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URBAN SECURITY POLICY MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS: THE ROLE OF THE BRAZILIAN ARMED FORCES IN RIO DE JANEIRO’S URBAN SECURITY POLICY OF PACIFICATION IN THE FAVELAS OF COMPLEXOS DO ALEMÃO AND PENHA

By

John Melo

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In December 2010, the Governor of Rio de Janeiro, with the permission of the President of Brazil, initiated a military intervention in Rio’s de Janeiro Urban Security Policy of Favela Pacification, in the Penha and Alemão favela communities. This illustrated an unconventional use of the Brazilian Army within Brazil’s boundaries, one of an actor to implement urban security policies. The participation of the Brazilian Army in United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) (2004 to present) demonstrated to Brazil’s former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Dilma Rousseff and Rio De Janeiro Governor Sergio Cabral that the Brazilian Army could be used as a public security policy actor in favelas. However, the Brazilian Army is not trained to implement public security policies, therefore this brings into question how effective can it be this in this role. Through this military intervention the Brazilian State is attempting to institute law and order to favela communities where it has failed with previous urban security campaigns. Using the experiences in Haiti, this intervention attempts to pacify the Penha and Alemão communities, however it is unsuccessful in filling the role of a community police actor as envision by state leaders.
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Introduction

“Brazilian society has full confidence in the efficiency of the members of the military force. The values attached to them -- patriotism, professionalism and dedication -- make this institution a permanent source of pride for the country.”

-- Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff speaking to members of the Brazilian Military at the Day of the Military ceremony, April 19, 2011

On the morning of November 28, 2010, the denizens of the Complexo do Alemão, one of Rio de Janeiro’s most populous and dangerous favelas, were exposed to an unconventional Brazilian urban security force: the Brazilian military in the role of the Pacification Force (Força de Pacificação, or Fpac). Fpac was operating under the authority of the democratically elected president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and President-elect Dilma Rousseff, and at the request of the Governor of Rio De Janiero, Sérgio Cabral Filho. The Brazilian military did not act as an independent agent, citing constitutional directives as it had done throughout Brazil’s history. As Fpac, the active-duty military embarked on a 17-month mission to protect an impoverished segment of the favela under the discretion, jurisdiction, and authority of the Rio de Janeiro (RJ) state government, not the federal government. This decision to use the Brazilian military to implement new public security policies in one of the most populated cities in the world may appear to be an historical collusion between the Brazilian federal and state governments. But the commitment actually stems from the short-comings and outright failures of previous

1 “Dia do Exército - Mensagem da Presidente Dilma Rousseff”
public security policies. The favela incident established a new role for the military in modern-day Brazil -- a role envisioned and mandated by civilian authorities. According to this new role, if civilian agents required assistance or failed to implement the rule of law, the military would use ethical and non-abusive measures to manage urban security. But how did the Brazilian military, an agent of the state whose role in society had diminished since the return of democracy to Brazil in 1985, obtain the support of multiple levels of government to pacify the favelas? If the primary mission of the Brazilian military is to protect the boundaries of Brazil against foreign threats, how was it able to assume the role of community policing as it did in the Pacification Police Units (Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora, or UPP) of the Rio de Janeiro’s Fpac? If this new community policing policy required the Fpac to become a social program facilitator as stipulated by Rio de Janeiro’s Security Secretary José Mariano Beltrame, how did the Brazilian military go about fulfilling this role throughout the mission? And what does this altered mission of the Brazilian military mean for institutional and civil-military relations?

I argue that the Brazilian military was able to accomplish such a mission in a poor, urban environment because of its eight years of work in similar conditions in the Caribbean, where the Brazil military contingency has been the largest contributor to United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). But despite this experience, I further argue that community policing in urban or rural environments should not become a permanent role of the Brazilian military because the military is not adequately trained to complete this task traditionally assigned to civilian authorities.
Purpose of Research

The purpose of this research is to conduct a policy analysis in urban public security management specifically addressing this intervention by the Brazilian military at the request of civilian authorities. This analysis reviews the status of civil-military relations in the country, with emphasis on strategic and operational levels. The operational level encompasses interactions between the average civilian and a majority of soldiers in the lower ranks. The operational level is the environment in which the role of the Fpac was tasked to perform community policing. Although the Brazilian military has participated in public security policy enforcement operations in the past decade, these actions have been relatively few and brief, and the military has operated in a supporting role to state public security agents. The Fpac intervention, therefore, was unprecedented, and my research on the unique incident will contribute to the fields of urban public security management, civil-military operations, and the role of the Brazilian military in contemporary Brazilian society.

In this research, I consider the role of the Brazilian military in civil-military operations in the Rio de Janeiro Favela Pacification Campaign from December 2010 to July 2012. The Rio de Janeiro Favela Pacification Campaign is studied as an example of the use of trained civilian UPPs in the poor and violent areas of Rio de Janeiro known as favelas. The favela pacification that began in December 2008 was intended to improve security for the World Cup 2014 and the Summer Olympics 2016. Brazil wanted to make the favelas safer to improve its geo-political image as a global power.
This research is presented in three sections. The first section explains the role of the contemporary Brazilian military. I begin by examining civil-military relations since the fall of the Brazilian military dictatorship in 1985. I focus on how civilian authorities have operated the Brazilian military as part of a democratic Brazil beholden to the will of the people. The second chapter considers the modern-day role of the Brazilian military in Haiti as part of MINUSTAH, the United Nations peacekeeping mission in Haiti. I highlight the conditions that the Brazilian military contingency was confronted with in the urban environment of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, and the peacekeeping skills that it subsequently adopted as a participant in MINUSTAH.

The second section centers on understanding the urban security threat of violence. In the third chapter, “The Plague of Violence,” I discuss the extent of the violence and the dire living conditions that favela residents endure. I review why past public-security measures have failed, and focus on the counter-productivity of large-scale, aggressive police interventions. I highlight the case study of the siege of the Complexo do Alemão in 2007 before the Pan-American games that exemplifies how oppressive and violent interventions that injure and kill innocent members of the community erode trust in public security forces. Then I explain the purpose of the UPP, which is foster a bond of trust between the favela resident and civil authorities. The chapter details the Rio de Janeiro Security Crisis of November 2010, in which the city’s notorious drug factions publicly challenged the new public security policy and terrorized Rio, prompting state civilian authorities to request the Brazilian military intervene in the favela communities of Complexos do Alemão and Penha. The fourth chapter will focus on Complexos do Alemão and Penha, the poor, urban neighborhood that was propelled to global notoriety
because of the Rio de Janeiro security crisis. These communities have been plagued by a minute criminal population, that has oppressed the freedom of its residents and created a stigma that all residents of these communities are involved in nefarious activities. This marginalizes and excludes favela residents from the society at-large. Ironically, the public security policies and measures intended to address violence have done the opposite by injuring the innocent population. Favela residents do not trust the Military Police (Policia Militar, PM), the civilian police that work with drug gangs, nor the Special Police Operations Battalion (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais, BOPE), that have used violent tactics to implement the rule of law.

The final section, “Achieving the Mission, But Not Community Policing,” concentrates on the Fpac and favela residents. In the fifth chapter, I discuss the Brazilian military in the role of the Fpac. In this chapter, I highlight the constitutionality that authorizes the president of Brazil to use the military as a public security agent in Complexo do Alemão and the Complexo da Penha per the request of the governor of Rio de Janeiro. I detail the stringent parameters in the mandate of the Fpac that was written by civilian authorities of the federal and state governments, and I provide an overview of the objectives of the mission and its accomplishments. In chapter six, I review the positive and negative effects the Fpac had on Complexo do Alemão and the Complexo da Penha. To understand the long-term effect of the Fpac, I compare crime statistics from before and after the pacification and consider, the number of gunshot victims admitted to Getúlio Vargas Hospital in the two areas prior to November 2010 and since. I then present the reflections of the local population in these communities gathered through surveys on the use of the Brazilian military for public security. This chapter also
addresses aggressive and improper behavior by the Fpac, which underscores the risks of using the Brazilian military as an urban security policy enforcer.

In my conclusion, I state that this intervention by the Brazilian military was based on the expansion of the Brazilian military’s mission in Haiti. I show the Brazilian military was successful in Haiti thanks to strict oversight, a detailed mission, and the diligence of the military at all levels. Minus these factors, I argue that the Fpac was not able to instill community safety back home in the favelas. It is therefore imperative to analyze and address the shortcomings of the civilian authorities that are the principle agents of public security. It is necessary for Brazil and other Latin American countries that have exercised this type of military intervention in urban setting to review the implications of such a role for their armed forces and its impacts on civilian-military relations.

The decision to use the Brazilian military to augment the Rio de Janeiro pacification campaign was extremely unconventional in the field of urban security management. In this thesis, I point out the steps that led to the Brazilian federal government, made up of civilian representatives from a center-left party, sanctioning the Brazilian military as a community policing force in Rio de Janeiro. I demonstrate that the federal government’s decision to allow the use of Brazilian military in such a capacity was fostered by the successful Brazilian military experience in the streets of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. Since 2004, the active duty forces of the Brazilian military had been performing a role as a Força de Pacificação for the residents of Port-au-Prince. Former Brazilian President Da Silva and his Minster of Foreign Relations Celso Amorim, say the
Brazilian military involvement in Haiti was based on solving social problems like poverty and inequality.\(^2\)

It is important to address the concerns associated with the Brazilian military’s influence on Brazilian society. These concerns stem from the historic influence of the Brazilian military on Brazilian politics. The apogee of the influence was the coup of a democratically elected government in 1964 and the establishment of a military dictatorship that lasted until 1985. Throughout this period, the military dictatorship suppressed democracy and targeted efforts that were identified as a threat to the military. These campaigns consisted of the unwarranted imprisonment, torture, and killing of opposition members. Brazilians that were associated with the resistance were forced into exile or subjected to the harsh tactics of the military apparatus. Favela residents were also subjected to the tyrannous behavior of the Brazilian military dictatorship, including police brutality and the forced removal policies that displaced thousands of favela residents from their homes to other areas of the city.\(^3\) More than two decades later, the behavior of the Brazilian military during its dictatorship continues to cast a dark shadow on the Brazilian military. One of the individuals that has accused the Brazilian military dictatorship of inflicting tortuous methods while in the custody of its security apparatus is the current Commander of the Brazilian Armed Forces and President of Brazil Dilma Vana Rousseff.\(^4\)

Given the military’s dubious past and present role, it is imperative to understand the dynamics of its urban security intervention. Civilian authorizes at multiple levels of


the Brazilian government mandated that the Brazilian military perform the role of community policing in two favela communities each with over 100,000 residents. This is not the traditional role of the armed forces, nor should it evolve into a new role for this institution. This is seconded by former Brazilian military representatives, former public security policy experts, and civic organizations. Delivering public security and the rule of law to cities is the responsibility of civilian institutions. Though the Brazilian military lowered crime rates in Complexos do Alemão and Penha and minimized the influence of drug factions by forcing these networks to operate clandestinely, there were incidents in which Brazilian military personnel failed to act ethically and did aggressively treat residents. In the end, the Brazilian military was not able to foster the bond between residents and the public security agents that are the essence of community policing. I argue these networks can only be created by traditional public security agents that perform ethically to earn the trust of the residents.
Section One: The Role of the Contemporary Brazilian Military

Chapter One: Civil-Military Relations Post-dictatorship

What is the role of the Brazilian military in contemporary Brazilian society? This is the question that I address in this chapter. I argue that the Brazilian military has emerged as a vital apparatus of the Brazilian federal government’s strategy to make Brazil a global power. In this section, I outline the military’s evolution from post-Brazilian Military Dictatorship (1964-1985) to the present. I examine how the leaders of the Brazilian Military Dictatorship were successful in retaining pivotal privileges at the beginning of the first civilian-selected government, and how the military intended to remain a key player in the new democratic government. I then focus on how civilian politicians, understanding the new dynamics of electoral politics, were able to diminish the role of the military in this landscape through initiatives that established a framework to safeguard democratic principles and expand the political base of elected officials. This was accomplished in the Constitution of 1988, the creation of the civilian-led Ministry of Defense, and an austere budget strategy. Finally, I detail how, under President Luiz da Silva and due to Brazil’s eye toward global-power status, the military’s role in society has subsequently expanded. This new power is strictly controlled by civilian authorities and does not equal a resurgence of military strength like that seen before or during the dictatorship, and the civilian oversight challenges the Brazilian military to redefine itself. This is complicated because of the historically autocratic role of the military in Brazilian politics, and is compounded by the fact that the military in Brazil does not currently have a clear external enemy to fight against.
Lasting Military Prerogatives

In the late 1970’s, even before transitional negotiations began between the dictatorship representatives and the civilians who would assume control of the government, the military had already instituted measures that would protect its traditional role in Brazilian society. The most notable self-preservation measure was the adoption of the 1978 Amnesty Law. The 1978 Amnesty Law prevents anyone from being tried or convicted for the hundreds of cases of forced disappearance, torture, and political murder committed during the military dictatorship in Brazil. This law continues to be enforced even though the country has been led by the three administrations – under presidents Cardoso, Da Silva, and Rousseff – that have spoken out against the dictatorship. The law also persists in spite of calls by the Inter-American Court on Human Rights (2010) and courts in Brazil to include the Brazilian Supreme Court that have made decisions in the direction of holding individuals accountable for their actions during that timeframe.

The 1978 Amnesty Law continues a daunting legacy of civilian-military relations in Brazil. The Brazilian Truth Commission, an initiative instituted by President Rousseff in May 2012, is intended to be the catalyst to overturn the Amnesty Law. To this end, the commission has begun a two-year process of compiling information on human rights violations committed by the state during the military dictatorship. Despite this effort, many in Brazil say President Rousseff’s should have simply repealed the 1978 Amnesty Law after taking office.

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6 Ibid.
The Sarney Administration: Sustaining the Military Influence Post-dictatorship

President José Sarney’s administration from 1985 to 1990 expanded the influence of the military in the first civilian government. This was reflected in Sarney’s cabinet, which consisted of six active-duty generals. This military group included the chief of the Military Cabinet (also known as the Secretary-General of the National Security Council), the Minister of the Army, the Minister of the Navy, the Minister of the Air Force, the chief of the Armed Forces General Staff (EMFA), and the chief of the National Intelligence Service (SNI). This was the same composition that ruled during the dictatorship.

During the Sarney administration, the military was forced to negotiate with civilian counterparts during the National Constituent Assembly (ACN). This was a valuable experience for the military, which transformed this practice into the “military lobby”. As Santos articulated, the military lobby was essential to protect military privileges in the post-dictatorship democracy in which they now had to operate\(^7\). Over time, the lobby has become a powerful tool for the military in an environment that has increasingly aimed at constraining its influence. The movement to restrict the military became apparent during the National Constituent Assembly with the adoption of new articles restraining the military. This was reflected in articles 142 and 144.

