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From the Barcelona Process to the Union for the Mediterranean: Sectors and Levels of Integration and Trust in the Mediterranean Region

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FROM THE BARCELONA PROCESS TO THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN: SECTORS AND LEVELS OF INTEGRATION AND TRUST IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

By

Astrid B. Boening

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Miami in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida

May 2009
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

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the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

FROM THE BARCELONA PROCESS TO
THE UNION FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN:
SECTORS AND LEVELS OF INTEGRATION AND TRUST
IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION

Astrid B. Boening

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This dissertation is a case study of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP). It aims to examine the complex political, economic and social interrelationships in the EMP, and their impact on regional security in the Euro-Mediterranean region. The main thesis proposed here is that regional integration is taking place to the point of a regional security complex being established among EMP-member countries. This would contrast with the Middle East Regional Security Complex suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003). The dynamics observed reflect realist concerns with security among members. They also display neo-liberal integration approaches as well as the regional reciprocal (re-)constructions of structure, interests, and identities as suggested in the constructivist literature.

A triangulated mix of qualitative research methods is utilized with primary data from elite interviews, as well as from official publications of member governments and institutes. Secondary data from analyses by other researchers provide comparison data for this dissertation. It will contribute to a framework for understanding the shifting security environment in the Euro-Mediterranean region from 1995 to the present in terms of regional integration, peacemaking and peacekeeping.
DEDICATION

This dissertation is dedicated to the people of the (greater) Mediterranean region.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation was in no small part possible due to the true friendship and loyal support of family, friends and many teachers over the years.

Most eminently, my dissertation committee, Chairman Professor Joaquín Roy, and Professors Michael Connolly, Francesc Granell Trias, Ambler H. Moss, and Elisabeth Prügl, who gave their time, advice, patience, and support endlessly and with good humor throughout this project. It is their wisdom and knowledge, conveyed with much personal care and great effort on their part, which form the basis for this work. Prof. Roy in particular faced the daily brunt of guidance with tireless encouragement, and it is to him that the completion of this dissertation is a small “monument,” as he fights like a warrior for his students. And it is his vast experience in all aspects of academic- and related field work, but especially his dedication to this project, which are truly tremendous. It was he who encouraged me to apply to the doctoral program at the University of Miami, and then to see this project through together with me in expanses, both cultural, pedagogic and personal, which I was barely imagining when I had just started in the field of International Relations upon the initial – and continuing - encouragement of Dr. Prügl.

The University of Miami, and many of its faculty and its facilities, who I was privileged to deal with, were also elemental to the success of this dissertation. Prof. Bruce Bagley, not only as wise and dedicated professor, but also as departmental chairman, underwrote both the intellectual aspects of my studies (such as through securing very generous tuition grants for me), as well as the extensive financial expenses involved in the field studies underlying this dissertation (e.g., by substantially funding my presentations at numerous international conferences, during which time I was also able to conduct my field interviews). Furthermore, the University of Miami Arts and Sciences
Dean’s office and the Graduate Students’ Association contributed additional financial resources to this end, as did the generous European Union Commission research grants to the Miami Florida European Union Center throughout my doctoral studies at the University of Miami. Without any of these I would not have been able to dedicate the necessary time to this work, or carry out the research underlying it.

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<td>UMed</td>
<td>Union for the Mediterranean</td>
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<td>UNECE</td>
<td>United Nations Economic Commission for Europe</td>
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<td>United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia</td>
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Chapter One

Introduction

Historical Background

On July 13, 2008 the new Union for the Mediterranean was inaugurated in Paris. It is the successor program to the EuroMed Partnership (EMP), which was founded in 1995 in Barcelona (hence also known as the “Barcelona Process”). During its initial thirteen years of existence, the EMP’s regional significance became apparent, leading to this significant inter-regional institutional “upgrade” to maximize its potential amid greater inclusiveness. This dissertation examines the complex political, economic and social interrelationships within the EuroMed Partnership (EMP), and their impact on regional security in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Euro-Med) as the historical background to the Union for the Mediterranean.

In this dissertation I explore a region of the world, the Mediterranean, which has through the millennia been significant as a passageway for peoples, their trade and cultures. S. Victor Papacosma (2004, 15/6) writes, particularly concerning the Eastern Mediterranean, that

\[\text{\ldots} \text{despite their proximity, the diversity of the indigenous groups contributed little to harmony and much more to clashes among them … [and this region was characterized by] fragmented distributions of power and security systems that posed obstacles for this major avenue of economic and naval traffic.}\]

Previous experiences with regional Mediterranean integration, such as the Roman Empire or the spread of Christianity in the East and West Roman Empires were certainly not always peaceful.

\footnote{Compare Appendix 1: the official Barcelona Declaration of 1995}
Hence in this dissertation a modus operandi is explored within the EMP, which is intended to serve as a peaceful “bridge” not between “Them” and “Us,” or “the West” and “the Rest,” but which utilizes approaches beyond functionalism and institutionalism, which not only have been historically successful in integrating neighboring countries that had an extensive history of “un-neighborly” relations. An example would be France and Germany, which were able to integrate into a structure, i.e. the European Union (EU), which has brought not only prosperity but also peace. This dissertation examines i.a. whether there is in fact integration occurring in the Mediterranean region through the activities of the EMP.

Figure 1.1: EuroMed Partnership Member States 2008 (map courtesy Chris Hanson, University of Miami GIS Laboratory)

(Blue: EU Member countries, Turquoise: EU-Candidate Countries, Green: MNMCs, Yellow: Observer Country. Source: Author)
The main hypothesis suggested here is that regional integration is taking place to the point of a regional security complex being established among EMP-member countries\(^2\) (compare Appendix 2). This would represent a revision of the Middle East Regional Security Complex (MERSC) suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003). Hence my research question is: How do the dynamics of the EMP contribute to regional integration in the Euro-Mediterranean and hereby affect regional stability, and possibly reduce violent

![Figure 1.2: Northern and Southern Mediterranean/Euro-Mediterranean region](image)

(Source: EU-Commission website)

\(^2\) EMP-membership at its founding in 1995 consisted of the European Union (EU) member states, plus Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Libya (as an observer), Morocco, the Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.

The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as of July 2008 has the following member states: the twenty-seven EU-member states, three EU-Candidate States: Croatia, Macedonia and Turkey, and eleven Mediterranean Partners: Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria and Tunisia. Libya has had observer status since 1999.
conflicts in this area in the future, increase prosperity and the application of human rights more uniformly among all residents in member states as well? Specifically, how do these structures and dynamics change EMP member states’ self identity and interest in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC)?

**Intervening Variables:**
- EU Member State Inputs  
  (e.g. MEDA, Benchmarking)  
  = soft power
- NATO  
  (e.g. Mediterranean Dialogue, Istanbul Initiative  
  = soft power)
- UN  
  (= soft power)

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**Independent Variable:**  
Euro-Med Partnership  
3-Basket Structure/Dynamics

**Dependent Variable:**  
Security Community (EMRSC)  
with New Interests and Identities (contradicts Buzan and Waever’s “Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex)

Figure 1.3: Proposed feedback loop of the EMP in Regional Integration toward an EMRSC  
(Source: author)

Security issues are still as acute in the Mediterranean today, as they have been since at least the Trojan Wars some three thousand years ago. At the latest since 9/11
securing the EU’s borders, as any country’s borders, has become even more imperative. The EU’s southern borders, i.e. those with its north African and Middle Eastern neighbors, however have been difficult to secure: Illegal immigration, usually in direct relation to the economic wellbeing of the originating country, has been difficult to control, especially by those European countries bordering the Mediterranean: Spain, France, Italy, and to a lesser extent, Greece. The riots in the last few years in France, the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, and the recent increase in murders in Italy, attributed to illegal immigrants have led European law enforcement to undergo the financially and socially difficult task of increased forcible repatriations. In addition to the frailty of EU border integrity to the south, Libya under Gadafy represents a neighbor, who is cautiously becoming “socialized” into the EMP.

History of the EuroMed Partnership

The founding of the EMP occurred against the Middle East and North Africa’s (MENA) historical background. Richards and Waterbury (2008, 1) comment that there are “two great games … being played out in the Middle East today.”

One, …is a quiet game that seldom makes headlines. It is a game of peoples and governments, states and societies, sometimes in cooperation but more often at odds, trying to advance the prosperity and overall development of the region’s nations. The other is the more conventional great game in which regional and superpower politics intersect… It has been the unhappy fate of the Middle East to be the stage for an extraordinary amount of conflict, much of it generated within the region itself and the rest provoked from without (Ibid.).

The Middle East has been part of the world politics stage (Ibid., 2) for millennia into the present. “It has been endlessly fought over, coveted as strategic real restate on the world’s major trade routes, and occasionally used as the launch pad for homegrown expansionist
powers” (Ibid.), such as the Ottoman Empire. This “geopolitical significance draws resources and special treatment from outside powers” (Ibid.), as it draws interference and occasional invasion (Ibid.).

In the twentieth century MENA was involved in the two world wars, the war to liberate Turkey, a seven years colonial war in Algeria, four wars between Israel and several of its Arab neighbors, extensive civil wars in Lebanon (Ibid.), wars between Iraq and Iran as well as with Kuwait culminating in the current war in Iraq with the U.S., in addition to the longterm insurgencies in Western Sahara, the internal struggle in the Palestinian territories.

The EMP is analyzed in this dissertation for its regional dynamics, and the security significance this might imply. Richards and Waterbury (2008, 2) state that even single events in regional conflicts “can set in motion processes that destroy the resources and disrupt the societies, thereby irreversibly altering the political economies of large populations” (Ibid.). Yet, “the sheer scale of military conflict in the region cannot be passed off as a series of unfortunate accidents. The Middle East, more than any other developing area, was crucial turf in the playing out of the Cold War and superpower rivalry” (Ibid.), both due its wealth in natural resources, and as a land and sea throughfare between and Asia. This led, i.a., to a state of continuous preparation for war in the region (Ibid.), with the accompanying social and economic costs.

This continuous regional instability in MENA prompted U.S. President George W. H. Bush and USSR President Gorbachev sent an invitation for a peace conference on October 30, 1991 to be held in Madrid to the governments of Israel, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians (as part of the Jordanian delegation), Egypt, the European
Community, and the Gulf Cooperation Council and the UN as observers (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website “Madrid Letter”) to take advantage of the opportunity for reshaping the basic political order in the Middle East following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the “Second Gulf War” (Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait), which read i.a.:

The co-sponsors believe that this process offers the promise of ending decades of confrontation and conflict and the hope of a lasting peace … and hope that the parties will approach these negotiations in a spirit of good will be and mutual respect. In this way, the peace process can begin to break down the mutual suspicions and mistrust that perpetuate the conflict and allow the parties to begin to resolve their differences… Only through this process can the peoples of the Middle East attain the peace and security they richly deserve (Ibid.).

The framework laid out in this invitation became the structure of the Madrid Framework for bilateral as well as multilateral negotiating track, which enabled the first-ever direct talks between Israel and her immediate Arab neighbors on November 3, 1991, hosted by the US Department of State in Washington. Additionally, the multilateral track envisioned by the Madrid Framework was hoped to contribute to the construction of the Middle East of the future, while building confidence among regional parties (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs website “The Madrid Framework”). These talks opened in Moscow in January 1992 with delegations from North African and Middle East countries (MENA) as well as from the international community. The negotiations focused on key issues of concern to the entire Middle East: water, environment, arms control, refugees and economic development.

Formal talks continued intermittently until 1993 with Israel at first refusing to take part in the refugee and economic meetings as Palestinians from outside the West Bank and Gaza were present. Syria and Lebanon refused to take part in multilateral meetings as long as there was no concrete progress on this level. Formal talks froze in this multilateral
track until January 31, 2000, although secret negotiations continued (e.g. resulting in the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994 and the signing on the White House lawn of the Declaration of Principles between Israel and Palestine, based on the terms of the Madrid round of negotiations which had been rejected at first). This in effect greatly increased the number of countries which recognize Israel, and have some degree of diplomatic relations with it, in particular Gulf countries, Tunisia and Morocco, as well as a decline of the Arab boycott and an increase in economic relations with some Arab countries (Shlaim 2001).

These negotiations led to the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Foreign Ministers of the future EMP states in Barcelona in November 1995 and marked the official starting point of the EuroMed Partnership. Its three main objectives are:

1) the definition of a common area of peace and stability through the reinforcement of political and security dialogue;

2) the construction of a zone of shared prosperity through an economic and financial partnership and the gradual establishment of a free-trade area;

3) and the rapprochement between peoples through a social, cultural and human partnership aimed at encouraging understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil society” (Horizon 2020 Bulletin 2005, 2).

Christiansen, Petito and Tonra (2000, 401) write that while shared geographic and climatic conditions have shaped regional cultures and peoples – what the French historian Braudel has termed the common ‘material culture’ of the Mediterranean Civilization – they have failed to forge any significant degree of political or ideational collective identity [due] to the complex and conflicting geopolitical history of the area … This duality has recently been reproduced in the … analysis of the Mediterranean in the post-Cold War era through two opposite images … the Mediterranean as a ‘sea without customs’ where continuities in social structures, customs, habits and
ways of life are the constitutive ingredients of a material Mediterranean civilization. The second is an image of the Mediterranean Sea as one of the key fault lines in a ‘clash of civilisations’ (Huntington 1993 in Ibid.).

Indeed the Middle East and North Africa (MENA\textsuperscript{3}) region is variegated along north-south as well as in south-south orientations.

No one will argue about the positive correlation between economic development and political stability (e.g. Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000, 404). As much discussion as has taken place on this topic – and development and research funds spent – the yawning gap in income between developed and developing countries has worsened in the past three decades despite a booming world economy (Ocampo 2006). MENA, also referred to in this dissertation as Maghreb and Mashrig, are one area in the European “neighborhood” with traditional historical cultural ties to Europe as well as of continuing strategic significance.

Today, progress has certainly been made, but much obviously needs to be done in the regions bordering the Mediterranean to remove obstacles not only to economic traffic but to build bridges to traverse the cultural and political diversity between the East and the West and the North and the South of the Mediterranean, and to substitute military clashes with peaceful socio-economic and cultural interactions. While other regional integration efforts in MENA were limited in scope (such as OPEC) or success (such as the African Union) (Babarinde 2008, 53), the EMP’s objectives were ambitious, and, as this dissertation shows, despite some doubts around the time of its tenth anniversary in 2005, very effective in terms of its widening and deepening in a number of security sectors and levels.

\textsuperscript{3} MENA is used to refer in this article to the EuroMed Partner states in the Middle East and North Africa, including Israel
EMP Organizational Structures/Levels of Involvement

The EMP constitutes the EU’s main multilateral foreign policy instrument in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Currently, the EMP comprises the twenty-seven EU member states, and twelve Mediterranean Partners (Albania, Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, which is also an EU candidate country) and Libya (as observer since 1999) (compare Appendix 2). Malta and Cyprus, who were also original EuroMed Partners, are now EU member states. The EMP is the Mediterranean region-specific program of the broader (and more recently established) European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). The ENP per se was developed in 2004 to address the strategic objectives set out in the EUs December 2003 European Security Strategy. These objectives include the avoidance of emerging new dividing lines, be they economic, political or social, between the enlarged EU and its neighbors by extending to the countries neighboring the EU measures aimed at institutional and economic strengthening similar as those extended to EU members internally. The ENP offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, building upon a mutual commitment to common values (e.g. democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). The ENP overall goes beyond existing diplomatic and institutional relationships to offer a deeper political association and economic integration and to extend the zone of prosperity, security and peace to them (EU Commission website: ENP).

The EMP’s specific mandate is based on the political, economic and culturally strategic significance of the Mediterranean region to the European Union (EU) and seeks
to develop a relationship between its partners based on “comprehensive cooperation and solidarity, in keeping with the privileged nature of the links forged by neighbourhood and history” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). The “three pillars” (often referred to as “Chapters” or “Baskets,” similar to the Helsinki accords) of the EMP consist of the following in greater detail and follow the dual regional (multilateral) and bilateral tracks established in the Madrid Peace Conference for the international relations among EMP members:

**Political and Security Partnership**

The political and security partnership, with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue, is based on “observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (Ibid.). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex” (Ibid.) as well as other obligations under international law, including their regional and international agreements. Furthermore, they agreed to

develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, socio-cultural, economic and judicial system, … respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies [both in MENA AND the EU], promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. … to respect the equal
rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the UN ... including those relating to territorial integrity of states (Ibid., italics added).

While this is concerned with “soft security,” Joffè (2001, 60) suggested, referring to the agreements relating to the “acquisition of conventional weapons, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), disarmament and adherence to arms control and non-proliferation regimes” that they could be labeled “hard security” areas of cooperation in the EMP. However, priorities were “re-shuffled” (Aliboni 2000, quoted in Chourou 2001, 61) to focus on confidence building measures, rather than security building measures such as those seeking to “prevent military conflicts or limit the use, acquisition or proliferation of non-conventional weapons” (Ibid.) as a “soft” approach to improve cooperation with parties who might feel ambivalent by more “hard”-security type approaches.

The fact of the founding of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Association (EMPA), which did not occur until eight years after the establishment of the EMP, is one indication for the lack of momentum observed in the EMP in the early years – and the frustration expressed by many with its often small steps and lack of “grand” results upon its ten-year anniversary in 2005. While historians may point to blurry mutual intentions among member states, others would point out that no international relations are ever clear-cut or dilemma-free: exactly these conflicts led Jean Monnet to propose the European Coal and Steel Community after all. This historical impetus, however – or political commitment (or desperation) - for supranationality is absent from the design of the EMP so far (despite considerable instability in the Middle East).

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4 Referred to as “Barcelona Plus (10)” (years) occasionally
MENA is one area in the European “neighborhood” with traditional historical and cultural ties to Europe in addition to the continuing strategic significance between the two. As both Abdullahtif Ahmida (2000) and Joffé (2001, 34) point out, already the 1957 Treaty of Rome made specific provisions for the economic relationship between the Maghrib and the EC. However, while these were more heavily based on colonial patterns of the former as raw material and labor suppliers as well as markets for EC/EU goods, the political aspect of the EMP is closely interconnected with the economic aspect of the EMP, as it is directed towards economic development (and prosperity) in MENA to reduce the gap between the northern and the southern periphery of the Mediterranean (hereby reducing the economic pressure for emigration from the south to the north). This recognition and the initiatives to put them into practice in the relationship between security, cooperation and development were inspired by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe following the Helsinki Conference of 1975. They were adapted to the Mediterranean in the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean immediately before the Gulf War of 1990 (but not followed through decisively as a result of the instabilities in connection with this war) (Joffé 2001, 36). The next sections will provide a brief overview over the economic and socio-cultural chapters of the EMP.

**Economic and Financial Partnership**

In the Economic and Financial Partnership aspect of the EMP the participants emphasize the importance of sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view toward achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity, and
recognizing the impediment which debt represents to development (addressing it e.g. by promoting an environment through EMP initiatives conducive to both internal savings as the basis for investment, and by direct foreign investment). Additionally, dialogue and regional cooperation are emphasized to accelerate socio-economic development (e.g. through the promotion and development of the private sector, upgrading the productive sector, establishing appropriate institutional and regulatory frameworks for a market economy, such as those protecting intellectual and industrial property rights and competition, those promoting mechanisms for technology transfer), as well as through the progressive establishment of a free-trade area, and a substantial increase in the European Union’s financial assistance to its partners (Ibid.).

The participants at the Barcelona Conference acknowledged that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the EMP require substantially increased financial assistance through the EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB). This necessitates sound macro-economic management in terms of promoting this political and economic dialogue, as well as optimized financial cooperation among their respective economic policies (Ibid.).

This emphasis on the economic and development aspects in the region are underscored by UN Under-Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, José Antonio Ocampo (2006) remarks that the “global economic conditions and regional economic environment” are an important motivation to reduce the yawning gap in income between developed and developing countries. Additionally, he recommends developing countries to transform their production and “export structures, particularly by shifting resources to activities with higher levels of productivity,” rather than specialize
solely in natural-resource intensive sectors. He also stresses the need to strengthen economic linkages among developing countries to create new domestic technological capabilities and to integrate these countries into dynamic world markets within the mutual reinforcement of macroeconomic stability (such as soothing normal business cycles instead of pro-cyclical fiscal adjustments) with investment (such as creating fiscal space through improved governance, a strengthened tax base and institutional reform including the creation of regulatory and institutional frameworks required for well functioning markets) and growth strategies. Marks (1996, 2) views the creation of a free trade zone as reflecting “the 1990s dynamic of building large transnational trading and investment blocs, from which closer political and socio-cultural relations are assumed to flow.” Subsequent studies have shown, however, that “economic liberalization strategies of the EU’s southern Mediterranean partners have not by themselves led to grater political liberalization” (Marks 1996, 2). This was one reason why the EU has focused on bilateral Association Agreements with individual MENA countries “to act as stepping stones towards the Mediterranean Free Trade Area (MFTA) initially envisaged for the year 2010” (Spencer 2001, 16).

In the case of the EMP we notice that since its inception in 1995 its members have in fact set out to pursue this agenda: Follow-up meetings between the foreign ministers of EMP member states as well as conferences have been taking place since the signing of this agreement. Examples of their results are the plans for the MEFTA through harmonization of rules, procedures and standards in the customs field, the elimination of unwarranted technical barriers to trade in agricultural products and the adoption of relevant food, phyto and veterinary sanitation measures and the reporting of reliable data
(e.g. economic, financial etc.) on an EU-harmonized basis. Additionally, joint research programs, especially in the telecommunications and energy sectors (including the support for renewable sources of energy) and regional tourism development, environmental protection (especially combating desertification) and scientific and technical cooperation (such as the expansion of the Mediterranean Water Charter of 1992 for the expansion of desalination projects, clean-up of the Mediterranean Sea and a pro-active approach for conservation and rational management of fish stocks in the Mediterranean Sea, including improved research into stocks, including aquaculture programs to re-stock the Mediterranean Sea and inland lakes (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration) were implemented. The supply, management and development of water resources, the modernization of agriculture and the development and improvement of infrastructure, especially in rural areas, including efficient transport systems and information technologies, were also declared priorities (Ibid.). We notice here that some of the original concerns addressed in the Madrid Peace Conference of 1991 have been specifically adopted by the EMP in 1995.

Additionally this “chapter” of the EMP acknowledges the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economies of EMP partners and the need to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of energy policies, including the appropriate framework conditions for investments in, and the activities of, energy companies (Ibid.). While large parts of MENA were economically on unequal terms with the EU, the economic integration of the southern Mediterranean with the northern markets “could create a market of sufficient size to attract foreign investment and, in Gordon Brown words, generate self-sustained “endogenous growth” (Joffé 2001, 44). The facts appear to
support this vision: “up to one billion Dollars is set to flow into North African and Middle Eastern stock markets in the coming months (of approximately 2008/9), as several heavyweight firms launch funds to focus on the region – confirming its status as the next investing hot spot” (Brewster 2007). It is understood that the current research for this concluded in the summer of 2008, i.e. the global consequences of the financial crisis, which became particularly acute from September/October 2008 onward, have not been integrated into this dissertation.

Social, Cultural and Human Affairs

Social, cultural and human affairs are addressed within the EMP with the aim to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other, including the importance of the role which mass (audio-visual) media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment (Ibid.).

It is recognized that “economic change also produces social change” (Joffe 2001, 46). The proposals and projects discussed in the preceding section are expected to lead to economic development and export-oriented growth in MENA, along with market-accessibility in the EU, political and social transparency and accountability, which are
often necessary factors to attract foreign direct investments to ensure successful private
sector development (Ibid.). These economic policies and changes also have cultural and
social consequences. The Barcelona Process originally already incorporated the
framework to address these in terms of stimulating the growth of participatory civil
society within the context of legitimized government (Joffé 2001, 47).

Some writers view the social-cultural “basket” of the EMP as “mainly
inspirational in nature…, primarily devoted to supporting the growth of civil society in
the South” (Joffé 2001, 38). However, the EMP’s documents also indicate plans to
develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges
between civil societies (e.g. European Commission 2000, 2006, 2007), aims which have
been substantially supported in turning them into reality by NGOs such as the Anna
Lindh Foundation. The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and
civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and
exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are essential factors in
bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving
their perception of each other, including the importance of the role which mass media can
play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual
enrichment (Ibid.).

The importance of civil society specifically, and the development of human
resources overall, such as social development and education and training for young
people, e.g. the familiarization with the cultural identity of each partner country are
concretized by facilitating active exchange programs between partnership states. The
importance of these programs, beyond enabling the EU’s southern neighbors to develop a
workforce with skills (i.e. increase their human capital) (Putnam 1993) to enable them to improve their economic situation, is to in turn develop civil society as a significant component of functioning democratic institutions and to strengthen the rule of law (Tarrow 1994, 1996). Reinhardt (2002) points out that the development of civil society, and especially exchanges and communications between the civil societies of the northern and southern Mediterranean and the movement of people within the EMP overall have not been facilitated sufficiently in the past. Reinhardt (2002, 20) writes that

As far as the lack of a sense of common ownership for the Partnership is concerned, it is not sufficient to constantly complain that the Barcelona Process is a European design, even if this is true. There is little reason to expect that the process will become more equitable unless there are more inputs from the partner countries … civil society actor … initiatives … need to be exploited,”

as well as people mobility\(^5\) in the region, e.g. through the introduction of a special “Barcelona” visa.

By addressing socio-economic needs, the EMP seeks to alleviate consequences of poverty, such as higher crime and violence rates, and poor health and nutrition, which can contribute to illegal migration (compare White 2006) to the northern Mediterranean countries. Beyond these socio-economic approaches, EMP MSs also address mechanisms for the rule of (international) law by agreeing to cooperate in the repatriation of illegal immigrants as well as cooperating in the joint fight against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption, racism, xenophobia and intolerance (Ibid.).

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\(^5\) In terms of the “labor”-aspect of the EU’s principle of the Four Freedoms (i.e. labor, capital, goods, and services)
Goals of the EMP

“Overcoming not a clash of civilizations but of mutual suspicions”: Huntington’s (1996, 32) ominous words regarding common divisions between countries, such as between modern, developed countries and poor, developing countries, or the Muslim distinction between Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb (the Abode of Peace, and the Abode of War respectively) are the type of divisions the EU seeks to ameliorate and bridge through the programs of the EMP. We note that the Dar al-Islam has been undergoing what some scholars have described as more serious internal divisions than schisms within the Dar al-Harb (i.e. between Muslim and non-Muslin regions). The EMP not only encompasses beyond Shia and Sunni populations also predominantly Jewish and Christian member states. Beyond this religious diversity, there is also a significant gradient between economically richer and poorer regions within the EMP. Nevertheless, I would disagree with Huntington that the West is moving towards a phase of a “universal state” (Ibid. 53), at least with respect to the northern Mediterranean states versus the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states. While the original goals of the EMP are i.a. trade harmonization and coordination, its purpose, with its emphasis on diversity, is also the harmonization within cultural diversity of its MSs, rather than a homogenization among the regions encompassing the EMP.

The EMP has since the data collection period for this dissertation formally ended, received an “enhancement” in the form of the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), which was inaugurated on July 13, 2008 at the UMed summit in Paris under the EU’s French Presidency. The UMed was the agreed upon version of Sarkozy’s original

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6 This is expressed e.g. in the EU’s motto of “unity in diversity” (in contrast to the “Melting Pot” national approaches to cultural diversity)
proposal for a “Mediterranean Union.” Since at the time of writing this dissertation the UMed’s details are still being formulated, I will refer to it briefly in the final chapter of this dissertation.

Challenges to Progress in the EMP

Today, thirteen years after the inauguration of the Barcelona Process, the need for these multilateral institutions and community-building practices are more needed than ever while the political hurdles loom larger than ever – and are hoped to be addressed through the mechanisms inherent in the UMed. As Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) writes:

the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion.

Rather, her observation (Ibid.) that the Wider Europe strategy (published by the Commission in March 2003), as well as the new European Security Strategy (prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year) “propose[s] major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor.” In my view, this is not optional today, 2008, but imperative in light of the geopolitical “reconfigurations” taking place in the region overall. The risks and challenges make not only strategic thinking, but as an enhanced focus on action vis-à-vis the EU’s southern neighbors a priority – not on the basis of a looming “clash,” but a rapprochement of neighbors, alienated too long, and the different levels of integration beyond the EMP.
Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on the assumption that the deepening of neighborhood relations cannot be achieved through governmental agreements alone, but that essential participation and contribution by civil society is urgently needed to bring the partnership to life, and to create the greater understanding and closeness between the peoples envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995. The EU posits the security environment of the EMP in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3). While the intentions of the EMP are not only laudable, but address many of the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general, hereby enhancing regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP per se is not legally binding. That is, participation is not uniformly strong. Instead it applies concepts of “benchmarking” and “differentiation” in the evaluation of program implementation on an individual country/case basis, “allowing countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (Ibid., 4). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaesch-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63). It remains to be seen to what extent the UMed’s approach will change this. This approach by the EMP varies from a purely realist one which might suggest that the overall wealthier North might keep its distance (to preserve its wealth), and rather remain vigilant toward the Southern and Eastern regions of the Mediterranean. In fact, the EMP seeks to address the risks and threats from the Other, and increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) by Constructivist engagement, such as through
the EMP and funding its development arm, the Middle East Development Assistance (MEDA) (more on this in Chapter Five). This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the EU-Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the latter having been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches.

Some scholars have suspected the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU in terms of extending territory and herewith power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting MENA to develop politically, economically and socially, not only to make the southern neighbors of the EU less likely to emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the Mediterranean, but also to offer the political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural options and tools, such as through a harmonization of practices, norms and institutions for the integration into some areas of the “Four Freedoms” (i.e. the free movement of goods, people, services and capital ultimately through the entire EMP region7), for a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU.

This dynamic of the EMP is multilateral not only due to the character of its membership, but also because it is based on several international conventions, such as UN declarations, or the parallel “three baskets” of the Helsinki Declaration of 1975. This application of EU soft power in countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean is more than just cultural power in Joseph Nye’s (2002, 11) terminology, but is being applied by the EU in its foreign policy in the EMP to promote peace and human rights through the reciprocity between economic and education, identified by e.g. A. Sen as essential for development to translate into individual freedom. Gonzalo Escribano (2005)

7 In line with the European Neighborhood Policy’s (ENP) (as the more recent “umbrella” institution of the EMP) motto of “sharing everything but (EU-internal) institutions
points out that in the past the ENP’s economic prescriptions overall had been perceived as merely cosmetic occasionally.

As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than reality at the moment, with the extent of spillover from possible inter-regional fragmentation post-Iraq yet unknown. In the relative institutional vacuum (beyond the activities of the other regional security cooperative institutions, such as the Arab Maghreb Union or the Arab League) (Vasconcelos 1999, 30), the realization of the EMP’s goal to extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” as a tool of EU soft power, utilizing proven approaches to address regional (in-) security in the Mediterranean through step-by-step processes of socio-economic and political harmonization are more urgent than ever.

Funding of the EMP

The EMP’s unique intra-regional value is its normative dimension based on the EU’s emphasis on democracy, adherence to human rights, the fight against international terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs and regional conflicts. Some of these issue areas are pursued by the EMP in terms of development of civil society, while others are pursued by EU and international NGOs and policy organizations. The economic “engine” to drive this regional integration is the goal of a EuroMed free trade area by 2010, and the harmonization of legal structures and judicial systems to support this. Between 2004 and 2006 the EU provided five billion Euros in grants (Symons 2004) to MENA, and one billion Euros per year for EMP-projects specifically from 2006 onward (Howells 2005).

The main financial instrument for the EMP is the EU’s MEDA program. For the period from 1995 until 2003 MEDA’s budget was 5.458 million Euros, while the

Working Areas/Projects

The EMP celebrated its tenth anniversary in 2005, and is set to continue to grow with the support of an expanded MEDA budget to further continue its mandate of economic, political and cultural cooperation. These programs address i.a. the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea by 2020 through a reduction of industrial (e.g. ship) emissions, and municipal/urban waste as well as stemming the decline in local fishery stocks. Other joint research programs are especially in the telecommunications and energy sectors (including the support for renewable sources of energy) and regional tourism development, environmental protection (especially combating desertification) and scientific and technical cooperation (such as the expansion of the Mediterranean Water Charter of 1992 for the expansion of desalination projects and improved research into fish stocks to compensate for over-fishing in the Mediterranean) (Ibid.).

A particular focus are development measures for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and the adoption of international or European standards for, and the upgrading of, conformity testing, certification, accreditation and quality standards among EMP MSs. The Euro-Arab Business School in Granada and the European Foundation in Turin for example are contributing to this end, as is the Anna Lindh foundation which focuses on women’s empowerment and development. It should be pointed out that NGOs, such as the Stanley Foundation (in association with the Institute for Near East & Gulf Military
Analysis) in the US for example also address open Arab media. These examples serve to point out that the EMP is not simply an EU construct out of ulterior market and political motives, but that instead exemplify that the multilateralism, including the US, which existed since its very beginning, leading to the establishment of the EMP, continues within the EMP.

The EMP has made concrete progress in wide areas of its mandate: Examples are the Member states agreement in May 2006 to a European Commission draft for “level 2” implementation of measures to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, launched the first two twinning projects in Euro-Egyptian relations in the tourism and maritime safety (tourism) sectors, and the “Europe for Mediterranean Journalists” project to empower journalists to have greater, more informed knowledge when they present EuroMed partnership-related information to their audiences and to network among colleagues in the region (in addition to the establishment of many other programs).

Research Purpose, Research Problem and Significance of Study

This dissertation seeks to delineate the dynamics in the Mediterranean as a macro geo-political region in which the nations around its rim are joined through their common concerns and shared interests. In this dissertation I plan to process-trace i.a. the thinking contributing to, and the re-imagining of the Mediterranean “region” politically, geographically, and socio-culturally by conceptualizing its past social construction with the underlying assumptions, and to determine how the future of this region appears to evolve under the soft power approach within the EMP, in particular with respect to an EMRSC-identity according to New Regional Security Complex theory (Buzan and
Waever 2003). The secondary purpose would be the determination of potential hard power aspects, i.a. involving a transatlantic “umbilicus” through NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and examining the evolving European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

There are three facets to this research problem: (1) What are the socio-economic and political dynamics of the EMP in the Euro-Med today? (2) What is the security relevance of these dynamics in terms of regional integration? (3) In light of the preceding findings, does a revision of the term “Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex,” prevalent in the existing literature (e.g. Buzan and Waever 2003), seem indicated?

The study is significant for two reasons: First, this dissertation focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union and its southern Mediterranean neighbors in the context of the EMP in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it meaning in the context of regional stability. Secondly, this integration could additionally lead to a reciprocal “re-construction” of EMP members’ self-identity and interests in the structural context of a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex. This would be significant in terms of the EMP’s role in contributing to the regional integration among countries surrounding the Mediterranean, and the overall Euro-Med regional development. This would contrast with the Middle Eastern Regional security Complex, which Buzan and Waever (2003) and Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) have proposed. If such a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex can be traced to have evolved through the dynamics of EMP activities, it would have potential reverberations vis-à-vis a transatlantic Euro-Mediterranean Regional Super Security Complex (EMRSSC).
Functionalism

Approaching institutional integration in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Euro-Med) I start with functionalism (Mitrany 1975), whereby the economic function dictates the shape of the institution established for this particular purpose, such as the European Coal and Steel Community, was for the political purpose of achieving peace. It involves specific, limited, and technical competencies that are easily managed by an agency of scientists and technocrats (rather than politicians). While the historical context of functionalism was war as the starting point to evolve from economic to political integration, it does not necessarily have to be unique as a parallel could be made to the politics of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

Functionalism is pragmatic, technocratic, yet flexible, and deliberately blurs the distinctions between national and international, public and private, and political and nonpolitical, making national borders less and less important as functional agencies were formed.

Neo-Functionalism

Institutionally, *neo-functionalism* (Ernst Haas, 1960s; Schmitter and Karl 1991) then is non-statecentric, i.e. moving beyond the state with a system-level logic of societal pluralism, impelled by a logic of functional integration, and hoped-for *political “spillover”* (i.e. agencies will develop political characteristics).
The EMP exhibits some neo-functional characteristics\(^8\), as these had also proven useful in expanding the European Coal and Steel Community into the European Economic Community through linking essential functions beyond industries “to make war unthinkable and materially impossible\(^9\).” The existence of common institutional structures for the relationships \textit{within} the EMP does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation \textit{among} them as an organized and structured form of diversity (O. Jacob 1997, quoted in Flaesch-Mougin 2005, 63). This explains in part why the EU, in its external relations vis-à-vis its South-Eastern Mediterranean partners, adapts “to the characteristics of each partner, to the nature of the traditional links maintained with the partner, to its geopolitical positioning [and] to its level of economic development” (Ibid., 66), partially by some historical bi-lateral relations, especially between the EU Mediterranean countries and MENA.

\textbf{(Neo-)Liberalism}

Today, thirteen years after the inauguration of the Barcelona Process, Ruggie’s (1992, 561) advocacy of multilateral institutions as contributing to Europe’s collective destiny, the need for these multilateral institutions and community-building practices to full the goals of the EMP (compare Appendix 1) is greater than ever on the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean, while the political hurdles loom larger than ever. This was expressed also by with Rosa Balfour (2004, 1), who writes that

\(^8\) An example would be the EMP involvement in aquaculture to re-stock the Mediterranean (as referred to in the preceding chapter), and to proceed from there to a more conscientious collective approach to maintain sustainability in the Mediterranean (i.a. through joint clean-up projects) to eliminate the security threat which environmental degradation (including overfishing) poses to human security.

\(^9\) Compare the Schuman Declaration of 1950
the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a ‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion.

Liberalism does not completely explain the dynamics of the EMP’s multilateralism in promoting security in the Med by itself, since the prima facie theory is one of underlying harmony in the international relations of this region, which is not yet the case.

According to Ruggie (1998) and Krasner (1983), international regimes, such as the EMP, are the intervening variable between the structure of the international system and actors’ behavior by increasing the predictability for foreign policy, e.g. with respect to the foreign policy role analysis model (Holsti) in terms of role performance, national role conceptions, prescriptions and position through the explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area.

Since actors expect reciprocity rather than only short-term calculations based upon self-interest as in anarchy (as realists would hold), institutions provide information and facilitate negotiations (e.g. enhancing cooperation) by reducing uncertainty, enhanced through iterations. Ruggie (1998) holds that international regimes need a hegemon to create it (though it is not necessary once a regime is established\textsuperscript{10}). The advantage to small countries lies in providing them with a structured environment in which to express their views or influence other countries. International regimes also even-out power balancing, and often contain the agreement not to use power to promote policies.

\textsuperscript{10} In application to the Euro-Med, this would mean that despite the Middle East Development Assistance program (MEDA) funding and other EU support of the EMP, an EU hegemonic presence would theoretically not be necessary per se. This speaks against the critique of the EMP as an imperialist instrument.
Additionally, small states benefit from large states’ support payments (such as EU structural funds etc. due to the power of interstate bargaining) (Moravcsik 1999).

The preceding brief reference to the foreign policy relevance of the contractual language of EMP agreements is exemplified by the previous Eastern Enlargement of the EU: This was not automatically to the detriment of MENA, as some scholars claim (e.g. Crawford 2006). Instead, the goal for a free trade zone, declared by the EMP in 1995, will allow the countries in MENA to firmly establish themselves on EU markets following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, well before the EU Eastern Enlargement in 2004. If anything, the enlarged EU also increased the market for MENA agricultural products as the demands for products from Southern climates ballooned in the new EU member states.

While neo-liberalism conceptualizes the interaction of multiple actors pursuing various interests, and utilizing different types of resources and methods of interaction (Moravcik 1999), including the adoption of underlying norms in the attainment of a greater, collective good (Moravcik 1999), it is nevertheless insufficient as a theory to explain the diverse processes of multilateralism in the Euro-Med in addressing the security challenges there, although it is a potentially instrumental theory in explaining EMP dynamics nevertheless.

