Rio2016: Mega-Event Urban Planning and Imagining the Anti-Olympics Scale-Shift Process

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RIO 2016: MEGA-EVENT URBAN PLANNING
AND IMAGINING THE ANTI-OLYMPICS SCALE-SHIFT PROCESS

By
Lana Schissel

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the requirements for the degree of
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RIO2016: MEGA-EVENT URBAN PLANNING
AND IMAGINING THE ANTI-OLYMPICS SCALE-SHIFT PROCESS

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Today’s sporting mega-events are a globally recognized urban spectacle for their capacity to stimulate economic growth, revitalize urban cityscapes and promote their respective metropolis to a transnational audience. Yet in spite of the ubiquitous enthusiasm touted by Olympic stakeholders, there is a growing literature documenting the negative impacts that sporting mega-events have on the quality of life of host-city residents. In part one of this work, I explicate the “Olympic Planning Equation”: a three part analysis that links the negative ramifications experienced by host city citizens, to the ambitions of Olympic stakeholders and their execution of the event. Part two applies this equation to Rio de Janeiro’s current preparatory efforts for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Rio de Janeiro’s mega-event ambitions and its methodological implementation will be reviewed, followed by an in-depth look at specific instances of political, legal, economic, social, and spatial restructuring that are occurring to produce Rio’s Olympic city. This case study intends to show how the exigencies of mega-event preparations temporarily suspend the form and function of public institutions, binding them to the service of private capital, rather than to the provision of public services and the protection of civic rights. In recognizing the democratic deficit that is created when cities host sporting mega-events, this work problematizes the current, local nature of anti-Olympic resistance occurring in Rio. Part three theorizes the transnationalization of anti-Olympic activism.
using the *boomerang theory* (Keck & Sikkink 1998), and calls on the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to play a more proactive, mediating role in the preparation of Olympic host cities. Part four will issue fourteen recommendations for ways in which the IOC can make Olympic preparations more accommodating of the diverse interests of urban stakeholders, and more accountable to host-city residents.
This work is dedicated to Bernie.
Your love of history and travel is encoded into my DNA, and your memory will live forever.
Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Marten Brienen, my academic adviser, without whom graduating with some semblance of sanity would not have been possible. I would like to thank my parents for their unwavering support of my personal and academic endeavors. I would like to acknowledge my best friend and partner in crime, Liz Weintraub, for her friendship and loyalty, her commitment to learning, and her fierce passion for life. I would like to thank Casey Clyde for his unyielding belief in my ability to finish this work and change the world, and whose love and tenderness meant the world to me, then and now. Part 3 of this work would not have been possible without the patience of Dave Korn- your commitment to exploration and self-discovery, and your virtue inspires us all.
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<td>ANT</td>
<td>Associação Nacional do Torcedores: National Association of Fans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APO</td>
<td>Autoridade Pública Olímpica: Olympic Public Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BNDES</td>
<td>Brazilian National Development Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRT</td>
<td>Bus-Rapid-Transit lanes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS</td>
<td>Court of Arbitration for Sport</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDURP</td>
<td>Port Urban Development Company</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEPAC</td>
<td>Certificate of Additional Construction Potential</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COHRE</td>
<td>Center on Housing Rights and Evictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FGTS</td>
<td>Brazilian Federal Workers Pension Funds</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIFA</td>
<td>Fédération Internationale de Football Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC/MPC</td>
<td>International Broadcast Center/Main Press Center</td>
</tr>
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<td>ICESCR</td>
<td>International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC</td>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPPUR/UFRJ</td>
<td>Institute of Urban and Regional Planning at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUTH</td>
<td>Land and Housing Unit of the State Public Defenders Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>PASO</td>
<td>Pan American Sport Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>PPM</td>
<td>Porto Maravilha Projecto: The Wonderful Port Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Public-Private Partnerships</td>
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<td>SEOP</td>
<td>Secretaria Especial da Ordem Pública: Special Secretary of Public Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFH</td>
<td>Sistema Financeiro de Habitação: Housing Financial System</td>
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<td>SMH</td>
<td>Secretaria Municipal de Habitação: Municipal Housing Authority</td>
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<td>UFF</td>
<td>Fluminense Federal University</td>
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Chapter 1:

Overview

In 2009, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) granted Rio de Janeiro the right to host the 2016 Summer Olympic and Paralympic Games, marking the first time that the global spectacle would travel to South America. The country’s stable economic growth, the discovery of offshore oil reserves, and its booming export industry, have all contributed to Brazil’s rising place in the new world order. And as the former political capital, premiere tourist destination, and cultural icon of Brazilian beaches, futebol and samba, the city of Rio de Janeiro is an ideal advertisement for the emerging nation.

Yet the city itself is beset with unresolved issues that will inform its preparations for the upcoming mega-events. Rio’s cityscape is characterized by its uneven processes of urban development, embodied by the city’s numerous informal and underserved housing settlements known as favelas. In failing to provide housing and public transportation for the droves of immigrants that came over the twentieth century, migrants took up illegal residence in the foothills and embankments of the formal city. Following the return to democracy in the 1980’s, drug trafficking networks territorialized the favelas in the absence of the formal State. This further justified the State in abandoning the provision of formal services such as trash collection, health, and education, all the while criminalizing residents because of their association with the armed cartels. Brazil’s democratic framework has been also been consistently undermined by political clientelism, which has permeated the favelas as politicians would barter votes in exchange for public infrastructure projects, furthering the marginalization
and lack of meaningful citizenship rights extended to favela residents. Rio’s divided city and its state of parallel politics have underwrote the city’s extraordinary rates of homicide and it’s perpetual condition of underdevelopment, all the while worsening from the cyclical effects of political corruption and excessive police violence. Modern urban planning in Rio de Janeiro is dictated by fear and insecurity, and is characterized by the numerous gated communities and fortified public spaces. The city’s punctuating socio-economic disparities have given rise to persistent informal economies and the uninterrupted expansion of informal settlements. Rio also suffers from a poorly integrated public transportation grid due to decades of urban planning that privileged the personal automobile.

In recognizing the various obstacles that condition Rio de Janeiro’s urban form, I began my investigation by searching for a possible methodology by which the city would approach its preparatory efforts. My interest in the Rio 2016 Olympics began as early as 2009, just after the IOC had awarded the Games to Brazil. Naively, I narrowed in on the Games as a poverty alleviation technique: an alternative model to urban development for a city, and a continent, overwhelmed by informal housing settlements and uneven urban planning, and with few incentives and resources to address each. In my initial estimation, the two-week spotlight of the Olympic games would afford cities with an exceptional financing and public relations moment, in which they would be forced to attend to a range of urban issues like poor transportation and public insecurity. However, soon after I had conducted a fairly surface level investigation of the themes ‘urban development and the Olympics’, it became clear that although the two are very connected, their results have been anything but positive.
Yet, Rio isn’t the first Olympic city with high crime rates or an outdated public transportation system, and it certainly isn’t the first to be drawn to the Games for their capacity to generate economic growth or revitalize rundown neighborhoods. In fact, the literature on Olympic host-cities indicates that since the entrepreneurial Los Angeles 1984 Games, most host-cities have attempted to use the Olympic spotlight to do just that (Hiller 2007; Horne 2007; Hall 2006). In trying to ascertain a central methodology by which host cities typically approach and execute their mega-event preparations, I started to recognize an unsettling pattern in the post-Games case study literature. Principally, these studies concluded that the hosting of modern mega-events exacerbates existing social and spatial inequalities, and in many cases generates new ones (Green 2003; COHRE 2007; Broudeuax 2007; Gaffney 2010e; Fox Gotham 2005; Lenskyj 2008; Waitt 2008). Similarly, these studies seemed to associate the intensifying ambition and competition among cities to host sporting mega-events, and the execution of these events, to the negative ramifications experienced by host-city citizens.

During my fieldwork in summer 2010, I became interested in the sites and modes of contestation and resistance that were occurring to confront Rio’s Olympic preparations. This interest was multi-faceted. As a student whose primary research agenda in the field was to explore Olympic processes, manifestations of anti-Olympic activism seemed significant to the social geography of an Olympic host-city. I also believed that in order for researchers to properly articulate the dynamics between host-city residents and the Olympic host city stakeholders (meaning those involved in the production of the Games), it is critical to acknowledge how citizens themselves are understanding these processes, who they are blaming, and from whom they are seeking
redress. Finally, sites of anti-Olympic activism are important for determining the myriad of ways in which people are being affected by Olympic preparations, which would allow me to comprehensively and systematically cross reference them with the evidence found in other host cities.

Although my fieldwork was unfocused, it was informed. I had studied the maps of the city and the projects of associated with the ‘Olympic City’, and I knew where to look for future infrastructure projects. Case studies of past Olympic host cities had also given me cues to watch out for: construction sites with Olympic logos or joint city partnerships; projects and campaigns aimed at international tourism; increased police presence in zones with tourists. I also looked for idiosyncrasies and ruptures in the political, legal, economic, social, and spatial organization of the city, which would occur to facilitate Olympic projects or enact a self-consciously constructed version of the city. When I returned from the field, I had made two key observations that would inform the future course of my investigation. Through the various Olympic sites and the city’s preparations at large, in addition to the contentions voiced in the various anti-Olympic manifestations, I observed that Rio’s Olympic preparations were indeed exacerbating many existing social ills, and were reproducing many of the negative social impacts that had been observed in past Olympic host-cities. Secondly, I resolved that processes occurring to produce Rio’s Olympic city were in many ways insurmountable and inevitable.

In the words of British journalist David Runciman commenting on the recent 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa: “In reality, sports tournaments rarely do much to transform the fortunes of the countries that host them – at least not for the better – let alone change the fate of whole continents. But they can tell us a lot about where power
really lies” (Runciman 2010). Taking a cue from Runciman’s insight, and my own perception that Rio’s Olympic preparations and their consequences were inevitable, I began searching for a way to articulate the institutional power dynamics involved in the preparation of Olympic host-cities. I began by asking what makes a city bid for the Olympics: who are Olympic stakeholders that craft the bid and pursue the Games, and what do they seek to gain from hosting them? How do these same agents produce an Olympic host city, and achieve these objectives? And, how are the ambitions of Olympic stakeholders, the execution of Olympic host-cities, and the exigencies of mega-events (immutable timeline, international spotlight etc.) related to the negative ramifications experienced by host-city citizens? Through the course of this work, I will suggest that the negative social impacts that are consistently generated by the Olympic games can be attributed to the ambitions of host-city organizers and their execution of the event. More specifically, I hypothesize that mega-event preparations temporarily suspend the form and function of public institutions from the provision of public services and the protection of civic rights, and instead binds the host-city to the accumulation of private capital, and the execution of a short-term elite sporting event.

In the first part of this work, I present the ‘Olympic Planning Equation’. This three-part analysis attempts to link why cities pursue the Olympics and how they execute them, to the ramifications experienced by host city residents. Using both empirical and theoretically-based case studies of past Olympic host cities, this literature review attempts to sketch out the conditions and exigencies that inform mega-event preparations. The ‘Olympic Planning Equation’ is an idiom that I created. The use of term ‘equation’ suggests that there is a degree of predictability regarding the production of mega-events,
due to their universal appeal to regimes of urban governance, and the fairly consistent methodology by which they are executed. The Olympic Planning Equation also suggests that mega-events create an exogenous shock, governed by the conditions specific to sporting mega-events (the immutable timeline for preparations, the globally mediated spotlight, the high volume international tourism and the need for tourism and leisure sites, sport-oriented urban development etc.), which temporarily suspend the normal function of urban governance and flow of urban life.

There are three conclusions that are reached from this line of inquiry. The first is that the negative impacts experienced by host-city residents are directly correlated with the mega-event ambitions of the host city, and the manner in which they produce their Olympic city. This enables us to determine that the host-city is the active agent driving the Olympic preparations and their negative consequences, rather than the IOC and their stipulations for Olympic host-cities\(^1\). The term city is a misnomer however, because it implies that the city is an autonomous actor, or a representative unit of the diverse interests within a city (Marcuse 2005). In the context of mega-event preparations, ‘Olympic stakeholders’ more appropriately implies that there are agents and actors who actively pursue and benefit from the Olympics; thus, it is imperative to understand mega-event impacts as specific to the ambitions and methodology of those who converged in its pursuit. The final conclusion reached by the Olympic Planning Equation is that the processes that facilitate mega event preparations invert and suspend the form and function of public institutions, making them beholden to agents and strategies of capital

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\(^1\) The type of analysis, which tries to put blame on either the host city or the IOC for the method and consequences of mega-events preparations, is not uncommon. See Pentifallo and VanWynsberghe (2012) for an analysis of why environmental programs have figured more prominently in recent Olympic bid, and how Rio specifically is the latest host-city to perpetuate the trend of promising more dense environmental programs in their bid documents.
accumulation, rather than the provision of public services and the protection of civic rights. As such, mega-event preparations are inherently unaccountable, undemocratic, and unjust.

In part two of this work, I will apply the Olympic Planning Equation to Rio de Janeiro’s current preparatory efforts to host the 2016 Summer Olympic Games. Specifically, I intend to situate the negative impacts being experienced by cariocas (residents of Rio) within the context of Rio’s mega-event ambitions and implementation. In Rio, the insights and deductions of the Olympic Planning Equation are already evident four years on, and are manifesting in a variety of ways. To demonstrate this, I offer five examples of the processes of political, legal, economic, social, and spatial restructuring that are occurring to facilitate Rio’s mega-event transformation. Each case study illustrates the ambitions, execution, and impact of a particular preparatory initiative, while also substantiating the centrality of capital accumulation in each. These examples also illustrate the ways in which democratic, participatory, and horizontal measures are being relegated to accommodate the exigent conditions of mega-event preparations. In the context of this study, democracy is defined as a condition wherein which elected public officials legislate on behalf of the interests of all citizens; and a condition in which citizens have particular mechanisms and strategies at their disposal to access local politics. The ‘inversion of democracy’ should therefore be interpreted as the perversion of political institutions, legal mechanisms, economic resources, social norms, and spatial strategies that citizens conventionally use.

Part three begins by chronicling a range of efforts currently underway to resist Rio’s Olympic preparations. By documenting these sites of contention, we are able to
understand that these efforts are inherently local, or of a localized nature: local residents are protesting local processes that are being driven by local actors. However, the insights gained from the Olympic planning equation and the case study of Rio de Janeiro, problematize the use of local channels to block or resist Olympic preparations. Simply put, if Rio’s Olympic preparations are being driven by local stakeholders who have unilaterally bound it’s political and legal institutions and economic resources to the production of the Games, then citizens trying to protest Olympic impacts using local channels are fighting a losing battle.

This conclusion requires us to formulate a qualitatively different approach to anti-Olympic activism. For this, we look to the work of scholars Keck and Sikkink (1998), who analyze the transnationalization of social movement contentions; this refers to the various ways in which local resistance movements take their struggle from the local to the transnational arena, by way of a scale-shift process. One of the ways that this can occur is by the boomerang theory, which observes that when local channels for political action are blocked, resistance efforts must elevate their claims to the transnational arena using advocacy networks and membership-based organizations, which will then help to put diplomatic or economic pressure on domestic institutions in order to incite change. In an effort to resolve the democratic deficits that are created at the local level when cities host sporting mega-events, and to theorize ways in which mega-event preparations can become less threatening for host-city citizens, I argue that the International Olympic Committee should take on a more proactive role in the preparation of Olympic host-cities. This section will conclude by exploring the reasons that the IOC is both an
appropriate and capable actor to pressure host-cities to execute their mega-events in a more democratic, participatory, and horizontal way.

In the final part of this work, I will issue a series of recommendations for ways in which the IOC can become a more direct mediator in host-city preparations. These recommendations are structured by a four-point rubric developed by scholar and activist Jan Aart Scholte, for ways in which institutions of global governance can become more accountable to their stakeholders. By stressing the need for transparency, evaluation, consultation, and correction, I offer fourteen recommendations to be mandated by the IOC, so that future Olympic host-cities will be able to effectively and democratically manage the diverse interests of all urban stakeholders. The landscape of sporting mega-events is changing rapidly, as more cities from the developing world vie to host this globally mediated urban spectacle. In acknowledging that the democratic traditions of these countries are often less institutionally grounded, analyses that look for alternative ways to strengthen anti-Olympic activism, and change the methodology of hosting mega-events, will become increasingly more relevant.
Chapter 2:

Part 1: Explicating the Olympic Planning Equation

Introduction

The ‘Olympic Planning Equation’ is the ideological and empirical sum of host city symptoms, situated within the grander logics of neoliberal economic restructuring. This section is a composite review of many scholarly works regarding the various effects that the Olympics have on urban planning, economic growth, political restructuring and social development. The equation has three component parts that seek to answer three questions about mega-event preparations: Why do cities pursue the opportunity to host the Olympics?; How do host-cities approach their mega-event preparations in order to achieve these objectives?; and What usually occurs as a result of these preparations?²

This comprehensive overview suggests that there is a degree of predictability in mega-event preparations, which links the perverse ramifications experienced by host-city citizens, to the aspirations and execution of mega-events. This part will conclude with a brief summary of the ways in which mega-event preparations affect civil society and democracy in a host-city.

What is a Mega-Event?

Mega-events like the Summer Olympics and the FIFA World Cup are referred to

² This framework for understanding mega-event preparations is echoed by Burbank, Andranovich, and Heying (2001). They frame their study within four similar questions: (1) How and why do cities seek to host mega-events? (2) How are policy decisions concerning mega-events made? (3) What are the outcomes of hosting a mega-event? (4) What can the conduct of mega-events tell us about urban politics generally?
as ‘hallmark’ or ‘landmark’ events. They are distinguished from smaller-events such as conferences and celebrations because of the tremendous resources that go into their preparation, and the physical legacies that are left for host cities. They are different from annual festivals in that they are hosted by a different city every four years, thus lending a qualitatively different character to their preparations; while past host-cities can offer tips for best practices, each host city must execute the Games within its extant urban form, under conditions and constraints particular to their city. Mega-events such as the Olympics are characterized as ‘discontinuous’, noting their “out of the ordinary, international and simply big composition” (Horne 2007). The scholarly definition most commonly cited understands mega-events as “large-scale cultural (including commercial and sporting) events, which have a dramatic character, mass popular appeal and international significance” (Roche 2000, 1).

The Olympic games are held in a different city every four years, true to the vision of French nobleman Pierre de Coubertin who revived the Games in 1896. The Games are an expression of Coubertin’s theory that physical exercise is the basis of a balanced education, and that organized sport should be an agent of international unity and social equality (Essex and Chalkley 2010). The second belief was informed by a growing sense of internationalism in the late nineteenth century. “This growing interaction [between nation-states] in international space initiated a new wave of globalization as new organizations were set up to establish rules for how nations were to interact with each other” (Short 2008). As such, he declared that the Olympic Games should be held in alternating locations as a means of promoting and diffusing the Olympic mission, while also allowing nations to compete in different cultural and political contexts.
Gold and Gold (2008) argue that there are several factors that make the Olympics a unique sporting event. The first is their ambulatory character, and the fact that their hosts are subject to an intensive bidding process. True to the vision of Coubertin, the IOC favors the principle of continental equity, preferring to see the Olympics travel on a rotating basis to all corners of the world (Poast 2007). As such, the Olympics are extraordinary rather than recurrent occurrences in the life of a city, meaning that “organizers inevitably face a steep learning curve by virtue of having to assemble from scratch the teams required to bring the Games to fruition and to establish their specific working practices” (Gold & Gold 2008). The Olympic, unlike other sporting mega-events, also comprise a set of interlocking festival components, rather than just a single theme. The ancient Olympics functioned as a panegyris: an assembly that combined religious rites, sporting competitions, and cultural performance. The modern Olympic games too have a cultural program, putting additional logistical strains on organizers. Finally, the Olympics are distinct by virtue of their scale, infrastructural provisions, and the proclivity to design complex, expensive stadia, warranting the title of ‘mega-projects’. “Defined as prestige schemes involving large-scale and high-risk investment over a lengthy period, mega-projects notoriously suffer heavy cost overruns, often fail to deliver the supposed benefits and regularly provoke financial crises” (Gold & Gold 2008). In the context of mega-events, these risks are exacerbated by the immutable timeline for completion, burdening projects with costly emergency onuses.

Nevertheless, the opportunity to host the Games has been consistently and eagerly received by various cities throughout the world. There was a time when major fairs, festivals, and expositions generated a similar excitement; at the turn of the century, these
occasions were seen as opportunities to showcase local urban planning, technological marvels, and cultural sites, as much as they were seen as opportunities to invest in infrastructure, beautification projects, and tourism programs (Essex and Chalkley 2010). As scientific and technological exchanges became more frequent over time, sporting mega-events seemed to eclipse the popularity of commercial fairs, and have come to assume increased significance in the promotion of global cities and in urban renewal strategies.

While there is a confluence of factors that explain the rise of sporting mega-events as the premiere, aggressively pursued urban spectacle, there are three that dominate the conversation: the growth of the global economy; changes and shifts in urban policy and urban governance; and the advent of global media coverage. Briefly, the globalized economy has intensified competition amongst cities to acquire hyper-mobile sources of capital and investment, and stimulate local growth (Gordon 1999; Hall & Hubbard 1996). Concurrently, urban policy has shifted away from its reliance on national economies, and pursued more autonomous, entrepreneurial strategies of stimulating local economic development (Harvey 1989; Owen 2002; Schimmel 2006). Finally, global media coverage and the highly mediated nature of Olympics consumption, facilitates the branding of cities and the exhibition of national culture, in addition to inserting the city in the heart of transitional media flows (Short 2008; Whitson & Macintosh 1996). Yet in order to fully understand the hegemony of the modern mega-event, it is important to understand exactly why cities are so eager to play host.
**Mega-Event Ambitions**

The emergence of the ‘sporting mega-event’ as the preeminent urban spectacle is contextual to the rise of the ‘mega-event strategy’: an approach to urban governance that privileges the pursuit of high profile, highly visible, short-term events. Nominally, all specific advantages related to the hosting of sporting mega-events can be categorized under the umbrella of the ‘mega-event strategy’. The pursuit of mega-events as a strategy of urban governance is the product of increasing inter-urban competition amongst cities in the twenty-first century (Burbank et al. 2001, 2002). “Cities are now part of a hierarchy of urban places in which power flows from global cities which serve as command centers, to peripheral cities who struggle for a significant place within the global urban hierarchy” (Hiller 2007). The hypermobility that characterizes the global age is analogous to why cities are increasingly engaging each other in global contests like hosting the Olympics. Inter-urban competition synthesizes the contest to attract hyper-mobile sources of national and foreign direct investment, portable individuals in the service-economy, multinational headquarters and able-tourists. Modern mega-events are seen as catalytic moments, and are associated with processes that would make metropolitan areas more economically competitive, thus explaining their nearly universal appeal in the global era. And, according to Short (2008), “Hosting the Olympics is akin winning the gold medal of global inter-city competition.”

It is important here to define key terms that will be used throughout this chapter, and whose obfuscation has led critical inquiry astray for far too long. Marcuse (2006) offers sage commentary on the perverse use of the term ‘city’ and the distortions its use
has created. He focuses on three ‘perverse’ uses: the city as an actor or active agent; the
city as a component, product or project of globalization; and the city as a unified
aggregate of groups, preferences or lifestyles. In contesting these uses, he posits that there
is no neutral understanding or use of the term ‘city’, and that an informed analysis would
view its form and function as embedded within the forces that polarize and unite.

Cities are made up of a variety of interests groups. They include representatives of
global capital that use cities as an organizational commodity to maximize profit,
but they also include disadvantaged local population groups who need the city as
a place to live. Competition, induced by globalization, may benefit businesses
linked to transnational corporations, but harm local neighborhoods. The outcome
in any given situation reflects a balance of contending interests. (Marcuse 2006)

Using this perspective, the notion of a host-city is charged with ideas of who is actually
hosting the Games, who is pursuing them, who is benefitting and who is loosing? The
literature on mega-event planning and mega-event politics do much to steer this debate.

A number of scholars have analyzed the pursuit of sporting mega-events within
the logics of the ‘regime theory’ in urban governance scholarship (Surborg et al. 2008;
Burbank et al. 2001). As explained by Burbank et al. in their study of the ‘mega-event
strategy’ and its effects on urban public policy: “A regime is an informal coalition
between local business leaders and city officials that unites the resources of business with
the formal authority of government, to carry out policies of mutual interest, most
commonly economic development” (Burbank et al. 2001,184). Regime theory is based on
the dual notion that: government institutions are controlled by public officials who are
formally elected and accountable based on a process of open elections; and that the
economy is dominated by private, non-governmental actors. Taken together, modern
urban governance is best described as a set of informal arrangements between political
leaders and members of the city’s business establishments (Burbank et al. 2001, 21).
Regime theory emphasizes the bringing together of resources to accomplish common goals. “In contrast to other approaches in urban politics, regime theory emphasizes that a regime is a mechanism for overcoming the fragmented power and limited resources that characterize local governments” (Burbank et al. 2001, 22). This theory explains the capacity to assemble and utilize the resources required to ‘capture’ a mega-event like the Olympics. It logically follows that any analysis of mega-event preparations must be positioned within the interests of the stakeholders that coalesced in an effort to obtain it.

Thus, the following analysis as to why a city would bid for the Olympics is more of an articulation of how different interests within the city could benefit from what the Games have to offer. In the context of this work, the term city will be used to refer to the various stakeholders implicated in Olympic development processes. Various scholarly works regarding the production of an Olympic city have determined that the stakeholders of Olympic development are most commonly the city’s political authorities, backed by the national government and business corporations such as those in real estate, construction and tourism (Essex & Chalkley 2010, Burbank et al. 2001). The following ‘advantages’ must be understood in the context of how they benefit these various stakeholders.

What are the supposed advantages to the Olympics? What advantages, perks, and opportunities do host-cities believe the Olympics will bring?

- **Federal Funding**: The preparations to host a sporting mega-event require large fiscal investments by the host-city, but also from the state and federal governments (depending on the government structure). These bodies are more willing to allocate funds for high-profile events like the Olympics because of the prestige that is associated with them, and the idea that this prestige will have residual effects on the entire nation. For example, the US National Olympic
Committee will receive petitions from an average of five US cities each bid cycle, all vying for the right to host the Games, and receive federal funding for urban development.

- **Foreign-Direct Investment:** Hosting the Olympics will also put host-cities and urban businesses in a competitive position for foreign-direct investment by multinational corporations who want to jump on the bandwagon of potential financing opportunities. As such, “The Games are now an important part of strategies used by city elites to boost the global integration and economic competitiveness of cities” (Short 2008).

- **Urban Revitalization:** New sources of financial revenue are predominantly directed towards infrastructure projects to prepare for the Games. However, in addition to the construction of sporting infrastructure, cities are also able to target their preparations towards the revitalization of run-down areas. Thus, the Olympics provide an opportunity to regenerate, beautify, restore, or refurbish various aspects of the urban environment (Hiller 2007). This principally began after Barcelona’s urban transformation for the 1992 Games; the city directed 83% of its Games-related expenditures towards revitalizing the old harbor, modernizing its airports, and expanding its cultural/tourism sector (Gold & Gold 2008).

- **Urban Entertainment Districts:** The project of regeneration is commonly geared towards the development of urban entertainment destinations (UED’s), or regions that focus on leisure or consumption-based activities. The growth of consumption-based places does not merely serve the ‘high-demand consumer behavior’ of Olympic tourists. Hiller (2007) suggests that UED’s “support the shift towards leisure consumption as a dominant theme in the new urban symbolic economy.” Whereas the city was once a space for spatial and labor-intensive activity, the post-modern service-based city is defined by consumptive leisure in culture, dining and entertainment. In the eyes of the urban merchant and municipal governments, these regions represent increased revenue sources through consumer spending.

- **Economically Competitive:** Urban makeovers are not limited to the construction of consumption-based leisure districts. “They are [also] designed to improve international linkages and a firmer insertion into the international circuits of capital flows, tourism, and the global circulation of urban images” (Short 2008). As such, the Olympics incentivize cities to restructure their urban environments for the increasingly competitive global marketplace.

- **City-Branding:** The Olympics are an occasion to engage in a transnational campaign of city branding, where the city can invest in a high-profile international public-relations campaign, with the opportunity to showcase the city to a global audience. “To compete successfully in a cacophony of rival international destinations and entertainment facilities requires a distinctive local profile” (Waitt 2008). Mega-events award cities the opportunity to brand their cityscape with iconographic architecture and art installations, as well as publicize the city’s unique natural features.

- **City Re-Branding:** The stage afforded by the city’s media spotlight also provokes a “temporary reorganization of the flows of urban and national images that
circulate around the world” (Short 2008). As such, “In the context of a global media spotlight, the spectacular staging of the Games becomes the setting for a dramaturgical remaking and representation of the city” (Short 2008). The narratives that are commonly generated are: the creation of the green city; the creation of the modern city; and the creation of the world city.

- Short (2008) argues that the, “Growing recognition of global warming and the emergence of an urban environmental movement now links with a city’s ‘greenness’ as a sign of urban competitiveness. Not to be green is now similar to being an industrial city, a sign of the past compared to the future, the old in contrast to the new, the pre-modern as opposed to the post-modern.” As such, the Olympics offer the opportunity to demonstrate a city’s global sensibilities by integrating green building concepts, attending to urban pollution, and improving public transportation grids. The Millennium Games in Sydney were the first to incorporate the environmental agenda into its Olympic preparations, and its branding campaign.

- “Hosting the Olympics provides the opportunity for citywide, coherent planning to create a modern city” (Short 2008). Modifications to create a modern city commonly attend to public transportation and consumption needs, but can also generate a desire to remove historical or colonial urban vestiges, similar to what occurred in preparation for the Beijing 2008 and Athens 2004 Olympics.

- Because the Olympics are highly mediated, and attract visitors from a particular international class, cities pursue urban development and image-campaigns that are geared towards the elevated standards of international viewers/consumers; Carter (2006) terms this the ‘economy of appearances’. The predilection with the international consumer is related to the competition among cities for tourism revenues and foreign-direct investment, or the ‘sport of cities’ (Carter 2006). By focusing on the development of ‘world class’ facilities, cities are also able to demonstrate their status as ‘world class’ cities.

- **Highly-Visible**: The Olympics are the most internationally watched spectacle in modern times. Being that they are a highly mediated event, the Games offer the city an opportunity to show its people, its culture and its development to the world. As such, “The media coverage also grounds urban images, national sentiments and global concerns in complex and interrelated representations of the city, the nation, and the international community” (Short 2008). Harvey (1989) refers to the use of ‘urban spectacle’, such as major sporting events, as one of the main products of post-modern society and a key means by which cities express their personality, enhance their status, and advertise their position on the global stage.

- **Revise Urban Images**: The Olympics also offer the opportunity to rewrite or correct negative associations that the city might have with features of urban crime, underdevelopment or ‘problem places’ (Waitt 2008). The Games are thus seen as an opportunity to correct these problems (if only superficially), and to present itself as an effective manager of urban space and social relations. Rio de
Janeiro is associated with high crime rates and urban violence, and is strategically structuring their Olympic campaign to reverse these stereotypes.

- **World Player**: “Participation in the Games is now integral to being a member of the international community. It is no accident that countries formerly shunned or marginalized because of their role in international affairs sometimes seek redemption through the Games” (Short 2008). Beijing is a textbook example of how China used the Olympic platform to project a modernized aesthetic, attend to and correct images of environmental degradation, and more broadly solidify its role in the new world order. Likewise, Short (2008) observes that, “Because of the heavy infrastructural requirements of hosting such a large international event, it is only the larger, richer cities that are serious candidates to host the Summer Olympics.” Thus, capturing a sporting mega-event is akin to reaching the status of a ‘large, rich, capable’ city.

- **Upgrade Transportation and Communication Infrastructure**: One of the most consistent urban legacies of hosting the Olympics comes from the ability to upgrade and modernize urban transportation and communications infrastructure. The Games require the ability to shuttle a large-influx of visitors to different parts of the city; thus, a high-speed and efficient transport system is a requirement for host-cities. As Kassens-Noor (2012) argues, transportation improvements are commonly at the core Olympic bids to the IOC, because they can offer the broadest legacy for host-city citizens.

- **Demonstrate Trade Liberalization**: Economic studies that assess the positive economic growth of Olympic host cities have shown that hosting, and even bidding to host the Olympics, signals a country’s openness to trade with other countries. Thus, if countries want to expand their export sector, studies have shown positive correlations between rises in exports and hosting the Olympics (Rose & Spiegel 2012). Beijing 2008 is illustrative of this, as China was accepted into the WTO just six months after it was selected to host the 2008 Olympics.

- **Technical Capacity**: Playing host to the Olympic games offers the host-city the opportunity to show that is capable of organizing large-scale events which require coordination, creativity, organization and technical savvy; this is also referred to as the “show-case” effect (Hiller 1989). As British Prime Minister David Cameron said after the London 2012 Games concluded, “The British brand has never been stronger...We put on an incredible show in London in 2012, that was a fantastic advertisement for modern Britain and all that we can achieve” (Mackay 2012).

- **Future events**: The Olympics are the ultimate sporting mega-event in the sense that the technical capacity to produce an event of this scale demonstrates a city’s ability to host other events; in addition to the fact that the Olympics will equip the city with the venues necessary for future events and expositions. According to Short (2008), “A city that has hosted the Games has increased its stock and value of athletic venues, improved infrastructure, created new political alliances and positive imaginary that can then be used in subsequent competitions.”

- **Job Stimulus**: The Olympics offer an opportunity for job stimulation in almost every sector of the economy: tourism, construction, hospitality, food and services, retail (Kasimati 2003). Job creation and economic diversification means that the
city is increasing its tax base, enabling it to invest in, provide, and extend public services, urban maintenance, and security.

- **Advance Projects**: The Olympics also offer an exceptional opportunity to advance and finance projects, initiatives, and campaigns that were previously lacking political and fiscal support (Short 2008). This rationale is commonly used in the context of developing dilapidated areas, but extends to renovations on public transportation, cultural areas, or housing developments. “The Olympic Games provide obvious economic benefits to the city as a whole because they accelerate projects already in the pipeline, force national and state urban expenditures, and mobilize spending that may remain blocked without the deadline of an opening ceremony to a global media audience” (Short 2008). The revitalization of Rio de Janeiro’s Port region, and cleanup of Sydney’s Homebush Bay, were both facilitated because of the Olympics.

- **Apolitical Impetus for Urban Development**: The Olympics also afford an apolitical reason for urban development, which ostensibly enables it to pursue Olympic-related preparations with less resistance and criticism. In the same vein, revitalization and general improvement projects that occur within the years leading up to the Olympics are extended the same courtesy, giving the city a window of opportunity to pursue controversial, or unevenly distributed projects.

- **State of Exception/Emergency**: This atmosphere of urgency and exception is connected to the ‘exigencies of the mega-event’. Such pressures are derived from the condensed, fixed timeline of the mega-event, the requirements of international sport federations, and the stress of needing to impart a precise urban image. “The brute reality of such severe deadlines overcomes political resistances, bureaucratic logjams and administrative inertia” (Short 2008).

- **Manufacture Consent via Nationalism**: The Olympics also manufacture an environment of consent because host-city preparations are linked to notions of national pride and the international spotlight. As Short (2008) argues, “In a time of frayed and fraying civic connections, bidding for and hosting the Games holds both the promise and reality of creating a sense of solidarity, a feeling of communal ownership of the event and the collective goodwill during and immediately after the Games. The Games tap into large reservoirs of civic pride and deep feelings of urban community.” Waitt (2008) counters by noting that, “Following the logic of the ‘bread and circus’ formula, social injustices and inequalities are seemingly forgotten in the euphoria of entertainment provided by the festival.” In this light, the Olympics offer an opportunity to cast off critics as naysayers, or impediments to national development and progress.

- **Commercial Advertising Recognition**: The corporatization of the Olympic Games is eloquently described in an IOC document: “As an event that commands the focus of the media and the attention of the entire world for two weeks every other year, the Olympic Games are the most effective international corporate marketing platform in the world, reaching billions of people in over 200 countries and

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3 For a detailed explanation of the rationale(s) used to justify Olympic preparations, see Lenskýj (2008, 18). She offers five justifications for the “inconveniences” that disadvantaged residents of Olympic host-cities have to tolerate “for the greater good”: the ticking clock argument; the eyes of the world argument; the Olympic leverage argument; the Olympic catalyst argument; and the intangible benefits argument.
territories throughout the world” (IOC 2007). As such, the Games are guaranteed to attract recognition from multinational corporations, and transnational product campaigns.