The practice of the Brazilian military using the constitution to justify autonomous interventions was a concern for drafters of the National Constituent Assembly and so

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much attention was given to this topic; however, it was addressed careful to avoid alienating the military at the assembly. The final version of Article 142 reads:

“The Armed Forces, compromised of the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force are permanent and regular national institutions, organized on the basis of hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, and are intended for the defense of the Country, for the guarantee of the constitutional powers, and on the initiative of any of these of the law and order”\(^8\).

This clause directly prevents the military from using of the legitimacy claim to autonomously incite military action.

Another measure adopted by the assembly was the clause that gave direct control of the military police from the Brazilian military to the state governors. The military police had been an instrumental security apparatus of the dictatorship that allowed it to extend its influence\(^9\). But the state governors resented the ability of the military to control public security through the military police, as it weakened their power. Article 144 restructured that hierarchy of control by stating that the military police are “ancillary and reserve forces of the army” under the control of state governors. This severely restricted the influence of the military.

Although the Constitution of 1988 did in some ways constrain the power and influence of the Brazilian military, it did not completely achieve its goal of total subordination. For example, there was no change to the number of military representatives in the president’s cabinet, and the military still maintained control of intelligence and security agencies as it had during the dictatorship.

The Collor Administration

\(^9\) Ibid,50.
Immediately after the dictatorship, the Collor Administration drastically shifted power in favor of civilian authority. Executive decrees on the first day of the administration removed the SNI and SADEN, two security organizations of the government. These organizations were replaced by the civilian Strategic of Strategic Affairs (SAE). The administration also reduced the number of military cabinet positions to three instead of six. The cabinet positions that were cut belonged to the Armed Forces General Staff and the Military Cabinet. These cabinet reductions and the transition to civilian security organizations attempted to cleanse the federal government of military influence.

The biggest change to the military during the Collor regime was Collor’s austere military budget. The budget cuts were caused by market-oriented policies and resulted in a wage decrease that impacted both the military and civilians. The budget cuts also meant there wasn’t enough ammunition to train soldiers and there wasn’t enough fuel for the Air Force was not able to train pilots. There were no planes on the Navy’s only aircraft carrier. The defense budget that during the dictatorship had been at least 2% was reduced under the Collor Administration to .41% to 1.5% of the Gross Domestic Product.

Throughout the Collor Administration, the reduced military budget sparked protest from both active and retired military and military spouses. Retired military personnel and military spouses used their networks to voice concerns about lack of resources for the military, specifically on the issue of wages. Although it conflicts with Military Disciplinary Code, there were instances of insubordination and even rumors of a

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11 Ibid, 123.
possible coup d’etat. Senior military officials aggressively disciplined both active and retired military personnel to diffuse these types of behavior. The 1992 impeachment of Collor solidified the military’s obedience to civilian authority, as the military didn’t interfere with the impeachment process or the transition of power to Vice-President Itamar Franco.

The Franco Administration

Civil-military relations were marked by continuing concerns about the weak economy during the Franco Administration (1992-94). The concerns centered on wage increases and military equipment modernization. There were reports of low-ranking soldiers living in slums and the claims that the military was unable to recruit from the middle class. President Franco reversed the decision to reduce the presence of the military that President Collor had instituted and reinstated cabinet positions for the chief of the EMFA, the Military Cabinet and the SAE, once again bringing six active duty generals to the cabinet. Franco said he did this to appease the military and combat military corruption -- the reason for the downfall of the president Collar. This move was supported by Franco’s decision to reintegrate military personnel back into security organizations as the DSI and the newly created Sub Secretariat of Intelligence (DST).

The Cardoso Administration

The Cardoso Administration (1995-2002) restructured civil-military relations to further enhance the power of civilian authorities. Under Cardoso, the Ministry of Defense, the Brazilian System of Intelligence, and the Brazilian Intelligence Agency
(ABIN) were all created in 1999. These civilian-led and civilian staffed organizations stymied the growing influence of the military in Brazilian politics by demilitarizing the security apparatuses of the government. The military’s power was also reduced by the privatization of civil airports and the creation of a regulatory agency to control commercial airlines.

Although Cardoso reined in the military, the military was bolstered during these years by an increase in its Gross National Product (GNP) allocation. As reflected in the work of Jorge Zaverucha and Flávio Da Cunha Rezende, the Ministry of Defense has been the recipient of increase of resources\(^\text{12}\) (figure 1).

![Figure 1: Expenditures by the Ministry of Defense under the Cardoso and Luiz da Silva administrations](image)

**The Luiz da Silva Administration**

The Luiz da Silva Administration has instituted a vision of civil-military relations different from that of past Brazilian presidents. It has maintained the same funding

through resource allocation that was initiated by the Cardoso government and, though the Luiz da Silva Administration has made social programs its priority, the military has also received funding for modernization. This is essential because of the roles that the Luiz da Silva administration had assigned to the military. In 2003, Luiz da Silva’s Minister of Defense, José Viegas, announced that in addition to military pursuits, the armed forces should participate in the social programs of the new government. Soon after, the Ministries of Transports and Defense settled an agreement by which 11 engineering battalions would construct and repair federal roads. (I will further elaborate about the use of the Brazilian military in United Nations Operations in Chapter Two.)

This chapter has detailed the evolution of civil-military relations in post-dictatorship Brazil. Soon after the return to democracy, there were concerns about how the military would be regulated in a civil-military model in which the military is subordinate to the civilian government. For Brazil, a country that has not experienced any external threats from other countries, the role of the military can be difficult to determine. Regardless, recent leaders like Cardoso and Lula have invested in the military in pursuit of global influence. This is illustrated in Brazil’s commitment to United Nations Peacekeeping mission in Haiti and in other locales, the modernization of the military which includes investment in a nuclear submarine, and the expansion of national security missions in the Amazon and in cities like Rio de Janeiro. These initiatives have been approved by civilian governments and are fostering the growth in a military defense industry in Brazil.
Chapter Two: The Brazilian Military Contingency in Haiti

Figure 2 Port-au-Prince, Haiti

In this chapter, I focus on the deployment of the Brazilian military to Haiti, which began in 2004 and continues to the present day. I briefly discuss Haiti’s dire economic and social conditions, demonstrating the similarities Haiti shares with Rio de Janeiro’s Complexos do Alemão and Penha. I discuss the theoretical framework that explains why a state elects to participate in a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation (UNPKO). I review Brazil’s participation in UNPKOs and outline the motives for its participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Finally, I address the
role of the Brazilian military in MINUSTAH. In this chapter I demonstrate how the Brazilian military’s participation in MINUSTAH played a crucial role in the Brazilian federal government’s decision to deploy its military in support of Rio de Janeiro’s Favela Pacification program in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha.

**Haiti**

“Once considered by many observers as the pearl of the Caribbean for its natural beauty and French colonial architecture, Haiti now conjures up the images of filth, utter despair, and endemic political corruption.” 13 Since securing its independence in 1804, Haiti has been on a tumultuous path to embrace democratic principles and institutions. Haiti has been ruled under 22 different constitutions, the first one issued in May 1805 14. Given such instability, Haiti has been unable to effectively sustain democratic institutions and foster an environment conducive for its citizens to develop and exercise their rights. The result has been what Gauthier and Moita identify as a fragile state 15. A fragile state is defined by the Development Assistance Committee, part of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED), as, “when state structures lack political will and/ or capability to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reductions, development, and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations” 16. The fragile state fosters an unhealthy interaction between the state and civil society. 17 This further complicates the state’s ability to properly function and provide essential services to its citizens. As Gauthier and Moita argue, the incapacity of

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14 Ibid, 29.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
the state to enable citizenship can result in citizens choosing to ignore laws, thus electing to harm society with malicious behavior\textsuperscript{18}. Haiti is the Western Hemisphere’s poorest country, with 76 percent of its population living on less than two U.S. dollars a day.\textsuperscript{19} Poor economic policies and detrimental foreign influence promoted faulty structural adjustment plans in the 1990’s\textsuperscript{20}. These economic policies contributed to the negative economic growth of minus two percent GDP/per capital growth from 1990 to 2005\textsuperscript{21}, wreaking havoc on the economy and causing extreme poverty in large segments of the Haitian population.

Ineffective governance and poor economic conditions have afflicted Haitians citizens with inadequate social conditions. Consider, for example, the April 2008 food riots. This event was triggered by an increase in price for the basic essentials. From January to April 2008, the price of a 55-lb bag of rice more than doubled, from $13.90 to $28.30\textsuperscript{22}. During this same period, the price of flour rose from $31.50 to $53.00, and a 50 kg bag of sugar climbed from $31.50 to $44.50\textsuperscript{23}. This drastic price spike caused Haitians to starve. Robert Fullerton wrote that during the food riots, “in their efforts to stop their hunger, the poor, especially in the slums of the capital, filled their empty bellies with ‘mud cakes’”.\textsuperscript{24}

Haiti is also vulnerable to corruption and human rights abuses. Its lack of effective democratic institutions to address corruption amount to the tacit approval of

\textsuperscript{18} Fishel and Sáenz.(2007). “Capacity Building for Peacekeeping. The Case of Haiti”. pg. 29.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 78.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid, 79.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid, 29.
\textsuperscript{22} Ibid, 51.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid, 29.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid, 51.
criminal behavior by state officials. A study published in 2006 by Wayne State University Social School found that within a 22-month period in Port-au-Prince, 8,000 individuals were murdered, half of them by government officials or outside political actors. The study also found 35,000 women and girls were victims of sexual assault during this same 22-month period, and 13.8% of the perpetrators were Haitian National Police. The study concluded that crime and abuse of human rights by government officials or outside political actors were common in Port-au-Prince, the capital of Haiti.

**United Nations Peacekeeping**

“All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including, rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.”

The UN charter stipulates in Article 43 that all member countries are required to support the maintenance of international peace. However, every UN member country does not fulfill this requirement. Some countries choose to make only financial contributions. The decision to go beyond financial help to support the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations with personnel, either military or civilian, requires meticulous analysis. The likelihood is that the location where these personnel will be deployed lacks stability. This is a risk that countries face when sending personnel where the possibility

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of injury and death is real. For this reason, a government’s decision to support a UNPKO is often opposed by rival political parties or factions. If the involvement in the UNPKO proves to be damaging for the country, rival political parties will use this to foster public support against supporters of UNPKO during elections.

What causes a country to volunteer its citizens to participate in UNPKO? Scholar Laura Neack provides several reasons about the driving factors in her article, “UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?”. Neack questions whether the motive of a country is to create international peace, or whether there is another motive altogether. Jarett Jobe, another scholar on this subject, questions whether, “states contribute personnel out of a desire to support the institution of PKOs through the shared norms and values of the international community or are there other reasons for their participation, particular self-interest behavior”. Based on the academic research, two motivational theories emerge: value-driven perspective, and interest-driven perspective.

**Value-Driven Perspective**

The value-driven perspective centers on the idea that a state must provide humanitarian support to allies that need it. Within this framework, several approaches have been discussed. According to the idealist perspective, “states will participate in UN peace-keeping [sic] out of an obligation to protect international peace and preserve international norms and values”. A state is idealist if it supports international peace and norms and values above its national interest. In relation to a state role in the world order,

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28 Ibid.
Neack explains that, “middle powers are the most likely to protect the international systems, and thus more likely to participate in multilateral activities such as peacekeeping because of their strong commitment to international peace”\textsuperscript{30}.

The collective security theory is another value-driven perspective. This theory is associated with the liberal institutionalist school of thought. The collective security theory proposes that states are required to trust each other. Essential to this is the decision to abdicate the use of military force to settle disputes. Furthermore, states must cooperate for the greater interest of the international community. The UN and UNPKO provide a forum to apply the collective security theory.

The knowledge-based approach centers on how a state interacts in the international system. It also includes the role the state assumes in peacekeeping operations\textsuperscript{31}. This theory, which comes from Alexander Wendt’s International Relations Theory of Constructivism, postulates that a state’s identity is exposed through its social interaction\textsuperscript{32}. For example, using the knowledge-based approach, the middle powers like Canada, Brazil, and India were able to interact with more influential states through UNPKO without being perceived aggressively. Jobe states that, “without the presence of [a] middle power to serve as the primary support mechanism for peacekeeping operations, the perception of such actions would be seem to be less altruistic, and more self -serving for powerful states at the time”.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{32} ibid,29.
\textsuperscript{33} ibid,29.
\end{flushleft}
Interest-Driven Perspective

The realist perspective argues that states will participate in UNPKO when it serves their interests. Neack states, “in terms of who participates and how they participate, in terms of where peacekeeping operations get launched, in terms of the impressions of peacekeepers and observers, states participate in peacekeeping to serve their own interests”\textsuperscript{34}. Using the realistic perspective, UNPKO has become an instrument to further a state’s interests, and these interests are manifested in various ways. Participation in UNPKO can increase the international profile of a state, develop its prestige, facilitate its influence and interest in specific areas, empower its leadership, develop its access to the international community, and increase its opportunity for multilateral cooperation\textsuperscript{35}.

The interest-driven perspective can be illustrated by various examples. The candidates interested in becoming a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council participate in UNPKO. Brazil and India are examples of this\textsuperscript{36}. Menghes uses the example of Japan’s participation in UNPKO to illustrate how peacekeeping can be used to improve and strengthen a country’s international image and subsequently profit it economically. Another example of this is Fiji, which had threatened to withdraw its participation from UNPKO if it did not receive financial reimbursement from the UN\textsuperscript{37}. States can also use participation in UNPKO to justify expenditures on military training and equipment.

\textsuperscript{35} Ibid, 30.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid, 29.
Brazil’s Policy on UN Peacekeeping Operations – A Historical Overview

Phase I: 1956-1967 – A Willing Contributor

Brazil was a willing contributor to peacekeeping endeavors during this timeframe. It is important to note that this attitude existed prior to the beginning of United Nations peacekeeping operations in 1954. In 1933, Brazil provided a peacekeeping force to oversee a negotiated peace agreement in Colombia. Brazil later participated on a regular basis to support UNPKO, contributing one infantry battalion to the first UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) in the Sinai Peninsula, and participating in missions to the Congo, Western Guinea, Cyprus, the Dominican Republic, and India-Pakistan. Brazil also contributed large contingencies to the Middle East, including two force commanders and 6,300 military troops.

