day. (p. 876)

Remittances act as a “private safety net” (Cardona-Sosa, 2006) for poor households in Mexico, at the same time, a lot of studies argue that social welfare programs and other

“social safety nets” can help politicians avoid political punishment as well as help them gain public support (i.e., Pacek and Radcliff, 1995; Aguilar and Pacek, 2000). At this point, Germano (2013) concludes that “members of remittance-receiving households tend to have fewer economic grievances” (p. 879) and “tend to be more optimistic about their financial situations and the national economy” (p. 879). As a result, government officials and politicians faced less opposition and pressure, which means that, in general, the incumbent party should face less dissenting voices from voters in presidential elections (Germano, 2013).

3.3 Gender-gap in Voting Decisions

The third category of studies focuses on the influence of Conditional Cash Transfers, in the case of Mexico—*Oportunidades*—through gendered lens. In this part, it is important to discuss gender-gap between women and men’s voting behaviors in a global perspective. Conditional Cash Transfer programs vary from country to country, but they are unified in terms of the basic structure of conditionality, (Hughes, 2015) which gives money to the recipients based on their fulfillment of requirements. These conditions normally require that children should attend schools, and family members should perform health check periodically.

Past studies evaluate that such programs have significant effects on health improvement and children’s school attendance (Rawlings and Rubio 2005; Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2008; Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2007; Skoufias et al., 2001). However, very few works concentrate on the influence of CCT programs through a gendered lens.

In terms of “gender-gap”, there are multidimensional political phenomena that can be referred to, for example, with issues dealing with voting behaviors, attitudes and opinions toward a policy, and partisanship. There is reason to believe that among beneficiaries, women and men perform differently on voting patterns. Nevertheless, what I am concerned with is restricted to voting choices. Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris (2000) used ordinary least squared regression models based on data from World Values Surveys (WVS) in over sixty countries in a global perspective and conclude that:

Sex differences in politics tend to diminish as a society reaches an advanced industrial phase. Or, going beyond our data, one could interpret the cross-national pattern as reflecting a continuous shift to the Left on the part of women: in the past they were more conservative than men: in Post-Industrial society, they may be more likely to vote for the Left. The relative conservatism of women is probably disappearing... The traditional gender gap continued to be evident in many postindustrial societies as late as the 1980s. Moreover, this pattern persists today in many developing societies where women continue to prove slightly more right wing than men, even after including a range of social controls. (p. 18)

A recent in-depth examination concludes that female voters harmed López Obrador in 2006 and 2012 presidential elections (Camp, 2013). He was viewed as the most “radical” or non-traditional candidate; therefore, he might lose votes from females. Under this circumstance, gender-gap does exist in presidential elections. However, what I am interested in, as part of this work, is gender-gap in voting patterns specifically among the beneficiaries of *Oportunidades*.

Chapter 4 Methodology

4.1 Research Questions and Hypotheses

Based on the past works, the basic questions addressed in this thesis are related to the extent to which these cash grants may impact beneficiaries' voting decisions. The questions that are addressed in this paper are the following:

1) Were beneficiaries more likely to improve the incumbent party's electoral performance than non-beneficiaries in Mexican presidential elections?

Based on the antecedents' statements, the hypothesis is that beneficiaries were more likely to improve the incumbent party's electoral performance than non-beneficiaries in Mexican presidential elections.

2) Given that women received cash directly, was there a gender-gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries?

3) Was there a gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* when some of them received remittances?

4.2 Data Description

The analysis utilizes secondary open data from the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), which conducts cross-national, regional research specializing in the development of public opinion surveys. The project focuses on governance and democracy in the continent of Latin America. The best known survey named *AmericasBarometer* has been produced by this project. In 2004, LAPOP started the *AmericasBarometer* as multi-country surveys concentrating on democratic values and behaviors in Latin America. The first round included 11 countries and it took place every two years; in the second round in 2006, 22 countries were included. Also, 24 countries

were included in the third round in 2008. In the years of 2010 and 2012, respondents were from 26 countries across the Americas. In the most recent round of 2014, more than 50,000 respondents from 28 countries were included.