Security

(Neo-)Realism

Traditional neorealist theory holds that the preconditions of the international system enable states to take certain foreign policy actions but not others (Waltz 1979).

11 This is to be expanded into an EMP Free Trade Area by 2010
Waltz (1959) also suggested that to understand state action in terms of war (as a foreign policy behavior), one needs to understand the dynamics of the international system as well as its internal characteristics, such as leadership, as they may explain the immediate reasons why a war is undertaken. However, the multilateralism elaborated on in the previous sections does not equate this realist realm of international relations, one characterized by a constant struggle to maintain sovereignty over other states under anarchy. Rather, I propose here that the “international system” of the Mediterranean region, and the institutional structures of both e.g. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the EMP are neither a “finite” system of a zero-sum game, nor (due to the supra-national aspects of the EU at least), are the dynamics of the Euro-Med exclusively state-centric, with states not as the only actors of note, privilege, or agency (Neak 2003, 19).

Mirbaheri (2004, 49) states that “projections of force in international relations [are] … an indication of weakness before it is a reflection of power.” Overwhelming military projections can be inversely related to the diplomatic influence of a country in a region (Ibid., 50). Bettina Huber (2005, 3) writes that cooperation in the EMP is based on the assumption that the deepening of neighborhood relations cannot be achieved through governmental agreements alone, but that essential participation and contribution by civil society is not only necessary, but needs to be enhanced to bring the partnership to life, and to create the greater understanding and closeness between the people envisioned by the Barcelona Declaration in 1995.

In the past it has frequently held true that “the relationship with the Other as a different entity is most problematic not with those who are very distant, but with those who are closest” (Amin Maalous in “In the name of identity,” quoted in Bensalah
As the EMP has these clear security and defense implications, the ESDP has reciprocally a Mediterranean dimension (Heisbourg 2001, 5). However, while the Barcelona process is primarily concerned with soft security, the European Security and Defense Policy will involve hard security approaches in the Mediterranean in coordination with NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue. These developments in conjunction with the UN intervention in Kosovo had caused considerable anxiety in the past in MENA about the validity of their state sovereignty (Joffé 2001, 52), and led to a reluctance to “share” security within the Mediterranean. However, the EMP, as a traditionally soft power approach to security in the Mediterranean, is able to by-pass this reluctance and approach collective security in this region. Hence (neo-) realism is only of limited applicability in the EMP.

What is security?

Bicchi (2001, 2) grapples with broadening the definitions of security following the Cold War to vertically deepen the analysis by identifying post-structural sub- and supra-state subjects (such as the individual or society), and to broaden the horizontal focus by including a wider range of potential threats, rather than focusing on the centrality of the state as the sole security actor in the international system.

Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde (1998, 27) define security as “survival in the face of existential threats,” though these threats are not the same across different sectors. According to these authors (Ibid., 22) in the societal sector, “the referent object is large-scale collective identities that can function independent of the state” (italics added).
Hence this dissertation will attempt a discursive analysis of the political constellations to determine the securitization in the Euro-Mediterranean region within the EMP.

Noting that Buzan, Waever and de Wilde are diverging from the traditional military definition of security by adding “soft” areas, such as economic, environmental, societal and individual security, we turn to Joffé (2001, 55) who refers to the EMP as a perfect example of political symbiosis that may have interesting social and cultural consequences and should be the real paradigm for the future … [where] soft power projection becomes interdependence as the ‘forgotten frontier’ becomes the common arena - the stated objective of the Barcelona Process, if not its underlying purpose. Rather, in Buzan and Waever (2003, 57) words: “the most relevant form of security community contains active and regional securitization, only it is not actor-to-actor (one state fearing the other and therefore counter-threatening it), but a collective securitization of the overall development of the region.” In fact, Buzan and Waever (2003, 67) also view Europe as likely to move towards a structured security region “because its internal interaction capacity is much too high to permit” an unstructured security region. With respect to including the southern Mediterranean in this context, Chourou (2001, 61) recognizes this concern when he writes that “the competence of the EMP in the area of security has been eroding through re-conceptualization [and] attrition.” The argument in this dissertation is that the essence of regional security is not about charters, but in the processes of a shared commitment to security region-wide\(^\text{12}\). This dissertation hence will diverge from Chourou’s finding several years ago, by identifying a considerable security-relevance of the EMP today.

\(^{12}\) Compare the Schuman Declaration of May 9, 1950: “world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.”
Collective security

Collective security has been referred to as a condition or a process of increasing the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence (Deutsch 1957). In this regional security context, integration is occurring when the states involved cease to prepare for war against each other (a political pluralistic process leading to the status of “peace” by re-defining interests and a commitment to a “new way of life,” instead of coercion). This political integration, starting at the elite level through a convergence of goals and expectations, is hoped to lead later to nonpolitical integration, i.e. economic and social welfare.

In this dissertation I trace some of the security dynamics of a region, the Euro-Mediterranean, which according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 16) could be termed a heterogeneous complex, as it abandons the assumption of being locked into specific security sectors, but rather involves interactions across several levels such as states, nations, firms (incl. NGOs) and “confederations” (in the widest sense, the EU), as well as across the political, economic, and societal sectors. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 17) state that there is a “cause-effect nature of the issues around which securitization takes place: the ‘facilitating conditions’ for securitization. Second is the process of securitization [as the extreme version of politicization, (Ibid., 23)] itself” (italics added).

Regional security

Buzan ((1991, 190), quoted in Pace (2003, 166)) introduced the concept of a security community and a security complex theory. Security community, according to Buzan (1991, 218) represents the far end on the scale of security interdependence,
wherein “disputes among all the members are resolved to such an extent that none fears… either political assault or military position on his continuum security configurations, related to the idea of a ‘security community’.” A *security complex* represents “a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another (Buzan 1991, 190 quoted in Pace 2003, 166).

*Security Community* (compare Karl Deutsch 1957, Adler and Barnett 1998, Ole Waever 1995) as “zones of peace” are based on knowledge such as broad environmental factors, e.g. demographic shifts in the local economy. These concepts provide ideational epistemic shifts through the development of new interpretations of social reality/learning (i.e. alternative notions of what security is). Thus mutual trust and collective identity (based not only on material, but also on social structure) are achieved through social learning. Additionally, institutions can provide conditions of dependable expectations of peaceful change. Hence this points to the security structures of international politics (such as in the EMP) as outcomes of social interactions: states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents without given identities, that are (re-)constituted through complex, historical overlapping (if often contradictory) practices and a tenuous relationship between domestic and intl. politics.

**The EMP and Collective Security**

The Mediterranean’s strategic importance for earlier civilizations throughout millennia appears to also be central to the Arab-Israeli dispute, the Anglo-American invasions of Iraq and inter-regionally vis-à-vis the NATO occupation of Afghanistan over
terrorism and oil, set against a backdrop of religious, socio-economic and political disparities between all parties (Papacosma 2004).

The Eastern Mediterranean in particular is poised today more than ever before to become the epicenter of global strategic concern writes Papacosma (2004, 19) due to the much greater number of variables involved than existed during the Cold War. This leads to increased difficulty in determining common policy among traditional allies and neighbors. The continuing security dilemmas facing the states in this region validate in my opinion Adler’s (1998, 120, quoted in Attina 2000, 5) belief that multilateral institutions and the community-building practices and the “institutions they activate produce the necessary conditions for peaceful change, i.e. cognitive and material structures, transactions between states and societies, and collective identity or ‘we- feeling’.” Malmvig (2004, 3) also echoes the dialectic in the EMP’s security discourse, one as being a liberal reform discourse, and the other as a cooperative security discourse. He furthermore argues that the simultaneous intermingling of these two discourses has meant “that the EU has wavered uneasily between different priorities and logics in its Mediterranean policy” (Ibid.). This gave the impression of inconsistencies to some MNMCs, and led to suspicions in Arab states about the real intentions and goals of the EU in the region” (Ibid.).

The threats identified in the ESDP’s Security Strategy, such as terrorism, failed states, organized crime, proliferation and regional conflicts, all manifest in Africa (Chaillot Paper No. 87, 2005, 31) (and spill across the Mediterranean observed in Europe). Some argue that widespread insecurity in the EU’s southern “neighborhood,” i.a. in (Northern) Africa is reduced with increasing success by the EU’s traditional
development policy progress. In this dissertation regional integration programs are viewed as a force for progress among neighbors within the EMP in the quest for effective multilateralism as a way to ensure a sense of international order, of building trust and of combining effectiveness with legitimacy, in particular to support those parts of the EMP, which are over-armed but under-institutionalized (Ibid., 31/2). This is also particularly significant with respect to bring stability to subregions in MENA, as Hazem Saghieh (quoted in Kumaraswamy 2006, 1) wrote: “we are brothers but others are dividing us,” often as a result of state creation in the post-colonial period without regard to ethnic or cultural lines. Hence socio-political and economic harmonization and integration between the northern and southern Mediterranean are not the only concerns of the EMP, but stability and security on the sub-regional level (e.g. Palestinian Authority and Israel) are also affected by the agenda of the EMP.

A security complex is defined in terms of power relations (i.e. the regional interactions between the states in this complex) and patterns of amity/enmity (those relationships which range from friendship to expectations of protection and support vs. those which are beset by suspicion and fear) (Haddadi 1999, 4). My present analysis leads me to concur with Buzan’s (1984, quoted in Haddidi 1999, 4) approach to the Mediterranean as a security community. With this approach Buzan uses security as an analytical tool, broader than power and peace, and as a paradigm to build solutions to “reduce threats and vulnerabilities without leading to a ‘security dilemma’” (Ibid.), within a regional security complex as the framework of analysis. This would represent a “management approach,” wary of the limits of national, regional and international dynamics in insecurity questions, but instead reconciling “differences and concentrates
on the harmonious interrelations between individuals and states [and regions] alike” (Ibid.). This security complex approach would “capture the security dynamics and the interdependence operating in a region with relation to their impact, both internally and externally, on states and societies” (Haddadi 1999, 4).

Neoliberal institutionalist scholars have emphasized the role of international institutions in helping self-interested states achieve and sustain cooperation in an anarchic international setting. Yet the effectiveness of institutions in promoting cooperation remains contingent on member states’ commitment to undertaking and observing the institution’s norms, rules and regulations (Gomez Mera 2007). It is this environment which the EMP addresses through the plethora of approaches further alluded to in Chapter one, in order to achieve a peaceful and prosperous southern neighborhood. This gained significance in addressing regional concerns as the Western European Union became more and more integrated into the EU, and did not continue security-related tasks formulated nine years ago. Nevertheless, the attainment of Euro-Mediterranean security and stability is not exclusively an EU-driven project within the EMP. Rather, Echeverria (1999) suggested already nine years ago, with the post-World War II history of political instability in the Middle East already well-known, but the current Iraqi regional destabilization, then still unimaginable, to utilize the regional experience and confidence of the armed forces of non-European Mediterranean nations in peacekeeping operations. This would make the EU’s approach in the Mediterranean demand-driven and proactive.

Against the background of the EMP co-exists NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (the Dialogue)\(^\text{13}\) in this region. While the Dialogue evolved post-Cold War, the tragic events of 9/11 did not fundamentally alter the goals of the Dialogue itself or change the

\(^{13}\) Member states as of May 2008 are: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, and Mauritania
conceptual framework (1999 Strategic Concept), but rather highlighted the need for NATO and its Mediterranean partners to cooperate closer and substantiate their friendship within the Dialogue frameworks in the face of common terrorist and WMD challenges (Bin 2003, 2). While the Dialogue has widened and deepened over the years, some authors (Bin 2003, 2) maintain that it remains behind other NATO initiatives, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), as a mostly confidence-building program, rather than as a true partnership. Some of the reasons suggested for this “lag” of the Dialogue in developing its true potential behind other NATO programs is uncertainty among Allies and the Mediterranean partners over the degree and extent of cooperation possible and necessary.

While military aspects are not explicitly on the agenda of the EMP, their hard security role cannot be ignored in a Mediterranean security complex beyond the socio-economic development standpoint. Howorth (2004, 212) considers ideas as distinct from interests (though they are not necessarily opposed to them), because they have the weakest impact in the field of security and defense policy. Especially in the interest-based realist discussion of the U.S.’s continued involvement in European security through NATO, some authors have pointed out the Europeans’ inability towards a coordinated security agenda (Gordon 1994). Specifically, how does a new “coordinative discourse” (Schmidt 2000b; 2002, 232-4, quoted in Howorth 2004, 213), i.e. the role which the construction of ideas, epistemic communities (P. Haas 1992), advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998), and the interplay of inter-subjective norms, values and identities (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999), and the interaction of these ideational forces with the perceptions in EMP member states affect Euro-Mediterranean security?
In “imagining” a new European foreign policy and security order beyond the Cold War, the EU posits the security environment with respect to the Mediterranean in the human dimension of good governance, human rights and the rule of law (Balfour 2004, 3). While the intentions of the EMP are not only laudable, they also address many of the criteria which scholars and political leaders (e.g. note the criteria for the Madrid Peace Conference) have identified as contributing to economic growth and development in general. While this enhances regional stability, we need to remember that the EMP is not legally binding, i.e. participation is not uniformly strong. Instead progress evaluating concepts of “benchmarking” and “differentiation” on an individual country/case basis “allow…[s] countries to make progress without jeopardizing the entire regional approach” (Ibid., 4). Hence this “common model of relationship does not exclude a certain degree of differentiation among the states which are part of this model” (Flaeschi-Mougin in Thiele and Kostelnik 2005, 63). In fact, the EMP seeks to counteract the risks and threats from the Other (Wendt 1999), and to increase understanding between the cultures (Ortega in Batt et al. 2003, 5) in Constructivist fashion. This is to the credit of the EMP as a specialized regional exception of the ENP, which has been accused of “one size fits all” (Aldis 2005, 5) programs and approaches.

Regional Security Identity

Europe and its southern neighbors have shared over the millennia common security concerns, though they were not always managed cooperatively. The significance of regional stability, especially in the context of the Mediterranean security, is not simply a “flavor du jour” with respect to the foreign policy of the EU, but very much essential in
analyzing the regions beyond it, i.e. stability in post-war Iraq (including intra-regional conflict) and the current Iraq war\(^{14}\) as well as their reverberations of a new “Silk Road” (in terms of western economic imperialism). Buzan and Waever (2003, 53) consider boundary, anarchic structure, polarity, and social construction as essential in a regional security complex.

This dissertation examines the extent to which the mutual roles of the EU, North Africa and the Levant, beyond historical ties and their current economic interests in a security context, shift from state-centric interests to society and identity. The Mediterranean region is an example of the interplay between

the destabilizing consequences of uneven economic development in states lacking democratic accountability as a sub-state-problem, and the trans-national links of organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, drugs and arms as a supranational problem (Spencer 2001, 12), although the development of a common security identity has been overshadowed by the breakdown of the Middle East peace process (the animosities between Palestinian, Jewish and Arabic identities became again oppositional rather than finding a common security denominator).

Pace (2003, 166), referring to Buzan and the Copenhagen School, states “that societal identity is a core value vulnerable to threats and in need of security.” Hence these authors (Ibid.) state that national identity (as deflecting from a regional political bias) has been a source of resistance to integration in Europe, as it was e.g. the major cause of upheaval in central and Eastern Europe post-Cold War. Waever (1993, 26) suggests a less fluid and rather more reified reality to explain this, which excludes questions of process

\(^{14}\) The First Gulf War viewed by many Middle Easterners as the one between Iran and Iraq in the 1980s, the Second Gulf War being Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait, and the Third Gulf War being the recent U.S. intervention in Iraq.
Pace (2003, 167). Pace (Ibid., referring to Waever 1993, 26) points out that this author was less concerned with the *process* of social construction, but rather regarded society as “a social agent that has an independent reality.” Pace (2003, 168) alternately suggests adopting a process-based framework, rather than relying simply on static theoretical frameworks when analyzing regions. The multilateral approach of neo-liberalism e.g. is predicated on domestic input (i.e. “embedded liberalism”), enabling individual member countries to tailor their EMP membership to assertions of domestic interests. The EMP, as a “dynamic” accommodates both domestic regional and systemic levels.

While Waever (1993) (quoted in Pace 2003, 167) “acknowledges that economic threats to particular groups within a society can affect the security of society as a whole,” yet neither the multidimensionality of threats and their reciprocal effect on political identities, nor the effects which processes of negation among political and societal actors have on their identity, have been analyzed for the Euro-Mediterranean from a Regional Security Complex perspective. In this dissertation I propose a more complex analysis of the dynamics and their implications on the security in the Euro-Mediterranean in the context of the EMP.

Wendt (1999) pointed out “that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than [simply] material forces” (Pace 2003, 167). Applying these dynamics to discourses about and within regions, Wendt (Ibid.) argues that identities and interests of (state) actors are constructed by shared ideas rather than primordially or automatically predetermined by history or geography for example, nor are they just a distribution of material capabilities as neo-realists hold, or just a function of

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15 A security threat in MENA would threaten EU identity for example (Pace 2003, 167).
institutions, as neo-liberals would emphasize. This reciprocal (between the northern and southern Mediterranean) “construction” of a regional security identity then is hence neither exclusively militarily, nor religious based, but perception-based (as some social constructivists would argue). Consequently, development in all areas envisioned by the Barcelona Process, including the social-cultural, requires i.a. to mitigate xenophobia and Islamophobia inherent in Europe itself. Joffe (2001, 53) points out that the frequent failure to appreciate the consequences of security initiatives go back to much of the violence which stems from the politics of exclusion and resentment.

Buzan and Waever (2003) propose a Regional Security Complex Theory (NRSCT) based i.a. on this proximity of shared security identity, desired or destined by shared boundaries, and the mutual concerns arising as a result. Some scholars view regionalism as the body of ideas, values and concrete objectives that are aimed at creating, maintaining, or modifying the provisions of security and wealth, peace and development within a region. Understanding the EMP’s security dynamics focuses around a geographic area, i.e. the Mediterranean, which is already heterogeneous internally and its effects on the wider region (compare Khader 2006).

Intensified by globalization processes during recent years, neither security nor freedom are inseparable between countries. While not advocating a “one size fits all”-identity, the more harmonized and synchronized our cultures (whether economic, political or social) become, the greater the trust between societies (in line with e.g. Joffe’s argument in the preceding paragraph). Here the EU is an example of “unity in diversity”:

16 Versus *regionalization* as a multi-dimensional, empirical process of change (rational choice by natl. leaders for convergence of interests, reflecting national will/interests) from relative heterogeneity and lack of cooperation towards increased cooperation, integration, convergence, coherence and identity in fields such as culture, security, economic development and politics (e.g. democratic rule) within a given geographic space
a communal construct of collective socio-political core attitudes of identity formation. Shared ideas and expectations distinguish it from other social collectivities in a continuous process of reconstruction, and accommodating multiple identities, depending on the group and/or situation. National identities confronted and reinforced by globalization and integration processes (economic, political and cultural globalization) can prompt a revival of populist and neo-nationalist demands, i.e. while globalization can erode national identities, strong counter-identities can to form to protect the threatened identity.

The development of a common regional security identity in the Mediterranean can be approached from a number of theoretical perspectives. While models for analyzing shared identities range from transactional psychoanalysis’ Co-creative Identity, to social constructivism, and neoliberal institutionalism (each with its own dynamics and polarities), with respect to the EMP we need to keep a chronological perspectives with the EU as an example for comparison: the EMP is only thirteen years “old” in comparison to the EU (which, in its fifty years of existence is itself still evolving its intergovernmental vs. supranational security agendas, such as linking it to Justice and Home Affairs, and the Common Foreign and Security Policy debates concerning the Southern Mediterranean neighbors) (Spencer 2001, 14).

Regionalism

Integration theories are meso-theories rather than relying on a single universal theory to explain collective decision making of political actors in distinct national settings who are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations, and political activities to a new
center (E. Haas 1961, 1958). These political actors still exercise rational choice (i.e. they are utility maximizers with exogenously determined preferences (such as the national interest and the relative power of a state remaining significant, even in the EU) in new regional arrangements. Regional integration is also not static but a dynamic process, both path-dependent on the context of the historical period, the sociological actors (state and non-state), and the specific issues involved.

Spencer (2001, 14), among other authors, recognizes geographical proximity as contributing to a “blurring of purely internal and external security agendas, particularly in an area of key concern to the EU, namely the very human issue of migration in all its dimensions.” This necessitates i.a. addressing the economic insufficiencies of the “sending” states which lead to emigration out of this despair (i.e. mostly from northern Africa to the southern EU), and cooperating in the repatriation of these EU-immigrants. Joffé (2001, 48) points out that this is one reason why the EU is not taking a stronger stand on civil society and political reform expectations towards MENA, i.e. in order not to have e.g. social reforms by themselves disrupt a regional security identity. Of course, some authors (such as Chourou 2001, 58) doubt that “security ought to be on the Euro-Mediterranean agenda at all” unless they are very long-term considerations and that participation must be open to all countries that have clear stakes in the issues to be discussed, even if such countries are not Mediterranean in strict geographical terms. He further advocates that non-EU Mediterranean countries must negotiate as a single entity if a genuine partnership is to be set up between the shores of the Mediterranean (Chourou 2001, 59/60).
Mediterranean Regionalism

The Euro-Mediterranean as a region is not only significant from the regional level on the basis of shared history and a common future, but also from an inter-regional perspective vis-à-vis the strategic significance of neighboring regions, as well as the reciprocal security effects on it from a global level. Although threats might seem distant from the homelands in the Euro-Med, some global threats need to be addressed through a coherent (regional EU-Mediterranean) policy to effectively address these challenges, and act on the international stage, not only as pro-active measures, but also “in order to take greater responsibility in promoting peace and stability, or, put another way, its won ‘core values’” (Senyucel 2006, 6) (italics added).

In the past the Euro-Mediterranean region had not been the object of regional analysis, because it was viewed as not sharing cultural and institutional homogeneity. However, “new regionalism gained ground in the 1990s, and the Mediterranean area has been increasingly considered by researchers as a region in which cooperation is in progress and institution-building is feasible and desirable” (Attina 2007, 198). However, the perception of the Mediterranean as a region has been debated among scholars: either EU action in the Mediterranean has been interpreted as a European hegemonic act, while other scholars interpret the EMP as socialization of its member states as a response to to globalization in order to make the Euro-Med region a more effective economic block. In view of the privatization efforts starting in the 1980s, which followed the economic crises of the 1970s, as well as in light of the “consequent reforms of national economies, based on deregulation and restructuring imposed by the developed states, … world economics
and financial institutions, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank” (Attina 2007, 198), the economic argument is a strong one.

Nevertheless, Mediterranean regional analysis cannot be separated from security considerations in this region. The asymmetries existing between EMP members from the northern Mediterranean as compared to the southern Mediterranean are recognized as placing the European economies in a dominant position and forcing other economies to adapt to their interest, “at least until the former reach high industrialization standards and fully integrate into the world economy” (Ibid.).

**Neo-Hegemonic Regionalism**

The end of the Cold War and with it that of the global power bipolarity “led to systemic transformations reshaping the global order” (Reus-Smit 2005, 195), and with it questions about the “dynamics of international change, the nature of basic institutional practices, the role of non-state agency and the problem of human rights” (Ibid.).

While some previous cooperative endeavors in the Mediterranean region were less successful (e.g. the Western Mediterranean Forum), it has been argued that as a result there was an

absence of a strong web of regional interaction at state and non-state levels, … the cross-cutting strategic interests of the key states involved … and the low and strongly asymmetrical rate of economic integration between the two shares of the Mediterranean Sea” (Christiansen, Petito and Tonra 2000, 403)

were contributing factors. The institutional and ideological structures of the EMP on the other hand were designed to address the weaknesses observed in other cooperative efforts in this region. In fact we observe how the ideational structures of the EMP influence
democratic institutionalization and their norming effect e.g. on gender relations, the enhanced integration of market economics, and environmentally protective measures.

In the post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors, and hence deterrence is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by both IGOs, which acknowledge other securitizing factors, e.g. environment or citizens’ welfare and governments.

The complementarity of two multilateral IGOs in the Mediterranean, the Dialogue and the EMP, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms. This represents an advantage in the efficiency of harmonizing among members, as it reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War: these had consumed considerable resources that could have been much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multi-lateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and the EMP enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of the Cold War to contribute to regional stability available for the socio-economic development of this region, and reduce e.g. the dividing lines between north and south which i.e. the demographic developments\(^\text{17}\) bring through more graduated responses.

In this dissertation I argue that the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) is significant beyond regional economic growth, and political and socio-cultural stabilization also in dispelling some myths surrounding its origins. Crawford writes for examples of the EMP

\(^\text{17}\) An example would be countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic education amidst the great population growth in their region - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge this represents to the northern Mediterranean countries.
as “bursting on the scene in 1995 when the Spanish presidency of the EU organized a conference in Barcelona” (Crawford 2005, 1). Rather, the EMP’s origins go back to multilateral efforts in the early 1990s beyond the EU, as indicated in the opening chapter of this dissertation. Attina (1996) concurs that regional cooperation can have external origins and extend not only to economic, but also to political, socio-cultural cooperation. The reciprocal efficacy of strengthening economic, political and cultural factors to achieve regional stability has also been reiterated by Turkish Foreign Minister Guel to prevent new dividing lines within Islamic countries where internal conflicts have been raging (Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan), and to reduce inter-regional problems which can push the mainstream towards “the extremes for want of good governance and true civic engagement” (Ibid.), rather than non-extremist voices to be heard. Guel (quoted in ‘Main conflict is in the East, not between East and West’, EurActiv 1/17/2007) advocates, as A. Sen (1999) does, support for the South-Eastern Mediterranean region to develop socio-economically as well as culturally in face of the violence and extremism surrounding them.

Some authors (e.g. Crawford 2005) have claimed that the EMP is an imperialistic tool of the EU to out-do the US. However, the Barcelona Declaration positions the EMP as primarily a regional multilateral mechanism, enhanced by bilateral relations between member states. The fact that the US and the former Soviet Union both were essentially its godparents would support this argument: the synergy between the EU and MENA member states make it a cooperative Euro-Mediterranean project, rather than the reverse of this hypothesis as one might suspect, i.e. a “colonial project” by the US or the Soviet Union.
Ulla Holm (2004, 1) views the dialectic faced by the EU in the Mediterranean in terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone, interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through a model to copy rather than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty while exporting political shared European values. The relationship between security and regional stability is well known, was it not the basis of the Truman Doctrine for Europe (Coufudakis 2004, 235). With the Maastricht Treaty the EU’s self-appointed mission arose to propagate human rights and democracy through the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and to foster fundamental freedoms within the framework of cooperation policy. This became one of the explicit objectives of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2005).

The end of the Cold War necessitated a complete rethink about European regional security in terms of the subtle dialectic between Atlanticism and Europeanism, which had been painstakingly knitted together over the previous decade through shifting patterns of interest (Howorth 2004). The EU does not usually challenge the US directly in MENA especially in light of the common NATO bond. However, the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of responsibility for peace in the Southern- and Eastern Mediterranean, based on respect for the political liberty of the parties involved and through the promotion of the economic interests of all actors, including the least advantaged (Gokay 2005, 12). The approaches are multilateral and bilateral on trade issues, cultural exchanges and security consultations with its Southern neighbors in the twenty first century, while the US might still be fighting demons from the last century (Carapico
2001, 28): although unipolarity may have proven easier for the US in the period immediately following the Cold War, multilateralism may become the forward approach in the twenty first century as it enhances cooperation and spreads transaction costs, as “any country which had a voice shaping a particular policy is also bound to contribute to the execution of that policy” (Mohamedi 2001, 15).

**Third Generation Regionalism**

Referencing the sectors and levels proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in their new framework for security analysis, the “levels” pertaining to a theoretical EMRSC are i.a. the sub/intra-regional (e.g. from some viewpoints the Israeli-Palestinian conflict), the inter-regional (e.g. the Euro-Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), the bilateral level (e.g. France and Morocco), the international level (i.e. the foreign relations among the states within and outside the regions in question), and, lastly, as Van Langenhove (2008b) proposed, a neo-Westphalian level. This last level is from a viewpoint of global governance where the world of states gradually becomes “a world of states and of regions” (Van Langenhove 2008a, 115) (italics added. The concept initially of neo-Westphalian “Second Generation Regionalism” (Van Langenhove 2008b) identified integration in non-economic matters such as justice, security, culture (Ibid.). An emerging EMRSC then could be interpreted as evolving into a “Third Generation Regionalism” (Costea and Van Langenhove 2007) in some parts of the world, whereby the regional institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated. As such regions become more proactive engaging in inter-regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely
trade issues, with a multidimensional character with the potential to affect more relations at the global level. Ultimately in third generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. (Ibid.), and exhibit a greater “global governance” identity.

Development

Hettne (1991, 279) distinguished as crucial the interactions between ‘high” and “low” politics, such as security vs. development issues, in understanding Europe’s recent history and immediate future. This is true today more than ever as regionalization in the world economy, the growth of sub-regionalism within Europe, and the development of smaller multinational economic regions create a new balance of power globally, one more economic than military (Ibid.). The complexity of socio-political and cultural asymmetries in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, especially in the post-9/11 security context (e.g. a possible spillover from post-Iraq instabilities), and Russian revisionist moves continue to require a renewed commitment by the EU in its southern neighborhood rather than permitting complacency. While the EMP’s results are neither entirely positive nor completely negative, “the very existence of the process already constitutes an important contribution by the EU to stability and prosperity in the zone, as well as building up a region in the political sense where it only existed in a geographical one” (Ortega in Batt et al., eds., 2003, 5).

The theory behind the multilateral approach (“3 baskets”) structure of the EMP is that political transparency and voice, and socio-economic development are mutually enhancing in contributing to regional development and as a result, to stability. As an approach to operationalize my assessment of the relevance of the EMP, I will start by
comparing it with the criteria which Sen has identified as contributing to national
development (for the purpose of overall human freedom. Sen (1999, 11) distinguishes
“five distinct types of freedom, seen in an ‘instrumental’ perspective… 1. political
freedoms, 2, economic facilities, 3. social opportunities, 4. transparency guarantees, and
5. protective security,” which are not only ends of development in themselves, but also
principal means which he views as empirically linked and strengthening each other
reciprocally (Ibid., 12). Importantly, Sen points to free and sustainable individual agency,
whereby “individuals can effectively shape their own destiny” (Ibid.), rather than simply
being “passive recipients of the benefits of cunning development programs” (Ibid.), or of
authoritarian environments, I would add.

**Political Freedom**

Sen refers to political freedoms as those under which people “determine who
should govern and on what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and
criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press”
(Sen 1999, 39).

The EMP was developed as an inherently multilateral approach in contrast to the
US’s predominantly bilateral tracks of Arab-Israeli negotiations. This “invitation” by the
EU “to an elite party, casting a broader and potentially more viable net around issues of
common concern like the environment, shipping and communications” was critiqued by
Carapico (2001, 25) on the grounds that the functional and utilitarian integration is
hoped to build confidence, and institutional structures to increase political stability
among anxieties on one hand would also encourage Arabs and Turks to overrun
Northern Europe. These fears started in the 1990s e.g. as the deteriorating situation in Algeria might result in Islamist radicalism spilling over into Europe. At the same time French and British colonial legacies, as well as Italian, Spanish and Greek merchant empires were hoping to advance their special (economic) interests – as were northern European companies vying for markets - and the EU in general for petroleum in MENA. While these critiques are likely not without merit, economic development could also be viewed as supportive of existing political structures.

Civil Society

Balfour (2004, 3) writes that the “European Commission started [only recently] to acknowledge the degree to which the creation of a secure environment also depends on the individual human dimension.” In this context this writer encourages the approach by the EU “to strike a balance between the conception of ‘soft’ security inherence to the EMP … and the new developments in the fields of the European Security and Defence Policy and the new European Security Strategy” (Ibid., 4)

Asbach (in: preface to Huber 2005) writes that since the inception of the EMP it was recognized that increased cooperation and understanding among EMP members could not be achieved without the active involvement of civil society. For this reason, NGOs such as the Heinrich Boell Stiftung, Lebanese Transparency Association, Life and Environment (Israel), Sisterhood Is Global Institute (Jordan), and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies, among many others have actively participated “to advocate interest, needs and priorities of their constituencies to EMP decision makers” (Huber 2005, 5) in bilateral, individual and thematic meetings (Ibid., 6). While not all of these
suggestions were utilized, these processes also provided opportunities to influence EU policy mechanisms for the establishment of the 2002 Civil Forum, which in turn strengthened the participation of civil society organizations in EMP political decision making processes in member countries (Ibid., 8), and hereby augment the political multilateralism in the EMP with civil society mechanisms.

**Economic Freedoms**

A. Sen refers to economic facilities as those opportunities which individuals enjoy to “utilize economic resources for the purpose of consumption, or production or exchange” (Sen 1999, 39). The economic entitlements a person has will depend on the resources owned or available for use.

**Free Trade Area (FTA)**

It is in line with Sen’s argument that an FTA has been welcomed by countries both on the Northern as well as the Southern Mediterranean as a Mediterranean development approach to increase the “economic facilities” for their populations and hereby expand their opportunities and the leverage this brings the individual.

It is no surprise that, although the EMP is the EU’s premier foreign policy approach to the South- and Eastern Mediterranean, in the early years of the EMP it attempted to present a uniform approach to the region. However, northern Europe views the Mediterranean differently than southern Europe in terms of diverging or even competing commercial concerns. The economic basket of the EMP envisions a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010 with aid from the EU through the Mediterranean Development
Assistance (MEDA) Program in exchange for market reforms for a common area of peace and stability. By raising the economic conditions in MENA through economic development programs as part of the EMP, last by not least through a free trade area throughout all member states, the economic impetus leading to illegal immigration is hoped to be reduced. As of June 2005 (Escribano 2005, 1), only Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia had expressed an interest in progressing beyond the current Association Agreements for participating in the Single European Market. This could be interpreted as reflecting the varying degrees of current technical harmonization capability in MENA.

Some authors, such as Carapico (2001) state that the EU’s ambitions in the Euro-Mediterranean basin and the cultivation of a special relationship further south in the Arabian Peninsula do not directly challenge US security policy in the Middle East, but are comparable to US interests in the Caribbean and Latin America as representing “a large regional free trade zone, open to imports and foreign investment” (Ibid., 24). This could be viewed as representing one of the modi operandi of the economic constitutive elements identified by A. Sen as essential for development.

Social Freedoms

A, Sen defines this freedom as that arrangement that society makes for education, health care and so on, which influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political activities (Sen 1999, 39).
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2007) pointed out in response to a speech by the Chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, (2007) concerning the effects of globalization, that to guard against resulting polarizations in personal income which affect the poorest the most, skill-based technological changes need to be addressed, especially in developing countries. Many programs supportive of social development are carried out by private NGOs and IGOs (sub-)region-wide in MENA to address these needs identified by officials and scholars in the Euro-Mediterranean region as essential to contribute to this development. This would indicate that the EMP as part of its “three basket-structure” and their great variety of programs (detailed in the first part of this dissertation) as mechanisms are positioned to address socio-cultural and human development in MENA. Since cultural understanding is a two-way street, many programs specifically involve populations from all sides of the Mediterranean).

Transparency guarantees

According to Sen “transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect in their society: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity” (Sen 1999, 39). Political and economic transparency go hand in hand. Introducing measures in EMP transactions which are specifically aimed at institutional and economic strengthening, similar as those extended to EU member internally, such as building upon the mutual commitment to common values (such as democracy and human rights, rule of law and good governance), contributes to a significant developmental step in achieving one of the basic human freedoms identified by Sen, “transparency.”
Protective security, according to A. Sen, “is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death” (Sen 1999, 40). The EU, as the largest collective foreign aid donor, is particularly active in this respect in the south- and eastern Mediterranean (as in all other parts of the world). However, structural human security in an institutionalized social sense is significantly path-dependent on the political system and economic strength (as well as the “modernization” of a country socio-culturally to permit this equally in authoritarian countries). The lack of these indicators is reflected by the steady stream of economic refugees from North Africa into the EU, who are not only endangering their lives in an uncertain passage to the Mediterranean’s northern shores in order to achieve protective security, but who also do not address those issues in their native countries which forced them to emigrate. This uncontrolled flux of illegal immigrants in turn negatively affects the security of the northern Mediterranean and points to a need for “multi-level approach” to security in the Euro-Med, such as envisioned by the EMP.

Another example of inadequate civil security are the consequences of gender differences in education which were widespread in MENA. This makes it much more difficult for a woman in this region to have access to the type of job which allows her to build up the economic resources to ensure her physical well-being without dependence on a man. The NGOs operating within the framework of the EMP have also been very helpful in gaining the local populations’ trust to assist in enabling gender equality in education on all institutional levels. Furthermore, insufficient institutional structures of an
impoverished region challenge its ability to financially and medically assist their disabled or citizens too old to work any longer.

Again, while economics also play a significant role in this aspect of development, protective security is also frequently a function directly or indirectly of political problems, such as in Palestine. Hence the EU, i.a. through the channels of the EMP, such as MEDA, attempts to improve the collective security of the Euro-Med region by additional mechanisms of its three-chapter dynamic. This combines political transparency, institution building and civil society enhancement with economic and social development on a multi-lateral basis, permitting countries to participate to the degree they are capable of, and able to integrate into their societies (in light of the great socio-political and economic diversity among them).

Global Governance

Globalization is not new. But the speed at which it expands and deepens in the past few decades is extraordinary. The impact of the new economic giants such as China, India and others, as well as the gap between the EU and the US which is not closing, are concerns to the EU (Commission of the European Communities 2005, 4). Against this background I would suggest that in order to transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the possibility of changing the assumptions about peace and definitions of security in the Mediterranean to identify post-structural\textsuperscript{18}, sub- and supra\textsuperscript{19}-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-Westphalian EU) in the post-Cold War era. Although the traditional referent object in matters of war and peace has been the

\textsuperscript{18} Such as ideational dynamics (e.g. a new “Euro-Mediterranean security community identity”

\textsuperscript{19} Such as the European Union as a post-national political construct with new forms for governance, e.g. supranational decision-making
state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2).

Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005) find that an analysis of Middle Eastern society through the English School lens is helpful in understanding the traditionally non-liberal mix of inter-human, transnational and interstate social structures of the classical Islamic world in a “layered international social structure in which some norms and institutions are shared and some not” (Ibid., 11). The EMP can be understood as functioning within this interplay of interregional and global social structures.

**The EMP as a New Statecraft? Multi-level Governance**

Analyzing the EMP from a multi-level governance perspective, organized around multiple foci (e.g. national and supra-national), rather than as simply a homogeneous integration process could also be a viable analytical lens of the EMP. It could be viewed as multi-layered and polycentric (Schmitter and Karl 1991) governance, though nowhere near a “regional-state,” but possibly a new polity species, a *sui generis* constructivist entity where national preferences are not fixed but co-constituted between agent- and structure through processes such as preference aggregation/convergence/transformation (Prugl and Locher) to make them more compatible and legally binding) through regulatory, judicial and legislative channels (“Networks”/Slaughter).

To quote Jolyon Howorth (2004, 211. Italics original): “We became so accustomed to the prison that history had built for us that, like recidivists or long-term hospital patients, we became almost incapable of visualizing any other kind of existence.
No other world, it seemed, could exist.” The significance of approaching the EMP from a constructivist standpoint is that constructivists think that culture matters in that it is inherently socially constructed, not foremost rooted in blood and soil (Reus-Smit 2005, 211). English School writers, such as Hedley Bull, prefer to think of international relations not only in terms of competition for power and wealth, but also holding particular rights, entitlements and obligations, i.e. as a society of states with cosmopolitan values (e.g. Grande and Beck 2004). We do not live in a borderless world, regardless of whether from a standpoint of extreme extrapolation of globalization, or on the basic sense of Bedouin migration for example, loosely organized according to bloodline.

Aldis’ observation (Aldis 2005, 5) that the Wider Europe strategy published by the European Commission in March 2003 and the new European Security Strategy, prepared by the High Representative for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) the same year “propose major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor”: This is, however, not optional in my opinion today, 2008, but imperative in light of the geopolitical “reconfigurations” taking place in the region. The risks and challenges make not only strategic thinking but an enhanced focus on action vis-a-vis the EU’s southern neighbors a priority.