Phase 2: 1968-1989 – A Non-Contributor

The overthrow of the democratic government in 1968 by the military coup heralded a new Brazilian policy towards UN Peacekeeping Operations. Brazilian president Araujo Castro viewed the United Nations and other multilateral organizations as agents of the super powers that he believed used global organizations to institute a “policy of freezing the world power structure”38. Predictably, Castro withdrew Brazil’s support from UNPKO. The country also did not take a seat on the UNSC after 1968 and

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withdrew from the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in 1977. Analysts call this behavior as the “autonomy through distance” strategy.\textsuperscript{39}

**Phase 3: 1989-2012 – Assuming a Greater Role**

Brazil’s return to UNPKO was driven by two factors: support of multilateralism and a desire for a more influential role in the world order. The election of democratic governments cemented this new theory of Brazilian diplomacy based on supporting and engaging international organizations. Brazil during this time became an active participant in the United Nations. This form of participation is notable when compared to Brazil’s previous engagements, marking its transition from “autonomy through distance” to “autonomy through participation”.\textsuperscript{40}

One direct result of the adoption of this new policy was a diversification of the composition of Brazilian peacekeeping forces. Prior to 1989, Brazil only supported UNPKO with military personnel. After 1989, the Brazilian government began to add other sectors made up of police personnel, medical teams, and civilian medical observers.\textsuperscript{41} The addition of these peacekeeping members embraced the new diplomacy of the Brazilian peacekeeping philosophy and helped redefine Brazilian peacekeeping.

The second reason Brazil returned to UNPKO was based on the government’s decision to further its national interests. Through active participation, Brazil thought it could improve its international profile and promote international peace. Prior to President Luiz da Silva’s administration (2003-2010), Brazil contributed only 79 peacekeepers to

\textsuperscript{39} Vigevani and Cepaluni, (2007). “Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification”

\textsuperscript{40} Ibid, 1310.

\textsuperscript{41} SIPRI, 2010.
UNPKO, but in 2010, Brazil contributed 2,246 personnel to nine different UNPKO efforts. Using UNPKO in this capacity has been identified as “autonomy through diversification”⁴². This diversification allows Brazil to emerge as a world power and apply peacekeeping as an instrument of foreign policy. The success of this strategy is reflected in Brazil’s assumption of more responsibility in UNPKO, like Brazil’s large contribution as the UNPKO leader in Haiti (MINUSTAH).

The Brazilian Military in Haiti

Figure 3 United Nations MINUSTAH Operation Graphics. Image obtained from http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minustah.pdf⁴³

⁴² Vigevani and Cepaluni, (2007). “Lula’s Foreign Policy and the Quest for Autonomy through Diversification”
⁴³ United Nation Peacekeeping Operations

Brazil’s support of MINUSTAH can be characterized as precipitous and inconsistent. Initial UN missions in Haiti, dating between 1994 and 2003, were not supported by Brazil. The country voted to abstain from supporting these Haitian peacekeeping resolutions in the UN Security Council. Brazil’s Minister of External Relations, Celso Amorin, said at the time, “the seriousness of the Haitian crisis requires the continued attention of the international community, but, as we have expressed on several occasions, we believe that any action to be taken should be completely in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and of the Organization of American States, especially in matters concerning the basic principle of non-intervention…” 44.

In 2004, Brazil not only voted to support the UNPKO in Haiti, but also became one of the largest contributors of military personnel. This reflects a very drastic change regarding the support of the mission, especially taking into account the short time frame. The magnitude of the change is also evident in Brazil’s decision to take leadership of all peacekeeping mission forces in Haiti.

On April 30, 2004, United Nations Resolution 1542 established the mandate for MINUSTAH\(^45\). The mandate called for the working with the Haitian government to promote a stable civil and political environment. The Brazilian military provided the largest contingency and assumed operational command of the mission.

The decision to support MINUSTAH created political controversy within the Brazilian government. The first question that was raised by opposition parties centered on the legacy associated with United Nations peacekeeping operations in Haiti. Opponents argued that the United Nations had illegitimately removed a constitutionally elected government. Therefore, any mission associated with the establishment of any new

government would implicitly support aggressive interventions to remove democratically elected governments.

Another reason presented in opposition to Brazil’s involvement centered on United Nations Resolution 1542, the mandate under Chapter IV of the United Nations Charter. Chapter IV empowers United Nations peacekeeping operations to forcibly institute peacekeeping methods to achieve mandated objectives. Critics said that having the Brazilian military support a mandate with a chapter IV clause would require the contingency to disarm or apprehend any entities in opposition to the mandate. Brazilian intelligence estimated that Haitian gangs would contest any United Nations Peacekeeping force that would challenge their power. The argument presented by the opposition centered on how Brazil’s consent of supporting a charter IV mission would change Brazil’s stance on forced interventions opposing to supporting them.

President Da Silva’s administration defended its support of the Resolution 1542 by stating the only one clause in the resolution stipulated enforcement of Chapter IV, not the entire resolution and therefore Brazil was not altering its position on opposing chapter IV mandated UNPKO’s. The Lula administration acting under Brazilian constitutional directives initiated the approval process of deploying the Brazilian military in a foreign country. The Lula administration’s decision to deploy Brazilian military personnel was endorsed by the Brazilian Congress after a procedural vote\textsuperscript{46}.

Since 2004, the Brazilian military contingency deployment has consisted of over 14,000 military personnel\textsuperscript{47}. This contingency has been comprised of personnel with

\textsuperscript{46} Sanchez, A. (2011) “Endgame for Brazil’s Role in MINUSTAH”
\textsuperscript{47} United Nations Peacekeeping operations MINUSTAH database 2004-Present
diverse specialties from all the branches of the Brazilian military, including tactical professionals, engineers, and members of the medical community. The Brazilian contingency has been involved in multiple tasks that attempt to meet U.N Resolution 1542’s objectives. This endeavor has been pursued and achieved jointly with other nation’s military contingencies, mostly from Latin American countries. The Brazilian military contingency has worked with Haitian police enforcement agencies to increase its capabilities and effectiveness.

The cost of deploying Brazil’s military contingency to Haiti over eight years is noteworthy. The Brazilian government has spent over $631 million (R$1 billion) on MINUSTAH. In 2010, after the January 2010 earthquake, Brazil’s MINUSTAH annual expenditures increased from $100 million in 2009 to $210 million, including $140 million for humanitarian aid and $69 million in maintenance costs. Perhaps more important than the economic cost, the Brazilian military contingency has lost twenty-five military personnel over its eight years in Haiti. These fatalities have sparked political debate about withdrawing from MINUSTAH.

In MINUSTAH, the Brazilian military has been tasked with many objectives. It provides the headquarters command that controls MINUSTAH on a daily basis. In this capacity, the Brazilian general is entrusted with running the entire mission. Currently, Major General Fernando Rodrigues Goulart is in charge of 10,101 uniform personnel

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49 Ibid.
50 United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
from 19 nations and police personnel from 50 nations\textsuperscript{51}. The command headquarters also
works in conjunction with Haitian law enforcement officials and government officials. In
addition to working with military and Haitian counterparts, the Brazilian command works
with United Nations civilian officials. Civil society representatives like non-
governmental groups (NGOs) also interact with the Brazilian military representatives at
all levels of the MINUSTAH organization. NGOs in Haiti have exponentially increased
from 3,000 in 2011 to near 10,000 after the January 2012 earthquake\textsuperscript{52}. After the January
2010 earthquake, the Brazilian command worked with humanitarian aid groups, public
and private volunteers, and donors to address the needs of the three million people
affected\textsuperscript{53}. Over its eight years in Haiti, the Brazilian military command has had the
experience of coordinating and synchronizing an operation not just in the military
spectrum but at complex civil-military crossroads.

\textsuperscript{51} United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
\textsuperscript{52} Bradley, M. (2012) Notes from the Field: Haiti-Displacement and Development in the "Republic of
NGOs" http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2012/10/11-haiti-bradley
\textsuperscript{53} United Nations Peacekeeping Operations
The majority of the Brazilian military contingency supporting MINUSTAH has been specialized units. This includes infantry trained in conducting patrols, disarming threatening forces, and otherwise maintaining law and order. These Brazilian infantry units have been tasked with patrolling the streets of Cité Soleil. Cité Soleil is a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince that has been associated with high crime and poverty. The 200,000 residents of this community live in dire conditions where it is difficult to access clean water and to feel safe. In Cité Soleil, Brazilian military units have had to confront malicious criminal gangs that have threatened the lives of Haitian citizens and

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**Figure 5 Map of Port-au-Prince, Haiti**

The majority of the Brazilian military contingency supporting MINUSTAH has been specialized units. This includes infantry trained in conducting patrols, disarming threatening forces, and otherwise maintaining law and order. These Brazilian infantry units have been tasked with patrolling the streets of Cité Soleil. Cité Soleil is a neighborhood of Port-au-Prince that has been associated with high crime and poverty. The 200,000 residents of this community live in dire conditions where it is difficult to access clean water and to feel safe. In Cité Soleil, Brazilian military units have had to confront malicious criminal gangs that have threatened the lives of Haitian citizens and

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the Brazilian unit. Brazilian military units have countered by participated in operations to capture gang leaders and gang members.

Brazilian military engineers have also participated in Haiti. The engineers have been tasked with repairing roads in urban and rural areas throughout Haiti. In addition to transportation tasks, engineers have also engaged in constructing and rebuilding projects to improve living conditions in Haiti. These projects have the objectives of addressing social and economic needs based on the type of project.

Figure 6 Aerial view of Cité Soleil, Haiti

Civil-military operations have been at the core of MINUSTAH objectives. This focus has afforded the Brazilian military contingency the opportunity to interact with Haitian citizens of all social classes. The interaction between Brazilian military and Haitian citizens has been instrumental to expanding and evolving Brazil’s military doctrine in peacekeeping operations, low-intensity conflict operations, and other non-war operations. The lessons the Brazilian military learned from positive and negative
experiences in Haiti have spread throughout the entire military and has been embraced by Brazilian civil law enforcement agencies to address similar civilian problems in Brazilian cities. The Sérgio Vieira De Mello Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Joint Center (Centro Conjunto de Operações de Paz do Brasil, CCOPAB), named after Sérgio Mello, the U.N. Secretary envoy that was killed by a car bomb in Badghad, Iraq, has worked with the Brazilian military to harness the experience of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping. The Brazilian Peacekeeping Operations Training Center, a unit of the Brazilian Army, prepares military and civilian personnel from Brazil and friendly nations to be deployed in peacekeeping missions.

The fact that these forces are trained to execute missions during times of war makes their assimilation in an environment that is peaceful very difficult. This became evident in 2005, when Brazilian forces patrolling in Port Au Prince allegedly abused the residents’ human rights. Incidents like this underscore that the selection of forces is an important aspect of how countries are able to execute their mandates. Personnel that have been trained to deal with citizens and riot-like situations will likely perform with more professionalism than forces that have not received training or experienced that type of environment.

Brazil’s decision to participate in MINUSTAH marked its return to United Nations peacekeeping operations and demonstrated its ambition to assume a greater role as a global power. The fragility of the Haitian state presented Brazil and MINUSTAH a challenging environment to achieve security and stability. The Brazilian military exposure to civil military operations in the Haiti environment has yielded positive and negative results. However, the Brazilian military capacity to harness the experience and
defused it through its organization and other law enforcement agencies reflects the
evolution of how the military prepared itself for future mission it will be call on to
address.
Section Two: Understanding the Urban Security Threat

Chapter Three: The Plague of Violence

In this chapter, I discuss the violence that occurs in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. I address the role of drug factions, which operate freely in these communities. I then outline past public security policies. These policies have been delivered by state actors in large scale police operations. However, these operations result in aggressive and deadly behavior, which affects innocent residents. This contributes to fear and a lack of respect for public security agents. Because of this cycle, Rio has implemented a new initiative, the Favela Pacification Campaign (2008-current). This campaign focuses on delivering public security through community policing. This campaign is challenged by drug factions, most notably in the November 2010 Rio security crisis. This event led to the intervention of the Brazilian Army in two favela communities, which I will discuss in Chapters 5 and 6.

The origin of the favela in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, can be traced back to the end of the Canudos War in Bahia in 1896 when government soldiers marched into Rio to receive payment for their services in the war. They settled in the hills of the city to await their money. The government never paid, and so the soldiers never left\textsuperscript{56}. From the 1900s-1940s, these settlements, or favelas were thought of as uncultured, backwards, unsanitary, and highly sexualized. In the 1940s, they hindered the expansion of urban planning in the city. The favelas of Rio de Janeiro grew in size and population due to the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the 1940s housing crisis\textsuperscript{57}. Their growth is a consequence of unequal

\textsuperscript{57} Ibid
income distribution and a general lack of housing across the country. Currently, many outsiders see favelas as, “a space for the city’s shady characters, bums and troublemakers”\textsuperscript{58}. Metaphors for favelas include “cancer” and “wound”, and comments like “the womb of a favela woman is a factory for making drug traffickers” are common among outsiders\textsuperscript{59}.

Since the 1980s, there has been a dramatic rise in violence in Rio de Janeiro, mostly seen in the favelas. In \textit{Drugs & Democracy in Rio de Janeiro}, Arias argues that the “violence affecting Rio today is part of [its] history”\textsuperscript{60}. Rio’s remarkable rise in violent crime within the favelas corresponds to the appearance of the drug trafficking gangs\textsuperscript{61}. The major sources of the ongoing violence continue to be these drug traffickers, as well as large-scale police, military, and security forces, also known as mega-police.

The three main drug factions in Rio de Janeiro are the Comando Vermelho, Amigos dos Amigos, and the Terceiro Comando\textsuperscript{62}. Since the 1970s, two of the three criminal organizations, the Comando Vermelho and the Terceiro Comando, have been linked to several favelas. Before the 1980s, drug trafficking in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro ran rampant. Arias and Rodriguez point out that as narcotics poured into Rio in the mid-1980s, local drug dealers and traffickers gained access to heavy arms and weaponry.

\textsuperscript{58} Amnesty International.( 2005) “They Come in Shooting”, pg. 7.
\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} Arias, E.D. (2006) \textit{Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro}, pg. 21.
\textsuperscript{61} Alves and Evanson.( 2011). \textit{Living in the Crossfire:Favela Residents Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro}.
The illegal drug trade in Rio is a source of enormous quick profits. The competition for drug sale points and customers in this lucrative black market causes rivalry between the factions, which has caused a significant increase in the violence in the favelas. Zaluar states that cocaine is more expensive than gold as soon as it crosses into Brazilian territory.