In the year of 2010, the survey of Mexico included the question of whether or not the respondents' family was the beneficiary of *Oportunidades* for the first time. In terms of family members' voting decisions, this survey included two types of questions: the first question was "For whom did you vote in the last presidential election?" and the second question was "For whom would you vote in your country if a presidential election were to be held this week?" There was no evidence showing that at the time of the presidential election year, the respondent was from the targeted family or not. In fact, the survey indicated their beneficiary status at the moment that they responded to the survey. As a result, the second question nicely fits this research for conducting the correlation between voters' decisions and their families' statuses as beneficiaries of *Oportunidades*. Similarly, in the survey of 2012 and 2014, responses for the previous presidential election will not be considered, and answers for the hypothetical next presidential election will be analyzed.

Dependent Variable. Based upon what has been discussed above, the dependent variable in this research is the respondents' voting decisions in the hypothetical upcoming presidential election. The original question in the survey is "¿Si esta semana fueran las próximas elecciones presidenciales, qué haría usted?" Answers were classified in six categories, which are (1) I would not vote; (2) I would vote for the candidate or party of the current president; (3) I would vote for a different candidate or party than the current president; (4) I would vote but leave the ballot blank or void; (88) I don't know; (98) I

would not answer. Since this research seeks the correlation between the cash incentive and the constituencies' voting decisions, the six categories were divided into three categories to simplify the future results for comparison. An answer with three categories was ordered from 1 to 3 (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 *Dependent Variables Classified in Three Categories*

Category VB20 New	Description
1	No action (include the original answer of category (1), (4), (88), and (98))
2	Vote for the incumbent party (I would vote for the candidate or party of the current president)
3	Vote for a different party (I would vote for a different candidate or party than the current president)

The original answers were split into three categories which are: (1) no action; (2) vote for the incumbent party; and (3) vote for a different party. It will be much easier to compare the results of categories (2) and (3).

Three Independent Variables. One independent variable as predictor includes the status of respondents' families who received *Oportunidades*. The original question in the survey is “¿Usted o alguien en su casa es beneficiario del Programa *Oportunidades*?” There are four categories of answers, which are (1) Yes; (2) No; (88) I don't know; and (98) I would not answer. This study's point of focus is the influence of *Oportunidades* on the beneficiaries' voting decisions, so the answer of (88) and (98) are missing values in this study; however, it will not influence the analysis of the results.

Gender is the second independent variable for testing the second hypothesis, which is whether women from a beneficiary family were more likely to improve the

incumbent party's electoral performance than men from a beneficiary family. Using the "select case" function in SPSS, it is possible to analyze the second question under the circumstance of only "beneficiary respondents," and ignoring those non-beneficiaries and missing values.

Table 4.2 *Independent Variable*

Category	Description
cct1b	You or someone in your household is a beneficiary of <i>Oportunidades</i> ? 1=Yes, 2=No
q1	Gender 1=Male, 2=Female
q10a	You or someone living in your home receives remittances? 1=Yes, 2=No

The status of receiving remittances is the last independent variable in this study. The original survey question is "¿Usted o alguien que vive en su casa recibe remesas, es decir, ayuda económica del exterior?" There are four categories of answers, which are (1) Yes; (2) No; (88) I don't know; and (98) I would not answer. In this study, answers of (88) and (98) were missing values but will not influence the results. The answers of these independent variables are ordered in Table 4.2.

4.3 Model Selection/Analysis

Multinomial Logistic Regression. Logistic regression analysis is used for testing the relationship between dependent variables and independent variables. Multinomial logistic regression (MLR) is a simple extension of binomial logistic regression (LR). It is used when the dependent variables are more than two unordered or nominal categories. Like binomial logistic regression, MLR uses maximum likelihood estimation to evaluate the probability of each category (Chan, 2005; Bayaga, 2010). For this study as discussed

above, the dependent variable is separated into three nominal categories and it fits the Multinomial Logistic Regression model.

Why Multinomial Logistic Regression Instead of Other Techniques.

According to Tabachnick, Fidell, and Osterlind (2001)'s argument, the MLR model has some advantages over other models. Bayaga (2010) made a conclusion that:

(1) it is more robust to violations of assumptions of multivariate normality and equal variance-covariance matrices across groups; and (2) it is similar to linear regression, but more easily interpretable diagnostic statistics. Further, advantages of the analysis that raise its popularity come from the following assumptions: (3) most importantly, MLR does not assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables; (4) independent variables need not to be interval (5) MLR does not require that the independents be unbounded and lastly (6) normally distributed error terms are not assumed. (pp. 290-291)

As a result of these advantages, Multinomial Logistic Regression is the most suitable model for testing these hypotheses.