Nachmani (2004) cautions, however, that in the discourse of the West, external support takes place as shared with Arab political leadership. Yet, this discourse does not exist in Arabic countries, where political leaders “do their utmost to guard the borders of the states, as if all the state’s plights and diseases are something external, as if it always comes from abroad, as if nothing that causes any wrong is to be found within our
borders, inside our states” (Ibid., 28). The Arab Human Development Report (2002) points out the “existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in Arab institutional structures” (Ibid., 27), which pose obstacles to building human development (Ibid., 27/28) in terms of deficits relating to freedom, empowerment of women and knowledge. While the EMP may not yet have achieved complete success, this may have been attributable in the past to this sense of lacking necessity for reforms. Now that internal shortcomings in MENA are being recognized, it is hoped that the dialogue between the northern and south- and eastern members of the EMP is shared to a greater extent to achieve an enhanced utilization of the multilateral and multilevel mechanisms available to its members for the purpose of development in the political, economic and socio-cultural arenas. As Krahmann (2003, 34) describes these multi-level governance mechanisms as

    multilevel network theory [which] proceeds from the premise that political actors seek to ensure that their political preferences will be served by the outcome of the decision-making process… The interactions which evolve due to these attempts are a result of the structure of the network on one hand, and the distribution of preferences with regard to a political issue on the other… Actors can choose among their network linkages [and] … actors choose whether to change their preferences and join a coalition in favour of a particular policy. … By hypothesizing about the choices of network actors, multilevel theory proposes a causal link between the structure of the network and the behaviour of political agenda in the decision-making process.

In conclusion then the literature points to a variety of International Relations theories to support likely interpretations of the EMP’s regional security-relevant mechanisms, including support for a more likely Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex than the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003).

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20 in line with the sectors and levels suggested by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) to operationalize security and securitization.
Chapter Three
Methodology

This dissertation utilizes the parameters of “levels” and “sectors suggested by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) in their new framework for security analysis as the bi-polar model, dominant during the Cold War, had ceased its usefulness by approximately 1989 (Ibid., vii). This “wider conception of security …and… [that of] security complex theory … [seeks] to unfold the societal component of the wider security agenda” (Ibid.), questioning “the primacy of the military element and the state in the conceptualization of security” (Ibid., 1).

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1989, 5) suggest an analysis *levels*, including national, regional, and international? and hereby “locate the actors, referent objects, and dynamics of interaction that operate in the realm of security” (Ibid.). Furthermore, these authors suggest an expansion of the political realists’ power calculations and the military strategists’ calculations of offensive and defensive capability by adding additional global systemic referent points (Ibid., e.g. pg. 8), thus defining additional sectors such as environmental, energy, human, societal, financial and others.

By operationalizing this single case study via security levels and sectors and their effect on the Euro-Mediterranean region, I hope to bring clarity to the complex political, economic and social interrelationships affecting this region, and in turn their related effect on its security status. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) point out that *insecurity*, often associated with *(geographic) proximity*, makes security a *relational* matter. Hence the security perceptions of the states in the (wider) Euro-Mediterranean region are so
interlinked as to have an internal dynamic, and the states’ national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another (Ibid.).

The focus of this dissertation is the regional integration taking place in the Euro-Mediterranean region (Euro-Med) to the point of vestiges of a regional security complex evolving among EMP-member countries. I hypothesize that the EMP now, thirteen years into its existence, is showing characteristics of regional integration beyond socio-economic harmonization to vestigial indications of an Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (EMRSC), and possibly a transatlantic umbilicus as an Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC). This would represent an epistemological shift from the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex proposed by Buzan and Waever (2003). I operationalize an EMRSC and EMRSSC by analyzing the levels and sectors in the Euro-Med, as suggested in the literature on RSCT (Ibid.).

The etiology of an EMRSC can be traced in several ways, as identified in the literature review. First, it seeks to achieve economic harmonization to optimize development through neoliberal and functional interdependence, such as a Free Trade Area. Secondly, it re-constitutes the actors and structures in member countries through social-cultural rapprochement, and increased facilities for the movement of people (and hopefully labor under the potential terms of the recently launched Union for the Mediterranean (UMed). Thirdly, it involves beyond traditional aspects of military

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21 According to Buzan and Waever (2003), a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex encompasses North Africa and the greater Middle East/Gulf states (with the Maghreb a (sub)complex (and the countries to the South of them insulator states), and also Turkey and Iran, the Gulf and the Levant as (sub)complexes.

In this dissertation I propose that due to the complexity of institutional and socio-political interconnections the Euro-Mediterranean region is more likely the regional “epicenter” of a regional security complex, than the Middle East per se, as the south-south connections are much weaker institutionally and socio-economically there vs. the wider Mediterranean region, encompassing the EMP memberstates in MENA, the Levant and Turkey as well as the EU. The future relationship of the Gulf States (such as through the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)), and Iran in a EMRSC will be addressed further in Chapter.
security/hard power (such as through intra-regional harmonization within NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) and the evolving ESDP, also constructivist dynamics of regional security complex sectors and levels. Fourth, taken as a whole, these dynamics have characteristics of a security community, which involves, according to the new framework for security analysis (Buzan, Waever, and deWilde 1998), also additional security sectors such as members emphasizing the development of civil society, or the securitization of food, water, finances, energy or the environment. These are addressed in an EMRSC on a number of levels, and can be analyzed i.a. through neo-hegemonic and Second/Third Generation Regionalism theories.

This is an individual crucial case study designed to test the theory whether there really is a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex, or whether a theoretical shift needs to be considered towards a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex, and, by extension, potentially a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex. My methodology involved thick description, history, text-, content- and policy analyses in order to determine the intersubjective understandings of norms, ideologies, and values, such as in elite decision making and leadership styles. Likewise, the triangulation of data sources from countries with different experiences in the EMP is intended to ensure the consistency of my conclusions.

A case study such as this one of course is not designed to quantitatively support the pathways to the etiology of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex. However, it uniquely enabled me to explore some of the dynamics, mechanisms, and the outcomes made possible as a result.
Data Collection Methods

This case study utilized a two-stage design: the first stage involved a review of EMP activities and programs since its inception 1995, and an interpretive reading of these activities to probe underlying norms. Additionally an archival probe of EMP projects was undertaken, such as are available from EU, ENP and EMP websites, reports from research institutes focusing on socio-political and economic developments in the Mediterranean region as well as the foreign ministry websites of member states. I describe the path of the EMP and its evolution into an EMRSC within the framework of regional security theory and Third Generation Regionalism theory from its inception in 1995 through the summer of 2008. By analyzing official EU, ENP and EMP documents, I examined norm transplantation, civil society learning, as well as regional economic and political cooperation as part of the EMP dynamic.

I take the synergistic dynamics\(^22\) observed in the security sectors and levels identified by Buzan and Waever (2003) as apparent in the EMP as an indication that it has started to transform the Euro-Mediterranean region into an EMRESC. I collected information in particular about programs which indicate harmonization of economic and social practices, as well as very strong degrees of security interdependence as indicative of a security community (Buzan 1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166) and/or a security complex as that “group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another” (Buzan 1991, 190, quoted in Pace 2003, 166). I show hereby the

\(^{22}\) This is to be understood as the synergy between the security sectors and levels identified in the EMP (e.g. those being pursued within the 3-basket structure (political, economic, and socio-cultural), as well as the reciprocity between domestic and international dynamics (as identified in the International Relations theory review in Chapter Two of this dissertation, such as Functionalism, Social Constructivism etc.).
extent to which the mutual roles of the EU, North Africa and the Levant, beyond historical ties and their current economic interests, in a security context shift from state-centric interests to society and identity. Additionally, I examined data in connection with the burgeoning UMed as it was initiated towards the conclusion of my research.

The second stage of data collection consisted of a field study of the EMP in several EMP member countries (Italy, Greece), to substantiate my archival findings. The field study-portion consisted of data-collection via semi-structured elite interviews of scholars and politicians active in the EMP. These interviews were conducted with semi-open-ended descriptive and inferential questions to allow these experts to expand the discussion to topics with which I had not been familiar before the interview. Human subject testing approval had been obtained through the University of Miami’s Independent Review Board process. The interview guide is attached in appendix 3, as is the approval by the Institutional Review Board and the Human Subject Testing Exemption in Appendix 4.

Data Analysis Methods

My data analysis for this study involved triangulation by first identifying and describing the institutionalization patterns and themes from the perspective of EMP activities in the Euro-Med, and by comparing the interview data with the archival information obtained. It involved searching for social and normative patterns in the activities of the EMP which contribute to the formation of Regional Security Complexes. Any trends where then compared with the established literature on Regional Security Complexes in order to understand and explain – or rule out - observed patterns and
themes in terms of inter-regional security and International Relations theory implications. In addition, I probed those programs which bind the member countries cooperatively in this region in such a way as to reduce security “infarctions,” be they illegal immigration, trafficking, or environmental non-sustainability (such as pollution of the Mediterranean Sea or selective water shortages to certain populations, such as the Palestinians). I suggest that the increased commitment signaled by the EU through increased MEDA funding, and the establishment of the UMed as an enhancement of the EMP, as well as economic incentives, such as securing energy supplies and routes, as playing a major role for this enhanced regional security integration in EMP member countries at different sectors and levels intra- and inter-regionally. While this perspective appears Euro-centric, tracing EMP-projects through MEDA funding and program schedules (compare Appendices Five and Six) provides a broad overview over programs taking place within the EMP. Unfortunately, time and financial constraints, as well as the general nature of the project design (as an overall security analysis) did not permit detailed member state analysis into the extent programs were initiated in non-EU countries within the EMP.

As a case study of the EMP, triangulation of methods to enhance the reliability and validity of my results (in order to control for the same outcome through different research strategies) is achieved through primary data collection in elite interviews, official publications by EMP governments and institutes, as well as through secondary data from other researchers’ reports in the field, such as research institutes, e.g. those associated with EuroMeSCo. Hence some participant-observation and ethnography is involved in this study to “best capture the intersubjective nature of reality and dialogical aspects of knowledge claims” (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 107; italics original).
The theory underlying this study is that the original “three basket EMP paradigm” (= the Three Chapters of the EMP) has been augmented by the hard security-implications of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue (even if its members are not synonymous with the membership of the EMP). The rational actor model is applicable in this context as “peace and prosperity” are a public good that cannot be achieved any longer by a country exclusively individually, but requires cooperation under scarcity (of “peace”) in the neo-hegemonic regionalism we observe today in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

Because my research strives for representativeness in quantitative and qualitative terms, I attempted to give a valid and detailed understanding of the changing political, economic and social dynamics in EMP member countries through this multitude of sources and methods. In this way I examined the multidimensionality of threats and their reciprocal effect on political identities, as well as the effects which processes of negation among political and societal actors have on their identity.

The preceding review of the relevant literature and theories revealed an eclectic applicability of theories in studying the security implications of the EMP. Since I am focusing in particular on the “construction” of new identities, interests, and structures in the regional context of the EMP, constructivism appears as the most appropriate theory for my analysis. Constructivist ontology does not have falsifiability as a goal (although the validity of “truth” claims can be established) (Klotz and Lynch 2007, 106/7), as this theory searches for meanings which do not have prima facie an objective reality. Regional integration theories as meta-theories require some flexibility to unmask assumptions about logic and interpretations (Ibid., 107).
In this dissertation, I carried out a more complex analysis of these dynamics and their implications on the security in the Euro-Mediterranean region in the context of the EMP. Furthermore, I examined the role of NATO through its Mediterranean Dialogue is be integrated into the image of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex, by extrapolating this region transatlantically. Hereby the Mediterranean Regional Security Complex could hypothetically be viewed as a Supercomplex with the inclusion of North America. Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, 5) confirm that while in the past strategic differences existed between the US and the EU towards the Mediterranean, recent changes in US policies towards the Middle East and North Africa regarding the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, in relation to a successful exit strategy from Iraq, could in fact contribute to a narrowing of the transatlantic gap (Ibid.) within the “triangular nature” (Aliboni and Qatarneh 2005) of Mediterranean relations between the US, the EU, and the Arab states.

I argue in this dissertation that the security structures of international politics are outcomes of social interactions: states are not static subjects, but dynamic agents without given identities, that are (re-)constituted through complex, historical overlapping (if often contradictory) practices. These practices reflect a tenuous relationship between domestic and international politics, e.g. between knowledge, power, social reality (compare Foucault 1978; 1985), as well as tenuous relationships between ideology and state-power, and culture and hegemony (Gramsci 1971).

Collective security, which has been referred to as a condition or a process of increasing the probability that conflicts will be resolved without violence (Deutsch 1957),

\[\text{This would not affect Buzan and Waever’s view of a North American regional security complex, but simply overlap with the Euro-Med and the North American regional security complexes.}\]
occurs in a regional security context when the states involved cease to prepare for war against each other through integration. This status could also be described as the “de-securitization” of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a result of EMP dynamics.

Constructivism stresses “structural continuities and processes of change” (Wendt 1999) based on agency, which is shaped by its social, spatial and historical context (Ibid.). However, constructivism does not give ontological priority to either structure or agency, but views them as mutually constituted, rejecting “the individualism inherent in rationalist theories of choice, which take for granted the nature of actors’ interests and identities” (Ibid.). Instead constructivism takes seriously “the principle that social reality is produced through meaningful action” (Ibid., 4). It is the “norms, rules, meanings, languages, cultures, and ideologies [as] … social phenomena that create identities and guide actions” (Ibid., 7).

My methodology here is identifying the co-constitution between the actors and institutional structures in a less rigid notion between positivist and post-positivist “data,” and the effect actors’ interests and identities have on socio-political processes in the Euro-Mediterranean post-Cold War. I argue that co-constitution between soft as well as hard power are necessary and interrelated in contributing to the Mediterranean regional security complex, rather than having a simple causal relationship.

Some overlap between constructivism and neo-functionalism includes processes of socialization, learning, transfers of loyalty, and redefinitions of interest, in

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24 This would be a political pluralistic process leading to the status of “peace” by re-defining interests and a commitment to a “new way of life” instead of coercion.
25 Such as “ideology” (e.g. of a collective Euro-Mediterranean regional security “consciousness”
26 As a social ontology and social theory dealing with ideas and interests in social relations, i.e. identity formation without concern about what the outcome is.
27 In terms of an integration theory re: policy formulation, and potentially biased towards an ever more integrationist development
keeping with “anarchy is what states make of it” in Wendt’s (1992) words. From an international relations realist perspective, state centrism is not abolished in the EMP, however, neo-hegemonic Third Generation Regionalism (Van Langenhove 2008) could possibly be identified in the southern Mediterranean.

Nevertheless, security is by definition a realist calculation. Having framed the EMP in this analysis from a security perspective as a regional Euro-Mediterranean Security Complex, potentially evolving through neo-liberal and constructivist dynamics, the legitimacy of the EMP cannot be denied, with its dynamics continuing to evolve: the question as to what extent it might evolve from an international system to the English School’s International Society not as yet answered.

The EMP seeks to address these uncertainties through an international relations approach which is “value rather than interest oriented” (Heisbourg 2001, 8). Thus it seeks to narrow the gap between different values among members through the process (i.a. through the development of a transnational identity itself (Ibid.)), with its interests, identities and actors co-constituted (Wendt 1999), rather than solely imposed through specific policy objectives (Ibid.). Other authors, such as Spencer (2001, 10) have echoed the processual28 aspect of the EU and the EMP, rather than being end-games in themselves or as a rigid paradigm.

This dissertation confirms that the initial three-level paradigm of the EMP discussed in the literature on development (compare Stiglitz, Sen, Rodrick, or Krugman), as well as in security theory, regional security complex theory, regional integration theory, international institutionalization, and complex interdependence theories represents a

28 This would refer to the process-orientation (e.g. in terms of a re-constitution of actors, identities, values, and structures) in achieving its goals.
constructivist constellation in the synergy between economically, politically, and socially stabilizing broad and vastly heterogeneous intra- and inter-regional dynamics.

From the EU perspective, this dissertation seeks to show how both hard and soft power approaches are utilized in its foreign policy approach to MENA, with the ESDP and the Rapid Reaction Force of the EU in tandem with NATO (and especially its Mediterranean Dialogue) as hard power (Manners 2002, 237), and the EMP focusing on soft power. This dissertation shows that soft power has significant security implications, with the optimal mix between the two constantly being adjusted (Heisbourg 2001, 6/7). It is based on the political realities of the day, as well as progress in the process of harmonization among EMP members. Heisbourg (2001, 7) points out that capability is not merely a function of military hardware, but equally a “function of strategic vision” (Ibid.).

If my hypothesis is confirmed that the EMP through its 3-basket structure, as the independent variable has a regional de-securitizing effect (i.a. through the intervening variables of MEDA programs, Nato’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative, and the UN), I expect to find that the emerging structure (in terms of underlying sectors and levels) and dynamics within the EMP, can indeed be more appropriately referred to as an EMRSC, hereby adjusting the current concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex which other authors had proposed.

The research and travel grants from the European Commission, as well as travel grants from the University of Miami Department of International Studies to attend international conferences on this topic and carry out my field work, in addition to grants from the University of Miami College of Arts and Sciences, the Provost, and the
university Graduate School enabled me to travel internationally to conduct the interviews in conjunction with the presentation of papers at conferences during the spring and summer of 2008.

Limitations and Biases

Since the EMP is a unique regional integration program in terms of the circumstances of its creation, the players (e.g. the EU as a *sui generis* actor) and the extent of its programs, it cannot be compared directly to another IGO for example, hence affecting the reliability of my interpretations of the evolution of a regional security complex. Furthermore, to my knowledge this type of regional integration program has never been studied within the framework of an evolution into a regional security complex, given the parameters of intensity of levels and sectors of security integration in the Euro-Med. Hence the validity of this case study is limited because I cannot compare my findings to another, similar case. Furthermore, even though the activities undertaken by the EMP appear to have a positive correlation (though of unproven causality) with the theoretical parameters of regional security complexes, they may not apply to other geographical regions striving for this type of regional integration, which could potentially affect the universality of the dynamics researched here.

Positioning the dynamics and structures of the EMP within regional security complex theory appeared to me as the most consistent with established international relations theory. However, another researcher, studying the same case, may prefer to develop the concept of regional integration more specifically along other theoretical models, e.g. along theories about neo-functionalism, or international regime theory. The
findings could be subject to other interpretations, mostly with respect to the effect of intervening variables such as the domestic socio-political and economic factors, or global governance theories, such as Network Theory (Slaughter 2004).

This study was confined to interviewing a very limited field data sample, chosen on availability, rather than breadth and randomness of member state representation. Also, I was not able to examine every single document written about the EMP, which could have led to a different interpretation of the data – hence representing a significant bias in the study. Nevertheless, since I detected consistency within the great abundance of data that was available to me, it is doubtful that any further data would present a completely different picture of the status of the EMP by summer 2008.

Additionally, no formal fieldwork was conducted in southern Mediterranean EMP member countries. This might also have presented a completely different perspective of EMP dynamics and structures, as opposed to those by diplomats and researchers (though many are native in the southern Mediterranean) available to me in the northern Mediterranean.
PART II: DATA AND ANALYSIS

Chapter Four

Field Research Data and Analysis

The field data of this study consist of elite semi-structured interviews with inferential questions, conducted in Northern Mediterranean countries, and interviews with South and Eastern Mediterranean subjects conducted in North America and EU countries, due to the material limitations to carry out fieldwork in MENA. These data are intended to be compared and contrasted with the archival findings and secondary data in the following sections.

The interviews were carried out at random among academic (social scientists) and political elites native to countries surrounding the Euro-Mediterranean. Since this study took place in the spring/summer of 2008, simultaneous with the impending “launch” of the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed)\(^30\), the sample is particularly small as elites were hesitant to express their opinion about the past and future potential of the EMP at such a politically sensitive time.

Union for the Mediterranean

Since the inception of this dissertation (summer 2007) to the execution of the field work (spring/summer 2008), French President Sarkozy called for the creation of a “Mediterranean Union,” which has been transformed by the collective work of the EU into the “Union for the Mediterranean.” Since its launch on July 13, 2008 was impending during the data collection period, no clear cut line can always be made between opinion

\(^30\) More on the UMed in Chapter Nine
and perceptions about the EMP and hopes and anxieties for the UMed among the respondents.

Nevertheless, this launch of the UMed has definitely created excitement and enthusiasm for bringing “dynamic” into the EMP and political and economic relations in the Euro-Med in general, when the EMP per se has been viewed as not fulfilling the expectations generated by it. Expectations, which were possibly unrealistic in light of the conflicts in the region exceeding a couple millennia (while, by comparison, the EU has been close to sixty years in the making since the time of the Schuman Declaration, whose goal originally was to address French-German conflicts, which date back “only” several hundred years).

One responded pointed out that among MENA countries there does not exist unanimity about the UMed, but that Libya for example is against the concept as a whole, and that among Arab states there is ambivalence about its military aspect, as it would involve Israel. Other respondents pointed out that “jockeying for primacy” in a region (i.e. the shores of the Mediterranean in this context) as not limited to Europe, but that some countries in MENA were also seeking a “primary status” in the UMed, either by playing the “privileged relations-card,” such as Algeria-France, or in a decision about the location of the UMed proposed permanent secretariat (e.g. Egypt).
### Table 4.1: Summary of Field Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Origin</th>
<th>Northern Mediterranean Countries</th>
<th>Southern Mediterranean Countries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># and Gender of Interviewee</td>
<td>1/M</td>
<td>1/F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Male</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Female</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive about EMP?</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative because</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Difference</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimistic about Future for EMP?</td>
<td>maybe</td>
<td>difficult</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Several respondents expressed the hope for greater resources and manpower to deal efficiently and rationally with the challenges in the Euro-Med in all their diversity, including the one viewed by the North as “irrational” (terrorism, nuclear proliferation etc.) by offering options more palatable to all concerned. This increased emphasis on broadened approaches to peaceful solutions should, according to one respondent in particular, also emphasize the parliamentarian aspect. Hence, rather than the Mediterranean Parliament’s limited advisory role to the EMP, and North-South ministerial meetings taking place on a more bilateral level, rather than integrated EMP-level, the UMed should address a more collective and representative approach to the Euro-Med.

Since this dissertation is not about the UMed per se, comments which arose about it during the collection of the field data are being treated in this dissertation as a previously unknown independent variable that cannot be fully analyzed within this dissertation as its end date coincides with the actual launch of the UMed. Hence the data involving the UMed had to be acknowledged, but have to be viewed as “speculative” on the part of the respondents (though they were definitely influencing their expectations and probably actions), without being able to be confirmed by the author with the “actual” UMed which was not even officially in existence (and was, in fact, clouded in great secrecy until its launch).

Pronounced demarcation between responses from interviewees from Northern vs. Southern Mediterranean countries

Despite the preceding caveats, the data trends appear surprisingly clear (compare Table 1). Utilizing the Interview Guide (Appendix 4), none of its three questions were
generally addressed in a differentiated manner. Rather, most respondents displayed a considerable unfamiliarity with the EMP, its processes, goals and accomplishments per se. However, they had generally very firm opinions about the relations between “their” coast of the Mediterranean and the other shore. Overall, subjects from the Southern Mediterranean were rather open to involvement with the Northern Mediterranean, especially economically (even though the literature points to hesitancy by the ruling elites in the Southern Mediterranean to be cautious towards any kind of program (such as civil society building or democracy enhancing “schemes”) which might endanger their own power (especially in the case of authoritarian regimes, which applies to the majority of countries in MENA) (compare Ouassia 2008).

In contrast, respondents from the EU were for the most part very cautious about the potential of any kind of cooperation with MENA, regardless of the program (such as the EMP) involved, or the prospect of a new one (such as the UMed), although the French respondent was slightly more open to MENA, probably because he was influenced by the media-frenzy stirred up by French President Sarkozy during the time period of this study in support of the UMed as the successor program to the EMP.

Gender differences among respondents

Although the ratio of female to male respondents was not equal (approximately 1:3), there was negligible difference in their responses (especially in comparison to the difference in Northern vs. Southern Mediterranean, which were distinctly pronounced, based on geography, as discussed above).
Incomprehension about the concept of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex

While the theoretical construct of security community is not at all new (compare Deutsch et al. 1957), shared security was not perceived by any respondent as existing among the countries bordering the Mediterranean. Several respondents pointed out that security in the Mediterranean region needs to be multi-lateral in terms of a balance of soft and hard power, i.e. approaches e.g. from NATO and the EU (as the EU is not perceived by the respondents as a “hard power” actor in this region at the time of writing), and the inclusion of all actors (especially in terms of religious “inclusivity”). Ironically, just this inclusivity was nevertheless also cited as one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the region.

The EU as a Security Actor in the Euro-Mediterranean?

Some respondents pointed out that the EU itself is overall frequently not viewed as a security actor in the Euro-Mediterranean region. One respondent viewed only the hard security of an actor such as NATO having credibility. The EU’s soft power potential in terms of economic harmonization and development, or socio-cultural rapprochement were not even considered (thirteen years after the founding of the Barcelona Process…).

In this context, France was accorded “credibility” as a (“credible”) security actor by several respondent not only as a nuclear power itself, but as one willing to share it with MENA countries, quoting the recent sale of equipment to Libya for the generation of energy (which in MENA appears to be frequently a euphemism (or illusion?) as the first step in gaining know how and equipment for preparing nuclear weapons (which in
turn are justified apparently not only as a defense vis-à-vis Israel’s suspected nuclear weapons, but also simply as a statement of “equality,” at last, with the West)). In contrast, the need for “hard” power was viewed by other respondents as that element necessary to control just this pronounced reemergence of the “nuclearization-fetish” among many MENA countries.

Negation of a Potential for an “International Society” or Similar in the Euro-Mediterranean

There was unanimity among respondents that they (or their country of origin) perceive the “other” shore of the Mediterranean as culturally and politically too different to permit conceptualization of any type of “shared fate,” i.e. there exists no “Euro-Mediterranean Self Identity” (yet). The exception to this trend were the Israeli and Palestinian respondents, who happen to work for a Think Tank whose goal is in fact the rapprochement between Israel and Palestine, and see the need for a shared future.

Several respondents gave the impression that they perceive an “either-or” situation in the Euro-Mediterranean: NATO or the EU, Judeo-Christian West or Islam, France or EU, etc. Certainly this is historically based. But it has been propagated throughout recent history by some actors for their political ends, although not others, such as NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, which is basically open to all interested countries. But without past examples and experiences to copy, “inclusion” of all concerned actors is today, even among elites according to the limited field data in this study, still very difficult to at least conceptualize. One respondent suggested separating (actually the verb used was “contamination of”) religious and cultural factors from more a “multicultural” (in the
words of the respondent) - approach, such as “human rights” as an EU-approach (or would alternately the more “universal” “UN”-approach be more neutral??).

Intra-“shore” differences or similarities

This study focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region as a whole. However, there are a number of studies which point out the lack of intra-regional (e.g. South-South or North-North linkages). This can be viewed among EU member states, despite the considerable degree of pooled sovereignty among them, in terms of limited trust of their neighbors31 (as the recent Irish referendum has shown). Nevertheless, lack of cooperation with one’s neighbors has been shown academically to increase the potential for conflict, as proximity increases the number of issues which can lead to non-peaceful outcomes.

Discussion

Perception

The underlying tone among the responses from respondents on all shores of the Mediterranean was alienation with the “other” culture, resignation and a sense of hopeless about the status quo, with additionally a sense of exclusion among some respondents from the Southern respondents, yet often a desire to “be part” of “Europe.”

One respondent pointed out that a “twinning”-type program between MENA and the EU to bring junior university faculty to Southern European universities appears to be very effective in bridging the Mediterranean gap between its southern and its Northern shore intellectually in a very cost-effective manner.

31 This can be partially traced back to the Cold War when countries in MENA often chose opposing alliances between the US and the Soviet Union
Dynamics

A lack of political will on both sides of the Mediterranean, expressed partially in a lack of financial commitment, especially in MENA, was pervasive. Apparently the payoff structure was not advantageous for change. The evolution (i.e. expansion of its budget) of the MEDA-program often came too slowly and/or too late in the EMP for its effects to be discernible by the respondents.

In terms of “bilateral” relations, President Sarkozy’s proposal of the UMed certainly catapulted France into a priority “actor” vis-à-vis MENA. While the EU Commission and EU Parliament had successfully changed the original proposal of a Mediterranean Union (with a more bi-lateral character France-MENA, or possibly a “5+5” arrangement of the Southern European countries and most interested MENA countries) into the more multilateral (i.e. involving the EU-27) UMed, this scaled back a broadly perceived (in MENA, especially in Turkey, as well as in Spain and in Northern Europe for example) neo-Gaullism. While many respondent on all sides of the Mediterranean stated some ambivalence about French neo-hegemony, other MENA respondents “cherished” the (historical) “familiarity” of dealing with France, rather than the prospect of dealing with the (more unfamiliar) northern European countries.

Cultural differences

They are mostly perceived North-South as “insurmountable,” but South-North views exhibit a “cautious curiosity.” In this context a surprising (not to say shocking) overt “racism” was obvious: Several European respondents (many being academics, I might point out) flat out stated that Europe should seek relations (economic, political)
with Northern Europe as a “superior” “world,” and ignore the southern Mediterranean as “inferior” and of little use to them for anything (sic). One responded from a former Communist country, for example stated that his country was much closer culturally to France than North Africa (even though geographically the distance from his country is closer to MENA than the Iberian peninsula) - and despite the “Iron Curtain” separating his country from the West for a generation and a half (though technically not necessarily separating former Communist Europe from MENA countries, which had “communist-parallels” during the Cold War at times…). A similar opinion was heard interestingly enough in earnest from a Northern Italian executive of an MNC, who stated that (catholic) Northern Italy should cooperate much more closely with Northern Europe as they are more similar with (protestant) (sic!) Scandinavia than with (catholic) Southern Italy or MENA culturally!

Another respondent, however, pointed out that the “culture card” is played as a political tool and was not per se “set” in a “North-South”/”West-MENA”-paradigm. Rather, this respondent stated by way of comparison that even among the Christian Lebanese today, who, far removed from Lebanon, have emigrated to the US, peace and harmony do not automatically exist, but that even here a wrangling for “position” (power?) is taking place in this seemingly religiously and socially homogeneous group through mechanisms of “exclusion.” The topic of “power” (voiced as overtones to a majority of questions/inquiries by the researcher), often in the context of hegemony, was dominant among respondents from all countries surrounding the Mediterranean, interestingly enough, while “culture differences” appeared to be a more primary concern among Northern European respondents in dealing with MENA.
This would be an area for further study, e.g. to compare how countries which have less (practical) familiarity with “pooling sovereignty” for example might be more likely to seek “zero-sum” international relations (possibly in comparison with Russia today also for example, or even with the policies advocated today by those scholars in the West, who had experienced their top personal intellectual acclaim as Cold War scholars during that time period), as compared to those who prefer (more peaceful?!) positive-sum international relations and solutions to international conflicts as a result of (heavily iterated) successful (peaceful), institutionalized cooperation in an environment of credible compliance structures.

Data Analysis Methods

My data analysis for this study involved triangulation by proceeding now from first having identified and described the interview data to comparing them with institutionalization patterns and themes from the perspective of EMP activities in the Euro-Med, and in turn comparing them with the archival information obtained in the following section. It involved searching in particular for social and normative patterns in the activities of the EMP which might contribute to the formation of Regional Security Complexes. Any trends will then be compared with the established literature on Regional Security Complexes in order to understand and explain – or rule out - observed patterns and themes in terms of regional security and International Relations theory implications.
Chapter Five

Archival and Secondary Data – Part A

Traditionally, military alliances were viewed as the most important form of international cooperation to deal with threats to states (Attina 2005, 2). These have changed over the past couple centuries due to changes in system polarity and great power competition and their effect on cooperation in terms of encouraging “the formation of military alliances either to consolidate or change and subvert the existing political order” (Ibid.). Attina (2005, 2) points out that security cooperation is also influenced by culture “because values and norms about security, stability and peace make national governments inclined to change the forms of military cooperation in harmony with the prevailing values and norms.”

As mentioned in the introduction to Chapter Three on the methodology in this dissertation, “security” in the Euro-Mediterranean region is assessed by evaluating “sectors” and “levels” per the New Framework for Security Analysis (Buzan, Waever, and de Wilde 1998) in greater detail in the remainder of this chapter. In particular, in terms of security co-operation in the Mediterranean region, Attina (2004, 2) views its construction as relating to two dimensions: “the multidimensional strategy of the three Chapters of the Barcelona Declaration and the specific initiatives of the partners within the 1st Chapter frame” (Ibid.) (italics added) in particular.

As my analysis utilizes a constructivist approach, this section starts with a brief examination of EU “values” and “identity” as reciprocally dependent and independent variables of the structures and actors in the Euro-Mediterranean region. Due to material and temporal limitations inherent in this dissertation, but explicitly not due to
ethnocentrism or lack of awareness, unfortunately the non-EU EMP-member states’
individual values and identities are dealt with in a much more abbreviated format in other
sections of this chapter.

EU Values and Identity

The EU, as a unique socio-political “construct” ("sui generis"), has been described
in its international relations i.a. as a normative power (e.g. Nikolaides 2002, Manners
2002), based on its social values to achieve its political end and peaceful relations,
internally and internationally. The EU’s promotion of human rights and democracy are
based on the principles of the UN’s 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the
1950 European Convention on Human Rights, the UN’s 1966 International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the UN’s 1976 the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. These were again enshrined in the EU’s legal body in the
1999 Amsterdam Treaty, marking a deeper commitment to democratic principles,
especially in the new Article 6 which states that the European Union “is founded on the
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States,” which now obliges
the EU to bear the international obligation to respect those principles also in its
relationships with other actors in the International Community, such as those receiving
technical and political assistance or financial aid within the framework of their
cooperation (cited in Scalambrieri 2004, 13).

The Commission’s actions are further guided in the coherence of their internal and
external approaches by the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, proclaimed at the 2000
Nice Summit. This was enhanced by a series of Commission communications to the EU Council and the EU Parliament, such as the “Communication on the EU’s Role in Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries (May 8, 2001), which ensure that human rights and democracy issues are dominant themes in every external EU project or action based

on the universality and indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural human rights and … [making] the protection of such rights, together with the promotion of pluralistic democracy and effective guarantees for the rule of law and the fight against poverty, the EU’s fundamental goals (quoted in, and interpreted by Scalambrieri 2004, 13).

In 2003, the Commission (in: *Final Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament #294 “Reinvigorating EU actions on Human Rights and democratization with Mediterranean partners”*) set out working guidelines to achieve these goals of democratization and human rights promotion in cooperation with its partner countries in the Mediterranean by proposing ten concrete recommendations to improve the dialogue on, and the implementation of, democracy promotion and human rights implementation in those regions not complying with international norms (Scalambrieri 2004, 24). By including a standard clause on democratic principles and fundamental human rights in agreements with third countries the EU is now able to suspend or terminate agreements with these countries in case of non-compliance, as they are not establishing new standards but are simply referring to customary international law (Ibid., 25). Furthermore, these clauses are also not transforming the basic nature of their agreements, but are simply re-affirming commonly shared values and principles, but positing them as a precondition for all cooperation (Ibid.). “This approach was expressly confirmed by the ECJ in Portugal V. Council (1996)” (Ibid.).
The original academic discussion of Europe as a civilian rather than military power dates back to authors such as Duchene (1972) and Bull (1982) who viewed the EU as long on economic power, but short on military power (Duchene 1972). By 1991, however, the Treaty on the European Union indicated the intent of the EU to also develop its defense dimension (Manners 2002, 237). Hence Manners (Ibid.) suggests augmenting the civilian and military aspects of the EU by “the international role of the … EU as a promoter of norms, which displace the state as the centre of concern,” such as social solidarity, rule of law, human rights, and a “Treaty base” such as the Copenhagen criteria (Ibid., 243).

Pertaining to EU values internally, Held (1999) states that common European values underpin EU social models, and represent the foundations of the specific European approach to economic and social policies.

There can be no partial solutions. No single country can meet the challenges alone. Acting together at a European and national level, we can give Europe a future. We can have a strong voice, projecting European vision and European values among our partners around the world … the status quo is not an option … growth and jobs is a truly European agenda. … The EU’s Member States have developed their own approach reflecting their history and collective choices (Ibid. 3).

One of the stumbling blocks the EMP encountered in its early years was the lack of ratification a charter for Peace and Stability - this failure being symptomatic of a lack of commitment to these values of EMP member states at that time.

Positing EU values in the Mediterranean Ulla Holm (2004, 1), however, views the dialectic faced by the EU in this region in terms of the tension in the conceptualization of the Mediterranean as a cultural cradle of great civilizations versus as a conflict laden zone. It is interlinked with the discourses of the EU as an exporter of democracy through
a model to copy, rather than an empire-builder through respect for cultural diversity and Arab sovereignty, but also exporting political shared European values. The relationship between security and regional stability for the greater Europe is well known – and proven in the post-World War II developments.}

The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 expanded the EU’s self-appointed mission to the propagation of human rights and democracy through the development and consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, and to foster fundamental freedoms within the framework of cooperation policy. It later evolved into one of the explicit objectives of the emerging Common Foreign and Security Policy (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke 2001).

This contradicts the statements of some right-wing Europeans who attribute EU-values as a guiding culture drawing on Judeo-Christian humanistic traditions, implying a “proprietary” quality for them (including to challenging “the Islamic problem”) (Spiegel 3/31/08 interview with Geert Wilders: Moderate Islam is a Contradiction).

This approach of “exclusion” cannot be viewed as representing the EU’s position (as it is certainly not accepted that Islam does not share many of the same values). Rather, the diffusion of EU norms in MENA in the context of globalization could be viewed as significant in the fight against terrorism which cannot be fought with military means alone:

apart from international law, tolerance and respect for other cultures should be the maxims of actions … Islamic motivated terrorism can only be successfully fought if we encourage the democratic and economic development in the affected crisis regions and achieve more respect for human rights (Merkel in Spiegel Online 9/11/2006).

32 In fact, it represented the basis of the Truman Doctrine for Europe (Coufudakis 2004, 235).
This philosophy was already reflected also in the preamble of the Barcelona Declaration of 1995:

… turning the Mediterranean basin into an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures…

Despite religious and civil (EU and international) actors in favor of these values, a number of governments in MENA “have been reluctant to adopt substantive reforms on the way to democratization, … appearing content on maintaining authoritarian rule” (Scalambrieri 2004, 26). However, one must keep in mind the dangers inherent during periods of transition from authoritarian to democratic rule, as the case of Central-and Eastern Europe has amply demonstrated, such as a resurgence of extreme nationalism, often leading to increased domestic ethnic conflicts, and an exaggerated aggressive foreign policy. In MENA, this could in combination with radical “Islam exacerbate the already existing threats to peace and stability” (Ibid., 27. Compare also Gillespie and Youngs 2002, 9 and Chourou 2002, 28). Senyucel et al. (2006, 11) write that following the anti-terrorism measures post-9/11, the start of the Iraq War in 2003 and following the 2007 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, debates of religious and/or cultural identity increased in many MENA states. On the other hand of the spectrum, “organizations and groups representing ‘anti-Western’ positions and concepts of state and society have been attracting greater attention” (Ibid.) (though variable in extent from country to country), and the impact of “normative” Europe is being questioned.

By comparison, in 2006 Democracy Watch reports a significant increase in the pervasiveness of democracy, respect of human rights and civil liberties in the Arab world
along several parameters. Yet, a stage of consistent peaceful, substantive democratization is not yet reached in the Maghreb and Mashrig, as the continued Middle Eastern unrest shows, in addition to other unsolved “conflicts,” such as the former western Mauritanian region’s, the Western Sahara area conflict with Morocco, and the Turkish occupation of Cyprus. The significance of an ascendance of liberal democratic values following the end of the Cold War suggests (compare Schweller 1991, 268) that despite the ongoing power shifts *i.a.* in the larger Euro-Mediterranean region currently that “the instability often associated with uneven rates of growth is neutralized by the increase in the number of democratic states (Ibid.).