These drug gangs play various roles in their favela communities, including mediating community disputes, recruiting labor for public works projects, mobilizing support for political candidates, and exercising state-identifiable features like judicial procedures. The residents of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro maintain a complicated relationship with drug traffickers. The donos, or crime bosses, counter their violence with paternalistic protection over the residents of their favela. Arias states, “Residents must constantly remain aware of changing politics in the favela in order to be on good terms with traffickers”.

For some, traffickers are a folk heroes because they provide aid and enforce order in the favela. It is important for traffickers to maintain a rapport with the residents as they depend on residents for “their continued freedom and livelihood”. If a dono has killed or exiled too many residents, others may turn against them and aid the police during raids, or aid a rival trafficking gang to force them out.

The police of Rio de Janeiro also contribute to the violence of the favelas. Several studies claim that the steady increase of violent conflicts within favelas between drug traffickers and the police have caused an extraordinary increase in the amount of

63 Ibid.
66 Ibid, 34.
homicides, as will be shown later in this chapter. Misse and Vargas claim the illegals market, of mostly drugs and guns, is to blame. Police repression of trafficking and possession of illegal drugs began in Rio in the mid-1950s, and escalated in the mid 1980s. In their seminal work, Alves and Evanson discuss the “violent disruption of community life” by the state military police, especially the BOPE, during this time. They asked whether these mega-police operations were completed to increase public security, or whether they were genocide. In May of 2007, a large-scale police operation occurred in the Complexo do Alemão in the Northern Zone of Rio de Janeiro and continued until August. Governor Sergio Cabral, when describing the operation, said it was a declaration of war and war-like techniques were used in order to achieve their goal. The violence during this time in the Complexo do Alemão was appalling. During the four months the National Security Force (NSF), the State Military Police, and the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE) conducted these operations, a “significant number of people were killed or wounded who were not proved to have been involved in criminal activities [and]…at least nineteen children were killed by stray bullets.” A news report in 2007 stated that for every Rio de Janeiro police officer that was slain, 41 civilians were executed.

There are reported to have been over one million violent deaths in Brazil over the last 30 years. A study conducted in 2008 in Rio de Janeiro showed that from 1991 to

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68 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, 1.
2007, there have been between 5,741 and 8,438 homicides every year.\(^{73}\) But even these figures are likely low. Only the victims of deliberate killings, who die immediately after, are counted as homicides. This means that those who “suffer deliberate injury to the body”, but they die later, are not counted as a homicide\(^{74}\). According to Alves and Evanson, this explains why, at times, police take bodies to hospitals and make it look like they were alive when they arrived. Acts of resistance are also not counted as a homicide, including situations in which police say they acted in self-defense. Alves and Evanson believe that these acts of resistance are really summary executions, since most of the resistors are shot in the back or the head, often at point-blank range. Additionally, missing persons and unidentified bodies and human remains are not counted as homicides in Rio de Janeiro. Thousands of people disappear each year from the city that if included in the homicide count could more than double it. Since 1990, homicide rates in Rio have in some years reached 300 per 100,000 people. These rates are comparable to active war zones. Overwhelmingly, victims were young men aged 15 to 30, black or brown-skinned, and residents of poor communities, especially the Baizada Fluminense, and Northern and Western Zones of the city\(^{75}\). A report by Amnesty International found that gun-related deaths increased nationally in Brazil from 7.2 per 100,000 people in 1982 to 21.8 per 100,000 in 2002. In 2002, approximately 50,000 homicides occurred in Rio de Janeiro, while hundreds of thousands were violently attacked and robbed\(^{76}\). Over the past 25 years, violent crimes and homicide rates have soared in Brazil, with socially excluded groups – or residents of Rio’s numerous favelas -- being the principal victims.


\(^{74}\) Ibid, 31.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.

The 2007 Siege of Complexo do Alemão

In *Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro*, Alves and Evanson document extensive interviews with favela residents, government officials, and police officers. In these interviews, several favela residents discuss the use of the BOPE’s “Big Skull”. The “Big Skull” is an armored vehicle outfitted with holes in the sides for gun barrels, with a skull emblazoned on the side. This skull, which will be discussed further in the paper, is the trademark symbol of the BOPE. In an interview conducted in 2008, four teachers describe how the BOPE uses this “Big Skull” to scare and intimidate residents. Residents say that through loudspeakers, officers in the vehicle yell, “I’m going to get you! I’m going to kill you! I’m going to take your soul!” Amnesty International states these vehicles are used as weapons of intimidation to terrorize favelas and other communities. The BOPE who use these armored trucks argue these are used solely for police protection. The four teachers maintain that, due to the actions of the “Big Skull”, the bandidos or criminals within the favelas are more respected than the police. One goes on to say, “If you don’t cross him [the bandido], he doesn’t do anything against the community… But the police enter full of aggression, saying terrible things to the residents. Then the community ends up being against the police.” In another interview conducted in 2008, Carlinhos Costa, a resident of the Rocinha favela, argues that residents of the communities are not necessarily against

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78 Ibid.
79 Ibid.
the use of these Big Skulls. They are against “bad use” of the vehicle\textsuperscript{80}. Costa makes a valid point by saying that the vehicle itself does not speak, scream threats, or fire guns.

One resident, a mother from the Complexo do Alemão who was interviewed in 2008, argues, “When the BOPE comes, it comes to kill. The Military Police don’t”\textsuperscript{81}. Many residents of the Complexo do Alemão claim that, during the mega-police operation that took place in 2007, the only form of state action taken was to make war. The police made no distinction between the bandidos and the civilians in the favela, thus placing the residents on the firing line or in the crossfire. This mother says that neither the bandidos nor the police respect the residents of the favelas.

Since the initial police mega-operation in 2007 of the Complexo do Alemão, residents state in interviews that large-scale police operations have become more frequent. During and after the pacification campaign, media reports in Rio de Janeiro portray the violence in the favelas as the state repressing the bandidos. By the 1990s, crime and violence were considered endemic to favelas, which had the public drawing sharp distinctions between the city of Rio de Janeiro and the favelas. Alves and Evanson argue that, “together with the police, the gangs disrupted community life that, in turn, led to a new era of stigmatizing favelas by the media and by many in the middle and upper class”\textsuperscript{82}. The authors also argue that the media has encouraged the favelas’ bad reputation. The sensational coverage of the violence in the favelas by the Brazilian press has increased the public’s fear and reinforced various discriminating stereotypes.

According to Amnesty International, this media coverage has distorted the true picture

\textsuperscript{80} Ibid, 99.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, 63.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid, 15.
and strengthened calls for repressive ways to combat crime. The “wealthier sectors of society [are] demanding the police act as a force for social control rather than ensuring public security”\(^\text{83}\) in the favelas.

Murders by gang members, inmates of prisons, police officers, death squads, and hired killers make the news headlines on a regular basis in Brazil and around the globe. The press of Rio de Janeiro has been accused of excessive coverage of the violence in the favelas, especially the chacinas, or police massacres. Chacinas were reported in Rio de Janeiro by the media after the war between drug traffickers and the police, both military and civil. Some of the most infamous chacinas, in and out of favelas, include the Candelaria massacre in 1993, the Vigario Geral massacre in 1993, the Baixada Fluminense massacre in April 2005, and the Complexo do Alemão massacre in 2007.

The Candelaria massacre in 1993 resulted in the death of eight children, ages 14-20, near the Candelaria church in Rio de Janeiro. The reasons for this massacre range from the police officers being angry that children threw rocks at their cars, to “social cleansing” by a death squad\(^\text{84}\). According to some witnesses, police officers started firing into a crowd of almost 50 children. Over 50 officers were informally accused of participating in this crime. Three military police officers were eventually charged in the killings, but only one was convicted. In August of 1993, another death squad made of police officers killed 21 residents of the Vigario Geral favela in retaliation for four officers being killed by drug traffickers. The victims included a 15 year-old girl. The local narco-traffickers had killed the officers after the officers attempted to interrupt a


drug shipment. In the subsequent massacre, residents tell of the officers shooting indiscriminately at people gathered in the central plaza of the favela. And the massacres continued. In April 2005, rogue policemen killed 29 or 30 people in the suburbs of Rio after eight police officers were arrested in connection to a double murder. In March 2005, 29 residents of the Biaxada Fluminense were gunned down by a group consisting of military police officers. These officers drove through the favela, shooting randomly at pedestrians.

The last chacina to be mentioned is the massacre in the Complexo do Alemão on 27 June 2007. At least 19 people died during this massacre. Alves and Evanson state that the police “had mapped the bandidos location but stopped 300 meters from where they were, killed a sizeable number of innocent people, and afterward left without arresting a single bandido.” Small-scale incidents also occur frequently. Examples include a 15 year-old boy killed by members of the Civil Police and a 74 year-old shot in the back while shopping, both in 2005. It is these police actions that explain why favela residents like police even less than drug traffickers. Residents of favelas are treated with disrespect and contempt by both police officers and residents of the middle and upper classes. The police label the entire community criminal, and all members are treated accordingly.

Rio is a divided city. These two parts are the Zona Sul, or Southern Zone, and the favelas. Before the 1980s, the city’s elites opted for separation from the residents of the

85 Ibid.
favelas, or segregation. This separation, according to Yudice, worsened after the military dictatorship ended in 1984. Many leaders attempted to eradicate the favelas by evicting residents or having them raised, but by the 1990s it was obvious this was not a viable solution. Mayors Cesar Maia and Luis Conde tried to find a way to integrate the favelas into the city of Rio de Janeiro.

According to Amnesty International, the Brazilian government has “failed to challenge the belief among police forces that [the] use of lethal force is [an] acceptable practice”. In some extreme cases, it has been shown that some politicians have openly called for executions of criminals. In its research, Amnesty International found that favelas have been denied public security by the state, which dooms them to higher rates of violent crimes, as well as systematic violations of their human rights. This also leads to excessive use of force, extrajudicial execution, torture, and corruption becoming standard police practices in favelas. In order to change this, and improve conditions within the favelas, “genuine security can only be achieved through the fulfillment of all human rights as part of a preventive, multi-sectoral approach”. The duty of the government is to ensure security and guarantee the rights of residents, and make sure that the police are working for all citizens.

Many sources associate the increase in violence in favelas to the lack of a productive state and government presence. Alves and Evanson point out that the only state presence in favelas is in the form of mega-police operations and sieges. Amnesty

91 Ibid,9.
92 Ibid, 10.
International argues that this lack of state presence has allowed drug trafficking to flourish, causing others to label these communities as criminal. One contrary view is that of political scientist Dr. Enrique Desmond Arias, who states, “Despite prevailing popular opinion, trafficking has not developed in the absence of the state”\textsuperscript{93}. He argues that the actions of the disinterested bureaucrats, corrupt police, and politicians have all empowered criminals in these areas. These “self-interested actors” are what has caused the surge in violence.

Criminal violence is not unique to the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. Favelas located in Sao Paolo and other areas are prone to violence as well. The war between competing drug factions and police officers within the confines of favelas have led to a significant increases in homicides, especially among young black or brown adolescents and young adults. Amnesty International recommends plan of action to help decrease the amount of human rights abuses and homicides that have been occurring, but without cleaning up the corrupt police, implementing this plan is impossible. The World Bank also gives recommendations, arguing that crime and violence have significant negative impacts on economic growth.\textsuperscript{94} They also say prevention is usually more effective than control actions, and preventive state institutions must exist for public safety strategies to work\textsuperscript{95}.

**Addressing Public Security Concerns Prior to the World Cup and Summer Olympics**

Brazilian public security policies became a concern on both a national platform and global platform when it was announced that Brazil would host two mega events: the

\textsuperscript{93} Arias, E.D. (2006) *Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro*, pg. 35.
\textsuperscript{94} The World Bank, 2006.
\textsuperscript{95} The World Bank, 2006.
Futbol International Federation Association (FIFA) World Cup in 2014 and the 31st Summer Olympics in 2016. The issue of public security is a major concern in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil at-large. Prior to being awarded the World Cup in October 2007 and the Summer Olympics in October 2009, public security was highlighted by both mega event committees as a cause for concern. The problem of public security has plagued Rio de Janeiro. According to a 2008 Center for the Study of Public and Citizenship (CESeC), from 1991 to 2007, the number of homicides in Rio de Janeiro ranged from 5,741 to 8,438. This could be seen as a failure of adequately addressing the problem of public security in Rio de Janeiro, not only at the municipal level, but at the state and federal levels as well.

In his article “Drugs & Democracy in Rio de Janeiro” (2006), Enrique Arias identifies a highly intricate social network that incorporates multiple actors who play a role in the decay of public security in the “marvelous city” (cidade maravilhosa). Arias’s dissection of the public security problem shows the reader that these actors are members of multiple classes within the social structure of the city. He further illustrates that these actors are more than just the drug trafficking factions of the Comando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Comando (TC), and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA). By outlining the social networks, Arias shows that the public security epidemic does not come from the over 763 favelas in Rio de Janeiro. According to the 2010 Brazilian census conducted by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica (IBGE), the official number of favelas, or

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98 See Glossary list.
99 http://www.rio.rj.gov.br/web/ipp/
what the census calls “subnormal clusters” (aglomerados subnormais) is 763 in the city of Rio de Janeiro. The 2010 census reported that there are 1,393,314 people living in those favelas, or 23.03% of the total city population. This is a reflection of how rooted the dynamics of these social networks have evolved into a dire state of public security and violence.

Figure 7 Map of operational Pacification Police Units in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

With the looming mega events and persistently high levels of violence, the question of how to address public security became imperative. The status quo was no longer acceptable. And so, in 2008, RJ implemented the Favela Pacification Campaign. The Rio de Janeiro Favela Pacification Campaign was intended to institute the rule of law

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100 Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística IBGE, Censo Demográfico 2010 Aglomerados subnormais Primeiros resultados Pg 19, 2011
in areas of city where it was lacking\textsuperscript{102}. These areas were selected by the RJ Secretary of Security Office. They were mostly favelas. The general plan of action for the campaign was to embed a police force in the favelas. The police force would be called the UPP and would be made up of new police academy graduates. The main focus of this police force would be to establish a community-policing relationship with the residents of the favelas. It was imperative that the UPP do what the Polícia Militar (PM) and Polícia Civil (PC), and other law enforcement agencies had failed to do – convince the residents to trust them. The UPP is charged with protecting the rights of residents and with community policing. However, to make this happen, the UPP must overcome years of distrust.