Chapter 5 Results

5.1 Descriptive Statistics and Model Fitting Information

Basic Descriptive Statistics. As discussed in the previous chapter, code symbols representing dependent variable and independent variables will be used to simplify tables in this chapter.

In the last chapter, the dependent variable was recreated, so there were no missing values among the dependent variable. As shown in Table 5.1, the analysis of the first question and hypothesis shows that missing values come from the answers of (88) I don't know and (98) I would not answer, regarding the question "cct1b". From the descriptive data listed in Table 5.1, there are more than 1,500 individuals interviewed every two years. But the data for the years of 2010 and 2014 are more credible compared to the data of 2012, since more than half of the answers in 2012 regarding question "cct1b" were considered as missing values.

Table 5.1
2010, 2012 & 2014 Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Question 1

	2010		2012		2014		
	n	Marginal Percentage	n	Marginal Percentage	n	Marginal Percentage	
VB20 New	1	700	44.9%	250	32.3%	588	38.5%
	2	294	18.9%	207	26.7%	346	22.6%
	3	564	36.2%	217	41.0%	595	38.9%
cct1b	1	304	19.5%	146	18.9%	361	23.6%
	2	1254	80.5%	628	81.1%	1168	76.4%
Valid		1558	100.0%	774	100.0%	1529	100.0%
Missing		4		786		6	
Total		1562		1560		1535	

As shown in Table 5.1, considering the marginal percentage of the answers regarding *Oportunidades* program (cct1b), regardless of the slight decrease from 19.5%

to 18.9%, there was a considerable increase from 19.5% to 23.6% in the period of 2010 to 2014. Although the sample only represented a tiny portion of the entire population, the representativeness of the sample still worked since the process for choosing interviewees was based on the random selection mechanism.

Using the “select case” option in SPSS, analysis was conducted of the descriptive data for the second question under the circumstance of only “beneficiary respondents,” ignoring those non-beneficiaries and missing values (answers of (88) I don’t know and (98) I would not answer regarding question “q1”).

As shown in Table 5.2, there were no missing values; however, the total valid numbers significantly decreased compared to the data used in the first question. It is rational because the second question and hypothesis was analyzed under the circumstance that only beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* had been considered as samples.

Table 5.2
2010, 2012 & 2014 Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Question 2 Under the Circumstance of Only “Beneficiary Respondents”

	2010			2012		2014	
	n	Marginal Percentage		n	Marginal Percentage	n	Marginal Percentage
VB20 New	1	119	39.1%	43	29.5%	130	36%
	2	74	24.3%	48	32.9%	105	29.1%
	3	111	36.5%	55	37.7%	126	34.9%
q1	1	154	50.7%	72	49.3%	160	44.3%
	2	150	49.3%	74	50.7%	201	55.7%
Valid		304	100.0%	146	100.0%	361	100.0%
Missing		0		0		0	
Total		304		146		361	

However, from Table 5.2, we can see that the valid number for analyzing the second question in 2012 was small given that only 146 interviews had been considered in the test. But, it was ideal that the sex distribution of “beneficiary respondents” in each

year reached equilibrium (see Table 5.2). The marginal percentage of male and female respondents in 2010 was 50.7% and 49.3% and the percentage in 2012 was 49.3% and 50.7%. In 2014, the gap of marginal percentage for gender was larger where male represented 44.3% of the sample population and female represented 55.7%.

Table 5.3
2010, 2012 & 2014 Descriptive Statistics for Variables of Question 3 Under the Circumstance of Only “Beneficiary Respondents”

	2010		2012		2014		
	n	Marginal Percentage	n	Marginal Percentage	n	Marginal Percentage	
VB20 New	1	119	39.1%	43	29.7%	130	36.2%
	2	74	24.3%	47	32.4%	104	29.0%
	3	111	36.5%	55	37.9%	125	34.8%
q10a	1	45	14.8%	13	9.0%	30	8.4%
	2	259	85.2%	132	91%	329	91.6%
Valid		304	100.0%	145	100.0%	359	100.0%
Missing		0		1		2	
Total		304		146		361	

In regards to the third question, based on the same condition of the second question—only beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* had been considered as samples—those non-beneficiaries and missing values (answers of (88) I don’t know and (98) I would not answer, regarding the question “q10a”) were ignored. However, only a small portion of respondents claimed that their family had additional money, remittances, to cover their expense.