**The Olympic Brand:** Olympic boosters often claim that the real value of the Games comes from being associated with the Olympic image (Burbank et al. 2001). In this context, the Olympic brand is analogous to ideas about international cooperation, economic stability, fair play, and respect for rules and for human rights. The Olympic brand, and sport in general, is also linked to the notion that sport unites us all; host cities thus seem more global, and open because of the common emphasis on sport.

**Enticing Residents:** While world-class facilities attract a tourist demographic that is advantageous for urban revenue streams, features like modern public transportation systems and vibrant cultural districts also appeal to the demands of residents as well. “In the logic of civic boosterism, festivals as external ‘image builders’ help to secure the future financial base of urban places, regardless of their size, by enhancing a municipal authority’s ability to court not only tourists and private investors, but also the so-called ‘service class’ or ‘creative-class’-including those employed in the arts, web design, information-technologies, and media. Urban festivals as a mechanism of place-branding become part of the logic of why the creative class may choose to live in or visit what are thought of as ‘hip’, ‘cool’, ‘happening’, ‘dynamic’, ‘vibrant’, ‘winning’ places” (Waitt 2008).

**Training Facilities:** Venues such as sport training facilities are highly specialized sites that can offer unique advantages to the residents that live near them (Hinch & Higham 2011). They can be converted into private gyms for residents, universities, or housing complexes, but they can also be used in a social development capacity, for the athletic training of the city’s next generation of Olympic athletes.

**Safe City:** Finally, the Games are also an opportunity to revamp and equip the city with the most modern security and surveillance technologies. While heightened security requirements conform to the host-city’s obligations stipulated by the IOC, cities look fondly on opportunities to increase security as a means of enhancing social control and order. Addressing urban crime and increasing security is also a way to demonstrate that the city is safe (for residents, corporations etc.)

**Rare Opportunity for Underdeveloped Cities:** While these are appealing advantages for any city, mega-events offer developing or underdeveloped countries an exceptional, catalytic opportunity to shift from being a peripheral to a core city in the global economy. While developing countries commonly lack vital urban infrastructures that the Games’ urban legacies can provide, the Olympics can afford even greater, immaterial rewards. Greene (2003) argues that, “Mega events in the developing world are often motivated, at least in part, by a desire to demonstrate that the host country embraces international legal norms. In addition to recasting the image of the host city as a hospitable location for tourism and leisure activities, mega-events in the developing world can help the host country assure tourists and potential investors that it respects human rights and the rule of law.” Furthermore, international institutions like the IOC and the World Bank
appear as if they’re giving their approval to these cities, reifying the strength of the host country’s legal and political institutions.

*Mega-Event Execution*

While ‘regime theory’ is typically invoked to explain how Olympic stakeholders coalesce in the pursuit of sporting mega-events, the theory does not explain how their interests produce the economic, urban and image development desired by Olympic stakeholders. It does however signify that a multitude of interests are informing public policy: a characteristic of urban governance in an age of neoliberal economic restructuring. In order to understand how cities are approaching their mega-events preparations, it is important to understand how the mega-event strategy is related to the urban governance of modern cities, and to the more general shift towards neoliberal economics.

Explicitly, neoliberal urban restructuring has signaled a shift from *government* to *governance*, wherein which public policy and governments institutions have become more flexible, less accountable, and compositionally diversified. Modern cities are evaluated less by the health of their inhabitants, and more by the quality of their economies. Public policy has shifted to privilege the accumulation of capital, rather than the provision of public services. The modern era of urban governance, termed *new urban politics* (Cox 1993), is thus differentiated as the politics of growth, rather than the politics of income redistribution (Hall and Hubbard 1996).

In order to facilitate opportunities for capital accumulation, political and legal institutions have been restructured to incentivize investment and encourage business growth. Specifically, “Profound changes in the way that cities operate have seen the
public sector taking over characteristics once distinctive to the private sector: risk-taking, inventiveness, promotion and profit motivation” (Hall and Hubbard 1996). New urban politics is defined by the entrepreneurial activities and pursuits of public institutions. These include an understanding of the city as a ‘growth machine’, the advertising of cities through ‘place-marketing’, ‘urban redevelopment’ and ‘revitalization’. And, as Essex and Chalkey (2010) observe, “The transformation of urban politics to become less bureaucratic, more entrepreneurial and sometimes comparatively autonomous, has particularly manifested itself in the competition to host and manage events like the Olympics.”

According to Chalkley and Essex (1999), “In order that cities might exploit the full potential of hosting the Olympics, different approaches are demanded, characterized by speed, flexibility, initiative, networking, and a willingness to work with a range of other public and private-sector bodies.” Mega-event preparations are intimately informed by the logics and priorities of neoliberal urban governance.⁴ Mega-events impose mechanisms of privatization, militarization ‘free-trade’, global branding, hollowing out of social services, the public subsidy of infrastructures that meet the demand of increasingly mobile sources of global capital, similar to that which is imposed by neoliberal governance regimes (Gaffney 2010e). The following list explores the various strategies that host-cities employ to execute their mega-event preparations. In particular, this section asks: How does a host-city politically, legally, economically, socially, and spatially restructure itself in order to host the Games? It is important to keep in mind that these arrangements are complicit in the pursuit of the mega-events’ supposed advantages.

(as theorized by the Olympic stakeholders). Yet they also correspond with the characteristic, reoccurring adaptations and modifications that take place when urban governments prioritize capital accumulation over the well being of their citizens and the health of their city. Each trend embodies a different shift in the urban condition of host cities. By and large, we can observe that: political institutions prioritize the needs of capital over the needs of citizens; legal institutions are compromised to facilitate economic growth; economic resources are diverted from public services to leisure infrastructures; society is partitioned based who conforms to the new image of the city; and space is militarized to guarantee order and restrict movement.

How do cities approach their mega-event preparations?

- **Public-Private Partnerships (PPP):** One of the principle arrangements in the production of an Olympic host city is the use of public-private partnerships. PPP’s can describe a number of different arrangements:
  - Some Olympic-related projects and venues are auctioned off by state agencies, and contracted out to private entities for execution and readiness based on the timeline of the Games.
  - In other cases, Olympic cities will privatize public goods and contract-out entire urban services if they feel that they are not capable of producing the renovations or service improvements in a timely manner. An example of this is the privatization of airports, or the use of private security guards, in addition to public security officers like the police or military. Another example is the use of private trash collection agencies to deal with civil services within privatized venues.
  - Public and private actors often hold positions on the Olympic organizing committees, stratifying the interests of Olympic preparations, and making them beholden to diverse, often unknown, entities.
- **Public Financing:** By in large however, Olympic preparations are financed using public tax revenues (Hiller 2007). Host-cities often rely on federal, state, and municipal funds, as well as loans from international banks. Host-cities use public tax dollars to finance both sporting infrastructure as well as necessary upgrades for other infrastructure projects. Pension funds for government employees have also been used to finance projects.
- **Privatizing Stadia:** In order for this to be an economically viable model, host cities have had to devise ways to recuperate their investment. One such strategy
involves the selling of Olympic-related infrastructure like sports stadia, once the Games have concluded. For example, the Atlanta Braves stadium was an Olympic venue for the 1996 Games. This commonly occurs because the scale and requirements for Olympic-related venues are disproportionate to post-event potential uses, in addition to the fact that upkeep and security for vacant venues is too costly. Thus, sporting infrastructure is commonly sold to private sport franchises during the preparatory stages, or once the Games have concluded. In this case, “The costs are borne by public authorities while the revenues are privatized by private or non-profit organizations that are neither democratically elected nor publically accountable” (Short 2008). In many instances where stadia have been sold to recoup the initial financial investment made by taxpayers, subsequent sporting and entertainment events have been notoriously overpriced, thus excluding a large portion of the population from enjoying the Olympics’ structural legacies.

• *Business-Friendly Strategies:* Deregulation and tax breaks are often a part of the Olympic preparatory strategy, as the city is trying to attract businesses and multinational corporations; this is referred to as ‘growth politics’ (Molotch 1993). In an attempt to stimulate investment, governments are known to provide tax abatements, low-interest loans, direct grants, revenue bonds, and land allocation (Schimmel 2006).

• *Multi-Scale Political Coordination:* In order to effectively bid for the Games and execute related preparations, the organizing committee needs to demonstrate political and financial support from all levels of government. Executing mega-event preparations often require large investments from the federal, state and municipal level, requiring political teamwork and coordination. Directing federal funds towards the preparations of a host-city also requires that funds be taken from other cities; thus, all parties need to be in agreement on subsidizing and prioritizing the development and wellbeing of one city over another.

• *Supranational Actors:* In addition to the public-private entities that comprise organizing committees, some organizations involved with Olympic-developments are supranational, comprising individuals and entities from multinational corporations, international sporting federations, and other bodies not subject to domestic laws or democratic appointment. Surborg et al. (2008) call this the ‘growth machine diaspora’, a term that calls attention to the idea that growth machine politics are no longer limited to local businesses, but include “transnational multi locale actors, who can be a part of multiple local regimes and thus transcend the powerful dichotomy between the global and the local.”

• *Extra/Supra Legal Mechanisms:* Host-cities commonly legislate Olympic laws, which give extra-judicial power to developments projects and entities related to the Olympics. Laws and decrees that accommodate Olympic preparations usually expire after the Games are held, meaning that Olympic preparations afford the city a window of opportunity to expedite development bureaucracy, regarding procedures like building codes and zoning regulations (Gratton & Preuss 2008). These laws are also known to give tax breaks for companies working with the Olympics, subsidizing Olympic preparations and allowing huge earning potential for companies who win Olympic contracts.
• **Relaxation of Planning Processes**: Special legislation is often enacted to relax or streamline planning processes to ‘fast track’ Olympic development. For Sydney’s mega-event preparations, Owen (2002) notes how “The relaxation of planning processes, for example, not requiring environmental impact statements for Olympic developments, enabled organizing authorities to have most Olympic facilities ready nearly twelve months in advance of the opening ceremony.”

• **Exceptional Planning Conditions**: A common characteristic of mega-event preparations is the imposition of a ‘state of emergency’ or ‘state of exception’ planning discourse (Gaffney 2011d; Stavrides 2008, Boyle & Haggerty 2009). These states describe a condition wherein which the exigencies of mega-event preparations (e.g. the strict timeline, externally imposed requirements, the international spotlight) manufacture an environment which enables organizers to bypass political procedures, legal requirements, public participation and civic dialogue. These extraordinary conditions manufacture an environment of consent, in which dissent is cast off as an impediment to preparations.

• **Global City Discourse**: One of the reasons why state of emergency planning techniques are so successful is that they are situated within a discourse that promotes the global city imaginary: “A vision of a self consciously ‘global’ city replete with images of busy international airports, foreign tourists, inward investment, a cosmopolitan atmosphere, creative industries, cultural economies and an overwhelmingly positive image shared around the world” (Short 2008). Olympic stakeholders use this image to promote and justify all manner of policies and programs. “Elites and urban political regimes call on this image to generate public support for projects, to justify tax incentives and business-friendly policies in an era of neoliberal economics and sometimes to support multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism” (Short 2008).

• **Nationalist Discourse**: Another discourse that is used in the selling and preparation of a sporting mega-event is that of nationalism. Boosters of the Games routinely evoke feelings of community as well as intense national pride (Short 2008). “Through embracing an ideology of city marketing, municipal authorities not only provide a rally point to re-affirm citizens’ identities but also enhance local loyalty or patriotism” (Waitt 2008). Nationalism is also invoked to create an environment where the reputation of the city is riding on citizen support, cooperation and acceptance of the city’s mega-event trajectory. Those who resist or try to disrupt the city’s preparations, or those who contradict the city’s new public relations image, are cast off as unpatriotic and hazardous.

• **‘Street Cleaning’**: In order to ready the urban environment for international investors and foreign tourists, Olympic host-cities often engage in a social cleansing of the streets to remove any signs of urban poverty or decay. “A key part of the host city’s image-building process involves the ‘disappearing’ of homeless people and slum housing, lest potential tourists and investors be deterred by sights and sounds that are incompatible with the ‘world-class city’ image” (Lenskyj 2008). These initiatives commonly utilize legislation that criminalizes the poor, such as mechanisms that make trash picking, loitering, informal peddling, and sleeping in public places illegal (Carmichael 2009, Lenskyj 2001).
• **Construct New Narratives:** In preparing for the Olympics, cities often engage in a reflexive process of advancing a narrative about the city and its people. Commonly, this History conforms to how the city wants to be seen, while censoring and excluding the histories of many of their inhabitants. “The essentialist language of place-marketing erases place-based differences because ‘friendliest’, ‘biggest’ and ‘safest’ become part of every locality’s quest to secure investment, tourists and the ‘creative-class’” (Waitt 2008). Controversial, racial, or radical elements of a city’s past are often ignored, privileging a more agreeable version history.

• **Achieving Uniqueness:** Museums and exhibitions, commonly located in the city’s new urban entertainment districts, are one way in which host-cities generate these mainstream histories. Likewise, organizing committees often hire famous architects and artists to brand the cityscape with interesting and memorable sites for Olympic tourists. While they are often enormous expenditures, these sites of cultural consumption also contribute to refashioning the city’s historic districts, driving people away from traditional sites and towards these new zones.

• **Securing the city:** A common feature in the production of an Olympic city is security (Boyle & Haggerty 2009; McRoskey 2010). While the IOC imposes a number of its own security obligations, host-cities often inflate these requirements in an effort to secure their own agenda of control and order. Common techniques to achieve this end include: zero-tolerance policing; the militarization of urban space; private policing; intensive surveillance technologies; and architectural and environmental ‘target-hardening’ designed to deter transgressive behaviors (Fussey, Coaffee, Armstrong & Hobbs 2012). According to McRoskey (2010), information on the most recent Olympic Games suggest that, rather than root out threats and sources of insecurity, mega-event preparations seek merely to contain and conceal violence.

• **Regulate Protests:** Lastly, in order to guarantee that the production of the Olympic-city is not delayed by protests or political resistance; in order to generate the appearance of public support and national pride; and in order to secure areas in and around Olympic venues: cities often prohibit movement, and curtail civil liberties and freedom of speech during the Games (Lenskyj 2000, 2008, 2010). Lenskyj (2008) notes that in order to uphold Rule 61 of the Olympic Charter, which bans political protest from venues, “Such guarantees can only be made through enacting legislation that suspends the basic right to freedom of speech and freedom of public assembly that characterizes a democratic society.” While venues are designated no-protest zones, host-cities often take it upon themselves

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5 There are multiple factors that have contributed to rise of security as an integral element in the Olympic landscape. The 1972 terrorist attacks at the Munich games and the post 9/11 world has made security an integral feature of the Games and Games expenditures. However, as the Games have commonly been used a site for political protest by participating nations (e.g. boycotts), organizers fear that the Games will be high jacked as a platform to articulate the claims of resistance groups; this fear is heightened by the increasingly contestable nature of host-city Olympic preparations. Additionally, the Olympics locate athletes, politicians and celebrities under one roof, making an external attack even more opportune. For this reason, Olympic organizing committees have introduced a series of initiatives in order to protect and secure the city before and during the event.
to regulate and remove other forms of anti-Olympic protest, going so far as to remove signs from private property (Boykoff 2011).

*Mega-Event Symptoms*

The debate over mega-event preparations tends to focus on the economic impact of the event - the cost of the stadium, the value of a new hotel, or the tax revenues generated - rather than on its broader political and social ramifications (Burbank et al. 2001, 4; Roche 2002). Indeed, few studies to date have offered a comprehensive review of the transcendent trends and outcomes of hosting mega-events (Lenskyj 2008). The following list is a compilation of features associated with the hosting of modern mega-events, beginning around the time of their near-extinction (Montreal 1972) and their revival (Los Angeles 1984). It must be noted that the impacts associated with hosting the Olympics are as much linked to the city’s actual preparations, as they are to the processes of political, legal, economic, social, and spatial restructuring that took place in order to facilitate them. In this way, the use of the term *equation* is meant to suggest the predictable nature of these impacts, based on the ambitions and execution of modern mega-events.

What commonly occurs over the course of a host-city’s Olympic preparations? What are the reoccurring themes, trends, and conditions in the pre, during, and post-Games literature?

- **Criminalization of Poverty**: Olympic preparations have increasingly resulted in the criminalization of poverty, informality, and homeless (Lenskyj, 2002, 2008, 2010; Greene 2003; Pillay & Bass 2010), in an attempt to rid the streets and the television panoramas of signs of urban poverty. For example, the preparation of downtown 1996 Atlanta Olympics used intermittent sprinklers and sleep-proof benches, and the city even offered its homeless residents one-way bus tickets to other parts of the country, in an effort to clean up downtown Atlanta (Burbank et al. 2001).
• **Displacement:** The 1988 Seoul Olympics is said to have evicted 720,000 of its residents. For Beijing 2008, that number is cited at 1.7 million (Global Report on Human Settlements 2007). In preparation for sporting mega-events, citizens have been forcibly evicted from their homes under ‘imminent domain’ statutes or simply priced out of the neighborhoods they live in, and offered inadequate, inferior relocations, if they are offered compensation at all (Lenskyj, 2000; Searle, 2000; Owen 2002; Greene 2003). To date, the Center on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) has produced the most comprehensive study on displacements driven by mega-events (Fair Play for Housing Rights 2007). Evictions have commonly taken place in low-income neighborhoods, or slums, meaning that residents often have less legal grounds and fewer economic means to contest their eviction. “Under the logic of event-oriented development, the visibility of poverty becomes paramount in renewal schemes, and preparations often involve removing the poor from high-profile areas surrounding event venues, without significant attention to long-term solutions to slum problems” (Greene 2003). Greene calls attention to this type of socio-spatial restructuring by describing these environments as ‘staged cities’, “In order to highlight the tension between the mega-event as a means of constructing an image of ‘development’, and the actively concealed landscapes of the urban poor.”

• **Rising Real Estate Prices:** Mega-events have contributed to rising real estate prices, speculation, and gentrification near zones set for Olympic-related development, and even non-Olympic zones undergoing superficial urban or economic regeneration (Essex and Chalkley, 2010; Mckay & Plumb 2001; Hall & Hodges, 1997; Preuss 1998). For example, in the lead up to the Barcelona 1992 Olympics (between 1986 and 1993) residential property prices in Barcelona rose 250-300% (McKay & Plumb 2001). This tendency has become so predictable that Kavestos (2009) was able to construct a pricing model to calculate of how real estate values would increase ahead of the 2012 London Olympics.

• **Suspend Democratic Processes:** Public participation, civic dialogue and forthright communication is consistently relegated in order to fast-track Olympic projects. Owen’s (2002) study of Sydney’s preparations observes that, “By removing planning power from local governments, the Olympic organizers were thus much less accountable to the community than under normal circumstances.” In some cases, temporary, emergency-style Olympic-legislation allows governments to alter their urban environment so rapidly that citizens do not have time to participate or react. In the after affects of what Gaffney (2011d) terms the ‘shock and awe tactics’ of sporting mega-event preparations, “Individuals and communities are either too traumatized to respond, have become anesthetized and passive, or have woken up under a new suite of laws that they are powerless to fight against as normal channels of governance have been eliminated.”

• **Concentrated Benefits:** Olympic preparations often result in an uneven distribution of Olympic legacies, because only a small minority are privy to Olympics planning processes. Hall and Hubbard (1996) accredit this to the elite pluralist positioning of regime theory, which recognizes that access to local politics is uneven, so that certain groups enjoy more favorable terms; for example, Owen’s (2002) study of preparations for the Sydney Olympics showed how
efficacious participation was determined by the socio-economic status of involved communities.

- **Sideline Extant Needs**: Accordingly, the preexisting needs of communities are often sidelined throughout the course of host-city preparations. “Less visible, localized community-oriented benefits are consistently sidelined and sacrificed in order to secure the more (literally) spectacular and globally oriented features of the games” (Fussey, Coaffee, Armstrong & Hobbs 2012). Harvey (1989 b) attributes this to the creation of ‘voodoo cities’ in which “the cultural economy of festivals is a façade to conceal the ongoing disinvestment and diverging access to employment and services” (Waitt 2008). Broudehoux (2007) suggests that the spatial concentration of Beijing’s Olympic venues ‘undermined the principles of spatial justice’: “By concentrating capital in certain sectors of the city, while depriving others of investments, Olympic redevelopment exacerbated preexisting socio-spatial polarization, further disenfranchising Beijing’s new poor while allowing its new rich to expand their control over the urban core.”

- **Exacerbate Inequalities**: The Olympic games have consistently concentrated profits and benefits among Olympic stakeholders, while exacerbating existing social inequalities and economic disparities, and prolonging the underfunded, poor quality of public services. According to Short (2008), “The existing analyses suggest that the distribution of costs and benefits is regressive with most of the costs borne locally, especially by the more marginal urban residents displaced to make way for the Games, while most of the benefits accrue to local elites and a global media market.” Schimmel (2006) observes that the resultant concentration of benefits is symptomatic of the ‘social dependency on private capital’, thereby critiquing a mode urban governance that legislates on the basis of capital accumulation, rather than the direct provision of public services.

- **Disadvantage the Disadvantaged**: Poor residents are disadvantaged by mega-events preparations in a myriad of ways. Investing tax dollars in sporting infrastructure takes away available funds for the provision of indispensable public services. Olympic developments concentrate profits among Olympic stakeholders since preparations bore in mind special interests over the welfare of all citizens. Consumption-based leisure zones spatially exclude those who can’t afford their activities. Poor residents are priced out of neighborhoods that come to assume increased accessibility via public transport and public safety. And, as Waitt (2008) notes, “The poor are often times more disadvantaged than other groups, specifically because their socio-economic status constrains their ability to mobilize effective community resistance.”

- **Public Deficits**: Expedited timelines (referred to as ‘accelerated development’) because of derisory planning has resulted in exacerbated budgets (Gaffney 2010e; Burton 2003; Owen 2002; Whitson & Horne 2006), behind-closed-doors contracts, and negligent outcomes. Budget overruns and the resulting public debt can be attributed to the lack of oversight over organizational committees; paying workers overtime in order to make sure that all Games-related projects are completed in time; and the lack of foresight as to how venues required for the mega-events will be utilized once the Games have concluded. Taxpayers bare the burden of this debt in the form of increased municipal taxes, and price hikes for
public services. The Montreal 1976 Olympics put the city $1.2 billion in debt, which they only finished paying off in 2001. Unfortunately, Montreal was not unique, as every Olympics since the 1984 Los Angeles Game has accrued a deficit (Zimbalist 2011).

- **White Elephants**: Due to the requirements of the IOC, the strict timeline of preparations, and the pursuit of the Games with reckless abandon, many Olympic structures have no post-Games use, and become what are known as ‘white elephants’ (Lenskyj, 2000; Burton 2003; Searle 2000; Owen 2002). The term ‘white elephant’ refers to the burdensome possession felt by an owner who cannot dispose of an item, but whose cost is out of proportion to the items’ usefulness or worth. Vacant venues are not only expensive to maintain, but serve as a constant reminder of the inappropriate use of public space and resources. Hall and Hubbard (1998) link the creation of white elephants to the nature of the urban regime that coalesced in the pursuit of the mega-event: “The ephemeral nature of many coalitions tends to result in a piecemeal approach to urban development that lacks strategic foresight or long-term planning.”

- **Exclusive Urban Development**: Olympic bids tend to focus on the development or redevelopment of a concentrated zone, resulting in improvements that only benefit one part of the city (Horne and Manzenreiter 2006; Macintosh & Whitson 1993; Owen 2002). Moreover, targeted revitalization has a tendency to produce consumption-based spaces, meaning that many of the city’s residents are excluded from enjoying these new zones.

- **Illogical Urban Circuits**: The targeted development of a specific portion of the city has also resulted in new urban configurations that make little sense with the extant urban form and areas of high population density, or the flow of people from their residences to employment districts. This wasteful use of resources often occurs at the expense of existing areas in need of service and infrastructure improvements. For example, new transportation routes are conceptualized and implemented that only make sense for Olympics travel (i.e. airport to venues), and run counterintuitive to the city’s traffic patterns and commercial districts; Gaffney (2010e) refers to these as ‘sportive constellations’ or ‘Olympic geography’.

- **Advance Unpopular Initiatives**: Olympic preparations also tend to authorize projects that have had little funding or support in the past, making them a reality using tax dollars, government subsidies, and the supposed ‘exigencies of the mega-event’. In the absence of public dialogue, this has meant that controversial, illegal, unethical, or discriminatory projects have often been advanced in the exceptional atmosphere of mega-event preparations.

- **Sideline Environmental Concerns**: For example, Olympic projects often take place in environmentally protected zones or zones rich in bio-diversity because of their aesthetic appeal. To do so, they often violate environmental protection laws, which are suspended for Olympic-related projects (Roper 2006). The Millennium Games in Sydney, Australia introduced the trend of locating Olympic venues on

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6 The term derives from the story of the Kings of Siam, wherein white elephants were presented to redundant employees, in order to financially ruin the recipient because of the cost of maintaining the animal (Mangan 2008).
former toxic sites such as landfills, as a way of both clearing land for Olympic development and rehabilitating environmentally hazardous areas (Preuss 2004).

- **Environmental Impact:** While the Games have tried to integrate ‘green’ architectural concepts and other environmentally conscious building principles into their Olympic preparations, the Olympics are an inherently wasteful event with a large environmental footprint (Collins 2009; Preuss 2012; Roper 2006). While most recent host-cities have tried to integrate both permanent and ‘collapsible’ venues, the air and noise pollution required for venue construction remain a constant. Notwithstanding the transportation of athletes, media personnel, and tourists to the host-city, the daily transport of visitors to and from various venues creates immense traffic and pollution for host-cities. The high volume of visitors also produces an enormous amount of trash and sewage.

- **Inflated Economic Projections:** Studies have also shown that the economic impact of sporting mega-events projected by boosters *ex ante* have exaggerated the net economic benefit of the Games, often to the detriment of tax players and investors (Matheson 2006). “The persistence [of cost overruns] suggests international low-balling of bids and the generation of cost-benefit analyses more sensitive to benefits than costs” (Short 2008). Oliveira (2011) argues that in general, *ex ante* economic studies pose a number of problems: they overvalue the money non-residents bring to the host-city; there is a lack of accurate information about mega-event expenditures, especially those that differentiate costs in the public and private sector; the atmosphere of boosterism that permeates dialogue and eliminates objective discussion of real cost-benefit analysis, also puts weight behind the justification of high spending for mega-events; and because there is rarely discussion of alternative uses of public resources.

- **Prohibitive Gigantism:** On a systemic scale, Short (2008) notes that, “The increasing size of the Games is leading to both an increased competition to host the Games, but a narrowing of the range of cities that can host them.” To describe this phenomenon, he sites Houston’s failed bid to the 2012 Games. “Local residents, for example, are often encouraged to support Olympic bids with the rhetoric of ‘putting the city on the world map’, a campaign of making and reaffirming its global city status… However, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) rejected the bid because the city did not have enough of an international profile. In other words, the very cities that are desperate to host the Games, because they are in the wannabe global city category, are the ones most likely to fail” (Short 2008). While the current scale of mega-event preparations is a disservice to Coubertin’s desire for a rotating host city, Short’s observation also calls attention to the unsustainable nature and demands of contemporary sporting mega-events.

- **Legally buffer Sponsors:** In hosting the highly commercialized Games, the host-city assumes the legal responsibility of protecting Olympic corporate sponsors. In an attempt to thwart ‘ambush marketing’ (using Olympic insignia to sell goods and products without paying sponsorship fees), host-cities are forced to censor billboard advertising, and require that patrons remove food, drinks, and clothing with logos of non-sponsors (Short 2008). For the duration of the Games, Olympic laws also mandate that in places like airports, or on public transportation, host-
cities suspend existing commercial contracts, and replace them with advertisements of Olympic sponsors.

- **Favor Global > Local**: Favoring transnational brands over local products and businesses is one way in which the global elements of sporting mega-events negate the local (Andrews & Ritzer 2007). Waitt (2008) extrapolates on this contradiction by deciphering the logic of festival-oriented celebrations which manage the demands of the local and transnational actors: “Once a festivals’ time and space becomes commodified within entrepreneurial approaches designed to encourage people to spend money, the sense of collective identity can only be illusory or, at best, a public relations exercise” (Waitt 2008). Consequently, Olympic preparations that privilege multinational brands and global consumption models negate efforts to highlight local cultural traditions. Furthermore, Olympic-sponsored merchandise is frequently imported, generating few economic benefits or employment opportunities for the host country (Berkes 2009).

- **Exclude Independent Vendors**: The Game’s corporate sponsors hold a virtual monopoly over all food and products sold at the Games and within a certain radius of Olympic zones. This has contributed to the crowding out of informal or small-scale vendors, prohibiting entrepreneurs and local businesses from taking advantage of the additional sources of revenue (Hall 2006). Overall, studies have shown that informal vendors face displacement and more stringent regulation of their activities (Duminy & Luckett 2012).

- **Monopolized Corporate Sponsorship**: And with a price tag of over $100 million for each corporate sponsor, it is only the multinational giants that have access to the near blanket media coverage, and legal guarantees of Olympic sponsorship (Kalogeropoulos 2012). This is a missed opportunity, as the Olympics would be a catalytic advertising platform for brands of the host nation.

- **Uncritical Media**: Lenskyj (2008) posits that because of the lucrative advertising potential of the Games, mass media that relies on commercial contracts is often uncritical and silent on issues related to the Games and their preparations. Another component to the uncritical media coverage of the Games is what Lenskyj (2008) calls ‘the Olympic gravy train’, which questions the “objectivity, accuracy, and autonomy” of those journalists who have gained exclusive access to covering the Olympics with all of their fringe benefits, “in exchange for giving favorable treatment to all things Olympic” (Lenskyj 2008). In her estimation, the fact that the Olympics manufactures an environment that impedes honest investigative journalism, qualifies as a way in which the Olympics violate human rights.

- **Homogenized Cities**: The eleven corporations who win Olympic contracts Disney-fy Olympic sites with their corporate logos, generating the appearance of a culturally homogenous setting, irrespective of the rotating host city (Waitt 2008; Urry 1995). Yet this “creeping urban homogeneity” is not exclusively produced by the appearance and commercialization of venues. Schimmel (2006) observes how efforts to revitalize or ‘reimagine’ cultural/leisure districts by branding them with cultural sites that highlight their uniqueness, has ultimately produced

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7 Over half of London’s Olympic merchandise was made in China (WantChinaTimes.org 2012).
uniform urban spaces (Salmon 2001, 111), or ‘non-lieux’ (non-places) (Waitt 2008).

- **Violate Civil Freedoms**: According to Lenskyj (2008), “The mass media and Olympic boosters, including elected representatives, have repeatedly bowed to Olympic industry pressure to suppress critical voices and to outlaw peaceful protest in recent bid and host cities” (Lenskyj 2008, 19). The Games restrict freedom of speech, movement, and assembly due to the requirements made by the IOC, but also due to the liberties taken by the host-city in order to maintain order and project an appearance of political stability and social cohesion. Mega-events allow the ‘corporate rights’ of sports-media-business alliances to trump the rights of urban inhabitants, including their right to use and produce urban space in an egalitarian manner. As such, mega-events consistently undermine the human rights that they are purported to promote (Duminy & Luckett 2012).

- **Suspending Labor Rights**: Workers rights are commonly relegated, violated, or ignored throughout Olympic preparations. Expedited timelines, large-scale projects, and tight budgets are the commonly cited as the reasons for such infractions (National Coalition of World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee Dossier 2012).

- **Militarization of Space**: The preparation and execution of the Olympics has often resulted in the militarization of urban space. In addition to the IOC’s security requirements, host cities often invest heavily in surveillance technologies to better monitor urban space, as well as “cleanse and increasingly civilize local populations” (Fussey et al. 2012). Additionally, host-cities will often create fortified enclaves, effectively privatizing public space and relegating public security to private firms. While the host city is mostly concerned with acts of terrorism that seek to disrupt the production of the Games, citizens have questioned if they have unknowingly made themselves targets of international terrorism in agreeing to play host to such a high profile event (Boykoff & Tomlinson 2012).

Figure 1: Olympic Planning Equation Chart is an attempt to present the preceding information in a different way. To reiterate, in using the term *equation*, the author intends to convey the interdependent quality of the ambitions and execution of sporting mega-events, as they indeed correlate and condition the event's ramifications.

The host city’s mega event Ambitions should be broadly understood under the umbrella category of urban governance strategies, specifically concerning the
way in which the host city approaches the health and future of its urban economy and urban infrastructure, the branding of its city, its dynamic relationship with the rest of the nation and with the nation-state, while also related to the specific advantages and conditions of the sporting mega-event itself. The qualities heretofore discussed regarding the way in which a sporting mega-event is Executed, can be broadly categorized as those which are related to the events’ financing, those related to the physical preparation of the host city, those related to the specific pursuit of the host city's mega-event ambitions, and that which is pursued to satisfy the requirements of the IOC. The third column of Figure 1 differs most dramatically from the information presented in the previous section on Ramifications. That is because, as stated, this chart attempts to link the ambitions of the host city, and its execution of the event, to the specific ramifications experienced by host city citizens. In this section, these ramifications as determined to be either the product of the host city and its stakeholders, a necessary byproduct of the event, or a direct result of the influence of the IOC. Some ramifications are the result of more than one catalyst. For example, it can be argued that rising real estate prices are the desired result of targeted gentrification, in an effort to stimulate growth and generate high returns on initial investment; yet it can also be argued that the prerequisite improvements to a given area would have resulted in real estate valorization no matter what. As the blame for, arguably, the most debilitating mega-event ramifications lies with the host city organizers and its Olympic stakeholders, this chart reifies the centrality of these agents in the negative ramifications experienced by host city citizens.
Figure 1: Olympic Planning Equation Chart

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambitions</th>
<th>Execution</th>
<th>Ramifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Urban governance strategy:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Financing:</strong></td>
<td><strong>Product of the host-city/Olympic stakeholders:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Economic:</em></td>
<td>• Public-private partnerships</td>
<td>• Criminalization of poverty/informality/homelessness</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Federal funding</td>
<td>• Public financing</td>
<td>• Concentrated urban benefits/improvements</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Foreign direct invest</td>
<td>• Privatizing staida</td>
<td>• Adverse affects for poorer residents: less money for public services/ cant afford consumption-based areas/priced out of homes/less political clout for resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Urban entertainment districts</td>
<td>• Multi-scale political coalitions</td>
<td>• Deepened inequalities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Advance stalled projects</td>
<td>• Extra-legal mechanisms</td>
<td>• Public debt born by tax payers</td>
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<tr>
<td>• City branding</td>
<td>• Business incentives</td>
<td>• White elephants: poor use of urban space/resources</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Security: secure city</td>
<td>• Relaxation of planning processes</td>
<td>• Illogical urban transportation circuits</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Appearance of Trade Liberalization</td>
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<td>• Advance unpopular initiatives</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Future events</td>
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<td>• Sideline environmental concerns</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Prove knowledge/ management capacity of city</td>
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<td>• Inflated economic projections by boosters</td>
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<td>• Job stimulus</td>
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<td>• Aesthetically homogenized cities</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Recognized as commercial platform</td>
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<td>• Violate civil freedoms: assembly/media</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Attract high value residents</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Violate/suspend workers rights</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Developing Nations: catalytic opportunity</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Militarize urban space</td>
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<tr>
<td><em>Infrastructure:</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Urban revitalization</td>
<td>• Extra-legal mechanisms</td>
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<td>• Urban entertainment districts</td>
<td>• Relaxation of planning processes</td>
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<td>• Advance projects</td>
<td>• Global city discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Upgrade transportation</td>
<td>• Street cleaning</td>
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<td>• Event-specific infrastructure</td>
<td>• Displacement</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Apolitical motive for urban development</td>
<td>• Resocialization via new urban narratives</td>
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<tr>
<td>• World class facilities</td>
<td>• Regulate resistance</td>
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<td>• Improve airports</td>
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<td>• Improve public transportation</td>
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<td>• Sport training facilities</td>
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<td>• Developing Nations: physical infrastructure</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>City Branding:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Highly visible mediated event</td>
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<td>• City branding images: world city/global city</td>
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<td>• Green city/modern city</td>
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<td>• World class city</td>
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<td>• Attracting advertisers</td>
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<td>• Attracting multinational corporations</td>
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<td>• Attracting positive value residents</td>
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<td>• Correct/revise negative urban</td>
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<td><strong>Preparing the host-city:</strong></td>
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<td>• Extra-legal mechanisms</td>
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<td>• Relaxation of planning processes</td>
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<td>• Global city discourse</td>
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<td>• Resocialization via new urban narratives</td>
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<td>• Security</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Achieving ambitions:</strong></td>
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<td>• Multi-scale political coordination/ interrelated interests</td>
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<td>• Business friendly incentives</td>
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<td>• State of exception/emergency</td>
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<td>• Global city discourse</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Product of the event:</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Rising real estate prices/gratification/speculation</td>
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<td>• Displacement: pricing out</td>
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<td>• Suspend democratic processes: public</td>
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images
• Safe city
• Developing Nations: new urban destination

via the Nation:
• Foreign direct investment
• Highly visible media attention
• World class city(ies)
• Trade openness
• Prove knowledge /management capacity of city
• Major geopolitical player
• Nationalism
• Developing Nations: coming out party
• Revise negative urban images
• Olympic brand= stamp of approval for human rights and respect of international law

Mega-event conditions:
• Highly mediate event
• Event/sport related infrastructure
• Apolitical motive for development
• Immutable timelines
• Nationalism → via team sport
• World class facilities
• Training facilities
• Olympic brand
• Exceptional opportunity
• Bid process: looks like your city out-competed other cities
• Developing Nations: geopolitical statement

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<th>Street cleaning</th>
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<td>Displacement/</td>
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<td>Gentrification</td>
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<td>Securing the city</td>
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Requirements of the IOC:
• Supranational actors
• Extra legal mechanisms
• Privatizing stadia (via the specialized yet impractical requirements
• Regulate resistance
• Security

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<th>participation/civic dialogue</th>
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<td>Illogical urban transportation circuits</td>
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<td>Advance unpopular initiatives</td>
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<td>Favor global &gt; local</td>
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Product of IOC influence:
• White elephants: poor use of urban space/resources
• Illogical urban transportation circuits
• Harsh environmental impact
• Unsustainable scale/requirements of the Games
• Exclude independent vendors
• Legal defense of corporate sponsors
• Favor global > local
• No benefits for local/national businesses
• Aesthetically homogenized cities
• Violate civil freedoms: assembly/media
• Militarize urban space
**Effect on Democracy and Civil Society**

This exploration of the Olympic Planning Equation - the motivations, execution, and ramifications of hosting the Olympic games - will conclude with a discussion of how mega-event preparations affect the quality and efficacy of civil society and democracy in host-cities. The Olympic Planning Equation is based on the notion that the exigencies of mega-event planning both permit and require the restructuring of social order in the host-city. The restructuring that occurs takes place at the political, legal, economic, social and spatial levels, permeating the host-city in a myriad of ways. Thus, in attempting to analyze the ways in which mega-event preparations affect meaningful civic participation, it is helpful to follow this same framework. This analysis is situated within the broader literature on the effects of neoliberalism on democracy.

