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Does US Foreign Policy Achieve Meaningful Results to Stop Nuclear Advancement?

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DOES US FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL RESULTS TO STOP NUCLEAR ADVANCEMENT?

By

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A THESIS

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DOES US FOREIGN POLICY ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL RESULTS TO STOP NUCLEAR ADVANCEMENT?

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Does US Foreign Policy Achieve Meaningful Results To Stop Nuclear Advancement?

Despite the vast research by academics and their attempt to explain why states aspire nuclear power, why states transfer conventional arms, and the effect of nuclear proliferation on the probability of war and crisis behavior, little is known why states continue to provide sensitive nuclear assistance despite the catastrophic consequences it may bring. An additional problem to this paradigm is that according to the strategic theory of nuclear proliferation the spread of nuclear weapons threaten the United States and the international peace and security.

To increase the understanding of the problem of nuclear development this study focuses on the question: Does United States Foreign Policy Achieve Meaningful Results To Stop Nuclear Advancement? To address this question, two case studies: Pakistan and Iran are examined through their regional history to understand their motivations for developing nuclear capability. Reference to International Relations theories of realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism are also used to serve as a critical basis to understanding the different aspects of foreign policy and what approach the United States pursues to halt nuclear advancement.
The work concludes that US Foreign Policy can achieve meaningful results but it is not always successful at bringing nuclear advancement to a halt. The balance of diplomacy and the pressures of sanctions have been proven as an effective means of pressuring and persuading regimes to resolve conflicts and respect international norms. Utilized together these tactics can buy time and negotiating leverage to prevent states from continuing with their nuclear aspirations, acquiring nuclear weapons, prevent war, as well as show nuclear weapon states that their actions have serious consequences that include isolation and pressure of additional penalties upon them.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Nuclear advancement poses a grave threat to the United States and the international peace and security. For this reason, politicians, policymakers, and academics worry that nuclear capable states will provide nuclear assistance to other states or terrorists networks fueling to the spread of nuclear weapons. Academic analysts have explained why states want nuclear weapons, why states transfer conventional arms, and the effect of nuclear proliferation on the probability of war and crisis behavior, but what is more interesting, is that states that provide sensitive nuclear assistance understand the strategic consequences of their behavior yet they still do it. An additional problem to this case is that according to the strategic theory of nuclear proliferation the spread of nuclear weapons threatens powerful states such as the United States more than it threatens weak states, therefore the question arises: Does United States Foreign Policy Achieve Meaningful Results To Stop Nuclear Advancement?

To address this question this research paper will look at foreign policy through different theories of international relations and will be divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 gives an overall introduction of what the paper is about, Chapter 2 gives background information on the development of US foreign policy, its goals, and how events in the twenty-first century alter policy thinking. It also discusses hegemonic stability theory (HST) and how it contributes to the distribution of power through hegemony in an anarchic condition of the international system. In addition it looks into realism and how its main objective is the survival of the state and its security in an
anarchic condition. This chapter introduces the security dilemma and how the use of power of states can create uncertainty due to the misperception of not knowing a state’s intentions. Then it moves onto liberal institutionalism to explain how in an interdependent world, institutions help states define acceptable international behavior and to provide for a means of punishing defectors from agreed community standards. Chapter 3 is based on how the role of the President is crucial in foreign policy because state actions depend on the perceptions of the person in command. To explain this, the chapter looks into the individual level of analysis to explain why Presidents choose to take certain actions, like President Truman for example, who decided to drop the bomb in Japan during WWII to save lives and avoid invasion, or how President George W. Bush chose to go to war in Iraq in 2003, a choice that he believed would enhance his presidency and change the course of history in the critical region of the Middle East. The chapter continues to give a brief comparative evaluation of President G. W. Bush and President Barak Obama. For President George W. Bush it looks into how he handled the war in Iraq and his foreign policy affects. For President Obama it looks into how he handles his objective towards a nuclear free world. Further, this sections elaborates on the importance of the role of a leader, his perception in foreign policy and how that has an effect in the future of the US and how that matters. It also looks into the importance of soft power and the solutions suggested in President Obama’s speeches from 2008-2010 like the use of the NPT, the IAEA, sanctions, if these strategies have worked, the problem of nuclear proliferation and how far foreign policy has come to help stop nuclear advancement.

This is also relevant in Chapter 4, which focuses on the case studies of Pakistan and Iran. All sections of the chapter look into the reasons behind Pakistan and Iran’s
nuclear aspirations and how the United States through its foreign policy stops this from happening. It also looks into Iran and Pakistan’s regional history to understand their motivations for developing nuclear capability as well as how their leaders have an impact on their foreign policies and actions they take. And lastly the paper ends with an overall conclusion that answers the question based on analysis, if US foreign policy does or does not achieve meaningful results to stop nuclear advancement and how. It also states that the realist theory is prominent in foreign policy.
Chapter 2

Foreign Policy

US foreign policy has changed since the fall of the Cold War. It gave the United States a unique status never experienced before by any other country. A form of modern global imperium where it did not build up its capabilities through colonial conquest. US supremacy emerged in natural form as a result of its predominant military presence but also as a result of the appeal of American culture associated with the premises of soft power such as democracy, personal freedom, economic openness, and the information age among others.¹

In the latter half of the past century in particular US foreign policy developed at pace, with the US electing to involve itself in events far across the world as a means of maintaining its position as one of the key ‘superpowers’ in the world today. The goals of American foreign policy have not changed in more than two hundred years. They are: to ensure the continued security, prosperity, and freedom of [the people].² The United States has been up to the task of not only strengthening its capacity and security but also as a global leader to be able to address three international priorities: 1. manage and shape central power relationships in a world of shifting geopolitical balances, and intensifying national aspirations so that a more cooperative global system emerges; 2. contain or terminate conflicts preventing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and promote collective peacekeeping in regions torn by civil strife so that global violence recedes rather than spreads and; 3. to address effectively the increasingly

intolerable inequalities in the human condition and to prompt a common response to the new environment and ecological threats to global well being.\(^3\) This is an example of what the theory of hegemonic stability would pose in terms of security where a hegemon must be able to take the lead, be able to manage, provide assistance in times of crisis, and encourage development in the peripheral areas of the system.

Both Robert Gilpin and Stephen Krasner say that under the theory of hegemonic stability when the distribution of power is hegemonic, the dominant state can promote liberalization without jeopardizing essential security objectives. This is because the hegemonic state, in this case the US, ‘has symbolic, economic, and military capabilities that can be used to entice or compel others to accept an open trading structure.’\(^4\) The bottom line in the security version of the hegemonic stability theory, explicates that it does not assume that states have a common interest in international economic liberalization and stability. And even though an open system may raise the absolute level of welfare of all participants, some states will gain relative to others. If the pattern of relative gains threatens the security of powerful states, international economic liberalization will be restricted even though those states could have increased their absolute welfare by participating in a more open system. Hence, the theory of hegemonic stability is relevant to this research project because it places the United States post Cold War world in a position as global leader with sufficient power (military, economic,


technological, diplomatic, and cultural) and motivation to provide the public good of international stability by its own actions.\(^\text{5}\)

Furthermore, foreign policy has traditionally been seen as the pursuit of the national interest in the external relations of states, but there has never been a precise boundary between the domestic and international spheres and there have always been important non-state actors, so as a result, policies have to be constantly re-crafted to meet new challenges.\(^\text{6}\) For this reason, events in the twenty first century alter foreign policy thinking and the United States has to reconsider policies that meet security needs, especially in an information age where technological advancements play such an important role\(^\text{7}\) and when the international system is highly threatened by nuclear advancement, nuclear proliferation, weapons of mass destruction and terrorist attacks.

The post Cold War world challenged long held convictions that the US must play a major international role in case of chance of local nuclear conflict among undeclared nuclear weapon powers, today those powers are Pakistan and Iran who aim to advance in their nuclear plans. Thus the priority role of the United States was and still is containment of potential challengers, and that national security demands a bipartisan consensus to empower the President to act vigorously and with a great deal of discretion in foreign policy.\(^\text{8}\) Based on this argument the aim of this research paper is to try to explore if US foreign policy does or does not achieve meaningful results to stop nuclear advancement.

\(^{5}\) Webb, Michael C., loc. cit.
To help answer this question it is essential to acquire some understanding of US foreign policy and how it meets challenges and the world. The Constitution of the United States offers a clearer explanation. For example, Secretary John Foster Dulles, found basic foreign policy in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States:

To form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty and Prosperity.\(^9\)

According to him, “To form a more perfect Union,” meant to assist in making the United Nations an effective organization for peace. “Establish Justice,” meant to promote the sway of international law to bring peace accompanied by justice. “Insure domestic Tranquility,” meant to assist other peoples to achieve their just aspirations through peaceful change rather than violence. “Provide for the common defense,” meant to join with other independent nations in a common effort to protect their and the freedom of the US from any force, which sought to destroy them. “Promote the general Welfare,” meant to adopt policies of economic assistance and trade as would stimulate economic development in other nations. “Secure the Blessings of Liberty,” was reflected in all these objectives and also meant to make known to other peoples that the American Revolution was the true revolution for human freedom.\(^10\)

These two paragraphs give a basic understanding of the importance of foreign policy to the security of the United States. Historical illustrations such as the Cold War, the war in Iraq, and now nuclear development in countries like Iran and Pakistan, have demonstrated the essence of international politics, each underlying unique episodes reflected on the forms of political action, which were most appropriate according their

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\(^10\) Berding, Andrew, loc. cit., 22.
time, and today nuclear weapons are an integral part of the strategic discourse in international relations.