From Table 5.3, it was clear that only 14.8%, 9.0% and 8.4% of the valid respondents of the survey declared that they had additional money from outside the country in 2010, 2012 and 2014. Because of the limited number of valid answers, it will challenge the credibility of the experiment regarding the third question.

Modelling Fitting Information. Based on what has been discussed above, it is necessary to talk about the modelling fitting information of Multinomial Logistic Regression model for each question in these three discrete years. As in logistic regression, it is ideal to have the 95% confidence interval, while sometimes the 90% confidence interval is also accepted since social behavior can be influenced by many factors.

Table 5.4
Model Fitting Information for Questions 1, 2 and 3 in the year of 2010, 2012 & 2014

			2010	2012	2014
Question 1	Model Fitting Criteria	Intercept Only	34.707	26.891	37.488
	-2 Log Likelihood	Final	26.173	23.547	26.525
	Likelihood Ratio Tests	Chi-Square	8.534	3.345	10.963
		df	2	2	2
		P (Sig.)	.014	.188	.004
Pseudo R-Square	Nagelkerke	.006	.005	.008	
Question 2	Model Fitting Criteria	Intercept Only	25.158	19.107	26.214
	-2 Log Likelihood	Final	20.708	17.904	21.469
	Likelihood Ratio Tests	Chi-Square	4.450	1.203	4.745
		df	2	2	2
		P (Sig.)	.108	.548	.093
Pseudo R-Square	Nagelkerke	.016	.009	.015	
Question 3	Model Fitting Criteria	Intercept Only	23.392	16.443	19.214
	-2 Log Likelihood	Final	19.395	15.674	19.179
	Likelihood Ratio Tests	Chi-Square	3.997	.769	.035
		df	2	2	2
		P (Sig.)	.136	.681	.983
Pseudo R-Square	Nagelkerke	.015	.006	.000	

From table 5.4, it is observed that p-values for analyzing the first question in 2010 and 2014 are .014 and .004, which fall in the conventional levels of statistical significance ($p < 0.05$). Although the significance (Sig./p-value) for analyzing the second question in 2014 is out of the conventional level, p-value of .093 is quite close to significance at the 10% level regarding the chi-square value of 4.745 in the 2 degree of

freedom row (see Appendix A). Even though the chi-square of 4.450 regarding the second question in 2010 is outside the probability of critical values (see Appendix A regarding the 2 degree of freedom), p-value of .108 is quite close to significance at the 10% level and is approaching formal significance. In terms of model fitting for 2010 regarding the third question, p-value of .136 to some extent shows slight significance. Although p-value of .188 regarding the first question in 2012 is not remarkably significant, it still shows a slight slide towards significance, while models with p-values of .548, .681 and .983 fail to have statistical significance.

Regarding what has been discussed above, in the next section the results of three questions of 2010, the results of the first question of 2012, and the results of the first two questions of 2014 will be discussed.

5.2 Results

Results for Questions of 2010. Before examining the influence of the independent variables, it is important to check the confidence intervals. As in logistic regression, it is crucial to check the conventional 95% confidence intervals. For p-value (significance variables), smaller p-value suggests greater precision. However, in this case, as discussed above, the statistical significance at the 10% level will be accepted. P-values of .046 and .048 fall into the conventional 95% confidence intervals, and .064 only slightly misses the conventional threshold of significance (See Table 5.5). P-value of .133 nearly misses the statistical significance; however, it is worth analyzing the overall trend. Returning to the parameters, Table 5.5 presents the parameter estimates for the Multinomial Logistic Regression (MLR) model on three questions of 2010. Based on clarifications for each category in the previous chapter, the “3” group (vote for a different

party) is the reference group. It is compared to the “1” group (no action) and to the “2” group (vote for the incumbent party). The Exp (B) is the odds ratio which represents the likelihood for the event of interest. Odds ratios greater than 1 represent a greater likelihood and vice versa. Interviewees who were beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were 1.373 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group. In terms of gender issues, among beneficiaries of *Oportunidades*, male respondents were .635 times as likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group versus the “vote for a different party” group. Regarding the additional money, remittances, among beneficiaries, interviewees with family member receiving remittances were 2.276 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group.