The EU’s engagement in the Mediterranean came much closer to home with the 2004 enlargement which included Cyprus and Malta. Some authors, such as Scalambrieri (2004, 12) have wondered whether this enlargement has shifted the balance in the Euro-Med to the disadvantage of MENA by diluting the EMP – especially in light of its increased shift during the same EU enlargement to the East as well. It is in this context that the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) gained a new saliency.

The EU and Democratic Transitions

While this dissertation is not intended to provide either an in-depth analysis of the value of democracy, or the dialectics involved in democratization processes, below will follow a brief synopsis of democratic transitions to review some of its inherent problematiques which are (potentially) faced by some non-democratic EMP member states and their impact on regional security, and the role of the EMP in potentially addressing them.
Internal Parameters which reflect consolidated Democracies

There is an extensive literature on democracy in political science, and especially internal parameters which reflect consolidated democracies. Lipset (1959) was interested in mechanisms which contribute to successful democratizations. He identified three necessary components for this process. They are the following: Economic and social background conditions, such as high per capita income, widespread literacy, prevalent urban residence, a broad middle class without extreme income polarization. These conform with the criteria which Sen (1999) also had identified as promoting “freedom.”

Rustow (1979) concurred with Lipset in that certain beliefs (civic attitudes), such as the belief in consensus, including consensus about the right to differ, and the willingness to participate are essential ingredients of successful democratization. The degree of a democracy’s legitimacy can be measured by how well the system performs, e.g. institutions are not threatened and groups have access to the system.

According to Lijphart (1992), just as Lipset had also pointed out, democratic stability requires conflict and reconciliation in the political process as well, i.e. democratic values need to be congruent not only in the political arena, but also in authority structures throughout society, such as businesses, trade unions and culture. Or, in Schumpeter’s classic words “democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions… through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schumpeter 1943, cited by Schmitter and Karl 1991, 76).

Thus, the literature on democracy has emphasized the key role of civic values and economic conditions, and these goals are in fact reflected in the EMP’s three chapters as well as its corresponding programs. However, central to the establishment of democracy
are institutions. Huntington (1991, 6) defines a democracy as characterized by “sources of authority for government, purposes served by the government, and procedures for constituting a government.” The central procedure of democracy is “the selection of leaders through competitive elections by the people they govern” (Huntington 1991, 6), including a choice of parties, as well as “the existence of those civil and political freedoms to speak, publish, assemble, and organize that are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral campaigns” (Huntington 1991, 7).

At the simplest level, Huntington (1991, 35) observes three stages to a democratic transition from authoritarianism:

- the end of an authoritarian regime,
- the installation of a democratic regime,
- the consolidation of the democratic regime (stabilization phase). This latter observation is similar to the “habituation phase” identified by Weber (1949) and echoed by Linz and Stepan (1996, 6). In this study I will refer to this stage as the “consolidation -phase.

The challenges faced by a new democracy can be categorized into three types according to Huntington (1991, 208):

- First are transition problems stemming from the event of regime change from authoritarianism to democracy, e.g. new constitutional and electoral systems, changing/abolishing authoritarian agencies and institutions, such as the secret police or the one-party system.
- Second, contextual problems endemic in the country pose a challenge to any government, authoritarian or democratic, such as regional antagonisms,
communal conflicts, poverty, and low rates of economic growth (Huntington 1991, 36) and are not coincidental to the transition. In this context Max Weber’s work (1949) is often cited. He argued that differences in national patterns often reflect key historical events which set a certain process in motion in one country and a different one in another.

- Third, *systemic* problems are those resulting from a working democracy, such as the inability to reach decisions, remnants of overly concentrated decision making, deficient feedback, and dependence on performance legitimacy.

Consolidation success, according to Huntington (1991) can be influenced by several factors:

- Characteristically, democracies do not succeed in creating a stable democracy with their first attempt (Ibid., 270);
- A high correlation exists with the level of economic development (Ibid.), and
- A supportive external/international environment and foreign actors are conducive to consolidation (Ibid., 273).

Huntington tests successful consolidation via the “two turn-over test” (Ibid., 153), whereby a party which is in power in a country, but looses the next election, is able to regain power in a subsequent election.

This review is meant to be taken in correlation with the other broad dynamics, to be outlined in the remainder of this data chapter, which are taking place in the EMP,
sometimes enhancing, and on occasion disrupting other security dynamics in the Euro-Med.

European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)

Basic Governmental Structure from the EU perspective

As discussed in the previous section, following the end of the Cold War and the socio-political consequences of this geopolitical challenge to the EU, its policy makers sought a convergence of EU values and political principles in neighboring countries, even if the incentive of EU-membership could not be offered (Scalambieri 2004, 11). The European Council of Copenhagen approved in December 2002 the idea of a “Wider Europe” and as its policy tool, the European Neighborhood Policy. In May 2004, the Commission “published its Strategy Paper on the ENP, laying out the principles and objectives that would govern all future ENP partnerships” (Gaenzle 2008, 10). Each country Strategy Paper identifies that bilateral relationship between the EU and a Neighborhood country, identifying EU cooperation goals and policy responses, and mapping out areas for cooperation, key priorities, as well as assessing the partner country’s policy agendas, political and socio-economic status. By taking political and legislative measures to enhance economic integration and liberalization, as well as measures to promote human rights, cultural cooperation and mutual understanding, countries neighboring the EU “are explicitly invited to make steps towards regional security co-management and participate in initiatives aimed and improving conflict prevention and crisis management” (Attina 2005, 17), as well as strengthen cooperation in the prevention and fight against common security threats.
In June 2004 the Council confirmed that the ENP is a strategy based on partnership and joint ownership to promote modernization and reform in a single, inclusive, balanced and coherent policy framework. Action Plans with each country should clearly identify a limited number of key priorities with performance-driven, tailor-made assistance and incentives for reform (Council Conclusions 2007) (italics added) in addition to contributing to regional cooperation (Council of the EU 2004). In terms of day-to-day operation, the respective ministries of ENP-member countries are in often daily contact with the EU’s Council of Ministers.

The Commission for its part also developed its first set of country reports, reflecting the political, economic and social conditions in ENP countries, and an indication for assessments of future achievements. These were published in May 2004 for the first time for those countries, with which Association or Partnership Agreements with the EU were in force. Building on experience gained from the accession proceedings leading to the large 2004 EU enlargement, the ENP itself also originated in the post-enlargement environment in the DG Enlargement until it was shifted to DG Relex (Kelley 2006, 30-2). It was envisioned as a “ring of friends”33, expressing the EU’s hopes to “develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood” to maintain a particularly close, peaceful and cooperative relationship” (Ibid.) with the countries surrounding it through joint responsibility for security, and bilateral as well as regional cooperative projects, often containing EU values as “political conditionality.”

33 “Neighbors” at the time of the ENP’s founding were: Algeria, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus*, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya*, Moldova, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority, Syria*, Tunisia and Ukraine (* = participating as observers) (International Herald Tribune September 2, 2007).

Russia does not participate as Brussels is pursuing a “strategic partnership” with Moscow (Associated Press September 4, 2007).
The EU Parliament for its part is involved in the ENP through regular meetings with its counterparts from ENP-member states (MSs) under the umbrella of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs).

**The ENP as Foreign Policy**

The ENP represents the core priority of the EU’s foreign policy, with a clear geopolitical imperative to foster stability (EU Presidency Progress Report 18/19 June 2007) in its neighborhood. It is viewed by the EU as critical in addressing its strategic objectives, “to tackle the challenges we face and to reap the substantial benefits of closer political and economic ties” (Ibid., 1), such as political instability and weak governance in its neighborhood, as well as Europe’s energy security, environmental threats and rising flows of illegal migration, which have a growing influence on the EU’s security and prosperity – and reciprocally on its neighbors.

In its first two years since the ENP’s implementation in 2004 significant results have been “helping partners to forge a detailed reform agenda … by providing higher and more effective EU assistance” (Ibid.). By developing privileged reform relationships, the ENP becomes more attractive, effective and credible, but also flexible (through the bilateral aspect under the general ENP “umbrella”), as a single, inclusive and coherent policy framework. Additionally, its funding was increased by thirty-two percent for the period 2007-2013 to euro 12 billion, “including euro 1 billion to help stimulate private lending for the most reform-minded neighbors” (Herald Tribune September 2, 2007). These measures are also intended to prevent new “dividing lines” between those countries inside and those outside of the EU through financial assistance to link systems and programs in transport, research and education, energy, environment, culture etc., as
well as fostering cross-border cooperation (e.g. South-South, East-West, and North-South), including facilitating visa procedures through streamlined programs and simplified funding procedures (Smith 2005, 766).

The ENP, nevertheless, is distinct from any EU-accession processes or aspirations, neither favoring nor discouraging these. This is in some cases a point of consistent consternation for some neighbors, such as Ukraine. Additional ambivalence is voiced by those countries in the “vicinity” of the EU, which are neither EU-members nor candidate countries, nor fall under the ENP, despite their frequently great economic and political fragility. This might also reflect the difficulty in defining “Europe’s borders” geographically. ENP is only one of several frameworks in the EU’s foreign relations among others, such as the Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) and TACIS (micro-financial assistance and humanitarian aid) assistance program with the former Soviet republics. Some authors, such as Lippert (2007, 181) bemoan this strategic ambivalence in geography (ambivalent borders) and a perceived lack of finalité of the ENP overall. I would state however that this intentionally built-in flexibility is a significant part of the EU’s strategy, not only in light of the substantial shifts possible in any foreign policy, but most certainly in MENA and particularly during the last decade, with potentially more significant shifts forthcoming in light of the US military potential in the greater “Iraq-area,” among other “theatres” in the greater regions. The flexibility, diversification and multidimensionality of the ENP as the basis for the dialogue and negotiation to build

common security mechanisms are not on the frontline of the process, but heavily depend on achievements in other cooperation dimensions, i.e. on the reforms needed to increasingly harmonize the economic markets and,
eventually, the political systems of all the partner countries (Attina 2005, 18).

The EMP in the Context of the ENP

Early cooperation programs between the EC and certain Mediterranean countries date back to 1958, the year of the first Treaty of Rome, when Israel approached the EEC for a comprehensive agreement between Israel and the EEC. In 1973, shortly after the October War and the oil embargo of that year, the EEC Council adopted in Copenhagen the *Euro-Arab* Dialogue upon a French initiative. While the Europeans anticipated it as a forum to deliberate economics, the Arabs viewed it as a forum for political affairs. It was suspended 1979 after the Camp David Agreements, and resumed once more in 1989 as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean, an Italian-Spanish proposal advocated by the Italian foreign minister Gianni de Michaelis, upon Egypt’s return following its suspension from the Arab League 1983. It was abandoned a year later as too ambitious in light of the Gulf Crisis and Arab dissension afterwards. However, it was “followed by a French-inspired proposal for consultations about common security problems between five European states and the five states of the Maghrib” (Joffé 2001, 36). Libya and Mauritania, having joined the group, formed in 1989 a collective security and economic integration organization, the Maghrib Arab Union, which became absorbed in 1994 into another Mediterranean security dialogue led by Egypt, the Mediterranean Dialogue. This shows how regional security is neither an EU-hegemonic and/or imperialist design for MENA, as countries in the latter have recognized the regional security significance, regardless of any differences.
Despite these repeated attempts to harmonize security around the Mediterranean overall during the Cold War era a “reductionist concept of security prevailed [which] sought to prevent conflicts between the two superpowers and their allies” (Aliboni 2002, 9), the period following it involved “transformations in the world order” (Ibid.). These represent a conflict potential, involving new security threats ranging from organized crime networks and mafias involved in money laundering, drug trafficking, illegal trafficking in arms, including WMDs, as well as terrorism. This resulted in a new theoretical debate of comprehensive security, and its policies beyond military security to include new security concepts, actions, functions, and actors (Ibid.). Security was no longer viewed as simply a “state achieved by society, but a process which moves forwards – and sometimes backwards – and thus needs constant attention and care” (Ibid.).

It is in this context of basic security and its “positive constructive force in society and – especially in an international environment“ (Aliboni 2002, 11), responding to international legality, especially UN resolutions, from which a common approach to these threats must proceed. The formal EMP was defined as the new EU strategy towards the Mediterranean in the Essen European Summit of December 1994, and follows an EC predecessor program, the EC/EU Global Mediterranean Policy. This latter was based on tariff preferences (including exemptions for certain, mostly agricultural, products), and technical and financial cooperative agreements (such as for technical and research

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34 Joffé (2001, 36) refers to as the comfortable stasis of the Cold War, but afterwards having to face the fact that super-power patronage no longer existed. However it also revealed the close relationship between security issues and political and socio-cultural causes (as are being subsequently addressed together within the EMP).
projects), as well as the New Mediterranean Policy in effect from 1990 to 1996 with five objectives:

- strengthening support measures for economic reform in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries; stimulating private investment; increasing bilateral and Community financing of structural adjustments; opening up the EU market; and strengthening the political and economic dialogue (Sánchez Monjo 2004, 75).

The EMP was formally launched in 1995 in Barcelona with the explicit, but not exclusive\(^35\), goal of a Free Trade Area among member states by 2010. The institutional structure of the EMP was not cancelled upon the implementation of the ENP (Attina 2005, 18). Interestingly enough a “micro”-version\(^36\) of the EMP with similar objectives of transforming the Mediterranean region into “an area of peace, security and prosperity; of mutual tolerance, understanding and exchange between the peoples of the region, within the framework of promotion of the rule of law, multi-party democracy and human rights” (Greek Foreign Ministry website 8/16/08) was founded in July 1994: the Mediterranean Forum (FOROMED). With the founding of the EMP it continues to serve as a forum for dialogue only, despite greater initial aspirations.

At the third Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Stuttgart 1999, the foreign ministers agreed on a strategy to strengthen international cooperation and progressive development to address common security concerns. To this end the elaboration of the EMP’s objective into a ‘Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and

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\(^35\) This is contrary to early reports by some writers (e.g. Marks 1996, 1) that the EMP had a predominantly economic agenda with the goal of a “free trade area encompassing 800 million people by early in the twenty-first century” (Ibid.).

\(^36\) The membership is comprised of Algeria, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia and Turkey and was based on a French initiative. Its resemblance to the “Mediterranean Union”-proposal of 2007 by President Sarkozy is evident – as well as both the Union for the Mediterranean and the EMP’s distinction between them (as well be discussed briefly further in Chapter 5).
“Stability” was discussed, but decided against at the Marseilles ministers’ meeting (2000). Some authors (Aliboni et al. 2006, 7) have interpreted this as an indication that the EMP, as a structured regional organization based on cooperative security, ceased to exist [at that point], and with it went the goal of a joint Euro-Med policy of conflict prevention based on shared Euro-Med institutions and instruments based on the CSCE/Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) example.

By the time the research for this dissertation was undertaken in the spring/summer of 2008, my findings indicate that the concept of a Mediterranean Regional Security Complex evolved despite this dire assessment then.

The following sections will confirm rather a much broader interplay of not only hard, but also soft power in the political, economic and socio-cultural dynamics of Euro-Mediterranean security. The mere “setting aside” of the Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Peace and Stability in 1999 does not negate the EMP’s security significance per the data of this study. Rather, the intervening variable of the stalling Palestinian-Israel peace process, in the wider regional security dynamic of the Syrian-Lebanese-Iranian context was discouraging to this process. Blaming the EU for attempting (successfully, in retrospect) to utilize the paradigm of the EMP to continue the evolution of the broad spectra comprising “security” is more destructive, as it is obvious that alternative IGOs were less successful to a constructive regional engagement.

Since the inception of the ENP, the EMP falls operationally within the EU under the general institutional structure outline above for the ENP. Since its inception, the Euro-Mediterranean Committee of the 1995 Barcelona Process is a Troika, consisting of one representative from each partner state, the European Commission, and the High Representative of the CFSP. It meets bi-monthly, presiding over all EMP-programs and
actions overall, such as preparing the annual foreign ministers’ meeting, and supervising all sectoral ministers’ meetings, and as such represents the “central structure of the cooperation process” (Attina 2007, 197). This “troika” had originally been established to make the EMP a truly multi-lateral endeavor. This contradicts *prima facie* the claim by Aliboni et al. (2006, 8) that “the unilateral character of European diplomacy stemmed from the inherent unilateral nature of the EMP. A large number of bodies have been formed, e.g. by government representatives, experts and civil society representatives, to prepare and assist in the execution of programs on a cooperative basis, independent of national governments (Ibid.).

The geographic proximity, despite the socio-economic and political heterogeneity among EMP member states appears “to have contributed to a ‘securitization’ of non-security issues in the First [political] Chapter” (Schumacher 2003, 222) of the EMP among its Mediterranean non-(EU) Member Countries (MNMCs), although a traditional understanding of security based on the concept of the state prevails there (Ibid.). Nevertheless, Schumacher (Ibid.) states that what he would consider the security aspect of the EMP, namely the First Chapter, as having been incompletely “contracted,” especially by the MNMCs. Hence, while the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean Region was unilaterally adopted by the European Council in Feira on June 19/20, 2000, it did not include the literal security concerns of MENA EMP-members (Ibid.). However, at the Valencia EMP ministerial conference in 2002 the “political dialogue on human rights and democracy” (Schumacher 2003, 232) continued to be insufficiently enforced as MNMCs utilized the “exit options” of the Barcelona Declaration to avoid engagement
with this dialogue (Ibid.). Since the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements\textsuperscript{37} (EMAAs), as treaties under international law, could potentially give rise to sanctions, in the absence of other conditionality in the processes of the EMP, Schumacher (Ibid.) views this as not sufficient to lead to interest convergence within the EMP Council of Ministers, and as an impediment to the overall success to the EU’s political and security partnership (Schumacher 2003, 235). Some scholars have pointed out that the EU’s approach has the appearance of “unilateralism” during the time period\textsuperscript{38} of the late 1990’s cannot be reduced to bad intentions on their part, but the waning interest of the other EMP-members to engage proactively in a cooperative regional security approach.

At the fifth EMP foreign ministers’ conference 2002 in Valencia following 9/11, the Spanish Presidency of the EU sought politically greater Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) cooperation for the EMP, while democracy promotion received less attention, though the inter-cultural dialogue was enhanced. Additionally, commercial integration in the economic/financial sectors within the EMP through the re-introduction of the

\textsuperscript{37} The Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAAs) replace the 1970s Cooperation Agreements between the EC and Mediterranean partners. These bilateral EMAAs between the EU and its southern Mediterranean partners are an essential feature of the EMP. Although they are individualized, the common aspects are clauses for political dialogue (including respect for human rights and democratic principles), phase-in of free trade in accordance with WTO rules (i.e. dismantling tariffs, especially with respect to agricultural products and services, starting from the General Agreement of Tariffs in Services/GAT), harmonization between the EU and MENA, e.g. the maintenance of a high level of protection of intellectual property rights, gradual liberalization of public procurement, adjustment of competition provisions, state aid and monopolies, and provisions relating to capital movements, as well as economic co-operation in a wide variety of sectors (such as industry, environment, energy, transport, customs), financial cooperation in terms of financial assistance for MENA, and social cultural cooperation (e.g. workers’ rights and other social matters, re-admission of nationals and non-nationals illegally arriving on the territory of one party from the other.

As some of these issues draw on both the European Community (i.e. the First Pillar) and EU member state competences (i.e. the Second and Third Pillars), a lengthy ratification process by the national parliaments of EU member states may be involved.

\textsuperscript{38} This may be deduced on the basis of the majority of EMP-funding proceeding North-South through MEDA, as well as the projects they fund vs. those (quantitatively) initiated in the South.
proposal for a Euro-Mediterranean Development Bank took shape as an enhanced credit facility from the European Investment Bank (Gillespie 2002, 96).

Nevertheless, the EMP, which had been in existence already since 1995, received a new stimulus after the launch of the ENP in 2004 when it was incorporated into the ENP as its Mediterranean region-specific program. Its relative brief existence has needed fine-tuning not only for the “challenges of its infancy,” but also in light of the drastically changing global as well as regional security environment such as that of post-9/11, the Iraq invasion, and the stumbling Israel-Palestine peace process (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 19), which undermined its region-building plans. The ENP as the EU’s umbrella neighborhood program was designed i.a. to address the strategic objectives set out in the EU’s December 2003 European Security Strategy, such as the avoidance of emerging new dividing lines, be they economic, political or social, between the enlarged EU and its neighbors by extending to the countries neighboring the EU measures aimed at institutional and economic strengthening similar as those extended to EU members internally.

As indicated at the beginning of this section, the ENP overall offers its neighbors a privileged relationship, envisioned as sharing “everything but institutions” by building upon a mutual commitment to common values (e.g. democracy and human rights, rule of law, good governance, market economy principles and sustainable development). To address some of the regional challenges in the Euro-Med, the ENP (as the umbrella program of the EMP since 2004) goes beyond existing diplomatic and institutional relationships to offer a deeper political association and economic integration and to extend the zone of prosperity, security and peace to them (EU Commission website:
ENP), and potentially opening “functional cooperation at all four levels of European integration: the freedom of movement of goods, services, capital and people” (Kempe 2007, 188). To demonstrate the significance the EU attaches to the ENP, it raised funding for 2007-2013 by 32 percent to twelve billion Euros (Associated Press September 4, 2007) to fund the programs properly to achieve their goals. This addresses critiques by earlier authors (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 19/20) that “the instruments of the ENP and the alleged incentives it offers are ill-defined and inadequate for reaching the explicit and implicit policy objectives.”

In the case of the EMP, the ENP is not the EU’s overriding regional framework, but supplements the special existing policies and arrangements, i.e. implementing ENP programs through the Barcelona Process and the bilateral Association Agreements between the EU and individual MENA member states. Some authors (such as Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 21) have questioned whether this increased bilateralism is at the expense of and compatible with, the regionalism/region-building inspired by the envisioned Mideast peace process. However, these bilateral adjustments, according to speeches from the EU’s External Directorate, were instituted to continue the progress by way of an additional approach rather than let it stall (since the multilateral approach by itself was not sufficient to achieve progress in the EMP’s political, economic and social-cultural mandate). An additional shift in the EMP’s previous modus operandi following the establishment of the ENP was a shift from “negative“\(^39\) conditionality in the EMP to the “positive” conditionality as part of the ‘wider Europe’ (ENP)-approach (Ibid., 22).

\(^39\) The Barcelona Process and the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements contained a suspension clause in case of a partner state’s human rights violation. However, this barred reform-minded, but authoritarian states from proceeding. The new benchmarking approach addressed this dilemma by making closer economic integration with the EU dependent on concrete progress in demonstrating shared values
A further differentiation between the EMP and the ENP was a shift in objectives between the two: while the EMP emphasizes “region-building,” the ENP expresses EU-interests (e.g. conflict prevention and crisis management) as well as common interests (such as “challenges deriving from poverty, autocratic rule, and conflicts in its periphery”) much more defined (Ibid. 23). Whether this characteristic of the ENP downgrades the region-building dimension, or enhances the EMP’s dynamics has been debated, though I view the ENP’s effect on the EMP as enhancing the latter. However, the EU’s commitment to playing a greater international role is apparent, in particular in its increasingly institutionalized – and funded – neighborhood, especially as a result of its change following the end of the Cold War. The resulting geopolitical change from the EU’s perspective has, however, intentionally not created firm new “borders” pursuant to this logic of avoiding “new dividing lines,” but rather led to a greater interconnectedness of political and trade relations (such as “energy, infrastructure, and telecommunication networks”) (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 26) within “a single, inclusive and coherent policy network for all of the sixteen neighbor states” (Lippert 2007, 181).

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(such as democracy, liberty, rule of law, respect for human rights and human dignity, and in the case of Israel, on progress in the peace process, although Israel is still accorded “special status”) in MENA partner countries (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 23).

This has been interpreted as an assertive demonstration of the EU as acting as a normative power to encourage reforms (despite accommodations for a very slow peace process or continued authoritarian regimes in the region), as well as encouraging “ownership” of the southern partners in the bilateral Action Plans.

As it might shift the focus into a more-EU-centric rather than Mediterranean perspective (and priorities)

referred to by some authors as the “EU’s finalite”


**Agenda 2000 and Barcelona Plus**

The initial Barcelona Process was formally modified by Agenda 2000 to reinforce relations between the EU and the Mediterranean partners and to promote sustainable development there (Sánchez Monjo 2004, 76). A further review of the EMP upon its ten-year anniversary in 2005 brought a modified agreement, the Barcelona Plus Declaration, still “nestled” within the ENP, to address some of the short-comings of the initial EMP programs. These were formulated in the Tenth Anniversary Declaration (2005), as well as the new five-year Work Programme, and the Anti-Terrorism Behaviour Code (Attina 2007, 197). The Declaration tied peace in the Mediterranean to the non-proliferation of ABC-weapons within the framework of all *UN* initiatives, and the “two states solution” of a sovereign Palestinian State and Israel in the Middle East.

Economically, the free trade area by 2010 through economic reforms in MENA was a priority in these agreements, in addition to encouraging foreign direct investments (FDIs), enhancement of services and integration of transport structures, the establishment of an integrated energy market, the completion of the de-pollution of the Mediterranean Sea, and a commitment to tackle immigration problems, the reduction of illiteracy by fifty percent, and a total eradication of gender disparity in education by 2015 (Attina 2007, 197). While some of these goals appear repetitive, they emphasize their continued salience as well as some modifications which were necessary due to recent developments in some areas.

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42 This illustrates the multilateral legal basis of the EMP, not only in terms of the multilateral actors involved in the founding of the EMP and the MS’s agreement to UN doctrines, such as human rights, and equally to the EU, as it affirms the multilateral declarations of the UN. This perspective of the “global” agreement to UN charters and declarations and their equivalent EMP declarations by its members is significant in countering the argument against the EMP as unilateral, (neo-) imperialist, or favoring some MSs over others.
These “goal posts” were expanded in the EU Council’s Interim Report (December 2006) on the Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East by emphasizing *co-ownership* in addition to *cooperation* (Ibid., 5), exploring paths to democracy and *inclusion within diversity* (rather than simply focusing “generically” on gender equality and civil society), and the implementation specifically of the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism to include emphasis on the role which the media play “in preventing incitement to terrorism through effective and professional communications” (Ibid.) as well as *ensuring respect for human rights in the fight against terrorism in accordance with international law* (Ibid.).

While this dissertation cannot discuss in detail the global significance and implications of these perspectives, they indicate a greatly differentiated and socio-historical complex approach beyond the economic and political solutions pursued by the EMP to millennia-old challenges. This recent (2006) report (Ibid.) also envisions a further strengthening of cooperation in higher education and research as well as the continued prioritization of the intercultural dialogue, pursued particularly by the EuroMed Youth Parliament and the Anna Lindh foundation (which i.a. focuses on the adoption of the UNESCO Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural expressions and the Alliance of Civilizations43) (Ibid.). Additionally, cooperation extends to the field of migration to topics of legal migration, immigration and development, as well as the fight against illegal migration and trafficking in humans, executed through the FRONTEX agency (in coordination with an exploration of a Mediterranean coastal Patrols Network involving all relevant EMP members).

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43 Compare this focus with the presumably “novel” goals of the Union for the Mediterranean of July 13, 2008, contrasted further in the Discussion in Chapter Nine.
In summing up this section, the EMP may represent an EU instrument of regional governance, although it may not necessarily be a regional security organization. I would argue that the EMP was never meant to be a regional security organization such as the OSCE, but rather an institution to *not* address security through hard power, but integrate its members beyond the political and economic (as one might want to remind oneself), also in the socio-cultural sphere. I would further argue that the lack of interest in exploring all its parameters which all EMP-member states had agreed to (but then chose not to adhere to and to comply with them) led to a sub-optimal output of the EMP in its first years of existence. The fault for this lies heavier with *those* states which did *not* input effort and commit resources, than on those states which continued to support the process *despite* the passivity. Hence if there is blame in the incomplete performance of the EMP as a *collective security endeavor,* the following sections of this dissertation show that it lies more likely *within* the states critiquing, than those who continued to contribute to its successes. State sovereignty implies i.a. that the responsibility *for* a state lies *within,* and cannot be “delegated” externally\(^{44}\). The interrelationship between the EMP and the ENP has been described by Kaczynsiki, Kazmierkiewics and Tekin (2006, 4) as not being sufficiently crystallized, with the latter being viewed as a techno- and bureaucratic tool for EU assistance to the Southern Mediterranean, while the former represents “an instrument of political dialogue between northern and southern partners of the EMP” (Ibid.). This approach is made that much more significant to overcome

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\(^{44}\) This could meant that states have to deal with their domestic dilemmas – and accept responsibility for their actions, rather than taking for granted the advantages of external assistance, but then discharging the responsibility for usual political challenges externally (e.g. in state-to-state “blame-games,” which have occurred in the region over time. It might be more beneficial to view the region in terms of the strengths and opportunities it *could* and *should* represent *collectively* (e.g. in a neo-liberal and social-constructivist manner).
sentiments in the Southern Mediterranean such as that “Europe does not need Arabs except for the issues of oil, immigration and radical Islam” (interviewee quoted in Kaczynsiki, Kazmierkiewics and Tekin (2006, 21)).

With respect to the reverse perspective from the new EU-members, these authors write that

the new EU-member states with the exception of Malta and Cyprus [do] prefer a low-key approach given the general lack of expertise and the virtual absence of any relevant debate on this issue, as is expressed by the statement of one interviewee who stated that ‘the Mediterranean, seen from most of theEU’s new member states, is a distant sea’ (Kaczynsiki, Kazmierkiewics and Tekin (2006, 4).

With minimal support of these new EU members for further enlargements (Kaczynsiki, Kazmierkiewics and Tekin (2006, 18), their perceived impulse towards “benign neglect” appears to have evolved and merges with opinions of the “old” EU-member states for a stable and prosperous neighborhood, but without prospect for accession. Although historically there has been a North-East and a North-South interest constellation within the EU in terms of each region’s preferential foreign policy interest (Lippert 2007, 182), and the ENP overall despite – or because of - its flexibility, it presents an overriding character as a single and coherent policy framework (Ibid.).

Some authors (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 20) question whether the ENP’s contribution “to the socio-economic development of the southern Mediterranean” or connecting the latter to the “centre” (of the EU) will be sustainable. I am not convinced that this type of “dependent development” is in fact desired – or designed - by the EU as being too paternalistic (and for historic reasons, as well as for development reasons, undesirable). While del Sarto and Schumacher (2005, 21) suggest a departure from the idea of regionalism and a return to enhanced bilateralism between the EU’s neighbors
overall, I would argue that in the context of security, a specific Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex can not only be imagined, but should be considered legitimate for further development – and appears nascent from official documents, as sampled above - in terms of the sectors and factors outlined by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998). The fact that certain EU-members have special (bilateral and sub-regional) historical relationships with certain MENA countries (e.g. the “5 plus 5,” i.e. Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Malta plus Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and Mauritania) is understood but not at issue at this time.

As will be briefly discussed further in Chapter Nine in a brief preview of the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), its co-presidency is intended to “revive” this waning interest by laying the responsibility for participation on all the other EMP-partners besides the EU. Whether this will contribute to the EMP’s/UMed’s efficiency remains to be seen. It does represent a renewed “contracting” to the EMP/UMed by all partner states – and much needs to be done in this regard.

At the time of writing (summer 2008), the European Commission holds the secretariat of the Euro-Mediterranean Committee, and is as such a strategic player in the EMP (Ibid.). Additionally, a Civil Forum represents the most important unofficial event of the EMP, garnering representatives of NGOs supportive of stronger cooperative efforts in the EMP.
**Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly**

As a result of the Barcelona Plus evaluation of the EMP\(^45\), a parliamentary component was also added to the EMP, the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA). It was formally established in Naples on December 3, 2003, and its proceedings formally opened on March 22, 2004 in Vouliagmeni (Athens) as a consultative today, adopting resolutions (recommendations of the Barcelona Process). The EMPA consists of a maximum of 240 parliamentarians appointed by the national parliaments of the EU member states (75), the national parliaments of the Mediterranean partners (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey (a total of 120 delegates), plus the EU Parliament (45 delegates), who meet at least annually. The assembly consists of three committees (of 80 members each: Committee on Political Affairs, Security and Human Rights; the Committee on Economic, Financial and Social Affairs and Education; and the Committee on the Promotion of the Quality of Life, Human Exchanges and Cultures, plus a four-member Bureau.

It is structured along specific Rules of Procedure with a presidency rotating among the member states annually. Its working languages are Arabic, English and French (European Parliament EuroMed Vade-Mecum 2006). The EMPA committees are broadly structured along the three-basket structure of the EMP itself and more specific working groups as mutually decided. This deepened institutionalization of the EMP is an indication of an increasingly long-term commitment of its members to the EMP’s process, as well as the democratization of the parliamentary process also leads to a more effective relationship with civil society actors and NGOs and the anticipated freer expression of the will of the people in the region. The related institutional modeling after

\(^{45}\) Which some countries on the southern Mediterranean did not attend
the EU could be viewed as an indication of increased organizational Euro-Mediterranean harmonization.

It plays a consultative role, such as providing parliamentary impetus and support for the consolidation and development of the EMP and the association agreements. Its resolutions, addressed to the Euro-Mediterranean Conference, are not legally binding. In the few years since its founding, the EMPA has made resolutions on the situation in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, the Middle East, the EC-Algeria Euro-Mediterranean Agreement (in light of the accession of ten new EU member states), as well as MEDA and financial support to Palestine, partially in light of the Annapolis conference 2007. In terms of EU neighborhood (i.e. *inter alia* MENA) security, however, limited cooperation (i.e. hard security) has been offered by the EU under the ESDP to some ENP members (e.g. Russia, Ukraine and the non-EU European NATO members, such as Turkey) (Schumacher 2004, 96; Biscop 2003, 186-8; and Vasconcelos 2004, 6). Hence the blurring between EU hard and soft security among the ENP and the EMP vis-à-vis its neighbors is apparent.

**Implications of EMP-Institutionalization on Regionalization**

The ENP has come a long way since 2004, when it was criticized by some scholars for lacking vision and conditionality in implementing its programs and values (Kempe 2007). Keeping in mind that the great economic gap between the north and southern shores of the Mediterranean did not develop overnight, it is not realistic to bridge it completely in a couple years. Considering not only the politicization but also the securitization of the EU neighborhood per se, and its southern Mediterranean one in particular, the EU, within the framework of the EMP, has made great strides in a broad
institutional implementation in areas as diverse as politics, economics and culture in a region spanning even wider diversity than just these areas (compare the 112-page EMP/MEDA outline of its programs for 2005).

The overall benefits of institutions in complex interdependence are, according to scholars such as Keohane (1984 and 1988), Keohane and Nye (2001), Moravcsik (1999) or Finnemore (1996) to increase trust, provide information, reduce uncertainty, lower transaction costs and to increase transparency among members and their transactions. EU institutions can also be traced from a Neo-liberal standpoint of “Institutionalism” and “Structurationism” under the assumptions of rationalism (such as the pursuit of self-interest, international anarchy) and the primacy of the state. These are shared with neorealism, while also recognizing the role of non-state actors (such as institutions, domestic constituents and NGOs).

To paraphrase a comment attributed to Dag Hammerskjold: “institutions exist not in order to bring us to heaven, but to save us from hell”: Despite their “cost” of membership, institutions have a cushioning effect on the consequences of anarchy in the intl. system, they help stabilize members’ expectations of each other’s behavior and intentions, and to help alleviate distributional conflicts by assuring members that over time gains will be evenly divided, i.e. institutions lengthen the “shadow of the future” by providing linkages between different issue areas. This has been shown to increase total benefits for all members. As a result, absolute gains by member states are more likely, contributing to the allure of increased material benefits through cooperation in areas of converging interests in institutions.
The assumptions underlying a neo-liberal institutionalist approach to regional integration is that of institutions resembling a restricted club, in which members gain mutual benefits of a restricted and divisible good, i.e. more members means less benefits. The assumption is that smaller organizations would, under neorealist and neoliberal assumptions, be more advantageous for their members. An expansion of the institution is predicted to become more problematic in terms of less benefits for its members due to more free-riders (Olson 1971), do not prove true. Rather, institutional membership is not a zero sum game. An example is EU-enlargement, where one would expect that old members would only be in favor of it if the advantages (net benefits) of expansion outweighed the losses and/or costs. Bearce and Bondanella (2007, 703) in fact empirically confirmed that the “constructivists’ institutional socialization hypothesis, which posits that intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) make member-state interests more similar over time” (i.e. promoting interest convergence), both in global and in regionally restricted samples. They argue that these results are consistent “with a longer-term socialization process and cannot be explained by the short-term effect of institutional information” (Ibid.). While this indicates that the benefits are not necessarily reduced with increased membership, inn the case of the ENP, however, questions of overstretch have been raised, such as how far the neighborhood actually reaches, e.g. in term of including Iran and Iraq when Turkey becomes an EU-member.

There is no uniform consensus in the literature, however, about whether institutions can transform interests that are fundamentally in conflict. In the case of the divergence between EU and MENA political, economic and civil institutions, the EMP was designed to assist both regions to harmonize trade practices by providing financial
and technical know how and assistance. This, however, is also not simple formula to a straight road: Upon the completion of a single market in 2010 within the EMP, some industries in EU-member states (such as agriculture, textiles, steel and services) would loose their comparative advantage with the lifting of tariffs and are lobbying for aid not trade with MENA (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 33).

**Funding**

Middle East Development Assistance (MEDA)

EMP projects are mapped out by the EU in Regional Strategy Papers (RSP) for each funding cycle under its Middle East Development Assistance (MEDA) program. The 2004-2006 cycle posited five priority areas, selected for their regional added-value (EU Commission 2004: EU and Mediterranean strategy), e.g. making the Euro-Med Free Trade Zone (FTA) a reality, promoting regional infrastructure initiatives, promoting the sustainability of Euro-Mediterranean integration, enhancing the rule of law and good governance as well as bringing the Partnership closer to the people.

The 2007-2013 Regional Strategy Paper, covering the EMP partner states on the Southern Mediterranean, replaces the previous MEDA financial instrument for this region. It recognizes the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region to the EU, both economically (trade, energy, migration), and politically (security, stability) (EU Commission ENPI Regional Strategy Paper 2007-2013, and Regional Indicative Program 2007-2010). This points to an institutionalized (beyond the merely inspirational or

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46 Which may contain some funding through EuropeAid, the EU’s humanitarian aid office
47 The sum of these programs and their historical continuity being an indication of some “longue durée,” indicating commitment to the “dependent variable” of regional security. The EMP, as a response to the
ideational) *securitization* of these issues pertaining to the Euro-Mediterranean *region* as occurring, which are then funded by the EU for their strategic significance to it. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 23) define securitization as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics.” The EU, in this latest 2007-2013 ENPI Regional Strategy Paper, recognizes the political situation in the Mediterranean as

characterised by persistent tensions due to the Middle East conflict, the war in Iraq and its spill-overs to other countries, regular upsurges of terrorist activity, and in some countries domestic political tensions, lack of political openness and increasing popularity of political Islam movements,

and approaches it with three policy responses: the EMP at the regional level, its bilateral Association Agreements, and since 2004 through the bilateral Action Plans of the ENP.

The most recent EU’s policy priorities for the years 2006 - 2009 in the Mediterranean were decided at the Euro-Mediterranean Summit 2005 in Barcelona. They relate to four aspects: political and security cooperation\(^{48}\), sustainable socio-economic cooperation\(^{49}\), education and culture\(^{50}\), and migration.

\(^{48}\) Some of the programs in the 2005 MEDA programs include cooperative project on questions linked to the social integration of immigrants, migration and movement of persons, Euro-Med Place Cooperation Project in the Mediterranean region, Euro-Med Justice, Disaster Management Cooperation between civil protection services, and Middle East Peace Projects.

\(^{49}\) Some projects in this area include Euro-Mediterranean Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) cooperation, UNIMED Business Network, the Europe-Mediterranean Forum of Economic Institutes (FEMISE), the Euro-Mediterranean Network of Investment Promotion Agencies (ANIMA), Education and Training for Employment, Training of Public Administrations, as well as the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Programs for the Environment and for Local Water Management, i.a. to support the restructuring processes in the southern Mediterranean necessary to prepare for the Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area envisaged for 2010. This will involve liberalization of economic cooperation not only for bilateral free trade between the EU and each MENA country, but also in South-South trade.