In addition it is important to take into consideration that although the US has been portrayed as a leader it has not been a leader in many aspects of international law and has been criticized with human rights violations. According to the *Human Rights World Report 2013*, the United States incarcerates more people than any other country and practices contrary to human rights principles, such as the death penalty, juvenile life without parole sentences, and solitary confinement marked by racial disparities to name some. For example, 2,600 youth offenders were serving life-without parole sentences in prison, many of whom were placed in long term solitary confinement, and under counter terrorism and torture. United States officials sought to explain US policy on targeted killings in Pakistan and elsewhere by unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones. They said the policy was to engage in targeted killings only if traditional law enforcements means were unavailable, although they relied on both the laws of war and self-defense as legal bases for targeted killings. Not only does this exceed the scope of targeting permitted under the laws of war but also targeted killings via drone strikes are classified as human rights failures.11

Furthermore, for the purpose of this research project it is crucial to understand that in the field of international politics, foreign policy plays a major role as order is shaped by Great Powers, and the United States as such has not been an exception to this. The anarchic condition of the international system establishes security as the main

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priority in foreign policy; as a result reflections of foreign policy have been mainly constructed through the realist school.

Realism is described as the dominant theoretical perspective in International Relations theory. It uses power to indicate the ability of one group to influence and control either another group or outcomes and events that pertain to them. All outcomes in realists analysis are ultimately dependent on the relative power of the actors involved with those having greater power determining outcomes according to their own interests.

It is the absence of a higher authority to protect and dispense justice equitability, the combination of anarchy and relative power that leads to a behavioral pattern called balance of power, in which power is sought by the relatively weak to counter the relatively strong. Nothing is guaranteed to provide security or effectively deter an ambitious opponent and it is this uncertainty that leads to decisions and outcomes that realists argue are the inevitable consequences of anarchy.

One such consequence is the security dilemma, in which nation-states arm themselves for defensive purposes and in so doing, induce the same behavior in neighboring states but then become mutually suspicious of one another’s “real” intentions in arming. The misperception of power can also lead to an unwarranted faith in one’s alliances or free-riding on the balancing efforts of others; consequences that Thomas

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Christensen and Jack Snyder refer to as “chainganging” and “buckpassing”, because such outcomes were never intended by the participants involved whose rational behavior in pursuit of their interests combined in unanticipated ways. This is why realists are apt to characterize the condition of International Relations as “the theory of power politics” because this is how wars get started.

According to Brian Schmidt in, “The Primacy of National Security,” he resumes the logic of national security in the ‘three S’s, (statism, survival and self-help), which develop the following logic of analysis. Because of the existence of anarchy there is no government that regulates the relations of the states thus making states sovereign. This means that states have a hierarchical organization within them, and an anarchic structure outside. This means that they are the legitimate representatives of people, and as such, possess the legitimate use of coercive power.

As a result, the state is the highest authority in the system, which is known as statism. The anarchical characteristic of the international system makes states concerned when it comes to the distribution of power. Because there is no supranational government above them states are sensible to the distribution of power among each other, which becomes a threat of power, especially in military terms, which is crucial to their existence and survival. Therefore, understanding foreign policy requires one to invoke the tools and aspects of international relations in order to understand how foreign policy is formed.

Different scholars have discussed the goals of states and what is necessary in order to survive. Defensive realists for example, such as Kenneth Waltz, believe that a dominant state, like the United States, seek enough power to maintain the status quo.

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Consequently, a state can increase its power by improving military capabilities by the number of nuclear weapons it possesses. Brian Schmidt states that,

> Defensive realists argue that expansionist and aggressive foreign policies most often prove to be counterproductive because they cause other states to form a counterbalancing coalition.

Offensive realists, on the other hand, such as John Mearsheimer, counter that states never have enough power. Offensive realists assume that nation-states want to maximize their aggregate power and will therefore be predisposed to expansionist policies. *Au contraire* defensive realists assume that states want to maximize security and anticipate a wider range of possible policies and outcomes as a result. It is important to distinguish between defensive and offensive realists with regards to power because either one will influence security and foreign policy and its outcomes. However, realists agree, that the best route to national security is to accumulate power for oneself and to ensure that no other state acquires a preponderance of power.

Later in this research paper the nuclear era will be explored through case studies on Iran and Iraq that will explain how a nuclear-armed state can create an imbalance and many problems in world order. For example, not knowing the intentions of a state that possesses nuclear power, in realists terms this is known as the security dilemma, a concept developed to understand state actions and how it implicates foreign policy.

In terms of nuclear weapons the security dilemma argues that, state A increases its nuclear weapons. State B learns that State A has increased its supply of nuclear weapons and decides to increase its own supply of nuclear weapons. This dilemma is that states do not operate in a transparent world. Subsequently, government officials in one state do not necessarily know the intentions of the other state. State A could desire to build up nuclear weapons for offensive purposes or for peaceful purposes. The issue of uncertainty and
transparency ultimately could lead to a spiral and an eventual arms race or nuclear war can occur, something that the United States aims to prevent.

In a counter argument, Neoliberal Institutionalists would claim that states can overcome anarchy by working through institutions. Neoliberal theory posits that formal international institutions can make international cooperation easier to attain than in their absence. International institutions reflect the general, embedded framework of international principles, rules, norms, and decision making procedures around which states seeking to maximize their interests will converge.\(^\text{17}\)

Neoliberalism looks to state behavior in formal international institutions as evidence that in an interdependent world, states will seek efficiency in managing collective problems presented by international anarchy. Additionally international institutions help states to define acceptable international behavior and to provide for a means of punishing defectors from agreed community standards.\(^\text{18}\) Security after all, places high value on the risks from failure of cooperation in that a states’ very survival might be at stake.

Kindleberger, as a liberal economist, would say that this is an example of hegemonic stability theory that falls through his explanations on insights from game theory and, in particular, the ‘logic of collective goods’.\(^\text{19}\) The logic behind this is that the collective goods version assumes that all countries would benefit from international economic liberalization and stability, but they are unable to achieve this common interest


(in the absence of a hegemon) because of the institutional and strategic, in the game theoretic sense, obstacles to the provision of collective goods.\textsuperscript{20}

Robert Keohane argues that institutions can facilitate states in several manners. Joseph Nye and Stanley Hoffmann also agree. They have shown that some types of security institutions can aid the exercise of influence, constrain bargaining strategies, balance or replace other institutions, signal governments’ intentions by providing others with information and making policies more predictable, specify obligations, and impact both the interests and preferences of states.\textsuperscript{21} Charles Kupchan shows that institutions are relevant to security because they increase the level of information available and defining what constitutes defection, increasing the likelihood of issue linkage, and advancing interstate socialization by promoting the concept of an international community.\textsuperscript{22} First, states must forgo some elements of sovereignty and abide by the rules and regulations of the institution, and for members who decide to work through an institutional framework may receive benefits. Thus, institutions are seen as important mechanisms for lowering the costs of establishing international cooperation and creating more efficient outcomes, as they can help states by decreasing transactions costs while increasing transparency, but for that to happen states must interact with other states to increase levels of cooperation.\textsuperscript{23}

In its entirety, neoliberal institutionalists are more concerned about absolute gains than relative gains, and for realists, relative gains are most important because states want

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\item Webb, Michael C., loc. cit.
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to increase power or gains in relation to other states. Thus, neorealists are very critical about institutions.

Overall, this argument is important because different theories and theorists propose different forms of thinking about the world and how these theories can be applied to form the appropriate foreign policy to meet the needs of the century. For example, national security is one of the key elements of the realist analysis of foreign policy. All main tenents of Realism- statism, survival, and self-help- underline the primacy of this concept. For realists, the main foreign policy goal is to secure the state. As explicated previously, in order to explore how to achieve national security, realists focus on the concept of power and the security dilemma, which is central to this paradigm because threat is generally perceived as external, because internally, or within the state, the problem of order is considered to be solved.  

Brian Schmidt also brings up a significant point; he states that the role of nuclear weapons is crucial in the history of the discipline of security especially after the Cold War. He considers this from two main perspectives: theory of deterrence and ‘maximalist’ school, both try to answer the question of how nuclear weapons could be used taking into account its fatal consequences.

In addition Schmidt states that multilateral cooperation and international institutions are necessary for survival and states should pursue a common goal through cooperation. Ann-Marie Slaughter, a liberal theorist, in her essay *Wilsonianism in the Twenty-first Century* expresses her thoughts on how the appropriate institutions and

25 Schmidt, Brian, loc. cit.
collective actions can make measured judgments about intervention. That is, to be undertaken only in extreme circumstances in order to ensure enforcement of a governments’ responsibility to protect its own citizens. This approach can be called offensive realism because it stresses the projection of power and alliances and in this case the state is a power maximizer.  