Table 5.5
Results (parameters) of MLR Model on Questions 1, 2 & 3 of 2010

		VB 20 New ^a	B	Std. Error	df	P (Sig.)	Exp (B)		
2010	Question 1	1	Intercept	.249	.063	1	.000		
			[cct1b=1]	-.179	.146	1	.220	.836	
			[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		
		2	Intercept	-.722	.082	1	.000		
			[cct1b=1]	.317	.171	1	.064	1.373	
			[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		
	Question 2	1	Intercept	.346	.193	1	.073		
				[q1=1]	-.531	.267	1	.046	.588
				[q1=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.	
		2	Intercept	-.165	.218	1	.448		
				[q1=1]	-.454	.302	1	.133	.635
				[q1=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.	
Question 3	1	Intercept	.030	.141	1	.832			
			[q10a=1]	.318	.403	1	.429	1.375	
			[q10a=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		
	2	Intercept	-.535	.165	1	.001			
			[q10a=1]	.822	.416	1	.048	2.276	
			[q10a=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		

a. The reference category is: 3

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Results on the First Question of 2012. Considering the modelling fitting information in the previous section, only the reasonable results on the first question of 2012 will be discussed and the results of other two questions without creditability will not be analyzed.

Following what has been discussed above, the statistical significance at the 10% level will be accepted. However, P-value of .101 is not far from significance at the 10% level; it is worth analyzing the overall trend and it may be marginally significant. Returning to the parameter estimates for the “2 (vote for the incumbent party)” versus “3 (vote for a different party)” shown in Table 5.6, it was found that interviewees who were beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were 1.438 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group.

Table 5.6
Results (parameters) of MLR Model on Question 1 of 2012

	VB20 New ^a	B	Std. Error	df	P (Sig.)	Exp (B)/Odds Ratio
2012	1 Intercept	-.236	.093	1	.011	
	[cct1b=1]	-.011	.224	1	.963	.990
	[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.	
2012	2 Intercept	-.499	.101	1	.000	
	[cct1b=1]	.363	.222	1	.101	1.438
	[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.	

a. The reference category is: 3

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Results on the First Question and Second Question of 2014. Taking into consideration of the modelling fitting information, the results of first and second questions in 2014 will be analyzed. P-values of .002 and .032 perfectly fall into the conventional 95% confidence intervals. It was obvious that respondents who were beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were 1.622 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group.

Considering gender issues, in 2014, male from beneficiary families were 1.780 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group versus the “vote for a different party” group.

Table 5.7
Results (parameters) of MLR Model on Question 1 & 2 of 2014

		VB20 New ^a	B	Std. Error	df	P (Sig.)	Exp (B)/Odds Ratio	
2014	Question 1	1 Intercept	-.024	.066	1	.718		
		[cct1b=1]	.055	.141	1	.697	1.057	
		[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		
	2	2 Intercept	-.666	.079	1	.000		
		[cct1b=1]	.483	.154	1	.002	1.622	
		[cct1b=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		
	Question 2	1	1 Intercept	-.107	.164	1	.514	
			[q1=1]	.334	.255	1	.190	1.397
			[q1=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.	
		2	2 Intercept	-.438	.180	1	.015	
[q1=1]			.576	.268	1	.032	1.780	
		[q1=2]	0 ^b	.	0	.		

a. The reference category is: 3.

b. This parameter is set to zero because it is redundant.

Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Investigation

6.1 Summary and Main Results

Conditional Cash Transfer programs are social safety nets that give cash grants to impoverished households that fulfilled certain conditions. Pioneered in the 1990s by Mexico and Brazil, CCT programs by 2011 had spread to 18 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and covered around 129 million beneficiaries (Stampini & Tornarolli, 2012). The goals of CCT programs are poverty alleviation and human capital accumulation to end the poverty cycle in the long run. Millions of families moved out of extreme poverty and their children had more chances of receiving education and improving their health conditions. Some citizens doubt that CCT programs are the best way to tackle social problems; however, these universalistic, well-established and independent of political loyalties programs intrinsically bring tangible benefits to the people. The effects of CCT programs on beneficiary families are multidimensional, but most studies only have concentrated on the effects on human development. In contrast, only a very limited number of scholarly works have focused on its unpopular impact on the presidential election results. If they exist, these studies are focused on the case of Brazil. However, in this study, the investigation of the impact of the famous Mexican CCT program, *Oportunidades*, on its presidential elections are discussed. In addition, it is preferable to more deeply analyze this topic through a gendered lens with migration issues.