The Olympic planning equation observes that mega-event preparations alter the function of political institutions, shifting the responsibility of elected officials to service economic growth above the provision of services. Legal institutions are also compromised to facilitate these strategies, and to conform to externally imposed requirements, often to the detriment of citizen rights. Economic resources are streamlined away from public services and towards the construction of leisure infrastructure and tourism sites. Citizenship rights are reconfigured to privilege ones consumer power as the basis of social identity. And the quality of public life is restricted by the privatization, militarization, and commodification of public space.

The reordering of the political, legal, economic, social, and spatial relations within a city has obvious effects on the composition of civil society and the strength of civic participation. Host-city preparations degrade democratic political processes by
temporarily relegating their function and their authority to non-elected bodies. Awareness of this effectively nullifies the notion that city officials are elected by the people, for the people, and will discourage citizens from actively participating in politics in the future. This undermines the quality of democracy because if people lose faith in their political institutions, they will withdraw from civic life, and fracture the agency of cohesive civil society. This could result in the creation of dual politics, wherein dissatisfied citizens forge autonomous decision-making bodies, issuing judgments and taking action regarding justice, security, and political allegiance.

Isin (2000) argues that civics is one of the founding rationales for modern democracy. That the subject becomes a citizen by developing loyalty and virtue toward the city means that the city becomes a breeding ground for active citizenship and democracy. Virtue of the modern citizen is civic precisely because it is expressed through a loyalty to his city as a particular place rather than an idea. The city is where citizens are habituated into democratic imagination by practice, experience, and education. (Isin 2000)

If the political function of the city is usurped by policies of capital accumulation, which recognize citizens as consumers with buying power, rather than participants in a republic with inalienable rights, then the city will no longer be a site for political engagement, loyalty or virtue.

Reformatting legal regulations and protocol in order to fast-track Olympic preparations is insulting to all those who have used political channels and legal mechanisms to pursue increased freedoms and political recognition. In this way, neoliberalism’s emphasis on deregulation and business-friendly policies is a corrosive force to democratic institutions. Furthermore, by diverting or disabling legal methods of protest, citizens have no way to effectively resist and articulate their claims. Concurrently, suspending forms of protest that were traditionally available, questions the
quality of democracy, and the legitimacy of the regime executing the mega-event preparations.

On the other hand, some have argued that neoliberalism has produced ‘limited-capacity urban governance’, independent of any deliberate attempt to ignore its duty to public service. The anti-democratic effects of neoliberalization on urban governance stem from the narrowing of options open to decision-makers and elected officials. “Because of the disciplining force of the perceived need to remain globally competitive, cities are pushed away from redistributive social policies and any other option seen as a threat to economic growth” (Purcell 2008; Dryzek 1996). The preservation of democratic public spaces is thus overruled for the development of revenue-producing privatized spaces. Social housing provisions promise little short-term return for the local economy, and thus affordable housing loses out to gentrification (Purcell 2008). What’s more, urban-decision making structures are becoming less open to democratic debate because of the perceived need for quick decision-making, in order to respond quickly to the global marketplace.

The use of the city’s economic resources for the provision of sporting infrastructure violates another of Isin’s rationales for modern democracy: subsidiarity. “The city is the closest level of government to the citizen and is approachable and direct. The subsidiarity of the city consists in the fact that there is a shared relationships between the state and the city in delivering public services to the citizen” (Isin 2000). Failing to provide social services and public goods decreases the quality of life for many urban denizens. The denigration of human life compromises one’s ability to meaningfully participate in democracy. Social democrats, for their part, condemn the erosion of state
policies like social insurance and economic redistribution and the associated growth of material inequality at all scales “The material inequality that neoliberalization produces means that the very social and material basis for great political equality – central to the very idea of democracy - has been undermined” (Purcell 2008). The link between material equality and a robust democracy recognizes that an individual’s basic needs (e.g. food, health, shelter) must be met if they are to actively participate in political processes. Purcell (2008) argues that this requirement even extends to those in the liberal democracy school, citing that, “The greater the social inequality, the more unstable is the claim that all citizens are equally valued and carry an equal voice. Since such formal political equality is a minimum requirement for all notions of democracy, increasing social inequality destabilizes liberal democracy’s claim to political legitimacy” (Purcell 2008).

Olympic preparations fracture the composition of civil society, pitting the interests of some citizens against the interest of others. This is due to the fact that Olympic preparations increasingly differentiate citizens based on their purchasing power, and on their acceptance of this new mode of identity.

In the spaces generated by entrepreneurial style urban regeneration, including urban festivals, those welcomed conform to particular 21st century societal ideals of consumers or producers- the new service or creative class. Those excluded from urban festivals spaces are those who do not belong in public space as framed by a neoliberal ethics of consumer citizenship- including the poor, the homeless, street-level sex workers, yobs and political campaigners. (Waitt 2008)

The urban festival, when positioned as an attempt to regulate social reproduction, becomes a mechanism by which the State can encode urban spaces with a particular ‘moral order’, enshrining normative rules of social desirability, undesirability, and citizenship in the refashioned ‘festival city’ (Waitt 2008). For advocates of deliberative democracy, this is particularly problematic. “Neoliberalism values individuals who
myopically pursue their material self interest in the marketplace, not citizens who cultivate their civic virtue in the public square” (Purcell 2008).

Citizenship rights, in theory, give equal stakes to those participating in politics, acting as the great leveler of civic relations. If, on the other hand, citizenship was defined by ones purchasing power, citizens would choose to self-segregate into the haves and have-nots, choosing to concern themselves with those of equal status and equal economic input. While seemingly hyperbolic, Purcell (2008) correlates the classic liberal emphasis on individual self-reliance with the democratic deficits produced by the lack of social cohesion; “In the absence of a strong sense of cohesive society, it is all the more difficult to constitute legitimate authority.” Thus, fissures in the fabric of social relations, as well as an unbalanced notion of civic identity, are impediments to civic processes.

Finally, mega-event preparations obstruct the ability to peacefully assemble, organize and protest: the cornerstones of a democratic society. Public space is regulated in order to assure that the Games are apolitical, but in turn increase control over evermore aspects of public life. The mediation of public behavior to conform to externally-imposed standards means that public life is no longer public, but private; no longer democratic, but censored; no longer free, but controlled.

The final implication of the Olympic Planning Equation, and one that this work will attempt to demonstrate through the case study of Rio’s Olympic preparations, is that the practice of Olympic preparations is innately undemocratic. Given the nature of the advantages that Olympic stakeholders covet, and the execution of this agenda, we recognize that mega-event preparations will ultimately empower some, and disenfranchise others. This allows us to discern that the advantages and execution of
mega-event preparations are linked to the perverse effects experienced by host-city citizens. As such, the components of the Olympic Planning Equation allow us to determine that it is in fact the host city that is driving the ramifications experienced by host-city citizens, rather than the requirements of the IOC. This is not to suggest that the project of economic development, urban revitalization, city-marketing, and other associated benefits, will always be pursuits of an inherently undemocratic nature. However, we can determine that in combination, the pursuit of all these developments under the conditions of mega-event preparations (an immutable timeline, immense financial investment, and the ‘threat’ of the international spotlight, and the priorities of the key stakeholders) will continue to reproduce the repercussions documented here.

The following case study of the city of Rio de Janeiro will attempt to illustrate just that. Rio’s recent history has been defined by its pursuit of sporting mega-events as the preeminent urban strategy that will redefine the city of Rio for the twenty-first century, and solidify Brazil’s place in the new world order. Rio’s Olympic bid represents a multifaceted attempt to use the Games to accomplish a range of initiatives and projects, such as urban regeneration, transportation upgrades, image recovery, city-marketing, metropolitan reorganizing, among others. Rio’s preparations illustrate the use of public, private, public-private, supranational, quasi-public and temporary agencies. Subsequently, Rio’s mega-event preparations have already resulted in the eviction, criminalization, gentrification, privatization, disenfranchisement, and marginalization of many of Rio’s communities.
Chapter 3:


This chapter follows the general structure of the Olympic Planning Equation, in an attempt to demonstrate the democratic and institutional blockages that occur as a result of the city’s mega event preparations. I will begin by outlining why Rio bid for the Olympics. My analysis will contextualize these ambitions within the broader mega-event trajectory that the city has been on for the majority of the twenty-first century, and which has subsequently dominated its economic and urban development plans. Rio’s ambitions and objectives with regards to hosting sporting mega-events allow us to discern who is promoting and benefitting from these events. The agents who benefit from and pursue mega-events are known as Olympic stakeholders; understanding the composition and motivation of these actors allows us to qualify their temporary imposition on the urban governance of host-cities. The Olympic stakeholders play an active role in shaping how a city’s mega event preparations are executed, and consequently how its supposed advantages are achieved.

Following the discussion of Olympic stakeholder ambitions, we will address how these actors, coalitions, and interests are realizing their mega event preparations. This discussion will be shaped by the political, economic, legal, social, and spatial mechanisms that are being employed to articulate Rio’s Olympic city.

The third part will briefly detail the diverse consequences of Rio’s mega-event preparations, followed by a more in-depth look at five specific processes of restructuring
that are occurring in the pursuit and execution of Rio’s Olympic city. Consistent with the framework already in use, I have chosen preparatory initiatives that articulate the dynamics of political, legal, economic, social, and spatial restructuring that realize Olympic stakeholder interests. The general thesis extended in these discussions argues that Olympic developments temporarily suspend the form, function, and accountability of the host-city’s public institutions, effectively prioritizing capital accumulation over the needs of citizens.

*Mega-Event Trajectory*

Rio de Janeiro’s recent history is most comprehensively described by the mega-event trajectory that has shadowed it since the 1990’s. Rio bid for the 2004 Summer Olympics in 1997, and again in 2003 for the 2012 Olympics, but both times the city did not advance past the first round of bidding. The International Olympic Committee was concerned with the large-scale infrastructure projects that Rio was proposing, in addition to the fact that they had never handled such a large influx of tourism or an event of the technical organization required by the Olympic games. Rio hosted the 1992 UN Environmental Summit, which demonstrated its capacity to jumpstart programs that cater to the international eye. Given the theme of the event, Rio also took the opportunity to clean up the Guanabara Bay, modernize its sewage system, and make its public spaces more pedestrian friendly. The pre-event construction included a sidewalk-widening project for the road that divides the main coastal thoroughfare and the beach, in addition to creating bike and walking lanes, and limiting the types of vehicles that could travel on this coastal street. The citizens of Rio saw these initiatives as a great success, because it
reified the centrality of Rio’s beaches, while reprioritizing pedestrian needs over that of automobiles, who had been at the forefront of Rio’s urban planning priorities since the 1960’s (Broudehoux 2001).

However, it was not until Rio secured the 2007 Pan American Games that the city truly committed its urban agenda to accommodating global mega-events. Similar to the spatial imagineering of the Rio’s contemporary Olympic zones, the venues for the Pan American Games were clustered in Barra, Copacabana and near the Maracanã stadium. There are several notable features of Rio’s Pan American preparations. Oliviera (2011) notes how the financing of the Pan was funded predominantly by the federal government, illustrating Brazil’s federalized economic structure, and revealing the dependence that Brazilian cities have on the federal government. Interestingly, she also notes how the Pan’s financing shows that, like the United States, “Competition and differentiation have become keys to urban development models. The transformation of cities into companies developed into a strategy based on urban marketing. For Rio’s public administrators, these changes increased interest in host mega events. The new urban model was called strategic planning” (Oliviera 2011).

Other studies of the Pan contribute to an emerging niche within mega-event literature, which contextualize mega-event preparations within a methodology specific to developing countries. Curi et al. (2011) use Rio’s Pan preparations to conclude that mega-events hosted by BRIC countries are characterized by their lack of participation, transparency and accountability. According to their account, “The social tension was such that the Organizing Committee actually constructed a ‘big wall’ around the stadiums which turned them into islands of excellence to be shown on television, thus hiding the
unsightly parts of the city, that is, poor neighborhoods and favelas.” Other studies confirm this tendency, highlighting the security, surveillance, and overall militarization of urban space, as dominant features in the Pan’s preparations (McRoskey 2010; Gaffney 2010e). The Pan’s preparations are characterized by a lack of urban legacy: they did not deliver the promised transportation infrastructure; they did not improve the housing situation for Rio’s low-income residents; they did not establish new sporting venues to train the next generation of Olympic athletes; and they casually neglected their environmental impact while contributing to the general opacity of mega-event management (Gaffney 2010e). By and large, the 2007 Pan American Games are remembered as the most expensive Pan Games in history, going six to ten times over the original US$177 million budget, not withstanding the extra US$300 million spent on security (Gaffney 2010e).

In spite of the content of these post-Games academic studies, the Pan American Games were heralded as a success by organizers, politicians, and the Pan American Sport Organization (PASO)⁸. The event confirmed Rio’s ability to design, execute, and protect a short-term sporting mega-event, while lodging and transporting tourists, athletes, and members from the international media. For the international sporting federations that watch over the World Cup and the Olympic Games, the Pan American Games had shown them what they needed to see. The city of Rio was capable of securing political support at the federal, state and municipal level given the large investments made by each⁹, and they

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⁸ The Pan American Sporting Organization is the decision-making body and guardian of the Pan American Games similar to the relationship that the IOC has with the Olympic Games. These two organizations are associated however, because PASO includes the international sport federations (IF’s), and the national organizing committee’s (NOC’s) in its decision making body, and because Pan host-cities must act in accordance with the Olympic Charter.

⁹ It should be noted that Cesar Maia, Rio’s Mayor during the Pan, is said to have pressured other levels of government for investment by attempting to blame them for the possible/probable failure of the Games.
were able to execute an apolitical Games, unmarred by the social unrest and inequality that still characterizes the city. The Pan’s intensive technical coordination and event management also echoed the wider national movement towards stable economic growth and responsible fiscal management. And for various interests in the public and private sector, the Pan American Games initiated a new era in the city’s history.

Mayor Cesar Maia, who pursued and executed the Pan American Games in his third term as mayor, had ardently chased after sporting mega-events as an integral component of his wider urban revitalization effort, specifically aimed at the city’s commercial districts. During his first term, the Rio Cidade program upgraded pedestrian spaces with new sidewalks and street lamps, although it was ultimately criticized for its wasteful architectural choices like the Obeslisk in Ipanema. In his second term, Maia tried to attract a Guggenheim Museum for the city’s dilapidated port region, in an effort to initiate a Barcelona-inspired revitalization of the region. With a Mayoral career spanning over thirteen years and four political parties, Maia successfully bridged the public and private sector, pursuing projects defined by their marketing potential and high profit margins.

Maia’s successor and recently reelected Mayor, Eduardo Paes, embraced this approach to urban governance as well. Beginning his career in earnest in January 2009, Paes received the news that Rio de Janeiro had been selected to host the 2016 Olympics that October, which would root his urban agenda in the city’s mega-event preparations until the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2016. In the interim period, Rio would

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Maia also relied on the support of local political coalitions comprising city council and state legislators, congressmen and city hall technical staff. This broad-based political support dismantled after Pan preparations were linked to corruption and fiscal mismanagement, causing Maia to lose the next election to Eduardo Paes in 2009 (Beinstein et al.).
prepare to host the 2011 Military Games, the 2012 Rio+20 Global Climate Conference, the 2013 World Youth Conference, the 2013 FIFA Confederations Cup, the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2015 Copa América, positioning Brazil at the epicenter of global sporting mega-event production (Gaffney 2011d).

As stated, the pursuit of sporting mega-events is a strategic decision taken by the public and private actors of a given city, in an effort to make the city economically competitive by way of increased tourism, federal and foreign-direct investment, and city-marketing. As Rio’s recent history and immediate future with mega-events should indicate, the city’s political and business elite has quite vehemently adopted the mega-event strategy and its particular approach towards urban governance. In this light, it is important to ask if the Olympics are a qualitatively different mega-event than, for example, the Pan American Games or the slew of events that Rio will host before the Olympics? And perhaps more importantly, it is necessary to distinguish the neoliberal style of urban governance that has characterized Brazil since its transition to democracy (Schmalz & Ebenau 2012), from the current mega-event logics governing the city. In this light, are the conditions of the Olympic Planning Equation specific to the contemporary moment, or are Rio’s mega-event preparations are simply exacerbating, politicizing, facilitating and crystallizing the processes of neoliberal restructuring that were in progress before the Olympics. The answers to each are mutually reinforcing. The Olympics are an event of unprecedented scale, coordination, media coverage, investment, and expenditures. Because of this, preparing for the Olympics will be unlike their preparations for any past or future mega-event. And because of high risk/high reward
proposition of the Games, the projects, processes, and initiatives being installed for Rio de Janeiro’s preparations must be understood within, and as a product of the mega-event climate. Simply put, Rio’s mega-events have created an urban condition that - while accelerating projects and processes that conform and make sense under the logic of neoliberal urbanism- did not, would not, and could not have happened without the exigencies of the Olympics.

Ambitions: Why did Rio pursue the Olympics?

For the city of Rio de Janeiro, being the first South American city to ever host the Summer Olympics signals that Brazil has truly achieved the status of a dominant world power. In choosing Brazil to host the summer Olympics, the IOC has determined that the country has enough financial resources, clout, and management skills to finance an event of this scale. The IOC has also resolved that Brazil is a country worthy of receiving international visitors, verifying the city’s ability to lodge, transport, and protect all of its guests.

In receiving the Games, Rio is reasserting its political, cultural, and economic importance following the years of decline that resulted from the capital’s transference to Brasília. The period of disinvestment that followed that event was exacerbated by a series of economic crises, high rates of inflation, and the aggravation of urban social programs during the transition back to democracy in the 1980’s. In the 1990’s, Rio de Janeiro experienced the suburban exodus of many middle-class families, the growth of favelas and the degradation of the port and city center. Concurrently, the machinated ‘shocks’ of the Washington Consensus validated the city’s underinvestment in infrastructure and
public services. In this light, the opportunity and obligation to invest in comprehensive, citywide revitalization efforts is a major ambition of Rio’s mega-event preparations. Rio is also hoping that the Games will attract foreign direct investment opportunities, allowing it to position itself as an economic hub and a conduit of transnational capital, similar to the way that São Paulo has done over the last few years. In the words of Brazil’s Secretary of Tourism, “Vamos mostrar um país que é um porto seguro para investidores, que encanta com atributos naturais já conhecidos e que está pronto para surpreender com produtos e serviços inovadores” (We will show that this country is a safe haven for investors, which enchants with its well-known natural attributes, and is ready to surprise with innovative products and services) (Portal Planalto 2012). With improvements to public transportation and an optimistic decline in urban violence, Rio is also hoping to attract permanent residents of a wealthier income bracket. The consolidation of Barra da Tijuca through the city’s new transportation circuits will be one of the principle urban legacies of the Games, and will appeal to the preferences and comforts of these preferred residents.

While controversial, Rio’s Olympic plans aim to reintegrate territories lost to the drug traffickers in the political vacuum following the military dictatorship. The Police Pacification Units (UPP’s) are a new instrument in the city’s attempt to reign in urban violence, upgrade and integrate favelas, and achieve a holistic urban form. According to Rio’s governor and the architect of the program, Sergio Cabral, “The main aim of the pacifying force is to ensure that the communities which have endured living with criminals now learn to coexist with the presence of the State” (Zibechi 2010). The UPP’s
intend to discipline urban space and to impose an environment of security and stability, which the city hopes will facilitate and encourage financial investment.

Rio’s Olympic plans also include the revitalization of the port area, through a public-private partnership called the Porto Maravilha Project. The Port project, inspired by the revitalization of industrial ports in cities like Barcelona, London, and New York, will use the anticipated tourism revenues to generate sites of cultural and leisure-based consumption such as museums, shopping malls, and restaurants. Rio hopes that its effort to reign in urban violence, while self-constructing new urban narratives through cultural exhibitions, will positively differentiate the city, encouraging future growth. Different from the conventional narrative of Rio as a cidade maravilhosa (marvelous city) endowed with natural wonders, beautiful beaches, and lively Afro-Brazilian cultural traditions, the Summer Olympics presents the opportunity to invest in globally recognizable sites, allowing Brazil to claim its status as a developed, world class city.

In addition to the place-marketing opportunities and tourism revenues that the city seeks to gain from hosting the Olympics, one of the most enduring legacies of the Games will be upgrading its public transportation system and communication technology infrastructures. Taken as a whole, Rio’s ambitious aspirations and comprehensive physical plans for its Olympic city will ultimately determine how the city executes the event, and what effect that will have on its citizens.

*Execution: How is Rio preparing for the Olympics?*

While the 2007 Pan American Games gave Rio the assurance it needed to prove itself capable of organizing a mega-event of that scale, there were other factors that
influenced Rio’s successful Olympic candidature. Partially this was due to the rare and opportunistic political alignment of officials at the federal, state, and municipal level. Mayor Eduardo Paes and State Governor Sergio Cabral are both of the Partido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro (PMDB), and former President Lula was a vocal advocate for Paes’s election in 2008. The three levels of government were able to work together, ultimately demonstrating that Rio’s bid had the political support and the financial backing of the Brazilian nation and the State of Rio de Janeiro. Rio boasted it’s multi-level political support in its 2009 Candidature File: “Rio’s Candidature has enjoyed the continuing support of the three levels of Government since its inception, confirmed by the active leadership role by Government in the development of Rio’s Games proposition and full endorsement of this Candidature, and provision of 100% of all required guarantees by the relevant level of Government.” All three levels of government are also seen in the composition of Rio’s honorary council, in addition to its executive council which includes members from the Government coordination, business, legacy, and athletes commissions.

Demonstrating political support for the bid mirrored the alleged approval of Rio de Janeiro’s citizens. Throughout its candidacy, Rio was able to boast a 70% approval rating at the prospect of the Games. This fanfare was confirmed on the beaches on Copacabana, as the city-sponsored watch party of the IOC’s decision attracted 100,000 people to celebrate Rio’s historic win. Rio’s bid also presented the country’s 3.5% annual growth rate as proof that the country was emerging as a new, stable player in the global financial system. As stated in their bid, “For Brazil, the opportunity to host the Olympic and Paralympic Games is both economically feasible and attractive, and is aligned with
the country’s long-term development strategies” (Rio Candidature File 2009). Rio’s political and popular support, in addition to the financial facility and guarantees from all three levels of government, made Rio’s candidacy distinct among the final round competitors (Chicago, Tokyo, and Madrid). The Chicago No-Games coalition had submitted to the IOC a 438-page dossier of reasons why Chicago should not receive the Olympics; Spain’s financial stability was in decline; and Tokyo’s bid suffered from a lack of public support, coupled with the IOC’s desire to maintain continental diversity given that Beijing had just concluded their Olympiad.

The political coordination that was guaranteed in Rio’s bid has been maintained in many ways. The federal and state governments are still footing the bill for a number of public works projects, and diverting much of the country’s sustained economic growth into Rio’s development. Specifically, $240 billion is coming from the Growth Acceleration Program (Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento: PAC), a program that funds infrastructure development; the majority of the money being invested by the federal government will go towards the provision of infrastructure (Maurrasse 2012)\(^{10}\). At this moment, the federal government is preoccupied with the country’s readiness for the 2014 World Cup, given that the Games will be staged in twelve Brazilian cities. This has put considerable strain on the country’s domestic transportation circuits because São Paulo has the country’s only truly international airport, which connects with other domestic flights. In 2011, the federal government privatized three of the airports in World Cup cities, including São Paulo’s Guarulhos International Airport. While the federal government is working to improve the remaining public airports, in addition to breaking

\(^{10}\) This is different than the 2007 Pan American Games, when investments for infrastructure by the federal governments only compromised 3.4% of their total expenditures (Oliviera 2009).
ground on the long-awaited high-speed bullet train from São Paulo to Rio de Janeiro, preparations are slowly realizing their limitations, with expectations that only half of the projects planned nation-wide will be ready by 2014 (Winter 2011). In order to maintain a steady flow of investment, the federal government has also legislated tax breaks for foreign companies investing in the country or supplying materials for the mega-event preparations.

One of the main instruments that Rio is using to prepare it’s Olympic city is the use of extrajudicial and supralegal mechanisms. Law 12035 ‘The Olympic Act’, established in 2009, is the main legislation that is facilitating the conditions required for the execution of Rio’s Olympic City. The law’s sixteen articles establish a wide array of conditionalities. In particular, it intends to: regulate immigration rules; empower the Brazilian government to unilaterally interfere with public contracts regarding the production the Games (specifically related to goods, property and equipment); temporarily suspend contracts with advertisers who utilize space in airports and other areas of interest to the Games (from July 5th to September 26th, 2012); control, monitor and repress illicit acts which infringe on the intellectual property of Olympics’ insignia including that which occurs on the internet; reserve the necessary airwaves and frequency spectrum for the uninterrupted broadcasting of the Games; guarantee that any resulting fiscal deficit will be covered by the Organizing Committee; and install the full application of the World Anti-Doping Agency code, as well as the Olympic and Paralympic Charter (Lei 12035, 2009).

In addition to the Olympic Law, the Autoridade Pública Olímpico (APO) was created by an executive order and has extraordinary decision-making powers over
processes that would typically flow through democratic channels (Gaffney 2011d). Even more extensive than the Olympic law is the 2011 World Cup law. Gaffney (2011d) takes particular issue with Article 39 which states that, “The three levels of government will, in collaboration with all competent authorities assure that, during the length of the competition any official event location, especially the stadiums, will be available for the exclusive use of FIFA.”

The ‘Olympic family’, including the international media and athletes, are also given access to private beaches and exclusive transportation lanes, furthering the process of isolation, privatization, and exclusion in Rio’s mega-event preparations.

Additionally, the urban master plan for the city of Rio de Janeiro (called the plano director) has been modified to include new building codes and zoning restrictions. In his speech to the IOC, Mayor Paes outwardly committed the city’s urban form to the requirements of the Olympic games: “The Games Master plan is the city’s master plan—they are one in the same” (Paes 2009). In Gaffney’s account, these reforms followed “unconstitutional processes, without public audiences, [and] have rezoned strategic parts of the city that have set off a series of real estate speculations without taking into account the people that live there already. Most of the targeted areas house poorer communities that are threatened with forced relocation in order to allow the real estate projects to move forward” (Gaffney 2009c). An example of this type of legislation was the PEU Vargen’s law, which passed in November, 2009. According to Gaffney (2011d), the law

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11 The use of extrajudicial or supranational laws to facilitate mega-event preparations calls for the “temporary suspension of territorial sovereignty”, “a re-inscription of geographic space”, and “a form of moveable entitlement without formal citizenship,” all of which is characterized as a form of neoliberal biopolitics (Ong 2006).

12 These spaces of neoliberal exceptionalism are comparable to the imposition of free trade zones, argues Gaffney (2011d). By suspending the public nature of space in and around venues and public transport facilities, and the transferring of power to non-elected bodies, the government is abdicating its responsibility to citizens, choosing instead to facilitate an uninterrupted commercial spectacle.
allowed for the construction of high-rise condominiums in a region characterized by one and two-story houses by raising the building height codes; the policy was on the backburner until developers were able to use the “Olympic moment to push through a law that was prepared in anticipation of a moment of maximum distraction” (Gaffney 2011d). The city also modified the plano director to allow for hotel construction in an area not previously zoned for hotels.

Rio’s mega-event preparations cannot be discussed without acknowledging the various public and private actors involved its mega-event preparations. The bill for Rio’s US$85 million bid for the 2016 Games was predominantly covered by taxpayers, but private interests such as those in Brazil’s large civil engineering, construction, and telecommunications firms played a role as well (Gaffney 2012f). Rio’s Olympic organizing committee, the Olympic Public Authority (Autoridade Pública Olímpica: APO) was established in 2010, and is a modified version of the Olympic Development Authority who was responsible for drafting Rio’s Olympic bid; both organizations contain actors from both the public and private sectors (Oliveira Lo Bianco 2010).

To date, a number of major Olympic works are being executed at the hands of public-private partnerships. Commonly, the city will auction off the land that will be the future site of the project, and a private company will either bid for the land outright, or the land will be bought by public money (using a municipal pension fund, for example), and then leased to a development company that will execute the project according to the immutable timeline of Games. Most likely, that company will hold on to the project or venue for several years after the Games have concluded, enabling them to recuperate their investment. Projects such as the Olympic Park and the Port revitalization effort
illustrate this formula. Another development project being financed by a public-private partnership model is the renovation of the historic Maracanã stadium. The State agency responsible for stadium development and management (SUCERJ) plans to privatize the stadium by selling it to Rio’s four biggest soccer teams, allowing teams to get a portion of ticket sales; Gaffney (2010e) argues that this arrangement follows the North American model where public monies finance private profits, and the neoliberal model of selling public goods to private companies. The Brazilian National Bank (BNDES) is also investing and financing projects with lower interest rates than those of the market, which is also a form of public financing.

“Ahead of the Olympics, we are working to make Rio more business friendly and also providing incentives and support for all those who intend to do business in Rio,” said Mayor Eduardo Paes (Forbes Custom 2010). Rio’s strategic plan to attract and facilitate business was drafted by Rio Negócio, a private agency controlled by the Commercial Association of Rio de Janeiro, in partnership with the city administration. It is divided into five sectors, utilizing both public and private agencies within each field: energy; creative industries; tourism; infrastructure; and innovation industries (Forbes Custom 2010). In an effort to advance its energy sector and make use of the facilities being prepared for its mega-events, the city is bidding to host the World Energy Forum in 2015. Global Village Telecom, a fixed-telecommunications carrier, is set to invest US$170 million over the next two years to advance the city’s creative industries with respect to media, entertainment, and sport. To provide the required 49,750 hotel rooms stipulated by the IOC, in addition to expanding its own tourism capacity, Rio plans to double the number of hotel rooms by 2016; however, in order to meet this demand without
generating a surplus, Rio plans to dock cruise ships and rent condominium apartments to handle the extra visitors. Infrastructure projects include the revitalization of the port, in addition to the new BRT lines and subway extension. Finally, the Mayor is designing specific tax incentives to attract innovative industries like biotechnology, electronics, and computer software, in an effort to earn Rio a more forward-looking nickname: ‘Silicon Beach’ (Pearse 2012).

Foreign investment from multinational companies is another form of financing the Games, and can also constitute a method of public-private financing. In a 2012 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit, which evaluates countries in Latin America and the Caribbean based on how friendly their environment is for public-private partnerships, Brazil was ranked second (Maurasse 2012). In 2010, Brazil was the worlds 10th largest recipient of foreign direct investment totaling US$66.7 billion, and 85% of those ventures were occurring in Rio and São Paulo (Horneberger 2011). In 2011, 18.6% of the city’s revenue stream came from investments (‘The World Bank and the City of Rio de Janeiro’ 2011). Brazil’s macroeconomic stability, the discovery of oil reserves, its diversified market, and its resilience in weathering the 2008 global economic crisis, tell only part of the story. The rise in foreign direct investment is also related to the association between the Olympics and economic growth; Rose and Spiegel’s ‘Olympic Trade Effect’ (2010) articulates that the connection between hosting the Olympics and increased external trade relies on the perception that serious contenders for the Olympics are demonstrating their willingness for trade liberalization. As such, foreign banks and multinational companies

13 Increased trade and foreign direct investment in Brazil has many advantages: a strong and growing middle class; supportive government policies, the simplification of licensing procedures and regulatory frameworks, subsidized credit and easy financing options; the upcoming mega-events; a large and untapped
have been investing in a variety of Brazilian industries since 2009. For example, the China Development Bank began investing in Petrobras (the semi-public multinational energy corporation), Electrobras (the state-owned power-utility company), and Oi (the leading telecommunications operator) (Forbes Custom). The World Bank also issued Rio a US$1 billion loan in 2011.

Preparations for Rio’s 2016 Olympics require more than just financing, even though Rio’s environmental preparations are in many ways geared towards realizing an investor-friendly atmosphere. The Shock of Order (Choque de Ordem) program is one such initiative, and was one of the first initiatives Paes legislated after assuming the position of Mayor. The program focuses on eliminating sources of urban disorder by using a zero-tolerance approach towards minor infractions such parking violations, informal vendors, and homelessness. Together, the Secretary of Public Order, the Municipal Guard, the Civil and Military police, the waste collection agency Comlurb and the Secretary of Housing have launched a coordinated attack intended for the “reinstatement of order in the city” (Flor do Asfalto 2011) 14.

However, Rio’s mega-event timeline does not permit a sit-and-wait attitude regarding the trickle-up effect that the Shock of Order program is expected to have on urban violence. More importantly, the trafficker-controlled favelas generate a far more pervasive sense of lawless than the ambulantes (informal food vendors that walk along the beaches). In an effort to regain control of the territories lost to drug trafficking and

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14 Paes’s administration hired former New York Mayor Rudi Guiliani to consult the city on how to go about its mega-event preparations back in 2009. The Shock of Order program is modeled off the approach that Guiliani used in the 1990’s to combat New York urban crime, which is informed by sociology theory on ‘broken-windows’. This approach understands urban crime as a product of a sense lawlessness and abandon, which is epitomized by the sight of a broken window; confronting petty infractions which perpetuate that sense of anarchy will eventually reduce larger, violent crimes.
gang violence, Rio has begun the process of establishing a permanent security presence in high priority favelas (near Olympic venues, zona sul (south zone), and the downtown commercial/business districts); however, this only occurs once the drug traffickers have been forcibly ejected by the Special Police Operations Battalion (BOPE), an elite special force of the military police. The Police Pacification Units (UPP’s) have been installed in twenty-nine favelas at the time of this writing, but the city hopes to have at least forty pacified favelas by the World Cup in 2014 (Barrionuevo 2010).