Essentially our foreign policy is designed to promote the national interest of the United States, the formulation of foreign policy has a three-stage objective. The first stage is to fend off the immediate threat of war, provide we can do so honorably without sacrificing our national interests and making ourselves still more vulnerable later on. The second stage is to utilize the term of peace, albeit uneasy, imperfect peace, to exert utmost effort and skill at home and abroad to promote strength and unity. The third stage is to strive toward the ultimate goal of a world rule of law, which will secure freedom and peace.  

But from previous examples the US often works against international law, undermining the International Criminal Court committing violations on human rights.

Looking at these points through a neoliberal lens makes it very appropriate because the security of a state in a discourse guided only by assumptions of just one political theory is wrong, for nothing is constant, and although these are the three main objectives in foreign policy, it illuminates how not only national interests change but so do state actions in order to adapt to new situations to adequately understand the world.

Likewise, under the over-all definition of foreign policy come many specific policies and treaties. In the past the United States have celebrated policies such as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the Good Neighbor Policy for Latin

27 Sterling Folker, loc. cit.  
28 Berding, Andrew H., loc. cit.
America, the Open Door Policy for China, and the Freedom of the Seas, but as mentioned above, the world has changed and so has United States foreign policy, especially in the 21st century where the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is a fundamental component to US foreign policy to stop nuclear advancement and proliferation as well as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. 29

The bottom line, as it is explained in article, What is National Interest? Hans Morgenthau’s Realist Vision and American Foreign Policy by Peter Pham, “No nation has the resources to promote all desirable objectives with equal vigor; all nations must therefore allocate their scarce resources as rationally as possible [in other words cooperation is needed]. The indispensable precondition of such rational allocation is a clear understanding of the distinction between the necessary and variable elements of the national interest. Given the contentious manner where in democracies the variable elements of the national interests are generally determined, the advocates of an extensive conception of national interest will inevitably present certain variable elements of the national interests, as though their attainment were necessary for the nation’s survival. In other words, the necessary elements of the national interest have a tendency to swallow up the variable elements, so that in the end all kinds of objectives, actual or potential, are justified interest of national survival… the same problem presents itself in its extreme for when a nation pursues, or is asked to pursue, objectives which are not only unnecessary for its survival but tend to jeopardize it. 30 The main point is that “while the interests which a nation may pursue in its relation[s] with other nations, are of infinite variety and

29 Berding, Andrew H., loc. cit.
magnitude,” the resources which are available to the United States- or any country- for
the pursuit of such interest would necessarily be “limited in quantity and kind.”31 But if
you look at Morgenthau’s argument from a neoliberal institutionalism point of view, yes
resources might be limited under realism, but in an interdependent world, states will seek
efficiency in managing problems presented by the international anarchy collectively, and
will probably realize that institutional adaptation alone is insufficient when security is at
stake.32 Therefore, the purpose of theoretical analysis is to help us understand the limits
on political change and become aware of hidden assumptions, prejudices, and biases
about how the social and political world is and what it can be, and in that manner apply
the most appropriate theory to the situation which will lead to the adoption of strategies
that will help determine the success or failure of foreign policy.33

31 Pham, Peter, loc. cit.
32 Sterling Folker, Jennifer. “Liberal Approaches.” Jennifer Sterling Folker,. Colorado: Lynne Rienner
33 Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Narding, Matthew Paterson,
Christian Reus-Smit and Jacqui True. Theories of International Relations. Fourth ed. New York: Palgrave
Chapter 3

Presidential Leadership

More than four centuries ago, Niccolo Machiavelli advised the prince in Italy that it was more important to be feared than to be loved. But in today’s world, it is best to be both. Winning hearts and minds has always been important, but it is even more so in a global information age. Information is power, and modern information technology is spreading information more widely than ever before in history. Yet political leaders have spent little time thinking about how the nature of power has changed and, more specifically, about how to incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies for wielding power.\(^{34}\)

In the twenty-first century, science and technology added dramatic new dimensions to power resources. The ability to use information technology to create precision weapons, real-time intelligence, broad surveillance of regional battlefields, and improved command and control, allowed the United States to surge ahead as the world’s only military super power. But the progress of science and technology had contradictory effects on military power over the past century. On the one hand, it made the United States the world’s only super power, with an unmatched military might, but at the same time it gradually increased the political and social costs of using military force for conquest. Paradoxically, nuclear weapons were acceptable for deterrence, but they proved so awesome and destructive that they became muscle bound—too costly to use in war except, theoretically, in the most extreme circumstances. Also, with modern communications, technology fomented the spread of nationalism, which made it more difficult for empires to rule over socially awakened populations.\(^{35}\)

Living in a complex world, globalization and the information age have brought a new world politics shaped by a wide diversity of actors, multiple channels of communications, transnational activities, and the diffusion of power and governance. Today, internet makes global communication virtually free, and technological progress is putting into the hands of deviant groups and individuals destructive capabilities that were once limited primarily to governments and armies. Technology is [also] putting new


\(^{35}\) Ibid. 18-9.
means of destruction into the hands of non-state actors like extremists groups.\textsuperscript{36}

Terrorism for example, deliberately attacks on non-combatants with the objective of spreading fear and intimidation and it depends crucially on soft power for its ultimate victory and on its ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.\textsuperscript{37}

Therefore, sudden action by foreign governments or current events in foreign countries often challenge US interests and it requires the President or the Prince, as Machiavelli would call him, to respond to such events and thus initiate US policy. And as Alan P. Dobson and Steve Marsh, state in their book, US foreign Policy Since 1945,

No matter how powerful the US might be, it is not omnipotent. It cannot get its way on everything and multilateral cooperation is often needed to consummate American objectives and confer upon them authority and legitimacy.

Take the Iraq War in 2003 for example,

The Bush Administration relied on the unilateral wielding of hard power in pursuit of American security and the propagation of its values abroad in an ambitious scheme to democratize the world,\textsuperscript{38}

The administration also used the argument that Saddam Hussein was hiding weapons of mass destruction (WMD’s) as a \textit{casus belli}\textsuperscript{39} but when the facts came forward that there were no connections between Iraq and 9/11 terrorist attacks, and there were no WMD’s, the President lost the hardest battle of all by failing to win peoples hearts and minds.\textsuperscript{40}

This is why the role of the President is crucial to the security of the nation and it is true what Machiavelli suggests, on how winning hearts and minds is always important, or what Joseph Nye refers to as soft power, but as the nature of power changes with

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{37} Nye, Joseph, Ibid., 22.
\textsuperscript{39} Casus belli: An act or event that provokes or is used to justify war.
technological advancement, political leaders must think on how they are affected by these changes and change their strategies and their actions.

According to Brian Schmidt, the events of the last fifty years and the primary role of the United States in the international system have tested correctly the Realist formula in American foreign policy. National security indeed has been the main objective in US foreign policy. After WWII and with the emergence of the bipolar system, the United States understood that it could not delegate its security to an international organization. It found that it was its responsibility to protect itself; this was its prerogative and main duty as competition for the accumulation of nuclear weaponry that threatened its physical security. Yet, as the nuclear races unfolded during the Cold War, and, as accurately depicted by Schmidt, the mutually assured destruction (MAD) offered by the nuclear weapons affected the attractiveness of war, developing a new game and set of rules in the international system.

Security did not stop being important, on the contrary the nuclear scenario limited the military utility of nuclear weapons and forced states like the United States, besides maintaining nuclear capabilities, to think any notion of offensive diplomacy in strategic terms. And that is exactly what is happening now in the 21st century. With countries like Iran who seek to obtain nuclear power and Pakistan who has nuclear capabilities, the US is forced to analyze past experiences and apply the best form of power and make policies accordingly. States like Pakistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, among others, are not able to exercise sovereign control over their territory, ceding power and influence to terrorists groups and spreading fear and insecurities across the world.  