Firstly, open data of 2010, 2012 and 2014 from Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) website were collected. Using Multinomial Logistic Regression model, the first research question can be explained using the results of the years 2010, 2012 and

2014, while in regards to the second question, the results of the year 2010 and 2014 can be reliably interpreted. Unfortunately, due to the limitation of the significance (p-value) of the third question's results, only the results of the year 2010 can be explained.

Interviewees in 2010, 2012 and 2014 who were beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group. However, the results of the second question were not consistent. Among beneficiaries of *Oportunidades*, male respondents were .635 times as likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group versus the “vote for a different party” group in 2010. In contrast, in 2014, male respondents from beneficiary families were 1.780 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group versus the “vote for a different party” group. When comparing the p-value of these two results regarding the second question in 2010 and 2014, it appears that the result of 2014 was more reliable. However, the result of 2014 was in contrast to the hypothesis that beneficiary women were more likely to vote for the incumbent party because women received cash directly. Regarding the third question, among beneficiaries, interviewees with family members receiving remittances were 2.276 times more likely to be in the “vote for the incumbent party” group as compared to the “vote for a different party” group. There was a huge gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* when some of them received remittances. This result cannot be generalized since only the results of the year 2010 can be explained, but it is still worthwhile to reconsider the influence of additional money, remittances, on Mexican presidential elections.

6.2 Qualitative In-depth Interviews

Besides this quantitative research method described in the paper, several qualitative in-depth interviews were conducted after this work had been approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) with the IRB ID of 20160295. Qualitative research answers questions with the purpose of understanding and describing the phenomena from the participants' point of view and seeks a better understanding of a complex situation (Creswell, 2007). Due to the limited number of in-depth interviews, some of these representative interviews will be discussed to show the most insightful and candid thoughts of locals. According to a 58-year-old man (Personal communication, September 24, 2016) from a beneficiary family of *Oportunidades* since 2006, he would like to vote for the incumbent party PRI for the next presidential election. He emphasized that all parties were bad, but other parties were worse than PRI. Historically, PRI had great experience to lead people. It became clear from an interview with a 60-year-old man (Personal communication, September 24, 2016) from a non-beneficiary family that he would like to vote for the incumbent party because the PRI was in power, with more governance experience and a positive form of governance.

In contrast, some of the interviewees stated that they would not like to vote for PRI in the next presidential election, they would choose the National Regeneration Movement (Morena) with the previous candidate of PRD, López Obrador, as its leader. The newest electoral force of the Mexican left, Morena, had become the second political force in the state of Zacatecas and displaced the PRD as the primary Left party. If López Obrador is elected, he promises "regime change," which rails against U.S. imperialism and neoliberalism. Some of these interviewees thought that Obrador was more willing to

help the poor. According to another interview with a government officer (Personal communication, September 26, 2016), he thought that it was appropriate to believe *Oportunidades* can help the incumbent party gain more support in presidential elections. Concerning the gender gap in voting patterns among beneficiaries, he stated that it was logical to believe beneficiary women were more likely to vote for the incumbent because the money went directly to their pockets. In terms of the influence of remittances, he didn't think this was a factor that would change the constituencies' decisions. Other interviews conducted with two more government officers showed similar responses with the previous officer toward these research questions. However, all these officers brought up concerns about corruption and economic issues. They argued that the determination and practical action to combat corruption and to improve the economic situation were crucial in a presidential campaign.

6.3 New Challenging Situations for the Mexican Incumbent Party

In a stunning election night, Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, secured a victory after a fierce competition. During his campaign for the White House, Trump made Mexico a campaign issue. Creating new deportation regulations and stopping illegal immigrants were central campaign promises for President Trump. He also rallied for building a wall between the border of Mexico and the United States. The “war” about the U.S.-Mexico border wall began after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Mexican President Peña Nieto defended the dignity of his country, the rights of migrants, as well as the economic wellbeing of Mexico as his key points of negotiation with President Trump. In fact, illegal Mexican immigration has plummeted since fewer Mexicans are willing to migrate to the U.S. For example, in 2007, 23% of Mexican adults thought life