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
\hline
UPP & Data de Inauguration \\
\hline
Santa Marta & 12/19/2008 \\
Cidade de Deus & 2/06/2009 \\
Batam & 2/182009 \\
Chapéu Mangueira e Babilônia & 6/10/2009 \\
Pavão-Pavãozinho e Cantagalo & 12/23/2009 \\
Ladeira dos Tabajaras e Cabritos & 1/14/2010 \\
Morro da Providência, Pedra Lisa e Moreira Pinto & 4/26/2010 \\
Morro do Borel, Casa Branca, Chácara do Céu, Indiana, Morro do Cruz, Catrambi & 6/7/2010 \\
Formiga & 7/1/2010 \\
Morro do Andaraí, Nova Divinéia, João Paulo II, Juscelino Kubitschek, Jamelão, Morro Santo Agostinho e & 7/28/2010 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}

\textsuperscript{102} Instituto de Segurança Pública Unidades de Polícia Pacificadora - O que são. http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=261
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arrelia</th>
<th>9/17/2010</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Salgueiro</td>
<td>10/30/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turano</td>
<td>11/30/2010</td>
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<tr>
<td>Macacos</td>
<td>1/31/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quieto, São João e Matriz</td>
<td>2/25/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fallet, Fogueiteiro, Coroa</td>
<td>2/25/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prazeres, Escondidinho</td>
<td>5/17/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro São Carlos, Mineira, Zinco e Querosone</td>
<td>11/3/2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mangueira</td>
<td>1/18/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vidigal e Chácara do Céu</td>
<td>4/18/2012</td>
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<td>Fazendinha</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nova Brasilia</td>
<td>5/11/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Morro do Adeus / Morro da Baiana</td>
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<td>Alemão</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chatuba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fé / Sereno</td>
<td>5/11/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vila Cruzeiro</td>
<td>5/11/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vila Proletária da Penha</td>
<td>5/11/2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rocinha</td>
<td>9/20/2012</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 List of Pacification Police Units implemented by the Favela Pacification Campaign

The Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos (IPP), in a study of the population of Rio’s favelas, stated that the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha, the two favelas that will be discussed in this thesis, reported to have 60,583 and 36,862 residents respectively. But neither study reflects what local favela residents and media estimate to be the actual population of favelas. In 2009, when the pacification of Rochina began, Brazilian and international media outlets reported the population to be

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103 Instituto de Segurança Pública Unidades de Policía Pacificadora - O que são http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=261
anywhere from 80,000 to 300,000 residents. Unofficial sources indicate that Complexo do Alemão population is between 100,000 to 200,000 residents.

This dramatic population discrepancy underscores the shadowy presence the favelas have occupied at the mainstream’s fringe. According to Arias, for multiple decades the residents of Rio’s favelas have felt as if the rest of the city and country treated them as if they were not there. He writes that the residents of favelas have been isolated and marginalized from the rest of Rio de Janeiro. There have been displacements of favela residents to provide space to develop commercial and residential housing for wealthier classes.

Until the 1970s, there was a global perception that favela residents subjected themselves to desolate, poverty-filled lives. These perceptions were generated by multiple segments of Brazilian society that benefited from maintaining the status quo. One of the most important contributions to clarifying the real character of the favelas and their residents is the work by Janice Perlman (1976 and 2010). In her works, “The Myth of Marginality: Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro” (1976), and “Favela: Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro” (2010), favela citizens were shown to share the same characteristics as their fellow cariocas (or citizens living in Rio de Janeiro).

Alves and Perlman write that the negative stigma of living in a favela continues to oppress the favela residents, and the oppression is escalated by public security. Public security policies in favelas have been characterized as abusive, and have often led to inhumane treatment and human rights abuses. It has been argued that favela residents
create the hostile conditions that support drug trafficking factions and gangs\textsuperscript{105}. But, in the absence of a stable and trusted law enforcement presence, the residents have arguably been forced to follow the rules established by the criminal networks as the only available authority. These criminal networks then forge relationships with corrupt law enforcement that further complicates the state’s ability to gain the trust of its citizens.

The Brazilian federal government and the city government of RJ have used strong tactical operations to attempt to manage public security in the favelas. These operations depend on violence\textsuperscript{106}. The state of RJ has conducted operations in favelas using the PM (Policia Militar) and the BOPE (Batalhão de Operações Policiais Especiais), two of the main proponents of public security policies. The federal government exercised the use of Brazilian military forces to conduct operations in favelas in support of Operação Rio (1994) and Operação Rio 2 (1995). In 2007, the federal and state governments of Rio cooperated in a four-month operation to establish public security. This operation coincided with the preparation for and hosting of the 2007 Pan American games in Rio de Janeiro. The National Security Force (NSF), a Brazilian military task force, was used along with the BOPE and the Polícia Militar.

The operation would become another dark chapter for the favela residents and law enforcement agencies. In her book “Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drugs Dealers and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro” (2011), Maria Alves and Philip Evanson detailed the impact of the siege of Complexo do Alemão in 2007 on the residents. The

\textsuperscript{105} Alves and Evanson “Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drugs Dealers and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro” 2011, pg 3.
\textsuperscript{106} Ibid.
police operation killed at least 43 people and wounded 85\textsuperscript{107}. Furthermore, based on interviews with Complexo do Alemão residents, the siege further eroded trust in law enforcement. Favela citizens that had been oppressed by the drug trafficking factions were now being similarly oppressed by law enforcement. Something needed to be done to address the police failures. The favelas needed a policy to decrease the violence and influence of the drug traffickers, and reform the behavior of public policy institutions.

The pacification campaign implemented in 2008 was formed to address concerns by favela residents and Rio de Janeiro civil society organizations. The goal was for a new law enforcement actor, the UPP, to establish a trust-based relationship with the residents of the favelas being pacified. From the end of 2008 to November of 2010, the pacification campaign was implemented in 12 favela communities, including the Cidade de Deus community, which was featured in the 2002 film “City of God”\textsuperscript{108}. The concept of bringing community policing to these favelas had won praise from favela residents. The UPP were integrating themselves into these communities just as intended and the program was delivering public security to favela communities where it before had not existed.

But in November 2010, powerful drug factions that still operated in un-pacified favelas challenged the pacification campaign. The drug trade had been compromised by the new relationship with the UPP and favela residents. In response to this threat, leaders from the major drug syndicates organized their followers to execute a campaign of criminal events throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro. A city wide “campaign of terror”

\textsuperscript{107} Ibid, 2.
\textsuperscript{108} Instituto de Segurança Pública website http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=261
was organized in retaliation to the pacification campaign. The campaign included setting fire to more than 14 buses and vehicles on the city’s major roads. A police operation conducted by BOPE and the Polícia Militar in the Villa Cruzeriho favela furthered intensified the situation. Intelligence then gathered by law enforcement elements revealed that drug trafficking factions were organizing in the Complexo do Alemão. It soon became obvious that momentum for public security was being challenged by the elements that oppressed the residents of the favelas. In the international media, articles with headlines like the BBC’s “Violence sparks panic on Rio's streets,” and the New York Times’s “Brazil: Gangs Battle Police in Rio de Janeiro Slums,” questioned whether Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian government would be able to deliver on their to secure the city before the Olympics.  

The November 2010, the Rio de Janeiro security crisis would force the state government and the federal government to decisively demonstrate their commitment to delivering public security to the residents of the city. The failure to stop the terrorist attacks that were now paralyzing the city would be a humiliating defeat to the governments of Rio de Janeiro and Brazil. The state government of RJ did not want to initiate another 2007 siege of the Complexo do Alemão that would counteract the main point of the pacification campaign, which is respecting the citizens of favelas. With the approval of the Governor of Rio De Janerio Sergio Cabral, the Secretary of Public Security for Rio de Janeiro Jose Beltrame requested the federal government use the

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military to occupy and pacify the Complexo do Alemão. Additionally the Brazilian
military would act as community policing agent like the UPP in other pacified favelas.
Nestled in the hills of the northern zone of Rio de Janeiro are the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. These juxtaposed communities share the natural boundary of the Morro do Alemão at its highest point. The Complexos do Alemão and Penha are a conglomeration of multiple favelas. The Complexo do Alemão has more notoriety than the Complexo da Penha, but they both are known as violent communities that have been subjected to Commando Vermelho (CV), Terceiro Commando (TC), and Amigos dos Amigos (ADA) control. Due to its violent reputation, the Complexo do

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Alemão has even been called the “faixa de Gaza carioca”, or the “Gaza Strip of Rio de Janeiro”\textsuperscript{112}.

The perception of these communities is generally negative\textsuperscript{113}. They have been called “Coração do Mal” (Heart of Evil) and “Entreposto do Crime” (Warehouse of Crime)\textsuperscript{114}. This negative reputation can be attributed to a minute fraction of inhabitants, the approximately 0.05\% of the population in the favela who are associated with drug trafficking but who cast a long shadow over the rest of Brazilian citizens who live in these two communities.

\textsuperscript{112} Perlman, J. (2010)“Four Decades of Living on the Edge in Rio de Janeiro” pg 105.
\textsuperscript{113} Alves and Evanson.(2011), \textit{Living in the Crossfire: Favela Residents, Drug Dealers, and Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro}. pg. 32.
\textsuperscript{114} Lima, C. (2012)“Força de Pacificação” pg 43.
Figure 9. Map of Complexos do Alemão and Penha and major vehicular roadways

Ibid, 44.
It is important to highlight the geography of these two settlements. The communities combined cover 14 km$^2$ (5.4 mi$^2$) or 3,456 acres, with the Complexo da Penha being the larger of the two. The Complexo do Alemão was built on the Serra da Misericórdia (Mountain of Mercy), which was made up of hills and springs that were destroyed as the settlements expanded. Those features that were not destroyed, such as the Morro do Alemão, were incorporated into the communities. Satellite imagery shows how much of the natural features like trees and open space have been replaced by man-made features. One example of this is the recently opened Teleférico do Complexo do Alemão (Cable Car Project), notable for its white and gray towers. Another feature of these two communities is the multitude of narrow streets and alleyways that wind throughout the complex. These narrow streets and alleyways on which residents walk and

\[116\text{ Ibid, 45.}\]
motorcycle to carry on their daily activities can become obstacles to law enforcement. Drug gangs have taken advantage of the fact that the streets are difficult or impossible to navigate with machinery and tanks. Since most of the streets and alleyways are uphill, public security forces are at a disadvantage as they attempt to traverse these avenues. Additionally, drug gangs have placed abandon vehicles and garbage in the streets to block public security forces.

![Satellite image of Morro de Alemão, Rio de Janeiro](image)

Figure 11 Satellite image of Morro de Alemão, Rio de Janeiro. (Image created by author using the IBGE database based of 2010 census information)

Figure 12 Satellite image of the Complexo da Pehna, Rio de Janeiro. (Image created using the IBGE database based of 2010 census information)

The population of these two complexes is disputed. Official population estimates provided by government sources state that the population of Complexo do Alemão is 80,000, and the Complexo da Penha is 185,716\textsuperscript{117}. However, other entities like non-governmental organizations estimate the population is 100,000 to 300,000 residents\textsuperscript{118}. Official estimates indicate that there are 20,000 homes in the Complexo do Alemão and 58,619 homes in the Complexo da Penha\textsuperscript{119}.

**Economic and Social Characteristics of the Community**

In this section, I illustrate the social characteristics of the favelas to attempt to accurately reflect the realities and challenges of their residents.

The Human Development Index (HDI) is used by agencies like the United Nations to measure the human development of locations. The process takes into account health, education, and living standards. Within those dimensions, key indicators are

\textsuperscript{117} Ibid, 44.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid, 44.
considered like life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling, and gross national income per capita\textsuperscript{120}. The scale used to measure the index is from 0 to 1. The Complexo do Alemão ranked 149 out of 158 communities in the city of Rio de Janeiro with a .584 HDI rating, and Complexo da Penha ranked 85 out 158. The highest ranking community in Rio de Janeiro, Lagos, achieved an HDI level of 85\textsuperscript{121}.

Both of these favelas report a lower monthly income per capita than the average for the city of Rio de Janeiro, which is R$ 615.00 (US $303.80). The Complexo do Alemão’s monthly per income capital per household is R$ 176.00 (US$86.96), and Complexo da Penha’s is R$465.00\textsuperscript{122} (US$229.69). The 2010 Brazilian Census reports that 30% of the households in the Complexo do Alemão earn less than R$145.00 (US $71.53)\textsuperscript{123}. Another characteristic to take note of is the unemployment rate. The Complexo do Alemão’s unemployment rate is 19%, nearly four times higher than that of Rio de Janeiro at 5%.

In these two communities, the average amount of years spent in education is only five years, whereas the average in the city of Rio de Janeiro is eight years, and six years in Brazil at-large\textsuperscript{124}. One of the causes for such a low average is how few schools there are in the community. The Complexo do Alemão has four nurseries, 12 elementary schools, and one high school. The Complexo da Penha has 13 nurseries, 10 elementary schools, and one high school. Data presented in 2011 by the Instituto Pereria Passos revealed that 92% of children between the ages of birth to three are not enrolled in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{120} Human Development Reports. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/
  \item \textsuperscript{121} Lima, C.(2012) “Força de Pacificação” pg 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{122} Ibid, 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{123} Ibid, 47.
  \item \textsuperscript{124} Ibid, 47.
\end{itemize}
nurseries and 27% of teenagers between the ages of 15 and 17 are not attending school. In the same age bracket of 15 to 17, 11% of girls in these two communities have already given birth to one child.

Rio de Janeiro has been working to improve the infrastructure available to residents of favelas, such as garbage collection, sewer, clean water availability, and electricity. The Prefeitura Municipal of Rio de Janeiro reports improvement: in the Complexo do Alemão, 82% of the residents have their garbage collected, 71% have access to sewer services, and 99% have access to clean water. In the Complexo da Penha, 99% have their garbage collected, 91% have access to sewer services, and 97% have access to clean water. The company that provides electricity estimates that it reaches 60% percent of the Complexo do Alemão and 69% of the Complexo da Penha.

**Influence of Drug Trafficking Gangs**

The Complexo da Penha and Complexo do Alemão have had a long affiliation with drug gangs. The Commando Vermelho (CV) drug leader Orlando da Conceição, known as “Orlando Jogador”, dominated the Morro do Alemão. A turf war with the rival gang Terceiro Commando (TC) ensued for the control of the favela and other areas of the Complexo. This resulted in the death of Conceição, and the TC gaining control of the area. The territorial feud continued in the favela in areas controlled by both the TC and CV, leading to more violence between gangs for control of the Complexo. In May 2007, the ADA drug faction staked claim to another favela in the Complexo. Prior to the November 2010 siege of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha, intelligence data indicated that the prominent drug gangs in the two communities were affiliated with
the CV, which has approximately 500 members. Gang activity includes the selling of illegal drugs such as cocaine, marijuana, crack, and hashish; and the selling and receiving of weapons, munitions and explosives. Trafficked weapons include machine guns, shotguns, handguns, and grenades. Other nefarious activity includes kidnapping, extortion, intimidation, and vandalism on businesses and buildings. The gangs would spray paint their initials on walls and doors as a sign of marking their territory.