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This creates a problem because like nuclear weapons, terrorism historically, is the weapon of the weak, that is, of those who do not possess conventional military power yet can create major destruction.\(^{42}\) Another interesting example in regards to nuclear weapons, is what happened during the Cold War and the material evidence of the time, that says that nuclear weapons and the dominant presence of the Soviet Union presented a highly sensitive and possible disastrous era for the world, yet it emphasized the role of US superpower. An additional example to the list, are the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during the last stages of WWII in 1945. Under President Truman’s decision of dropping the bomb to have Japan surrender, prevent the invasion of the home islands and save American lives, the aftermath was super destructive as the atomic bomb destroyed several Japanese cities and the number of casualties were high. Hans Morgenthau would say that Truman’s decision to drop the bomb was based on the concept of rationality where ‘governments act rationally, have consistent, ordered preferences, and that they calculate the costs and benefits of all alternative policies in order to maximize their utility in light both of those preferences and of their perceptions of the nature of reality,’ hence, making this decision an act of neorealism.\(^{43}\)

Interestingly enough, Brzezinski uses two level of analysis to explain this, framed within the traditions of foreign policy analysis and school of realism that gives it an interesting twist. First, in his approach to foreign policy he masterly uses the individual level of analysis and its rational premises. That is he depicts foreign policy behavior and the actions of states through the decision making of foreign policy through the decision making of US Presidents. Brzenzinski, who was the 10\(^{th}\) United States National Security


Advisor, proceeds to make sense of US assumptions of its position and influence of single individuals in foreign policy, while it still narrows international politics to the state as unitary actor. This approach to foreign policy analysis is important because it recognizes that individuals matter and that their perceptions, beliefs and values matter and affect foreign policy because US policy makers interpret world events through their own values.44

The emphasis that Brzezinski puts on individuals and on cognitive processes however is no constructivist in character but more oriented to the premises of classical realism. Classical realism tends to argue that a leader “thinks and act in terms of interest defined as power.”45 Brzezinski makes a case for the idea that the role of the leader is crucial in the behavior of state, which is seen in the latter example of the bombings of Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. His argument is not naive regarding the scope of influence of leaders; the appreciation of leaders does not change the need to protect the physical security of the US and as such, the maintenance of its power, yet changes in leadership reorient foreign policy. Therefore, who the President is at the time and their act of choosing methods of actions in foreign policy, reflects the preferences and the psychological milieu of the leader.46

Within his discussion of the role of leadership, Brzezinski does not underestimate the preferences, the characteristics, and the structure of the group of individuals that form the executive leadership in national security. From this notion, he approximates the decisions and intentions of the United States policy and credibility as the only

superpower from the point of view of the elite decision-making group and how their idea or interpretation of the world inform the policy choice and strategies determined by the President. We can see that with the decisions made by President G.W. Bush and the Iraq war in 2003 where the needs of national security in a world of dangers created by terrorism seemed to justify swift, effective, if at times extreme, measures, and arrogant use of power. What seemed to have been forgotten was one of the foundational principles of the republic: good causes can be achieved only by good political means.  

At the same time, Brzezinski rescues the importance of the organizational process in policy making. By taking into account this element he depicts the priority and elevation of the international events to matters of national security, according to the bureaucratic organizations in charge of their management. In particular, Brzezinski depicts how these bureaucratic structures offset the high/low personal involvement of the president and their participation in the decision-making and execution of the policy agenda. Under this assumption, Brzezinski takes time to reveal the political dynamics of foreign policy in the US, explaining that a President with a more proactive role in foreign policy usually takes the lead in matters of international relations relying in the National Security Council as his executive arm. 

Au contraire a President more concerned with domestic issues delegates international policy to the Secretary of State, lowering the responsibility of the National Security Council to a coordinating role.

Take the devastation of 9/11 for example, the Al Qaida attacks after September 2001;

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In January 2002 President George W. Bush referred to Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as an “axis of evil” seeking to develop nuclear weapons, something that the United States would not tolerate. We know now that there was no active nuclear program in Iraq at the time of the speech, although the 2003 invasion did indeed foreclose the possibility that one would be restarted in the near future. The invasion also seems to have played some role in persuading Libya’s Mu’ammar Qadhafi to give up his nuclear program, though he was well down this road for other reasons by 2003. But the invasion appears to have stimulated Iran and North Korea to accelerate their programs, under the calculation that they would be safer with nuclear deterrents than without. Consequently Iran withdrew from the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), asserting its right to develop “peaceful” nuclear power, and North Korea actually tested a nuclear bomb, making it the eighth country to demonstrate a nuclear capability.

The Bush Doctrine sought to use preventive war against Iraq as a means of raising the perceived cost to would-be proliferators of approaching the nuclear threshold. Unfortunately, the cost to the United States itself was so high that it taught exactly the opposite lesson; the deterrent effect of American conventional power is low, and the likelihood of preventive war actually decreases if a country manages to cross that threshold.

The US government has demonstrated great incompetence in its day-to-day management of policy. The Bush Administration responded to this unprecedented event with dramatic and sweeping new policies. First, it created an entirely new federal agency, the Department of homeland Security, and pushed through Congress the Patriot Act, designed to give domestic law enforcement greater powers to act against would be terrorists. Second, it invaded Afghanistan; a land locked country on the other side of the world, and deposed the Taliban regime that had sheltered Al-Qaida. Third, it announced a new strategic doctrine of preemptive action- actually, a doctrine of preventive war- that would take the fight to the enemy, rather than relaying on deterrence and containment that were the staples of Cold War policy. And fourth, it invaded and deposed the regime

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49 This fact is another example of the security dilemma.
51 Ibid., xiv.
52 Ibid., xv.
of Saddam Hussein on the grounds that he had or was planning to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD).  

3.1 Soft Power And Its Importance In Foreign Policy

As we can see, beneath the surface structure, the world changed in profound ways during the last decades of the twentieth century. September 11, 2001 was like a flash of lighting on a summer evening that displayed an altered landscape, and we are still left groping in the dark wondering how to find our way through it. George W. Bush entered office committed to a traditional realist foreign policy that would focus on great powers like China and Russia, and eschew nation building in failed states of the less developed world. According to the national security strategy, the greatest threats that the American people face are weapons of mass destruction, transnational terrorism and particularly their combination. We are groping for a path through the strange new landscape created by technology and globalization whose dark aspects were vividly illuminated on that traumatic occasion. The Bush administration, like Congress and the public, has been torn between different approaches to the implementation of a new strategy. Past events have shown us that we have been more successful in the domain of hard power, where we have invested more, trained more, and have a clearer idea of what we are doing. We have been less successful in the areas of soft power (getting others to want the outcomes that you want). Soft power is based on attraction rather than coercion this is why it is associated with Liberalist thinking in International Relations theory, as opposed to Realism, which

53 Ibid., 1-2.
56 Ibid., 132.
57 Ibid., x.
emphasizes value on hard power. Because sources of soft power are understood to be sources of culture, values, and a legitimate foreign policy, explains why Liberalism- soft power included- is associated with Constructivism that takes into account power of ideas, being a fundamental part of soft power.

According to Joseph Nye, America’s success will depend upon our developing a deeper understanding of the role of soft power and developing a better balance of hard and soft power in our foreign policy. That will be smart power, an alternate way of instead of using inducements (“carrots”) or threats (“sticks”), a way where sometimes you can get the outcomes you want without tangible threats or payoffs but through a balance, because smart policies can soften the sharp edges of that reality and reduce the resentments they engendered.

As technology advances it increases our vulnerability to terrorist attacks and their access to destructive power. They also benefit greatly from increased capacities to communicate with each other across jurisdictions, and with global audiences. According to Joseph Nye, many terrorists groups also have soft as well as hard power and use both to their advantage. An example of this soft power is getting their messages out quickly to a broad audience, use mass media and the internet to attract support from the crowd at least as much as its ability to destroy the enemy’s will to fight. An example of hard power would be destructive power like bombings, for this reason the United States was correct in altering its national security strategy to focus weapons of mass destruction and terrorism after September 11, 2001. But the means the Bush Administration chose

58 Ibid., 5.
focused too heavily on hard power and did not take enough account of soft power and that was a mistake.\textsuperscript{61}

A lot has changed since the Bush Administration as the world has taken a challenge on nuclear technology. Evidence tells us that over the past three years, a remarkable bipartisan consensus has emerged in Washington regarding nuclear security. The new US nuclear agenda includes renewing formal arms control agreements with Russia, revitalizing strategic dialogues, pushing for ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, repairing the damaged nuclear nonproliferation regime, and redoubling efforts to reduce and secure fissile material that may be used in nuclear weapons.

Interestingly, during George W. Bush’s Presidency the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)\textsuperscript{62} was unsuccessful because not only did he not ratify the treaty but also left an open door for resumed nuclear testing. In addition, President Bush boycotted three consecutive conferences on CTBT states-parties, denied support to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) for onsite inspections, voted or spoke against the CTBT in the UN General Assembly and the First Committee on Disarmament and International Security and during the NPT meetings. His administration said that the US had no intentions of developing another nuclear weapon and his supporters said that US nuclear stockpile would not be as safe or reliable in the absence of testing among other reasons. Without US ratification, efforts to bring the treaty into force have been unsuccessful, and although the treaty itself cannot stop

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 141.
\textsuperscript{62} Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty’s purpose is to ban all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes.
proliferation, it is a crucial element of the nuclear non-proliferation strategy that helps to prevent other nuclear weapons states from testing or developing nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{63}

The following analysis is based on the “first level of analysis” or “first image” using the ideas of Kenneth Waltz (1959) in “Man, the State and War.”\textsuperscript{64} The individual level of analysis will demonstrate how foreign policy is shaped by the leader in command and what the outcomes are when a President takes a proactive role in foreign policy that does not focus on just hard power but smart power. Above we saw how President Bush handled foreign policy during his time, the following will focus on President Obama.\textsuperscript{65}

President Obama is an interesting case that shows the two conceptual characteristics used here; soft power and Waltz’s fist level of analysis. Through different speech acts Obama has tried to justify the dangers of hard power, particularly regarding the negative effects of relying predominantly on nuclear weapons, and has put huge emphasis not only on disarmament but also in a convincing discourse to persuade others to follow his criteria, which is a strong asset of soft power. In other words, he is not only using soft power but suggests its use. As a key figure- him and his team are the unit of analysis that embody the fist image in politics that leads and shapes the new foreign policy on nuclear weapons. Let’s see some cases in the following paragraphs:

In 2009, President Obama embraced the idea of a world free of nuclear weapons and has made that goal a priority for his administration.\textsuperscript{66} According to Zibigniew Brzezinski, in

\textsuperscript{63} LaVera, Damien, J. “\textit{Looking Back: The U.S. Senate Vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, October 2004.}
\textsuperscript{64} Waltz, Kenneth. \textit{Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis.} New York: Colombia University Press, 1959.
\textsuperscript{65} Reuters. OSLO. “President Obama’s speech at Nobel ceremony. December 10, 2009.
\textsuperscript{66} Ferguson, Charles D. “\textit{The Long Road To Zero Overcoming the Obstacles to a Nuclear-Free World.}” Foreign Affairs, 2010.
his article *From Hope to Audacity*, he says that on his team, Obama himself is the main source of the strategic direction which means that the leader must be able to be the conceptual initiator of a great power’s foreign policy, and needs to be actively involved in supervising the design of the consequent strategic decisions in overlooking their implementation, and in making timely adjustments.\(^\text{67}\)

Barak Obama, as he came into office in 2008, addressed the nation in regards to a nuclear war, a threat that not only the United States faces but the whole world. On a speech on nuclear weapons in April 2009 in Prague, he states;

> Today, the Cold War has disappeared but thousands of those weapons have not. In a strange turn of history, the threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of a nuclear attack has gone up. More nations have acquired these weapons. Testing has continued. Black market trade in nuclear secrets and nuclear materials abound. The technology to build a bomb has spread. Terrorists are determined to buy, build or steal one. Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered on a global non-proliferation regime, but as more people and nations break the rules, we could reach the point where the center cannot hold.

As President Obama says;

> This matters to people everywhere. One nuclear weapon exploded in one city…could kill hundreds of thousands of people. And no matter where it happens, there is no end to what the consequences might be. [Therefore,] our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, [is critical] to our ultimate survival.\(^\text{68}\)

President Obama in his speech says that;

> Some argue that the spread of these weapons cannot be stopped, cannot be checked, that we are destined to live in a world where more nations and more people possess the ultimate tools of destruction. Such fatalism is a deadly adversary, for if we believe that the spread of nuclear weapons is inevitable, then in some way we are admitting to ourselves that the use of nuclear weapons is inevitable. Just as we stood for freedom in the 20th century, we must stand together for the right of people everywhere to live free from fear in the 21st century. And as nuclear power, as a nuclear power, as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act. We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it, we can start it. So today, America’s commitment [is] to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons [even though] this goal will not be reached[immediately] it [is something] will take patience and persistence.\(^\text{69}\)

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\(^\text{68}\) Reuters. OSLO. “President Obama’s speech at Nobel ceremony”. December 10, 2009.

\(^\text{69}\) Ibid.
This is a direct example of a proactive leader who takes direction in matters of international relations relying on the National Security Council as his executive team. President Obama’s plan of actions states the following:

First, the United States will take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the same. As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal. To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russians. To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing [the Obama] administration will immediately and aggressively pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned. Cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, seek a new treaty that verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons, put an end to the dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them. That's the first step. Second, together we will strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a basis for cooperation.

President Obama proposes that countries with nuclear weapons move towards disarmament, for those countries without them not acquire them, and for all countries to successfully access peaceful nuclear energy. The problem here is that there are officials who cling to nuclear weapons and are reluctant to part with policies they consider vital to security. In a world where security is a concern, the fundamental justification for maintaining reliance on nuclear weapons are the principle reasons why proliferating states seek to acquire these weapons, to guard against perceived security threats and enhance national power and status. Thus the Obama administration aims to turn the security argument around, to have a world where nations are safer and more secure without the bomb but it is difficult when the continued divide between nuclear haves and have-nots impedes non-proliferation cooperation and threatens the NPT regime. This is a perfect example of the division between realism and liberalism regarding the means to

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70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
achieve and increase security, that is, armament versus disarmament, both with the same goal; security.

As the leader of the United States, Barak Obama oversees effectively a qualitative change based on soft power, in the nature of countries that want nuclear weapons and a turning point in relations with those nations but in order for that to happen cooperation is needed. Take the case of Iran for example; Iran’s nuclear ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just to the United States but Iran’s neighbors and their allies. As long as the threat from Iran persists, the President states that the US will go forward with a missile defense system that is cost-effective and proven. If the Iranian threat is eliminated, the US will have a stronger basis for security, and the driving force for missile defense construction in Europe will be removed without delay. Obama also proposes engagement with Iran based on mutual interests and mutual respect, the US welcomes Iran to take its rightful places in the community of nations, politically and economically. The United States will support Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear energy with rigorous inspections but if it does not accept this condition then they can choose isolation, international pressure, and a potential nuclear arms race in the region that will increase insecurity for the US. Like Samuel Huntington states in his book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*,

The future of both peace and civilization depend upon understanding and cooperation among the political…and intellectual leaders of… civilizations.

President Obama is right when he says that in an era when our destiny is shared, power is no longer a zero sum game and the divisions between nations of the South and

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the North make no sense in an interconnected world; nor do alignments of nations rooted in the cleavages of a long-gone Cold War.\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, to meet his goals and maintain the security of the US and the world, the US must face obstacles like when it comes to the insecurities of countries even those protected under their umbrella.

We must understand the notion that nuclear weapons are the great equalizer in the realm of international relations and that proliferation risks are dangerous as they help those states that seek to advance their nuclear power.\textsuperscript{76} For this reason it is crucial that the US project legitimacy of future intervention, deal with those countries that break the rules by making them accountable, place sanctions, and find alternatives that are tough enough to change behavior.\textsuperscript{77} Overall, part of the challenge is facing these obstacles and obtaining cooperation of other nations because even though America is the world’s sole super power it is not invincible.

In sum, through these examples one can see the difference of political leadership between both President Bush and President Obama. It is evident that there are differences between the national security strategies of both Administrations. The challenges Barack Obama is discovering are different, for example, President Obama’s new strategy emphasizes international cooperation. It is obvious that the burdens of a young century cannot fall on American shoulders alone. Another important difference is that his Administration is cautious against over-reliance on military power. This is good because it projects the message that we have learned from the results of the Iraq war and that we are exercising a different type of power, smart power. Francis Fukuyama in \textit{America at

\textsuperscript{75} Reuters, Op. Cit.
\textsuperscript{76} Ferguson, Charles D. \textit{“The Long Road To Zero Overcoming the Obstacles to a Nuclear-Free World.”} Foreign Affairs, 2010.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
the Crossroads states something similar to this idea, he suggests that there should be a “demilitarization of American foreign policy and reemphasis on other types of policy instruments…” Here this would mean not only using military power but a combination of soft and hard power, and or sanctions. The US should focus “primarily on good governance, political accountability, democracy, and strong institutions…” which is what the Obama administration is trying to do through his foreign policy objectives to have a nuclear free world, as he seeks for cooperation of other countries to achieve this goal) and as Fukuyama sates, “we do this… mostly within the realm of soft power: our ability to set an example, to train and educate, to support with advice and often money.”

79 Ibid., 184-185.
Chapter 4

Case Studies- Pakistan and Iran

Looking at the nuclear advancement problem one might ask, what makes a state want to acquire nuclear power? And how does the US through its foreign policy, intervene and stop this from happening? The following case studies in sections 4.1 through 4.3 will focus on Pakistan and Iran, it will look into their regional history to understand why they have motivations for developing nuclear capability (Pakistan between 1960-1998) and (Iran between 2002-2008) and why problems with neighboring countries arise. It will also look into how the United States intervenes in the use of Pakistan’s nuclear capability as well as Iran’s and how Presidential leaders have an impact on each countries’ foreign policies and the actions they take.

4.1 Case Study 1: Pakistan and its Nuclear Aspirations from 1960-1998

Pakistan is located at the junction of the South Asian Persian Gulf and Central Asian security complexes. Because of its geographic location it perceives multiple threats from different regions\(^\text{80}\) as well as domestic political upheavals and regional confrontations, but above all its major security threat has been India. Pakistan struggles to maintain control making it very difficult with its weak military capability, poor economy, and lack of resources and when it is compared to India, who is the complete opposite, it forms an identity –constructivist- issue making it inferior. For that reason Pakistan has always tried to strengthen its military capabilities sufficient to withstand pressure form India but it has been merely impossible to develop and sustain the required deterrence capability it wants, without external connections, support and the appropriate technology.

Nonetheless, South Asia’s security profile underwent a major transformation as the Pakistani military focused on the best means to counter India through hard power and began to take an interest in developing multidimensional forces and nuclear related programs.  

81 But it was not until Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Z.A. Bhutto), a politician and statesman who served as the 9th Prime Minister of Pakistan and 4th President to the country, who introduced and popularized the politics of the nuclear issue in 1969 to Pakistan.  

82 Looking back at history, Bhutto was a well-educated individual who had gotten his college degree in the United States and exercised his knowledge and skills, as he became a member of President Ayub Khan’s cabinet in the 1960s. Being part of the President’s team he was able to mobilize against the regime on the basis of its alleged failures in foreign policy issues. And with his intelligence, abilities and charisma he became a credible voice of the dominant discourse in West Pakistan by conveying to the masses.  