in the U.S was neither better nor worse than their life in Mexico (Krogstad & Posts, 2016). However, in 2015, one third of Mexican adults said this (Krogstad & Posts, 2016). Conversely, more Cubans are trying to reach the U.S. through Mexico. In 2015, 43,159 entered the U.S. with a 78% increase over previous year and two thirds of them entered through U.S. Border Patrol's Laredo Sector in Texas (Krogstad & Posts, 2016) under the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act (CAA), Cubans who pass the inspections can enter the U.S. legally. Fifty years after the CAA was implemented to protect refugees from Cuban communist regime, this act had been subjected to questioning as a result of immigration restrictions that President Trump raised at the end of 2016 (Cancio Isla, 2016). Interestingly enough, many unauthorized Central Americans also entered Mexico illegally from the Mexican southern border in hopes of crossing via Mexico into the U.S. in 2015 (Krogstad & Posts, 2016). However, President Donald Trump declared that Mexico should pay the bill to build a wall to stop illegal immigrants with some of the \$25 billion annual remittances given back to Mexico. On January 27, 2017, President Peña Nieto indicated "neither confrontation nor submission" in a public speech (Diaz, 2017). The White House stood firm on this topic but it is clear that both sides have not yet reach a consensus on it.

U.S. President Trump is poised to pressure Mexico on trade. Rather than kill NAFTA, Trump and his advisors seem to be pursuing substantial changes to this treaty linking U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico, an effort that could be perilous to the American economy (Mauldin & Luhnnow, 2016). President Trump decried NAFTA during his campaign and threatened to pull the United States out of the NAFTA treaty if Mexico didn't agree to modifications (Mauldin & Luhnnow, 2016). NAFTA eliminated

almost all tariffs among the three nations allowing flow of goods and services across borders. Approximately \$1.4 billion in goods every day cross the U.S.-Mexico border (Gillespie, 2016). NAFTA also brings more chances for manufacturing companies from the U.S. to move plants to Mexico. The U.S. trade deficit with Canada fell 57% in 2015, while the deficit with Mexico increased 9.5% to \$60.7 billion (Mauldin & Luhnaw, 2016). According to Trump's comments and his advisors, although he hasn't drawn a blueprint for his new vision, the likeliest would be new trade tariffs or other barriers that will attack U.S. firms that moved there. In fact, some U.S. jobs had been lost because of NAFTA, but it was not as serious as Trump declared (Gillespie, 2016). So if he breaks up NAFTA, there are also millions of NAFTA-based U.S. jobs that will be lost (Gillespie, 2016). Between 1997 and 2013, the Economic Policy Institute calculated that approximately 800,000 jobs were lost to Mexico (Gillespie, 2016). However, a nonpartisan report by Congress found that "NAFTA did not cause the huge job losses feared by the critics" (Gillespie, 2016). U.S. companies, especially automakers, are big winners because of cheap labor. But would killing NAFTA bring jobs back? It is unlikely since companies will find other cheap labor countries in Asia or Latin America. Also, this will cause more loss of U.S. jobs that depend on trade with Mexico. However, after Trump's win, Mexico and China have moved to deepen their relations. Mexico has been exploring ways to lessen their dependency on the U.S. and seeking access to enhance trade and investment with China. For example, a recent auction of deep-water oil fields was carried out among investors from China, Australia, and elsewhere (Graham, 2016).

The Mexican peso had plummeted to a low record upon Trump's election; it was increased by more than 20 pesos per dollar after his election (Reuters. 2016). Under these

circumstances, the incumbent Mexican president, Enrique Peña Nieto, faces unprecedented challenges: the U.S. massive deportation of illegal Mexican immigrants, the relocation of future illegal Mexican immigrants, economic barriers raised by the U.S., and the situation of Mexican inflation. In 2014, President Peña Nieto, with a stronger desire to improve living conditions and fight against poverty circles, renamed *Oportunidades* to PROSPERA, which covered more families and expanded its scope. In this study, it showed that beneficiaries of *Oportunidades* were more likely to vote for the incumbent party; this finding raises more questions than answers. However, it is very complicated to see the incumbent's dominant voter approval among the poor and extreme poor if the economic situation and the incredibly ingrained corruption becomes worse during his presidency. On June 5, 2016, Mexican voters made it clear that they are fed up with the corruption of the PRI and its inability to fight street crime and improve the economy (Oppenheimer, 2016). The big winner of the local elections was the center-right National Action Party (PAN). But by December 2016, the leftist MORENA had become the center of attention (Oppenheimer, 2016). MORENA won the constituent assembly of Mexico City in the round of June, 2016. The leader of MORENA—Andrés Manuel López Obrador—is the most anti-system of all those candidates who have run for president. According to a poll done on April 17, 2016, López Obrador was leading in the polls with 29% of Mexico's support (Oppenheimer, 2016). It is still premature to make predictions on the 2018 Mexican presidential election. But the failure of the PRI in the June 5 pre-election should serve as a clear warning signal to the party. It is true that the center-right PAN party was the biggest winner on June 5, 2016, but its leader, Ricardo Anaya, is less famous than López Obrador.