Despite the drug gangs, violence, and dismal statistical data, more than 80,000 people call these two communities home. Favela residents go about their daily duties like their neighbors in the affluent Copacabana and Ipanema neighborhoods in Rio’s southern zone. Nova Brasília, a neighborhood located in the Complexo do Alemão, shows how favela residents resiliently live despite social, economic, and security challenges. On a daily basis, Rua Nova Brasilia and Avenida Itaóca bustle with commercial activity. Residents support local businesses by buying local goods. This type of activity occurs daily in the inner areas of the Complexo do Alemão and Complexo da Penha. And located in alleyways are smaller shops, or biroskas, that provide more goods to members of the community. The communities also offer social functions such as local church gatherings, baile funk gatherings, family gatherings, parties, and weddings.

The struggles of the Complexos do Alemão and Penha residents are evident but these residents are still Brazilian citizens, entitled to their rights of citizenship as guaranteed by the Brazilian constitution. Economic policies implemented by former President Cardoso and continued by current President Luiz da Silva have given favela residents the opportunity to improve their lives. Conditional Cash transfer (CTC) programs like the Bolsa Familia have slowly eroded financial inequality and facilitated
childhood education. Yet the right to be afforded just, effective, and enduring public security measures, such as with other Rio residents, continues to evade the residents of these two communities. As detailed in Chapter One, aggressive, large-scale police operations have failed at guaranteeing this right. Instead, these public safety operations have been accused of human right abuses that have eroded constitutional rights. And the average Brazilian isn’t helping matters: A sociological study found in 2001 that “favela-ism”, which is the association of criminality and favela residents, was identified by 84% of citizens as the number one reason for discrimination in Brazil. When the study was conducted two years later, the number rose to 92%. The participants in this study were Brazilians of all ages.125 The stigma of favela-ism associates all favela residents with criminality and narco-trafficking gangs even though only .05% of the 200,000 inhabitants are actually involved in trafficking in the Complexo do Alemão 126.

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Section Three: Achieving the Mission, But Not Community Policing

Chapter Five: The Favela and the Pacification Force

What were the residents of Complexos do Alemão and Penha thinking on December 23, 2010, when at the Palácio das Laranjeiras, the official residence of the governor of Rio de Janeiro, the accord creating the Pacification Force was signed, entrusting their safety to the Brazilian military? Did they wonder whether this would mean a repeat of the law enforcement siege of 2007 of the Complexo do Alemão? Or did the citizens have faith that this time the military would act differently? Was the Pacification Force really ready to bring public security to two of the most notorious criminal havens in Rio de Janeiro?

Since November 28, 2010, the residents of these two favelas had been under siege by public security forces. The siege was set in place by the collaborative decision by the federal and state governments of Rio to guarantee law and order. The role of the Brazilian military in the initial phase of the siege was to establish an outer cordon around the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. The first Brazilian military unit to assume the mission was the Airborne Infantry Brigade (Bda Inf Pqdt). This unit consisted of 800 paratroopers. The public security missions taking place inside the favelas were being carried out by Rio de Janeiro security forces. These forces consisted of the BOPE and the PM. These two units were conducting house searches for criminals based on intelligence information. Based on these actions between November 28 and December 23, 2012, it seemed that the favela residents were experiencing a repeat of previous demoralizing security operations. The common characteristics of these operations were that they were
short in duration and did little to establish lasting law and order. In 2012, the notion was that the Brazilian military had become a collaborator in these faulty operations.

Addressing the public security problem using the Brazilian military seemed like a good idea. Why not use the Brazilian military? The Airborne Infantry Brigade (Bda Inf Pqdt) had just completed a deployment as part of the Brazilian contingency in support of United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). The soldiers had undergone intensive training for that mission and had operated in the poor neighborhoods of Port-Au-Prince similar to the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. There was no need to question the experience level of this unit. What they needed was the administrative structure that is essential when conducting stability operation in urban environments. This is where the role of federal and state administrators, who will ultimately decide to deploy Brazilian soldiers on the streets of Nova Brasilia (one of the favelas in the Complexo do Alemão), is critical to protect the citizens of Brazil.

The key players involved in outlining the pacification force’s mission and rules of engagement included Nelson Jobim, defense minister representing the federal government, and Sergio Cabral, the governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro. The work done by these parties between November 24 and December 23, 2012 would guide the operation in its entirety.

Legality

Even today, many Brazilians associate the military with the dictatorship of 1964-1985. The country of Brazil has, after all, only been a democracy for 25 years. Given the country’s history, officials had to be extra sure that using the military for public safety
was supported by the Brazilian Constitution. Regardless of the fact that the governor of Rio requested this support, the appearance of circumventing the constitution to support public security operations would have raised concerns of the legitimacy of this operation.

According to the Brazilian Constitution (1988), the federal government of Brazil has the right to deploy the Brazilian military in support of public security operations in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. Chapter II, Article 142 clearly allows the use of the military branches to uphold law and order (Garantia de Lei e da Ordem, GLO). However, essential to legitimate use of the military is the stipulation in the same clause that the military is subordinate to the president and must guarantee law and order. This is a clear framework that outlines the role of the military in this type of situation. This not only protects the citizens of Brazil, but also the soldiers that will act on this directive. This clearly legitimizes the federal government using the military with direct authority from the constitution.

In addition to Article 142 on the deployment of the Brazilian military to support public security operations is Complementary Law 97 (June 9, 1999). This law, which has been amended by Complementary Law 117 (2004) and Complementary Law 136 (2010), calls for the adequate and necessary training of the Brazilian military for missions in which the guarantee of law and order are the primary tasks. This directive requires the Ministry of Defense and subordinate military headquarters to train units for public safety operations. The commentary law also directs the federal government to oversee the units to guarantee the protection of constitutional rights for Brazilians:
“Das Forças Armadas

Art.142. As Forças Armadas, constituídas pela Marinha, pelo Exército e pela Aeronáutica, são instituições nacionais permanentes e regulares, organizadas com base na heirarquia e na disciplina, sob a autoridade suprema do Presidente da República, e destinam-se à defesa da Pátria, à garantidos dos poderes constitucionais e, por iniciativa de qualquer destes, da lei e da ordem.”

Armed Forces

Art.142. The Armed Forces, constituting the Navy, the Army, and the Air Force, permanent and national institutions are regular, organized basis in hierarchy and discipline, under the supreme authority of the President of the Republic, intended up the defense of Homeland, the guaranteed constitutional powers and, on the initiative of any of these, the law and order.”

Chapter II, Brazilian Federal Constitution, 1988

Lei Complementar 97

“Lei complementar estabelecerá as normas gerais a serem adotadas na organização, formação e emprego das Forças Armadas.”

Complementary Law 97 (July 9, 1999)

“Supplementary law shall establish general standards to be adopted in the organization, training and employment of the armed forces.”
With the constitutional legitimacy to use Brazilian military forces clearly established, it was then essential for the federal and state governments to develop the framework for the specific mission of the Fpac. This framework between two important ruling entities would make real the public security policy in Rio de Janeiro, the establishment of the UPP (already underway since December 2008) and a new phase of pacification for the communities of Complexos do Alemão and Penha.

Thanks to meticulous discussions between the federal, state, municipal, and military representatives, the mission of the Fpac was clearly outlined in the official directives. However the duration of the mission was not clearly defined. The original predictions made by federal administrators and the wording in the directive left the impression that the mission was open-ended. The directive stipulated that every 30 days, an extension would be reviewed. The review process would originate with the Fpac commander and then be forward through military channels to the state of Rio de Janeiro Security Secretary and the Brazilian Minister of Defense. When the mission was extended, it demonstrated that federal and state administrators remained committed to the campaign. This reflected a mature and functional democratic process in which accountability was enforced as outlined in the Brazilian Constitution. This was important because previous favela public security operations were not held accountable for inappropriate conduct. To favela residents, the failure to institute these measures resulted in a loss of trust in public security forces and fostered an environment where human rights violations were committed. This was essential to the Brazilian military because it clearly reflected the support of the state and federal government through the duration of the operation.
**Força de Pacificação (Fpac)**

The Fpac mission in the Complexo do Alemão and Penha was limited to 12-13 weeks per each task force. The entire operation lasted: 583 days. During that time, over 11,900 Brazilian soldiers participated. The Fpac mission in these favela communities was called Operação Arcanjao, or Operation Archangel. The average size of each task force was 1,700-1,800 soldiers. The primary occupation of these soldiers was infantry tactics, with some representatives from the civil police and military police. As the mission progressed, the task force composition evolved based on the Fpac commander’s direction and the intelligence and operational challenges that the previous Fpac confronted.

The task force also included Brazilian military that specialized in psychological operations and community relations. This was critical to improve relations with the community.

**Training Required for a Unit to Assume Força de Pacificação (Fpac) Mission Readiness:**

- Judicial
- Military crimes in peacetime
- Common crimes
- Home search
- Control disorders
- Repossession procedures
- Drug law
- Statutes of disarmament
- Preventive prison (Code of Civil Procedure)
- Temporary prison (Law 7960/89)
- Prison of an individual detained
- Self-defense
- Strict compliance with the statutory duty
- Military instructions
- Defense of a sensitive point setting a static security post
- Establish a blocking position and control of roads
- Establishment of a strong point
- Realization of ostensive patrolling (on foot and/or motorized)
- Protection and safety of authorities
- Searching an area
- Application/procedures of lethal weapons
• Application/procedures of non-lethal weapons
• Realization of search and seizure operations
• Training and practice (education) as a shock force in operations control disorders

• First aid
• Clearing of public roads
• Intelligence
• Communication
• Training tax-military
• Elements of justice
• Rules of engagement

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit</th>
<th>Mission Name</th>
<th>Mission Timeframe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Airborne Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo I</td>
<td>November 26-February 20, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo II</td>
<td>February 21-May 15, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Light Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo III</td>
<td>May 16-August 14, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo IV</td>
<td>August 15-November 6, 2011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11th Light Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo VI</td>
<td>January 27-April 8, 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th Mechanized Infantry Brigade</td>
<td>Arcanjo VII</td>
<td>April 9-June 30, 2012</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Initial Reception

The first Brazilian army unit to undertake the Fpac mission was the Airborne Brigade. The Airborne Brigade transitioned from its primary mission of providing outer cordon security for state public security forces from November 26 to December 21, 2010. The residents of the favelas were aware that the Brazilian military had been a component
of the initial siege in late November 2010. The commander understood that for his unit to be successful in this type of environment, there would have to be strong emphasis on Brazilian soldiers patrolling the favela. He directed the Fpac mission to send Brazilian soldiers into the narrowest of alleyways in the favelas. This mission vision was carried out by subordinate leaders down to the youngest soldiers in the task force. The initial reception varied in the two favelas. In the Complexo do Alemão the task force found a community receptive to the military. In the Complexo da Penha, there was the opposite reception -- residents were withdrawn and deliberate with the military.

Appearing to be a positive force was an important aspect of the Fpac. This sentiment was echoed by all commanders throughout the units that served. Brigadier General Otávio Santana do RêgoBarros, the commander of 4th Mechanized Infantry Brigade that served as the Fpac in Arcanjo V, dictated that his task force address the local population with proper greetings, reflecting the soldier’s good manners. The proper greeting consisted of: “Bom dia (Good Morning), Boa tarde (Good Afternoon), Boa noite (Good Evening), Por favor (Please), Com licença (With your permission), Conte conosco (Tell us). Brigadier General Santana’s leadership reflected the military’s intention to develop a trusting relationship between the soldier and the favela citizen. This relationship was based on open communication and mutual respect between the two entities and was one of the most important lessons that commanders and soldiers shared with incoming units that were assuming the Fpac mission.

The Fpac uniform was also part of this trust-building effort. A military’s unit patch illustrates the unit’s military lineage based on its accomplishment. It is important

\textsuperscript{127} Lima, C.(2012) Força de Pacificação pg 86.
symbol of identity for the soldier. However, for civilians, the patch can become a symbolic representation of what the military embodies, good and bad. This is very important in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha because of the experience of the citizenry with public security forces. The residents of these communities have been exposed to the symbols of other security forces such as the BOPE. The BOPE have adopted the symbol of a “Faca na Caveira”, white skull with a knife running through it and two pistols in the background. Additionally, favela resident associate the BOPE’s armored fighting vehicles called Caveirão (Big White Skull). In the 2007 siege of the Complexos do Alemão by the BOPE, favela residents saw BOPE inside the Caveirão with fire machine guns at innocent people and their homes.
The military leaders of the Fpac knew it was essential from the beginning of the Fpac mission to dissociate itself from negative symbols. The Fpac unit was instead symbolized by a patch that reflected its mission to create a peaceful environment in these communities. The Fpac’s uniform patch, which is worn on the soldier’s right arm sleeve, emphasized the central task of the mission and the manner in which it was going to be accomplished by those that wore it. The Fpac patch has the outline of the iconic Cristo Redentor, “Christ the Redeemer”, statue with two hilltops in the background, and in the foreground the word “PAZ” (peace). On the patch’s top border is written, “Força de Pacificação” and in the bottom border, “Rio de Janeiro”. The patch’s design was intended to showcase positive icons that the citizens of the city and the favela share and take pride in, and has drastically improved the perception of the Fpac units.
To further enhance the perception of community policing among the favela residents, the Fpac began wearing blue baseball caps as part of its uniform. The blue baseball caps became a symbolic of the Fpac. The design of the baseball cap was simple: in the front of the head-gear were the words “Força De Pacificação” in bold white letters.