\(^{50}\) Institutes especially active in cooperative research programs are the EuroMeSCo Network of Foreign Policy Institutes of EMP member countries, and the Malta Euro-Mediterranean Information and Training Seminars for Diplomats. Since 2006 “Twinning” (from the EU enlargement’s “tool box” is also being utilized as an approach between universities of the southern and northern Mediterranean.
We notice that security cooperation, sustainability, education and migration have moved up on to the EU’s agenda as policy priorities from the more general goals at the beginning of the EMP as political, economic and social-cultural. Specifically, the EU Commission’s Regional Strategy Paper (2004) outlines three priority objectives for Mediterranean regional implementation:

- a common Euro-Mediterranean area of justice, security and migration cooperation, a common sustainable economic area, with a focus on trade liberalization, regional trade integration, infrastructure networks and environmental protection, [and] a common sphere for socio-cultural exchanges, with a focus on cultural and people-to-people exchanges, and raising awareness of the Partnership through the media.

These priority objectives also indicate a shift towards a more specifically formulated, integrated trade area, integrated justice and security cooperation, now also plans to utilize the media for raising mutual socio-cultural awareness.

In the context of allocating funds (through MEDA) following agreement among heads of state at the previous summit, these policy objectives indicate that EMP partners are viewing Euro-Mediterranean regional security in similar terms which Buzan and Waever (2003, 53) have delineated for regional security complexes (RSC), i.e. that that there exists boundary, differentiating the Euro-Mediterranean region from neighboring regions; that the Euro-Med has anarchic structure, as it consists of more than a single autonomous unit (e.g. states), that the Euro-Med has polarity, referring to the distribution of power among these units, and that social construction is evident, “covering the patterns of amity and enmity among the units” (Ibid.), such as the broad range of areas of cooperation and harmonization with increasingly specificity.

Nevertheless, the Strategy Paper also stresses that “the EU does not seek to impose priorities or conditions on its partners” (Commission 2004, 9, quoted in Kelley
2006, 36), but rather offers “incentives” to member states in the proposed action plans, such as

1. A perspective of moving beyond co-operation to a significant degree of integration, including a stake in the EU’s internal market and the opportunity to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and programmes;
2. an upgrade in scope and intensity of political co-operation;
3. opening of economies, reduction of trade barriers;
4. increased financial support;
5. participation in Community programmes promoting cultural, education, environmental, technical and scientific links;
6. support for legislative approximation to meet EU norms and standards;
7. deepening trade and economic relations (Kelley 2006, 37).

These interactions rely on contacts on multiple levels, with some officials from ENP countries reporting daily contact with EU officials” (Kelley 2006, 39). It is evident from this that concerns in MENA about EU coerciveness appear unfounded. Other writers (Johnston 2001, quoted in Kelly 2006, 40) report that the Commission is trying to “emulate the ‘social influence’-dynamic which existed during the accession proceeding during enlargement phases. These goals and their dynamics contribute to the recognition of the Euro-Mediterranean as an evolving contiguous RSC in terms of Regional Security Complex Theory. This process is distinct from the enlargement process, however, in that Copenhagen Criteria do not have to be adopted by the “neighbors,” but that the EU will always have neighbors upon whom the EU cannot impose values unilaterally (Kelley 2006, 41).

In summary, as of today, while a great number of programs in political, economic and socio-cultural areas are in the process of being harmonized, intensified and expanded through the EMP, some partner countries are more actively involved, such as Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia. Some author are questioning whether other countries, such as Egypt and Algeria, show more limited meaningful reforms in terms of the expansion of
civil society, obstruction of opposition forces (Kelley 2006, 45). This is in part due to the
dilemma the EU faces in balancing between reaching benchmarks in Association Plans
and enforcing human rights and democracy clauses. This dilemma is reflected in the
varying degree to which Actions plans have been adopted by MENA countries:

**Table 5.1: EMP Member States with Action Plans**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ENP partner countries</th>
<th>Entry into force of contractual relations with EC</th>
<th>ENP Country Report</th>
<th>ENP Action Plan</th>
<th>Adoption by EU</th>
<th>JOINT adoption WITH partner country</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>AA - September 2005</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>AA – June 2004</td>
<td>March 2005</td>
<td>Agreed Spring 2007</td>
<td>05.03.2007 06.03.2007</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>AA - May 2002</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>Agreed end 2004</td>
<td>21.02.2005 02.06.2005</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestinian Territory</td>
<td>Interim AA - July 1997</td>
<td>May 2004</td>
<td>Agreed end 2004</td>
<td>21.02.2005 04.05.2005</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Funding in MENA by the World Bank

The World Bank, as an indication of multilateralism to development and stability in the Mediterranean region in this case, has responded to challenges in the Southern Mediterranean by providing assistance to a broad range of sectors and programs in areas which have been “tailored to the specific challenges and national goals of each country” (World Bank website 2008), taking into account the impact of each intervention in a country. There are five areas which represent challenges common to the region, namely Public Sector Efficiency and Governance, Private Sector Development and Employment Creation, Education for a Global World; as well as Sustainable Water Resource Management and Gender.

Both the World Bank and the EU have increased donor coordination at all levels from program implementation to air programming and overall policies (World Bank website 2008), leading to a Strategic Partnership Agreement in 2004 between the World Bank, the EU and the European Investment Bank (EIB) for joint activities through parallel financing.

Section Discussion

Gaenzle (2008, 8) writes that in the ENP overall, “from an actor-centered perspective four different modes of governance” can be discerned: compliance, though this may be restricted to only the absolutely necessary (Knill 2001; Heritier 2003); negotiation, as the possibly “the” EU system per se to accommodate divergent interests among the broad group of state and not-state actors from all (inter-) and (sub-) national levels; “competition relies on incentives and disincentives for member states to align
themselves with EU standards and benchmarks” (Gaenzle 2008, 9), and *communication* as a support mechanism for “national policy-makers looking for regulatory best-practices to solve policy problems” (Ibid.), rather than imposing legally binding rules.

These dynamics would fall into the “actor-structure-interest co-constitution”- model of social constructivism (compare Wendt 1999) in the Euro-Mediterranean as a Regional Security Complex, and will be examined further in the next sections from further perspectives and other actors.
Chapter Six

Archival and Secondary Data – Part B:
Deepening Of the Euro-Mediterranean Region

Beyond Development

For the collective titles of the following sections I utilize the terms “Deepening” and “Widening” purely as heuristic devices as these are familiar to scholars in connection with the political and socio-economic developments in the EU post-Cold War. Nevertheless, I am in no way insinuating that this methodological approach to my analysis prejudices it in terms of EU-enlargement, even if the ENP was developed in response to the big-bang enlargements following the Cold War.

“Deepening” in this dissertation is understood as an increased and intensified institutionalization and its consequences economically, politically and socially (i.e. the “Three Baskets” of the EMP), in this case of an intergovernmental organization, namely the EMP. “Widening,” as used in this dissertation, applies in broad strokes to processes which “widen” the EMP, also from a political, economical, and social perspective, e.g. by an increase in its membership, or through the broadening of its inter-regional activities, and the significance these have on our conception of the EMP in security terms.

The Mediterranean, in its more “recent” history has progressed from a “Colonial Sea” of shared experiences between Europe, the Maghreb and the Middle East from the beginning in the late 18th century51 “until the erosion of the 1950s” (Borutta and Gekas

51 Borutta and Gekas (2008, 2) refer to the late ‘modern’ colonization of the Mediterranean as starting with Napoleon’s expedition to Egypt in 1798 and continuing with the British colonization of Malta in 1802, and the Ionian Islands (1815-1864), through the 19th and early 20th centuries. Said views Napoleon’s occupation of Egypt as the beginning of that process which subsequently dominated perspectives of “East” and “West,” and of the Mediterranean specifically (Ibid.). The Eastern Mediterranean with the British
2008, 1). This study seeks to digress from the Eurocentric perspective to include ambivalences and paradoxes both of colonialism and modernization theory in today’s Mediterranean region. Borutta and Gekas (2008, 4) suggest that had the Western/European influence not been as severe as it was, Middle Eastern, North African and Ottoman regions would have evolved on their own paths to modernity, considering the Silk Road already evolved a couple millennia ago, connecting the Orient with the Occident. This built on the trading routes of the ancient Egyptians as early as 4000 BCE,

Figure 6.1: Silk Road
(Map compliments of Chris Hanson of the University of Miami Department of Geography GIS Laboratory)
the Persian Royal Road, constructed in the 5th century BCE by Darius I of Persia, and Saharan animal trade with Asia between 4000 and 6000 BCE.

Political deepening

Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)

This section will briefly trace the evolution of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and its reciprocal significance towards MENA, and especially its reflection in the EMP.

With the end of the Cold War, the EC recognized “the transition to a new European order as a positive opportunity to develop its external role” (Pace 2003, 164). Hence it appears appropriate to position the EMP beyond its three-basket parameters as a dynamic per se also i.a. within the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and potentially with the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP).

The debate surrounding basic and comprehensive security revolves around general as well as universal values and their policy implementation (Aliboni 2002, 11), which may be either more immediate, or address broader issues, involving political, economic, and/or socio-cultural responses, as well as more longterm crisis management, such as through peacekeeping and peace-building as a structural approach from the perspective of the EU to national or regional instability, in addition to human security52 pursued by some countries in their official foreign policy. Evaluating the EMP from these policy considerations, we observe that its basic institutional structure follows this paradigm.

52 The framework for this Lysoen process-policy identifies vulnerabilities, such as landmines or child soldiers, some of which have been included in EU conflict prevention policies, and Aliboni (2002, 12) suggests that they should formally be included in the EMP to monitor and hopefully prevent the emergence of vulnerabilities in certain countries are arising as a result of reform processes.
Pertaining to the EU, one aspect of addressing this comprehensive aspect of security occurs through the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The CFSP itself has its origins in the formation of the European Political Cooperation (EPC) of 1970. The EPC was an informal consultation process between member states on foreign policy matters with the aim of creating a common approach to foreign policy issues and promoting both the EU’s own interests and those of the international community as a whole, such as the promotion of international cooperation, respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. The weaknesses evident in the EPC, for example in the context of the Balkan wars, led to a desire to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy in the form of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as the EU’s organized, agreed upon foreign policy. It operates as the second of the three pillars of the European Union (as established by the Treaty of the European Union in 1993), requiring unanimity about decisions among member states in the EU’s Council.

With the establishment of the CFSP as part of the Maastricht Treaty a renewed Mediterranean Policy was introduced in December 1990. The CFSP was enhanced by significant changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999 with the establishment of the Common European Security and Defense Policy (C)(ESDP) to “safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union” (European Commission website 2008 CFSP), promote international cooperation and development, consolidate democracy and the rule of law, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Ibid.) by i.a. adopting joint actions and common positions and strategies. Nevertheless, the EU still had not adopted long-term
policies to address the increasing disparities between the two sides of the Mediterranean (Pace 2003, 164).

According to this Treaty on the European Union (aka Maastricht Treaty), Article 11, the European Union defines and implements a common foreign and security policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy, with the following objectives (EU Commission website):

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter;
- to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act, and the objectives of the Paris Charter, including those on external borders;
- to promote international cooperation; and
- to develop and consolidate democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The European Council defines the principles and general guidelines for the CFSP as well as common strategies to be implemented by the EU, on the basis of which the Council of Ministers adopts joint actions or common positions. The former address specific situations, where operative action by the EU is considered necessary. They lay down the objectives, scope and means to be made available to the EU and require unanimity, and commit the member states. Common positions, on the other hand, define the approach the EU takes on a particular matter of geographic or thematic significance,
and define in the abstract the general guidelines with which the national policies of member states must conform.

The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1999 “provides for a more concrete definition of CFSP instruments and, by including the Petersberg tasks\textsuperscript{53}, strengthens the EU’s security and defence perspective (Schumacher 2003, 225). The Amsterdam Treaty created the office of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (currently held by Javier Solana) to co-ordinate and represent the EU’s foreign policy. The institutional shifts within the EU in the meantime, such as with respect to the integration of the Western European Union, which had been actively involved in these tasks (in close cooperation with NATO as well as their Partnership for Peace, involving the former Soviet States), added certain unavoidable delays to its Headline Goals (resulting in the definition of a new timetable for complete implementation of the CFSP as “Headline Goal 2010”).

The complementarity between these two multilateral IGOs, the NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and the EMP, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms. This advantage in the efficiency of harmonizing among members reduces the power balancing maneuvers of the Cold War, which consumed so many resources that could be much better spent on the development of human capital in the south and eastern regions of the Mediterranean. Instead, the multilateral mechanisms of the Dialogue and the EMP enable the Mediterranean security community to move beyond the retaliatory rhetoric of the Cold War to contribute to regional stability (through much more graduated responses available) for the socio-

\textsuperscript{53} These outline the duties of an EU Rapid Reaction Force, newly conceptualized
economic development of this region and reduce e.g. the dividing lines between north
and south which i.e. the demographic developments\textsuperscript{54} bring.

The recognition that no European country can tackle today’s complex security
challenges alone led in December 2001 to the adoption of a declaration on the
operational capability of the European Security and Defense Policy (European
Commission CFSP 2008) by the European Council at Laeken, recognizing the EU’s
capability – and responsibility – to conduct some crisis management operations. This
expansion of cooperation and harmonization in the EU’s foreign policy and defense with
member states’ policies is shared in Brussels by the Commission, the Council and to an
extent by the European Parliament which is consulted on budgetary matters. The first
congept concrete steps of the ESDP were to outline existing capabilities (in the Helsinki Headline
Goal) for implementation of the Petersberg Declaration.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), initiated in 2003, lists the threats of the 21\textsuperscript{st}
century as follows: failed and rogue states, regional conflicts, civil wars, political
instability and terrorism, as they have implications for the EU at the global, regional and
(member) state levels (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6). Potential threats are particularly
emphasized in the ESS at the regional level, as they are particularly relevant to the EU
for their proximity to it and due to the socio-economic and political heterogeneity of its
neighborhood.

Rosa Balfour (2004, 1) writes that

\begin{quote}
the EU, by nature and because of its history, is ill-suited to embracing paradigms such as the clash of civilizations. Limited by its capabilities as a
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{54} That is, countries in the south and east of the Mediterranean find it difficult to provide (gender equal) basic
education amidst the great population growth in their region - and hereby adequately address the social and security challenge this represents to the northern Mediterranean countries.
‘civilian power’, it has sought to develop relations based on dialogue, on economic integration as a means of building secure and stable environments, and on diffusing its norms through persuasion rather than coercion.

Rather, her observation (2004, 1) that the Wider Europe Strategy published by the Commission in March 2003 and the new European Security Strategy prepared by the High Representative for CFSP the same year “propose major conceptual changes in the EU’s relations with the rest of the world which, if implemented, could transform the EU’s still hesitant status as an international actor.”

The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC) of the CFSP as the forum for EU-foreign ministers and the political Committee of the EU explicitly underlined in its concluding remarks on 18/19 June 2007 that strengthening the ENP represents a core foreign policy which should continue dynamically, particularly by exploring the alignment of the EU’s Mediterranean partners with EU declarations, demarches, and positions on CFSP issues as other ENP members (such as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) have decided to do. Some authors (Danreuter 2006, quoted in Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) have stated that “the EU has realized that actualizing its ambitions at the international scale is very much related to how successful it is in its regional policies” (italics added). Pending the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, a new post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (superseding the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy) will be instituted (rather than an EU “foreign minister,” as the failed Constitutional Treaty had foreseen).

The CFSP is augmented by the work of the European Union Satellite Centre (EUSC) in Torrejón de Ardoz, Spain, to produce information derived from space imagery
of the earth, the European Union Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in Paris to contribute to the creation of a common European security culture and support the strategic debate (EU commission website security agencies 2008), as well as the European Defence Agency (EDA) in Brussels to develop a comprehensive approach in defining the needs and anticipated restructuring of the ESDP specifically (Ibid.).

It is against the background of this shifting foreign and security policy environment that the next section will expand specifically on the EU’s foreign policy relating to those states neighboring the EU to the south (Boening 2008d).

A Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex Structure?

Collective security involves keeping the armed forces under national control, but agree to make them available to intervene against an aggressor in a third country (Attina 2004, 3). The regions surrounding the EU have been termed part of the “new strategic geography” (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6) (emphasis added). Many of these regions are the sources of instability, yet rich in natural resources, especially critical energy reserves, which make successful relations with these neighbors essential (Ibid.). EMP-member states, in addition to their shared history and geographical space, and through their formal inter-linkage of the “three-basked”-parameters" of the Barcelona Process per se are also

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55 These are: a) The **political and security partnership** with the aim of strengthening the political dialogue is based on “observance of essential principles of international law, and to reaffirm common objectives in matters of internal and external stability” (EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration). EMP partners agreed to act in accordance with the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (such as guaranteeing “the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex”(EU Commission website 2006: Barcelona Declaration) as well as other obligations under international law, including their regional and international agreements.
formally linked beyond mere diplomatic and foreign policy ties through a complex structure of “formal” hard and soft security ties, including conflict resolution.

Attina (2004, 2) (emphasis added) points out that “the construction of security cooperation in the Mediterranean region” rests in the design of two constellations within the EMP: the multi-dimensional strategy of its three Chapters, and the specific initiatives of the partners within the First Chapter frame. “For this reason, the Barcelona Declaration is the fundamental agreement of a regional security system that … create[s] the operative mechanisms and measures that set up a comprehensive and cooperative security” (Ibid.) partnership. These are anchored on the part of the EU in a “thickening” institutionalization of its governing bodies, i.e. the Council, the Commission and the Parliament. Attina (2004, 2) suggests analyzing security systems according to the level of institutionalization in their security cooperation, as well as the social integration of their members, represented by the following graph:

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b) As both Abdullahtif Ahmida (2000) and Joffé (2001, 34) point out, already the 1957 Treaty of Rome made specific provisions for the economic relationship between the Maghrib and the EC. However, while these were based stronger on colonial patters of the former as a raw material and labor supply, and market for EC/EU goods, the economic aspect of the EMP is directed towards economic development in MENA to reduce the gap between the northern and the southern periphery of the Mediterranean.

c) Some writers view the social-cultural “basket” of the EMP as “mainly aspirational in nature…, primarily devoted to supporting the growth of civil society in the South” (Joffé 2001, 38), while the EMP’s documents also indicate plans to develop human resources and to promote understanding between cultures and exchanges between civil societies (e.g. European Commission 2000, 2006, 2007), aims which have been substantially supported in turning them into reality by NGOs such as the Anna Lindh Foundation. The EMP participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, the dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at the human, scientific and technological levels are essential factors in bringing their peoples closer by promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.
The European security system evolved from an Opposite Alliance System since the 1970s towards greater security integration, while the southern Mediterranean portion of the EMP is currently not an Opposite Alliance System, but has the potential to develop in either direction, depending on the institutional and political context, according to Attina (2004, 3).

European stability overall is based on several premises, i.a. economic prosperity and continued growth in its “neighborhood” as discussed above in the context of the EMP’s three Chapters. The EU’s CFSP, which was only three years old upon the founding of the EMP, evolved parallel to it with the objectives of safeguarding the common values and fundamental interests, independence and integrity of the EU, in compliance with UN principles and those set out in the Helsinki Declaration (EU website). Nevertheless, there is also a marked asymmetry in security institutions between the countries of the northern and the southern Mediterranean due to the density of institutional development, much more so in the former and somewhat less in the latter (Vasconcelos 1999, 29). Other regional integration projects in MNMCs, such as the Arab
League or the Arab Maghreb Union, did not develop a real security dimension, partially due to the stalled Middle East peace process and its “brake” on South-South integration. In this context, the EMP is by far the most significant security mechanism in the Euro-Med due to its multilateral character, and its “multi-layered” dimensions (Ibid., 30).

This application of EU “soft power” in countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean is more than just cultural power in Joseph Nye’s (2002, 11) terminology, but is being applied by the EU in its foreign policy mechanisms, such as the promotion of peace and human rights through the reciprocity between economics and education. A. Sen (1999) also identified development and its relationship to security as essential. The threats which this region faces, i.a. can rest on the conviction that, irrespective of culture distance and institution difference, global trends cause dangerous effects to the countries of an area in as different fields as environment..., demography for the problem of migration and public security for the problem of organized crime and illegal trade (Attina 2004, 2).

This recognition of the problem in the Mediterranean region and the solutions which the EMP is in the process of applying to address them are very much in line with Karl Deutsch’s (1957) original approach to security communities. This theory held that high similarity of culture and institutions are essential to further political cooperation among states, and to adopt common norms of conflict management and resolution (Attina 2004, 2).

Some scholars have accused the EMP of being an imperialist tool of the EU for an extension of territory, and herewith power. I would view the EMP rather as a model for assisting MNMCs to develop politically, economically and socially, in order to contribute to internal (national) stability as well as to discourage the southern neighbors of the EU
emigrate illegally in droves to the EU north of the Mediterranean. Additionally, especially thanks to MEDA, the EMP political/security, economic/financial and socio-cultural options and tools are available to all members, such as through a harmonization of practices, for the integration into some areas of the EMP of the EU’s “Four Freedoms” (goods, people, services and capital), including the mutual security-reinforcing effect they have on a peaceful coexistence in the culturally, politically and economically diverse North African and Middle Eastern “neighborhood” of the EU.

Discourse has an ideational dimension with cognitive and normative functions, as well as “an interactive dimension, with coordinative and communicative functions (Schmidt 2000, cited in Howorth 2004, 212). While the impact of ideas had been assumed to be the weakest factor in security and defense policy (Howorth Ibid.), policy elites in Europe restructured a radically transition from the Cold War to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a new “coordinative discourse” (Ibid). This slowly evolving common acceptance of an integrated European interventionism is based beyond national interests (‘British Atlanticism’, ‘French exceptionalism’ and ‘German pacifism’) but “on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics” (Ibid.). The new willingness by Europeans to discuss their collective interests and preferences within the Alliances … [as well as move] towards a greater Euro-American balance in influence and responsibilities … [reflected] a growing European inter-subjectivity based on cultural norms and values (Howorth 2004, 214)

and was reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy emerging from the 2001 Treaty of Nice.
Military: European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)

The following section will start with a brief timeline of the European Security and Defense Policy to establish the recent historical context for the (inter-) regional and transatlantic inter-linkages and synergies reflected today in the ESDP as a background for its ideational evolution as it effects the ESDP and its role in the Euro-Mediterranean today.

1948: Treaty of Brussels, as a defense pact purely against German rearmament, signed by France, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg as a post-WWII security cooperation pact.

1949: North Atlantic Treaty, signed by the U.S. and ten Western European countries and Canada, gave rise to NATO, as a result of the recognition that Europe was unavoidably divided into East and West, with the USSR being a more serious threat to West European security than Germany, and hence acknowledging that its defense would have to be Atlanticist. NATO’s Article 5 represents the essence of this organization, as it obliges all members to assist the attacked party in the right to individual or collective self-defense by whatever means necessary to restore and maintain security.

1954: Paris Agreement amends this treaty with the accession of Germany, establishing the West European Union (WEU) as a European security and defense organization, setting out the principle of mutual assistance in the event of an armed attack against any of the High Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations (the right of self-defense) (Europa-website “Collective Defence,” 9/19/2008), but without standing forces or
command-structures of its own. It featured additionally cultural and social clauses as concepts for the setting up of a 'Consultative Council' on the basis that a cooperation between Western nations would help stop the spread of Communism.

1960: The cultural aspects of the WEU are transferred to the Council of Europe.

1970: As response to Davignon report, the European Community introduces European Political Cooperation (EPC).

1987: Single European Act - formalizes consultations between EU Member States in foreign policy matters strive for Common Positions in IGOs. They are declared by the Presidency of the EU Council and implemented by the Council (even if they are not legally binding).

1992: Ministerial Council of the WEU set out the Petersberg Tasks, which became an integral part of the European Security and Defense Policy, and are specifically included in the Treaty on the European Union as Article 17, covering humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping as well as combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. On this occasion, WEU member states declared that they would make military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces available to NATO and the EU. Furthermore, the establishment of the Satellite Centre in Torrejon/Spain, and a Situation Centre to monitor crisis areas, were decided upon.

1992: Maastricht Treaty/Treaty on the European Union: The WEU, maintaining its autonomy, is envisioned as the future military arm of the EU, and the Council of the WEU and of NATO began regular consultations between secretariats and military staffs, leading to deep cooperation, such as WEU access to NATO’s
integrated communications system.

1992: Brussels NATO Summit – Agreement on closer cooperation between NATO and WEU, with NATO members giving their full support to the development of the **European Security and Defense Identity**, in order to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance and reinforced the transatlantic link. Hereby the European allies could take greater responsibility for their common security and defense. To avoid duplication of efforts, NATO agreed to make its collective assets available. Additionally, the Heads of State endorsed the concept of **Combined Joint Task Forces** (CJTF) (NATO Handbook, Chpt. 15).

1995: The **Eurocorps**, as a joint force drawn from the WEU, its associate members, partners and observers, who had over the years joined the WEU, becomes operational as a multi-national contribution to European forces. It includes **Eurofor** as the European Rapid Reaction Force, which reports directly to the WEU, as well as Euromarfor a non-permanent, pre-structured European naval force consisting of Spanish, French, Italian and Portuguese ships.

1996: At their June meetings, NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers decided that NATO’s internal adaptation would involve building the European Security and Defense Identity within NATO, in order for the European Allies’ shared responsibility to be expressed more effectively and coherently in their contribution to the missions and activities of the Alliance, and reinforce the transatlantic partnership.

This “**New-look**” NATO has been described as a process of redefining the organisation’s role and operation” (europa-website New-look NATO,” 8/19/2008)
recognizing a European defense identity, strengthening the European component of the transatlantic security system, the new role of the WEU, as well as NATO’s eastern enlargement and its establishment of a stable and sustainable partnership with Russia and Ukraine, as well as NATO deepening its relations with third countries, e.g. through Partnership for Peace and Mediterranean Dialogue programs.

1998: **St. Malo Declaration** lays the political foundation between France and Great Britain, which in turn facilitated the launch of the European Security and Defense Policy and the formulation of the Headline Goal.

1999: **Treaty of Amsterdam** introduces **Common Foreign and Security Policy** (CFSP); supersedes the EPC as a common strategy\(^{56}\), and makes common positions obligatory when adopted unanimously at the Council. Additionally, the WEU is absorbed into the EU to make it a defensive and peacekeeping military organization in addition to its social and economic agenda, hereby gaining operational defense capability. As such it provides the framework for a future common defense policy, which could lead to common defense.

2000: “**Helsinki Headline Catalogue**” generated, leading to the formulation of the Petersberg task scenarios that specify which capabilities are required in each of 144 capability areas. In November 2000, the European Union held the first of several Capabilities Commitment Conference in Brussels, which elicited commitments for Over 100,000 (existing) troops that were declared available for this Helsinki Force

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\(^{56}\) The EU Common Strategy as an instrument of the CFSP involves i.a. “operational” mechanisms: constructive (positive) abstention does not block “unanimous” votes under the CFSP, but this member must refrain from actions conflicting with actions based on this vote.
Catalogue.

2000: European Council “Common Strategy of the European Union on the Mediterranean Region” (Appendix 6): builds on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to pursue cooperation between the EU, the Mediterranean region and Libya in a vast range of areas including security, democracy, justice and the economy. The objective is promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region. It was initially planned to run for four years up to 2004 but has been extended to January 2006.

2001: Treaty of Nice – established closer cooperation for the implementation of joint actions and common positions, but without applicability to military or defense implications.

2001: Laeken Summit - EU launches the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) In order to remedy European capability shortfalls. It involved initially some twenty panels composed of military experts from the member states which put forward plans and proposals in order to fill the identified shortfalls (e.g. by acquiring new equipment or optimizing existing capabilities, in particular through cooperation at European level).

2003: Definition of Headline Goal 2003 during the Helsinki Summit - the European Union pledged itself during the Helsinki summit to be able to deploy rapidly and then sustain forces capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks (as set out in the Amsterdam Treaty), including the most demanding (in operations up to a corps-level of up to 15 brigades or 50,000-60,000 persons to have the capability to intervene in any crisis in areas affecting European interests). The aim is to make
those forces self-reliant, deployable within 60 days and over 4,000 km, and sustainable in the field for a year. This might actually imply a force of 180,000 troops, including rotating replacements for the initial forces.

2003: **European Security Strategy** (ESS) formulated in a post-Cold War environment with increasingly open borders, linking internal and external security aspects indissolubly.

Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence — and so vulnerability — on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields (European Security Strategy 2003, 2).

2004: As the Helsinki Headline Goal became fulfilled, the European Council approved further development of the EU’s military crisis management capability with a new target: "**Headline Goal 2010**" (Appendix 7), in which EU members committed that by the year 2010 they would be capable of responding "with swift and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach" to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty of the EU and the 2003 EU European Security Strategy (i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, disarmament operations, support to third countries in combating terrorism, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, and peacemaking). The EU also aims to address the shortfalls from the previous headline goal (e.g. gaps related to strategic airlift and sealift).

2004: **European Defense Agency**, established by a Joint Action of the Council of
Ministers “to support the Member States in their effort to improve European Defence capabilities in the field of crisis management, and to sustain the ESDP as it stands now and develops in the future” via four functions: a. defense capabilities development, b. armaments cooperation, c. Development of a European defense technological industrial base and a defense equipment market, and d. research and technology.

While there is no regional focus beyond the EU overall, however, for the ESDP’s activities per se, the Common Strategy on the Mediterranean, on the other hand in fact updated the terms of reference of the Barcelona process by referring to the need to take developments in the ESDP “into account” in the context of promoting security in the Mediterranean (Article 13, quoted in Spencer 2001, 28), while its Article 8 (quoted in Ibid.) stated more specifically that “the EU intends to make use of the evolving common European policy on security and defence to consider how to strengthen, together with its Mediterranean partners, co-operative security in the region.”

The EMP and the ESDP

The EMP needs to be evaluated against this historical background: While the Valencia EMP foreign ministers’ summit 2002 after 9/11 only addressed the fight against terrorism in general terms, but authorized a deepening of the EMP’s dialogue to accommodate the recent development of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) through the launching of the European Security and Defense Policy… [t]he European purpose behind the deeper dialogue is to reassure MPCs (Mediterranean partner countries) about the role of the European Rapid Reaction Force and possibly
to open the way, in the longer terms, to modest defence co-operation in areas such as maritime distress relief operations (Gillespie 2002, 98).

Regardless of the ratification of an EU “Constitution,” some of its foreign policy objectives, such as the European Security Strategy (ESS) proposed in 2003, are planned to be implemented separately (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6). The ESS (2003) “identifies the Union’s role in the world and its geo-strategic interests” (Ibid.) and states (quoted in Ibid.), whereby

Europe should share responsibility for global security and building a better world [concludes that] the EU has the potential to make major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realize the opportunities. An active and capable EU would make an impact on a global scale.

The Eastern Mediterranean in particular is poised today more than ever before to become the epicenter of global strategic concern (Papacosma 2004, 19) due to the much greater number of variables involved than existed during the Cold War. This leads to much greater difficulty in determining common policy among traditional allies and neighbors. The continuing security dilemmas facing the states in this region validate in my opinion Adler’s (1998, 120, quoted in Attina 2000, 5) belief that multilateral institutions and the community-building practices and the “institutions they activate produce the necessary conditions for peaceful change, i.e. cognitive and material structures, transactions between states and societies and collective identity or ‘we-feeling’.”

Helle Malmvig (2004, 3) also echoes the dialectic in the EMP’s security discourse, one as being a liberal reform discourse, and the other as a cooperative security discourse. He furthermore argues that the simultaneous intermingling of these two
discourses has meant “that the EU has wavered uneasily between different priorities and logics in its Mediterranean policy” (Ibid.). Not only does this make EU policies somewhat schizophrenic, but they also “cause suspicions in Arab states about the real intentions and goals of the EU in the region” (Ibid.).

The threats identified in the ESDP’s Security Strategy, such as terrorism, failed states, organized crime, proliferation and regional conflicts, all manifest in Africa (Chaillot Paper No. 87, 2005, 31). It is argued in this dissertation that widespread insecurity in the EU’s “neighborhood,” i.a. in (Northern) Africa e.g. is reduced with increasing success of the EU’s traditional development policy, in addition to the political approaches. In this dissertation regional integration programs are viewed as a force for progress, and are natural allies in the quest for effective multilateralism as a way to ensure a sense of international order, of building trust and of combining effectiveness with legitimacy, in particular to support those parts of the EMP which are over-armed but under-institutionalized (Ibid., 31/2). This is particularly significant also with respect to subregions, as Hazem Saghieh (quoted in Kumaraswamy 2006, 1) writes: “‘we are brothers but others are dividing us’,” e.g. due to state creation without regard to ethnic lines in the post-colonial period. Hence socio-political and economic harmonization and integration between the northern and southern Mediterranean are not the only concerns of the EMP, but stability and security on the sub-regional level (e.g. Palestinian Authority and Israel) are also affected by the agenda of the EMP.

Cooperative security in the EMP proved in its early years a challenge. Beyond the disagreements among EMP-members over an approach to the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, long-term proactive policies “aimed at fundamental political and economic
reform in the Southern countries with a view to imposing systemic changes on their polities” (Aliboni 2002, 7) in terms of democracy, human rights and globalization were viewed by the EU “as building blocks on the road to stability, but by the Arab (and to some extent the Turkish) governments as a recipe for interference and certain destabilization” (Ibid.). MENA countries initially disagreed with the EU’s view of linking political and economic reform to address the root causes of instability and conflict, and would have preferred the EU to assist in reducing structural economic and social imbalances, and leave it up to them to address political stability and reform (Aliboni 2002, 7). Hence, as the South faced this “pro-active” Northern approach, they responded defensively to avoid domestic destabilization. Consequently, the 1998 Palermo declaration underlined the essentially civilian character of EMP cooperation (Ibid.), while in the Stuttgart “guidelines” of 1999 the military component of security was delayed indefinitely.

In light of the relatively short existence of the ESDP, no extensive and comprehensive studies have been undertaken to examine the relationship between the ESDP and the EMP specifically. Vasconcelos (2004, 6/7), however, lists the following key areas of translating principles into action, especially those cooperative actions which are feasible and likely to produce results, such as those building on the EU-UN cooperative crisis management experience gained in Bosnia and Kosovo, which might be applicable in sub-Saharan Africa, Civil Protection as an ESDP tasks, such as in the mitigation of natural or man-made disasters, civil-military training and exchange programs under the heading of possibly “transition, democracy and security,”
transparency in EuroMed defense cooperative agreements, as well as a WEU dialogue regarding cooperation on land mines in MENA.

The ESDP exists as the bridge to the EU’s hard power options, ranging from previously only national militaries and NATO on the one hand, and the EU’s soft power approach on the other. Pertaining to the Mediterranean, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue *per se* will be discussed in greater detail in the following section of NATO. While the EMP’s approach has been basically one of soft-power, focusing on economic and social assistance through the EU’s MEDA, NATO per se overall also boasts U.S. military hard power capabilities, while NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue on the other hand aims to build confidence and cooperation. Vasconcelos (2008, 8) suggests questioning the understanding of, and consensus on comprehensive security by EMP member states, i.e. whether e.g. the post-9/11 security perspective are really law and order related.

While the EMP, as a North-South integration project with the aim of security through the EU’s democratic principles of inclusion, and rejecting explicit power politics among the member states (Vasconcelos 2004, 8), the Euro-Med as a region has been the stage to continuing hard-power confrontations during the existence of the EMP, such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Lebanese civil war, Algerian internal “turmoil,” and other “incidents.” One major difference between soft and hard power is the former’s long “leadtime” vs. the greater potential for “immediacy” of hard power. Chourou (quoted in Spencer 2001, 24) had postulated that “Europe wanted a secure access to oil and gas and protection against waves of migrants.” However Spencer (Ibid.) points out that the first chapter of the Barcelona Declaration focuses on the standard agenda for cooperation over
hard security objectives of arms control, peaceful settlement of conflicts, conflict prevention and confidence building. In contrast to this, the

southern Mediterranean definitions of security are almost entirely drawn in economic terms, the principal aim being to secure European financial and technical assistance to restructure markets to meet the demands of increased international competition, if not directly the needs of the citizens and subject of each state (Ibid.).

The ideological aspect of the security culture of the EU rejects nationalism as a legitimate basis for security (in light of the detrimental historical European experiences), but views security as indivisible from a supranational perspective. The EU approach hence aspires to resolve differences in the security cultures of member states through the rule-of-law, and seeks peace through greater democracy in terms of the Democratic Peace theory. The practical application of this security culture of civilian power Europe in the EMP is approached through comprehensive/integrated policy, i.e. “economic integration, political convergence and security cooperation” (Vasconcelos 2004, 8), in order to make conflict a loose-loose proposition in this vision of a common destiny (Ibid.).

The soft power of the EU could also be viewed, in contrast to Heisbourg’s perspective (2001, 8), as value rather than interest oriented57, as it relates to the reciprocal co-constitution among all EMP-members of structures, values and interests within the dynamics of the EMP. Heisbourg (Ibid.) in my opinion is correct in stating that the “process itself becomes as important as the specific policy objectives” (italics added).

Over the course of the EMP and the changing international security context, the EU has

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57 This represents an interpretation which is contrary to social-cultural constructivism, which states that interests and values are mutually (re-)constructed by agents and structures. In the case of the EMP the data in this dissertation indicate that the dynamic of social-constructivism would be applicable in preference to the “value as opposed to interest” perspective, as values drive interests etc. (compare e.g. Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1987; 1992; 1999; Risse-Kappen 1995a).
now recognized, however, that it needs a consolidated hard approach to supplement its soft power, based on a common vision for this strategy of capability coordination.

The internal dynamics have often been ignored in the regional security analysis of the Euro-Med: not only in terms of the guarantees of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens, but also in terms of the role of the military and justice in internal security. This must be considered post-9/11 in connection with the international War on Terror, and the effect this has had on domestic policies which now increasingly exclude Islamic political parties, and justify repressive strategies or “reinforce authoritarian practices” (Vasconcelos 2004, 9), as well as an “increasing habituation to the use of violence and terror… against civilians” (Ibid.). This is supported by Heisbourg (2001, 8), who writes that the “ESDP and its Rapid Reaction Force does not exist in a historical vacuum.” On October 1, 2008 EU defense ministers met to focus on building a European fleet of helicopters and transport planes (in light of the deployment of the EU mission to Georgia on the same day highlighted a logistics deficit) (EurActiv 10/1/08). While previously EU peacekeeping missions, such as the one deployed in Chad had to rely on external contributions, such as from Russia, the EU can no longer afford this dependency. This expansion in EU defense logistics includes initial talks for joint EU officer training, “inspired by the ERASMUS student exchange programme” (Ibid.). While this indicates certainly a continued defensive EU, it suggests a deeper military integration, triggered by necessity arising from external circumstances, i.e. the Georgian-Russian crisis of August 2008.

While the intra-regional dynamics of the EMP are not analyzed in this dissertation, e.g. vis-à-vis the developing situation in the Caucasus (whether in terms of energy
security, Turkey’s EU-membership progress or a shift in current alliances among EMP-members), the writing of this dissertation quite unpredictably happened to fall on the cusp of two strategic events directly relevant to the EMP internally in the first case, and indirectly relevant to it inter-regionally in the second case: a. the launch of its successor program, the Union for the Mediterranean, and b. the Georgian-Russian hostilities of August 2008. In the light of the latter, the analysis of the ESDP (as well as the sections on Russia and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue) will encompass those data which were collected during the research phase of this dissertation up to the early summer of 2008. While some references have been made, a thorough analysis involving both events exceeds the parameters of the current project. A future analysis will delineate whether these events contribute to harmonizing the security cultures themselves within the EMP (as was emphasized by the West in mid-August 2008, following the Russian invasion of Georgia), or whether there will develop new dividing lines regionally.