83 As mentioned in previous sections of this research project, this here is another example of the individual level of analysis where an individual influences foreign policy. In 1961 Bhutto was convinced that the major threat to Pakistan’s security emanated from India. India has always seen Pakistan as “the other” and has implied to it physical attributes of superior/inferior and us/them dichotomies. According to Bhutto there has also been a “legacy of history, superstition, and prejudice” as well as “the Indian mentality” of “historical complexes and obsession of defeat at the hands of Muslims” that have resulted in physiological scars between Hindus and Muslims of the

81 Ibid.  
83 Ibid., 85-86.
To explain the concept of “the other” further between Pakistan and India, Tzvetan Todorov, Professor and Philosopher, says that the dynamics of one’s relationship with the Other can further help in contextualizing why nuclear politics cannot be divorced from the issue of identity in both countries, and why Pakistan sees the nuclear option as a guarantor of the independent identity of an Islamic Pakistan against the evil designs of heathen India. Conceptually, this is Constructivism; ideas, perceptions, identity, the other, the self in which threats are constructed.

In support to this idea, Z.A. Bhutto tied the survival of mankind with disarmament and said that the arms race was heading toward an accelerating crisis in which world leaders lacked the political and moral courage to do so. He concluded that the ultimate objective of India, “the monster,” was to “annihilate Pakistan.” He also said that the war in 1965 between both countries and the consequent debate in Pakistan regarding means to deter India was marked by the absence of exploring the strategic utility of the nuclear option.

For many years Pakistani strategic analysts were equally oblivious to the possibilities of the nuclear option that is why Pakistan struggled to resist Indian hegemonic moves manifesting itself in “two wars to establish a separate identity.” And it was not until 1969 that through Bhutto’s analysis, the idea of the possibilities of the

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84 Ibid., 77, 82.  
85 Ibid., 12-13.  
86 *Disarmament*: Reducing reliance on nuclear weapons and minimizing the danger of nuclear weapons and minimizing the danger of nuclear-weapons development or use. The options include measures to prevent proliferation and reduce nuclear weapons, bans on nuclear testing and fissile-material production, stronger nuclear monitoring and verification requirements, more effective export controls and sanctions on weapons-related goods, and more effective use of multilateral sanctions and incentives. Cortright, David and Raimo Vayrynen. “Why Disarmament? Why now?.” *Towards Nuclear Zero*. New York: Routledge, 2010.  
87 Ibid., 75.  
88 Ibid., 76.
nuclear option as a viable deterrent against India was discussed in his book *The Myth of Independence*. This is how the seeds of a nuclear discourse were sown in Pakistan.

After knowing that there was a way they could protect themselves from their long time foe there was a clear change in Pakistan’s political priorities that took on a realist manner where security and territorial integrity became more important than economic development. In this situation realists would define security as “the protection of the homeland from military attack,” and deterrence as a means to stop others from doing something by frightening them. With past history of wars, and India’s threat of testing its nuclear design, and going through with it, it is evident that the logic of deterrence suggest that Pakistan should have explored the nuclear option prior to 1974 which was when India exploded what it termed a “peaceful nuclear device” and passed its effect on the security discourse in Pakistan.

In addition, Pakistan’s foreign offices’ reaction to the explosion was that of shock and Bhutto was fast to make three accusations for the lack of actions taken; first, he claimed that his predecessors were criminally ignorant of the importance of the nuclear option despite his repeated efforts to correct their strategic myopia, second, he conveyed to the Indians that the nuclear issue was more of a political card than a technical subject knowing the history between both countries and, third, Bhutto tied the issue to the fragile national security theme and became “the sole spokesman” to represent what constituted the national interests of Pakistan.

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89 Ibid., 78.
91 Myopia: lack of imagination, foresight, or intellectual insight.
The mindset here is that of social constructivist theory. Alexander Wendt describes this;

it is not an unchanging fact that the international realm is a self-help system. Rather, the international environment is created and recreated in processes of interaction. As the way states act may change, so can the international system. The key move in this argument is that actors' identities are not given but are developed and sustained or transformed in interaction. This is, Wendt argues, what sets a constructivist93 approach apart from the ‘rationalism’ of mainstream approaches to the study of international politics. Rationalists may admit that behavior changes but they consider the properties of actors, such as their identity, external and prior to the process of international politics.94

In this case the interaction of both India and Pakistan is what creates their identity, Pakistan is weak with its continuous struggle to be better than India, while India with its capabilities remains strong and intimidating.

However, India’s neighbors like Pakistan do not perceive the entangled interactions in the above manner minimally, so Bhutto pressed President Ayub Khan to embark on a peaceful nuclear program in case India went nuclear again. In Wendt’s terms this is the point where identities are developed and transformed through continuous interactions. This meant that this time Pakistan “would be obliged to buy a weapon off the shelf somewhere” and use it if necessary95 bringing itself somewhat on the same level as India. In other words, the use of India’s nuclear weapons is what motivated Pakistan to develop nuclear technology and this is also an example of what Waltz (1959) defines as foreign policy being shaped by the leader in command as he takes a proactive role, in

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93 According to Wendt, Constructivism: is a structural theory of the international system that makes the following core claims: (1) states are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the state system are intersubjective, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or domestic politics.


both Pakistan’s and India’s case, it is focused on hard power since both involve nuclear weapons.

4.1.2 US Involvement with Pakistan

When India conducted nuclear tests the question was not whether Pakistan would follow suit but when it would do so to legitimize and consolidate a particular form of Pakistani identity.\(^96\) Ayub Khan, as a military ruler during the 1960s supported the idea of a nuclear program for its country and thought that Pakistan would buy nuclear bombs off the shelf if needed. Dr. M. Shaffi, a Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarian (PPP)\(^97\), supported this idea and called for giving priority to achieving nuclear capability as it was in their national interest. He mentioned Indian nuclear capability as a reason to speed up Pakistan’s nuclear programs and use the technology for industrial purposes only, not as an effective deterrent. Just like him, Nawaz Sharif, a businessman and later turned politician and Prime Minister of Pakistan, took this a step further and actually put the country’s homemade bomb on the shelf, which presumably ensured the safety of one hundred thirty million Pakistanis.\(^98\) Following the patters of the Realist security dilemma, this automatically gave Pakistan a level of respect in the eyes of India but it was viewed as a threat in the eyes of the rest of the world and the Untied States.

A year after the first time India tested its nuclear bomb in 1974 the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) had its first review. Its purpose was to prevent nuclear proliferation, reinforce the emerging non-nuclear norm, give the international community

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\(^{96}\) Ibid., 89.

\(^{97}\) PPP: A party launched for the establishment of an “egalitarian democracy” and the “application of socialistic ideas to realize economic and social justice.”

a stronger legal mandate to inspect potential violations and apply corrective and punitive measures.\textsuperscript{99}

With that said, India’s official stand on the nonproliferation treaty was one of no importance and it was seen by analysts in Pakistan as a part of its overall aim to play a hegemonic role in South Asia. As a result, Pakistan looking out for its security decided not to take part in the NPT, and due to its reluctance to join, it ended up on the list of states supporting terrorism, which automatically put the United States on alert.\textsuperscript{100}

In Pakistan the nuclear issue became a powerful tool especially in the hands of the people with knowledge about the issue. Interestingly it was used to determine how patriotic different rulers were. General K.M. Arif for example, was seen as patriotic because he acted on what was best for his country after India’s nuclear test, he saw that it was a serious threat to Pakistan’s national security so he proceeded with a nuclear test of its own in retaliation. Another example is that of President Nawaz Sharif, who used the nuclear test as a “golden chance to help Pakistan shift form dependency to self-reliance.”\textsuperscript{101} In the eyes of Pakistan nukespeakers\textsuperscript{102}, they emphasized that their nuclear program was a symbol of national sovereignty therefore it was justifiable and believed that only enemies of Pakistan would put pressure on the government to abandon this option.\textsuperscript{103}

\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., 111.
\textsuperscript{102} Nukespeakers: Tend to understand nuclear weapons, strategy, and war as benign or beneficial rather than repulsive and horrifying.
As for the United States, from the Pakistani point of view, it received a lot of criticism for several reasons. First, for not supporting its nuclear program as a means of defense, second, it was said that instead of focusing on India’s nuclear capability and stopping them, it alleged an ambitious and aggressive threat against Pakistan. Z.A. Bhutto argued that the reason why the United States had acted in this manner was because Washington did not want Pakistan to benefit from making nuclear plant deals with other countries. Regardless, with or without the help of the US, Pakistan did not stop from wanting to develop some capability in all types of armament India was building.

Furthermore, Pakistan had already embarked on a clandestine effort to develop a uranium enrichment facility in 1978. Its installation became operational in 1980, and started high uranium enrichment in 1982 and by 1984 it was capable of hard testing a nuclear device. This now became a serious nuclear issue for the United States and its foreign policy, so actions from the US against Pakistan continued under the NPT, in addition both the US and other Western countries decided to impose sanctions against Pakistan as a punishment for its nuclear audacity.

