Publication Date

2014-05-05

Availability

Open access

Embargo Period

2014-05-05

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PHD)

Department

Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

Date of Defense

2014-03-31

First Committee Member

Edward Erwin

Second Committee Member

Elijah Chudnoff

Third Committee Member

Harvey Siegel

Fourth Committee Member

Otavio Bueno

Abstract

The theory of moral intuition advanced and defended here is based on the largely unexplored possibility of combining: a) the idea that moral intuitions are justified on the basis of distinctive non-doxastic seemings (i.e., perceptualism) and b) the claim that a non-doxastic state also makes you aware of facts that are accessible in other ways through empirical observation and theorizing. Thus, the perceptualist is able to point to the phenomenology of intuition experience as important not along epistemic dimensions, but which have significant explanatory advantages over competing skeptical and non-skeptical approaches to moral knowledge and justification.

Keywords

Intuitionism; Meta-ethics; Experimental Philosophy; W.D. Ross; Ethical Intuitionism

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