**Justice and Home Affairs**

The Justice and Home Affairs dimension was firmly implanted in the third chapter of the Barcelona Process (Gillespie 2002, 99) at the 2002 EMP foreign minister conference in Valencia in “anticipating a ‘regional cooperation programme in the field of Justice, in combating drugs, organized crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of persons’” (Euromed Report 44, 29 April 2002, quoted in Ibid.). As the
lack of a common language on defense and security issues became clear, the Valencia Conference’s final Action Plan tended to delegate responsibilities for terrorism to the UN without a regional initiative (Gillespie 2002, 99), and only noted the need for a common strategic language. As a point of reference, (im)migration, however, falls from the side of the EU into the “Justice and Home Affairs”-(third) Pillar of the EU, and is handled by the countries on the southern border of the Mediterranean individually. The Third Chapter of the EMP, by comparison, is “social-cultural” – and the intent of the Valencia Conference in 2002 (i.e. post 9/11) was possibly to minimize any appearance of “hard” security in the EMP. Nevertheless, despite the delicate political climate in those years, migration and the fight against crime, such as terrorism, are being addressed within the EMP, as the example of the EU-EMP calendar for 2008 (preliminary) (Appendix 8) shows, that it is couched in the attainment of compliance e.g. with the UN mandate to provide human security (per the UN Report on Human Security of 2003).

In this sense, we turn first to migration as a security sector in terms of the New Framework for Security which Buzan, Waever and De Wilde (1999) proposed, before considering Good Governance in the Development-context of Justice and Home Affairs within the EMP.

Migration

Migration into Europe, such as from the Maghreb, is to some extent a necessity in light of Europe’s aging population (and hence shrinking its labor force). As the EU absorbs the labor forces of its latest enlargements, specific calculations about future labor

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58 Understanding of terrorism among EMP members varied, such as one country’s terrorist being another’s freedom fighter,
needs are uncertain, especially in light of Turkey’s EU-candidacy, which, when successful, will add a large and young workforce to the EU. While the EU is debating special work permits for Maghreb residents, the political reciprocal soft power symbiosis relating to migration has “interesting social and cultural consequences” (Joffé 2001, 55), as frequently migration from the southern Mediterranean into the north is the result of poor economic conditions in the sending country. As these migrations have been quite constant and large, the EMP was i.a. intended to reduce them by improving the economic outlook there. Until then costly repatriation occurs back to the (often unwelcoming) sending country. Other issues of migration pertain to the “gendered” impact of national and supranational policies and legislation, as well as questions relating to the rights of asylum seekers and the integration of asylum seekers and refugees into host societies (Freedman and Jamal 2008, 1), as many are not genuine, but simply economic migrants.

The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of the Geneva Convention protects refugees. However, overpowering the European social system with mostly bogus asylum seekers restricts the benefits for bona fide refugees, and calls into question the ability and willingness of European states to meet their obligations under the current international conventions on refugees and asylum seekers (Ibid. 2). Gendered forms of vulnerability are linked to social and welfare rights as well as in relation to detention, deportation and externalization.

The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council explicitly underlined in its concluding remarks on 18/19 June 2007 the importance of the extension of the Global Approach to Migration to the regions neighboring the EU in terms of exploring further initiatives to facilitate the mobility for certain categories of people from ENP (including
the EMP) to the EU, especially for ENP-related events. At the Tampere Summit in 1999, an EU-wide asylum and immigration policy was first initiated (Senyucel et al. 2006, 8). An EU-wide asylum and immigration policy was first initiated at the Tampere EU-Summit in 1999 (Senyucel et al. 2006, 8). In 2007, the EU General Affairs and External Relations Council explicitly underlined in its concluding remarks the importance of the extension of the Global Approach to Migration to the regions neighboring the EU in terms of exploring further initiatives to facilitate the mobility for certain categories of people from ENP (including the EMP) to the EU, especially for ENP-related events. This shows how Mediterranean migration as a security sector has global, regional, national, local as well as individual levels of concern and problematique.

Good Governance

“Good governance” is an area which is greatly dependent on the political will of a country’s leaders to not only legislate laws but also apply them in line with UN criteria of equitable, inclusive, participatory rule of law. Although the term Good Governance is used not only in the political arena, it is grouped in this dissertation under this section of “Justice and Home Affairs,” as the UN views it also in its role in development (UNESCAP 8/28/08: What is Good Governance?). Attention has focused on parliaments and the judiciary in Mediterranean countries, and the subjugation of the law and its institutions for the ruler’s interests (Dupret and Boutaleb 2008, 1), both upstream (i.e. the legislative processes) and “downstream (prosecution, pleas, adjudication etc.)” (Ibid.). As they take place in a cultural context, the applicability of code actually in practice, and the
practices of the courts (including the plethora of actors such as the court, clerks and court interpreters) need to be evaluated to determine the quality of governance (Ibid., 2).

“Bad governance is being increasingly regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within our societies” (UNESCAP website). Governance, as the process of decision-making and the process by government or civil society (such as (corrupt) influential land lords, peasant farmer associations, cooperatives, NGOs, research institutes, religious leaders, finance institutions, political parties, the military and on occasion organized crime syndicates) by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented) through formal or informal decision structures (e.g. kitchen cabinets or mafias) (Ibid.). In light of this, following the rule of law does not automatically guarantee “good governance,” as the laws themselves may not have been legislated involving accountability, transparency, responsiveness, equitability and inclusivity, effectiveness and efficiency, participatory or consensus oriented (Ibid.). As a UN-concept, “good governance” has been accepted (in theory) by all UN member states – an ideal, which is difficult to achieve in its totality. However, development programs in the “third chapter” of the EMP, the “social-cultural” basket, are well positioned to address some historical cultural obstacles to good governance in some Mediterranean countries. This context of ideas (“UN ideals”) affecting actors (states, NGOs etc.) to build structures (“good governance”) is well explained by Social Constructivism (compare Wendt 1999).

The Role of Civil Society in (Mediterranean) Security

Public institutions are understood to conduct public affairs, manage public resources and guarantee the realization of human rights by some definitions as part of
implementing in a state political governance as the process of decision-making. “Good
governance” would accomplish this in a manner free of abuse and corruption, and with
due regards to the law (UNESCAP website 8/30/08). While this is the ideal, the UN
views it as necessary to achieve sustainable human development – especially since many
major (donor) institutions, such as the IMF and the global community, condition their aid
and loans increasingly on reforms which lead to good governance. The “state” not only
needs to utilize its resources to support effective institutions to provide for the social
welfare of its population, but also the judiciary, police and military to assure a positive
reinforcing cycle, rather than a negative one.

This debate has become more salient in the last years, as civilian and military
officials are beginning to understand that an aggressor is not necessarily a traditional
military entity, but can be a sub-national or transnational non-state actor who implements
the kind of violence and instability “that subverts national and regional well-being and
exploits the root cause of instability for his own narrow ideological and/or commercial
[money-making] purposes” (Manwaring 2006, 2). Hence the danger of volatile security
situations needs to be addressed seriously, or it risks destabilization.

Donors and NGOs e.g. in MENA have experimented with innovative local
governance arrangements (such as consultative forums under the UN’s Agenda 21
program, to create “a profusion of spaces in which citizens’ participation has the potential
to enhance accountability and state responsiveness” (Bergh and Jari 2008, 1). In
determining this progress, one needs to ask questions of increases in the sense of

entitlement to participate, shifts in political agency, and … incremental
changes in power structures, [as well as whether] … decentralization reforms,
participatory programs, and local governance innovations resulted in more
efficient policy formulations and implementation, hence leading to more effective basic service delivery to the people at the grassroots (Ibid.).

The dilemma between regimes and activists is the challenge to existing power structures, e.g. would genuine participation from “below” improve “service-delivery and/or changes in local power structures that could challenge authoritarian governance strategies?” (Ibid.).

Recent work (Migdal 2001, 63 quoted in Ibid., 3) suggests diverging from the traditional perspective of “struggles and accommodations” as social forces in particular arenas appropriate parts of the state, or the components of the state co-opt influential social figures, hereby continually shifting “the boundary between the state and other parts of society” ( Bergh and Jari 2008, 3). Instead, Migdal proposes to shift from this adversarial position of state against society towards a perspective of “the state as part of society” (referenced in Bergh and Jari 2008, 3). While theoretical approaches may ontologically choose to disaggregate the (authoritarian) state from spaces for participation, deliberative democracy, political capabilities and issues of citizenship in multi-sited and multi-level research, a “state” represents the product of its internal and external dynamics. This argument is supported by Constructivist Theory, as the co-construction of “state” and “society” is occurring in a setting where international interests and values are co-constituted with domestic structures to bring about not only harmonization in the international relations of a state, but also contribute to the development of voices to enable their participation internally.

Answers to questions such as whether new spaces of participation have been opened by decentralization whether “it contributed to and increased a sense of
citizenship, … decentralization reforms contributed to the emergence of new elites that could challenge existing power structures… [and] what is the scope of ‘participatory’ projects to contribute to the development of political capabilities on the part of their intended beneficiaries” (Ibid. 4/5), or how such experiments compare with those in other regions of the world, have not been answered fully yet.

Spaces for Change: Decentralization, Participation, Local Governance, Transparency and Reform in MENA

Western governments and international organizations have encouraged Arab regimes during the last years to undertake what Bergh and Jari (2008, 1) refer to as “authoritarian upgrading.” In contrast to past analyses through the prism of “good governance” and democratic transitions at the national level, this new (official) discourse emphasizes rights, social justice, and citizenship, e.g. through decentralization reforms which give more resources and power to local governments (Ibid.). In the context of development, A. Sen (1999, 39) posits this in terms of “transparency guarantees deal with the need for openness that people can expect: the freedom to deal with one another under guarantees of disclosure and lucidity.” Political and economic transparency go hand in hand. For this purpose measures are introduced in EMP programs which are specifically aimed at institutional and economic strengthening, similar as those extended to EU members internally, such as building upon the mutual commitment to common values (such as democracy and human rights, rule of law and good governance), as significant developmental steps to achieving one of the basic human freedoms identified by Sen, “transparency.”
Special EMP Member States

Turkey

As an EU applicant state, Turkey, in addition to its current EMP membership, would be the premier area to develop this secular Euro-Islam outside of the current EU and then be able to offer it as an ideological alternative approach to other EMP members. This fusion of moderate Islam into a Euro-Islam identity is envisioned not as a bulwark against radical Islam, but as Ataturk recognized, represents a society based on secular rule of law.

As such it is a good example in the academic exploration of political party transitions which seek to combine traditional Islamic values in the development and modernization processes (especially in terms of adopting the EU’s acquis communautaire as part of its EU-candidacy status). This challenge for modernizing public policy in line with best practice has been a strong impetus for policy reform. The combination between evolving social norms and changing patterns of policy-making in Turkey’s Europeanization have contributed to political rearrangements which lead to speculation about other EMP members in the southern Mediterranean. A more fluid ideological contestation has been observed, at time rejecting old divisions of political parties and acquiring new dimensions through the articulation of new ideological standpoints of governing parties, ranging from “labor relations, social security reform and regional disparities to civil-military relations and the creation of a security culture” (Eralp and Sotiropoulos 2008, 2) both domestically and internationally. At times the governing parties have been hard-pressed to articulate and implement new modes of public policy
which would reflect their shifting ideological undertones while accommodating their electorate’s aspirations (Ibid.), which added to the reform load.

While a more stable constellation of party political representation has been achieved, it rests on the shifting “tectonic plates” of an uncertain and potentially turbulent political realignment (Ibid.) amid the rediscovery of ideological divides and the struggle among political actors to carve out new spaces for electoral, political and ideological dominance. While new ideological standpoints transcend long-established left-right divisions, “a much more fluid ideological contestation” (Ibid. 3) accompanies the receding role of the military amid attempts to redefine the center of the other parties. This climate of the dynamically evolving ideational component of party political transformation, public policy reform and institutional redesign (Ibid.) is reflected in the discursive frameworks shaping public policy agendas in Turkey.

The implementation of multi-level governance structure in Turkey in the preceding context of policy-making and implementation structures, in the case of Turkey as part of its EU-candidacy and its EMP-membership, shape the terrain of political struggle and participation (Ibid., 5), such as re-territorializing policy-making, which influences internal administrative organization of political parties and their agendas across the ideological spectrum (Ibid.).

The Eastern Mediterranean presents a buffer between the Middle East and the EU. Of course, once Turkey’s EU application results in successful membership, the EU will have a common border with Iraq, Syria, and Iran and anyone crossing this border into Turkey from those countries will have entered the EU and enjoys freedom of movement within the entire community (Mirbaheri 2004, 49). While this is a tremendous challenge
for the EU, the opportunity for the EU would be to have a secular Islamic member state which gives its citizens the option for modernity, progress and prosperity. This fusion of moderate Islam into a Euro-Islam identity is envisioned as one bulwark against radical Islam, with societies based on law and order as well as socio-economically stable, as another approach, and shows the conceptual efficacy of the EMP approach to Mediterranean security and development – even if not all aspects have developed into maturity at this point yet. Turkey, as an EU applicant state, in addition to its current EMP membership, would be the premier area to develop this secular Euro-Islam outside of the current EU and then be able to offer it as an ideological alternative approach to other EMP members.

Libya

Libya was offered EMP membership in the event of a complete lifting of UN-sanctions and on the condition of full compliance with the whole Barcelona Process acquis (Schumacher 2003, 227) at the third Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers’ conference in Stuttgart in April 1999. Although the sanctions were lifted in 2003, Libya’s observer status in the EMP continues until it fulfills the acquis. In the meantime, the European Commission held informal consultations in 2006 with Libyan authorities on migration, trade regulations, energy questions and EU policies in Sub-Saharan Africa to identify areas of cooperation and reform priorities in Libya when political conditions (especially the highly publicized case of the Bulgarian nurses) permit (EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 2006).
In 2007, Nicolas Sarkozy as newly elected French president in 2007, appeared to quickly burnish his credentials by solving the dilemma surrounding the captive Bulgarian nurses in Libya and immediately after made an arms deal/nuclear power generation deal with this country worth a reported $402 million (Fisher 2007). Critics have argued that the Sortir du Nucleaire (“Get Out of Nuclear”) grouping of public interest organizations claims that the official reason for the reactor to desalinate sea water is a "deception" as the civilian and military uses of nuclear technology were "indissociable (sic)." "Delivering civilian nuclear energy to Libya would amount to helping the country, sooner or later, to acquire nuclear weapons," it states further. Rich in oil and gas, Libya is "very amply self-sufficient in energy," the group argued. "If it wishes to diversify, it should logically give priority to solar energy; the country enjoys remarkable levels of sunshine all year long."

From an energy security standpoint, the oil and gas in Libya and Algeria could help Europe be slightly more isolated from a less predictable Russia, while benefiting their own oil companies. Re-establishing Libya as a petroleum exporter after the long international embargo following the Pan Am bombing by enabling it to generate energy for domestic use through nuclear reactors is argued by some to be an approach to bolster its economy and hereby reduce the emigration pressure of its citizens towards Europe.

Mauritania (and the Western Sahara Conflict)

This country, as one of the later members of the EMP, is being singled out for a brief country-discussion to show in the following brief timeline its impressive road to progress despite historical structural shortcoming (resulting in high levels of poverty),
political and geo-climatic challenges. Its current security-strategic significance pertains acutely to the conflict surrounding the Western Sahara region of Mauritania (also known as Spanish Sahara, a former Spanish colony with special autonomous status within the kingdom of Morocco) (Zunes 2007, 1). The Western Sahara region was partitioned between Morocco and Mauritania in April, 1976 with Morocco acquiring the northern two-thirds of the territory (CIA 2006, 266). When Mauritania, under pressure from Polisario guerrillas, abandoned all claims to its portion in August 1979, Morocco moved to occupy that sector shortly thereafter and has since asserted administrative control over the whole territory (Ibid.), with significant US arms support (Zunes 2007). The official Moroccan government name for Western Sahara is the "Southern Provinces," which indicates Río de Oro and Saguia el-Hamra. Not under control of the Moroccan government is the area that lies between the border wall and the actual border with Algeria (Ibid.). The Polisario Front claims to run this as the Free Zone on behalf of the SADR. The area is patrolled by Polisario forces, and access is restricted, even among Sahrawis, due to the harsh climate of the Sahara, the military conflict and the abundance
of land mines. Still, the area is traveled and inhabited by many indigenous Sahrawi nomads from the Tindouf refugee camps of Algeria and the Sahrawi communities in Mauritania. Both Moroccan and United Nations MINURSO forces are also present in the area. The UN’s autonomy plan for the region would imply that for the first time since the ratification of the UN charter sixty years ago a country’s (Morocco’s) military expansion of its territory is being endorsed, “setting a dangerous and destabilizing precedent” (Zunes 2007) – despite acceptance of an autonomy agreement over independence by the people of Western Sahara in a free and fair referendum (“constituting a legitimate act of self-determination”) (Ibid.). This statement is, however, disputed.

Mauritania itself experienced a non-violent coup d’etat in 2005, following which it has been ruled by a seventeen-member Military Council. The EU began consultations with Mauritania in late 2005 under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement to address i.a. the neutrality and transparency of the interim government, as well as active cooperation as a point of departure for illegal immigration into EU territory, and committing itself to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) as a framework for the use of its future oil revenues. It installed a transitional government to transition into democracy with free and fair elections 2006/7, following which Mauritania, together with Albania, became the newest EMP-member in November 2007 (having had observer status since the beginning of the Barcelona Process) (European Commission – Development/Regions website).

As such Mauritania had become an example of the successful utilization of ENP- (since it did not join the EMP until 2007) funds to bring about structural reforms, local development (especially improving the sustainability of, and maximization in the fishing
sector, as well as expansion and modernization of infrastructure), and administrative modernization in justice and civil society. Unfortunately, the military seized control of Mauritania in August 2008, though vowing to hold free and fair elections.

**Subregional-Groupings of Special Significance in the Euro-Med**

Adriatic Sea Partnership

The Adriatic Sea Partnership is an example of an intra-regional “region” within the Mediterranean. It represents a political deepening, through mainly epistemic cooperation. It was initiated in March 2006 by the Slovenian Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning as a protective approach against the environmental challenges to this sensitive and vulnerable marine ecosystem, modeled as an elaboration of the positive experiences with the Sva River Basin Initiative (MAP Bureau 2006, 1) in terms of integrating the Adriatic under the UN’s Mediterranean Strategy for Sustainable Development (Ibid.). This institution would coordinate national and international public and private level institutions of involved shareholders, such as financial, waste water management, integrated coastal zone management, etc. (Ibid., 205).

Israel-Palestine

The **Israeli-Palestine** dynamics are “conflictive” from several angles, destabilizing the region since the founding days of Israel, and negatively influencing the wider Euro-Med by polarizing the region along religious lines pertinent to the occupied Palestinian Territory (oPT), and to compensate for past injustices in the case of Israel. Examples of the festering issues are the hypocrisy in terms of Israeli nuclear arms, and the fine line in
differentiating between the “legitimate armed struggle against an ‘occupying power’ and ‘terrorist violence’” (Senyucel 2006, 14), which are problems yet unresolved with the EU. While this section cannot trace the intricacies of the entire conflict in detail, certain critical junctions will be highlighted as they affect regional security and stability overall.

In the early years Europe had been largely excluded from the political aspects of Middle East peace-making dynamics due to Israeli suspicion and resentment after the 1980 Venice Declaration\(^5\). However, as Europe was also a major funder of the process, it viewed the longterm economic and security inextricably linked, i.e. that new European policies, responding to specific European (soft) security concerns (hard security being addressed by NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, hereby leaving it – and the U.S. - out of

\(^5\) It held i.a. that “The heads of state and government and the ministers of foreign affairs [in the EU] held a comprehensive exchange of views on all aspects of the present situation in the Middle East, including the state of negotiations resulting from the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel in March 1979. They agreed that growing tensions affecting this region constitute a serious danger and render a comprehensive solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict more necessary and pressing than ever:

a. The nine member states of the European Community consider that the traditional ties and common interests which link Europe to the Middle East oblige them to play a special role and now require them to work in a more concrete way towards peace.

b. In this regard, the nine countries of the community base themselves on (UN) Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the positions which they have expressed on several occasions, notably in their declarations of 29 June 1977, 10 September 1970, 26 March and 18 June 1979, as well as in the speech made on their behalf on 25 September 1979 by the Irish minister of foreign affairs at the 34th UN General Assembly.

c. On the bases thus set out, the time has come to promote the recognition and implementation of the two principles universally accepted by the international community: the right to existence and to security of all the states in the region, including Israel, and justice for all the peoples, which implies the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

d. All of the countries in the area are entitled to live in peace within secure, recognized and guaranteed borders. The necessary guarantees for a peace settlement should be provided by the UN by a decision of the Security Council and, if necessary, on the basis of other mutually agreed procedures. The nine declare that they are prepared to participate within the framework of a comprehensive settlement in a system of concrete and binding international guarantees, including (guarantees) on the ground.

e. A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully its right to self-determination.”
the EU’s own policies) alongside the Commission’s long-standing economic interest in
the region, to also address political and social issues (Joffé 2001, 37).

(Non-)Democracy

The EU and the U.S.’ underestimation in the past of the political force of Islam
internally and externally led to inadequate attention in assuring democratic development
in the Palestinian population. Spencer (2001, 19) writes that

[w]here the Palestinians have lost out – apart from the obvious
discrepancies in their access to land, wealth and resources – is precisely
where Israeli society has been accounted for because it is a democracy.
Israeli leaders have been constrained by what the populace will support;
Palestinian leaders by what the populace will put up with. (Italics original) 60

By 2006, however, the Hamas-led government was democratically elected in the
occupied Palestinian Territory (oPT), leading to the ironic international response of a
boycott, which continued “through the formation of the national unity government in
spring of 2007” (De Voir 2008, 3). At that time a civil war broke out between the rival
Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah, resulting in the “political division of oPT into the
Fatah-controlled West Bank, and the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip” (Ibid.), which
handicapped the establishment of the two-state solution by the U.S.–set deadline of 2009,
as the “only internationally recognized representative of oPT are now seen as illegitimate
by Hamas” (Ibid.) and the majority of Palestinians who elected them. The parliament of
the West Bank, already fractured by these geographical and political divisions was
replaced with an “‘emergency government’ composed of unelected technocrats appointed

60 Incidentally, the implications of this pertain not only to the Palestinians, but can also be applied e.g. to
Algerian popular uprisings as a result of their exclusion in domestic politics.
to ministerial positions and tasked with guiding Palestine back toward internal stability and forward toward statehood” (De Voir 2008, 4). No elections are set until spring 2009 to establish a representative government.

From Oslo to Annapolis and beyond

The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Oslo Accords") of 1993 (Appendix 5), brokered by the Quartet on the Middle East (the U.S., Russia, the EU and the UN) were considered a milestone in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the first face-to-face agreement between Israel and political representatives of Palestinians. It was also the first time for some Palestinians to publicly acknowledged Israel’s right to exist. It was intended as the framework for the future relations between Israel and the anticipated Palestinian state upon resolution of outstanding status issues between these two states, such as the granting of interim self-government to the oPT by Israel in phases, and the withdrawal of the Israel military from parts of Gaza and the West Bank, to be reached within five years in a final agreement. Other issues, such as Palestinian refugees, Israeli settlements, security and borders were to be settled later.

Its progress has been continually hampered by numerous interferences, such as the Second Intifada of 2000, the Palestinian election victory of Hamas who repeatedly refused to officially recognize Israel, renounce violent resistance, and the lack of both Israel and OPT to live up to their pledges. As optimism for the eventual success of the realization of the agreements reached in the Oslo Accords has waned in many countries
in recent years, the U.S. held a multilateral conference\textsuperscript{61} on the peace process in the
Middle East November 27, 2007 in the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis (“Annapolis
Conference”) to articulate for the first time a two-state solution\textsuperscript{62}, i.e. Israel and a
Palestinian state consisting of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (in its entirely per
Abbas’ insistence, with any permanent Israeli control of land beyond its 1967 borders to
be agreed upon on a one-to-one basis, and Olmert indicating his willingness to give parts
of East Jerusalem to the Palestinians) as a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It
resulted in a Joint Statement (Appendix 10) from all parties.

The “confidence-building measures” offered in exchange for promises of a future
deal have not led to a comprehensive peace dedicated to a final status solution. This is
partially due to Israeli citizens’ lack of enthusiasm about giving up East Jerusalem, as
well as the other territorial negotiations necessary, and partially because the role of
Hamas, who the U.S. refuses to recognize despite their election victory, has solidified in
Gaza in contrast to Fatah’s role in the West Bank, some authors (deVoir 2008) suggest as
recently as this year to pursue the one-state solution for Israel and oPT. This argument is
based on the “duty” of the occupying power, Israel, to provide security for its occupied
territory, and envisions shared representation between Israel, the Emergency
Government, and NGOs to change the political direction from a human rights struggle to
one of civil rights. De Voir (2008) suggests that this would be more palatable to the

\textsuperscript{61} the list of over forty invitees included, besides Israel and Abbas (representing oPT for the first time on
its own rather than part of a delegation, such as the Arab League), also China, the Arab League, Russia,
Saudi Arabia, Syria (in order to discuss the Golan Heights). And the EU and the UN stand largely be
hind the U.S. (which played the major role in contrast to the Quartet’s strong role in the past).
\textsuperscript{62} which was approximately sixty years after the UN approved the Partition Plan (UN General Assembly
Resolution 181) dividing oPT into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem as an international
city (a \textit{corpus separatum}, to be administered by the UN to avoid conflict over its status (Israel Ministry of
Foreign Affairs website, accessed 7/6/07), a decision accepted by Israel at the time but rejected by the Arab
League and Arab Higher Committee.
international community, i.a. because it ostensibly overcomes the current “us and them” formula. I sincerely doubt that this de facto annexation of the oPT as a “protectorate” of Israel is a viable alternative for democratic representation for the Palestinian people or for their sovereign development of an own country, especially in light of the historic disadvantages bestowed on them despite the difficulties of a half a century to achieve this.

Extra-Regional Support or Indulgence?

The Israeli-Palestine conflict has been questioned as hiding the true nature of the U.S.’ presence in the region (Attina 2005, 21) as the contingent objective of Israeli security or to guarantee its longterm hegemonic power interests in the region (Ibid.). Did power politics play a role, the US’ integration, rather than regional competition with Arab power politics potentials, into the security partnership building processes in the Mediterranean would have to be examined (Ibid.). Some scholars (compare Attina 2002, 7) argue that the agreement by the ministers at the meeting in Malta that security cooperation as the basis for sharing a more comprehensive and essentially civilian concept of security was not feasible in the heterogeneous Euro-Med “security complex” due to the unsolved conflict between Israel and Arabs63. Aliboni (2002, 13) points out the vicious circle between the lack of peaceful conditions preventing regional economic and political cooperation progressing, versus the desire by the EU to institute this cooperation in order to bring about peaceful conditions.

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63 the ministers’ argument being that no security cooperation is possible in the EMP motivated them to move “from the idea of implementing Confidence-Building Measures (CBSs), as a precursor of arms control and limitation, to Partnership-Building Measures (PBMs) instead.
Other scholars, (Compare Schumacher (2003, 216) have utilized an all encompassing approach “to avoid mono-causal explanation artefacts” (Ibid.) in the analysis of the MEP, such as the argument (voiced frequently) that the EMP was not fully successful because of the Israeli-Palestinian hostilities. By incorporating the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) as an *external intervening* variable in analyzing its role in the EMP overall, in addition to the structural capabilities, interests and the security cultures of all actors involved, Schumacher argues that beyond the ongoing conflict in the Middle East, the political and security partnership, i.e. the first basket of the MEP, is compromised by four interrelated problems (Ibid.):

the institutional and structural constraints which can be observed in the EU’s foreign policy-making system, the existence of *complex horizontal and vertical interest divergences*, and lastly the problem of *time inconsistency and incomplete contracting* in the EMP’s main instruments, namely the Barcelona Declaration and the EMAA’s (Ibid.).

Kydland and Prescott (1977) had described the phenomenon of time inconsistency, which Schumacher (2003, 216) applied in the context to the EMP, as an instance of long-run policies which strongly differ from the originally (even contractually) agreed upon “short-run policy. They argue that this is due to the actor(s) responsible for policy implementation are presented incentives to deviate from the actual policy commitment,” such as when incomplete agreements offer exit-options and/or exclude certain policy issues from the political basis in a political relationship (Ibid.), as this in turn lessens the credibility of the original arrangement (Ibid.).

Some of the complex horizontal and vertical interest divergences pertaining to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, which need to be evaluated, is the dynamic with its neighboring countries, Syria and Lebanon. Throughout the EMP’s existence Syria and
Lebanon refused to accept certain military-related commitments towards confidence-building and disarmament as anticipated by the Council of Foreign Ministers in designing the Action Plans for these countries (Schumacher 2002, 217). While some authors (Ibid.) have criticized this circumvention of the intent of the EMP by diluting the Action Plan, one must remember that the ENP’s Action Plans are part of the EMP, as the ENP’s southern region-specific program. That there would be political “wrangling” is to be expected in any forum, whether political, economic, or social, public or private. That the lack of legal enforceability of EMP initiatives (in favor of positive or negative incentives, as discussed earlier in this chapter) led state-actors such as Syria and Lebanon to make decisions which were optimal from their immediate position (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 487, referred to in Schumacher 2002), rather than follow the rules of an international regime/IGO which would lead to sub-optimal outcomes in the short-term in favor of long-term gains (such as trust, lowered transaction costs, and possibly cooperation and peace in this case in the future), should not be surprising and should have been anticipated rather than criticized in a new coalition of states (i.e. the EMP in 1995) with no history of successful iterations.

Hence this particular example from the EMP should serve as a special case illustrating the limits of liberal institutionalism and the lack of its international security role in potentially contributing to the consolidation of democracies (in contrast to the findings of e.g. Boening 2006): Kydland and Prescott (1977) hence referred to their findings as “the inconsistency of optimal plans” – its remedy presumably the strict observance of the rules/laws of the IGO/international regime (as some authors, such as Schumann 2002, would hold). However, less democratic institutionalized countries
cannot realistically be expected to follow these recommendations, but need a broader actor-structure socialization, which the EMP was conceptually well poised to undertake, especially with its enhancements throughout the years within the ENP. In fact, I would argue that the EMP provides the complex and synergistic structures necessary for the Oslo Accords to come to fruition. While taking much longer than wished for, they not only expressed the guidelines, but also the sentiments of the peoples involved in this dilemma (compare Appendix 9: concluding remarks by signatories), including the future evolution of participatory democracy in member countries (such as the oPT) of people or parties who had been less than palatable to the West in the past.

Considering not only the very extensive and complex goals of the EMP, and the domestic context of member countries both to the north as well as the south of the Mediterranean, it is neither surprising nor realistic in my opinion that not all EMP member countries were able to comply perfectly on all strategies, methods or timetables in the implementation of the EMP, especially in the complex socio-political constellations involved in the Middle East conflict that pre-date the EMP by fifty years, and are accordingly entrenched and resistant to “cookie-cutter” solutions in the absence of properly established institutional, political, economic and socio-cultural networks established yet. Nevertheless, the multilateral security policies of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process in terms of the U.S. sensitivities need to be also short- and intermediate term, rather than just longterm (Spencer 2001, 20/1).
Political Parties, Arabic Security Culture and Islamic Parties in MENA

In some of the previous sections the background of the current European security culture was in the context of its Cold War background (e.g. the Helsinki Process) and the 1990 Paris Charter for a New Europe. The former represents a “three-decade long elaboration of new ideas and the formation of the mechanisms of comprehensive and cooperative security” (Attina 2004, 13), and the latter defines the security perspective in the post-Cold War period for its signatories (i.e. OSCE member states). In terms of the EU and its neighborhood, the evolution of common security and “defense policies in the 1990s to react to unexpected crises and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to countries and non-state actors insensitive of the conventional logic of military strategy” (Ibid.) involved combining “concepts of cooperative and comprehensive security with the discourses of the new threats and dangers” (Ibid.) and firmly grounding the ”regional security partnership model” (Ibid.) in regions such as the Mediterranean.

Contemporary Arab security culture views are on the one hand traditionally rooted in the views of “an Arab trans-state community as the building block of peace and security in the area” (Ibid.) and in “the view of the society of Arab states, which believes… in the friendly relations between the Arab states as the foundation of security in the Arab world and [as] the condition for protecting the individual Arab country against external violence” (Ibid.). Hence state sovereignty has been unquestioned in MENA (which explains i.a. this region’s “anxiety” over EU-intervention in Kosovo a few years ago).

Poised against these traditional views are a) the reformists’ view, which developed particularly in North Africa, which viewed security as positively related to the
Attina (2004, 13/4) points out that security cooperation at the regional level is not customary to Arab security culture, but rather evokes suspicion of the governments associated with national militaries and the traditional “strategic secrecy” (Ibid.). It is in this context of engaging the Mediterranean security “environment” on all its diverse levels that the Three Chapters of the EMP, the evolution leading up to the OSCE, as well as NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue need to be viewed. In other words, including external actors, including the U.S. in Euro-Mediterranean security dialogues is significant in developing multi-lateral results in this region (Ibid. 2004, 15). It is in this context that one can reflect on the political transaction costs involved in democratic institutions: Majone (2001, 75) points out that without political costs in majoritarian institutions the actors would negotiate forever on the one hand. On the other, national representatives find it difficult on occasion to agree on a proposal even if they recognize its benefits, due to the challenge they may face domestically (Ibid., 76). Having to abide by a majority decision in an international institutional environment permits them to be bound by a decision with which they intellectually agree, but could not vote for due to their fiduciary
responsibility to their electorate. Hence regional security progress through cooperation from this perspective can be explained well through the liberal institutionalist theory.

Economic Deepening

**Beyond a Free Trade Area**

**Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area**

A Euro-Med Free Trade Area (FTA) is planned by 2013\(^{64}\). It is no surprise that although EMP as the EU’s premier foreign policy approach to the South- and Eastern Mediterranean attempts to present a uniform approach, northern Europe views the Mediterranean differently than southern Europe in terms of diverging or even competing commercial concerns. The economic basket of the EMP envisions a Mediterranean free trade zone by 2010 with aid from the EU through the Mediterranean Development Assistance (MEDA) Program in exchange for market reforms for a common area of peace and stability. By raising the economic conditions in MENA through economic development programs as part of the EMP, last but not least through a free trade area throughout all member states, the economic impetus leading to illegal immigration would be reduced. As of June 2005 (Escribano 2005, 1), only Israel, Jordan, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority and Tunisia had expressed an interest in progressing beyond the current Association Agreements for participating in the Single European Market, which might reflect the varying degrees of current technical harmonization capability in MENA.

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\(^{64}\) Or, per the new Union for the Mediterranean plans, for 2010 already. This latter target, especially in light of the recent global financial crisis of late late 2008 and continuing into 2009 and potentially beyond, appears unrealistic according to some estimates.
Some authors, such as Carapico (2001) state that the EU’s ambitions in the Euro-Mediterranean basin and the cultivation of a special relationship further south in the Arabian Peninsula does not directly challenge US security policy in the Middle East but is comparable to US interests in the Caribbean and Latin America: “a large regional free trade zone, open to imports and foreign investment” (Ibid., 24). This represents one of the modi operandi of the economic constitutive elements identified by A. Sen as essential for development.

Spencer (2001, 12) suggests the EU “determine its priorities more fundamentally … in thematic rather than strictly geopolitical terms,” encompassing partners in the EMP beyond member states on the sub-state level also, in terms of “the destabilising consequences of uneven economic development in states lacking democratic accountability” (Ibid.), as well as the supranational dimension, such as “the trans-national links of organized criminal networks engaged in trafficking people, drugs and arms” (Ibid.). These are often linked with a weak civil society, and reciprocally with limited economic options of the population. Hence the following sub-sections will examine a prism of the economic aspects in the EMP and their direct or indirect security implications.

The Free Trade Area (FTA) of the Agadir Agreement of 2004 between Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt was seen as a first building block in the matrix of FTAs

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65 This entails the elimination of quotas, tariffs and preferences for most (not all) goods between its partners as the “second stage” of integration after a “preferential trading area,” and before advancing to a possible customs union (common external tariffs), a common market (integrating beyond the free movement of goods also the factors of production, i.e. labor, services and capital) or, finally, economic and monetary union in degrees of (regional) integration.
between EMP-member states for the planned greater Euro-Med FTA by 2010, as well as a stepping stone to the formation of a Greater Arab FTA. The envisioned Euro-Med FTA would cover the EU, the EFTA, the EU customs unions with third states (such as Turkey, Andorra, San Marino), the EU candidate countries, as well as the MENA states of the EMP, in addition to potentially all ENP countries at a later date.

The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council explicitly underlined that deeper economic integration is an essential building block of the strengthened ENP (now the “umbrella” institutional reference for the EMP) “to be achieved in particular by the progressive adoption of deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” (EU General Affairs and External Relations Council concluding remarks 18/19 June 2007) to create i.a. leverage for socio-economic development, considering sustainability and individual freedoms possible as a result. The following sections will outline the prisms of a “deeper” EMP. In the economic sense, it may be linked to seemingly “hardware” issues, such as infrastructure, which has been the Achilles heel in South-South cooperation, as well as domestic development per se.

**Energy as Economic and Hard Security**

The European Energy Community

The traditional weak link in Western political, economic and, historically, in cultural security is energy. The degree of European energy dependence on the southern

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66 In terms of the “perception” of “cold temperatures” as a force of nature, e.g. in folklore, which humans must struggle to overcome. In this context, Russia is traditionally perceived as not only as “the standard” with respect to unbearable, endless cold, but more recently, as one of the agents allowing or
Mediterranean was possibly not as acute upon the founding of the EMP in 1995 as it is today in light of rapidly increased world demand for energy, and partially because it intensified with the “liberalisation of European energy markets and the ‘dash for gas’” (Joffé 2001, 54).

While Joffé states (Ibid.) that Europe’s future on natural gas is at issue in the Mediterranean, in this dissertation a a more “holistic” approach to all energy as being complementary and essential to the security of any state is suggested as an alternative perspective. While Algeria and Libya are supplying a considerable portion to the overall European energy supply, Saharan solar and wind energy projects are becoming much more salient in the last years as well. As the energy is supplied via a hard grid, the interdependence between the northern and southern Mediterranean countries has become much more fixed. To this purpose the European Commission implemented Energy Liberalisation Packages, containing i.a. legislative proposals to meet European climate change targets within a changing (non-discriminatory) regulatory framework, e.g. for access to networks to “encourage investment and to facilitate cross-border trade and market integration, transparency of information and effective unbundling” (European Energy Regulators’ Work Programme 2008). This approach is hoped to also affect the southern Mediterranean beyond the current oil and gas trade between North Africa and Europe, but also in terms of the anticipated Euro-Med Free Trade Area within a couple years.

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67 This could be interpreted as an indication of a “hard” regional security structure beyond institutions only, yet non-military
This raises new questions in terms of the applicability of the European model of an independent [National Regulatory Association] (NRA) monitoring of (potentially) free and competitive markets being acceptable and useful in all Mediterranean countries (Glachant and Katsouklakos 2008, 3), such as the chance of substantial increases in energy flows among Mediterranean countries. The Euro-Mediterranean Electricity Ring (Medring) project is to be viewed in this context, such as the connection between Libya and Tunisia, which, when accepted, will enable the national grids of all the countries from Syria in the east to Morocco in the west to constitute one 5,000-kilometer-long synchronous system, at the flick of a switch. Its significance lies not only in potentially increased merchant interconnections of many types, but also the increased cooperation among regulatory institutions, their planning and monitoring, as well as training of their common staff. On the negative side it shows the challenges and risks posed, not only in the primary security of the grid, but also the secondary effects on the traditional national companies vs. the potential for cross-national, privately owned companies in the near future (and the socio-economic and political reactions to these).

Subsidies would be necessary to achieve policy outcomes in terms of lessening energy-dependence. Competing interests include concern over international safety and domestic needs for exports in terms of employment and trade balance for example. These would be offset by the anticipated increase in employment in MENA, which would lessen immigration pressures into the EU.