The baseball caps became an additional uniform item with the traditional headgear of the Brazilian military -- the wood-patterned camouflage Kevlar helmet or the colored beret based on unit affiliation. The adoption of the blue baseball cap is similar to the headgear wore by military personnel in support of United Nations peacekeeping missions. United Nation peacekeeping members can easily be recognized by the their blue helmets. In the case of the Fpac in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha, the blue baseball caps emphasized a non-aggressive posture and disassociate the Fpac from previous, aggressive public security forces. The Fpac baseball cap was so successful, in fact, that it became a public relations tool. It was given as a gift to visiting Brazilian government officials, foreign dignitaries, academics, journalists, and locals. President Dilma Rouseff wore the Fpac cap during her visit of the Complexo do Alemão.
Figure 15 Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff visiting Fpac headquarters in 2011

Figure 16 Graffiti Artwork in the Complexo do Alemão prior and after Fpac
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Types of Patrols</th>
<th>Quantity Conducted</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Motorized</td>
<td>55,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mechanized</td>
<td>1,753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foot</td>
<td>68,213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorcycle</td>
<td>867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>126,002</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contraband</th>
<th>Quantity found</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money (Real)</td>
<td>R $101,026,55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Money (U.S)</td>
<td>$30,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cocaine</td>
<td>76,211 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crack</td>
<td>12,983 kg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hashish</td>
<td>17,425 kg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detained Personnel Status</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Held</td>
<td>470</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Summary of the Fpac activity and items confiscated in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha (December 2010-July 2012)
Chapter Six: The Effects of the Pacification Force

In this chapter, I discuss how crime rates decreased in the two favelas thanks to Fpac community policing. I consider a study published by the Institute of Public Security (Instituto de Segurança Pública, ISP) and Center for Research on Criminal Justice and Public Safety (Núcleo de Pesquisa em Justiça Criminal e Segurança Pública, NUPESP) that shows the decrease in gunshot wounds admissions in local hospitals since the Fpac became operational. I address the Fpac commands’ work to keep schools open throughout their deployment in these communities. Finally, I highlight the local residents’ support of the Fpac according to surveys conducted through the 17-month occupation (December 2010-July 2012).

Decrease in Crime

One of the Fpac’s main objectives as defined by the State of Rio De Janeiro Government officials and Fpac commanders was to address the criminal activity in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. Statistical evidence proving the high levels of crime and violence in these favelas was provided in the introduction and chapters one and three. Chapter five included statistics indicating the number of arrest and detentions administered by Fpac. The essence of the Rio de Janeiro Pacification Campaign was to professionally and ethically confront oppressive crime in the communities with community policing.

A study published by the Institute of Public Security (Instituto de Segurança Pública, ISP) and Center for Research on Criminal Justice and Public Safety (Núcleo de...
Pesquisa em Justiça Criminal e Segurança Pública, NUPESP) titled “Indicators of violence in the Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro areas was significantly reduced in the first year of the occupation” (2011) shows a decrease in crime in that neighborhood. The study reviewed all the RJ strategic security indicators of public security. The results indicated that there had been significant reductions in the region of Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro in first year of Fpac’s presence in the following categories: Lethal Violence (assassination, self-resistance, robbery, and injury followed by death), Street Robbery (robbery, cell phone theft, and collective theft like looting) and Vehicle Theft.

Figure 17 Map showing police precincts serving the Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro where the rate of violence fell significantly in the first year of Fpac occupation

The ISP analysis considered data from three police stations, or precincts: 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 38\textsuperscript{th} and 44\textsuperscript{th} Delegacias de Polícia (DP). These precincts serve the communities of Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro and the surrounding neighborhoods of Engenho da Rainha, Tomás Coelho, Inhaúma, Del Castilho, Maria da Graça, Olaria, Penha, Penha Circular, Brás de Pina, Cordovil, Parada de Lucas, Vigário Geral e Jardim América (as highlighted in Figures 1-3). The study analyzed three dimensions: data from only the 22\textsuperscript{nd} Precinct, which comprises 90\% of the Complexo do Alemão; the sum of the data of the 22\textsuperscript{nd} and the 38\textsuperscript{th}, which includes the Areas of Integrated Public Safety (Área Integrada de Segurança Pública, ASIP) 16; and data from the region of ASIP 16 plus the 44\textsuperscript{th} Precinct, which serves part of the Complexo do Alemão. (The areas of Integrated Public Safety were created in 1999 as to strengthen the connection between civilians and military police in the communities covered by the ASIP through participatory management in the identification and resolution of local problems of public safety\textsuperscript{129}.)

According to all analyses, violence of all types decreased in the first year (November 2010-November 2011) of Fpac community policing operations (see tables 1-3).

\textsuperscript{129} Instituto de Segurança Pública. Divisão Territorial http://www.isp.rj.gov.br/Conteudo.asp?ident=220
Figure 18 Maps of the Areas of Integrated Public Safety 3 and 16

**Methodology**

I compared the strategic indicators of safety (lethal violence, street robberies, and vehicle thefts) in the Complexo da Penha (Complexo do Alemão and Vila Cruzeiro) during the year prior to the occupation’s start (28 November 2009 to 27 November 2010) to the year of the occupation (28 November 2010 to 23 November 2011). The period after the occupation going until the date of November 23, 2011 by virtue of information processing have occurred on 24 November 2011.
## Table 3 Comparison of Incidences Sum DP 22, DP 38 and DP 44

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Indicators</th>
<th>28 NOV 09 to 27 NOV 10</th>
<th>28 NOV 10 to 23 NOV 11</th>
<th>Difference Absolute Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny theft followed death</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury followed by death</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence totals</td>
<td>208</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>-67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>1560</td>
<td>1047</td>
<td>-513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell Phone Theft</td>
<td>571</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>-204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>3,016</td>
<td>2,183</td>
<td>-833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery Collective</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>286</td>
<td>-125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Robbery Totals</td>
<td>3,998</td>
<td>2,836</td>
<td>-1162</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 4 Comparison of Incidences Sum DP 22

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Indicators</th>
<th>28 NOV 09 to 27 NOV 10</th>
<th>28 NOV 10 to 23 NOV 11</th>
<th>Difference Absolute Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
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<tr>
<td>Larceny theft followed death</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury followed by death</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence totals</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>-17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>627</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>-308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell Phone Theft</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>-100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>1,380</td>
<td>768</td>
<td>-612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery Collective</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Robbery Totals</td>
<td>1,761</td>
<td>1,021</td>
<td>-740</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Decrease in Local Hospital Gunshot-Wound Admissions

For several years the Getúlio Vargas Hospital in the Complexo da Penha was essentially an urban war hospital accustomed to triaging the victims of gunshots wounds originating from the Complexos do Alemão and Penha. At the height of clashes between police and drug traffickers in the Complexo do Alemão, in 2007, 767 victims of firearm were treated in the unit, an average of 63 people per month. The bloodiest conflict occurred in June of that year, in which 19 people died and seven were wounded, including a policeman. The consequences of treating such a high volume of victims of violent activity compromised the hospital’s ability to address the needs of other patients and limited the number of beds available.

Table 5 Comparison of Incidences ASIP 16

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Indicators</th>
<th>28 NOV 09 to 27 NOV 10</th>
<th>28 NOV 10 to 23 NOV 11</th>
<th>Difference Absolute Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Murder</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>-13 -13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larceny theft followed death</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-4 -44.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>-41 -71.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Injury followed by death</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-2 100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lethal Violence totals</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>-60 -37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auto Theft</td>
<td>1,166</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>-358 30.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cell Phone Theft</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>-169 -38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery</td>
<td>2,323</td>
<td>1,567</td>
<td>-756 32.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbery Collective</td>
<td>274</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>-68 -24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street Robbery Totals</td>
<td>3,042</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>-993 -32.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Comparison of Incidences ASIP 16

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133 Cunha, V. (2012). “Pacificação libera até 70 vagas por mês no Hospital Getúlio Vargas.”
From 2007 to 2011, the hospital began to experience a reduction in the number of patients with violent gunshot wounds. The hospital recorded a decrease of more than half the cases during that timeframe. However, after the intervention of the Fpac and the pacification of the Complexos do Alemão and Penha, there was a dramatic decrease of patients with violent gunshot wounds. Data gathered by the Getúlio Vargas Hospital and RJ State Department of Health study (2012) reflect that there was a 43% reduction of patients treated at the hospital from January to May 2012 (149 patients) compared to the same timeframe in 2010 (767 patients), a period before the Fpac presence in the area\textsuperscript{134}. The hospital reported that in 2007, 25% of the fatalities that were brought it were caused by gunfire. In 2011, a year after pacification ensued in the communities, the percentage of fatalities that were brought to the hospital had dropped to 8%.

\textsuperscript{134} Cunha, V. (2012). “Pacificação libera até 70 vagas por mês no Hospital Getúlio Vargas.”
The data presented in these studies reflects that intervention by the Brazilian military in the capacity of community policing has helped reduce the violence that was already decreasing without military intervention. According to the hospital’s director, Carlos Henrique Ribeiro, today, 50% of cases of gunshot victims arriving to Vargas come from other regions, not neighboring communities of Penha and Alemão.

The Fpac intervention produced other visible changes at the Getúlio Vargas Hospital. Peace in the community has been reflected in the emergency room. “This is reflected in various forms of hospital,” the hospital’s director said, “because it frees the bed and surgical center, for example, for 60 or 70 months for patients with other types of necessity. We no longer have to provide both staff and material to violence; we can focus on other situations, such as victims of accidents, heart attacks, strokes, falls, among others.”

This sentiment was echoed by patients. Lopes Rodrigues, 69, a patient in the hospital’s Emergency Care Unit, benefited from the pacification intervention. He suffered a saw accident that left him with three fingers hanging off his left hand that required surgery and extended physical therapy. Lopez reflected on the hospital’s capacity to address his injuries thanks to the less chaotic environment. He explained, "I received great treatment and did not hear anyone complaining. Attendance has improved and we do not see scary scenes of people wounded.” The decrease in the amount of gunshot wound patients also allows for more time to treat all patients. Monique Fernandes, who brought her four-year old daughter to the hospital, said that, "the chaotic picture of people

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135 Cunha, V. (2012). “Pacificação libera até 70 vagas por mês no Hospital Getúlio Vargas.”
shot has changed. But there are many people waiting for care and is great," after she waited about six hours to get care in pediatrics.

Figure 20 Decrease in the Number of Shooting Victims Admitted to Getúlio Vargas Hospital (slide from original article)

Another important perspective on the effects of pacification on the hospital comes from the hospital staff. One healthcare professional at the hospital said that it is safer to work since the pacification. "It is visible in the calm surroundings and within the hospital," he said. Clavio Luiz Ribeiro Filho, an emergency room physician, stated how previous stressed doctors, nurses, and patients. “Today,” he said, “[that stress] no longer exists”.

136 Cunha, V. (2012). “Pacificação libera até 70 vagas por mês no Hospital Getúlio Vargas”.
137 Ibid.
Feedback from Community Residents

It is critical to understand that even though the Fpac community policing mission altered the behavior of criminal factions in these communities, it did not stop criminal behavior altogether. Criminal factions, aware that there was a withdrawal date for the Fpac, continued to remind residents that associations with the Fpac would be addressed through violent methods once the Fpac withdrew. These threats were communicated by various methods: graffiti on walls, verbal threats from lower echelon members, and low-levels acts of violence like beatings.\textsuperscript{138}

During the pacification in the Complexos do Alemão and Penha, the Fpac conducted periodic surveys to understand the population’s opinion of Fpac’s community policing efforts and to address and identify issues with regards to the mission. These surveys additionally provided the community a medium to participate in civil-military relationships unrelated to security concerns.

At the end of Fpac’s 17-month mission, the city of Rio de Janeiro and Fpac conducted a random survey with 506 residents of the two communities. The topics addressed in the survey centered on: 1) the use of Brazilian military pacification forces in the area; 2) changes to the daily habits routines of local residents after the Brazilian military pacification, 3) living conditions after the Brazilian military pacification, 4) feeling of security after the Brazilian military pacification, 5) sense of security after the withdrawal of Brazilian military pacification forces, 6) personal perspective on life after the withdrawal of Brazilian military pacification forces. There were 93 individuals (18%)
of the 506 who opted not to complete the survey after reviewing its context for fear of reprisal from criminal elements had they participated.

The survey revealed a positive perception of the Brazilian military pacification forces, but a guarded optimism about long-term security in the favelas. The survey asked: Is the presence of the Brazilian military pacification forces in the area of the Complexo da Penha favorable? The survey found that 94% thought the presence was favorable, 4% said somewhat favorable, 1% said it was not favorable, and 1% didn’t respond to the question. Another question asked: What were your perceptions of the actions of the Brazilian military pacification forces in the area of the Complexo da Penha? The question reflected that 88% of the participants perceived the actions of the pacification force as beneficial, 10% said they were indifferent to the actions, 1% said it their actions were bad, and 1% didn’t respond to the question. In response to whether residents altered their daily habits and patterns after the occupation of the Brazilian military pacification forces, 71% answered that their daily patterns and behaviors were altered because they were able to, for example, stay out later at night and travel with greater freedom, 25% said they that their daily patterns and behavior didn’t change, 3% answered they participate in less activities and feel less secure, and 1% didn’t respond to the question. In response to the question, “After the work of the Brazilian military pacification forces, did the region improve, worsen or stay the same?” 87% said the area where they lived had improved, 11% said that it had not changed, 1% said it had become worse, and 1% didn’t respond to the question. In reference to whether they feel safer after the occupation, 84% said they feel more secure after the presence of the Brazilian military
pacification forces, 11% had no change in feeling safe, 3% felt less safe, and 2% didn’t respond to the question.

The survey showed that 44% of residents worry that security will suffer after the departure of the Fpac, 26% believe that everything will remain the same, 20% believe that security will increase, and 10% didn’t respond to the question. When asked about security far into the future, 33% think it will worsen, 30% believe it will remain the same, 28% believe it will increase, and 9% didn’t respond to the question.

The survey also included an opportunity for the participant to provide additional comments. One of the most popular comments, which appeared eight times, was the suggestion that the Brazilian military make the community respect noise ordinances, because the neighborhoods are very loud. The statement, “I am in favor of the presence of the Brazilian military in the region” was written four times. The statement, “The Brazilian military should remain in the area without substitution” appeared three times. Similar comments favoring the Brazilian military included: “The military only brought benefits”; “I am satisfied, this work should continue”; and “With the presence of the Brazilian military, security has improved”. Participants also included negative feedback on the Brazilian military in its capacity as community police. Local residents provided the following comments: “The population is still afraid”; “The number of assaults increased in the interior of the community”; “I suffered a lot of hostility and threats without cause from the Brazilian military members”; and “If it was up to me the military would not be in the street”.
The survey’s results present a mixed opinion about the role of the Fpac in the Complexos do Pehna and Alemão. Statistically, the survey showed that the population was satisfied with the performance of Fpac and the security situation in the area, but the survey comments show that some felt the Fpac’s behavior with the citizens was unethnical and aggressive. The statistical data correlates with the IPS criminal statistics highlighted in the beginning of this chapter showing a decrease across key criminal indicators under Fpac. And survey results show some worry whether the new public security agent, the UPP, can maintain the momentum that some believe the Fpac created during its 17-month mission in the two communities.