Reintegrating the favelas through the imposition of security forces is a complex proposal. Fortunately, the program has the support of all three levels of government, meaning that pacified favelas are receiving infrastructure upgrades funded by the federal government’s PAC program, and urbanization projects through the Morar Carioca favela regeneration initiative. And in a concerted effort to thwart against police corruption, the UPP officers are receiving monthly bonuses of R$500 from the municipal government.

Pacification units are typically stationed at the apex of the community, as well as at points of entry to ensure that movements within the community are systematically monitored. A typical unit has 100-250 guards, depending on the size of the community. Officials have made it clear that the UPP units will not completely eliminate the sale of illegal drugs, but assert that their job is to prevent against the reacquisition of the

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15 Freeman (2012) notes that the violent, intrusive introduction of the UPP’s is consistent with the states’ standard approach towards favelas and its residents. In the 1960’s autonomous units within the police were given a mandate to assassinate “bandits” in Rio’s favelas. When the police where placed under military control during the dictatorship, such groups were incorporated into a violent strategy to oppress leftist opponents of the regime (the “internal enemy”), and were then redeployed against drug gangs and the urban poor after the return to civilian rule. A wave of drug-related violence and middle-class panic forced the state to redeploy the military in 1994, and again in 2007 to secure the Complexo de Alemão favela for the Pan American Games. The deployment of state and federal troops resulted in the death of 19 civilians, prompting the government to search for a better formula for securing the favelas. The method currently used deploys the state military police, BOPE, to push out, kill, or capture traffickers, arms and drugs, and once the community is considered secure the new community-policing units will indefinitely occupy the favela and prevent armed drug gangs from reclaiming the territory.
community by armed gangs. In guaranteeing that the community remains pacified, “It is able to be administered by the State in the way the rest of the city is, so that residents can become full citizens (Freeman 2012). However, the UPP units achieve far more than just the extension of public services, constituting a much larger role in the execution of Rio’s mega-event preparations, which will be discussed later.

Rio’s historically divided urban form has produced deep fractures in its social fabric, despite the façade of popular approval seen at the Copacabana victory celebration. While only subliminally, Rio’s Olympic preparations are utilizing specific discourses intended to manufacture and maintain the public’s support (Darnell 2012). One way they are accomplishing this is by linking notions of national development to Rio’s Olympic preparations. When Mayor Paes was challenged by protesters that greeted him upon his homecoming from London with the Olympic torch, he said, “In Rio de Janeiro there are always troublemakers, people who go against things, and for that reason the city was stagnant for years” (Winterbottom 2012). This sentiment attempts to manufacture popular support by linking dissent and resistance to inertia and underdevelopment. To further satisfy this discourse, organizers have linked Rio’s mega-events with the “self-affirmation of the Brazilian people” (“Right Time for South America” 2008).

Specific to Brazil, social development through sport is a familiar discourse employed to manufacture consent regarding the use of public monies on sporting infrastructure. “The discourse suggests that by investing heavily in sporting infrastructure and social programs aimed at the development of athletes, Rio will be able to extricate itself from chronic problems of socio-economic polarization and drug-related violence” (Gaffney 2010e). Gaffney observes that while this rationale has contributed to Brazil’s
success in international soccer - given that many see it as the only viable escape
mechanism for impoverished youth - it has allowed for the disinvestment in social and
educational programs that perpetuate Rio’s chronic condition of drugs, violence, and
marginalization.

Effects: What are the impacts of its Olympic preparations?

The preparations for Rio’s mega-events began in earnest soon after the IOC had
announced Rio’s successful candidacy. Renovations were already in progress at the
Maracanã stadium, as the city tried to ready itself for the 2014 World Cup Championship
game that would be played in the historic stadium. During my fieldwork back in the
summer of 2010, a number of different efforts were already in progress, and their social
ramifications were already beginning to emerge.

Displacement and forced evictions are a ubiquitous feature in the preparation of
modern mega-events (Porter 2009; Greene 2003). The first community to be threatened
with Olympic-related eviction was Vila Autódromo in March, 2010. The community is
located in Rio’s southwest wetland region of Barra da Tijuca, and was pursued by the city
government in order to facilitate the development of the media center and the Olympic
training facilities. The Observatório das Metrópoles, an urban planning think-thank in
Rio de Janeiro, produced a report in April, 2012 citing the current number of
communities threatened by forced eviction at twenty-four, with 8,000 people already
having been removed, and tens of thousands more threatened (Metropolitan Project and
Mega-events: The Impacts of the World Cup 2014 and the Olympics 2016: Figure 2).
Ten communities are being removed due to their proximity to the various BRT lines;
three are being removed because of general infrastructure and upgrade projects; five are being removed because of sport-related venues; four are being removed because of the

Figure 2: Metropolitan Project and Mega-events:
The Impacts of the World Cup 2014 and the Olympics 2016
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>Year of occupation</th>
<th>Number of families removed</th>
<th>Number of families Threatened</th>
<th>Total families</th>
<th>Justification</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Largo do Campinho/Campinho</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>BRT Trancacrio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Domingos Lopes (Madureira)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>BRT Trancacrio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua Quixama (Madureira)</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>BRT Trancacrio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Vila das Torres</td>
<td>1960</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Construction of a Municipal Park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Arroio Pavuna/ Jacarapagui</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>BRT Trancacrio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restinga/Recreio</td>
<td>1994</td>
<td>150 (and 34 small businesses)</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>BRT Transoeste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Harmonia/Recreio</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>2 families and 2 spiritual centers</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>BRT Transoeste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Recreio II/Recreio</td>
<td>1996</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>BRT Transoeste</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Autódromo/Jacarapagui</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>BRT Trancacrio e Tranolisipa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asa Branca</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Disappropriation: BRT Tranolisipa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Azalca- Curicica</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>Disappropriation: Tranolisipa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vila Tabonha</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Repossession</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Metrô Mangeuria</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>Parking Lot of Maracanã stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Aldeia Maracanã</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Privatization of the Maracanã stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favela do Sambódromo</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>Enlargement of the Sambadrome from the Olympics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favela Belém-Belém/ Pilares</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>New Access entrance for the João Havelange Stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favela Barreira do Vasco-São Cristovão</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>São Januário stadium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Machado of Assis</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>Marvelous Port Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Flor do Asfalto</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>Marvelous Port Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rua do Livramento e Adjacências</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Marvelous Port Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupation Boa Vista</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>Marvelous Port Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morro da Providência</td>
<td>1897</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>Implement teleférico and Area of Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Tabajaras</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>Area of Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community of Pavão-Pavãozinho</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>Area of Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,860</td>
<td>5,325</td>
<td>7,185</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Porto Maravilha Project; and three communities are being removed because they have been determined to be residing on areas of geological risk.

According to the 2007 Global Report on Human Settlements prepared by the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS), five of the top thirty-four recent examples of massive evictions worldwide have been related to mega-events. Forced evictions throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro have been an irregular and inconsistent process. By and large, the evictions that have taken place are characterized by their lack of prior notification, the use of violence and intimidation tactics, inadequate compensation and a lack of justifiable reasoning as to why residents are being removed. In a comprehensive look Rio’s mega-event displacements, Tapley (2012) noted that in many communities, city authorities would arrive, without forewarning of their intentions and without allowing community members to arrange for alternative housing, and level the community that day. In cases where communities would challenge the demolition, construction crews would begin while people were still in their homes; in other instances, the State sent in the Military Police to use pepper gas bombs to disperse those resisting. According to an account by Patrick Wilcken, Amnesty International’s Brazil researcher, “They come, demolish the house, leave the rubble, frequently damage neighboring houses and the infrastructure – breaking main pipes, cutting through electricity lines and making the community unviable – which then attracts drug addicts, plagues of rats and

\[16\] Marcuse (1985) argues that: Displacement occurs when any household is forced to move from its residences by conditions that affect the dwelling or its immediate surrounding, and that 1) are beyond the households reasonable ability to control or prevent 2) occur despite the household’s having met all previously imposed conditions of occupancy 3) make continued occupancy by that household impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable 4) exclude one from living where one would have otherwise lived. (Marcuse 1985)
cockroaches that basically force the rest of the community to move, often in very, very unfavorable circumstances” (Tapley 2012).

In the cases where authorities fulfill with their legal obligation to resettle those evicted, residents are offered three options: alternative housing, cash compensation or assisted purchase. Given the deficit of replacement housing options, there is a great deal of pressure put on the initial rounds of cash-compensation negotiation, which in turn fragments community solidarity and resistance. Additionally, State compensation is legally required to cover homes, but not businesses, which has made displacement even more devastating for the large number of home-run and community businesses.

According to the UN’s Special Rapporteur for Housing, Raquel Rolnik, the compensation being offered is often insufficient for families to relocate, especially given Rio’s booming real-estate market, which in turn forces them out to the peripheries of the city. That is if residents are offered compensation at all, which many are not. When housing is offered, it is often in the peripheral west zone known for militia activity and poor infrastructure, notwithstanding the two-hour, multi-bus commute to employment in central Rio. Relocations usually take place through the Minha Casa Minha Vida program, but personal accounts disclose that these housing alternatives are often lower quality, higher density, and less conducive to solidarity-building activities. Minha Casa Minha Vida housing substitutes are also known to constrict residents rights, prohibiting them from owning animals, running businesses out of their homes, or practicing religion in the common spaces (Roller 2011b).

17 There are four types of displacement, all of which can be seen throughout the city of Rio de Janeiro: direct displacement through eviction, compulsory purchase, and police harassment; chain displacement in recognizing that many households and residents are moving; exclusionary displacement when the displaced cannot access new or existing housing in the neighborhood; and displacement pressure where the daily reality of living in a rapidly transforming neighborhood has its own displacement effects (Slater 2009).
Gentrification due to rising real estate prices, and real estate speculation has already become manifest in a wide range of contexts. Rising rents can be seen throughout the city, but especially near areas undergoing revitalization, neighborhoods surrounding favelas with new UPP units, as well as in the favelas themselves, in areas that will receive new public transportation connections, and in areas near Olympic venues. Rio was named the second most expensive city in South America, after São Paulo, with real estate prices rivaling New York and Paris (Brasileiro & Millard 2012). According to a luxury property manager in Rio, the rising price of real estate is a confluence of factors: “The association between the government’s behavior and city’s strategies for hunting new business, coupled with the vigor of the oil and gas sector and the major sporting events that Rio will host, has all helped create an extremely favorable situation [for] the real estate sector” (Hurrell 2012). Fortunately, real estate prices have leveled off since 2011, which can be attributed to the decelerated growth of the economy as a whole, and declines in Brazil’s manufacturing centers (Brasiliero and Millard 2012). Some are hopeful that declining costs in real estate (specifically office space), expanded housing options due to new transportation connections, and the financing of infrastructure projects by large real estate tycoons like Donald Trump, will ultimately allow Rio to avoid the dramatic and devastating burst of its real estate bubble. Unfortunately, while the waning of Rio’s real estate market might benefit foreigners looking for property investments or coastal get-away homes, it does little to help the majority of cariocas struggling to compete with rising rents.

Rio’s Shock of Order program has had a particularly nefarious affect on the city’s informal workers. Foot-officers of the Special Secretary for Public Order (Secretaria
Especial da Ordem Pública: SEOP) have intently targeted workers in the informal sector, seizing their merchandise, and often times incarcerating them. Zero-tolerance policing has also targeted flanelinhas, people who watch cars in exchange for tips. However, in a 2010 progress report of the shock of order program, the targets of its actions were said to have had little effect on the city’s crime rates as a whole (cite). The criminalization of informal workers is not paired with vocational training programs, and thus undermines their livelihoods with no compensation. In a study conducted in the months leading up to South Africa’s 2010 World Cup, Venter et al. (2011) determined that the event had a positive impact on the entrepreneurial activities of workers in the informal sector, even though their work was not considered formal or legal. Given the considerable number livelihoods that rely on Rio’s informal networks, the criminalization of informality is potentially undermining one of the greatest sources of economic prosperity generated by mega-events.

Shock of Order programs have also resulted in the sanitization, homogenization, and commodification of urban public spaces. This is best illustrated by the new regulations for beach activities and beach vendors, which will be discussed further on. By regulating and inhibiting the diversity and vibrancy of these public spaces, Rio’s Olympic preparations have undermined the ways in which social groups have learned to cope with life’s social, economic, and political stresses.

The criminalization of baile funke - a genre of music that originated in the favelas in the 1990’s, but which is now associated with community block parties commonly hosted by the drug cartels- is an example of this. The prohibition of baile funk es is up to the discretion of the chief commander of the UPP, but most communities with a
pacification unit have chosen to prohibit the parties because of their association with drugs and violence. However, MC Leonardo, a member of APAFUNK (Association of Professionals and Friends of Funk) argues that “Funke allows the people living in these communities to communicate about their local reality”; prohibiting baile funkes only furthers the impression that the State is unable to understand the complexity of favela life, thus criminalizing it out of ignorance (Sluis 2011). The criminalization of poverty, and strategies of coping with poverty, has led Raquel Rolnik, U.N Special Reporter on Adequate Housing, to conclude that, “Big events like the Olympics and the World Cup can be an opportunity to mobilize investment into the city’s slums…But unfortunately, the dominant approach we have seen with [Rio’s] mega-events is that they are part of the machinery of the territorial exclusion of the poor” (Ríos 2010).

The quality of Rio’s Olympic preparations is also undermined by the visibly wasteful investments occurring with regards to infrastructure. The concentration of Rio’s Olympic venues and the epicenter of its new urban transportation network is in the upper-middle-class neighborhood of Barra da Tijuca, far from the areas of high population density, and those that rely on public transportation. Gaffney (2010e) notes that in the case of Rio’s preparations, “By funneling public monies into the production of sportive constellations, the city is compelled to produce spaces that do not necessarily function outside of the context of the event.” The spatial concentration of Olympic benefits also discourages people from actively taking part in Rio’s process of becoming an Olympic city, because they appear to be privileging one part of the city and its particular residents. Likewise, communities who are implicated by Olympic-related projects are often kept at arms length, often meeting with public officials, engineers, and managers from the
organizing committee only after the plans have been conceived. In such instances, communities face an impenetrable wall of bureaucracy when they attempt to decipher and question the potential impact of development plans.

Rio’s Olympic preparations also illustrate the privatization and commodification of fandom and ritualized sporting practices. Gaffney (2010e) studies the changing role of Brazilian sporting stadia since the beginning of the twentieth century. He asserts that, “The goal of using stadiums as windows into patterns of urban political economy, social relations and cultural processes is to expose the underlying power relations that direct behavior, produce space, and shape ideologies.” Brazilian sporting culture was once epitomized by the geral of Rio de Janeiro’s Maracanã stadium: an open, affordable concrete standing area that separated the field from the seated sections above. The stadiums’ construction for the 1950 World Cup was intended to demonstrate how Brazil was capable of grand engineering feats, ingenious architecture, and productive labor, while simultaneously affording local politicians a platform to project populist progressive policies. As the twentieth century drew to a close, the international sporting landscape had changed remarkably. The entrepreneurial 1984 Los Angeles Games marked a new era in Olympics’ commercialization and broadcasting, in addition to the more general shift in the production of sporting spaces in the US and the UK. “In both instances, the shift from a participatory to a consumerist model of fandom took precedence as stadium designers and managers targeted more affluent groups by creating ‘signature stadiums’ with increased amenities and rigid internal spaces that reinforced external socio-economic distinctions” (Gaffney 2010e). During this time, Brazil was unable to host international sporting competitions because its stadiums did not conform to the demands
of the increasingly influential international sporting federations, such as designated VIP areas, an increased ratio of parking spots to seats, standardized media areas, and individually ticketed seats.

Since 1998, the Maracanã stadium has undergone several renovations to conform to these demands: the carrying capacity has been gradually reduced from 179,000 to 89,000, luxury boxes now dominate the upper levels, and the gerai was entirely eliminated in 2005-2006. Maracanã is currently being remodeled for the 2014 World Cup Championships, but it is said that the stadium will have to undergo additional renovations to bring it up to code with the demands of the IOC. The recent modifications to Brazilian stadia reflect the shifting political economy of sport, the shifting demands of spectators, and the willingness to accommodate both. The Olympics fit neatly into this new mode of consumer-driven fandom, as they will likely complete the process of commodification and privatization nearly two decades in the making. And, being that fandom now is driven more by consumption than by participation, ones sporting identity is increasingly becoming a more politically passive act.

Furthermore, the future privatization of the Maracanã stadium has recently come into sharp focus. Two weeks after the Municipal elections, the city disclosed its plans to privatize the stadium by auctioning off the project rights to a private bidder. Over thirty-five years, the projected rate of return on their investment will be 26%; this profit will likely be reaped by Brazilian mogul Eike Batista and his sport-venue/entertainment conglomerate IMX, who were spotted surveying the land and taking pictures (Gaffney 2012g). In the recent announcement regarding the privatization of the Maracanã, the city also disclosed its intentions to demolish the Celio de Barros running track and the Julio
de Lamare Aquatic Center (both venues were built for the 2007 Pan American Games), the Museo de Índio, and Arthur Friendenrich Municipal School. “The expenditure of public money on public works to be handed to private interests that involves the destruction of a top-performing public school, a century-old indigenous heritage site, and two Olympic quality training facilities in order to generate even more profit for Brazil’s richest man (Eike Batista), is a perversity that boggles the imagination” (Gaffney 2012).

Despite complying with their legal obligation to hold an audiência pública to dialogue with residents about the plans for the future site in October, 2012, the city will likely auction off the rights to privatize Brazil’s most historic and iconic stadium by the end of the year.

Processes of Restructuring: Case Studies

It is obvious that Rio’s mega-event preparations are impacting the social and physical landscape in a range of ways. The following five sections will explore the ways in which the political, legal, economic, social, and spatial restructuring that is occurring conforms to a mode of mega-event preparations that meet the demands of Olympic stakeholders, and prioritizes strategies of capital accumulation over the provision of public services and the evenhandedness of public institutions.

Political Restructuring: The Revitalization of the Porturária

The revitalization of the Port area through the Porto Maravilha public-private partnership is a classic illustration of the political restructuring that occurs to facilitate

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18 The city must perform an audiência pública before it can begin the contracting process for privatization.
mega-event preparations. Public-private partnerships demand that entities from the public and private sectors join their political resources, knowledge, and funding in order to execute large-scale public projects such as sporting stadia, shopping complexes, and cultural districts. The exigencies of the mega-event combined with the use of public and private resources is an effective and oft used strategy precisely because the production of an Olympic city requires the political and economic resources marshaled by each. Yet public-private partnerships also generate a dynamic in which public agencies are beholden to non-elected actors, the political interests of the project, and the economic interests of investors. In the case of sporting mega-events, projects that employ public-private partnerships typically respond to the obligations of the event, such as stadium, and culture/leisure sites. In this context, the function of public entities breaks from its traditional role as a public resource, and instead works to service the needs of a transient tourist population and the private interests of project investors. The conditions of the Port revitalization demonstrate the use of public institutions, public policy and public coffers to service the needs of tourists and real-estate capital, to the detriment of local residents.

The Porto Maravilha Projecto (The Wonderful Port Project: PPM) is a public-private entity responsible for the revitalization of the Port region in downtown Rio de Janeiro. While the Port area is not a designated Olympic-zone, the revitalization of the Port reemerged as a central objective in Rio's Olympic City transformation in the days after it had won the bid, convincing the IOC to permit Rio to transfer some of its Olympic events to future Port venues. Rio's port region is located in the center of the city, directly north of the central business district. This downtown neighborhood was the epicenter of the colonial slave trade and the city's largest slave-trading market (the Valongo), and is
home to the city's oldest favela, Morro do Providência. Over time, the region took on an administrative role, housing many of the former capital's federal buildings. However, with the transference of the capital to Brasília in 1960, the area suffered from underuse, economic disinvestment, and physical decline. Current indices of poverty for the area are well below the city average, and abandoned buildings have given squatters rights to the city's low-income, transient population. As a result, the official discourse of the plan centers on, "Rescuing the city's long neglected historical center, ruined port area and degraded downtown from illicit and decadent uses such as illegal drug trade and prostitution, and to reverse decades of economic decline by turning it into a world-class living, working and leisure environment" (Broudehoux forthcoming).

Given its central location, accessibility to public transport, and spectacular hilltop views, the area has generated multiple regeneration plans since the 1980's. Former mayor Cesar Maia was fixated on the idea of bringing a Guggenheim museum to the port, but the project was mired by corruption scandals. The current regeneration initiative is the product of a perfect storm of factors, much like Rio’s Olympic bid. Principally, the rare political alignment of Lula’s Workers Party, and the political coalition of Governor Sergio Cabral and Mayor Eduardo Paes, enabled the city to launch the project where other attempts had failed. Indeed, Mayor Paes credited former President Lula for advancing a project nearly ‘40 years in the making’ (Passarinho 2010). Rio's current mega-event climate is also instrumental, if not indispensable to the current revitalization effort because of the connection between the Port’s future cultural/leisure function and mega-event tourism. As such, the Port project is an illustrative example of the way in
which the mega-event climate can advance projects that were formerly underfunded, unpopular, or unnecessary.

According to project documents, the Port Maravilha project will raze five million square meters of devalued housing and industrial buildings to construct a new cultural, residential and business district in the heart of downtown Rio. The PPM’s urban intervention will include a series of roads, the renovation and expansion of local sewage networks, the demolition of a major viaduct and the requalification of public spaces (dos Santos Monteiro & de Andrade 2012). The Port will also house two new museums - The Museum of Tomorrow and the Rio Art Museum - as well as warehouses to be converted for cultural and commercial use. The Port regeneration effort also hopes to quadruple the current population by attracting 100,000 new residents to occupy future residential towers, some of which will be converted from the Olympic media village (a late feature to Rio's Olympic plans).

The PPM development is being coordinated by both public and private agencies, and stands as the largest public-private partnership in Brazilian history. In 2009, the city formed the Port Urban Development Company (CDURP), which would coordinate the project and locate investors. Using a financial tool called the Certificate of Additional Construction Potential (CEPAC), the CDURP was able to sell the public land to the federal workers pension fund (FGTS), with the incentive that future land developers could exceed permitted zoning limits, and increase their profit margin. The goal of the CEPAC's is to capture the added, future value of the land that is created by revitalization. The FGTS purchased the CEPAC for US$2 billion and has committed to funding an additional US$4 billion, perpetuating the long-standing trend in which mega-event
infrastructure is predominantly financed by the public. Later, by emergency Municipal decree, the Porto Novo Consortium was chosen to execute the management and infrastructure renovations of the Port through the year 2025. The Porto Novo Consortium represents the construction and developing firms of OAS, Carioca Enghenaria, and Odebrecht, who submitted a private bid for the development of the Port area back in 2009. Evidence suggests that the parameters of the 2010 Municipal decree were structured by the 2009 bid, retaining the zoning, transportation, financial makeup, building heights, and areas of special interest from their original proposal (Freeman 2012; Gaffney 2011d).

According to analysis carried out by Jorgensen (2011), for developers to make a profit under these conditions, office and residential space would have to sell for US$5,000/square meter, making it the most expensive real-estate in all of Rio. As such, CEPAC's have been criticized as being a prime instrument of gentrification. Gaffney (2011d) adds that “The [CEPAC's] title to extra-building potential do not need to be acted upon but can be held until a building project comes to fruition.” Therefore, the creation of fictitious value will likely generate a real estate bubble, generating large profits for companies who are receiving public financing through low interest loans and tax exemptions. Moreover, Gaffney argues that as mega-events generate zones of special economic interest through extralegal measures designed to stimulate investment and development, the city is recalculating access to fundamental human rights and requalifying citizenship parameters. “This territoriality privileges corporate over individual rights, consumption over participation, and private over public domains” (Gaffney 2011d).
This is perhaps best exemplified by the resulting socio-spatial fragmentation and polarization of the Port area. The highly speculative nature of PPM’s investment is contingent on the drastic alteration of the area's socio-economic makeup (Freeman 2012). In Brazil, the proximity to poverty is one of the main sources of real estate devaluation, so much so that similar units in the same building can differ based on whether or not their view faces a favela (Broudehoux forthcoming). While the current calculations will prohibit low and middle-income families from affording future residential options in the Port area, social housing options have also been actively sidelined. In the original plans, 20,000 low rent units were to be made available for families earning five times the minimum wage. That number has now been reduced to 500 units, which will be constructed on the western periphery of the project to act as a buffer between the unsightly and noisy rail yard and the high-end real estate projects (Broudehoux forthcoming).

The evolution of the PPM’s planning demonstrates a series of unsettling trends in mega-event planning. The current nature of the revitalization effort is projected to gentrify the downtown area though unaffordable rents and the proactive effort to block social housing options. It is publically subsidizing private profits, some of which some are being earned by ‘legally’ manufacturing real estate bubbles. The use of financial tools such as CEPAC’s to legitimize socio-spatial segregation is compounded by the absence of the State's role as a regulator and the rise of non-elected parties to positions of extraordinary power. A perverse example of this influence is the ability to redefine zones of ‘special economic interest’, distorting tools that were originally intended for the creation of spatial justice and social development. And, by devolving urban planning into
the hands of property developers and real estate interests, the PPM regeneration effort is also facilitating the transformation of the urban realm into a marketable commodity.

Broudehoux (forthcoming) argues that the Port's commodification of urban space is comparable to its "commodification of culture, the museumification of heritage and the simplification and partial erasure of the sectors’ complex and controversial past.” The cultural-driven redevelopment of the Port is a major concern. In addition to the Museum of Tomorrow, a futuristic project designed by world-renowned architect Santiago Calatrava, and the refurbished Praça Maua, the Port will also draw visitors to Latin America’s largest urban aquarium, AquaRio. Cable car lines, parking garages, a new federal Police headquarters and Banco do Brasil building, are also in the works.

The transformation of this historic region compliments the global trend towards the transfiguration of working class areas into sites of global consumption (Harvey 1988). Sites that privilege the international tourist class frequently revolve around notions of culture and places of visual consumption. Broudehoux (forthcoming) criticizes the use of culture as a redevelopment strategy because of its negative association with for-profit economic revitalization, superficial cosmetic bandaging, and the manufacturing of social consent. What's more, the current cultural installations blatantly ignore the neighborhood’s Afro-Brazilian heritage, its roots in samba history, and the many quilombos (ex-slave colonies) that still exist today. By catering its urban development towards the creation of tourist-oriented spaces, Rio is using its mega-events to meet the needs of temporary visitors, while redefining its cultural heritage by delegitimizing the history and struggle of its urban poor.
Taken as a whole, the current Porto Maravilha project echoes characterizations of neoliberal urbanism:

Risk areas are made safe by displacing social undesirables and low-income residents, and are turned into investment opportunities for the real estate sector through public subsidies, tax breaks and the provision of infrastructure. This process is facilitated by the diminishing role of the State as a regulating and intervening power and by its growing involvement in serving the interests of the market. (Broudehoux forthcoming)

This perspective is best illustrated by the case of Morro da Providência, a vibrant community with a rich history that is being terrorized and parceled to facilitate the development of a tourist joy ride. Rio Olympic Neighborhood Watch (Rioonwatch.org), an undertaking of the NGO Catalytic Communities, began its coverage of Morro da Providência in June of 2011. Providência is Rio's oldest favela, settled by a group of soldiers who fought in the Canudos War on the promise that when they returned, they would be liberated and awarded with housing. Veterans built provisional shelters and when public housing never materialized, the settlement grew into a permanent working-class community, with many working on the docks nearby. Today, the community is home to around 5,500 people, and is under the guard of the city's seventh Police Pacification Unit.

On Friday June 10th, 2011, the UPP Social program hosted a public meeting in Praça Americano Brum, the main public square in the community and a space currently slated for removal because of the construction of a cable car station. During the meeting, city officials presented the Porto Maravilha project, including plans to invest US$69 billion in upgrades over the next 15 years. As part of Porto Maravilha, Providência is the first favela to have infrastructure investments bankrolled by private enterprise; other sources of funding are being provided by federal and state funds associated with PAC 2,
specially linked to the Morar Carioca favela-upgrading program. In attendance were members from Rio's housing secretary, the UPP Social, the Municipal Secretary of Labor and Employment, as well the Urban Development Company of the Port (CDURP) and the Instituto Municipal de Urbanismo Pereira Passos, despite the noticeable lack of residents because the meeting had been scheduled in the middle of the workday. The results of the meeting were negligible according to observers. Officials spoke didactically about dialogue between residents, ‘uniting a divided city’ and ‘bringing transparency to the pacified regions’ (Worms 2011). When residents voiced their concerns regarding the community’s lack of social infrastructure, the absence of accessible information about the project, and the fact that housing relocations to Pedra Lisa (a tentative housing alternative) would be ready two years after the demolition of their homes, city officials called them "liars" (Worms 2011). To date, city officials have only been back to the community once more, at which time conversations never broached the topic of whether these interventions were necessary, or whose interests they served.

Almost a year later, the 100 families originally slated for removal has climbed to 1,700, or one third of the community. Personal accounts conform to the experience of others throughout the city threatened with eviction; residents come home to find that their doors have been spray-painted by the Municipal Housing authority (Secretaria Municipal de Habitação: SMH), and then face an opaque bureaucracy when seeking concrete answers about their imminent removal. 800 of the evictions are connected to the cable car, while other families simply find themselves located on the wrong side of the

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19 Curiously, Morar Carioca is generally associated with a participatory, pro-community model for upgrades, yet in Providências case, interventions include the demolition of houses and the community's only available public space (Roller 2011b). Broudeaux rationalizes this, stating that while the city cannot uproot the entire community, they are engaging in a process of 'symbolically taming, trimming and turning it into a tourist attraction'
staircase-widening project. The cable car and gondola will facilitate movement to places of interest like the cruzeiro at the top of the community with a specular 360° view of Rio. Other proposed lines will connect to the Museum of Tomorrow, cruise docking, and the Samba City, an elite entertainment venue. For its part, the city is justifying the gondola as way of transporting residents more efficiently. But, in the logic of one Rioonwatch reporter, "If the residents who live at the top and would have the most need for the gondola are being evicted, then the projects original raison d'etre is gone" (Camposeco 2012).

In addition to the 800 homes, the community's main Praça will be removed, which has become a source of resentment for all community members. In July, 2011, residents tried to gather around the Praça to protest the destruction of their community’s only public space, but were prohibited from entering by the community's own UPP guard. Most importantly, residents complain that these multi-million dollar projects do not address the most important issues facing the community, such as sanitation, education, and health care (Broudehoux forthcoming). In trying to rationalize these development plans, Freeman (2012) suggests that, “Providência’s presence is disturbing, but the community cannot be removed wholesale. Instead it is being symbolically tamed, beautified, thinned out and turned into a tourist attraction.”

Morro do Providência is an obvious victim in the regeneration of the downtown Port. Aside from the constant insecurity and threat of eviction that residents live under, community life is being fractured by uneven policies and the destruction of public space. In many ways, their experience conforms to what Porter (2009) describes as the process of becoming a non-citizen or an invisible citizen through mega-event preparations.
“People, neighborhoods, and daily lives are seen as an abstraction by planning policy and practice. [Regeneration projects] have been imagined as the creation of new things, valuable uses, from space emptied of people and activity through bureaucratic Imagineering” (Porter 2009). Though less publicized than Providência’s struggle, there have also been a series of mysterious fires that have subsumed entire squatter communities and a popular, informal street-vending bazaar near Central do Brasil in April, 2010. While it is important to note that these fires were located near the headquarters of the Military Fire brigade that took over an hour to arrive, it is perhaps more notable that both the bazaar and the squatter communities were scheduled for removal due to PPM projects (Flor do Asfalto 2011).

The PPM project illustrates three important, reoccurring and emergent trends in mega-event preparations: the use of public-private partnership models for the development of major urban works; the revitalization of dilapidated areas at the expense of extant residents, businesses, and histories; and the emergence of cultural-led redevelopment strategies as a new tool for the justification of neoliberal urban development. The Port revitalization effort has resulted in population displacement, gentrification, socio-spatial polarization and the commodification of culture and urban space, as well as the deployment of mega-event exigencies to justify new politico-legal frameworks, and the financialization of urban development. Taken together, the logics that govern the revitalization of the Port privilege international tourists, rather than local citizens. Restructuring the form and function of political institutions to facilitate mega-event preparations is an inherently disenfranchising venture because its bind a public good to the interests of Olympic stakeholders, rather than to local citizens.
Legal Restructuring: The Eviction of Vila Autódromo

Similar to the restructuring and co-optation of political institutions, mega-events also require extra and supra legal mechanisms that allow organizers to by-pass bureaucratic red tape, expedite development projects, or incentivize investors. In the summary of Rio’s Olympic law, we observed a comprehensive effort to align the IOC’s requirements with temporary, exceptional legal measures that break with Brazil’s existing institutional and legal frameworks, in the name of facilitating Rio’s Olympic preparations. However, there are other Olympic projects that do not fall so neatly into these temporary provisions, and instead rely on the inversion and manipulation of the legal system in order to streamline Olympic development. The inversion of the legal system suggests that advances made within the legal system are being overturned in order to facilitate Olympic projects, whereas outright manipulation refers to tampering with the legal system by private, or semi-private interests. The evictions and forced removals that are occurring throughout the city illustrate both, yet no struggle articulates this dynamic stronger than the small community of Vila Autódromo.

Vila Autódromo is a 40-year old working class neighborhood and a former fishing community in Rio’s southwest wetlands. Over time, it’s population swelled due to the migration of workers from the northern suburbs who came to work on projects like the convention center Rio Centro, and the adjacent raceway track. However, their proximity to the emerging upper-middle class communities of Barra became problematic, and the community faced threats of eviction. Yet in 1990, the community won recognition of their land rights through the Direito Real de Uso (right to occupy through usage), and was legally deemed a Special Zone of Social Interest. This legal protection are
guaranteed by the State, just as the State gives the municipality use of the neighboring lands for the Barra Racetrack. Preparations for the 2007 Pan American Games threatened the survival of the community as well, yet the community was able to successfully resist removal and maintain autonomy due to the legal provision provided in their 40 year title. Despite the offensive barricades ultimately erected for the Pan American Games, the community has peacefully coexisted with large-scale events like the Formula 1 and the music festival Rock in Rio.

In addition to the community’s legal title and their past success in resisting event-related projects, Rio’s 2009 Olympic bid document maintained the community given its adjacent location to the projected site of the Olympic park. The community was further reassured of its security when the plans for AECOM’s Olympic Park bid confirmed the community’s permanence in the 2016, 2018, and 2030 projections for the site (Hall 2012). However, in September 2011, the invitation to private sector developers to bid on the construction of the Olympic Park infrastructure, revealed the city’s intentions to trade the land currently occupied by Vila Autódromo, the racetrack, and a small airstrip, for the new venue. The winning bid would eventually profit from the private, upscale housing developments that would be built on site after 2016.

In order to remove the community, the municipal government is manipulating the exact legislation that was established in the 2001 City Statue in order to protect communities like Vila Autódromo. Article 429 of the Lei Orgânica do Município stipulates that removal is only justified when an informal settlement occupies a tract of land that poses significant risk to its residents. In order to remove Vila Autódromo, the city is citing ‘pollution’ and ‘flood risk’, preying on the ambiguity of the term ‘risk’ in
the legislation; community members, on the contrary, are hard pressed to remember the last instance of a flood, and argue that most water-born illnesses come from the surrounding residential neighborhoods that pollute the lagoon, not the community’s own sanitation (Browning 2011).