Since petroleum resources have to be imported into the EU for the most part, regulation of, and solidarity to the internal energy market has to take place in reciprocity with an external energy policy. However, Russia, as a major oil and gas supplier to the
EU is no more interested in adopting EU rules that the EU willing to adopt Russian rules (Herzog quoted in EurActiv.com 11/30/07). In light of this, the EU’s approach has been to set up a long-term energy community in the context of environmental policy as much as sustainable energy development (Ibid.). The European Energy Community (“Energy Community South East European Treaty”/ ECSEE) was established on October 25, 2005, entering into force July 1, 2006, between the EU, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia, as well as UNMIK (as Kosovo representative under the UN Security Council resolution 1244), and Turkey and Ukraine initially as observer countries (with the former becoming a full member on July 15, 2008) (European Commission – Enlargement Newsletter 8/1/08). Its primary purpose is to align the contracting parties with Europe and contribute to the security of energy supplies in the wider Europe, through the establishment of a stable investment environment based on the rule of law. It would operate legally within a single regulatory framework for trading electricity, natural gas and petroleum products within southeastern Europe and the EU on the same terms, i.e. adopt EU single market regulations (the EU acquis communautaire as it relates to energy, environment, competition etc.68) with respect to energy. This treaty builds on the South-East European energy market for electricity and natural gas of the Stability Pact of the 2002 Athens Memorandum (including its revision in 2003 pertaining to natural gas) for South Eastern Europe.

68 such as implementing the EU energy market directives and regulations on cross-border network access by July 1, 2007, liberalizing the energy market for non-household customers from 1/1/2008, reducing sulfur content of certain liquid fuels by 12/31/2011, liberalizing the market for all customers starting 1/1/2015, and limiting air emission of certain pollutants from large combustion plants.
The EU plans to build an ‘energy community’ to deal with the challenge of legitimate change, security of supply and competitiveness are ‘a full of risks as […] hopes given the ‘violent conflicts of interest and prejudices’ involved, according to Philippe Herzog, president of French think tank *Confrontations Europe* (EurActiv.com 11/30/07). These, according to Herzog (Ibid.) are reflected in two major problems dividing Europe: “the choice of energy sources and the regulation of markets” (Ibid.), which need to complement each other to achieve the EU’s objectives of renewables, energy efficiency and the reduction of CO2 emissions. France of course recommends nuclear energy as “the only source that meets the threefold challenge of climate change, security of supply and competitiveness” (Ibid.) – ignoring the equally great danger which incompetent handling in its production and disposal of waste constitutes, not only locally but also inter-regionally (e.g. forgetting perhaps that the 2004 Chernobyl nuclear outfall reached France itself). Hence the European critical security concern, which the energy dilemma represents, is not only the sourcing, which lies outside it (making a single South-Eastern European and MENA-energy market a *regional security issue par excellence*), but making energy “management” (in terms of training and supervision in countries with uneven educational standards, for example) an equally urgent security priority. In this context, the EU’s directive (compare e.g. EU Parliament press release 6/18/2006) of “ownership unbundling” can be viewed as positive, as it represent a “checks-and-balances” of neo-national energy monopolies” (which is perhaps why France is so vehemently opposed to this directive).
With the election of Nicolas Sarkozy as French president, this country’s historic interest in pursuing a leading role in the Mediterranean was augmented by its new president’s interest “in assuming a leading role in the rise of nuclear energy as detected in the southern rim of the Mediterranean basin, with his recent visits to Morocco and Algeria, to which one might add Libya, and has proposed making French know-how in the sector available to a future Mediterranean nuclear agency” (Escribano and Lorca 2008, 20). While this French goal is understandable in the national interest of satisfying domestic labor and industry needs for expansion, they could also be viewed as a neo-Gaullist strategy to the countries on the southern rim of the Mediterranean closer to it by dangling the “magic” carrot, nuclear power. Unfortunately, the less stable a regime and the overall lower educational standard in a country, the greater the risk not only in the production of peaceful nuclear energy, but the motivation of such a regime to convert this ability for military purposes. Hence the multi-lateral structure of the Euro-Mediterranean increases in significance in light of these gambles.

One example of this politically and economically intensely interlinkage is the Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation-project. The Trans-Mediterranean Renewable Energy Cooperation’s (TREC) project of establishing a private interregional energy grid encompassing the EU and MENA is illustrated below:

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69 Compare “La Mediterranee traverse la France comme la Seine traverse Paris” (de Gaulle, quoted in Ouaissia 2008)

70 Keeping in mind that if France does not sell these, other countries, such as Russia most certainly will.
This project is being developed on the initiative of the Club of Rome as a cooperative project with the Hamburg Climate Protection Foundation to promote an increase in European energy supply and a reduction of its Carbon Dioxide emission by promoting renewable non-polluting electric power transmission to Europe via high-voltage direct current lines form solar and wind power stations in the MENA deserts. These solar power and water desalination projects\footnote{Satellite-based studies by the German Aerospace Center (DLR) have shown that, by using less than 0.3\% of the entire desert area of the MENA region, enough electricity and desalinated seawater can be produced to meet the growing needs of these countries and of Europe. Power generation from wind energy is particularly attractive in Morocco and in areas around the Red Sea. Solar and wind power can be transmitted throughout the region via High Voltage Direct Current transmission lines, and to Europe with transmission losses up to 15\%. \ldots Concentrating Solar Thermal Power (CSP) plants are idea for providing secure solar power. These types of power plants use mirrors to concentrate sunlight to create heat which is used to produce steam to drive steam turbines and electricity generators. Heat storage tanks (e.g. molten salt tanks) can be designed to store heat during the day to power steam turbines during the night or when there is a peak in demand. In order to ensure uninterrupted service during overcast periods or bad weather (without the need for expensive back up plants), the turbines can also be powered by oil, natural gas or biofuels. As an interesting side effect (and of great benefit to local people), waste heat from the power-generation process may be used to desalinate seawater or to generate cooling." (TREC website 5 August 2008).}, proposed e.g. for Gaza and Sana, have the secondary advantage beyond the diversification of European energy sourcing, the positive environmental impact of non-petroleum energy and its renewability, also the
economic development potential for MENA and the need for close and trusted relationships throughout Euro-Med north-south and south-south especially.


The priorities of the EUROMED Energy Partnership are the acceleration of reform in the countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean with a view to the gradual integration of the Euro-Med electricity and gas markets, to increase the security and safety of energy supplies, infrastructure and oil shipping, as well as to strengthen energy interconnections (both South-South and North-South) (European Commission: The Euro-Mediterranean Energy Partnership 2008, 5). The strategies are through the promotion of renewable energy, energy efficiency and support of the Kyoto process, as well as through harmonization of rules, standards, information systems and statistics used in the energy sector throughout the EMP, e.g. via agreements in Euro-Med energy ministerial conferences and the (private industry) Euro-Med Energy Forum, as well as the promotion of sub-regional energy dialogues and cooperative initiatives with the aim of creating an integrated Euro-Mediterranean energy market (Ibid., 6/7). Funding for the EUROMED Energy Partnership derives from the MEDA program (fifty-five million euro over the past eight years), as well as loans for nearly two billion euro to support energy infrastructure priority projects, such as the completion of regional electricity and gas links (Ibid., 8).

This brief synopsis outlines the broad security implications in terms of i.a. renewability, development, regional political stability, and the need for technical
cooperation in the energy sector *per se* in a Euro-Med regional context. This example is also excellent for disputing the assertion expressed by Spencer (2001, 22) that “both popular and elite-led Arab disgruntlements are not reserved for the EU’s regional security ambitions alone, … [but] target the EU’s *preoccupation* with its own security at the expense of genuine regional co-operation” (italics original). This type of energy project most definitely requires regional north-south security cooperation not only in the EU’s interest, but it has certainly much at stake for MENA as well in terms of energy production (as an export commodity) as well as water desalination, which MENA needs for internal industrial and private use. Granted, the spectrum of “security-visions” was not always identical among the EMP-members, but this is to be expected in any IO – which then seeks to harmonize the interests with capabilities and political will. This latter might be identified in some cases as a more significant factor in the differences in rates between plans vs. implementation time-spans, while using the “difference in vision” as the excuse for lacking progress.

**Financial Sector**

The newly independent states in MENA in the post-colonial period were confident to carry out development tasks in their countries without relying on weak private sectors at the time as

market forces driven by monopoly and speculation, or foreign private investment, which appeared likely to compromise newly won independence … [Rather,] in this kind of atmosphere all good things were seen to go together. Resource utilization would be planned rationally, administrators would conscientiously carry out their duties, the citizens would actively

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72 This involves fully granting the normal country differences in overall political objectives both domestically and internationally in many aspects
support the development programs, both growth and rising incomes would result – all so that the new resources would become available for new rounds of planned development (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 411).

This reality, however, lasted only briefly, with attendant costs in foreign indebtedness, and domestic price distortions swamping the plans in subsequent phases as unintended consequences (Ibid.). Of the many challenges facing MENA post-colonially, few addressed in those days the rapid population growth, or the demand of the young population for the delivery of services and job opportunities (Ibid., 412). “Bureaucrats behave rationally, not altruistically” (Ibid.). Regulations meant to rationalize economic activity, created barriers, and these officials guarding these barriers began to collect a fee to open them. Under a top-down political structure, citizens had little recourse for accountability. In this environment, the Middle East has reached today a period of uncertainty (Ibid.). The framework of the EMP, through the support of MEDA programs and others, is one of the longest lasting, tested models (especially in connection with the greater ENP it is able to utilize its “toolbox” of learning acquired during the last two EU enlargements), and most broadly committed as a long-term strategy to promote a Euro-Med region-wide political, economic and social harmonization. And no other sector so deeply touches these three aspects, as does the financial sector. Hence the following synopsis addresses the recent dynamics in this sector to determine the extent to which it has evolved under the broader umbrella of the EMP.

The development of financial markets as essential prerequisites for the operation of a ‘modern’ (i.e. functioning through interest rates rather than quantities of credit or money), involves some deliberate targeting of inflation and/or growth (or unemployment) monetary policy. This necessitates inflation-targeting, exchange rate pegging, and asset
price targeting, including the role of energy price shocks, and of real estate booms and busts for monetary policy in MENA to facilitate its separation of fiscal policy, i.e. money and bond markets (Cobham and Dbeh 2008, 2). Financial markets in their basic role to raise capital, transfer risk and facilitate international trade (in the currency markets), function as money markets and bond markets, i.e. markets in short term financial instruments such as treasury bills or certificates of deposit. In more developed financial system, repurchase agreements of long term bonds (repos) co-exist with markets in long term government (and possibly corporate) bonds typically. (Cobham and Dbeh 2008, 2). Having a market in long term government bonds (such as Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt have to an extent and the Gulf countries on a very limited scale) enables governments to borrow from the private sector, rather than the banking sector. This in turn permits “monetary growth and monetary policy to be independent, at least in the short run, from the government’s budget deficits” (Ibid.). The international institutional banking system, both privately and on a public level have been involved in linking cooperation and development, such as the Arab Monetary Fund\textsuperscript{73}, the European Central Bank, the national banks of course, as well as the European Investment Bank.

The EU General Affairs and External Relations Council explicitly welcomed in its concluding remarks on 18/19 June 2007 the Commission’s ongoing work to establish a Governance Facility, and i.a. the ongoing work in setting up a Neighbourhood Investment Fund with the aim of full compatibility with the Facility for Euro-Mediterranean

\textsuperscript{73} This is a regional Arab organization, founded in 1976, as a working sub-organization of the Arab League with the objectives of correcting and balancing the Payment of its members states, reducing payment restrictions between members (Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, UAE, and Yemen), improving Arab monetary cooperation, encouraging the development of Arab financial markets, as well as paving the way for a unified Arab currency, and promoting trade between member states.
Investment and Partnership (FEMIP). FEMIP brings together the whole range of services provided by the European Investment Bank (EIB) to assist the economic development of the Mediterranean partner countries\(^{74}\).

Operational since October 2002, FEMIP is now the key player in the economic and financial partnership between Europe and the Mediterranean, with financing operations worth almost EUR 6 billion mounted between October 2002 and December 2006. As part of the Barcelona Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy, FEMIP encourages the modernization and opening-up of the economies of the Mediterranean partner countries. Activities are focused on two priority areas: support for the private sector and creating an investment-friendly environment. As of 2007, 1.4 bn euro were invested in MENA, financing eighteen projects with a direct impact on the economy and the improvement of living conditions in the partner countries, and with an additional EUR 1bn earmarked for private sector development in the form of credit lines in support of SMEs, private equity operations and the financing of energy and environmental projects undertaken by private promoters (FEMIP annual report 2007, 8) (compare Appendix 5). This makes FEMIP the leading investor in the Mediterranean (with support for partner countries evenly distributed between the Maghreb and Near East regions). The infrastructure sector (energy, transport) is the main beneficiary, with support for SMEs and the environment in second and third place respectively (Ibid., 10). The amount of disbursements is a good indicator of the actual implementation of capital projects on the

\(^{74}\) They are: Algeria, Egypt, Gaza/West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. As a consequence of Turkey’s EU-candidacy, the Bank’s operations in Turkey have been transferred to the EU’s South-East Europe Department.
ground, which has increased from 630 mil. Euro in 2003 to over 1bn euro in 2007 (Ibid., 10).

Additionally, “FEMIP has actively supported the development of the nascent private equity industry in the region” (Ibid., 12), acting as a catalyst for the fund-raising of all major fund initiatives promoted by local companies (Ibid.), including microfinance institutions. This makes it the third-largest microfinance lender in MENA partner countries. Furthermore, FEMIP contributes to the transfer of expertise through technical assistance operations, which aim to improve the quality of lending operations and increasing their development impact (Ibid. 13). Syria, Tunisia, and Morocco have been the top beneficiaries of technical assistance, followed by Egypt and Lebanon (Ibid.).

There are still unresolved issues relating to monetary policy and exchange rates in MENA, including plans for monetary integration with the GCC (Cobham and Dbeh 2008, 1). While some studies are in the process of being published about monetary policy and central banking in Lebanon and Tunisia, little has been published so far about other countries in MENA on these topics. The fact that these questions are being addressed regionally (i.e. within the Euro-Med) as well as interregionally (e.g. with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)) indicates the role which the trust plays in international institutional transparency for financial offers.

Supranational Tax Legislation

This represents a significant aspect in inter-regional monetary relations. The role of economics in the Euro-Med lies not solely in development (besides the expansion of
prosperity for all members), but can play the role of creative diplomacy to gap differences in political culture.

… nearly two centuries after Adam Smith’s canons of good tax, nearly all the courts in Europe began to question the taxing power of the Sovereign State according to various principles (Constitutions, where available, Fundamental principles, Ethical and even Religious). In Europe, we ultimately are experiencing restraints of Supranational nature (Edrey and Greggi 2008, 1). These new limitations do not pertain to the social dimension, but to the market-economic approach (Ibid.). As economic integration across the Mediterranean is progressing, this area of taxation in a tax law and Constitutional limitational context is an example of the inter-regional connections and potential and/or necessary coordination in some respects. To this end it would be examined in a comparative manner among member states in light of their individual aims, as well as to determine any limitations to their taxing power in terms of the social, economic, legal, religious, and constitutional origins.

**Food/Water Security**

Competition over resources, such as water, has been repeatedly identified as a security threat. “Denying the majority of a population a decent life on the basis of widely accepted standards can translate into a security risk” (Aliboni 2002, 10). “The growing demand for water, increasing pressures on water quality and unexpected water-related occurrences (e.g. large scale floods or droughts) caused by climate changes and human activities” (Bogdanovic and Salame 2008, 1) require legal frameworks to peacefully settle disputes over them. Broader water production availability, such as desalination as
part of solar power generation (as discussed previously in the section on “energy” in this chapter) represents another aspect relating to regional water security in the EMP. Since water is used extensively in agriculture, water availability is not only a human security issue on the individual level, but also affects the availability of (affordable) food in areas of water scarcity, which in turn can have a macro-economic effect in terms of agricultural products available for export due to a limited availability of irrigation or as a result of draughts, in addition to the potential political destabilizations as a result.

The legal aspect of freshwater management in the Mediterranean region extends to customary water law (e.g. the construction of ancient Mediterranean hydrolic societies), the (lack or not of regional), and has complementarity in contemporary national water law systems, as well as bilateral and multilateral international legal instruments such as the EU acquis, the UN’s Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nation’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA). It reflects the overlapping supra-national as well as international frameworks for managing water in this region successfully in terms of the development and implementation of broader (e.g. global and regional policy and legal frameworks, its conservation, and restoration as well as the protection of aquatic ecosystems and dependent terrestrial ecosystems, and integrative approaches, such as good water governance) (Ibid., 3/4).
As essential as water is to human life, it is essential to have effective legal frameworks for the peaceful management of its use as well as its environmental implication in terms of the protection of ecosystems (e.g. desertification) and the risks it represents to environmental and human security (in terms of potentially decreasing arable land due to desertification).

The example of water availability (and its management) is a security *sector*, not only due to its potential for acute discontent in connection with its use, but also in the liberal institutional sense, and in the role which a broader international framework can play in cooperation on issues involving i.a. issues of trust among parties in the enforcement of international agreements, and the necessity of hydro solidarity, as well as the possibility of establishing the conditions for longterm transboundary cooperation over shared resources and the synergy between these processes and other regional initiatives. These are an example par excellence for also showing the levels of cooperation in this aspect in the Euro-Mediterranean, as they involve the global, regional, and subregional *levels*. Additionally “water” as a securitized issue is also a prime example for the need for

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75 This list is taken in part from Bogdanovic and Salame (2008, 3)
solid legal frameworks in the promotion of cooperation not only to agree on laws and to prevent new, and resolve old, water disputes, but to also have legitimate and effective legal institutions (such as courts of arbitration) to enforce them. Lastly, it demonstrates the value of involving numerous actors, such as NGOs, IGOs, private industry, the scientific community beyond the state and local governments to do justice to this human right to (clean) water.

**Sustainability**

**Environmental Security**

The prevalence of many environmental problems are shared across borders and threatens global stability. “Environmental degradation is frequently a key intervening variable in security dilemmas, not simply an incidental issue” (Moss 2002, 173). There are “causal links between environmental degradation, instability and conflict” (Ibid.), which can eventually lead to significant threats. The solutions are largely nonmilitary, though Manwaring (quoted in Moss 2002, 173) suggests that in light of the alarming prediction, “a complete response … will require a new, comprehensive architecture for a ‘global security campaign plan’, “ involving various levels of international cooperation, and the need “to engage in longterm analysis, planning and implementation” (Ibid.).

*Aid* and *debt relief* have not improved stability in Africa overall and developing countries rather need to commit themselves to good *policies* (Williamson and Beattie 2006). Indeed, it is a project of mutual learning on both shores of the Mediterranean, the traditional Judeo-Christian club of the EU opening itself socio-culturally to the Muslim world (in tandem, of course, with Turkey’s actual accession proceedings) and actively
engaging itself politically and economically, and with the reciprocal true for the MENA member states. While the bilateral “track” addresses characteristics specific to the relations between the EU and each Mediterranean partner, the regional dimension of the EMP covers simultaneously region-wide economic, political and cultural cooperation. The “regional cooperation has a considerable strategic impact as it deals with problems that are common to many Mediterranean Partners [due to the partially shared history of MENA, for example], while it emphasizes the national complementarities” (European Commission Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Barcelona Process website).

The interconnectedness of these security sectors is also expressed by the Club of Rome’s (as an independent think-tank) “systemic” diagram as follows:

In the context of political deepening within the EMP, especially in the Justice and Home Affairs aspect of civil society, protective security represent an additional aspect which, according to A. Sen, “is needed to provide a social safety net for preventing the affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even starvation and death” (Sen 1999, 40). The EU as the largest collective foreign aid donor, by definition is active in this respect in the south- and eastern Mediterranean, as in all other parts of the world. However, structural human security in an institutionalized social sense is significantly path dependent on the political system and economic strength (never mind the “modernization” of a country socio-culturally to permit this equally in authoritarian countries), as the steady stream of economic refugees from North Africa shows, who are endangering their lives in an uncertain passage to the Mediterranean’s northern shores in order to achieve protective security. This uncontrolled flux of illegal immigrants, as was discussed in a preceding section as well, however in turn, negatively affect the security of the northern Mediterranean. This enforces the significance of the “multi-level approach” envisioned by the Barcelona Process.

Another example are the consequences of gender differences, e.g. in education which were widespread in MENA (and which will be discussed further in the context of the socio-cultural “basket” of the EMP in a following section), make it much more difficult for a woman in this region to have access to the type of job which allows her to build up the economic resources to ensure her physical well-being without dependence in male-oriented societies.
The NGOs operating within the framework of the EMP have also been very helpful in gaining the local populations’ trust to assist in enabling gender equality in education on all institutional levels. Furthermore, insufficient institutional structures of an impoverished region challenge its ability to financially and medically assist their disabled or citizens too old to work any longer. Upon the tenth anniversary of the Barcelona Process, when its progress in establishing stability and security, in reforming governments, in introducing democracy, and in pushing forward economic and social modernization were critically evaluated by many (Jerch, Lorca and Escribano 2005, 1), as a number of new initiatives were concretely implemented, such as the Anna-Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (Senyucel et al. 2006, 12). Despite the pronounced historical differences among EMP-members, external influences affect the will to reform, though to varying degrees, in almost all MENA countries, be it directly or indirectly by modifying the level of acceptance among the political parties and social organizations responsible for Euro-Med cooperation in general, or the implementation of specific EMP goals (Ibid.).

The role of NGOs (in the context of protective security as a political aspect of the EMP) can be a focus of civil society building and human capacity development under the EMP umbrella to contribute to the human socialization underlying the institutional process. Some authors, e.g. Joffé (2001, 48) point out that the institutions themselves are only as effective as the effectiveness of civil societies and hence attitudes towards government can achieve real and legitimate political change. This might explain the current official reluctance to engage governments directly, but the promotion of build

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76 The role of NGOs in the EMP will be discussed also in a subsequent section in the context of the social-cultural chapter of the EMP
civil society and supporting indigenous political traditions which seek participation and social justice that could be accelerated by civil outside assistance, e.g. the EU.

Again, while economics also play a significant role in this aspect of development, protective security is also frequently a function directly or indirectly of political problems, such as in Palestine. Hence the EU, i.a. through the channels of the EMP, attempts to improve the collective security of the Euro-Med region by additional mechanisms of its three-prong approach which combines political transparency, institution building and civil society enhancement with economic and social development on a multi-lateral basis, permitting countries to participate to the degree they are capable of and are able to integrate into their societies (due to the great socio-political and economic diversity among them).

**EuroMed Heritage**

The Mediterranean, as cradle to many civilizations, is part of its citizens’ common heritage, whether archaeological sites, customs, craft skills, or more contemporary forms of artistic and scientific expression. EuroMed Heritage\(^\text{77}\) was a driving force soon after the founding of the EMP, which states clearly in this regard that

> the participants recognise that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other (excerpt from the Barcelona Declaration\(^\text{1995}\)).

\(^\text{77}\) It is superseded in the meantime by EuroMed Heritage I and EuroMed Heritage II which continue many networks of the original program in ongoing cooperation and political dialogue, focusing specifically on identification and preservation of tangible and non-tangible expression of culture which make the Mediterranean region unique (*EuroMed Partnership: the Cultural Agenda*. 2008, 3).
As this understanding among the peoples of the Mediterranean region is being challenged, the cultural agenda of the EuroMed Partnership (financed by the European Commission\textsuperscript{78}) builds on the recognition of the Mediterranean as a symbol of the coexistence of cultures and traditions beyond conflicts to support and enhance Euro-Mediterranean heritage. Programs involve representations and development of the Euro-Mediterranean region audiovisually\textsuperscript{79}, the EuroMed Youth program\textsuperscript{80}, the making available of regional information and communication, as well as the work by the Anna Lindh Foundation. These are envisioned to “open the way for a fully fledged EuroMed strategy on culture” (Ferrero-Waldner in \textit{EuroMed Partnership: the Cultural Agenda}. 2008, 1) (italics added). As an authoritative speech act of the EU’s External Relations Commissioner, this is an indication that any possibility of a “clash among civilizations” is being proactively addressed since the start of the Barcelona Process, extending among the generations, cultural genres, and sub-regions of the Euro-Mediterranean, to increase

\textsuperscript{78} It operates under the Framework Contract of the ENPI-Provision for technical assistance, training and organization of conferences, seminars and workshops are included under the European Neighbourhood Policy (EuropeAid/121694/C/SV/Multi).

\textsuperscript{79} Examples of these projects are the promotion of the Mediterranean film industry, with an emphasis on training, development, promotion, distribution and exhibition of Mediterranean cinema via a “traveling cinema festival event” in seven European cities and Amman, showcasing the best of Arab documentaries and feature films, or the 2006 launched “Caravan of the Euro-Arab Cinema,” now in its third year (reaching a wide audience of young students, intellectuals, professionals as well as the general public in open-air summer night events with mainstream films for big crowds of over 100,000.

\textsuperscript{80} It promotes e.g. the mobility of young people and understanding between peoples through three types of action: the EuroMed Youth Exchanges to bring together young people for a couple weeks, the EuroMed Voluntary Service, an unpaid, full-time transnational voluntary activity for the benefit of a particular community for a period ranging from two to twelve months, and lastly the EuroMed Support Measures to further develop youth organizations and civil society actors involved in youth work through “cooperation, partnerships, training measures and exchanges of good practices,” to bridge increase awareness between rural/large urban lifestyles in different countries of the Mediterranean (\textit{EuroMed Partnership: the Cultural Agenda}. 2008, 7).

It should be noted that these programs have been part of the EMP for a number of years, and do not represent an innovation of the Union for the Mediterranean (launched on July 13, 2008, and briefly discussed further in Chapter Five of this dissertation).
awareness as well as expand skills in cooperative inter-governmental institutional settings.\footnote{which are themselves “structures” to increase the trust and transparency among its members in classic neo-liberal fashion, as well as explicitly designed to broaden, and make more inclusive, the identities and ideas of the involved actors, i.e. the nearly 700 million people of the Euro-Mediterranean region, in line with Social Constructivist theory.}

**Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures**

In 2005, the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was established in Alexandria, on behalf of joint aspirations and efforts of EMP MSs in supporting youth to overcome stereotypes and misunderstandings, and efforts to build a better, more just and safer world. This was conceptualized as a catalyst for all Euro-Mediterranean initiatives aimed at enhancing dialogue and general understanding between cultures and hereby lessen the cultural divide among EMP MSs. It is financed through MEDA and member contributions.

Several Think-Tanks have been established in the context of the EMP, such as the Institut Europeu de la Mediterrània in Barcelona, Spain, and the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures. The former organization pursues a very broad agenda of lectures, seminars, training, exhibitions, cultural activities and publications on the politics, economy, migration, society and cultural dialogue on EMP issues, such as civil society, participation and human rights, minorities and cultural identities, women and social change, sustainable development, and human movements and migration. The Anna Lindh Foundation pursues a broad human development/training agenda in member countries on goals agreed on by EMP members.

Against the background of xenophobia, stereotypes and prejudices which youth have observed in their environment, the European Commission initiated in 1999 the Euro-Mediterranean Action Program to combat these concerns which “prevail across the Mediterranean and still determine mutual perceptions” (European Commission Youth Partnership 2008, 1). The Council of Europe\(^{82}\) and the European Commission are cooperating on a Euro-Med project, the Human Rights Education and Intercultural Dialogue, in order “to explore new areas of cooperation beyond those provided by the Euro-Med Youth programme.”

Youth Policy Cooperation is one such area, which aims to explore underpinning values, concepts, principles and forms of youth participation, to better understand the socio-cultural context of youth participation and reflect on various factors influencing youth participation, analyze achievements and challenges related to it, the roles of the different actors (youth organizations, international/regional institutions and agencies) in fostering youth participation in all areas that young people are concerned with, and to identify areas in Euro-Med cooperation, which are key for youth participation and youth policy development (Ibid.).

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\(^{82}\) This is an IGO, headquartered in Strasbourg, which is independent of the EU, and was founded to promote greater unity within Europe and preserve its political and cultural heritage through the promotion i.a. of human rights (e.g. through the European Court of Human Rights) and democracy. Its treaties deal with social, humanitarian (such as the protection of immigrants and minorities), cultural and economic problems.
MENA Domestic Social Movements

This section addresses a brief overview over the effects of some social movements in MENA as they affect the EMP regional cohesion. Traditional Social Movement Theories focused predominantly on labor movements, while new social movements also address gender equality, religion etc. Although social movements are trans-national, this section focuses on their intra-regional MENA aspects, rather than on e.g. a comparative EU-US-MENA perspective, as the focus of this dissertation is the EMP in a *regional* context. EU social movements e.g. do not affect the Euro-Med as a region for the most part beyond the moral and material support NGOs and the academic community provide (last but not least due to visa controls by authoritarian governments).

The following sub-sections will address Gender and Labor movement dynamics in MENA and their role in regional stability, as well as domestic elites in comparison to show further shifts in social stratification in MENA.

Gender Equality

This aspect is one of two parallel, but contradictory social developments, that are taking place as a result of globalization with respect to their impact on women: on the one hand these global economic processes enabled increases of women in the labor force. Additionally, global norms and policies emphasizing human rights and gender equality expanded. On the other hand, rising unemployment, the reduction of the social and development state, and labor flexibilization have taken place (Bouraoui and Moghadam 2008, 1).
The effect of these on working women in MENA especially, particularly in connection with existing legislation which might protect or constrain women’s economic citizenship, “as the right to equal opportunity in employment and income” (Marshall 1964) or as “decent wages for decent work” (International Labor Organization) has not been explored fully. These “are part of the panoply of the rights of citizenship and entail rights to education, vocational training, employment, fair wages, trade union, collective bargaining and welfare” (Bouraoui and Moghadam 2008, 2). Moghadam (2005, quoted in Bourouoi and Moghadam 2008, 2)) points out that “[i]n the Middle East and North Africa region, the era of globalization has seen trade liberalization, Islamization, and demands for women’s participation and rights emerging in tandem and often in conflict with each other.” Hence protecting or expanding women’s socio-economic rights confronts two barriers: aspects of economic globalization, particularly the expansion of “precarious” employment with little or no social protection, and the persistence of a gender ideology which marginalizes women (Ibid.). Venues for women’s collective action in MENA are expanding women’s organizations (e.g. feminist networks, business women’s associations, NGOs, and policy centers) which “engage in advocacy, lobbying, and coalition-building to enhance women’s participation and rights” (Ibid).

Overall, the “gender effect” of state strategies for integrating MENA into the global economy are affecting women’s economic participation and social rights, as well as women’s collective action “response” for legal equality and socio-economic rights (as a feedback loop to state gender policies) and the internal legal structure in MENA. These realignments of women’s role both socially in Arab societies, and in the changing labor context of globalization represent significant “currents” in the development of civic
society, civil law. They could be interpreted as supportive of the evolution of society as it enlarges the education and professional options for women, as well as contributing to the expansion of a country’s human capital (Putnam 1993).

Nevertheless, Arab society’s overall adjustment to these shifts within roughly fifty percent of its population, in addition to the economic shifts due to globalization, and the political alignments internally and region-wide, explain the tremendous fragility – and often firm authoritarian stances from the government to contain them. Those EMP member states with fully democratized societies need to be realistic about the timeframes of their expectations to allow for these transitions to be accomplished in the face of a large part of the population possibly critical. Hence, while intellectually there may be relative agreement on MEDA programs, the domestic socio-political dynamics, having evolved over centuries, may not always be fully supportive of them at time due to these underlying “currents.”

The parameters of this dissertation do not permit an in-depth analysis how these various women’s organizations define socio-economic participation and rights, or how they mobilize women around these issues, nor a thorough legal analysis of the legislation establishing women’s social rights and economic citizenship, or their local decision-making power. However, this section serves to indicate the need, and how it is starting to be addressed, of gender equality as a human right and as a security sector (especially in instances where this is not the case), in this case within the Euro-Mediterranean region.
Labor Movement Dynamics

This dissertation cannot provide an exhaustive analysis of global labor movement history, their academic analyses or even a comprehensive labor movement analysis in MENA. Rather this brief section is simply intended to highlight some of the dynamics as they affect the social stability in the Euro-Med region overall. For one, there exists an interesting reciprocity between the worker protests in colonized areas in the Middle East and across North Africa, which contributed to the definition of international workers’ movements (Bishop and Kaoua 2008, 1). These labor movements in the European colonies in MENA carried out strikes against the managers of the enterprises for better wages, safer working conditions and more secure contracts. The workers’ protest “fueled larger national liberation movements by defining inclusive national communities and articulating progressive directions for such communities” (Ibid.).

This colonial legacy on the practical and political realm, on what later became the post-colonial states, affected transfers of populations in the region both in rural and urban areas, whether for labor, military service, settlement purposes, or in response to induced environmental disasters (Ibid.). Examples include Arabs from West Asia and North Africa working as emigres in MENA urban centers, or the Palestinians who were left state-, and often job-less, upon the founding of Israel. This link between labor and national liberation bridged histories, which were fragmented from the shared common experience of modern Arabs. The questions of inclusion or exclusion loom large as a result. The lack of inclusion is often also a factor in radicalization through the strategic alliances forming as a result.
Arab migrant worker organizations have not yet received the attention they deserve, Bishop and Kaoua (2008, 2) write, in terms of “neglecting the internationalism of workers’ rights struggles in favor of the nationalist aspects.” Examples would be the relocation of Algerians conscripted to France for military service, or recruited as workers in the construction industry, and employment on public works during the colonial period, which is reflected in the unrest in Paris’ immigrant suburbs today. The debate on the protection of workers in MENA evolved into complex arrangements, as the case of the al Sham (“Greater Syria”/”Levant”) into separate League of Nations mandates shows, resulting in a rise in Syrian labor migration (Ibid). The significance of this lies in some of the sub-regional tensions continuing until today, e.g. between Syria and Lebanon.

Figure 6.7: The Al Sham/Greater Syria Area (“Levant”)
(Map courtesy of Chris Hanson, University of Miami Department of Geography GIS Laboratory)

Hence, to understand post-colonial social movements in MENA, we need to trace their historical roots. For example as the Yemeni migrant laborers’ agitation strengthened the national liberation struggle in their homeland, the British colonial administrators
created a Department of Labor and Welfare to limit dockworkers’ demands, who
nevertheless managed to establish thirty unions (Bishop and Khaoua 2008, 2).

In the EU today, some labor regulations in the furthest sense are handled on a
supra-national basis, while others remain a national prerogative. By comparison MENA
overall labor and social services are not automatically under national jurisdiction either.
Following the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority, Palestinian working
conditions were governed by the labor codes of the five states, which now represent the
Al Sham, i.e. a combination of Jordanian law, Palestinian National Authority decisions in
effect in the West Bank and Gaza (who continued to organize grassroots movements),
with Palestinian Jerusalem residents subject to Israeli labor law. Today, Palestinians are
left state-less, and left in a void for the provision of social services. This has led to
religious organizations in recent years, such as Hamas in Gaza, to fill it. Hence
examining historical labor movements in MENA leads us to the disenfranchisement of
current radical social movements, i.e. radical Islam, emanating from towards Europe and
North America. Another example of these dynamics are population movements, such as
recent immigrants from the southern Mediterranean into the EU, which can shift the
social responsibility to the receiving state.

To add to the complexity of labor relations in MENA, Bishop and Kaoua (2008, 3)
point out that Iraqis (though Iraq is not an EMP-member state, but bordering it) are
currently working under military occupation: (By Coalition Provisional Authority Order
No. 1 of May 16, 2003 de-establishing the Ba’th party), with it the structures of the
general Federation of Trade Unions and the General Federation of Iraqi Women were
also annulled. This left Iraqi workers without legal or institutional protection over their
rights and correspondingly vulnerable as migrants in their own country (Amnesty International 2003) as well as emmigrating to countries around them. The historical roots and social dimensions of the Ba’th party with activities both in Iraq and Syria (which is an EMP-member state) are too complex to delineate in detail in this dissertation. Suffice to state that its philosophy has strong European nationalist, and to an extent socialist, currents within the Arab world. Due to its more international background and experience, the Ba’th party was more efficient in providing efficient welfare and administrative services after 1945, as compared to the traditional Arab Muslim elite, which explains its popularity among many Arab masses. These complex historical roots to the (sub-) regional social organization, in combination with the post-World War II political events in the region explain some of the obstacles faced in the Middle East peace process for example, and hereby the challenges a Euro-Mediterranean security community faces.

Not to be overlooked are also the intra-MENA labor migrations, which have similar sociological consequences as in other parts of the world when young rural workers move to urban centers, whether in their own country or to another Arab country (whether within the EMP or neighboring it), in terms of the sociological and labor drain this represents to the rural areas. However, the remittances have made a substantial contribution to the material well-being in rural areas in return. While the migrations to oil-rich states during the building boom of the 1970s and 1980s have matured as the infrastructure has for the most part been completed, the sending countries can no longer count on this safety valve to their population growth Richards and Waterbury 2008, 405).

Overall then, labor-market structures and dynamics in MENA are problematic: too few jobs are being created for a population growing at the most rapid rate in the world,
while “for decades many government policies stimulated the acquisition of formal credentials rather than of marketable skills” (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 133). This was not a problem in an agrarian society. However, it becomes problematic today. While the public sector absorbs too high a portion of labor, intrusive government regulations don’t encourage private sector employment. These authors argue that (un-)employment makes this the politically most volatile issue facing the region – not only on the southern Mediterranean, but has a reciprocal effect on the countries bordering the Mediterranean to the north due to the massive illegal migration of people seeking work in the EU. Hence the implementation of a Free Trade Area discussed previously is more urgent than ever not only to control the southern border of the EU, but the political stability on the southern Mediterranean.

In terms of human capital, Richards and Waterbury (2008, 133) write that as a result of the unemployment and educational status quo, also the health of citizens is compromised. Many in the workforce today are not interested to take manual, low-status jobs, but the overcrowded, underfunded educational system does not convey modern marketable skills to them. It is in this context that the EMP’s student exchange programs, which are envisioned to be expanded substantially under the Union for the Mediterranean, play an important role in expanding the educational offering, in addition to the cultural exchange gained from them.

The New Elites in Arab Countries

Business elites, particularly the young and urban, have taken an increasingly prominent role in the political life, civil society and the media in Arab society. They run
for elected office, form or join political parties, and found non-governmental organization, advocating greater civil and political rights, and sponsor new media outlets (Hamzawy and Dunne 2008, 1). What are the motives for this political and civic activism, and what are the tactics and strategies to achieve the goals of the new elites in Arab countries?

As Middle Eastern countries have experienced small political openings over during the last millennium, the prominence of the business elite in this millennium has grown. Business people are running successfully in elections as independents (with some loosely associated with the National Democratic Party, others with the Muslim Brotherhood, and some completely unattached to any political trend), or supporting political parties, or sponsoring media outlets in the 2000 and 2005 elections in Egypt, for example (Ibid., 2). In Morocco, a group of mostly business leaders, such as CEOs from some of the largest corporations in Morocco, who collectively had little prior involvement in politics, formed the 2007 Daba association to increase voter participation among women and youth, as well as augment the role of the intellectual and economic elites within parties in the September 2007 elections (Ibid.). There are also recent examples of business elites organizing on a region-wide basis (though with some international encouragement). This involvement of previously apolitical business people in the political sphere in significant numbers is a new phenomenon, and is only in the beginning stages in MENA (Ibid.). Building on classics, such as “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule” by O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986), which studied the elite variable in democratic transitions, including elite divisions and inter-elite bargaining, some newer studies have appeared, such as Perthes’ *Arab Elites* (2004), which details how the political systems in select MENA
countries have adjusted to maintain the status quo. This model utilizes “the concept of a ‘politically relevant elite’, consisting of concentric circles of the core elite, intermediate elite, and sub-elite” (Hamzawy and Dunen 2008, 3). However, the unique influence of business elites has not been addressed yet in the political and economic spheres, and hence their role in these sub-regional security sectors.