6.4 Limitations

Findings in this thesis are limited to the data available. The existing data set used does not provide enough sources to pinpoint strong effects of *Oportunidades* on beneficiary women. Similarly, the limited data does not give a strong inferential statistic to conclude the effect of *Oportunidades* on beneficiaries' voting decisions when some of these beneficiaries receive remittances.

6.5 Future Research

Based on in-depth interviews conducted in Mexico, people were concerned about the topic of corruption and their national economic situation. As a result, for future study, using beneficiaries' attitudes toward the national economic situation and the government's efforts to combat corruption as co-variances can help define whether or not direct money was a significantly powerful tool for incumbents to "buy" support. When adding these co-variances, *Oportunidades* may not be an important factor for beneficiaries when deciding which candidate is suitable for their country.

In addition, more in-depth interviews, especially more conclusive data on female attitudes, should be done to define whether or not there is a gender-gap among beneficiaries in voting decisions.

Notes

1. “The 2009 UNDP report on Migration, UNDP defined human development as ‘the expansion of people’s freedoms to live their lives as they choose’ (Alkire, 2010, p. 7)”. Another explanation was “putting people and their freedom at the center of development. It is about people realizing their potential, increasing their choices and enjoy the freedom to lead lives they value (Alkire, 2010, p. 7)”.

2. The UNDP defines that “the term ‘Global South’ refers to developing countries, which are located primarily in the Southern Hemisphere”

3. Mexican Congress (2017-03-23). "Mexican Congress Bill, *General Law of Social Development*". In Capítulo VI, *De la Definición y Mediación de la Pobreza*, 9 indicators are listed to define poverty. They are “ingreso corriente per cápita; rezago educativo promedio en el hogar; acceso a los servicios de salud; acceso a la seguridad social; calidad y espacios de la vivienda; acceso a los servicios básicos en la vivienda; acceso a la alimentación; grado de cohesión social, y grado de accesibilidad a carretera pavimentada (8-9)”

4. In October 2015, the World Bank updated the international poverty line to US\$1.90 a day from US\$1.25 a day World Bank (2015), *World Bank Forecasts Global Poverty to Fall Below 10% for First Time; Major Hurdles Remain in Goal to End Poverty by 2030* <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2015/10/04/world-bank-forecasts-global-poverty-to-fall-below-10-for-first-time-major-hurdles-remain-in-goal-to-end-poverty-by-2030>

5. The Mexican Revolution (1910—1920) was an armed revolution that transformed Mexican government and culture. After 35 years’ regime of Porfirio Díaz, wealthy landowner Francisco I. Madero challenged the 1910 presidency of Díaz. Díaz was deposed from power and a new presidential election was held in 1911.

6. The Great Depression was a severe economic depression around the world that took place in the 1930s. It was the longest and deepest depression of the 20th century (Duhigg, 2008). The Depression started around September 4, 1929 in the United States after a fall in stock prices. And one month later it became a worldwide startle news that the stock market crashed of October 29, 1929. Between 1929 and 1932, worldwide GDP decreased around 15%. Because of the Great Depression, economy was severely damaged. Latin American exports industries were harmed especially those industries in wheat, coffee and copper.

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APPENDIX A

Upper-tail critical values of chi-square distribution with ν degrees of freedom

Probability Less Than the Critical Value

ν degrees of freedom	0.90	0.95	0.975	0.99	0.999
1	2.706	3.841	5.024	6.635	10.828
2	4.605	5.991	7.378	9.210	13.816
3	6.251	7.815	9.348	11.345	16.266
4	7.779	9.488	11.143	13.277	18.467