In the months following the call for proposals, the community of Vila Autódromo organized a legal response to their impending eviction. Using the fact that the original plans did not call for their removal, the Vila Autódromo Residents Association, the State Public Defenders and a handful of city councilmen rallied behind their legal claims to the land. Their efforts were complicated by the fact that the legal obligations stated in the bid parameters contradicted what was said in the public comment period on the Olympic Park PPP proposal, which suggested that the community’s resettlement would be the winning consortiums obligation (Hall 2012). The community’s uncertain fate prompted the legal group to file for an injunction to postpone the bid process until these details were clarified. In January 2012, a judge accepted the request and suspended the bid process, affording the community more time to organize and pursue alternative forms of action.

In July 2012, the community submitted their own upgrading plan with the help of urban planners, architects, engineers, geographers and social scientists from the Institute of Urban and Regional Planning at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (IPPUR-UFRJ) and the Urban and Housing Projects and Studies Nucleus at the Fluminense Federal University (UFF). Since October 2011, the community has partnered with these agencies in extensive data collection, including interviews with residents and technical mapping efforts. Residents also participated in a series of workshops and assemblies,
making collaborative, participatory decisions regarding the community’s future
development (Clarke 2012). From the start, technical surveys have concluded that
upgrading and integrating the community would be a far cheaper alternative than the
R$80 million price tag on the community’s resettlement. With only eleven streets and
solid houses on large plots of low-risk land, upgrading is far more feasible than in typical
favelas, which are narrower and more densely populated. The community’s alternative
upgrading plan includes widening the streets for water drainage and improved pedestrian
circulation, as well as the renovation of a public park. According to their plan, eighty-six
homes would be removed in order to comply with the Federal Forest Code, but would be
relocated in a four-story apartment development to be built on a vacant plot of land
within the community (Plano Popular da Vila Autódromo 2012).

However, while the alternative-upgrading plan presents a sound case against
resettlement, city authorities still maintain that the community needs to be removed for
Olympic projects. The city’s case was leveraged in August of 2012, when the
expropriation of land for the community’s settlement reached the final stages of the
judicial process. The procurement of land ran into controversy last year when it was
discovered that the city intended to purchase the land at an inflated sum from the
Tibouchina company, who had donated to Mayor Eduardo Paes’s campaign in 2008, as
well as Housing Secretary Jorge Bittar’s campaign in 2010. To add insult to injury, the
land destined for their resettlement has received no ecological survey, despite being
previously mined for sand and gravel, and has been identified as an area of medium-high
risk by a geological survey commissioned by Geo-Rio. However, despite the objections
of notable city councilmen, Vila Autódromo residents, and technical experts, the
expropriation of the land will likely occur, according to Clarke (2012). Meanwhile, as the community anxiously awaits the decision about its fate, Mayor Paes has chosen to postpone undertakings pertaining to their relocation for the forty-five days ahead of the election, so as to avoid the political use of the situation (Rolnik 2012).

The community of Vila Autódromo is exceptional in many respects. It is a community with legal title to their land, and one that, while informal and irregular, has developed in such a way that makes it suitable for urban upgrade programs. The small, resilient community has successfully resisted the rapid urban development of Barra da Tijuca, despite pressure from private developers and public officials alike. It is also exceptional in the context of Rio’s forced evictions, because unlike other targets of the city’s aggressive, illegal, and violent pursuit, the community has maintained its unity and resolve to resist.

On the other hand, Vila Autódromo’s experience with Olympic preparations illustrates the ways in which legal gains, such as those afforded in the City Statute, are being retracted and inverted in order to facilitate Olympic developments. The rights of Vila Autódromo residents are also being violated under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), of which Brazil is a signatory; under this convent, Brazil is prohibited from and must protect people against forced evictions and displacement. “These standards define forced evictions as those which are carried out without adequate procedural and legal safeguards, such as adequate notice, prior consultation with those affected, provision of legal remedies and adequate alternative accommodation” (Forced Evictions in Rio de Janeiro 2011). This standard conforms to Brazil’s own municipal, state and federal laws, of which they are also in violation.
The community’s experience also shows how both public and private interests are explicitly manipulating the legal system. Article 4 of Law 11.124/2005 of the National System of Housing states that, “Priority use of land owned by the Government is for the implementation of social housing projects.” Yet in direct contradiction of this, private land is being bought from the donors to Mayor Paes last campaign for the resettlement of Vila Autódromo residents, a trend being replicated in the redevelopment of the Port (Cosentino 2011). Another ill-fated example of legal manipulation was the dismantling of the Land and Housing Unit of the State Public Defenders Office (NUTH) in early 2011, after the public defenders had reached out to the IOC to communicate Vila Autódromo’s delicate situation (Williamson 2011).

*Economic Restructuring: BRT’s and the Consolidation of Barra da Tijuca*

Economic restructuring that facilitates mega-event preparations commonly indicates the use of public coffers to financially buttress sport-related projects. In this respect, public spending is used to finance leisure and consumption-based projects, rather than providing goods and services to be used by a majority of residents. Mega-event related projects are a broad category, encompassing both the legacy projects of the host-city and the stipulations and facilities required by the IOC. The Bus-Rapid-Transit lanes (BRT) that Rio is currently assembling fall under both categories. Transportation infrastructure received the lowest score on the IOC’s evaluation of Rio’s 2016 candidacy, even after its proposal had incorporated and modified the aspects of its previous two bids that were deemed insufficient (Kassens-Noor 2012, 157). Specifically, Rio was lacking suburban rail, metro and road infrastructure to connect all four Olympic zones, in
addition to the IOC’s wariness regarding the capacity of its airport to handle the high influx of visitors. Nevertheless, the IOC ruled that Rio’s successful 2016 candidacy was contingent on a total overhaul of its transportation infrastructure. In the same vein, the BRT lanes are a component of Rio’s Olympic transportation legacy in the sense that the city government is actualizing transportation upgrades that have long been a factor in the city’s Master plan (Kassens-Noor 2012, 163)\textsuperscript{20}. In terms of transportation, the federal and state government plan to invest US$14 billion in urban projects, a price tag likely to skyrocket as the cost of mega-projects, and Rio’s history with sporting mega-events, seem to indicate.

Unfortunately, in combination the two energies have struck an uneven balance, which prioritizes fluidity between the Olympic zones and reterritorialization of Barra de Tijuca, over increased access and ridership, and limited environmental destruction and displacement. The following section will review Rio’s plans for its ‘High Performance Transport Ring’, including the physical plans themselves, their likely social impact, and the discourse that is being employed to rationalize them. Yet Rio’s BRT lanes not only illustrate the way in which the city is succumbing to the demands of a short-term event. Rio’s new urban transportation circuits will also strengthen the reterritorialization of the wealthy western suburb of Barra da Tijuca, demonstrating the way in which economic resources are being managed, allocated, and manipulated by Olympic stakeholders with interests in real estate and construction.

\textsuperscript{20} According to Kassens-Noor, Rio’s Olympic transportation implementations are in sync with the city’s 2025 Transport Plan.
Bus Rapid Transit lanes (BRT's) are public transportation lines along which road-specific buses operate. Passengers commonly enter through elevated stations, using prepaid tickets that can be bought on the platform of each station. BRT lanes and their respective stations are built on the side of main highways or roads, or in the middle of main thoroughfares, and accessed by elevated pedestrian on-ramps. The first plans for BRT lanes were developed in the United States in the 1930's. Brazil first began experimenting with alternative transportation models in Curitiba in the 1970's, and has since heralded them as a model of transportation sufficient to meet the accessibility demands of a medium sized city. Rio's model for its BRT lanes is based on Bogotá, Colombia's Millennium Transport BRT. Like Bogotá, Rio’s BRT's present the city with a relatively inexpensive, quickly installed solution to the problem of urban mobility (Gaffney et al. 2012b). In comparison to light rail or metro systems, BRT’s are anywhere between one half and one fifth of the price, but their capacity is proportionately lower and their urban impact is significantly higher.

Low cost BRT's in places like Bogotá, Brisbane, and several South African cities for the World Cup, have encouraged urban planners and city governments to install them with greater frequency and enthusiasm. In Brazil, this enthusiasm is displayed in an 800-page manual produced by the Ministry of Cities, which describes best practices for the planning and implementation of BRT's, and through the low-interest loans that the Brazilian National Development Bank (BNDES) has allocated for their construction. According to Gaffney et al. (2012b), "The standardization and subsidization of BRT production have made this the dominant form of public transportation planning for Brazilian cities in the early 21st century.” However, their rise to prominence is curious
given the myriad of criticisms waged against them. Most problematically, BRT lines: i) do not decrease dependence on petroleum or wheel-based transportation; ii) they can become quickly overwhelmed and have problems expanding capacity; iii) they dedicate more urbanized space to motor traffic, while not necessarily dislocating or substituting personal automotive use; iv) they erect impenetrable barriers through neighborhoods and claim houses, businesses, and public space; v) they provide complimentary, not structural solutions to urban mobility; and vi) they are not related to effective metropolitan demands for transportation and mobility (Gaffney et al. 2012b).

Rio’s Olympic ‘High Performance Transport Ring’ will utilize four BRT routes (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Projected Map for the Bus Rapid Transit lanes for Rio2016

The BRT Transcarioca will principally connect the international airport and the region of Barra de Tijuca. According to the government, the connective logic of this line is supposed to reduce travel time by 60%, in addition to serving up to 400,000 people per
day. However, Gaffney et al.’s study suggests that airport-to-Barra travel will not be aided by the Transcarioca because of the inconvenience of putting large suitcases on a bus, compounded with the long-established cultural perception that public transport is precarious and dangerous, and the added necessity of taking a cab once the bus arrives at the final depot. Moreover, because employment is concentrated in Rio’s center, this line will be used primarily as a connection to the Barra-Ipanema metro line, meaning that at peak hours, the new metro line will be running at capacity on the departing platform in Barra. On the positive side, residents that were interviewed said the Trancarioca line might encourage work at the international airport or in Zona Norte, and would definitely encourage more people to frequent Barra’s beaches on the weekend. Lastly, in the neighborhoods along the Transcarioca, researchers noted high levels of informal commerce and spontaneous pedestrian traffic, which will both be restricted due to the construction of wide BRT lanes and narrow pedestrian sidewalks, and could concurrently devalue real-estate along its corridors (Gaffney et al. 2012b).

The Transolímpica BRT will connect two of the Olympic Zones: Deodoro and Barra (specifically servicing the Olympic Park and the Olympic Village). According to Gaffney et al., the Transolímpica will be the most costly BRT lane per-kilometer, and will have the most limited long-term utility, as well as the greatest urban and environmental impact. This sixteen-mile corridor is unlike the other BRT lanes in that it will also have an express lane for cars, with no crossings or traffic lights (Schlaikjer 2012). Deodoro is a sparsely populated area, hosting smaller-scale events like shooting and BMX. The BRT lane will involve extensive tunneling, as it passes through several ecological reserves, and will affect the populations in Bangu, Padre Miguel, and
Realango. Gaffney et al. projects that the long-term use of this line is principally being advocated to facilitate movement of low-wage workers to Barra, but they argue that the "Transolímpica will further segment and fragment the region, perhaps causing new territorial struggles in a region dominated by militias."

The Transbrasil, linking Deodoro to the port neighborhood of Caju, is highly problematic. As of 2011, it was the least developed BRT lane and the least likely to become a reality. It is also the project designed to ameliorate Rio's most congested transportation artery, Avenida Brasil, which transports an estimated 900,000 people per day. Unfortunately, the construction of this BRT would likely bring transportation of goods and people to a standstill during the years of its construction, as the operational space necessary for such a large project would significantly consume Avenida Brasil's carrying capacity. Likewise, the immediate neighborhood serviced by the lane is home to Rio's growing, car-dependent middle class, while stopping short of areas to the west that would benefit most from improved connectivity (Gaffney et al. 2012b).

Finally, the Transoeste line connects the western region of Santa Cruz to Jardim Oceânico, the first terminal on the Barra-Ipanema Metro line, via a 56km long BRT lane, with 64 passenger stops. This line is the longest and currently most advanced BRT project, and is also the most adequate and viable in terms of urban integration and connectivity. This lane expects to reduce average journey times by half (Schlaikjer 2012). Unfortunately, this route is mired in several problems. First, while Santa Cruz has experienced accelerated urban and demographic growth, it has not seen commensurate growth in employment opportunities or infrastructure, making commuter traffic unidirectional. When combined with the commuters from the Transcarioca and
Transoeste lines, the Jardim Oceânico metro extension will likely be congested from its point of origin, and will likely stifle any advantages these new transportation circuits might present. Likewise, the current layout of the plan positions the BRT station in the middle of a dozen-lane thoroughfare, making bus-to-train pedestrian traffic dangerous and chaotic. Gaffney et al. notes that none of the BRT buses currently have access for bicycles, which indicates that target users have not been profiled properly.

Three of the proposed BRT lanes have already been cited in connection with the eviction and removal of ten favela communities. In Figure 4, I use Gaffney et al.’s BRT transit map as a base to mark affected communities, each of which are in different stages of removal.

Figure 4: Projected Map for the Bus Rapid Transit lanes for Rio2016 marked with threatened communities

Along the TransCarioca line, favela Largo do Campinho will be raised, clearing 3,000 homes. In the West Zone, 500 families in Restinga, Vila Harmonia and Vila Recreio II have been pursued by the staff of city hall, police and demolition crews since 2010, to
allow for the widening of Avenida das Americas (Silvestre & Oliviera 2012). The TransOlímpica has stirred fears amongst residents of Asa Branca, Vila União de Curicica, Vila Calmete and Abadiana, unsure of exactly what part of their community will be bisected by the bus line. Residents of Curicica know that the majority of their community sits at the edge of Estrada da Curicica and Estrada Calmete, which will be widened to three times the current width to handle six future traffic lanes; and because the other side of Estrada de Curicica is the site of a municipal hospital, residents are trying to be proactive about their upcoming evictions. Unfortunately, requests made by the current president of the Residents Association of Vila União to speak with Municipal representatives have fallen on deaf ears. "Second to the obvious fear of eviction, its the lingering ambiguity that's perhaps most paralyzing. Without official word of the city government's plans, Vila União is caught in a space that offers no real avenues for mobilization, defense, or anything other than just waiting" (Dorado 2010).

Gaffney et al. argues that two discursive tropes are being advanced in the selling of the BRT lanes for the preparation of Rio’s Olympic city: naturalness and connectivity/integration. These discourses are layered and mutually reinforcing. In one sense, Rio's BRT's are being sold as a legitimate necessity to combat the city's growth patterns. By this account, the ‘city’ is an independent actor with its own logic, causing it to assume a natural destiny "outlined by the models and expectations within the marketplace of global cities" (Gaffney et al. 2012b). This narrative effectively disassociates the needs of the city from the involvement of social actors or special interests. An example of this is that, during a slide-show presentation at a public meeting held for residents of a lower-middle class area which will be bisected by the
TransCarioca BRT, a slide read: "The city of Rio has obligations that can no longer be put off. With its population, with its destiny as a global metropolis, with its history and with its future" (Gaffney et al. 2012b). The objective of this narrative is to construct a social consensus regarding the legitimacy and necessity of BRT projects. By being held as a natural and necessary intervention, naysayers become impediments to progress, and to the fulfillment of Rio's destiny. Gomes (2012) highlights the use of videographic elements to reinforce this narrative. In Olympic advertising, the labor of the men building the BRTs is conflated to the training of an Olympic athlete. "The conflation of athletes and laborers working for a common, patriotic cause, creates consensus regarding the social value and physical (if not moral) character of these projects; these heroic figures are presented as taking on the work of producing the city and the nation" (Gaffney et al. 2012b).

Fluidity is also thematic, imparting the idea that Rio’s Olympic city "will be a functional city that has permeability and connectivity between its various and historically disconnected regions" (Gaffney et al. 2012b). This is echoed in the marketing campaign: "TransCarioaca, a Rio that doesn't run to the sea. TransCarioca, a Rio that flows." The fluid mobility of the new transportation system conveys both its naturalness and its integration into the physical landscape. Likewise, Rio's projection as a modern city will be reinforced by BRT's platforms that are architecturally iconographic, integrating the forward-thinking vision of the city with futuristic transportation.

In light of these discursive tools, Rio’s Olympics transportation circuits will pose a number of serious problems for the city. Most immediately, the construction of the lanes is causing massive displacement all across the city. Futhermore, de Melo (2009)
argues that most effective solution to the problem of urban mobility in cities with high population densities such as Rio de Janeiro is a “diversified and integrated subway network” (de Melo 2012, 540); however, Rio’s transportation upgrades only include the extension of the Ipanema-Barra metro line, which have no connections to any other lines. In an interview with BBC Brasil, Gaffney attributes this thoughtless planning to the pressure exerted by the bus company lobby on City Hall (Idoeta 2010).

Rio's fragile mobility networks have been conditioned by a historical lack of integrated and long-term planning, and public policies that privilege the personal automobile and its associated driver (Brandão 2006). When one zooms out a bit further, we are able to see that the proposed BRT lanes still do not correspond with the city’s areas of high population density; to the contrary, the BRT lanes privilege the region of Barra, where the overall population density is relatively low, and the number of car-owners is strikingly high. Again, BRT’s run contrary to urban planning logic that “high density allows the scale and scope of the infrastructure investment to reduce operations costs” (de Melo 2012, 541). Even further, Gaffney et al.’s study seems to indicate that while real estate near BRT stations will appreciate due to enhanced mobility and connectivity, homes and communities near BRT corridors will decrease in value because of the negative externalities of the lanes (air and noise pollution, fractured public space, congested pedestrian walkways), illustrating how "BRT infrastructure concretizes social and class biases, and environmental and geographic inequalities" (Gaffney et al. 2012b).

Overall the efficacy and limitations of Rio's proposed BRT lines can be reduced to the fact that all three of its lines converge within a five-mile radius of Barra de Tijuca. This area is receiving the greatest percentage of Olympic investment, and consequently
undergoing rampant real estate speculation since the future availability of public transportation tends to increase market-value for real estate, setting off waves of speculative building (Sueldo 2012). Put in this light, public officials appear to be working in concert with the tools that leverage the events’ potential to maximize return on investment.

Gaffney et al.'s particular findings were echoed in a larger, comparative study on public transportation investments made for sporting mega-events. Kassens-Noor's *Planning Olympic Legacies: Transport Dreams and Urban Realities* (2012) evaluates Olympic preparations against the host city’s preexisting master plans and urban demands, arguing that while the Olympics present cities with an exceptional opportunity to realize urban and region goals, "Local governments must take proactive steps to ensure that the urban and transportation decision-making does not serve only the event's short-term needs" (Kassens-Noor 2012, 1). In her evaluation of Rio de Janeiro’s urban and transportation legacy plans, she explains:

If all projects were to be implemented as proposed, Rio would have exclusively focused on attracting international capital, hyped real estate developments and become a global city at the expense of the poor. Rio, as a more and more segregating Olympic city, has effectively ignored its original strategic plans premise to support integration and reduction of poverty. Instead Rio's government created a new urban structure excluding the favelas and in particular Rio's deprived northern and western suburbs - those that are in desperate need of investments. (Kassens-Noor 2012, 165)

Regarding, Rio's specific transportation plans: "At the end of 2011, transport projects for the Olympics are in continuous planning flux. Most original plans are being shoveled around to accommodate not only IOC needs but also the short time horizon before the Opening Ceremony. Because projects are faced with extensive delays, alternative solutions that can still be implemented are invented"(Kassens-Noor 2012, 165). Kasens-
Noor concludes that, "The urban and transport legacy of three internationally renowned mega events will leave Rio de Janeiro with an urban structure that is set up to stage and accommodate the needs of other mega-events, but not for an integrated urban fabric that is built upon the principles of urban sustainability and the needs of the populace" (Kassens-Noor 2012, 169).

Concerns regarding the concentrated benefits of the BRT lanes are best illustrated by the centrality of Barra in the city’s new transportation circuitry, and the consolidation of Barra as an extension of metropolitan Rio. While Barra as a region has been developing since the 1970’s, Rio’s recent mega-events have notably contributed to the area’s urban development. In effect, I suggest that Rio’s Olympic stakeholders are using the economic resources afforded by the city’s mega-event preparations as an excuse to further develop Barra by way of increased transportation access. As I will show, privileging the urban development of Barra through increased accessibility is both an economic strategy that subsidizes real-estate investments and attracts elite residents, and a political strategy that aims to showcase Barra as Rio’s urban prototype.

While Rio’s bid book promised to make “full use of the city’s magnificent landscape,” it is Barra de Tijuca that is the city’s obvious winner. According to the Rio2016™ website, the Barra Olympic zone is referred to as the "heart of the Games", and will receive 56% of all Olympic-related facilities. In addition to the Olympic and Paralympic villages, the Rio Olympic Park, the International Broadcast Center/Main Press Center (IBC/MPC) and the media village will all be located in Barra. The region will also accommodate twenty Olympic competitions at a range of facilities such as the
Olympic tennis center, the Maria Lenk Aquatic Center and the Olympic Velodrome. Barra will also house the Olympic Training Center, which will become a permanent fixture of the area, occupying 111 acres of land. All official hotels of the IOC will also be located there. And as mentioned, 125km of new BRT lanes and the 13.5km long extension of the Ipanema metropolitan subway line will also reinforce Barra’s centrality in Rio’s Olympic urban development.

The majority of the venues for the 2007 Pan American Games were also located in Barra, including the Vila Pan athlete’s village. While the Pan Games left an ambiguous social and urban legacy, a few notable trends emerged. The Pan’s promise of transportation infrastructure that would connect central Rio to Barra set off a wave of speculative building and buying within the area, even though these plans were sidelined early on due to the exploding price of sporting venues (Oliviera 189). Preparations for the Pan also crystallized the unbalanced localization of mega-event venues, demonstrating the unfair distribution of facilities and financial resources in the city (Bienstein et al. 2012). According to Bienstein et al., large-scale land dispossession and the consolidation of Barra de Tijuca as a new urban center are some of the principle initiatives that begun with the 2007 Pan American games, and which are being advanced through the geographic constellations of the Olympic Games.

The emergence of Barra is a story of deterritorialization and convergence. Since the 1970’s, Barra’s population has exploded from just 6,000 to over 300,000 people.

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21 Hiller (2007) notes that a common feature of the post-modern urban transformation of mega-event host-cities is that development will commonly concentrate and cluster in regions dispersed throughout the urban metropolis- reifying the notion of the polycentric mega-city. “Whereas cities have always had a strong central core, the continuing growth of cities to produce mega-cities has meant that cities have become more de-centered into vast urban regions. The regionalization of cities has created metropolitan areas consisting of a plurality of urban municipalities. The mega-event then is not just one city but a multiple of cities forming an urban region.” For this reason, any analysis of the urban legacy of mega-
Around the time when the formal housing stock in *zona sul* was reaching capacity (1970’s), real estate developers began capitalizing on the vacant, coastal lands in the western part of the city. Until that time, the land had remained underdeveloped because of the Tijuca mountain range; however, with the construction of a four-lane motor highway, and the new Yellow Line expressway, Barra to Centro travel became a viable commute for buses and personal vehicles. Prior to the 1970’s condominium-building boom in Barra, Rio’s residential architecture was defined by small apartments. Barra had previously been the site of luxurious leisure clubs for the wealthy, but real estate investors came up with the idea to hybridize them into ‘housing complexes with clubs’ (Coy & Pöhler 2002). Indeed, large real estate companies were responsible for the majority of Barra’s (uneven) urbanization. In the 1980’s, a strong current of inter-urban migration occurred along Rio’s coast, with many upper-class residents leaving the increasingly insecure *zona sul* and retreating into highly fortified urban enclaves characterized by gated communities.

Today, Barra extends over approximately 20 km from the Atlantic Ocean to the lagoons. And while the area is dominated by high-rise buildings, its wide roads, numerous shopping centers, and leisure facilities make it more comparable to a US suburb, earning it the nickname *Orlando Carioca* or *Miami Brasileira*. Barra da Tijuca is currently the fastest growing urban development occurring in Rio today. Its luxurious high-rises and detail-oriented security features characterize the area’s architecture; gated entrances are protected by CCTV’s, and apartments have underground parking lots and barred windows, as well as 24-hour security guards. These self-contained and highly

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events must be mapped on to the extant processes of deterritorialization and convergence occurring within a host-city.
secure complexes are known as *condomínios fechados* or *condominios exclusivos*. Barra is also the location of South America’s largest retail complex, complete with hypermarkets and over 700 shops.

The gated communities or closed condominiums that have come to dominate the Barra coastal landscape have invented a new socio-spatial differentiation within the Carioca metropolis, argue Randolph and Lopes (2009). Williamson (2010) defines this in terms of the lack of formal urban planning that contributed to Barra’s urban development (as the region was mostly defined by real estate developers), and an overt attempt by developers and residents to have minimal contact with the city’s poor, “with no concern paid to transit efficiency, a sense of community, or even the effects of raw sewage” (Williamson 2010). Barra de Tijuca is a urban novelty in the sense that the inclination towards ‘closed-urbanization’ real-estate ventures has contributed to the "dispersed urbanization of semi-rural areas with little infrastructure and few urban services" which has inexplicably led to a process of "concentrated dispersion" (Randolph and Lopes 2009). Simply put, Barra is a rare example wherein urban sprawl has led to the extension of the urban metropolis, rather than the suburbanization of private communities.

In reality however, the reason for Barra’s concentrated urbanization is explained by a few key factors, which are contextual to understanding the Olympics’ prioritization of this region over others. The unprecedented scale and rate of urbanization in Barra is first informed by the fact that at one time, one third of the land belonged to only four property owners who only partially subdivided their land into lots (da Costa Silva 2010). This allowed for the construction of massive communities with few delays due to the buying/selling of property. The process commonly occurred through the use of
incorporados, businesses that have competence in all phases of planning and implementation (Coy & Pöhler 2002). These businesses were aided by federal funds from the Housing Financial System (Sistema Financeiro de Habitação: SFH) in the 1970's and 1980's, which opened up major lines of credit to large land developers. Lastly, in addition to marketing campaigns based on the landscapes' natural features, real estate agencies were able to capitalize on the recently built transportation infrastructure for personal automotive travel. Public investment in transportation infrastructure was conceptualized by the 1969 Plano Piloto (Pilot Plan), and increased the likelihood that real estate agencies would achieve high profit margins and become leading players in the city’s growth and urban development (da Costa Silva 2010).

And players they became. Real estate developers and construction companies became such a powerful lobby that in 1980 they drove the municipal government to modify building codes, such as raising building height regulations and extending zoning laws. The real estate lobby then appealed the Pilot Plan altogether in 1981, which allowed for further construction of residential apartment and hotel units along the Barra da Tijuca seashore. From 1998 to 2005, 58% of the total area rezoned for development within the city of Rio de Janeiro was in Barra (or the Jacarepagua Lowlands). In 2005, Barra received 65% of the city's total investment, 93% of which went to residential construction (da Costa Silva 2010).

From the historical development of the region and its particular stakeholders, it would appear that the use of the Olympics to further the consolidation, development, and economic prioritization of this area is an obvious arrangement. The fact that current Mayor Eduardo Paes was born in Barra, and was the administrator for the region before
he took office, strengthens this claim. It is also worth noting that some of his largest campaign donors are real estate and construction companies with numerous projects in Barra, as well as those in the private transportation industry (Zirin 2012 b).

But in fact, the use of public policy and economic resources for the preferential treatment of the wealthy has historically been a foundational characteristic of Rio’s urban planning. The production of urban spaces for the elite began in the 1870's when economically privileged social classes moved from the Port to neighborhoods in zona sul, benefitting from government sponsored transportation programs. Sixty years later, they moved further along the coastline, replacing single-family homes with residential towers. Over time, these neighborhoods became dotted with marginal communities that built homes on embankments and mangroves due to the city’s insufficient public transportation to take them to their sources of employment. In the 1970's, when areas along the shores of Ipanema and Leblon were nearly urbanized, the city engaged in a series of slum clearing initiatives to make space for further development projects. Later, Costa’s Pilot Plan intended to urbanize Barra by subsidizing a commercial and businesses center in Barra’s old historic district. And by the end of the twentieth century, real estate agents and brokers had capitalized on government-sponsored infrastructure projects and profited royally from Barra’s elite urban development.

While Barra's development may seem formalized and near completion, most of its residents still rely on the city center for employment. These people commute daily in bumper-to-bumper traffic along Avenida das Américas Pista Central, sitting in up to two hours of traffic each way. Rio’s visitors for the 2012 UN Environmental Summit were vocal about their daily traffic delays, among other problems inherent to Rio’s hosting.
The first day of Rio+20 arrived with the expected snarling traffic jams. The normal, brutal morning commute from the suburbs north of Rio de Janeiro into downtown and the beachfront was compounded by an influx of delegates, activists, journalists, indigenous chieftains — in a supreme irony, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development — in the broad sense of economic growth and social change in poor countries — is taking place in the least sustainable development — in the narrow sense of urban land use — in all of Rio. (Scruggs 2012)

Scruggs, a correspondent for Next American City, noted that locating the event’s lodging in Barra was attuned to the ‘21st century ideal that Rio’s power elite wished to show the world.’ While Scruggs might have been referencing “long stretches of unpolluted beachfront and the verdant mountains unmarred by favelas”, the consolidation of Barra as an extension of metropolitan Rio conforms to the way that Rio wants to present itself to the international community. In situating the most-watched events, Olympics-affiliated hotels, and the Olympic Park in the region, Rio is able to capitalize on the international spotlight, strengthen the economic and leisure profile of the area, and project Barra as Rio’s modern urban synthesis (Silvestre & Oliviera 2012).

Centralizing Barra in the transportation circuitry of the BRT lanes, thereby consolidating both the real and imagined urban metropolis, is central to this objective. Consistent with its depiction in the 2016 bid book, Barra is positioned as a ‘natural area of growth and expansion’. Yet as Gaffney et al. argue, “The ‘naturalization’ of these growth patterns, social characteristics and urban tendencies are part of a symbolic strategy that intend to legitimate political choices and their territorial effects. The geographic futures of the city, far from being natural or evident, are constructed through decision-making processes and forms of representation.” Thus, it is imperative to understand that the gluttonous use of economic resources for the construction of Rio’s BRT lanes is an explicit choice, conditioned by the socio-economic demographic of
residents in the Barra area, the capital interests of developers and real estate in the area, as well as the place-marketing value that is captured by Barra’s urbanized panoramas.

_Social Restructuring: The Taming of Rio’s Beaches and the Criminalization of Poverty_

The social restructuring that occurs as a consequence of mega-event preparations endeavors to validate a limited interpretation of citizenship and civic rights. This interpretation is inherently linked to new modes of consumerism, including those who can afford the real estate and services of the new Olympic city, those who are able to dynamically engage with the new regimes of public space, and those who are able to positively contribute to the new specialized economies of the city. This social reordering occurs in attempt to weed out those who do not conform to this new consumer-based culture through the use of public policy, legal ordinances, and social policing.

The municipal government’s _choque de ordem_ (shock of order) program is the most deliberate strategy of the city’s social reordering agenda, with respect to its mega-event preparations. This section will discuss two ways in which the definition of civic identity is being requalified in the course of Rio’s mega-event preparations: the resocialization of Rio’s beaches; and the criminalization of informality. The point of contention this section will raise is that places and ways of life inherent to Carioca notions of identity, citizenship, and agency are being compromised as a result of the city’s preparations to host the Olympics. In rupturing years of cultural and institutionalized behaviors, these preparations undermine the strategies that people use to cope with punctuating economic disparities, uneven interpretations and applications of citizenship, and modes of visibility, protest and resistance. Moreover, in using the
upcoming sporting mega-events to legitimize these initiatives, the narrative of inclusive nation building and horizontal development will be undermined by a fractured populace, some of whom will be ‘seen’ and others who will been removed (forcibly or tangentially).

Beginning in 2009, the Municipal government of Rio de Janeiro launched an initiative called *choque de ordem*: a series of new legislative and security initiatives to crack down on patterns of urban disorder, roughly categorized as minor legal infractions, informal businesses, homelessness and other irregularities. The program is managed by a new sub-unit called the Special Secretary of Public Order (SEOP), and is charged with ‘ordering public space such that the rule of law and the municipal code of conduct can prevail (Law 1876/92). The program is justified by the idea that:

Urban disorder is the greatest catalyst of feelings of public insecurity and the generator of conditions leading to criminal practices in general. As a consequence, these conditions ban good principles from the streets, contributing to degeneration, de-occupation of the streets, and the reduction of economic activities. (SEOP website, translated by Doehtry & Silva 2012)

The Shock of Order program is an obvious choice for Rio in terms of making a meaningful impression on foreign investors and international tourists. ‘Disorders’ such as petty urban crime, informal hawking, or graffiti convey a lack of control that the State has over social life. This has a direct effect on the confidence that multinational corporations and investors have regarding potential business ventures, because it suggests inefficiency, corruption, and the uneven application of the law. Similarly, high socio-economic disparities can signal mass discontent and future instability; thus, removing signs of urban decay and generating the appearance of high social investment and
infrastructural reliability intends to communicate an investment-friendly environment. Rio’s beaches are an obvious space to impart this message. Rio’s beaches are Rio’s brand: visitors are guaranteed to spend time there, and they are an essential fixture in the tourist imaginary. By focusing their preparatory efforts on making Rio’s beaches clean, safe, and orderly, Rio is addressing both the potential concerns of mega-event visitors, while also using the beaches as a space to impart key features of the ‘new’ Brazil: modernity, security, stability. However, using Rio’s beaches as component of the city’s mega-event ambitions and modifying them in an effort to realize these goals, is highly problematic. The following analysis will unpack the multifaceted role that Rio’s beaches play in public life, as well as the ways in which the *choque de ordem* initiatives are destabilizing them.

Beginning in 2010, the municipal government launched a *choque de ordem* initiative that sought to regularize economic and leisure behaviors on Rio’s famed beaches. In the words of Secretary of Public Order Rodrigo Bethlam “If [we] can succeed in bringing order to the beaches, there is a chance that we will succeed in organizing the city (Grudgings 2009). Vendors, including stationary beer sellers known as *barraqueiros* and mobile food sellers known as *ambulantes*, are now required to apply for licenses to sell food and umbrellas, in order to regulate the services available for consumption. The number of licenses approved aims to drastically reduce the number of vendors that can sell on the beaches, meaning that many vendors will become unemployed. Formally licensed vendors are required to pay taxes if they want to maintain their stands, and they have to reapply every two years in order to keep their licenses valid. The new legislation requires vendors to sell out of uniform white tents, as well as wait for patrons to approach
them, rather than approaching customers. Physically, Rio’s beaches would also receive a facelift, including improvements to the pedestrian sidewalk that divides the sand and the traffic on Avenida Atlântica, the modernization of 175 beachside kiosks, and the installation of subterranean bathrooms.\footnote{While the upgrade initiative has run into technical and fiscal problems along the way, the kiosks near Copacabana and other wealthy Zona Sul neighborhoods have been completed.} The \textit{choque de ordem} program has also imposed regulations on pick-up soccer games and other sport activities, limiting them to certain parts of the beach and certain times of day. Additionally, beach-goers are prohibited from bringing their own coolers, and stereo-systems. The social disciplining of Rio’s beaches will occur under the watchful eye of 80 municipal guards, who will patrol the shoreline and apprehend those who violate these new protocols (Godfrey & Arguinzoni 2012).

\textit{Choque de Ordem} policies seek to normalize, standardize, professionalize and homogenize the practices, behaviors, norms and rituals of Carioca beach behavior. However, the diversity of beach socialization and rituals lie at the heart of what makes these spaces seen as democratic, places that equalize social relations at their core, and allow for certain aspects of Brazilian national identity to be expressed and maintained (Freeman 2002, 20808). There are three studies of Rio’s beaches that give in-depth context for the role that \textit{Choque de Ordem} policies play in Carioca society: James Freeman’s seminal study ‘Democracy and Danger on the Beach: Class Relations in the Public Space of Rio de Janeiro’ (2002) and ‘Great, Good and Divided the politics of public space in Rio de Janeiro’ (2008); and Brian J. Godfrey and Olivia M. Arguinzoni’s article ‘Regulating Public Space on the Beachfronts of Rio de Janeiro’ (2012).