On several cases sanctions have been used by the United States as foreign policy tools. They are usually used by governments that help put, trade restrictions (denying a target country access to certain natural resources or commodities that it normally imports), financial sanctions (freezing of assets, cutting off economic and military aid, blocking access to multilateral lending institutions), investment restrictions (denying a country access to FDI), and monetary sanctions (buying or selling large quantities of a country’s currency.) Sanctions may also be used to alter a states domestic policy (i.e.

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105 Dittmer, Lowell, Ibid., 98-103.
human rights abuses) foreign policy (i.e. invasions) or both. In addition, states have both negative and positive sanctions at their disposal. Negative sanctions involve denying a country (or its leaders) access to economic options and positive sanctions, on the other hand, use the promise or actuality of expanded trade as an incentive for countries to change their behavior.\textsuperscript{106}

However, sanctions or no sanctions Pakistan opposed to the unilateral surrender of its nuclear weapons option and its policy makers continued to work on nuclear and missile development which resulted in both India and Pakistan recognizing each other’s nuclear capabilities. This in return compensated for India’s advantage in conventional forces and contributed to Pakistan’s efforts “to preserve a broad equilibrium with India and neutralize the Indian nuclear threat or blackmail.”\textsuperscript{107} One would think that this acknowledgement would be a step forward towards developing stable and peaceful bilateral relations but it was not at all like that.

The problems persisted in a realist fashion; neither side made a joint effort to solve the structural military conflict they had, to avoid a cycle of antagonism, nor were there fulfilling promises as well as expanding cooperation, mutual tolerance or two way transparency, so both continued with their nuclear ambitions.

In addition Pakistan policy makers realized that the international community and the United States were treating them unfairly when they thought they imposed no sanctions against India for its nuclear explosion and when a US-India Civil Nuclear


Agreement was approved in 2008 that facilitated nuclear cooperation between both countries.\textsuperscript{108}

Instead of posing sanctions it would make sense for the United States to pursue a policy that reflected the scope of common interests between itself and the two nations but this was not the case. A proper policy would have led to safeguarding the security of the United States and avoiding the turmoil that has afflicted the relations between both countries over the years, as the vital task of foreign policy for the US is to encourage both sides to commit to an agreement characterized by depth, candor and common interest, not to create misunderstanding and mistrust that can escalate things to something more dangerous, such as more nuclear retaliation like in this case.

In the long run, Pakistan was wrong because the reality was that the US did impose economic sanctions on India within a day of the first nuclear test under the terms of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act, which prevented any nation from performing testing with nuclear weapons both aboveground and underground worldwide.\textsuperscript{109} American officials also visited Pakistan within four days of the Indian tests and offered economic and military assistance.

Unfortunately in this case, incentives and sanctions to stop nuclear testing failed, because the offers of economic rewards were not categorical and convincing to Pakistan. For example, through the use of soft power tactics, the United States used carrots not sticks by offering to initiate legislation for the release of the F-16 aircraft ordered by

\textsuperscript{108} The deal lifts a three-decade US moratorium on nuclear trade with India. It provides US assistance to India’s civilian nuclear energy program, and expands US-India cooperation in energy and satellite technology.


Pakistan for which it had already paid. However, Pakistan had strong reservations about the viability of all offers since they only outlined the general direction of assistance and did not constitute a specific package.\textsuperscript{110} And what they were looking for was to be relieved of repayment of some loans, but no such offer was forthcoming and it was given vague promises that it might finally be given the 28 F-16 paid aircraft. \textsuperscript{111}

In sum, the international community’s inability to reassure Pakistan with concrete security guarantees and its failure to offer attractive material incentives as a form of soft power, led Pakistan’s policy makers to conclude that restraint did not necessarily offer a secure and attractive choice. In Pakistan’s view if it was to face hardships and uncertainties anyway, nuclear testing offered an opportunity to rectify the strategic imbalance in the region and restore minimal deterrence, which was critical to its security.\textsuperscript{112} As for the United States the problem between Pakistan and India is the same as what President Obama has said for the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, that there are officials who cling to nuclear weapons and are reluctant to part with policies they consider vital to security. In a world where security is a concern, the fundamental justification for maintaining reliance on nuclear weapons are the principle reasons why proliferating states seek to acquire these weapons, to guard against perceived security threats and enhance national power and status,\textsuperscript{113} as we see throughout this case study.

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 103-5.
4.2 Case Study 2: Iran and its Nuclear Aspirations from 2002-2008

Iran is located in the Middle East bordering the Gulf of Oman, the Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea, between Iraq and Iran. Therese Delpech, in her book *Iran and the Bomb*, describes Iran as a country that;

Represented the international community with one of its greatest long-term challenges. The enormous area between Gaza and Afghanistan is vital to the future of international well-being. It spans the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, reaches into Central and South Asia and holds energy resources on which much of the world’s economic prospects hinge. It contains explosive conflicts between Israel and the Palestinians and their supporters and between various autocracies and their frustrated citizens. Iran plays an increasingly central role in all of these conflicts and in the future of the entire region.\(^{114}\)

As if all these problems were not enough, Iran has been found to have nuclear aspirations through evidence of having uranium and plutonium capabilities. Automatically this becomes a security issue (under the security dilemma criterion) not only for the countries that surround it but also for the United States as an international player because Iran seeks hegemonic status.

Issues between Iran and the United States is nothing new, in 1979 after the rise of the Islamic Revolution the United States faced a hostage crisis where Iranian militants took seventy Americans captive in Tehran.\(^{115}\) Ever since, Iran became one of the top issues in US foreign policy for its ambiguous intentions of having a nuclear weapons program leaving little doubt about Tehran’s objectives of resuming uranium conversions and enrichment.\(^{116}\)

In 2005 when President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad took office the destiny of Iran changed. He came in with a different agenda in mind and ready to put into practice his ultra conservative ideals and to profess his “martyrdom everywhere in the world” as the

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\(^{115}\) Delpech, Therese, Ibid., 34.

greatest of acts. His mission was to lead Iran’s nuclear weapons program through its final stages and strengthen Tehran’s role in the Middle East by demonstrating its ability to stand up to “Western pressure” and condemn the State of Israel to the point of wanting to erase it from the map.\footnote{Ibid., 2.}

From President Ahmadinejad’s radical statements, if Iran were to obtain the bomb, for starters, the entire non-proliferation regime would not be able to withstand an assault of the magnitude in a strategically sensitive part of the world,\footnote{Delpech, Therese, loc. cit., 2.} meaning that it would end up disrupting the international order of the world, second, neighboring countries like Israel, perceiving the dangerous instability would probably opt to acquire nuclear technology of their own and put it to use, similar to how Iraq tried to match India’s nuclear capabilities, and thirdly, the United States would be forced to take the necessary actions to stop it, and that may very well be through realist terms. With a military strike from the US to destroy Iran’s nuclear program, it would probably stop the threat of a nuclear attack to the world but it is not certain that it would work without huge military effort and it would also protect the interests and security of the United States.

Here Ahmadinejad’s intentions are clear, which are to show that Iran is powerful and will go to any extent to show that. As a leader of Iran, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, was well prepared to make his arguments on nuclear weapons and knew how to manipulate the people to his favor or what he called, ‘gaining their support,’ which was by disdaining those opposed to its nuclear ambitions. His intentions were not to be underestimated he seeks to establish itself as the dominant power in the region.
while preserving political control at home and to prove that Iran can achieve all this through its nuclear program both technically and politically.120

As an adversary, the problem goes further, Iran was very astute and used to its advantage articles from the NPT to justify its nuclear program, saying that it should never be denied its right to use nuclear energy for “peaceful purposes,”121 as it is guaranteed by article IV122 of the treaty on the non-proliferation of weapons. Yet from 1985 through 2002 its “peaceful” program was covered in great secrecy for nearly twenty years.123

Furthermore, the IAEA forming part of the NPT, under the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1887 (2009) adopted by the Security Council at its 6191st meeting on 24 September 2009, the Security Council states under amendment 16, that it “Encourages States to provide the IAEA124 with the cooperation necessary for it to verify whether a state is in compliance with its safeguards obligations, and affirms the Security Council’s resolve to support the IAEA’s efforts to that end, consistent with its authorities under the Charter”. From what was stated previously, once Iran started to keep its program under secret it automatically committed a violation to the treaty.

When the International Atomic Energy Agency began its inspections in Iran it identified nuclear activities on military sites, which were compatible with a nuclear power program. In 2003 there was an inspection conducted at Lashkar Abad where the

120 Ibid., 8-9.
121 Ibid., 18.
122 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Information Circular Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 22 April 1970 states under Article IV: “All Parties to the Treaty undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also cooperate in contributing along or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of developing areas of the world.
124 IAEA: is the international body charged with applying safeguards to ensure that nuclear facilities and materials are used only for peaceful purposes (as described in the NPR 2010).
IAEA had gathered a body of evidence against Iran where laser equipment was dismantled before Iran allowed the IAEA to inspect. In 2004 at the Lavizan-Shian site, there were six buildings demolished before the arrival of the inspectors and in 2005 Iran resumed enrichment activities.