Other sentiments reflected in this survey are the insecurities and fear of reprisal that residents of these communities continue to exhibit even after months of a pacification campaign. Nearly 20% of the survey population identified insecurity and fear of reprisal as reason not to participate in the survey at all. Additionally, the number of individuals who decided not to respond to a given question increased when the questions addressed the future. While the survey doesn’t identify the cause of these fears, one possibility is the criminal factions that continued to operate in the areas even throughout the presence of Fpac, according to intelligence collected by both Fpac and RJ from detained individuals, informants, and local residents. Other potential reasons for the are the RJ public security actors like the Polícia militar, BOPE and even the UPP, that were scheduled to replace the Fpac as per the pacification campaign plan. As I detailed in the chapter on violence in favelas, the Polícia militar and BOPE are public security actors that the public associates with violent behavior that has killed innocent people. Although

the UPP will be a new public security actor in these two communities after the 
withdrawal of the Fpac, it already has a negative reputation from its work in other favelas 
where UPP members ended up being arrested for corruption and other criminal 
activity. It’s clear that the new public security policies will have to continue to address 
the public’s distrust and fear of public security actors.

Incidents that Question Fpac Behavior

One of the additional comments in the survey, which was discussed in the 
previous section, stated: “I had a family member that was wounded (lost their eyesight) 
because of the action of the Brazilian military, and I feel helpless and unattended.”
This section will address two incidents in which actions like the one alluded to by this 
respondent made members of the Fpac appear criminal and aggressive toward residents. 
It is important to note that the Fpac unit created an ombudsman office with the specific 
mission of addressing civilian fears and any alleged incidents. This ombudsman office 
was advertised to the community by Fpac through meetings with community residents 
and poster advertisements.

One of the incidents in which residents of the Complexo do Alemão accused Fpac 
soldiers of aggressive behavior occurred in September 2011 and was captured by cell 
phone and posted on YouTube. The incident occurred between a dismounted Fpac 
patrol and local residents that were watching a soccer game at a bar. The confrontation 
arose when an Fpac member ordered the television to be turned down. The residents

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politics/new-upp-controls-follow-corruption-scandal/
142 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CPNLdNxWSUA “Moradores do Complexo do do Alemão atacam 
Força de Pacificação a mando”
protested the order to lower the volume on the television and tensions quickly rose between both parties until the residents and soldiers began to shout at each other. Fpac members reacted by pepper spraying local residents, which agitated the residents further. The situation then escalated when the Fpac soldiers used non-lethal munitions, rubber bullets, against the crowd. A female teenager was injured by the rubber bullet and was taken to the Getúlio Vargas Hospital where she was later released after receiving treatment\textsuperscript{143}. After the Fpac used non-lethal munitions and additional Fpac patrols reinforced the unit, residents were forced to disperse. Residents were not happy with the aggressive behavior of the military and the situation thereafter remained tense. Residents protested the Fpac, which caused further unrest in which residents were detained by the Fpac because of aggressive behavior towards soldiers. In an attempt to quell the situation, the riot control unit of the Policia Militar was activated to augment the Fpac. Still, the situation remained tense for several evenings after the initial incident. The Fpac command headquarters opened an inquiry into the original incident. But I have not found any information on the results of the inquiry to date.

The second incident occurred in December 2011 in the Favela Vila Cruzeiro, in the Complexo da Penha. This incident involved an eight-soldier Fpac patrol that killed a 15 year-old boy who didn’t have drugs or weapons in his possession\textsuperscript{144}. The patrolled had identified a group of three men that were acting suspicious. As the patrol approach the three men, the men began to flee and shoot at the patrol. The patrol responded by

\textsuperscript{144} G1 Globo. (2011) “Após morte de jovem, militares são afastados de patrulhamento em favela ” http://g1.globo.com/rio-de-janeiro/noticia/2011/12/apos-morte-de-jovem-militares-sao-afastados-de-patrulhamento-em-favela.html
shooting at the men. The 15 year-old male was shot and died after being taking to the Getúlio Vargas Hospital. Area residents reported that the 15 year-old was shot close to where he lived. The Fpac command has removed the eight soldiers from conducting patrolling activities and an investigation was opened by the Military Police and the civilian police. I have not found information on the results of the inquiry to date.

These are only two incidents in which Fpac soldiers were accused of aggressive and violent behavior. It has been reported that the Fpac ombudsman section received 4,178 reports of allegations or reports of criminal activity. But there is no information on how many of these 4,178 allegations were against the Fpac. Based on the survey comments and the multiple incidents documented by citizens through various means, it is clear that were cases in which the Fpac was aggressive towards the citizens. Even though the mission has been completed and the Fpac has been decommissioned, it is still the responsibility of the military to determine if disciplinary action is required. If the military fails to demonstrate adequate accountability procedures, the RJ Secretary of Security Office must intervene to represent the rights of the citizens of these communities.

In this chapter I have demonstrated the positive and negative effects of the Fpac mission on the favelas. First, the good news. There is statistical data to support the claim that key criminal indicators have decreased since the Fpac assumed the role of community policing. Additionally, data collected by the local hospital, Getúlio Vargas Hospital, reflect that gunshot victim admissions and fatalities have decreased since

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pacification. Furthermore, the survey conducted at the end of the Fpac mission reflected that survey participants feel safer with Fpac in the community.

But there are also lingering concerns. The survey revealed that some residents think the Fpac was aggressive and violent towards citizens. This is underscored by the two incidents described in which Fpac actions resulted in injuries and death to residents with neither weapons nor drugs. These two incidents, along with others reported, reflect serious behavioral issues that need to be resolved. A policing force can’t behave in this manner and expect to achieve positive results in the community.
Conclusion

“O senhor vai ter que ter paciencia. Nao estamos acostumados com a lei…”

“The gentleman must have patience. We are not accustomed to the law.”

-- A resident of the Complexo do Alemão to a representative of Fpac during the pacification (December 2010)

Urban Security for Mega Events

Security is a central concern in Brazil due to the upcoming mega-events: the World Cup in 2014 and the Olympics in 2016. These events have forced the country to look at how past public security policies in Rio de Janeiro failed to adequately address drug trafficking and violent crime. Instead, these policies fostered an environment of police corruption and human rights abuses. A solution was needed, due to the marked increase in violence within the city of Rio de Janeiro, to protect Rio’s citizens and to increase public security for the approaching World Cup in 2014 and Olympics in 2016. This solution included using the military to pacify the favelas of Rio. This paper reviews the pacification of the favelas and highlights another peacekeeping operation undertaken by the Brazilian military in Haiti. The military learned a lot in Haiti that it would later apply to pacify the favelas in Rio. According to police records, the presence of the military in Rio has resulted in a large drop in crime rates\(^\text{146}\). Theft of vehicles dropped by 78%, burglary fell 91%, assaults on pedestrians decreased by 78%, and the homicide rate fell by 86% \(^\text{147}\).

\(^{147}\) Ibid.
The United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Haiti (MINUSTAH) helped to train the members of the military who would pacify the favelas. This thesis discussed the details of the Brazilian military’s mission to Haiti in 2004, which continues to the present day. It also discussed the role the Brazilian military plays in MINUSTAH.

Rio de Janeiro has many similarities to Haiti, including human rights abuses, high murder rates, assaults by security forces and police officers, and widespread corruption. The long-term effects on the military of Brazil’s decision to not only support the peacekeeping mission but to take leadership of all peacekeeping mission forces in Haiti was discussed and a historical overview of Brazil’s policy on United Nations peacekeeping operations was provided. Captain Leonardo da Rocha Costa sums up the thoughts described in the thesis regarding the military’s peacekeeping operations: “Even though [this] isn’t a typical mission for the army, we have evolved considerably when it comes to urban areas and slums”\textsuperscript{148}.

Even today, Brazilians associate the Brazilian military with the dark shadow of the military dictatorship of 1964-1985. The military, and the government, had to be prepared to face close scrutiny during their peacekeeping operations even though the Brazilian constitution emphasizes the military’s subordination to the president, and guarantees constitutional rights during security missions. Residents of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro have seen excessive force, extrajudicial executions, and torture by previous security forces, such as the BOPE and NSF. It was therefore important for the military to separate itself, in direct and indirect ways, from these two previous forces. A number of

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{148} Oliveira. N.( 2010). “Peacekeeping forces in Rio de Janeiro’s slums”. Infosurhoy.com
\end{footnote}
strategies were used, from patrolling the back alleys of the favelas, to wearing colorful patches on their sleeves, to donning blue baseball caps on patrol.

The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica, IBGE) defines a favela as a subnormal agglomerate with a minimum of 51 household units. Brazil is home to 6,329 of these subnormal agglomerates.\(^{149}\)

Violence in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro was also discussed in this thesis. Escalation of the violence has been noticed worldwide, blamed on local drug trafficking factions and corrupt police officers. Many favela residents feel repressed, as though Brazil has forgotten them, and the only presence of the state is a violent one. Benjamin Lessing, in an interview with BBC Brazil, states, “The lesson is this. If you increase the repression, in a situation of widespread corruption, you risk incentive to generate more violence”\(^{150}\). Media reports identify favelas as “places of perpetual violence populated by a lost lower class”\(^{151}\). Many of the elite population, those living in the more affluent neighborhoods of Rio de Janeiro, may have a distorted view of favelas due to these media reports.

**Latin America’s New Trend of Using the Armed Forces for Urban Security**

Critics are also concerned about what will happen after these mega-events take place. They question whether the pacifications will continue and whether public safety will be upheld. The federal government of Brazil has the constitutional right to deploy the

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\(^{150}\) Carneiro, J. (2011). “Modelo de repressao ao trafico no Rio e mais eficaz que colombiano ou mexicano, kiz analista”. \\
Brazilian military in support of public security operations (1988). However, this solution cannot be seen as a long-term one. Leon Panetta, in his address to the 10th Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas states, “To be clear, the use of the military to perform civil law enforcement cannot be a long-term solution”\textsuperscript{152}. Ultimately, the civilian authorities must be able to handle urban policing on their own even though, as Major General Brigadier General Carlos Barroso Sarmento says, “The Army, by the Constitution of Brazil, is in charge of homeland defense, security of the constitutional powers of law and order”\textsuperscript{153}.

The pacification of the favelas of Rio de Janeiro influenced other countries. One example of this is Mexico deploying troops to the outskirts of Mexico City. In 2012, the Mexican government sent soldiers to patrol a suburb of Mexico City to combat the rising drug-related violence there\textsuperscript{154}. Approximately 1,000 troops, as well as federal police, were deployed. Echoing similar concerns in Brazil, Alberto Islas, a Mexican security expert, described the difficulty of deploying the military for an urban operation: “[The mission] was unlikely to yield positive results, [and] the armed forces were not equipped to tackle the sources of the problem”\textsuperscript{155}.

Another example occurred in Honduras, where soldiers are being deployed on public buses to reduce soaring violent crime\textsuperscript{156}. The country has put two soldiers on each public bus because buses have been targeted by gangs who rob passengers and extort money from drivers. The President of Honduras, Porfirio Lobo, points out that using

\textsuperscript{152} Paneta, L. (2012). 10\textsuperscript{th} Conference of Defense Ministers of the Americas.
\textsuperscript{153} Sarmento, C.B. (2012). Entrevista com o General de Bregada Carlos Mauricio Barroso Sarmento, Comandante da Forca de Pacificacao Arcanjo VII. DefesaNet.com
\textsuperscript{154} Reuters, (2012). “Mexico deploys troops to outskirts of Mexico City”.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{156} BBC News. 2012. “Honduras crime: Soldiers deployed on public buses”.

military officers on buses otherwise frees up police officers to patrol in crime-ridden neighborhoods157.

The government of Argentina also started using the military for social containment tasks in the slums of greater Buenos Aires and the capitol. According to the Minister of Defense and Security of Argentina, the government requested the advice of the Brazilian government based on its peacekeeping experience in “the slums of Rio de Janeiro”158. Criticism similar to that against the Fpac in Brazil now plagues the Argentine effort -- the former President of the Defense Committee of Deputies Julio Martinez said that urban peacekeeping is not the mission of the Armed Forces of Argentina, and there was no crisis to justify this use159.

**Further Research Ideas**

The restructuring of state institutions in countries that have benefitted from economic prosperity due to globalization is an area of interest that be enhanced by this type of research. Brazil’s health economy has been able to contribute to the modernization of its armed forces. This has been illustrated by its efforts to better equip its armed forces with advanced equipment. This is a change from past strategies in which state institutions as the armed forces have suffered from lack of resources. The question becomes how are these economic resources disperse to allow them to diffuse to institutions of state governments, beyond the federal level. In the sphere of urban security this means addressing deficiencies in the military police and civil police.

157 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
In reference to urban security policies it is essential to consider the multiple effects of a pacification campaign involving areas of a city that are isolated from urban management strategies. From the perspective of urban management, municipalities must be prepared to efficiently reintegrate areas as favelas into contemporary urban planning strategies. This will require planning in several areas. One of these areas involves introducing housing improvement policies to address informal housing construction. Further research will be necessary to dictate the housing strategies that will be implemented, whether the strategy will be removal of the structures and the relocation of residents to modern communities in other areas of the cities. These are policies that have potential to impact hundreds of thousands in a city as Rio de Janeiro and remake the city landscape.

The problem of how to address crime will continue to require attention in urban environments regardless of pacification campaigns. Criminal statistics reported by the City of Rio de Janeiro already reflect that criminal activity has already migrated and increase in other areas of the cities. In favelas that have been pacified by UPPs crime has decrease, however city suburbs area have started to experience an increase in multiple types of crime. Research in the area of how crime migrates and identify factors in migration to specific areas will be essential to help security officials prepare and possible implement strategies. Literature already exists that reflects how communities might resort to implementing strategies to protect themselves from crime. There are already communities that can be characterized as security enclaves. The book by Marcelo Lopes De Souza, Fobopole (2008) reflects the effects of living in an environment driven by security concern that altered the freedom of its citizens. It also contributes to isolating
communities from each other which can have harmful results. Therefore, research in this topic can be influence by the military intervention in the Rio pacification campaign.
Glossary

Amigos dos Amigos (ADA)- Friends of Friends (Drug faction in Rio de Janeiro)

Comando Vermelho (CV)- Red Command (Drug faction in Rio de Janeiro)

Força de Pacificação, (Fpac) - Brazilian Military Unit Pacification Force

Rio de Janeiro (RJ) - The state of Rio de Janeiro

Terceiro Comando (TC)- Third Command (Drug faction in Rio de Janeiro)

Unidade de Polícia Pacificadora (UPP) - Pacification Police Units
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5x Favela , directed by Cacau Amaral, Cadu Barcelos, Luciana Bezerra, Manaira Carneiro, Rodrigo Felha, Wagner Novais, and Luciano Vidigal, 2010.