Freeman’s (2002) study investigates the perception that Rio’s beaches are democratic public spaces. According to his study, their democratic character does not
refer to the gathering of people to discuss and debate political matters, but rather implies that Rio's beaches occupy a place in the imaginary of all Brazilians, permitting an undifferentiated and unbiased enjoyment, and allowing them to serve as a place “whereby the legitimacy of social order is challenged, renegotiated and ultimately reproduced.” This notion is based, in part, on the history that Rio’s beaches have always been shared spaces, and spaces of identity and expression. During the time of slavery, the lower classes made the street and public square a place of sociability and refuge from their servitude. In the mid-twentieth century, Cariocas of all social classes likened the beach to the ideal of the ‘good life’, opting to spend time on the beach as they did in neighborhood bars or other public, outdoor spaces. During the urban development of Copacabana, real estate developers capitalized on this predilection by building large apartment buildings with small units, thereby reinforcing the cultural practice of socializing in public, rather than entertaining at home. Freeman also connects the ideal of Brazil’s democratic beaches to the ‘myth of the non-confrontational Brazilian’; this theory maintains that Brazilians are “friendly, easy-going people who prefer to resolve their differences through diplomacy rather than confrontation,” and that despite its history as a former colonial, slave-based economy, “Today Brazil is a largely colorblind society" (Freeman 2002) The predilection towards public socializing, and a somewhat questionable attitude towards difference, has thus engendered a preference towards beaches among Brazilians.

This preference has been maintained over time, but has become more consequential as Rio’s socio-economic cleavages have deepened and reproduced. Through an ethnographic study based on participant interviews and observation, Freeman explores the facets that make up the Brazilian beach experience and the conditions that
perpetuate its spatial agency. At its crux is the *barraqueiro* and his *barraca*: the beer vendor and the tent from where he distributes his beer. Freeman describes the *barraqueiros* at length, exploring their multi-faceted role on the sand and on the streets that divide the sea and the city. He argues that the informal vendors are a reference point for beach goers, demarcating their particular spot on the beach and offering regulars a sense of comfort and familiarity. *Turma* is the term for beach cliques, or a group of regulars who frequent a particular part of the beach and a particular *barraqueiro*.

Freeman stresses that people make an effort to get to know their *barraqueiro* because it is customary behavior in any transaction-based Brazilian relationship. “The fact that *barraqueiros* are treated like family, or at least like members of the *turma*, masks the social disparities between *barraqueiros* and their clients, and allows both sides to play down the underlying economic relationship where one person serves and the other persons pays” (Freeman 2002). Because of this familiar relationship, people usually frequent the same beach based on their long-standing relationship with a particular *barraqueiro*; this relationship is often so strong that it may be passed down generationally, or based on the social identity characteristic to a specific part of the beach (weigh-lifters, LGBT, political activists etc.). *Barraqueiros* are known to stake out a particular space and occupy it for years, generating a loyal clientele, and mutual respect from other vendors. This suggests that among the *barraqueiros* there are firm rules that govern the informal beach economy. Freeman also notes that the *barraqueiros* play a security role. "If he sees a thief he might warn the customer or he might go to the thief and try and talk him out of it. He might explain to the thief that this is a regular customer..."
and that he can't afford to lose the person’s business, possibly invoking his own personal ties with the thief as a means of persuasion" (Freeman 2002).

*Barraqueiros* are a permanent fixture in Rio's beach culture and have, in the past, successfully resisted attempts by the city to formalize their activities. This is in part because the rules and enforcement have been so uneven and in part because, "The *barraqueiros* stress that the beach is public and that no one can own a patch of sand. But many admit that the rights of particular stretches of beach are bought and sold freely." In this way, the logics that govern informal economies depend on a certain level of entitlement. As Freeman says, "The story of the beach as a democratic space is produced collectively...but different people tell the story differently to shape it to their own interests." The upper class narrative maintains that everything is ‘alright’ in Brazilian society; “We can both use the beach. I’ll be your friend, treat you as an equal, and pay you rather than some other guy if you respect my status” (Freeman 2002). However, the lower class narrative revolves around the idea that, "The beach is democratic and therefore we have a right to use it for recreation and not be excluded from it. We also have the right to privatize it and use it for our livelihoods. The rich owe us that much.”

Thus, both narratives benefit from the belief that the beach is a democratic space and a public good. But these narratives are also highly contingent on the status quo of beach, beach activities and beach commerce. Thus, through the initiatives to bring order to the beaches that formalize vendors through licensing, or take away their ability to aesthetically distinguish themselves (painted tents, colored umbrellas), the State threatens to disrupt this silent agreement between lower class workers and their wealthier patrons.
Freeman also notes that the Brazilian beaches offer a great deal of anonymity and allow people to feign social statuses that they might not have off the sand. In this way, the beach acts as a sort of safety valve for the mounting socio-economic pressures that grip daily life for many Cariocas. The anonymity afforded by Rio’s beaches relies on the existence of great diversity, because if there were a unitary appearance or mode of behavior for beach goers, it would be easy to ostracize those that didn’t conform. Social diversity on Rios’s beaches also serves an important, mediating function. Freeman notes that, "The upper classes know that they live very privileged lives because the poor are always present" (Freeman 2008). Thus, policies that standardize beach behavior and homogenize beachgoers degrade the few spaces in which class lines and economic differences are confronted. For example, if vendors became more expensive, or the diversity of nearby rents became unaffordable, access to the beaches would become more limiting, and the quality of diversity currently seen on the beaches would decline. If, according to Freemans account, the enfranchisement of informal vendors also contributes to the extent to which diversity, democracy and freedom brand Rio's beaches, than the current shock of order program destabilizes these narratives by limiting beach vending to formalized workers.

The impact of beach-related Shock of Order regulations has varied. In many ways, the current restrictive approach towards pick-up soccer games and other beach activities restricts the spontaneous and laid-back nature of beach culture, and discourages people from casually socializing with strangers. While some have argued that the measure was put in place to make sure that everyone could enjoy Rio’s ever more crowded beaches without the threat of being impaled by a soccer ball, it nevertheless
standardizes beach etiquette and behaviors. Tensions came to the fore recently when the municipal police were attacked after they tried to apprehend a group juggling a soccer ball near the shore; beachgoers have criticized the municipal guard for their “aggressive tactics” and for “indiscriminately wielding batons against innocent bystanders”, which was cited as the cause of their unprompted retaliation (Spinetto 2012).

When the State acts as a tool of order and policing, they commit themselves to the will of a certain group of people whose interests align with the outcome of their initiatives. According to Freeman, wealthy local residents of zona sul are more vocal about their discontent and distrust of many that share their beaches, avoiding the beach all together during times of day when beachgoers are numerous, and even naming people after behaviors that don’t conform to their notions of proper beach etiquette. One example of this is the farofeiros, a term for people that come from zona norte and bring picnics of chicken and farofa (manioc flour), instead of patroning the barraqueiros and buying food at the beach. People who used this term remarked that these ‘invaders’ didn’t understand beach etiquette, rather than understanding that food sold on the beach was perhaps too expensive for this group. Farofeiro also refers to their “distinctive” beach behaviors; “[They’re] always playing with the sand, throwing it around and rolling in it. The white sand sticks to their dark bodies and it looks like they’re covered in farofa” (Freeman 2002) While the intention to regulate sporting activities may seem harmless, homogenizing beach behavior to conform to one version of ‘proper’ etiquette impedes upon the beach’s use by all people, with diverse forms of leisure expression. This affects the diversity of Rio’s beaches, as these measures will likely prevent people from going if aspects of their beach routines are seen as invalid.
In attempting to regulate and formalize vendors by requiring them to apply for permits and carry licenses, the state is rupturing an established, merit-based system that is based on years of personal relationships between barraqueiros and their clientele. Licensing also requires application fees, literacy, and the eventual payment of taxes, which skew the system towards more materially secure vendors, leaving others unable to compete. In requiring a standardized appearance for stalls, it limits the ability for vendors to distinguish themselves, putting them at a disadvantage to those who are that more centrally located, or near nicer parts of the beach. A standardized appearance also makes it harder for patrons to recognize the barraqueiro and establish loyalty to his services. The reverse is also true; by requiring a standardized service from all vendors, they have less loyalty to their patrons, and show less willingness to protect against theft or harm. Thus, while choixe de ordem policies are apart of a wider initiative to prevent against petty theft, the measure could result in the need to hire more foot patrolmen since barraqueiros no longer provide this informal security service. And without their mediation between petty crime and the relationships they have with diverse, regular beach goers, Rio's beaches would become just another space of insecurity, unfamiliarity, and social distancing.

The modernization of kiosks and the formalization of beach vendors will likely contribute to a significant rise in the price of beach snacks. With vendors needing to pay taxes and maintain the quality of their products, in addition to city programs that maintain the beaches and public facilities, the price of coconuts, umbrellas, and beer are already on the rise, according to pedestrians interviewed by Veja (2010). The result of this could lead to a crowding out of some patrons, meaning that beaches would take on a more
homogenized look and feel. Freeman (2008) suggests that one of the strongest subnarratives for Brazil’s democratic beaches is contrast: “Speakers seem to take pride in the fact that differences can be overcome on the beach.” Without spaces that bring about awareness and confrontation with diversity, social polarization will only grow stronger, fueling more fear and othering of difference. By normalizing the appearance of beach-goers, these public spaces would begin to self-regulate and would no longer be thought of as a space for freedom of expression or identity. This conclusion is echoed in Godfrey and Arguinzoni’s more recent study; they argue that in order to preserve the socio-political space that beaches occupy, policy should seek to balance public security with initiatives that maintain social diversity and accessibility. They argue that, taken alone, current *choque de ordem* policies concerning beach activities walk a thin line between sanitizing public space, and over-regulating beach behaviors and economic pursuits, and establishing a security presence that positively enhances the experience of all beach goers.

Brazilian bars, like beaches, are also thought of as democratic spaces that define and maintain public life. In Freeman’s (2008) account, Rio’s well-used and well-loved beaches, bars and streets would be the envy of North American urban populists, for they are not just considered shared spaces, “But on a good day people see them as places of democracy, citizenship, and conversation” (Freeman 2008). Like beach *turmas*, bars offer their regular patrons a social meeting place where they can walk in unexpected and always find an acquaintance with whom to sit and drink. Yet these spaces are also under attack by the city’s *choque de ordem* policies. In 2010, the Municipal government began requiring restaurant owners to purchase a yearly permit in order to use outdoor seating, as
well as pay a one-time fee to the building if the owner granted permission. While some restaurants are in a position to pay such fees, others are not, making the likelihood of attracting patrons during the year-around warm climate unlikely. Some restaurant owners are not resistant to the new regulations and even welcome the city’s intention to ‘level the playing field’. However, the labyrinthine, bureaucratic, ‘find-out-as-you-go’ quality of these procedures is a source of frustration for many small business owners, who lack the time and resources to maneuver through these new protocol (Eisenhammer 2012).

Moreover, fewer street bars will reduce the cultural predilection to socialize and entertain in public spaces, causing people to retreat back into their homes, or into private spaces of consumption like malls.

Bringing order to Rio’s beaches and bars is overt attempt to discipline public space. By tradition, these spaces are associated with the freewill, expression, and autonomy of people, precisely because it is a realm that the State has little control over. In attempting to discipline these spaces, the State is asserting itself into collective imaginary of the people, so that the breadth of their authority seems more omnipresent and legitimate. In this way, *choque de ordem* policies are combating the disorder that arises from people thinking that there is no authority. In strengthening the legitimacy of the State, it increases the likelihood of successfully managing public space during the high influx of tourism for the mega events. However, by trying to discipline Rio’s beloved public spaces like beaches and bars, the city is undermining the social function that these spaces serve, and rupturing years of culturally institutionalized behavior in an effort to conform the will of a small minority and the superficial value of temporary visitors.
The assault on working class Cariocas and their livelihoods continues off the beach in various forms. For street vendors known as *camelôs, choque de ordem* initiatives have struck down particularly hard, principally by seizing a range of goods such as food, beverages, pirated movies and clothing. While the Municipal Police are trained to use non-lethal force to target informal vendors or pamphleteers, their criminalization and the lack of employment alternatives presented by the government or the private sector, makes the actions of the Police no less harmful. According to a website representing the *camelôs* of Rio de Janeiro, 23% of informal workers work in trade-related sectors and contribute 4.6% of the GDP; 21% of those who work in the trade sector are street hawkers, and since 1985 they have contributed to more than one fourth of newly created jobs. Some statistics suggest that one in every four individuals in Rio de Janeiro works in the informal sector (UNCH 2006), whereas others claim that number may be as high as two thirds (Camelo-film.org). Workers are often drawn to the informal sector because of the low-barriers to entry, a personal sense of entrepreneurialism, the lack of enforceable taxes, and an available market for goods and services.

According to the *camelô* advocacy site, while illegally pirated and stolen goods flood the market and may degrade formal services, it is the linkages between the informal and formal sector that pose a more nuanced, and serious threat. To set off the revenue losses, shops in districts with a high street hawker density hire ‘informal employees’ on consignment, who sell the identical products available in stores for cheaper prices to principally poorer clients. In this case, the shop functions as a storage facility and gives formal businesses the opportunity to evade taxes on sales, and social security. While
arresting informal vendors might limit the options for formal businesses to evade the law, alone these initiatives simply perpetuate a bifurcated legal standard, and do not prevent against future business arrangements between formal and informal businesses.

The criminalization of informality in preparation for Rio de Janeiro’s upcoming mega-events is one of the clearest examples of how the city is rupturing institutionalized social policies and cultural norms, and encumbering modes of survival. Whereas one can argue that there has been a consistent use of economic resources to perpetuate the status and privilege of a small minority, the sudden hardline approach towards poverty marks a clear break from Brazil’s historical treatment of its poor. Traditionally, Rio has demonstrated an implicit tolerance of informal economies and informal services. An example of this are the illegal vans that mirror the routes of formal public transportation services, while extending service to underserved communities where the formal routes do not go. *Kombi* vans demonstrate how informal economies service niche markets for those traditionally excluded from State services. While the city has made desultory attempts in the past to reign in these informal public transportation routes, the crackdown has been much more vigilant since the start of the *choque de ordem* program.

Doherthy and Silva (2012) argue that social reordering policies reinforce the existing binary between formal and informal, although they posit that the initiative intensifies the negative positioning of that which is associated with the informal sector. According to their analysis of the Shock of Order program, *formal* is associated with security, generation, and increased formal economic activity, while *informal* is associated with disorder, insecurity, degeneration, and decreased formal economic activity. They problematize this dynamic by suggesting the generative power of informal commerce
(due to a diversity niches), the degenerative power of the formal economy (due to high taxes and barriers to entry), and the lack of formal security produced by the global economy.

Put another way, targeting and criminalizing informality undercuts the way in which people have adapted to city’s project of neoliberal economic restructuring that begun in the 1990’s. Waquant (2003) argues that:

Under such conditions, deploying the penal state to respond to disorders spawned by the deregulation of the economy, the desocialization of wage labor and the related and absolute immiseration of large sectors of the urban proletariat by enlarging the means, scope and intensity of the intervention of the police and judicial apparatus amounts to (re)establishing a veritable dictatorship over the poor.
The phrase ‘dictatorship over the poor’ emphasizes the contradiction and injustice implicit in using Brazil’s penal system to combat "disorders generated by the rise of absolute and relative poverty" (Waquant 2003). Waquant argues that adopting a hard line approach towards urban poverty allows developing states to ‘dramatize’ their commitment to neoliberal economic policies, while also demonstrating "their new-found commitment to slay the monster of urban crime" and conform to a shared opinion of the urban poor as the main source of street deviance and violence.

However, Brazil’s preference for criminalizing the activities of marginalized groups is mired by five factors: the depth and scale of its urban poverty; the institutionalized and pervasive nature of violent crime that is rooted in recent political history; the fact that the Brazilian police are themselves a source of violence, corruption and fear; that Brazil does not have a judicious or efficient court system to process wrongdoers; and finally, that Brazilian prisons are sites of horrific abuse, dehumanizing
conditions, and are a hotbed for networked criminal activity (Waquant 2003). Ultimately, she argues that:

The adoption of US-style measures of street-sweeping and mass imprisonment of the poor, the useless and those factitious to the dictatorship of the deregulated market, is guaranteed to aggravate the evils from which Brazil already suffers in its difficult journey towards the establishment of a democracy, that is not only a facade but a delegitimation of many institutions of law and justice, the escalation of both violent criminality and police abuse, the criminalization of the poor, a significant increase in support for illegal measures of control, the pervasive obstructions of the principle of legality and the unequal and uneven distribution of citizen rights. (Waquant 2003)

Patterns of informality in the city of Rio de Janeiro are not only socially institutionalized by the historic lack, and uneven application of regulations. Informality is an institutionalized cultural and social mechanism that characterizes Brazilian society, as it does most developing countries. Work in the informal sector responds to the contraction of low-skilled labor, the intensification of the service-economy, and the hypermobility of the global labor force, all of which characterize employment in the global age. Informality is not simply a coping mechanism for the lack of formal employment opportunities, but expands the scope of occupational niches to include services that benefit people from all economic classes (e.g. kombi vans). Informality is not a disorganized, self-serving pursuit, but can be a structured, versatile, personable profession with social benefits for all walks of life (e.g. barraqueiros). Informality doesn’t excuse law breaking, but questions who the law serves.

The criminalization and elimination of informal economies not only threatens the livelihoods of the millions that rely on cheaper services. It not only perpetuates the criminalization of poverty, a term that describes the “observable phenomenon that sees the poorest members of Brazilian society identified by state and quasi-state actors (the
police and in particular the military police, elements of the legal system, prison guards
and militias) as criminal, or potentially criminal elements, and on that basis, targeted for
extortion, arbitrary arrest and detention, physical violence or, indeed, summary execution
(Justiça Global et al. 2008). The criminalization of informality also implies that being
homeless or poor is a crime, thus constructing new interpretations of citizenship that only
assign value on ones formal economic input. The criminalization of informality is thus an
attempt to regulate, as well as profit from all potential sources of revenue, but
subsequently recognizes only those who participate in the formal economy. In
criminalizing informality and poverty through Rio’s mega-event preparations, the city is
actively sanitizing its landscape of elements resultant from the city’s own economic and
social policies.

Spatial Restructuring: The Pacification of the Favelas

An Olympic host-city is typically restructured in a way that conforms to the new
modes of civic identity discussed in the previous section. This tends to include the
privatization, militarization, and commodification of public space, which function to
enable the execution of ambitious stakeholder-driven Olympic preparations. Privatization
limits the accessibility of public space for expressions of social life or oppositional
discontent, and redefines the parameters of social life within the constraints of consumer
expression. The militarization of public space through the increased presence of security
and surveillance technology, cleanses public space of non-conformist behavior, in the
broader sense. The commodification of public space is a result of the capital value
placed on investment in, and consumption of leisure-based, commercial, and residential real estate.

Lefebvre (1970) and Harvey (1978) refer to this as the ‘secondary circuit of capital accumulation’, differentiating between the circuits of moveable (durable and non-durable) final goods, and the production of immovable goods such as property, which in recent years has become closely related to the interface of global financial capital. As such, the ideologically loaded term ‘revitalization’ suggests breathing life back into obsolescent spaces, which are seen as urban pioneer fronts for global capital (de Souza 2012). While the Port revitalization is an obvious example of this, the spatial reintegration of the favelas is another project and strategy of capital accumulation. The process of spatially reintegrating the favelas is facilitated by the imposition of Police Pacification Units, which reassert the formal authority of the state, and state services like public security. In exchange, these new territories are manipulated for their real estate, consumer, and marketing potential.

One third of Rio’s urban population resides in the favelas that decorate the city’s mountainous hills and urban peripheries. While a 1950’s consensus categorized favelas as those communities with over fifty residents, no legal title, and a lack of public services and paved streets, today’s favelas typically have a range of pirated services, and solid houses with long-standing businesses (Gimenez Stalhberg 2011). However, their isolation from security services enabled drug trafficking factions to root their illicit activities in these communities, intensifying the struggle between the underserved and the asfalto (formal city) (Neate & Platt 2006). Sporadic interactions with the State security
forces, feuds between the cartels, and arbitrary violence have made favelas incredibly
dangerous places to live. Fear of drug-related violence is exacerbated by the negative
perception of Rio’s military and police forces, whose corruption, excessive violence, and
criminalization of the poor has been just as destructive as the armed cartels\textsuperscript{23}. In this
respect, the State’s traditionally violent incursions into the favelas are perpetuated by the
new UPP program, problematizing the initiative from the get-go\textsuperscript{24}.

The UPP program was developed back in December of 2007, and had as its goals:
to restore state control over communities currently under strong influence of ostensibly
armed criminals; to bring peace and public safety for the full exercise of citizenship; and
to break with the logic of ‘war’ that current exists in Rio de Janeiro (Gimenez Stahlberg
2011). In order to achieve this, the imposition of pacification units happens in four stages:
i) the invasion of the police elite force (BOPE), to recapture the territory from the local
drug faction; ii) BOPE and other intelligence agencies gather intelligence to make arrests,
and identify drug hideouts; iii) once the community is considered ‘pacified’ the UPP unit
will come and provide proximity policing on a permanent basis; iv) after the UPP has
established a consistent security presence, UPP Social will bring social services and
investments. Proximity policing is an integral feature of the pacification units. This marks
a sharp change from the old policies of violent incursion, and is also qualitatively
different than the services provided to residents in the formal city. For example, the

\textsuperscript{23} Police violence is excessive: between 2003 and 2007 the police of the state of Rio de Janeiro killed 5669
people, and although almost all deaths were registered as autos de resistência (consequence of the victim
putting the officers’ or others’ lives at risk), research done in 2003 shows that 65% of those killings had
unmistakable signs of execution (Soares, 2009).

\textsuperscript{24} In the 1960’s autonomous units within the police were given a mandate to assassinate “bandits” in Rio’s
favelas. When the police where placed under military control during the dictatorship, such groups were
incorporated into a violent strategy to oppress leftist opponents of the regime (the “internal enemy”), and
were then redeployed against drug gangs and the urban poor after the return to civilian rule. A wave of
drug-related violence and middle-class panic forced the state to redeploy the military in 1994, and again in
2007 to secure the Complexo de Alemão favela for the Pan American Games.
average number of inhabitants per police offer is 405, whereas in communities with UPP’s the number is 101 (Ferreira 2011). UPP officers are selected right from the academy, meaning that they have not been exposed to violent or corrupt tactics. They are assigned to a pacified community on a permanent rather than rotating basis, meaning that they become recognizable in the community and begin to establish a relationship of trust. UPP officers are also taught by a different curriculum, which includes sociology and human rights training, a practical internship, and a focus on proximity policing and dialogue rather than the use of force (Gimenez Stalhberg 2011).

Pacifying Rio de Janeiro’s historically violent, socially marginalized, and spatially complex favelas is a tall order, and the current UPP program is facing internal as well as external challenges. The security forces at large are transitioning from a training based in ‘warrior ethos’ in which they were taught not to recognize the humanity of the favela residents, who were seen as complicit in criminality (Gimenez Stalherg 2011). This attitude has affected the way that police are seen by the community, and has conditioned a general skepticism and caution towards community policing measures (Freeman 2012). This is particularly felt among youth, who have been systematically targeted by police raids and discrimination. However, residents cite the end of armed conflict between rival gangs, between gangs and the police, and the end of traffickers ruling over the community, as substantial gains that the UPP’s have made. In addition to the arbitrary violence, these gangs set a bad example for the youth, which now gives residents relief and renewed freedoms (Freeman 2012).

Other residents however, are cynical about the motivations behind the program, “Seeing it as a reelection project for Sergio Cabral and an effort to make a showing for
the benefit of foreigners leading up to the World Cup and the Olympics” (Barbassa 2012). Others see the UPP as “Simply a new gang that has taken the place of the old gang, replacing heavily armed traffickers with heavily armed police” (Freeman 2012). Many complain about the lack of participation, communication, and democracy in the new order. For example, before the first meeting of the UPP Social in Rochinha, Mayor Paes and members of BOPE assembled behind closed doors to “define the priorities and elaborate an action plan to be coordinated by City Hall,” only to allocate “a readymade packet of services and regulations to be implemented without discussing consequences with the community or whether they agree with the measure and time frame proposed” (Smith 2011).

The program also faces economic challenges. The current program, which hopes to install forty UPP’s by 2014, will cost R$480 million annually. By 2016, UPP personnel would account for over a third of all police and more than a third of the State’s security budget. And, UPP expenses were not even included in Rio’s R$2.5 million Olympics security budget (Oliviera 2011). Furthermore, critics complain the UPP strategy does not deal with Rio’s broader security needs. Even if the State is able to pacify one-hundered favelas by 2016, this program will not even address a fraction of Rio’s informal communities, in addition to the rippling effect that violence is current having in the city (Browning 2011). Thus, while the strategic localization of the UPP’s in the wealthy zona sul, the central business districts and the near Olympic venues is likely to assure security for the Games, the current program is not a holistic security solution for the city.
Freeman (2012) wages a systemic criticism against the new security program, arguing that the establishment of Police Pacification Units and the broader effort to reinsert the authority of the state in the favelas is most appropriately qualified as a strategy of neoliberal accumulation. He argues that these policies service four functions of the neoliberal agenda, specifically conditioned for the pursuit and execution of the mega-event strategy. In his estimation, the imposition of the UPP enables the: marketing of the games; the construction and preparation of the host-city; real-estate valorization; and the marketing of commodities within the favelas, as well as the commodification of the favelas themselves.

Freeman employs David Harvey’s term *accumulation by dispossession*, which draws on Marx’s inference that capitalisms’ initial operation relies on the violent acquisition of land, resources, or labor, which are then reinvested in the production system. Sources of surplus accumulation have been systematically targeted by agents of dispossession over time, beginning with the land plundered during the colonial enterprise, then with forced separation of peasants from their land, and finally with the disabling of the post-WWII welfare structure. By targeting sources of surplus, capitalism is able to acquire both the resources needed for production, as well as markets for consumption. In Freeman’s estimation, the current UPP program can be seen as State’s violent accumulation of territories previously dispossessed from the circuits of capital accumulation (both globally, and within the city’s formal urban economy), specifically for the expansion of private capital (Freeman 2012).

The imposition of Rio’s UPP’s in preparation for the upcoming mega-events must be filtered through the ambitions and exigencies of the city’s Olympic stakeholders. The
security that is advanced by the UPP’s allows the city to market itself as an “exotic place ready to be pollinated by the brands of international sponsors.” The imposition of a formal security presence testifies to the city’s ability to effectively manage, manipulate, and guarantee the rule of law. By pacifying the favelas, the city is guaranteeing new sources of fixed capital assets, while valorizing investments in nearby stadiums, CEPAC’s and luxury real estate. Finally, pacified favelas provide utilities, commodities producers, and merchants with an expanded client base.

The economic potential of the favelas is a driving factor of the program. In Freeman’s (2012) account of the days following the 2011 pacification of Rochina, “By Monday, access to the ubiquitous pirated cable television system was disconnected, and the community soon filled with representatives of various cable companies, seated at tables every few meters on commercial streets and wandering the narrow alleys passing out pamphlets and signing up residents for new services.” In a confidential US State Department cable released by Wikileaks regarding the UPP program, the Consul General to Rio de Janeiro asserts that Rio de Janeiro’s economy would grow by US$21 billion “if the favelas should be reincorporated into mainstream society and markets” (Hearne 2009). The same document cites the potential revenue from property and service taxes at US$45 million. Light, Rio’s electricity provider, estimates that it losses at least US$200 million per year due to pirated electricity in the favelas. “Imagine the revenue increase if Light could successfully turn one million illegal users of its service into customers,” said Andre Urani, an economist with the Institute of Labor and Social Research (IETS) (Freeman 2012). While there is no available data for real estate prices within pacified favela, real estate in areas neighboring favelas with UPP units have gone up 5-10% since
2008 (Frishtak & Mandel 2012). Likewise, in the absence of the UPP’s, Frishtak and Mandel observes that since 2008, the overall house price index in Rio would have grown 15% slower, and homicide and robbery rates would have fallen by 14-20% less than they did.

Conversely, Freeman (2012) finds that citizens are being dispossessed from the decision-making processes regarding community issues and community projects. They are being dispossessed from their homes due to gentrification and the rising cost of living, as they are now forced to pay for services that didn’t previously factor in to their expenses. Sueldo (2012) finds that legal titling in pacified favelas has also contributed to gentrification, as there is currently no legislation that prohibits residents from selling their property once they receive legal title. In the same leaked US cable, the program was likened to the ‘US counter-insurgency doctrine and strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq’; “One of the principal challenges in this project is to convince favela populations that the benefits of submitting to state authority (security, legitimate land ownership, access to education) outweigh the costs (taxes, utility fees, civil obedience) (Hearne 2009). This is likely to happen if and when residents see increased access to education and job opportunities, enhancing their ability to pay for the new services. But as of now, the imposition of a R$50-100 light bill (or 10-20% of the minimum wage) is daunting for most residents (Freeman 2012). Finally, Freeman argues that residents are also

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25 Sueldo (2012) offers interesting commentary on the titling process occurring in Rio, and problematizes its effects. As the result of the improved access to public infrastructure, and the safety provided by the UPP’s, he argues that gentrification in the favelas is actually being driven by residents who get legal title, and then sell their homes at a higher profit. “The titling process is adding little public value but driving gentrification. The titling-gentrification process is undermining decades of public money and efforts. Huge public investments are being lost or diverted from the original target populations.”
dispossessed from the semblance of autonomy, self-determination and democracy that was afforded under the control of the drug traffickers.

While Freeman acknowledges that the violence, parallel politics, stagnant development, and uneven policies of urbanization need to be addressed through a systematic policy approach, he argues that the current process is inherently flawed because it follows the logic of neoliberal governance. “Instead of being a security strategy for the whole city, the UPP initiative is a security strategy dictated by the needs of the Games, construction companies, real-estate interests and those who see favelas as potential markets” (Freeman 2012). 2012 mayoral candidate Marcelo Freixo upheld this sentiment when he described the community police plan as “just another form of control”, and one which “does not contribute to the construction of liberty” if it is not accomplished through “prioritizing social reform with the participation of the society that is being reformed” (Zibechi 2010).

Projecto Cantagalo - a land titling program undertaken by the NGO and think tank Instituto Atlantico that aims to provide legal tenure to 1,500 favela inhabitants in the pacified favela Cantagalo in zona sul - is more optimistic about development possibilities under the UPP. With the assistance of the project, Cantagalo received the title ‘barrio popular’ or low-income neighborhood, which protects its residents from paying the hefty land taxes paid by their neighbors in Copacabana or Ipanema. With this economic guarantee, their legal title, and the protection provided by the UPP, Projecto Cantagalo is confident that the quality of life for residents in the favela will improve dramatically.

First, if the government is giving the title, they have to provide the infrastructure. So, there are some investments in the community…Second, the inhabitants want a better home and so they start investing small amounts of money themselves…Thirdly, the private sector, including the neighborhood surrounding those areas,
which for years pretended the favela didn't exist, also starts spending. (Cowie 2012)
While Projecto Cantagalo might have found the silver lining to favela pacification, the
program is by no means a universal public policy; more acutely, it is the lone effort of
one of Rio’s countless community non-profits that emerged following the reduction of
state services after the military dictatorship (Ribeiro & Telles 2000). However, the
program does indicate ways in which public policy can reduce the dispossessing
tendencies of pacification under the exigencies of mega-event planning.

Rio’s urban form has long been characterized by its uneven urban development,
the juxtaposition of formal and informal economies, severe socio-economic disparities,
and the bifurcated authority and services provided by the armed drug cartels and the
formal state. The UPP units are presented as an effort to reintegrate the favelas into the
formal city by extending such services as public security, which typically characterize the
guarantees afforded to citizens by the State. Unfortunately, the UPP program reifies Rio’s
inconsistent application of citizenship rights, by integrating the favelas in a way that
economically disenfranchises, spatially segregates, and culturally disqualifies. De Souza
(2012) also cautions that the UPP program might simply reinsert the formerly squatted
communities in the ‘world of the commodity’, thus undermining the alternative forms of
sociability which have bloomed in the various ocupações, such as mutirão communal
labor. Ultimately, Freeman argues that this outcome is particular to the conditions of the
mega-event, which require a marketable urban façade, consumption-based revitalization
projects, devalued urban space for the accumulation of real estate capital, and new
consumer markets.
Conclusion

The structure of this chapter has loosely followed the component parts of the Olympic Planning Equation. The first part detailed the ambitions of Rio’s Olympic stakeholders regarding the perceived advantages of hosting the Olympics, and its intended legacy for the city. The second part broke down the specific ways that Rio’s organizing committee and peripheral Olympic stakeholders are preparing the city for the Games. This included an analysis of the political actors, legal mechanisms, financing models, social policies, and spatial strategies currently being employed. The third part presented the spectrum of perverse ramifications being experienced by host-city citizens, including forced displacement, rising real estate prices, and environmental degradation. This section concluded with an in-depth look at the restructuring of political, legal, economic, social and spatial relations within the city of Rio de Janeiro. These explorations intended to accentuate the ways in which mega-event preparations reorder host-cities, fundamentally prioritizing capital accumulation over the interests of citizens. Taken together, they illustrate the ways in which citizen welfare is being shelved as a consequence of the prioritization and facilitation of tourism, Olympic projects, Olympic requirements, private interests, consumerism and investment opportunities.

The intention of this case study is to present the reasons and the method by which Olympic stakeholders are driving mega-event preparations, thus implicating them in the perverse ramifications experienced by host-city citizens. The second intention was to communicate the institutional blockage that is created by the temporary exigencies of the mega-event, which rupture the traditional function and service of the city by binding it to the interests of capital accumulation rather than to the interests of citizens. In this light,
the potential for citizens to resist Olympic preparations is severely weakened. In the following chapter, I will propose a framework for anti-Olympic activism that takes into consideration the democratic deficits produced by mega-event preparations, and circumvents them by requiring the IOC to play a more proactive, and mediating role in host-city preparations.
Chapter 4:

Part 3: Imagining the Anti-Olympics Scale Shift Process

Anti-Olympics Resistance in Rio

On August 13th, 2012, residents of Rio staged their most recent demonstration in protest of the city’s current mega-event preparations. Protesters from the Rio Sem Remoções (Rio without Evictions) greeted Mayor Eduardo Paes as he returned from London with the Olympic torch, and attempted to present him with an ‘Eviction Trophy’, a metal-encased brick to symbolize the use of the Games as an excuse to forcibly uproot entire communities. Community representatives from Vila Autódromo, Vila Recreio, Restinga, among others, were joined by members of the Peoples Committee of the World Cup and the Olympics. Most were there to protest the evictions taking place in association with infrastructure and transportation works. According to the estimate of one representative, 30,000 people have been evicted so far, including five entire communities and twenty-four slated for eviction (Winterbottom 2012).

Since February of 2010, representatives from civil society groups, neighborhood associations, international human rights monitors and religious organizations have involved themselves in sporadic manifestations to protest Olympic-related issues. Direct actions usually take place on days when representatives from international sporting federations are present, such as the World Cup drawing on July 30th 2011. On that day, protesters convened outside the Marina da Gloria, where the R$30 million event drew
members of the federal and municipal government, international corporations and
celebrity athletes. To call attention to the commercialization of Brazil’s most beloved
sport, the ongoing forced evictions, and the poor benefits received by government
workers, teachers, and firefighters, protesters blocked the Aterro do Flamengo motorway
until a representative from the Ministry of Justice would speak to them.

During an IOC visit to a select group of future Olympic sites in November of
2011, members of the Comité Popular distributed a letter written to the chairperson of the
IOC, which they co-authored with Amnesty International, the Conselho Popular do Rio
de Janeiro (Popular Council of Rio de Janeiro), the Movimento Nacional de Luta pela
Moradia (National Movement of the Struggle for Housing), and WITNESS (a video-
based human rights advocacy organization). The letter addresses the fact that Rio’s
Housing Secretary publically defended the forced eviction of several communities by
invoking the city’s binding contractual obligations to the IOC; this letter also
recommended several proactive steps the IOC could take to prevent the further
degradation of the Olympic mission and spirit through Rio’s Olympic preparations. They
conclude by stating: “As a global symbol of cooperation and understanding, the
Olympics must not be complicit with human rights abuses conducted in its name” (Letter
to the IOC 2011).