Inspectors took into account all the delays and forbidden access to these sites and others as well as noticing major demolition works that had been carried out before inspection dates. These occurrences made it reasonable to question the purpose of the activities being conducted on these sites and why they were being hidden. One of the main issues that triggered headlines in 2006 was the IAEA discovery of traces of highly enriched uranium on machinery that Iran said it was using to produce only low enriched uranium for fuel. The new report accepted Iran’s evidence that the traces came from contamination in Pakistan- the country that sold Iran the machines. The agency also accepted Iran’s evidence that equipment it acquired such as balancing machines and magnets that could be used for nuclear weapons research, was being used for legitimate civilian purposes. It is also satisfied that experiments with polonium-210 (that can be used as a trigger for an explosive nuclear chain reaction) were not part of a larger weapon projects.

In sum, as Ray Takeyh and Joseph Cirincione, state on *El Baradei is quietly managing to disarm Iran*, the IAEA investigations produced enough circumstantial evidence to support the view that Iran probably conducted nuclear weapons research in the past and is noncompliant with the resolution of its obligations. For example, Iran did not cooperate satisfactorily with the agency especially when it refused inspections in

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certain areas, and was not being transparent as required every time it refused to permit continuous monitoring of the equipment it has. As if that was not sufficient, in 2008 Iran had approximately three thousand centrifuges, which it used to produce small test batches of uranium enriched to a low level (which cannot be used for nuclear weapons).  

4.2.1 US involvement with Iran

Nonetheless the Iranian government has declared its ambition to build more than fifty thousand centrifuges. Later reports say that Tehran is testing a modified “P-2” centrifuge, a more advanced version of its existing centrifuge technology, which can produce a larger volume of enriched uranium. This is seen as tools of deterrence against the United States hence the US has taken into account to impose sanctions against Iran in an effort to persuade Iran to halt uranium enrichment and negotiate the future of its nuclear development program. The purpose of these sanctions is to ban on certain transactions with Iran in interacting in some area of weapons trade, shipping and banking, and it would also expand the list of individuals facing a travel ban and assets freeze for their work in the nuclear program. 

Iran’s refusal to shut down uranium enrichment plants has led to tougher and tougher sanctions that have crippled its economy. For example, an oil embargo and banking restrictions have crashed Iranian currency, the rial. Another example are US sanctions imposed in January 2013 that have targeted a handful of companies and

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128 Ibid.  
130 Ibid.
individuals that Washington says are providing materials and technology to Tehran’s nuclear program.\textsuperscript{131}

Moreover, under President Obama’s administration from 2008 to present “The Nuclear Posture Review 2010” (NPR) provides a roadmap that implements his agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, allies and partners and the international community. One of the main aspects of the NPR is that it places prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at the top of the US foreign policy agenda. It describes how the United States is working to reduce the role and numbers of nuclear weapons in countries like Iran and Pakistan, as the case studies showed above, and at the same time address the challenge of ensuring strategic stability because as the hegemon the;

US maintains that as long as nuclear weapons exists, it must sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal- to maintain strategic stability with other major nuclear powers, deter potential adversaries, and reassure allies and partners of our security commitments to them.\textsuperscript{132}

In sum, in a world where technology has progressed at an accelerated rate it has contributed to the advancement of the creation of parts necessary to build weapons of mass destruction, which incites the issue of nuclear proliferation that has posed a grave threat to the international peace and security. Thereupon politicians, policymakers and theorists worry that nuclear capable states will provide sensitive nuclear assistance to other states or terrorists that will further the spread of nuclear weapons, and as a result threaten powerful states like the United States. This is why the US must be prepared to deter any nuclear attack to defend its interests and or its allies and partners.

\textsuperscript{131} “Iran says it will resume nuclear talks in Kazakhastan.” CNN

Great power policy makers will typically invoke sanctions with the stated aim of coercing a publically designated target actor. Taylor, Brendan. “Sanctions As Grand Strategy.”

\textsuperscript{132} Nuclear Posture Review Report April 2010.
Chapter 5
Conclusions

The focus of this research paper revolved around the question: “Does US foreign policy achieve meaningful results to stop nuclear advancement?” In an attempt to answer the question it explored what foreign policy is, how it plays a crucial role in the United States as a country, the influence Presidents and Leaders have in making decisions that determine the success or failure of foreign policies. It also looks at the principle theories of International Relations like realism, neoliberalism and constructivism to examine state behavior and foreign policy.

Based on the fusion of the theories and concepts of international relations mentioned in this research paper they anticipate the conditions under which continual instability and transformation are likely to withstand world affairs through foreign policy. For example:

Since the beginning of his term in 2008, President Obama presented his foreign policy agenda with a goal of reducing nuclear risks of having a world without nuclear weapons. He clearly noted that the United States could not make this possible without the cooperation of partners, the international community, and US allies.

The NPR 2010 provided a road map for reducing nuclear risks and President Obama’s foreign policy agenda described how the United States would work to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in countries like Iran and Pakistan, which has been true. US foreign policies have been effective to present day.133

Iran’s nuclear ambitions have not come to a complete halt and its nuclear program continues to move forward in 2013, but the US has worked very hard along with the

133 2012-2013.
European Union, allies like Israel, and the P5+1\textsuperscript{134} to ensure strategic stability and security.

For starters the United States has been smart in keeping counterterrorism options on a broad spectrum from soft- to smart- to hard power, this shows that it has learned the lessons of the past. It has also passed tighter sanctions on Iran and has gained cooperation from the European Union. On July 2010 Obama signed into law tighter sanctions on Iran by restricting further investment in its energy sector and cut off financing for the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, that over sees nuclear and missile programs that also cracks down on federal contractors that do business with Iran.\textsuperscript{135} On June 28, 2012 when US sanctions went into effect it barred foreign banks from doing or related business with the Central Bank of Iran from access to the American financial market. By July 1, 2012 all members of the European Union were prohibited from buying oil from Iran and insurance for ships that carry Iranian oil. (No president has ever been as successful as Obama in rallying the major powers to impose sanctions with bite.\textsuperscript{136} Later that year on October 2012 with “New Sanctions, European Union Tighten[ed] Screws on Iran Over Nuclear Work.” The EU toughened sanctions against Iran over nuclear program and banned trade in finance, metals, natural gas, and made business transactions more cumbersome. These sanctions were a result of a “continued failure to satisfy the world that the program was for peaceful purposes,” and according to the New York Times, until there is a negotiated agreement from Iran the EU will continue to keep up the pressure.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{134} Members of the P5+1 include: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States and Germany (+1).
This successful evidence shows that sanctions have had an impact on Iran. On September 2012 there was a fifty percent decline in oil exports by sanctions placed by the P5+1;\textsuperscript{138} oil revenues declined by forty billion dollars since the beginning of 2012;\textsuperscript{139} its currency the rial lost about fifty percent of its value in a week. Clearly these strikes on Iran’s government have affected its ability to fund and develop its nuclear program\textsuperscript{140} and its economic inflation just continues to soar through February 2013.

As mentioned in chapter 4.2 of this research paper President Mahmmoud Ahmadinejad’s conservative ideals have not changed. His goal still remains to lead Iran’s nuclear weapons program through its final stages that Israel believes it is not far from it. President Ahmadinejad continues to convince his people to stand up to western pressure by calling the US “the enemy”\textsuperscript{141} and by describing the US government of plotting to make Iranian’s miserable by aiming its sanctions to “normal people not Iran’s leaders.”\textsuperscript{142} This is an example of \textit{first level of analysis} and how an individual influences foreign policy, and it is also an example of \textit{realism} of how political leaders must think on how they are affected by changes and change their strategies and their actions.

In addition, similar to the security dilemma between Pakistan and India mentioned in chapter 4.1.2, Israel views a nuclear Iran as an existential threat. Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel says sanctions have not worked and time is running out to stop Iran from achieving a nuclear military capability. He says that Israel is ready to act militarily if faced with no alternative and Israeli Doctrine of self-reliance when it comes to national

\textsuperscript{138} This falls under neoliberalism: international institutions help states to define acceptable international behavior and to provide for a means of punishing defectors from agreed community standards.


\textsuperscript{140} Baker, Peter. “Obama Signs Into Law Tighter Sanctions on Iran.”

\textsuperscript{141} “The enemy” implying physical attributes of superior/inferior, us/them, dichotomies that fall under constructivism.

security. Also, Israel’s Defense Minister Ehud Barak said, “it was the governments responsibility to do everything possible to break the circle of hostility with out resorting to war, but that if left with no choice, Israel was ready to fight any battle demanded of it even at a painful price.” This shows once again that realism is the dominant theory of International Relations and what John Mearsheimer states in his book, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, “states in the international system aim to guarantee their own survival and cannot depend on others for their own security.”

In sum the objective of the US and the international community is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon for it is crucial that it continues carrying out intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent war. The right balance of diplomacy and the pressures of sanctions can buy time and negotiating leverage as well as show Iran that its actions have serious consequences that include isolation and pressure of more penalties. In the case that Iran refuses to prove it is not building a weapon then the United States and its allies must stand firm and resort to more stricter measures to protect their security and stability.

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