Smaller protests have also been held outside the offices of various city officials.
On February 10th, 2010, protesters gathered in front of city hall to protest the removal of
several peripheral favelas, and the days’ attendees went on to form the Olympics Does
Not Justify Removal movement. On October 26th, 2010, activists and community
members from Favela do Metrô hosted the Parade Against Forced Evictions, in which
participants marched from the community to the Mayors office. At the time, residents from the thirty-three-year old Favela do Metrô were in the process of being evicted in order to make way for the construction of a parking lot for the nearby Maracanã stadium. All but a few homes now remain in a community that once housed 700 families and 126 businesses (Clarke 2012). On October 15th, 2011, the Occupy Movement’s international call for solidarity produced a small group of protesters in downtown Cinelândia. While some in attendance brought up the impending mega-events, the forced evictions, and the wider social changes occurring throughout the city, most acknowledged that the real struggle will come after the Games have concluded (Waterman 2011).

One of the most noteworthy protests occurred on February 25th, 2011, outside of the office where Mayor Paes was presenting the city’s upcoming mega-event preparations to a select group of city officials. Protesters waiting outside came to voice concern over the growing affinity between the Mayors office and the city’s public defenders. According to those in attendance, the Mayor had specifically invited the Public Defenders to present the city’s impending preparatory efforts, and to ask for their ‘cooperation’ and ‘support’. As established in the 1988 Constitution, city public defenders are an autonomous coalition, offered precisely to defend the rights of the poorest residents who are unable to afford lawyers. Until recently, public defenders have been the most important institution in communities’ fight for justice (Marrone 2011).

Meanwhile, the protesters outside recited Article 429 of the Lei Orgânica do Município, stating that ‘there is to be no removal of squatter communities unless the occupied land presents a physical risk to the citizens that live on it’, among other human rights passages. As of my arrival in the summer of 2011, the city had relocated many of its
public defenders to peripheral districts, and replaced them with novice lawyers and untrained professionals.

The Associação Nacional do Torcedores (National Association of Fans: ANT) held a number of protests and direct-actions inside various national stadiums to publicize the commercialization of *futebol*, the rising cost of ticket prices, and the delayed start time of games to accommodate broadcasters (a 9pm start means that by the time the game ends, public transportation will no longer be working) (Gaffney 2011h). Likewise, on October 10th, 2012, the beaches of Ipanema became a site of violent protest after the members of Rio’s Municipal guard were attacked after trying to detain a group juggling a soccer ball by the waters edge, in violation of the Shock of Order rules restricting the sociable activity; in solidarity, people have taken to Facebook to organize the ‘biggest-ever beach soccer game’ in protest of the allegedly aggressive tactics that officers use to enforce beach regulation (Spinneto 2012).

Labor rights have also become a point of contestation, as the workers of the Maracanã stadium have already gone on strike twice since construction began. After an on-site explosion in August 2011 caused workers to demand better working conditions, increased pay, the presence of an on-site doctor and better health coverage for themselves and their families, construction employees went on strike again in September after their demands had not been met (‘Workers Struggles: The Americas’ 2011). In the same month, a spontaneous protest broke out after a new Shock of Order initiative would require weekly *ferias livres* (open-air markets) to close at 1pm. Protesters chanted “Epa, Epa, Epa, quero minha xepa” (*xepea* means the discounts that vendors give at the end of the market day); “According to the ill-logic of the current regime that governs this city,
Rio de Janeiro functions best and only when all of its elements are formalized, social practices regularized and social formations crystallized,” said Christopher Gaffney on his blog post reporting on the event (Gaffney 2011h).

In addition to these physical manifestations, four notable documents have been produced by various resistance coalitions. On the shorter end is the letter addressed to the IOC Vice-President, Ms. Nawal El Moutawakel. The same organizations also produced a 138-page dossier of human rights violations in Portuguese that is currently being translated into English (Megaeventos e Violações dos Direitos Humanos no Rio de Janeiro: Dossiê do Comitê Popular da Copa e Olimpíadas do Rio de Janeiro 2011). The document extends the definition of human rights to include: the right to housing; labor; access to information, participation, and popular representation; the environment; access to services, public goods, and mobility; and public security. However, until it is translated into English or French (the official languages of the IOC), the document is limited in its informative capacity. More recently, the National Coalition of World Cup and Olympics Popular Committee and Justiça Global published their own dossier, specifically problematizing the right to adequate housing; the emergence of new legislation to accommodate Olympic preparations; workers rights; and the Game’s financing operation.

Finally, the late Flor do Asfalto squatter settlement which was evicted from the Port region in September 2011, produced “Genocide and Spectacle: An anarchist reflection on the current context in Rio de Janeiro”. The manifesto offers their account of Rio’s current mega-event trajectory, and critiques the way the city is preparing for the upcoming events. The community, who refused to engage in talks with the State, defended their position:
Mobilizing oneself, and not falling into inertia, has been the strategy used to counteract this present moment. It is in that sense that communiqués have emanated from inside this okupa, which make the position of its squatters explicit, seeking to create ties of solidarity that scream and echo beyond the imaginary lines that demarcate the city of Rio de Janeiro, as these same ties are undoubtedly, in moments like this, the largest arsenal that oppressed rebels can come up with. (Translation by The Anarchist Library 2012).

While originally published in Portuguese, the document has since been translated into English by The Anarchist Library, and is freely available on the Internet.

Despite the growing nature of these protests and acts of resistance, activists within Rio de Janeiro have had little success in changing the course of its mega-event preparations. However, there are a few notable movements occurring within the city, and it would be unfair to affirm the inevitability of the situation without giving credit to their efforts.

While not explicit allies, the rallying cry of Flor do Asfalto can be heard in the current struggle facing artists of the former Bhering chocolate factory, located in the downtown Port region. Since 2010, contemporary artists have occupied and transformed the factory into over fifty art studio spaces, holding regular installations and open events. In August 2012, the building’s seventy-two occupants were served eviction notices by the new owners, Syn-Brasil, who had purchased the building from the federal government (to whom Bhering owes R$150,000 in unpaid taxes) at a property auction in May. Having fashioned themselves as an alternative and innovative art movement, their eviction drew widespread support amongst the city's artists and cultural supporters. Since that time, the Bhering artists have been successful in resisting the purchase of the building and their own eviction, "With a view to maintaining the building’s cultural activity by creating a public-private partnership that maintains city government ownership, but with collective
management" (Clarke 2012). However, State intervention on behalf of the Bhering artists has also drawn criticism, almost certainly from marginalized communities like Flor do Asfalto. In the words of one art critic:

It is known that art brings real estate speculation in tow. Let's not be naïve, in a sense, the Bhering occupation is a victim of its own success. The question is: does it necessarily have to be like this? Maybe not, but that depends not only on a sharper critical consciousness of art in relation to its ambivalent role in the urban dynamic, but also of a proactive attitude from the authorities in the sense of creating mechanisms that protect city spaces from predatory speculation instead of oiling it.

Another blogger declared that the "Bhering case will be definitive for the future of Rio."

Sound artist Vivian Caccuri defended the Bhering collective arguing that what happened was rare, and desirable in any other city; "It wasn't part of an institutional plan, but emerged from the force of the people" (Clarke 2012). Morro do Providência and the late Flor do Asfalto squatter settlement were also the result of resilient human effort, and yet few have come to the defense of these communities. For that reason, it can be argued that the future of Rio will be defined by the defense of artist collectives as much as it is by the preservation of historic communities.

Vila Autódromo is another community that has seen success in its attempt to thwart mega-event processes. And, as the chronicle of anti-Olympics resistance should indicate, the Vila Autódromo community-upgrading plan is special. Not only is the community working with educational institutions and legal teams, but they are also learning technical skills, and modeling what true participatory, horizontal community development and urban upgrading looks like. The legal injunction that the community won in January allowed the community more time to organize and call attention to the city’s agenda, but it also provided a symbolic lesson for all parties, revealing that even the expediency of mega-event projects are subject to protocol and bureaucracy. Most
promisingly, it allowed Vila Autódromo to present alternatives to its residents and to the city, providing a model of resistance for other communities and demonstrating how to build an effective network to oppose private developers and city officials.

The resistance occurring in Vila Autódromo was recently profiled in an article by *The Nation*. The piece profiles Armando, a diesel mechanic who has lived in the community for over 20 years, over which time he has built his family a sturdy, two-story home that he hoped would house generations to come. Writer Dave Zirin concludes the article by asking Armando is there is anything anyone can do it help. He replied, “Just let people know that we’re here…and we don’t want to leave” (Zirin 2012). This conjectural call for recognition is related to the final, albeit more abstract, form of resistance occurring in Rio de Janeiro, which uses digital media to document and inform an international audience of what is occurring as the city prepares for the upcoming mega-events. Even media and advocacy outlets like the *New York Times* and Amnesty International have taken a cue from video-based organizations like WITNESS, in a comprehensive attempt to document these mega-event processes. In the two months that I was in Rio, I assisted three separate film crews in their efforts to document Rio’s pre-Olympic condition. Organizations like RioonWatch and RioUnderbelly have devoted entire Youtube channels to community exposes, and even local film schools were seen capitalizing on the myriad of human-interest stories in their city.

The use of digital media is interesting in this context. Among the people I spoke with, there was a unanimous perspective that the changes and processes occurring in the city were omnipotent and inevitable. For them, it seemed that the only thing to do, at this point but perhaps in general, was to document people’s stories and make them feel heard
and cared for. Often times, the theme of these mini-documentaries was simply to show the other side of the Olympics. With titles like ‘The Dark Side of the Olympics’ or ‘the Untold Story Behind the Games’, images of bulldozed homes and leveled communities juxtaposed against blueprints for future parking lots, aimed to situate sporting infrastructure in its proper, politicized context. A common scene is the retelling of the moment when excitement and pride was replaced by the realization that Rio’s Olympic transformation did not include your community, your history, or your voice. Residents are often filmed walking among the rubble of their former homes, recounting the day they came home to find their door spray painted, or to find that their children had been tricked into signing a resettlement package while they were away at work.26

To measure the efficacy of these videos is problematic. There is no way to judge how many people have viewed them, or how many people shared them with friends. There is no way to measure how viewers’ opinions changed, or what affect their changed-opinion can have on residents’ realities. Moreover, there is no way to quantify their reactions, their sympathy, or their ability to help, because what is occurring in Rio is no more penetrable by its own citizens than by the global community. There is no way to know if these video campaigns reformed a would-be Olympic tourist, but there is also no way of knowing the detriment that undervaluing Olympic tourism might have. There is also no way of determining if these campaigns reach people who have the ability to positively affect change, or if they are just being seen by like-minded individuals. In this vein, transnational anti-Olympics campaigns are difficult to conceptualize because, what qualifies as positive Olympic tourism, or positive Olympic activism?

26 These scenes are a compilation of many videos, all seen on the RioonwatchTV YouTube channel.
Overall however, the transnational dimension of current video-advocacy presents an enlightened approach to anti-Olympic activism. Specifically, it recognizes the inherent truths of the Olympic-planning equation: that Rio’s mega-event preparations are an expression of the shift to a neoliberal style of governance, wherein traditional political, legal, economic, social, and spatial mechanisms are being inverted to accommodate private sector interests and investment strategies. It recognizes that the quality of urban democracy in the city of Rio de Janeiro has been compromised, the rights of citizens have been diluted, and the channels for political action and resistance have been dismantled. Yet, while calls to the international community demonstrate an understanding of these local barriers, the quality of their invitation falls short. Thus far, video-advocacy has not been linked with any broader letter writing or shame-based campaigns aimed at the International Olympic Committee, Olympic corporate sponsors, or athletes that participate in the Games. In my estimation, attempting to put pressure of external organizations demonstrates an understanding of the institutional power dynamics at work in the production of Olympic host-cities, but resistance campaigns have yet to make this association.

_Barking up the Wrong Tree: The Deficit of Neoliberal Urban Democracy_

By and large, Rio’s anti-Olympic activism has remained local and unsuccessful. Resistance campaigns have targeted the exact institutions and actors that are driving the city’s narrow-minded mega-event preparations, and the few internationally focused initiatives have fallen on deaf ears. Short (2008) identifies this as, “An asymmetry in power and resources between urban elites and local opposition.” Moreover, if we learn
anything from the Olympic Planning Equation, it is that that the mechanisms traditionally available for citizen resistance have been temporarily suspended in order to facilitate the host-city’s mega-event preparations. In attempting to deal with this institutional roadblock, and the current, seemingly contradictory mode of protest in use, it is appropriate to engage the literature. The literature on the deficits of urban democracy produced by neoliberal economic restructuring is extensive (Mayor 2007; Sites 2007; Lerher & Kiel 2007; Fung 2004; Freidmann 2002; Amin & Thrift 2002). To clarify, the term urban democracy is being used to mean the channels, mechanisms, and protocol available to everyday citizens, so that they are able to participate in the processes that produce urban space and their lived environment.

Neoliberal economic restructuring, or the restructuring of political, legal, economic, social, and spatial relations in order to accommodate and attract hyper-mobile capital, is at the heart of the mega-event strategy. The link between urban democracy and neoliberal economic restructuring is such that, in order to insert one’s urban economy into the hyper-mobile circuits of global capital, the relational organization of cities must be restructured in a way that is inherently undemocratic, non-participatory, and elitist (Falk 2000; Goodhart 2001). For example, neoliberal economic principles require the drastic reduction of the State and social services, meaning that those who suffer are those who rely on social services like public transportation, healthcare and education; constraining ones quality of life decreases the possibility to actively participate in decision-making politics, which is corrosive to democracy. Neoliberal economic restructuring has also proven to be disenfranchising because in order to attract capital, the public and private sectors will often merge, forming public-private partnerships, quasi-
public agencies, or privatizing services all together. In making government operate more like a corporation and less like a public good, public policy is more focused on servicing the needs of capital instead of the needs of citizens. Furthermore, by replacing public services with private institutions that are not accountable to, nor elected by citizens, it inverts, negates, and sidelines democratic processes, making paths of resistance, participatory decision-making, and representation harder to come by.

The fact that this is occurring on a global scale has promoted civil society and academics alike to look for ways to remedy urban democracy from the pitfalls of neoliberal economic restructuring. One suggestion that has risen to prominence is the idea of the ‘right to the city’, theorized by French sociologist Henri Lefebvre. The notion behind this theory is that decisions related to the production of urban space should be made more accessible, democratic, and local, instead of limiting input to decisions made by the State. The ‘right to the city’ specifically calls for the radical restructuring of social relations with respect to capitalism, which Lefebvre suggests will then inform the way that urban space is produced, by democratizing access to the various processes that determine urban space. His theory emphasizes the role of the inhabitant, stressing that the city must be produced so that it meets the needs of the users of urban space, and not its owners. The ‘right to the city’ privileges a local, decentralized form of decision-making practices, and has been a solution commonly advocated by those looking for ways to reify the agency of urban democracy and urban denizens. A number of urban housing

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27 For a comprehensive look at the way that urban social movements are contesting neoliberalism, see Chapter 6: “Contesting the Neoliberal City? Theories of Neoliberalism and Urban strategies of Contention” by William Sites in Contesting Neoliberalism edited by Leitner, Peck, Sheppard.
movements have incorporated the idea of the ‘right to the city’ into their struggle, including Brazil’s own 2001 City Statute.

However, Mark Purcell (2004, 2008) cautions that when we are looking for solutions, remedies, and tools for repairing urban democracy, we must make sure that the solution or approach we adopt is relevant and appropriate for the source of political erosion/exclusion. The ‘local trap’ is a term that he uses to describe the uncritical privileging of the local scale as the inherently best scale at which to combat the perverse effects of neoliberal restructuring. He illustrates this principle using the example of community security. In this case, community-policing strategies are born out of the sense of public insecurity that emerged due to the weakening role of the State in social life. Community policing is then offered as a proposal for how to deal with the pervasive feelings of public insecurity left by the vacuum of State withdrawal, thus requiring the community to provide a service that traditionally fell within the realm of the States’ obligation. However, while community policing (for those who can afford it) is positioned as a locally-generated solution to urban problems, it does not repair urban democracy, nor does it hold the State accountable for services that it should provide its citizens. In fact, it fractures urban space by creating imagined communities based on those who can pay for community policing structures, and those who are left to rely on the inadequate State security apparatus. Thus in this instance, localizing decision-making and action does not repair the deficits of urban democracy, but exacerbates them.

Purcell offers a myriad of examples that illustrate how the ‘right to the city’ and other rallying cries that localize action might be a step in the wrong direction. His findings are particularly pertinent to the processes put in motion by neoliberal economic
restructuring, calling our attention to that which excuses the State’s absence, and further erodes urban democracy. In the context of anti-Olympic activism, Purcell’s cautioning of the ‘local trap’ encourages us to correlate the method of anti-Olympic resistance and protest with the structural conditions that host-city residents are facing.

“Mega-events may mirror the political dialectics of a given host city at the domestic level, but events also act as transmitters of political processes between the domestic and international domains, allowing these domains to have reciprocal influences on each other” (Cornelissen 2012). The preparation of an Olympic city creates an extraordinary situation in which human rights, political procedures, and extant urban needs are willfully sidelined in order to prepare for the international spotlight and exploit national and foreign investment. The conditions and arrangements this creates within urban governments have generated an institutional roadblock for citizens wanting to use traditional political and legal avenues to resist mega-event related preparations. In this context and for this reason, mega-event preparations present a unique case study wherein which the local, municipal, and national scale might not be the appropriate site to challenge the processes that are occurring. These are the conditions that shape what I have termed the Olympic Planning Equation, and present a unique opportunity to explore anti-Olympic social movement organizing at the transnational scale.

Those active in social movements and advocacy networks commonly engage in this type of strategizing. They ask themselves: What is the nature of our struggle, and what is the most effective way to articulate it? What is our struggle and who is in the best position to help us achieve change? What is our struggle and who are our allies?
Multinational corporations, supranational organizations, and the hyper mobile flow of goods and services characterize our globalized society. Consequently, social resistance movements are discovering the importance of transnational linkages, not only in terms of the struggles they face, but also in terms of the advocacy tools available to them. They are discovering allies in every part of the globe, and because of the global nature of these affinity networks, their advocacy is transcending sovereign borders and working towards mutually benefitting objectives (Smith & Johnston 2002; Della Porta, et al. 2009; Tarrow 1994). Moreover, they are often discovering that those in the best position to advocate and inspire change are not limited to domestic agents, but can also be organizations that work in the transnational sphere. In these instances, social movements are privileging the transnational scale as the most appropriate place to deal with the lack of domestic democracy, accountability, and openness.

Discursive Scale-Shift

Social movements that elevate their claims from the local to the transnational sphere engage in a process known as *scale-shift*. This occurs when:

Localized collective action spawns broader contention when information concerning the initial action reaches a geographically and/or institutionally distant group which, on the basis of this information, defines itself as sufficiently similar to the initial insurgents (*attribution of similarity*) as to motivate *emulation*, leading ultimately to *coordinated action* between the two sites. (McAdam et al. 2003)

The shift that occurs from the local/national to the transnational scale does not cancel out the domestic origins of the social movement, but rather transposes the “frames, networks, and forms of collective action without a corresponding liquidation of the conflicts and claims that gave rise to them in their arenas of origin” (McAdam et al. 2003). This can
happen in one of two ways: diffusion means that information is transferred along established lines of interaction, whereas brokerage means information is being passed through two or more previously unconnected sites. The study of the ways in which social movements shift in scale is essential to the study of transnational political activism, and transnational public spheres.

Imagining the anti-Olympics scale-shift process is a purely discursive exercise. However, the burgeoning use of sporting mega-events as a platform for political discourse and resistance movements demonstrates the pragmatism in engaging in this type of discussion. Cornellison’s (2012) study of state-society relations and civic activism in the preparations for the 2010 FIFA World Cup in South Africa, even goes so far as to define itself as a study within the emergence of a *transnational political economy of mega-event protests*. However, she cautions that:

> In the current era, new generations of social movements concerning themselves with the ethics of neoliberal globalization have taken on board the issue of mega-events, thus enabling both the transnationalization of ‘local’ (domestic) issues and the localization of transnational dynamics. Paradoxically, however, this transnationalization gives anti mega-event campaigning a character of impermanence or transience, as advocacy networks and coalitions change not only across events, but from place to place, based on shifting convergences. (Cornelissen 2012)

The lack of a coordinated, ongoing transnational anti-Olympic movement can be attributed to a convergence of factors. First, resistance to the Olympics and Olympic preparations occur in a local context. Olympic sites are prepared within the context of extant urban formations and social relations, which are place-specific and only relevant to the citizens of that host city. Olympic host cities might be informed by international models of urban planning, global norms and aesthetics for areas of consumption, and even methods of security and social control. Yet they are ultimately adapted for a local
environment, and situated within existing social and political power relations. Likewise, organizing committees are composed of local politicians and local corporations, and organize the event within existing (albeit amendable) legal structures. Thus, it is understandable why resistance has also fashioned itself in a local context, against local actors.

Studies of other host-cities resisting their Olympic preparations substantiate the local, piecemeal nature of resistance (Burbank et al. 2001; Short 2008; Boykoff 2011). Boykoff’s (2011) article on anti-Olympics activism in Vancouver uses the term ‘event coalition’ to describe the “ongoing series of alliances and coalitions, whose convergences remain contingent on ongoing social solidarities ...but [that] activism is barely sustained through time from site to site” (Boykoff 2011). Activism in pre-Olympics Sydney was similar to Vancouver in their use of preexisting social networks and political struggles to contextualize and resist Olympic-preparations (Owen 2002). Cornelissen (2012) discusses the ways in which civil campaigning during South Africa’s World Cup provided a strategic entry point for civil society groups, but was ultimately a ‘fleeting and ambivalently presented platform in an otherwise ongoing set of political battles’. This presents a highly nuanced dilemma for anti-mega-event mobilization. Because social organizing is taking place among factions with preexisting struggles and contestations, it is difficult to determine the line between extant and purely Olympic-related struggles, which makes it challenging to widen the networks of social organizing. Moreover, the resistance campaign itself has an expiration date, as their message will fail to resonate once the Games have concluded.
Rio’s current mega-event climate, as well as the current nature of anti-Olympic protest and resistance, exemplifies several of these trends. As predicted by the Olympic Planning Equation, mega-event preparations are adversely affecting low-income, marginalized citizens at a far greater rate than they are affecting other social classes. This means that Olympic preparations are only widening existing divisions that separate the realities of the poor and the rich. In due course, Rio’s anti-Olympic resistance movements will draw from pre-existing social networks (such as those rooted in the mobilization of favela communities), thereby failing to widen the scope of their contentions and include all carioca citizens. Anti-Olympic resistance in Rio has also been very piecemeal, as evidenced by the numerous coalitions that have emerged against mega-event processes. And, as these organizations have fashioned themselves from existing social movement groups, it is likely that once the Games draw to a close, they will likely dissipate back into their original movements. It would seem that, more than just ‘barking up the wrong tree’, anti-Olympic resistance in Rio is following the same path as many ill-fated host-cities before them. In this light, the need to radically rethink anti-Olympic activism is essential.

Boomerang Theory

One of the most important theories to articulate the scale-shift process in transnational social activism is the boomerang theory, developed by Keck and Sikkink in Activists Beyond Borders (1998). Their theory states that when local channels for political action are blocked (by unresponsive states, authoritarian governments, etc.), civil society must elevate their struggles to the transnational arena using transnational membership-based civil society organizations, which will then put pressure on domestic
agents and motivate change. This constructivist approach to mobilization and change was theorized in the context of the internationalized struggle for human rights. Through the use of advocacy networks, global human rights activists were able to certify and endorse a universal definition of human rights, and then use the muscle of a globalized polity to pressure membership-based organizations like the UN to uphold and apply their standard through policy (Risse-Kappen et al. 1999; Keck & Sikkink 1998).

The power of these advocacy networks is derived from their ability to produce and exchange strategic knowledge; “When they succeed, advocacy networks are among the most important sources of new ideas, norms, and identities in the international system” (Keck & Sikkink 1998, x). And because these networks are activated by non-state actors, “The boomerang effect blurs the boundaries tying nation-states and their citizens, as these citizens can now join transnational networks which give them a voice and capacity to alter state policy” (Chandler 2005, 134). The ability to meaningfully participate in decision-making is based on the strategic use of information in mobilizing international allies, known as leverage politics. “By leveraging more powerful institutions, weak groups gain influence far beyond their ability to influence state practices directly” (Keck and Sikkink 1998, 23). Chandler (2005) concludes however, that despite the symbolic agency of transnational advocacy, domestic change relies on the cooperation of states and national governments. His work specifically refers to the ability of national governments to put economic or diplomatic pressure on other governments, but cooperation can also refer to the bi-directional, dependent relationship that a transnational organization has with a sovereign nation.
This work posits that the boomerang theory gives us the means to look to the transnational scale and conceptualize the anti-Olympic scale shift process. While social movement theorists like Keck and Sikkink developed the boomerang theory to explain the activities, decision-making, and history of a particular social movement, the theory has also been used as a way of determining exactly what domestic conditions require international action (Andonova 2011), or to explore which contentions and issues are best dealt with in the global arena (Rohrschneider & Dalton 2002). In these contexts, the boomerang theory introduces the various components that would make a domestic struggle relevant to the international community, as well as a method by which to raise awareness and effect change.

In order to evaluate the relevance of the boomerang theory in the context of anti-Olympic activism, and to determine if there are sufficient conditions in place for it to occur, the theory must be broken down into its relevant parts. Likewise, because of its conditionality, the boomerang theory has the potential to be used as an equation, rather than just an explanation, although Keck and Sikkink specifically use the word ‘pattern’ when describing the appropriate environmental conditions. The following analysis will break their definition into its component parts to see if the conditions that adversely affect host-city citizens justify the use of the transnational arena to catapult anti-Olympic contentions.

**Conditions to Satisfy Scale-Shift**

Keck and Sikkink state:

> When a government violates or refuses to recognize rights, individuals and domestic groups often have no recourse within domestic political or judicial
arenas. They may finally seek international connections to express their concerns and even to protect their lives. (Keck & Sikkink 1998, 12)

As we can see in the quote above, the first requirement is that local channels for political action and recourse must be blocked. The present work has attempted to show the systematic violation of citizen rights, from the violence and intimidation tactics used to forcibly evict favela residents, to the use of public tax dollars to fund illogical transportation circuits. It is also fair to say that local channels for action are blocked, given the fact that the Olympic stakeholders (the local political elite, the organizing committee, investors, real estate and construction companies, as well as the idea of the city) are driving Olympic preparations, whose interests run counter to the interests and wellbeing of urban inhabitants. And whose successful execution of the event depends on the suspension of normal political processes and civil rights.

Next, the boomerang theory requires the existence of an active, and discontent civil society. This condition is evidenced by the growing, albeit local resistance occurring in Rio. Those who have come under attack by the city’s mega-event preparations are united by their struggle for housing, workers rights and employment, public space, and participation in the decisions that affect the production of urban space. And, while cariocas are typically not politically aggressive people (Roett 1999), the political organizing that occurred during the military dictatorship (Gay 1994), as well as the struggle to articulate urban rights in the 1988 Constitution (Fernandes 2007, 2007b, 2000), demonstrates a history and a willingness to organize given the appropriate, external conditions.

The boomerang theory suggests the use of transnational advocacy networks in the elevation of local claims. This condition is satisfied by the fact that the residents of past
(and future) host cities are appropriate participants with which to forge transnational anti-
Olympic advocacy networks. While these networks might not currently exist, the anti-
Olympic efforts of past host-cities which were rooted in earlier existing struggles and
social organizing, have the potential to be mobilized again. The potential to mobilize
transnational advocacy networks in the context of sporting mega-events has been also
been documented by Brownwell (2012) in her study of human rights discourse and the
Beijing Olympics. She argues, “If the Olympic Games are the premier global ritual for
expressing global community, then they are also the foundation for building transnational
public sphere.” In another example, Harvey, Horne and Safai (2009) show how
alterglobalization movements are increasingly using sport as a sphere in which to
problematize the inherent contradictions and “evils” of economic globalization. Thus, the
possibility of using existing transnational networks to articulate the claims of host-city
residents, or the ability to forge new ones, seems achievable in the current context.

Lastly, the boomerang theory is mostly used in the context of struggles with
international significance or applicability. This condition is related to the attribution of
similarity, where actors in different sites identify themselves as sufficiently similar to
justify common action (Mcadam et al. 2003). This condition is satisfied by the reality that
the Olympics are a ‘travelling circus’, and enjoy the freedom to set down in any city,
without the permission or forewarning of its citizens (Shaw 2008; Boykoff 2011). This
perceptive inspires a common sense of urgency to act, in that we are all united by a
general feeling of vulnerability and powerlessness against the will of our own
governments. Anti-Olympic activism thus qualifies as a relatable campaign because of
the seemingly universal attractiveness, and deceivingly apolitical implications of hosting the Games.

The Olympic games present an exceptional opportunity to act as a unified polity, building the foundations for a transnational political sphere. The conditions implicit in the production of mega-events connect us to the experiences and struggles of host city residents through feelings of injustice, and perhaps apprehension. The boomerang theory carries weight if and when we understand the broader implications of the production of Olympic host-cities, and when we use that sense of vulnerability and injustice to mobilize and act. Moreover, the growing tendency for mega-events to be hosted by developing countries means that future host-cities will be connected by their condition of underdevelopment, as well as by the lack of democratic mechanisms in place to resist Olympic preparations. For these nations to receive the Olympics in their current form poses a greater threat than ever before, making the call to action even louder.

Transnational Agent of Change: The International Olympic Committee

Taken together, these conditions only satisfy one side of the equation. For the boomerang theory to successfully motivate domestic actors to change - whether it is a shift in values or a tangible change in the way a country operates- there needs to exist an appropriate and capable transnational actor to receive the claims of civil society, leverage their demands, and exert sufficient pressure (usually economic or diplomatic) so that the domestic agents change their conduct. The following analysis will position the International Olympic Committee as that actor. As an institution of global governance,
the IOC is both appropriate and capable of receiving the claims of host city residents, addressing the democratic deficits produced by mega-event preparations, and imposing a corrective procedure by which future Olympic host-cities will execute their mega-events.

The IOC’s designation as an institution of global governance has not been assigned lightly. While there may exist global entities whose sole mission is to deal with transnational themes such as human rights, organizations like Amnesty International often times lack the economic resources, political tools or diplomatic power to effect change. Alternatively, there are transnational corporations or international banking institutions that have the economic leverage to play a constructive role, yet they are neither elected nor accountable, meaning that the change they inspire is often self-serving. Furthermore, there are international governance institutions that lack everything from a goal-oriented constitution, economic leverage and political resources.

Fortunately, the International Olympic Committee combines all three of these faculties. First, it is important to discuss why the International Olympic Committee is an appropriate actor to receive the claims of host-city residents. Then, I will suggest the ways in which the International Olympic Committee is capable of playing a more proactive role in mega-event preparations. To begin this discussion, it is appropriate to ask the question: As a global society, what should be required of transnational organizations that play such an obvious role in domestic and international politics—what standard can we hold them to?

28 The same rationale can be used to explain why the IOC is also an actor and an institution of global governance.
IOC: Appropriate Actor of Global Governance?

The International Olympic Committee is a transnational organization, and enjoys diplomatic and tax immunity because it is not subject to the laws of any specific country. The IOC is officially registered in Lausanne, Switzerland as a non-governmental organization (NGO), and is in fact one of the oldest NGO’s in the world. The IOC also has 210 National Olympic Committees, making it the most internationally representative organization in the world (even more representative than the United Nations who only has 193 member states). These representatives act as ambassadors of the IOC and the Olympic movement to their respective countries, rather than as representatives of their country to the IOC. The dynamic between member states and the IOC already creates a condition wherein which countries voluntarily relinquish power, and in some cases sovereignty, over to the IOC. Therefore, asking the IOC to play a more aggressive role in domestic politics does not exceed even the current parameters of their relationship.29

In the early years of the modern Games, sporting competitions were smaller events, which were integrated into larger international festivals and World Fairs held to celebrate contemporary scientific and engineering marvels. “These fairs were not only selling goods, they were selling ideas: ideas about the relations between nations, the spread of education, the advancement of science, the form of cities, the nature of domestic life, the place of art in society” (Hall 2006). Even in its formative years, participation in the Games meant that one was recognized as a sovereign nation-state. According to Brownell, “Since 1896, the International Olympic committee has been at the forefront of this process (the expansion of a world system of nation-states) because

29 For an in-depth look at the power dynamics between the IOC and host-city organizing committees, see Booth (2011).
the Olympic games were a major public arena for announcing the existence of a country to a world audience” (Brownwell 2012). The Olympics ‘civilizing mission’ played a decisive geopolitical role in the twentieth century, and to this day the Games are still used as a coming out party for developing nations (Sun & Paswan 2012; Caffrey 2008). Thus, the IOC and the Olympic games is an existing socio-cultural filter that nations voluntarily submit to.

When the Olympic games were revived by Pierre Coubertin in 1894, he developed them based on a specific notion about man and sport. Still today, the modern Olympic games and the IOC are both governed by a specific set of ideals, articulated through documents such as the Olympic Charter, the Olympic Pillars, and the Olympic Creed. The fundamental principles of the Olympic Charter are:

Philosophy of life, exalting and combining in a balanced whole the qualities of body, will, and mind; creating a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational value of good example and respect for universal fundamental ethical principles; to place sport at the service of the harmonious development of man, with a view to promoting a peaceful society concerned with the preservation of human dignity; and the upholding of human rights and inclusion, while avoiding all forms of discrimination. (IOC 2007, 11)

Given that the IOC is already an organization that operates based on an organizing principle, petitioning them to adopt a firmer political stance in order to enact these ideals does not seem far-fetched. Moreover, part of the Olympic philosophy is using sport for the betterment of mankind, meaning that the Olympic Movement already looks at itself as an agent of positive improvement and world development.

In the past, the IOC has kept abreast of international trends, and has been receptive to emerging, value-based movements. A recent example of this is that following the 1992 United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, whereby
many nations adopted the UN’s ‘Agenda 21’ and its goal for sustainable economic
development, the IOC followed suit by installing its own ‘Agenda 21’ into the Olympic
Charter in the form of the third Olympic Pillar: the environment. “Although the Olympic
Games are primarily about sport and athletics, the IOC recognizes that the Games can
also be used to provide sustainable environmental legacies, such as rehabilitated and
revitalized sites, increasing environmental awareness, and improved environmental
policies and practices (The Challenge Series). Thus, if the IOC is in constant motion,
evolving with new trends and global movements, then the IOC, and the Olympic
movement more broadly, constitutes an appropriate vehicle to recognize and articulate
the rights of the urban inhabitant.

Another reason that the IOC is both appropriate and capable of playing a larger,
mediating role in host-city preparations is because its own reputation is on the line.
Greene (2003) argues that the increasing desire for developing countries to host sporting
mega events is because the Games are, in part, linked to nation’s acceptance of
international legal norms. “In addition to recasting the image of the host city as a
 hospitable location for tourism and leisure activities through physical improvements,
mega-events in the developing world can help the host country assure tourists and
potential investors that it respects human rights and the rule of law.” As such, in
 awarding the Games to a developing nation, the IOC is giving them the stamp of
approval, verifying the legitimacy of their legal institutions, and their commitment to
human rights. Thus, in order to maintain the quality of this endorsement, the IOC must
take proactive steps to ensure that human rights and the rule of law prevail.
There is also evidence to suggest that the IOC is attuned to the values and demands of the international community given the spotlight that ‘legacy’ has taken in the last decade. Legacy refers to the physical impact that the Games will have on the host city. The idea of positive legacy aims to convince the IOC, as well as host-city citizens, that money spent on sporting infrastructure will trickle down in the form of other social benefits (Mangan 2008). One theory to explain the emergence of legacy as a dominant Olympic discourse is that the IOC is acutely conscious of the public expenditure required to host the Games, and does everything in its power to make sure that this association remains favorable (Gratton & Preuss 2008). Incorporating and emphasizing the importance of legacy (both rhetorically and in concrete planning goals) shows how the IOC and the Olympics are malleable when it comes to the preservation of the movement; it can also be inferred that any threat to the movements’ image would be met with a reactionary, albeit flexible, response from the IOC. If the Olympic games or their preparations became too politicized or overly contentious, it appears that the IOC has the capacity and perhaps even the commitment to respond in a way that would be beneficial for host-city residents.

The Olympic games are often referred to as the world’s greatest peacetime event. Every four years, they offer a respite for participating nations from ongoing wars, political schisms, and ideological differences, and offer citizenries a reason to feel patriotic for non-political reasons. However, as this work and others have started to expose the true nature of Olympic preparations, it would seem that ‘wars that are put on hold’ do not preclude the war that is waged against citizens of the host country. If the IOC is to maintain the separation of sport from everyday politics, it must play a proactive
role in protecting host-city citizens from the politics involved in their Olympic preparations. In a similarly proactive vein, part of what makes the IOC an appropriate actor to receive the claims of host-city citizens is that the IOC is entrusted with the preservation of the Olympic message. If and when the Olympics become ever more politicized, the IOC will be the only appropriate actor to intervene and dissipate the fire.

One of the reasons that it is in their best interest to play a proactive, mediating role in the increasing politicization of the Games, is because the high value placed on broadcasting rights is linked to the easy-going nature of Olympic sports coverage. Television revenue accounts for the single greatest source of income for the local organizing committees and the IOC (Revenue Sources and Distribution, Olympic.org). Short (2008) posits that the Olympics are becoming more of a global media event than a real-time, real-place event that is attended physically by visitors; thus, maintaining the content and integrity of Olympic broadcasting is paramount to the interest of the IOC.

Current broadcasting contracts with the IOC prohibit televising any political protest related to the Olympics (Lenskyj 2001). Additionally, host cities are required to curtail the movements of their citizens, and erect no-protest zones within a permitted radius around the Olympic venues. However, if the nature of anti-Olympic protests grew to become an overwhelming feature of the Olympic urban environment, the relationship between the broadcasting agencies and the IOC would shift dramatically. Not covering isolated protests around the city is easy enough to do, but it would be much harder for the media to ignore massive acts of violence, vandalism, and riots, or widespread jailing. Moreover, broadcasters would be assuming more risk sending their personnel into ‘conflict zones’, and would have to calculate the extra costs they will accrue on
contingency plans, and in trying to keep their personnel safe. This cost-benefit analysis would likely factor in to the broadcasting bids, which currently make up 60% of IOC’s profits.

The apolitical symbolism of the Games extends to the health of the IOC’s business deals as well. Contrary to popular belief, Heffernan (2012) finds that the Olympics are not a highly lucrative marketing opportunity.

Companies sponsoring the Games don't make a ton of money because they tend to be large, well-known corporate brands, like Coca-Cola or McDonald's, that have bought into these gigantic deals for no other reason than to keep their chief competitors out. There's no question of raising brand-awareness; after all, these are the most familiar brands in the world. Given such companies' existing sales, even major public events aren't going to budge the needle and may not even cover the travel costs of all the executives who, of course, must be present for the Games. (Heffernan 2012)

The increasingly political nature of Olympic hosting will likely factor into future corporate marketing decisions: Is it better to keep out the competitor, but risk being associated with, and condoning a movement that violates human rights?

In order to maintain the upper hand with Olympic broadcasting and corporate sponsor contracts, the IOC needs to play a proactive role in mitigating the potentially politicized elements of the Games. As these elements stem from the inherently disfranchising, undemocratic, and elite nature of current Olympic preparations, the role they are being prompted to play will intervene and modify these processes, giving more authority to the voice and needs of citizens. Becoming an advocate and mediator of the elements that might potentially politicize the Games also upholds the Olympic values, perpetuating their image as an ideals-based movement. Moreover, because sport is at the core of these ideals, eliminating the political elements associated with the Games’ production reifies the centrality and agency of sport.
IOC: Capable Actor of Global Governance?

Just because the IOC is an appropriate transnational actor to receive the claims of host-city citizens, doesn’t mean they are capable to doing so. And in fact, the IOC’s track record would seem to indicate precisely that. However, the history of the IOC and its member states, as well as several other notable facts, imply that perhaps the problem is willingness, and not capacity.

The IOC was recently profiled in a scathing expose by the New York Times in the days leading up to the 2012 London Olympics.

The IOC, which champions itself as a democratic ‘catalyst for collaboration between all parties of the Olympic family,’ is nonetheless run by a privileged sliver of the global 1 percent. This has always been the case: when Baron Pierre de Coubertin revived the Olympics in the 1890s, he assembled a hodgepodge of princes, barons, counts and lords to coordinate the games. Eventually the I.O.C. opened its hallowed halls to wealthy business leaders and former Olympians. Not until 1981 were women allowed in. (Boykoff & Tomlinson 2012)

It is possible that Olympic scholars Jules Boykoff and Alan Tomlinson would blame the IOC for the negative impacts experienced by host-city residents, fundamentally disagreeing with the premise of this work. In their account, the IOC is behind many of the violations that we have discussed. For example, they argue that it is the IOC that demands that the host city change its laws to comply with the Olympic charter. They also argue that it is the IOC that requires the host-city to commit itself to policing infractions of intellectual property, and who outrageously defines trademark infringement

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30 To defend the argument that is being advanced in this work, although host cities are encouraged to change their laws to conform with the Olympic charter, the way in which they uphold this requirement is up to the city. For example, Vancouver passed a bylaw that outlawed signs and banners that did not celebrate the Olympics, and empowered local authorities to remove such signs from private property (Boykoff and Tomlinson 2012).
as the commercial use of words like ‘2012’ or ‘Games’. According to their article, the IOC also creates perverse incentives for host cities to overspend on security equipment and militarize urban space. “The IOC tends to look kindly on bids that assure security, and host cities too often use the games as a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to stock police warehouses with the best weapons money can buy” (Boykoff & Tomlinson 2012).

The position of these authors is endorsed by a number of memoirs, and institutional exposes on the inner workings of the IOC. In the words of Christopher A. Shaw, author of *Five Ring Circus: Myths and Realities of the Olympic Games*:

The IOC is an organization that clothes itself in platitudes as it conspires with local developers to concert public land to private use, all the while encouraging or bribing local politicians to raid the treasuries of the cities and countries that bid on the Games. Its ‘family’ lives like royalty, exploits its employees - athletes and volunteers - shamelessly, and pays taxes no taxes to anyone. It enjoys legal immunity in Switzerland. It even has the power to dictate public policy on transportation, the environment, and poverty to those cities too foolish to resist its siren song. The IOC is, in short, the ultimate mega-corporation, the very model of a corporate parasite. (Shaw 2008, 271)

The IOC has also been involved in notable corruption scandals, which have questioned the ethics and procedures involved in its bid processes. The Salt Lake City bribery scandal, in which voting members of the IOC were bribed with luxury vacations and college tuitions, gave way to a series of reforms including the establishment of an ethics committee within the IOC. Indeed, major reforms still need to occur within the IOC if it is to become more democratic, horizontal, representative, and accountable to host-city citizens, which will be discussed in the concluding section.

Fortunately, the IOC is in an advantageous position to establish such reforms and take on a more proactive role in the fight for host-city citizen rights. The parameters for
submitting a host-city bid are set by the IOC and change every year to include new requirements. For example, once the environment became the third pillar of the Olympic Charter, the IOC began to require all candidates to complete an environmental assessment survey of their bid’s physical impact, building materials and environmental-education legacy. Short (2008) suggests that the IOC’s role is so commanding, that its agenda will structure the bids of cities, the decision-making of National Olympic Committees in how they choose which city will bid from their nation, and the resultant character of the games. Therefore, if the IOC wanted to impose requirements that would make Olympic preparations more participatory and transparent, they could do so within the dynamic that already exists between bid cities and the IOC.

Likewise, the discourse that is used in bid documents already emphasizes the social benefits of hosting the games. For example, in the English version of the Rio2016™ bid book, the word ‘social’ is used forty-nine times, ‘legacy’ is used eighty-nine times, ‘benefit’ is used forty-two times, and ‘transform’ is used twenty-two times (Rio2016 Candidature file). By implementing requirements that would ensure the rights and active contribution of host city citizens, the IOC is only holding the organizing committees to promises they have already committed to. For example, the Rio2016 bid book promises:

Social Transformation through Sport: With improved sports venues and supporting infrastructure in place before the Games, and last community benefits afterwards, Rio 2016 will help transform the city. For example, social gains, including outreach programs for young people and those who previously may have been disconnected or displaced. (Rio2016 Candidature File)

Without being too forthcoming about those who are ‘disconnected or displaced’, Rio’s Olympic bid promises to put sport infrastructure at the service of marginalized
communities. Yet in 2011, former Minister of Sport Orlando da Silva was forced to resign over allegations that he had embezzled money destined for social programs funded by the Ministry. This incident is not unique, as the Rio2016 organizing committee has already seen five key members resign over corruption and embezzlement scandals. While the Rousseff administration has actively tried to tackle the notorious, debilitating perception of corruption within Brazilian politics, this case demonstrates the disconnect between the rhetorical promises of the organizing committee and the feasibility of their implementation without oversight. By assuming more responsibility in ensuring that benefits reach the promised recipients, the IOC is legitimizing and upholding a standard for its own selection processes.

One of the reasons that host-city bid books make such exaggerated, improbable guarantees is because of economic rationale that Olympic boosters propagate. While the strength of such incentivized arguments against the economic reports is inconclusive (Sterken 2006; Matheson 2006)\(^{31}\), the hype that shrouds Olympic bidding gives the upper hand to the guardian of the Olympic Games. Since the bid competition for the 1988 Games, there have been at least five cities vying to host the Olympics in each bidding cycle, and at times as many as nine. The IOC holds the key to a coveted commodity, and they are therefore in a rare and advantageous position to demand more from host city organizers.

Last, but perhaps most importantly, the IOC is a transnational actor capable of waging economic leverage against host cities. Although this will be covered in the concluding recommendations I offer for the IOC, it is important to recognize the

\(^{31}\text{Short (2008) reasons that, “Inclusive cost–benefit analyses are severely hampered by lack of proper accounting methods, technical issues, such as accurately estimating exchange rates of foreign currencies, and such basic issues as the lack of available data” (331).}
advantageous position the IOC is in. Because of the economically dependent relationship between the host city organizing committee and the IOC, the IOC is capable of withholding profits if certain stipulations of their contracts are not upheld. While this is not the current arrangement between the IOC and organizing committees, it would only require a simple adjustment to the host city contracts, as they change with each round of bidding.

Broader Implications

The exercise of thinking of ways to make anti-Olympic activism more effective is as practical as it is intriguing. First, it empowers us to understand the dynamics between host cities and their citizens. This requires us to delve into the logics driving mega-event preparations, and the even larger economic and discursive arguments dictating urban governance in the twenty-first century. As the momentum driving mega-event preparations in many ways conflicts with the needs of urban citizens, it is critical to generate alternative ways to impede these seemingly unstoppable processes. Expressly, these alternatives would have to have sufficient power, resources, and political clout to tip the scale in favor of public citizens rather than private capital.

But the need to think outside traditional modes of anti-Olympic activism becomes more pressing when one considers the changing dynamics in Olympic hosting. In a recent article entitled “Before and After the Vuvuzela: Identity, Image and Mega-Events in South Africa, China and Brazil” authors Tomlinson et al. (2011) pick up on an emerging trend in mega-event urban planning: the fact that as western economies reach the peak of their expansion, the responsibility and/or privilege of hosting mega-events
will increasingly fall on the shoulders of developing economies. And, compounded with the discursive hype surrounding the economic advantages of hosting, the political elite of underdeveloped nations are chomping at the bit to attract the international spotlight (Matheson & Baade 2003).

Yet there is substantial evidence to suggest that the ways in which developing countries are approaching their mega-events preparations are increasingly troubling (Tomlinson et al. 2011; Curi et al. 2011; Darnell 2012; Grix 2012; Horne 2010). According to Matheson and Baade (2003), for developing countries to host sporting mega-events is an even worse investment than it would be for industrialized countries, precisely because the public need for social rather than leisure infrastructure is comparably more urgent. Horne’s (2010) analysis of BRIC countries and stadium development shows that, “Mega-events have been largely developed by undemocratic organizations, often with anarchic decision-making and a lack of transparency, and more often in the interests of global flows of finance, technology, and imagery, rather than local communities.”

Rio is an excellent case study in this respect. Through the course of this work, I have shown that the limited democratic mechanisms that exist in a recently democratized country such as Brazil are being inverted to accommodate its mega-event preparations. Indeed the socio-economic fragmentation of Brazilian society, its underdeveloped status in light of its recent double-digit economic growth, and the lack of a fully formed political culture, is typical of underdeveloped and developing nations. Privileging mega-events (as Rio has shown to do) as a solution or strategy of twenty-first century urban development is a worrisome prospect. In the context of these underdevelopments, the
probability that civil liberties and human rights will be trampled on is heightened by the fact that citizens will likely have no political resource against their own government, and no way to resist or fully participate in its preparations. The problems we are seeing in Brazil are typical of how developing countries approach hosting sporting events, and embody the contradiction and inadequacy for developing countries to host a socially just Games (Pillay & Bass 2009; Bénit Gbaffou 2009).

In developing countries, wealth is often uneven and highly concentrated. This has far reaching implications, such as the inability to fully participate as citizens because the conditions of impoverishment prohibit meaningful participation in civic life. But perhaps more basic than this is the universal need for public goods and public infrastructure. Education, health care, housing, and public transportation are often lacking in developing countries, and in this context public expenditures on sporting infrastructure seem highly unnecessary and wasteful. Developing countries also tend to have a smaller leisure class, meaning that pricey sporting venues will likely sit idle once the Games have concluded.

Many developing countries are associated with images of backwardness, crime, and a substandard of living. In order to recuperate these associations and generate positive images that are favorable to international capital, developing countries will likely model their urban development on ideals of a world-class city, replete with five star hotels, business convention halls, and consumption-oriented cultural districts. In this way, developing countries that host mega-events will likely forsake their history, national culture, and their urban form in order to brand their city in a way that conforms to the standards of an international and business class (Calvin 2012). Thus, the further
commodification of cities will likely occur as developing countries bid and host sporting mega-events.

For these reasons, the contemporary approach to sporting mega-events taken by developing countries is inherently undemocratic, elitist and disenfranchising. In this context, problematizing local anti-Olympics efforts is crucial, as the production of modern mega-events in developing countries will likely magnify the symptoms documented in the Olympic Planning Equation. Furthermore, as cities in developing nations are united in their mutual state of underdevelopment, the lack of a fully formed political culture, and the desperate need for social and public infrastructure, the need to recognize this shared vulnerability is critical. In doing so, it strengthens the bonds necessary to elevate their claims, beginning the process of shifting local anti-Olympics contention to the transnational arena.

Future research in this area should take a structural approach to Olympic studies, and should look for systematic way to measure and qualify the ways in which Olympic host cities from developing countries conform to past host-city literature, or ways in which they differ. In this regard, researchers will be able to scrutinize citizens’ ability to interact with Olympic preparatory processes, and to measure if in fact Olympic preparations are becoming less democratic, less accountable, and less open. While this in itself does not premeditate the type of response advocated in this work, it will stress upon the need for anti-Olympic activism to rethink what channels for resistance are available to them. Likewise, future research that documents the ways in which urban democracy is suspended or reformulated to accommodate the Olympics will strengthen the need for
coordinated action between citizens of Olympic host cities, past and future. However, if researchers find that host cities are, of their own volition, incorporating strategies that democratize Olympic planning processes, than the fundamental premise of this work will be undermined. Therefore, future scholarship should seek to qualify host-city ambitions and event-execution with the ramifications experienced by citizens, as this formula is a respectable measurement of the city’s willingness to use the Olympics to build a better urban future, or its intention to work in myopic pursuit of international capital and esteem.
Chapter 5:

Part 4: Recommendations for the International Olympic Committee

Civil Society Accountability for Global Governance

The framework for this chapter, and for the following recommendations, is based on the work of Jan Aarte Scholte in *Building Global Democracy: Civil Society and Accountable Global Governance*. Inspired by his four-point accountability rubric, this chapter will issue fourteen recommendations for the IOC, in an effort to help them become a more accountable institution of global governance, and a more proactive and effective mediator in the production of Olympic host-cities.

Scholte’s framework for accountability regarding institutions of global governance relies on three inter-related components. The first is the idea of *global governance* institutions. In Scholte’s estimation, global governance is a “complex of rules and regulatory institutions that apply to transplanetary jurisdictions and constituencies” (Scholte 2011, 8). These institutions are qualitatively different than ‘international organizations’, as their reach is of a global scale and covers a range of social domains, whereas international organizations only recognize and operate within the country-state-nation unit. Furthermore, organization implies association, whereas governance lends a more regulatory character to their activities. Scholte argues that global regulatory bodies can be sorted into six categories: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, interregional, translocal, private, and public-private hybrids.
Accountability, meaning the “processes whereby an actor answers for its conduct to those whom it affects”, is crucial to the establishment and maintenance of effective and legitimate global governance (Scholte 2011, 8). Democratic accountability more specifically implies the ability to constrain an entities’ power and make it responsive to the people it affects, especially those who tend to otherwise be marginalized or silenced. This contrasts with the idea of ‘good governance’, which is limited to the promotion of financial responsibility and ethical performance. Scholte advocates for a four-part accountability rubric, which can be applied to institutions of global governance, as well as to local, national, private and civil society organizations. The four principles of the rubric are: transparency, consultation, evaluation, and correction.

- **Transparency** requires that affected constituents must always be able to see what the affecting actor is doing, and how. “In a situation of accountability, impacted circles should be able to discover readily what decisions are taken, when, and by whom, through what procedures, on the basis of what evidence, drawing on what resources for implementation and with what expected consequences” (Scholte 2011, 16).

- **Consultation** requires that affected constituents are consulted about the intentions of the affecting actor, and that those actions are adjusted based on the information, analysis and preferences heard from the affected constituents. “Decision-taking is accountable when affected people are incorporated into the deliberations and have opportunities to shape the outcomes” (Scholte 2011, 17). The consultation may be direct communication with the affected constituents, or maybe be indirect, using third-party mediators such as parliaments, civil society associations, or independent arbitrators.

- **Evaluation** requires that actions and processes that impact affected constituents are independently monitored and assessed. “Impacted persons have the right to know how the impacting agent has complied with its decisions and achieves the promised results. Furthermore, stakeholders (affected constituents) have a right to receive tenable explanations when outcomes have fallen short of expectations” (Scholte 2011, 17).

- **Correction** requires that affected constituents be provided with redress in the case of any harmful consequences they may experience. “In a situation of accountability, affected circles must be assured that affecting actors take responsibility for their actions and learn from any mistakes” (Scholte 2011, 17).
Finally, Scholte theorizes about the role of *civil society* in making institutions of global governance more accountable to those affected by their actions. While Scholte reviews four interpretations of civil society, his analysis is ultimately structured by an interpretation of civil society as, “A political arena where associations of citizens seek, from outside political parties, to shape societal rules” (Scholte 2011, 8). Contrary to earlier modes in which civil society only engaged the state, contemporary civil society engages a complex regulatory network that involves multiple types of actors, including global government agencies, because the mode of modern governance has shifted towards polycentrism (Scholte 2011, 33).

*Imagining Civil Society through the Olympics*

Civil society is conceptualized as both the agent that pressures institutions of global governance to become more accountable, and as the unit of analysis by which the influence of global institutions is measured. To give an example in the context of this study, global civil society is the agent that would pressure the IOC to become more accountable to host city citizens; and, the agency of the IOC is measured by the extent to which its actions and influence affect global civil society. Both interpretations reify the interconnectivity between the IOC as an institution of global governance, and global civil society as the breadth of constituents affected by the IOC actions, or by the Olympics more generally. Scholte’s explanation also suggests that the actions and activities of civil society are an enactment of citizenship; “That is, they are practices through which people claim rights and fulfill obligations as members of a given polity” (Scholte 2011, 34).
It might be difficult to conceptualize how the Olympics concerns global civil society because, after all, it is really only the host city citizens that are negatively affected by mega-event preparations. Thus, how can we define civil society in the context of the Olympics? Scholte’s definition of civil society would imply that the Olympics are a political arena in which associations of citizens seek to shape societal rules. While I have previously reviewed how nations use the Olympics as a political platform (e.g. boycotts), more recent studies have shown how the antiglobalization, alterglobalization, and labor rights movements have incorporated the Olympics into their contentions, as well as having fashioned them as a platform on which to articulate their struggles (Harvey et al. 2009; Timms 2012; Cornelissen 2012). Taken more literally, the Olympics as a political space means that we can use the two-week event as an instance in which to see ourselves as an interconnected, global polity. Held every four years in different geographical and cultural contexts in a celebration of humanity and human achievements, the Olympics are an exceptional opportunity to reify our common interests and common values.

An alternative interpretation that Scholte offers understands civil society as the general quality of a given human collectivity. By this definition, if the human rights of host city residents are violated, it undermines the value and agency of universal human rights, of which the Olympic Games is a vocal advocate of (Roche 2002)\(^\text{32}\). Therefore, if global civil society takes up the mission of democratizing mega-event preparations, we are strengthening the quality of universal human rights, and the quality of the human condition. Another interpretation posits that civil society is the sum total of the associational life within human collectivity. If sport is a platform on which we reify our

\(^{32}\) “The notion refers to membership in the implicit and ideal global community constituted by the moral-ontological ‘fact’ of the common status of human being, and the possession, thereby, of these common rights” (Roche 2002).
collective interests and commonality, then the Olympics are a vehicle that consolidates our identity as a global civil society. In thinking more pragmatically about the Olympics, it behooves us as a unified civil society to be proactive about the methodology of mega-event preparations, as the Games have the ability to come to any city, any time, without citizen consultation. Finally, Olympic athletes compete in the Games on behalf of their nations. By sending their citizens to participate, nations are endorsing the politics of the Games’ preparations, thereby formally recognizing nations that violate human rights. Anti-Beijing activists capitalized on this when they branded the 2008 Olympics ‘The Genocide Games’, consequently incriminating the IOC and participating nations as sponsoring and condoning genocide. The Olympic games unwillingly implicate all citizens in its political consequences, which thus requires a coordinated effort on behalf of a global civil society.

**IOC: Institution of Global Governance?**

The IOC is an international non-governmental organization, which acts as an umbrella organization of the Olympic Movement. While the IOC is the supreme authority, the Olympic Movement also includes National Olympic Committees, International Sport Federations, and the Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games. Part three of this work discussed the IOC as both an appropriate and capable actor to receive the claims of host city residents, thereby making a case for its capacity to act as an institutional of global governance.

In terms of Scholte’s six categories of global governance institutions, the IOC could fall under several. For example, the IOC could be a translocal organization, which
is defined as an arrangement in which, “Substate municipal and provincial authorities from across the planet collaborate directly, without mediation of nation states, in the regulation of common problems” (Scholte 2011, 12): the Olympics are hosted in cities, by administrations that competed in the transnational sphere for the opportunity to host them; they are pursued as a politico-economic approach to urban competitiveness; and they are executed by municipal administrations (somewhat) independently of their nation states, with authority bestowed upon them by a transnational organization. The Olympics could also be seen as public-private hybrid, since the IOC’s activities are funded by Olympic corporate sponsors, even though it is technically registered as a non-profit. Nevertheless, the IOC is legally categorized as a non-governmental organization; one which has extraordinary international reach and is governed by principles set forth in the Olympic Charter. As such, the IOC neatly coincides with Scholte’s definition of global governance as a ‘complex set of rules and regulatory institutions that apply to transplanetary jurisdictions and constituencies’ (Scholte 2011, 8).

Short (2008) argues that the Olympic games themselves are a significant regime of international regulation. Over time, their size, scope, and international media coverage has exploded. For example, the first games of the modern era involved 241 athletes from only 14 countries, while the most recent London Games witnessed the participation of 10,500 athletes from 204 National Olympic Committees. The Games are the most watched event on television, with a truly global audience that marks the “shrinking and flattening of the world” (Short 2008). Participating in the Games is the mark of being a member of the international community; “It is no accident that countries formerly shunned or marginalized because of their role in international affairs sometimes seek
redemption through the Games” (Short 2008). Olympic athletes compete as members of
countries-states, wearing national uniforms, and their gold medal victories are celebrated by
playing their national anthem, and the raising their national flag. The calibration of
athletic achievement as an indication of national success/failure reminds people of the
ties that bind the global community, as well as the differences that divide us.

Likewise, the IOC played a crucial role in the reconstitution of the world order at
the end of turn of the twentieth century. According to Short (2008) “The growing
interaction in international space initiated a new wave of globalization as new
organizations were set up to establish rules for how nations were to interact with each
other.” Over time, the IOC has grown into one of the most influential transnational non-
governmental organizations. To illustrate this, Short suggests that the IOC’s evolving
agenda is so influential that it can structure the bids of candidate cities, and ultimately
direct the resultant character of the Games.

IOC: Accountability Evaluation

Thus, if the IOC and its sphere of influence qualify as an institution of global
governance, how is it evaluated against Scholte’s accountability rubric? The One World
Trust is an independent think-tank that conducts research, develops recommendations,
and advocates for reforms to make policy and decision-making processes within
institutions of global governance more accountable to the people that are affected by their
actions. Every year, their organization publishes a Global Accountability report, which is
an annual assessment of the capabilities of the world’s thirty most powerful global
institutions (intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, and corporations),
and the extent to which they are accountable to civil society, affected communities, and the wider public. Organizations are accessed based on a profile of the organization that is vetted by the One World Trust, which evaluates them on their transparency, participation (with external stakeholders and their own members), evaluation, and complaints/response. Transparency is evaluated based on the existence of a specialized function that enables stakeholders to make contact with the organization. Participation is evaluated based on the existence of an institutionalized space for external stakeholders to engage with decision-making at the governing, executive or senior management level. Evaluation is evaluated based on the existence of a mechanism that facilitates the dissemination of lessons learned from assessments across the organization. Complaints and response handling is evaluated based on the existence of mechanisms that allow external stakeholders to make complaints against the organizations’ policies (Lloyd et al. 2008).

As these criterions align with that of Scholte’s, we are able to see that this publication is not only methodologically sound, but applicable for this work. According to their most recent 2008 Global Accountability Report, the International Olympic Committee received the lowest score in both the category of non-governmental organization, and for the overall list of thirty organizations. A summary of the report follows. (2008 Global Accountability Report: Figure 5)

• Transparency: The IOC has no explicit transparency policies, although it supports the Basic Universal Principles for Good Governance of the Olympic and Sport Movements, which has some commitments for transparency within sports governance. This document is only available in French and English, and is not disseminated to its stakeholders. Moreover, there is no personnel to oversee the

33 For non-governmental organizations, internal stakeholders are defined as national affiliates and members/staff, and external stakeholders are defined as affected communities, partners, and the wider public.
IOC’s transparency practices, nor is there any training or guidance provided on how to do so.

- Participation (external stakeholder engagement): External stakeholders are able to participate in IOC activities during Olympic Congresses (held in Switzerland), but this engagement is not subject to any specific policy or procedure. There is no personnel that is publically identified as having the responsibility to oversee IOC-external stakeholder engagement, nor is there any mechanism to ensure compliance with IOC commitments regarding external stakeholders.

- Participation (member control): The IOC has 115 members, including the President, Vice-President, and ten other members that constitute the executive board. All members are representative of the governing body, although it is unclear how non-executive members can actively participate in the agenda of annual meetings. No process was identified that would allow members to initiate the dismissal of a member.

- Evaluation: The IOC is most comprehensive in terms of its evaluation, particularly with its extensive knowledge transfer programs between host cities, and the systematic reviews that occur throughout the course of host-city preparations. The IOC also has a framework for evaluation in order to produce the Olympic Games Impact Reports, but it is not available for public viewing.

- Complaints/Response Handling: The IOC has a Code of Ethics that applies to all members within the Olympic Movement, and an investigative procedure for the IOC Ethics Commission to handle complaints regarding Code of Ethics violations. However, this procedure does not adhere to the One World Trust best practices principles for complaints, such as complaint confidentiality, non-retaliation, and independence of investigative process. Nor does the Ethics Committee have any decision-making powers; they are limited to issuing warnings and suggestions. The IOC does not have a procedure for handling internal complaints from employees, nor complaints from external stakeholders regarding IOC policies, or compliance with policies in its activities.

Figure 5: One World Trust 2008 Global Accountability Report Ratings: International Olympic Committee

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According to Shaw (2004), while the Ethics Commission might demonstrate an ongoing effort to address its accountability gaps, the chain of command within the IOC means that eventually, the decision of the Commission will be subject to the discretion of the IOC president.
The legal foundations of the Olympic system are weak. Any discrepancies between host city organizers and the IOC are dealt with in the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne. However, the CAS is not so much a court, as it is a tribunal, so its decisions are only binding to the countries that agree to be bound by them. Furthermore, it legislates based on International Sport law which, because the IOC and organizing committees are non-governmental organizations and are not bound by political treaties, has few legal ramifications. Moreover, because the organizing committees are independent of their national governments, their legal ties with the IOC are even more ambiguous. “Thus, the Olympic system is a transnational regime that is more truly autonomous from national governments than any other legal regime, so it must rely on voluntary compliance by governments and organizations stemming from their desire to associate with the Olympic Games” (Brownwell 2012).

It is curious that the One World Trust doesn’t specifically identify the external stakeholders as host-city citizens. More importantly, this accountability profile does not mention the IOC’s relationship with host-city organizing committees, which is arguably the mechanism by which the IOC embeds its global reach, notwithstanding the ideological effects of the Olympic brand. This oversight suggests that due to the degree of separation between the IOC and host city residents, the IOC doesn’t feel any
obligations to host city residents because it is the organizing committee who should be accountable to their own residents. It is true that host city organizers, as the middle man between the IOC and host city residents, have more substantial ties to what is perceived as ‘external stakeholders’, making the accountability of these specific organizations a much richer discussion. But, as this work has attempted to show, the IOC’s relationship with host-cities and host city organizing committees is characterized and constrained by their mutual dependence. The IOC relies on the host city to produce an event that perpetuates the Olympic brand, and guarantees commercial benefits to corporate sponsors. The host city relies on the IOC for its access to the Games, Olympic insignia, and the profits generated by broadcasting rights, merchandise, and ticket sales. Thus, in improving that accountability that organizing committees have to their citizens, the IOC is also improving their accountability to its own external stakeholders.

Recommendations

The following is a list of fourteen recommendations that, if mandated by the IOC, would greatly improve the quality of Olympic host-city preparations. Specifically, they would give host-city organizing committees the tools to democratically manage the diverse interests of all urban stakeholders, and it would give host city citizens and the IOC the tools to effectively supervise the host-city’s mega-event preparations.

1. Mandate that an independent, domestic commission be set up to evaluate the procedures of the National Organizing Committee, and the host city organizing committee. They must be domestic because they must have a solid understanding of the existing legal apparatus within which Olympic development will be executed. Olympic bids should thus be structured within existing legal frameworks, and not exceed them; nor should Olympic preparations expect to execute them using extra or supra legal means.
2. IOC must ensure that an IOC-affiliated commission makes an independent evaluation of the land and areas destined for Olympic development before candidate cities pass onto the second phase of bidding. This evaluation must involve meetings with community members and host city organizers so that they have mutual awareness of one another. Additionally, offices should be set up in each Olympic zone (depending on the host-city’s Olympic layout) for community members to hold meetings, and access documents related to Olympic developments.

3. Bid financing needs reform. At current, the bids are publically financed by tax dollars, and are extremely expensive because they often involve extensive domestic and international public-relations campaigns, and the assembly of mock urban planning models. Rio’s three Olympic bids collectively cost $185 million. Bid financing needs to remain public, because privately funded bids would certainly skew Olympic development benefits towards financiers. Publicly funded bidding needs to be dramatically downsized (including money that is spent on IOC visits), and commissioned using funds from a city’s tourism budget, rather than its sports, urban works, or social development budgets.

4. Cities must formally acknowledge that they are bidding for the Olympics and publicize what their intended plans are. A random survey of citizens must be submitted to the IOC as part of the bid, demonstrating that the average citizen has awareness that the city might undertake the responsibility of hosting the Olympics. The same survey must gage the public’s approval of their city hosting the Olympics; public approval below 50% would invalidate a city’s candidacy.

5. Civil society representatives from each candidate city must be present at bids to vouch for community support. Their candidacy will take place at public meetings that organizing committees are mandated to have with the public; these representatives will volunteer themselves for the position and be voted on by attendant community members. Civil society representatives will maintain their position for the duration of the host city’s preparations (if chosen) and will report to the IOC during routine visits, concerning the democratic quality of the city’s preparations. The IOC will take responsibility for training these civil society representatives on ways in which to monitor Olympic preparations.

6. All Olympic bid documents and host-city preparatory documents are to be published in the language of the host-country, as well as in French and English (languages of the IOC), and should be made publically available with copies that can be accessed on the internet and in designated offices throughout the host city.

7. National representatives to the IOC must act as ambassadors of the Olympic values to their respective countries, as they currently do. But they must also take on the role of mediator and enforcer, so that National Committees and Organizing Committees are actually held to the standards set forth in the Olympic Charter.

8. National governments are presently not signatories on the Host City Contracts with the IOC. National governments should become signatories, binding them to the contractual obligations set forth in both the candidature file and bid contract, rather than relying on a temporary, extralegal institutions like the host-city organizing committee.
9. The IOC should make its evaluation criterion for Games Impact Studies publically available. Additionally there should be a popular, crowd-sourced version of this criterion, which will be compiled by public forum in the host city. Host city organizing committees and impact studies should be evaluated according to both criteria.

10. The IOC must amend Rule 61 which bans protesters from Olympic sites. Holding cities to a lower standard of civil liberties than what is normally afforded to its citizens threatens national sovereignty and civic rights.

11. The IOC has acknowledged the ‘gigantism’ of the Games as a real issue (Tomlinson and Boykoff 2012). Yet the current scale of the Olympics is mandated by the IOC, and is not sustainable or healthy for host cities. It is unnecessary that cities dedicate an inordinate amount of space to sporting infrastructure, especially venues whose ticket price will exceed the means of the average citizen. The IOC should change its evaluation framework, and positively reward host city bids that use existing sporting infrastructure, and temporary venues.

12. The IOC should commission a temporal study that looks at sporting stadia that have had successful post-event uses, and then determine its venue criteria based on these best practices. This study should evaluate stadia in terms of seating capacity, venue architecture, public accessibility, and amenities, and relate them to the respective city in terms of the number of domestic sport teams, the average number of annual events, the population of the city, and the median income of residents. The IOC should also reduce the VIP, box seat, media, and preferred zoning requirements for the venues.

13. Additionally, some of the sporting events are outdated, and leave no positive impact on the sporting culture or sporting venues of the host-city. Events such as equestrian competitions are “drenched in privilege,” and “pseudo-historical events like Greco-Roman wrestling, concocted in the 19th century, could also go” (Tomlinson & Boykoff 2012). Events with high start-up costs should be replaced with those requiring fewer resources, such as more running events, with trail running and cross country. Tomlinson and Boykoff even suggest bringing back tug-o-war, a hotly contested event in the early twentieth century.

14. Because the IOC has no legally binding authority over host cities after the Games have finished, stipulations should be built into media contracts that withhold a percentage of the contract profits to be released only after the two and four year evaluation of legacy impacts has been conducted. If the promised legacy benefits have not materialized, or if projects were not complete within the timeline of the Games, or if citizens were negatively impacted by the Games, the pending portion of the media profits should be allocated to finishing incomplete projects or providing redress to those that were negatively impacted by the Games.35

35 As the owner of the global rights for the Olympic Games - including broadcasts on television, radio, mobile and Internet platforms – the IOC grants its partners exclusive rights to this effect in their respective territories. From the period of 2009-2012, the IOC generated US$3.8 billion dollars. According to the Olympic Marketing Fact File, the IOC itself retains under 10% of the total profits generated, and distributes the other 90% among organizations associated with the Olympic movement. In order to support
countries hosting the Olympic Summer and Winter Games, the IOC contributes part of the marketing revenue share and the broadcasting profits to the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (OCOG); Beijing 2008 are the last figures released, totaling US$ 851 million (Olympic Marketing Fact File). The National Olympic Committee for each member country also receives money from the IOC to fund training and development of the Olympic teams; Beijing’s National Olympic Committee received $US 372.6 million. Thus, one way to incentivize Olympic organizing committees to comply with the mandates of the IOC is to withhold money if certain requirements are not fulfilled.
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