(Select) Greater Religious context of Security in the Euro-Mediterranean

The expansion and decline of empires in the Mediterranean over millennia has led to displacements of religious groups. In the seventeenth century the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio* led to relative homogenous religion in European society (Roy 2008, 1). In pluri-religious societies around the Mediterranean, religious minorities were associated with minority ethnic groups (Ibid.), which might be genuinely ethnic (such as Turks in Greece), or a quasi-ethnic “construct” for administrative purposes of religious groups (such as Bosnians or Maronites). The ancient Middle-Eastern *millet*-system for classifying religious minorities other than the ruling Sunnis survived in Turkey even the Ottoman Empire. It implied a separate civil law of self-rule for these minorities, as long as their loyalty to the country’s ruler was assured. Throughout Europe it took a long time to dissociate the state from official religion, which has not yet been fully achieved today in Spain, Italy or Greece. The process of territorialization and ethnicization of religion also continues in Europe today in the Balkans.

However, greater migrations in recent decades, e.g. due to decolonialization giving citizens from far away countries citizenship in European countries, and globalization processes in terms of job availability and transport opportunities, are slowly producing
new religious communities outside traditional paradigms: “many second generation Muslims in Europe refuse to be seen as an ethnic diaspora or minority group, but as a faith community” (Roy 2008, 2). Furthermore, voluntary conversions (in contrast e.g. to the forced ones during the middle ages) are blurring traditional religious divisions.

As to the West today, the Economist published an “obituary to God” in its millennium edition, marking the relegation of religion, in the view of social scientists during the past decades, to a less significant role in the twenty-first century. Nevertheless, since then, religion has played an increasing role in many countries, affecting legislation and institutional design (Kuenkler and Lerner 2008, 2), as the following section will illustrate further in relation to the Euro-Med.

Religion and the State

In Liberal Democratic Theory little had been traditionally said about the role of religion in democracy beyond an institutional separation of religion and state, with the religious identity belonging in the private sphere (Ibid., 1). However, cooperation between religion and the state continued through the ages into the consolidated democracies of today. Hence some policy preferences and legislative processes cannot always be clearly separated in many states, and political and judicial conflicts over the appropriate regulation of religious institutions. Additionally, religious institutional practices in countries in various stages of democratization are insufficiently regulated in many (Ibid.). Especially Muslim emerging democracies such as Turkey, Indonesia, Bosnia and Senegal “are grappling with the appropriate relationship between religious traditions and the secular institutions of the modern state” (Ibid., 2). But Israel and India
have also struggled to guard secular principles against religion-inspired legislative majorities. Islamic identity in particular has been seen as a “defense” against foreign interference in some Muslim countries, especially as a negatively perceived (or anticipated) consequence of globalization and its effects on business, culture and identity (Senyucel et al. 2006, 13). This led some religious conservatives and Islamists to close ranks with former left-wingers “to build a national protective barrier and protect their own sense of identity” (Ibid.). These unresolved internal struggles and structural as well as economic, social and society factors have impeded modernizing reforms which propagate value convergence (Ibid.).

Violent conflicts are often attributed to political and power struggles. These can be exacerbated when socio-economic bases in a country deteriorate, often making human rights conditions intolerable and compromising democracy, leading to open conflict (Aliboni 2002, 10). Aliboni (Ibid.) suggests classifying today’s security threats overall into the following categories: First, those which threaten the existence of states in terms of their political structures and territorial integrity, exemplified by military conflict primarily, but also terrorism. Secondly are threats which endanger the well-being of an entire society or community, which may not risk an immediate or short-term violent conflict, but have the potential to destabilize society and lead to longterm violent conflict. These and can range from natural or environmental catastrophes to illegal arms dealings, money laundering, or narcotics trafficking. Third are those threats which endanger the everyday life and personal security of individual citizens. These may initially be limited to social discomfort, but lead to secondary consequences of different kinds of social violence and threats. Many of these (currently radical Islam, more so than any other
religious group) can be implicated: both in terms of contributing to violence, but also in terms of addressing individual and societal insecurity of their (own) populations. Youngs (2006) writes that

Middle Eastern autocrats had fueled anti-Western feeling and played to Islamist opinion in order to shore up the precarious legitimacy of their own rule. A vicious circle had taken hold: regimes had often played up the dangers of radical Islamism to justify to the West their own repressive powers, which merely served further to foment that very radicalism.”

Other authors (compare Spencer 2001, 18) have gone so far as to state that neither the EU nor NATO have adequately cultivated the common space, common concerns and common heritage of the Mediterranean, not as a question of imposing models, but in terms of cultivating trust in terms of security as “the absence of war” among cultural equals (despite the differences), and despite political or economic inequalities in the region. Spencer (2001, 19) argues that

the secular assumptions underlying the creation of modern Europe are perceived to be difficult to transfer to political cultures which, at least philosophically, encompass both temporal and spiritual authorities... Against the background of apparently flourishing Islamist movements, much of the debate has been driven by the rigidities of Islamist political philosophies, as well as by more mundane fears that elections, if encouraged and held in Muslim polities, would give rise to even more dogmatic and arbitrary regimes than those already in place.

Pertaining to the Mediterranean area specifically, political reform has been thrown into question due to the radicalization of domestic political processes due to unresolved regional conflicts (Aliboni 2002, 13). In the last two decades there have been several examples in the wider Euro-Med of the constellation of unresolved conflicts strengthening religious and nationalist opposition to secular and moderate regimes and their cooperation with the West. This opposition can weaken or even circumvent the
introduction of reforms by the ruling regimes, in which case they tend to bring instability, even to the point of destabilization. This presents the EU with the not uncommon dilemma in international aid between the risk of increasing instability and that of “financing dictators” (Aliboni 2002, 13, quoting a U.S. foreign policy expression), which is a judgment-call for policy choices on a case-by-case basis (rather than being able to follow a consistent policy). Additionally, some policymakers posit this North-South dilemma in a global security context, whereby the pursuit of long-term structural stability by one part of the world (e.g. the North) does not occur at the expense of domestic stability of another part (such as the South) or vice versa (Ibid.) With other words, these authors stress security not as a zero sum game, but in a context of a positive sum global interlinkage. This global security has been posited as more subjective, in contrast to more the objective categories of human security such as children, refugees etc. due to the cultural and emotional nuances that have become politicized and securitized. Aliboni (2001, 14) suggests that decisions about these subjective questions be made by consensus, not as a procedure per se, to reach a commitment to the principle arising from explicit agreement of the partners.

Islam

“Islam is the solution.” The slogan is found on many walls in North Africa and the Middle East in the popular quarters (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 362). In this section I will utilize the terminologies used by these authors on the role of Islam in MENA, to

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clarify some academic and (Western) press publications. In this vein, Richards and Waterbury (2008, 362) indicate how deeply misleading the term “Muslim fundamentalism” is, as Islamists do engage in interpretation of the Qur’an, though view it as “‘literal dictation’ from God to the Prophet Muhammad.” It is the application of the message to daily life which is debated among Muslims, its sacredness is not. These authors hence suggest avoiding the term “neo-fundamentalists.”

Likewise, the term “political Islam” as a social phenomenon, is misleading in that it is too broad since “political” refers to “having religious views on social organization and governance” (Ibid.), which it is. However, Islam per se has from the beginning always stressed “people’s involvement in community, society and the polity” (Ibid.), not just in recent years. The Islamic political discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood or the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, in contrast, was often opposed by the U.S. or Israel. Richards and Waterbury (2008, 363) suggest instead to utilize the term “Islamism” when referring to Islamic activism, when referring to Islamists seeking “to bring all elements of social, economic and political life into harmony with what its adherents believe” is ‘true Islam” (Ibid., italics original).

A typology of Islam would distinguish between Sunni and Shi’I Islam, the latter being less fissiparous than Sunni Islam, which lacks formal organization, although one can distinguish three broad approaches here: a. (restricted) political Islamism, b. the missionary (d’wa activity), and c. violent jihadism (Ibid.). Richards and Waterbury (Ibid.) suggest the use of the term “political Islamism” “to refer to all those who (a) pursue political power in order to (b) bring society more into alignment with its adherents’ understanding of Islam through (c) nonviolent means.” This includes the Justice and
Development Party of Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, and is distinguished from the “New (‘modernist’) Islamists” or waseteyya (“middle path”) intellectuals of Egypt who focus on diffusing their interpretation of Islam through preaching, personal example, and charitable activities. Lastly, there are the violent militants (Ibid., 364), such as al-Qaeda and its clones, such as the Salafis, who “radicalized and abandoned pacific missionary work to engage in political violence” (Ibid.), Hamas in Palestine, Hizbollah in Lebanon, and the Qutibsts (who follow the thinking of the executed Egyptian Sayyid Qutb). These factions were particularly apparent in the Islamist civil war between Shi’is and jihad salafis (aligned with the Ba’athists). The meaning of the term Jihad per se is also fiercely debated in the Muslim world (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 364). For example according to these authors the Palestinian and Lebanese movements resemble more the Irish Nationalists of Sinn Fein/IRA than the followers of al-Qaeda.

These fractions often coalesce and fracture again and can be juxtaposed as counter-elites of dissatisfied intellectuals, frustrated educated youth and elements of the urban poor, and businesses by those who perceive themselves as excluded from the favors bestowed upon them by the state.

Islamism as Social Movement

To understand Islamism as a social movement, one needs to understand not only the widely diverging political branches, but also their societal roles, as no Euro-Mediterranean regional program or integration and/or harmonization/coordination is possible without understanding the fundamentally different world view, which does not easily enable the adoption of institutions, concepts or programs from the West which are
taken for granted. Rather, these “multiple routes to modernity” between the different parts of the Mediterranean region need to be recognized and accepted to a degree, to define those common pathways which enable a “forward movement” in the relationships within the EMP. For only in understanding the actors and their background structures can a harmony within any joint dynamic be established.

These background structures not only pertain to Arabs, but also certain historical contexts beyond Europe to the U.S. in its socio-political relationships in the Middle East. A core element of the U.S. relationship with the salafi Islamists of Saudi Arabia (known as the Wahabbis) was their “opposition to Nasserism, Ba’athism and communism” (Richards and Waterbury 2008, 366). They supported instead Islamist movements, such as the mujahedin (holy warriors) of Afghanistan in their 1980s war against the Soviet Union. Globalization played a significant role in recent Islamist success through the facilitated communication with the world, including Islamists (Ibid.). This included the expansion of counter-movements to the Western ideological “hegemony,” such as the neoliberal ideas of the Washington Consensus (which failed to reduce unemployment or raise real wages significantly, or “provide economic and social development or defend vital national interests” (Ibid., 368)), and interestingly enough, also against Wilsonianism. Nevertheless, “the phenomenon of Islamism cannot be reduced to theses developmental problems. Blocked careers, unemployment, rampant corruption, unavailable housing, and a state-less Palestinian people all set the context of frustration

\[84\] even though it advocates self-determination by ethnic groups, the spread of democracy, Islamists reject the Wilsonian anti-isolationism in favor of humanitarian intervention and the spread of freedom – possibly because it relies to a large extent on naked military force to accomplish this (Ibid.).
and enrage of Islamists, but they are poor predictors of exactly who will participate in such movements” (Ibid).

In the absence or reductions of state services, Hamas has been providing social services with probity, dignity and staff efficiency (recognized by the EU as such) since the intifada in December 1987 in Gaza, as the successor to the Muslim Brotherhood. They were very active in building kindergardens, libraries and sports clubs after 1967, and promoting charity associations (Ibid., 369). Hizbollah’s activities in Lebanon are even more extensive, due in part to its financial strength. It has maintained the Jihad Construction Foundation, “which from 1988 to 2000 conducted some 10,500 projects to rehabilitate civil war-damaged schools, homes shops, hospitals, clinics, and mosques” (Ibid.), in addition to providing approximately 45% of the potable water needs of the mostly Shi’i southern Beirut suburbs, and direct-income support to those wounded in war, or whose breadwinner has been killed.

Bassam Tibi (1999, 16) writes that the socio-political evolution of Europe is closely connected with the appearance of Islam in the Mediterranean region, the fascination and threat it represented and the Medieval crusades in opposition to Jihad (i.e. by definition, the defense of Islam). Since then, have politics or socio-cultural studies found a successful constructive and peaceful approach of dealing with Islam in Europe or the Euro-Mediterranean region-wide, or is violence by anyone in Europe simply a police issue of public security (including those from minority or immigrant groups)?
Some authors have questioned whether studies of Islamic mobilizations are influenced by social movement theory, or whether the study of collective action in authoritarian settings would contribute to our understanding in comparative politics. Until the fundamental Islamic movement coalesced, the Middle East had often been analyzed along existing paradigms of functionalism, developmentalism, modernization theory etc.

Senyucel et al. (2006, 11) write that following the anti-terrorism measures post-9/11, the start of the Iraq War in 2003 and following the 2007 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, debates of religious and/or cultural identity increased in many MENA states. On the other hand of the spectrum, “organizations and groups representing ‘anti-Western’ positions and concepts of state and society have been attracting greater attention” (Ibid.) (though variable in extent from country to country), and the impact of “normative” Europe is being questioned.

Farid Mirbagheri (2004, 53) addresses the complex issues in harmonizing the relationship between the Muslim and Judeo-Christian world, and the specific security implications this has represented in the last years for the EU when he describes the underlying frustration in many Arab countries:

mass unemployment, periodic invasions of neighbouring countries, lack of longterm planning, population growth, undemocratic governance and failed modernization (or too rapid a modernization, as the case may be) are some of the problems that the countries of the region have only themselves to blame. Pointing the finger in the direction of outsiders does not absolve them from responsibility.

Some authors have questioned whether studies of Islamic mobilizations are influenced by social movement theory, or whether the study of collective action in authoritarian settings would contribute to our understanding in comparative politics. Until the fundamental Islamic movement coalesced, the Middle East had often been analyzed along existing paradigms of functionalism, developmentalism, modernization theory etc.

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(Beinin and Vairel 2008, 2). Wiktorowics (2004) argues that social movement theory is unsatisfactorily applied to Islamism because for one it tends to emphasize prosaic reasons to mobilize, limiting the Middle Eastern cases to fit the theory’s predictions, and also because it rarely moves beyond the validation of concepts developed based on Northern case studies. An example of this would be the awakening of civil society in some countries in the southern Mediterranean, which has nevertheless not always been accompanied by a transition to democracy. Heydemann (2002) suggested completing the existing literature, which focuses on structural processes at the state or regime level, with an examination of “politics under the threshold,” which could threaten authoritarianism in terms of the “opportunities and constraints for collective action in authoritarian regimes and their effects on the reconfiguration of such regimes” (Beinin and Vairel 2008, 4), i.e. regime transformations through the social and political relations that underlie them, rather than through the democracy-authoritarianism lens (Ibid.).

Beinin and Vairel (2008, 2/3) specifically critique that the concept of “political opportunity structure” in social movement theory does not explain “how human agency can alter contexts and actively create opportunities” (Ibid.). This would not recognize social constructivist theory whereby a reciprocity of agent-ideas-structure co-constitution is asserted (Wendt 1999). However, I argue here that utilizing the social-constructivist approach would make social movement theory useful in understanding fundamental Islam. It could also posit the EMP as an (institutional) “structure” among the actors (the

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86 As its criteria, such as a. relative deprivation (whereby people are driven into movements out of a sense of deprivation or inequality), b. resource mobilization (an organization structure to acquire and deploy resources to achieve well-defined goals, such as a religious institution), c. political opportunity (the political context conducive for social movement activities, such as perceived disenfranchisement of Palestinians), and d. framing (the ability to draw on shared cultural understandings to build solidarity with other groups, such as Palestinians with other Muslims).
member states), to harmonize and further their interests (i.e. “ideas” of peaceful and cooperative regional relations) as a legitimate platform (i.e. “dynamic”) to express them.

Furthermore, this dissertation finds that one modus operandi the EMP is utilizing in this social-constructivist dynamic is a neo-functionalist approach, leading to neoliberal developments, with possibly to a complex interdependence as a pathway to peace in the Middle East. Essential to this are the attempts to keep Islam secular at least in the EU per se (while the challenge in MENA is that Islam is the state in some cases). As discussed above. Some scholars, such as Bassam Tibi (1999), have argued that the relationship of Islam to Europe can be seen as one of a century-long “Threat and Fascination,” and calls for new concepts for dealing with assimilation and integration in the shared Euro-Mediterranean space. While this addresses the countries to the north of the Mediterranean primarily, it is intended to contribute to this type of evolution also in MENA. The secularization thesis (compare Habermas 1996, and the Economist article referred to at the very beginning of this section) postulated that religion “would disappear from the social landscape of developed democratic nations” (Kuenkler and Lerner 2008, 2). Empirical observations worldwide, and especially in the Euro-Med indicate that the relationship between law and religion needs to be understood more nuanced in terms of cooperation (in areas of education, public health, taxes and personal status law), rather than strict separation (Ibid., 3).

This suggestion does not demand the cultural surrender of Muslims through total conformity in dealing with the north, but on the contrary should allow for cultural adaptation involving religious reforms, similar to those which Islam underwent when it was introduced to Indonesia. This vision “in progress”, but the civilizing influence on
European identity is not anti-Muslim, since the ideal of Europe is one of inclusion. It suggests rather a synthesis into a Euro-Islam identity in South-North migrants only (Ibid.). Tibi states, after all, that the “European idea” (and identity) is not Christian, but is secular and lies in polytheistic Hellenism (Ibid.).

Especially in 19th century Europe, the boundaries of existing states were re-drawn to reflect nation-states based on the relative homogeneity of each population’s unique culture, history and unity of language and to some extent, religion. While these may have recognized regionalism, they did not accept “foreignness.” From the 1970s on, some European countries, such as Holland, were multicultural as official policy for a variety of reasons. William James (1909) believed that plural society is crucial to the formation of philosophical and social humanism to help build a better, more egalitarian society. Opponents of multiculturalism view it as contributing to cultural ghettos, undermining national unity and identity, and, in terms of Islam, as an attempt to Islamize Europe.

Arthur Schlesinger (1998) proposed a new perspective in this debate, one which celebrates difference and abandons assimilation to replace the classic image of the melting pot in the U.S., in which differences are submerged to democracy in order to end a history of prejudice, which may in the end endanger the unity of a society. In Europe today, however, the debate rages over the optimal approach of integrating Muslims. Some authors, such as Paul Cliteur (1999), argue that western culture, the Rechtsstaat (the rule of secular law, in contrast to a theocracy for example) and human rights are superior to non-western cultures, since cultural relativism would lead to the acceptance of “barbaric” practices such as honor killings, anti-Semitism or discrimination by immigrants. Into this debate, starting from his perspective within Germany, Tibi
interjected the concept of Leitkultur (the “guiding” culture). By this he refers to a form of multiculturalism comparable to Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, which refers to the cultural assimilation of the many Muslim residents and citizens into German culture (almost leading to the opposite, monoculturalism). By comparison, on the EU-level today social cohesion, integration and assimilation policies are to some extent reversing previous multicultural policies – towards a post-multicultural society (rather than monoculturalism)?

Against this debate Tibi (2005, 206) had proposed Eurolslam\(^{87}\), an awareness at the IR level, for Europeans to develop an awareness of the increasing resistance to Western hegemony over the rest of the world … A value-based consensus needs to be found with a cross-cultural underpinning for establishing world peace among civilizations on new grounds. Straight dialogue is here the best instrument for conflict resolution and establishing peace.

Tibi (Ibid.) considers the de-Westernization currently taking place globally with the possibility of making the dar al-Islam (the House of Peace, i.e. Islam society) at the societal level through migration into Europe detrimental. Since the conflict of norms, values and the related worldviews are not resolved in a pluralist society, but, as indicated above, could (and in fact, have already) led to hostility within Muslim-ghettos in western Europe. Rather, Tibi advocates focusing on the development of “Muslim citizenship” (beyond a passport) in Western (e.g. German) society, in terms of a sense of belonging vs. being the “foreign Other” (who does not belong) or that of an alien minority. The

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\(^{87}\) I am consciously not insinuating a Eurocentrism with this term: While I believe that Tibi has coined this term, I am not only accepting it for consistency with the literature, or to privilege “Euro” with a “first mover advantage” in the term, but because linguistically it is easier pronounced than e.g. “IslEuro” for example – and because this particular discourse originated in Europe, to address at first a European problem.
clear implication is “one law for all”88 (e.g. no shari’a in Europe for the Islamic minorities in any area of law, including family law) (Ibid.), without providing minority privileges, but also seeking individual integration (and keeping the Muslim “culture-politics lens” out of the European discourse).

EuroIslam as Constructivism?

While Wendt (1992, 391 – emphasis mine) explores social constructivism in terms of “the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions,” the present dissertation has been gingerly exploring not only post-international concepts in terms of “cosmopolitan Europe,” but also the post-multicultural society aspects of EuroIslam via the integration of the “sovereign” individual. The purpose of this dissertation is i.a. to investigate how Wendt’s approach be useful in exploring approaches of how anarchy could be shaped in post-international/post-multicultural society among the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors?

Jervis (1988) (quoted in Wendt 1992, 393) speaks of “changing conceptions of self and interest” in international relations and Keohane of ‘sociological’ conceptions of interest in the liberal research program and, by extension, a potentially much stronger conception of process and institutions in world politics” (quoted in Wendt 1992, 393). This concept of process in the individual integration of Muslims in Europe as well as the discourse of EuroIslam as “their/our” “identity” transposed from Europe (since Tibi is writing from Europe, and this debate is current there) to the Mediterranean, as anchored

88 This concept bears some similarity with the res publica of the Romans, but I hesitate to make this comparison for its possible “imperialist” interpretation.
in secular institutions, with mutually constructed norms to permit socio-political relationships not as with the “Other,” but that “other” being “one of us” – the “being” European as well as Muslim, but really neither, but something new which does not differentiate any longer between the religions (and regional origin).

The structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology of the liberal claim is significant in recognizing the important role which international institutions play in transforming state identities and interests (Ibid., 394) in the present context of supranational institutions, such as the EU (and even to some extent national institutions), and how they contribute to bridging the divide between Muslims and Europeans by establishing (through democratic processes/institutions, i.e. representative of the population) uniform laws and institutions throughout the EMP for example, contributing to decreased transaction costs (e.g. by reducing suspicion) and increasing transparency (e.g. trust). This is confirmed by Wendt (Ibid.) who states that “process and institutions are not subordinated to structure,” i.e. it is the process, rather than simply the structure which affects anarchy (or, in this case, the past “strained” relationship between Muslims and Europeans). EuroIslam then is proposed here as a concept and a process can contribute greatly to more harmonious relationships beyond Europe to all borders of the Mediterranean also.

The approach Wendt (1992, 405) proposes for this “process” is one of creating intersubjective meanings through a mechanism of reinforcement

interaction [here in terms of “citizenship” as referenced above in Tibi’s usage] rewards actors for holding certain ideas about each other and discouraging them from holding others. If repeated long enough, these

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89 “Institution” as representing a “relatively stable set or ‘structure’ of identities and interests,” and “institutionalization a process of internalizing new identities and interests” (Wendt 1992, 399)
‘reciprocal typifications’ will create relatively stable concepts of self and other regarding the issue at stake in the interaction.

Wendt’s approach, as a via media constructivist, contrasts e.g. with the postmodern constructivism of Richard Ashley, James DerDerian and Spike Peterson, as well as Beck and Grande’s (2004) analyses, the latter of which correlate to some extent with the ontology of Cosmopolitan Europe, referred to earlier in this section. The “mechanics” of evaluating the linguistic construction are hence significant to the present “construction” of EuroIslam beyond only a linguistic concept but also as a process, affecting agents and structures in a post-national construct (as we need to remember that Wendt applied this “process” only to traditional international relations, not post-national/post-multiculturalist developments).

One could extrapolating from socio-political construction to the next level of post-international “structures” through process in order to increase one’s understanding of identity vis-à-vis interest formation and transformation and structural and institutional constitution as unique re-conceptions of power, as well as an ontology and construction of the social world and how social change happens within it. From this angle, the application of constructivism to EuroIslam would then be a process for developing the structure of “peace” by the creation of new intersubjective meanings, e.g. EuroIslam, as a single identity which does not need to be suspicious of “itself” (Wendt 1999).

While this may sound utopian to some, since issues such as mutual suspicion are not only significant stumbling blocks in bringing peace to the Euro-Med (both among the populations internally of the EU and between those from countries along the northern and the southern borders of the Mediterranean), but have been exploited for political reasons.
A conceptualization of common identity might be a start in “imagining” an alternative which would lead to a solution to these “perceptual” and structural obstacles.

However, the structure should not be constrictive of agency. Hence, while European governments may (struggle to) apply the (national, supra-national and intergovernmental) structures of a Rechtsstaat (including the EU context) as discussed above, countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean apply theirs. This does not imply the need along either shore of the Mediterranean to necessarily abrogate individual or social agency in promulgating an identity of EuroIslam, i.e. of empathy and identity with (and mutual responsibility for?) “the Other” (Wendt 1999).

This is an alternative to Buzan’s and Waever’s (2003, 257) prognosis for the Middle East Regional Security complex

that any [original emphasis] development in the region would change its character as a classic conflict formation. The failure of the peace process cements Arab-Israeli hostility into place for many more years, now with the additional burdens and complications created by the ‘war against terrorism’ (Ibid.).

Islam and Gender

Gender equality has progressed as well in MENA in the last few years, e.g. in Morocco fifty female imams were recently awarded diplomas by the Islamic Affairs Ministry and in Turkey the Directorate of Religious Affairs (the Diyanet) appointed two hundred state-paid female preachers (Ahmed-Ullah 2006). Some scholars point out (e.g. Purvis 2006) that Western Europe needs to find ways in which its secular traditions can coexist not only with the bordering continents, “but with those that have, 500 years after the reconquista, returned to its shores… there will be no more pressing challenge [in his
opinion] to the next generation of Europeans than to reconcile its practice with the best of
the old Continent’s humanist tradition” (Ibid.): and it shows the intricate ideational and
socio-economic structures which need to be addressed today to maximize regional
security in this broad spectrum of security sectors.

Education

A. Sen defines this freedom as that
arrangement that society makes for education, health care and so on, which
influence the individual’s substantive freedom to live better. These facilities
are important not only for the conduct of private lives (such as living a
healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature mortality), but
also for more effective participation in economic and political activities (Sen
1999, 39).

Fulvio Attina (1996) also agrees that regional cooperation can have external origins and
extend not only to economic, but also to political, and socio-cultural cooperation. The
reciprocal efficacy of strengthening economic, political and cultural factors to achieve
regional stability has also been reiterated by Turkish Foreign Minister Gul (2007). To
prevent new dividing lines within Islamic countries where internal conflicts have been
raging (Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Afghanistan), and to reduce internal problems within
this region, pushing the mainstream towards “the extremes for want of good governance
and true civic engagement” (Ibid.) in favor of non-extremist voices to be heard, Gul
(quoted in ‘Main conflict is in the East, not between East and West’, EurActiv 1/17/2007)
advocates, as A. Sen does, support for the South-Eastern Mediterranean region to develop
socio-economically as well as culturally in face of the violence and extremism
surrounding them.
Financial Times columnist Martin Wolf (2007) pointed out in response to a speech by chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke (2007), in view of the effects of globalization, that to guard against resulting polarizations in personal income which affect the poorest the most, skill-based technological changes need to be addressed, especially in developing countries. Many programs supportive of social development are carried out by private NGOs and IGOs (sub-)region-wide to address these needs identified by officials and scholars in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

One far-reaching program was initiated in 2004 in the first Mediterranean University Forum the network of the “EuroMed Permanent University Forum”[90] (EPUF). It is based on the recognition of academics on all shores of the Mediterranean that peace and universality are the focal points of universities, and matter in a very special historical way in the Mediterranean (EPUF website), by building an Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Area[91], to establish common education and training paths based on a system of transferable credits and on easily readable qualifications that are also exploitable by the labor market, by shared criteria, evaluation methods and quality assurance guidelines (EPUF website Group 1 objectives), such as exchanges of good practices and expertise on student mobility, e.g. in comparison with Erasmus programs. Its objectives are to empower universities to meet the needs of the citizens in MENA to enable progress in coordination with the EMP, the EU and the educational institutions committed to the development of our societies.

[90] It consists of universities in Algeria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, Palestine, Portugal, Rumania, Slovenia, Spain, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom and Libya (as an EMP observer country).
[91] Compare with the similarity of goals of the UMed (founded thirteen years later in 2008 as the EMP’s successor program).
The EU’s role is i.a. through the EU Commission’s External Cooperation program of its Education, Audiovisual and Culture Executive Agency, which administers the Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation program to achieve a better understanding and mutual enrichment between the European Union and third countries cooperation in the field of higher education through promoting the exchange of persons, knowledge and skills at higher education level, such as through the promotion of partnerships and institutions cooperation exchanges between European Higher Education Institutions and Third Country institutions (EU Commission website EACEA).

By using a bottom-up process in constructing a EuroMed area of higher education, it reaffirms the “role of education as a key factor for development, social cohesion and prosperity” in line with the Barcelona Declaration, which emphasizes the importance of intercultural dialogue, the role of the media, the development of human resources in the area of culture, cultural exchanges, and the essential contribution overall which civil society can make to the EMP.

Scientific Cooperation

The EuroMed Satellite Navigation program’s Global Network Satellite System (GNSS) technology is regarded as a main vector for the development and safety of the Mediterranean region. The Vth Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs, held in Valencia in April 2002, adopted an action plan stressing, among others things, the need to boost co-operation on satellite navigation by means of considering concrete introduction for the benefit of different application sectors. This is also in accordance with the European GNSS strategy which foresees the early introduction of GNSS services by 2004 when the European Geostationary Navigation Overlay Service
(EGNOS) becomes operational. Europe’s final objective in satellite navigation will be achieved after 2008 once all GALILEO services are available. GNSS will be implemented over of a 3-year period, with training and demonstration activities for the benefit of the Mediterranean partners, and considering a cooperation office to bring longer-term benefit in the region.

**EuroMeSCo, the Euro-Mediterranean Science and Cultural Organization**, headquartered in Lisbon, is one of the EMP’s specific programs in the area of political, security and economic research and policy recommendations. It represents a network of institutes for strategic studies, including institutes of all Southern Mediterranean partners as well as from EU MSs.

**Chapter Conclusion**

In this chapter a variety of the security sectors, which Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) had referred to in determining securitization, were analyzed as they pertain to the Euro-Mediterranean region. It indicates how the EMP, through the programs and ideational content associated with its 3-chapter structure, contributes to maximize security among its member states, and contribute to a harmonization within this region in terms of a nascent security complex.
Chapter Seven  
Archival and Secondary Data – Part C:  
Widening of the Euro-Mediterranean Area  

Economic  

General Agreement on Trade (GATT) and Tariffs/World Trade Organization (WTO)  

In terms of North-South linkages within the EMP, the proximity among member countries makes economic cooperation attractive as an alternative to outsourcing and offshoring to the Far East. Since the formal launch of the Doha Round in 2001, some authors such as Tovias have argued that  

the fight is between North and South (around the group of the G-20, captained by Brazil)…The fear then is not anymore that closed trading blocs will emerge as a result of a possible failure of the Doha Round which is a clear possibility… [but a] ‘free-for-all’ atmosphere characterizing this new wave of preferentialism … What seems to be emerging now is a multipolar trade system, rather than the multilateral one envisaged by the architects of the WTO a decade ago (Tovias 2008, 13).  

In this environment of cross-regionalisms and considerations about North-South integration within the EMP, South-South cooperation is nevertheless strongly supported within the EMP, not only due to the proximity of countries, which reduces transport costs for goods and services, but to also enable a maximization of the reciprocal development momentum.  

There is an additional hard security aspect to Euro-Mediterranean regional integration beyond institutional or economic integration: guaranteeing the safety of the transport routes per se. It is in this context significant to note that under GATT\textsuperscript{92}  

\begin{footnote}
\textsuperscript{92} General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, effective January 1, 1948, reaffirmed as Article One of the WTO/GATT Uruguay Round document, confirms its status as regulating international trade agreements (with later documents clarifying some of the definitions and articles) reads as follows:
\end{footnote}
countries are permitted to use their self defense to secure their shipments, e.g. the Italian navy would be permitted to use that force on the Mediterranean, which is necessary to protect their commerce without having to rely on Foreign Ministry mandates or orders. Hence economic considerations in the EMP can be viewed as having in part a “hard” infrastructure (be they transport routes or harmonization of shipping conditions), as well as from a soft policy perspective of EMP-intra-regional trade cooperation and harmonization.

As the Doha negotiations have broken down since the writing of this dissertation, the complexity of trade liberalization and integration as a function of regional trade have been highlighted. Tovias (2008, 39) has elaborated on the strategic consequences of cross-regional free trade agreements in that it expands the influence of larger powers in regions beyond their past spheres, and lessens the dependence of smaller powers on previous alliances.

This remarkable change in the trade policies of both large and small countries could lead in the medium term to a sort of meltdown of still-existing, although loose, spheres of influence (such as the one the EU has in the Southern Mediterranean and in Sub-Saharan Africa or the US in North and Central America) (Tovias 2008, 39).

Article XXI Security Exceptions "Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed (a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; or (b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests (i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are derived; (ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly for the purpose of supplying a military establishment; (iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations;"

"93 These operate e.g. via self-correcting incentives within the MEDA program structures in terms of conditionality or, in the more recent MEDA programs, in terms of benchmarks (i.e. reward structures based on achievements in e.g. human rights)."
As least developed countries tend to be losers in these dynamics, since “neither economic powers nor emerging economies consider” (Ibid.) their markets worthwhile to be included in an FTA, it should be a caveat for the EMP in the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean FTA to avoid this temptation and the socio-political repercussions it might bring. Additionally, these dynamics gain salience by the U.S. Middle East Free Trade Area Agreement (originally proposed in 2003, to be implementation within ten years), which broadens the U.S. influence in MENA beyond the military influence and specific petroleum trade, with broader trade agreements as well. This also supports the findings of this dissertation that the Euro-Mediterranean region is beyond a Regional Security Complex, also a Regional Security Super Complex (in terms of Regional Security Theory/Buzan and Waever (2003)).

Political

Interregionalism

Some authors such as Spencer (2001, 9) suggest approaching the EMP not from an internal perspective, but rather view it in the context of the broader challenges facing the EU as a full-fledged security actor, especially as a process rather than substance (Ibid., 10). Her words in 2001 (Ibid., 11) that “the EU needs to reassess the EMP in a context which goes beyond the parameters of the Barcelona template alone” are particularly prophetic in light of the events of August 2008 in Georgia and Syria’s immediate consultations with Russia following the latter’s invasion.
Romano Prodi, as then President of the European Commission, in a speech at Louvain University in November 2002, stated that there is not demarcation line between some Mediterranean countries and others, but that the Mediterranean is

a girdle of peace and cooperation, the focal point of a vast political and economic region stretching from Spain to the black sea and the Persian Gulf, … [a region that] must not start from a closed, one-sided Eurocentric position; [but that] we must base our approach on a certain idea of belonging together which in essence already exists within the processes already under way, but needs to be bolstered with firmness and vision (First Jordan 2002).

These words, as an “authoritative speech act” in terms of securitization (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998), identify the multi-lateral Mediterranean “region” as one of belonging together socio-economically as well as politically in terms of a zone of peace, viewed from its inter-regional aspect towards neighboring regions.

While this dissertation focuses on the Euro-Med, it does not exist in a vacuum but has an inter-regional dimension. There are two aspects to this discussion: the EMP-internal transformations, and the interregional interactions between the EMP and neighboring regional organizations. Intra-regional EMP transformations pertain e.g. to the status of Turkey as EMP-member, or Turkey as additionally an EU-member state one day as well. This will re-define the entire south-eastern neighborhood of the EU, whereby i.a. Iran, Syria and Iraq will be the EU’s neighborhood. Schumacher (2004, 99) suggests that this would require the EU not

… [not] continue to treat war-torn Iraq simply as a recipient of reconstruction aid, thereby leaving the country in the power sphere of the occupying powers… [but rather that] the EU will have to consider redefining the EMP’s geographic scope and transforming it into a more inclusive and flexible *Euro-Middle East Partnership*.\(^9\)\(^4\) (italics added)

\(^9\)\(^4\) Compare also Neugart and Schumacher (2004)
Schumacher (2004, 100) suggests that this would involve redesigning the EMP’s intergovernmental framework with enhanced bi-, and/or multilateral inter-, intra and sub-regional cooperation layers/rings of cooperation, such as an enhanced infrastructure within this partnership and as well as within the south-south dimension, including transport enhancements to support its economic aspirations and interdependence. Additionally, the intra- and interregional socio-political evolution on these levels would need to be furthered through confidence-building measures, and intercultural learning, including intra-Arab civil society cooperation (Schumacher 2004, 101). Coherence and coordination within the EMP would give a much broader base in managing regional post-“Operation Iraq Freedom” stability. These statements, as a further “authoritative speech act” from a research institution focusing on the Euro-Med, not only views the EMP as the preeminent institutional framework in the Euro-Mediterranean to develop this enhanced socio-political and economic infrastructure in the widest sense.

The inter-regional aspect involves e.g. the status of the Middle East Peace Process. There are a number of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) overlapping with the EMP, from the EU to e.g. the Arab Maghreb Union, which seeks South-South integration through a sub-regional free trade area (Gillespie 2000, 95). The African Union\textsuperscript{95} represents the start for building a formal security cooperation (Attina 2005, 7 and 16) within a regional security partnership. It encompasses fifty-three states, whose goals are the prevention, management and resolution of African conflicts, including early warning and preventative diplomacy to promote peace, security and stability.

\textsuperscript{95} Its founding Protocol of 2002 relates to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council
Attina (2004, 2), in studying the constructive processes of the Euro-Mediterranean security system, utilizes analytical approaches of other regional security systems and regional security partnerships from a comparative perspective. He points out that

the existence of different multilateral initiatives on security in the Mediterranean is pointed out as a strategic tool for the future of the Euro-Mediterranean security project, and the proposal for increasing the relations between the EMP and other multilateral initiatives is put on the table as a step forward to strengthen the process for building the Mediterranean security system (Ibid.)

through an evaluation on the basis of their level of institutionalization of security cooperation and members’ social integration (Ibid.).

**Strategic Inter-Regional Constellations**

**Arab Maghreb Union**

The Arab Maghreb Union’s (AMU) objective is regional cooperation within similar regional institutions, enhance the international dialogue, reinforce the independence of member states and safeguard their assets (Faten 2004) within their strategic position in terms of natural resources (phosphate, oil and gas), and as a transit center to Europe (Ibid.).

The idea for economic union between the five Maghreb states (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia) was evaluated in 1956 upon their independence. Yet the first Maghreb summit did not take place until 1986, and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) formally signed in 1989. Beyond the traditional regional rivalries, the AMU has experienced solidarity problems, and, in addition to festering sovereignty question about
Western Sahara, little was accomplished beyond occasional meetings between some of the member states.

Black Sea Synergy Initiative

The Black Sea Synergy Initiative⁹⁶ was established in 2007 to deal with the opportunities and challenges of the region, which is “rich in natural resources and strategically located at the junction of Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East (Commission of the European Communities 2007). The EU Council in its conclusions of 18/19 June 2007 welcomed the initiatives aimed at strengthening a coherent EU engagement towards the Black Sea area. The Council pointed out that they explicitly recommend building on the experience gained through the Barcelona Process (as well as lessons learnt in the Northern Dimension of the ENP) to extend synergies with other regional cooperation processes, as the EU-accession process by Turkey, the ENP as well as the Strategic Partnership with the Russian Federation are of relevance to the EU.

EU-Africa Strategic Partnership

This IGO is a further southern extension of the ENP beyond the Neighborhood, and in this case specifically the EMP, (European Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007), to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, ranging from climate change to development, energy, migration, peace and security, trade and regional integration and good governance human rights, between the countries beyond the southern Mediterranean and the EU. These issues represent some of the sectors, which Buzan,

⁹⁶ The Black Sea region comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine.
Waever and de Wilde (1998) have referred to as “sectors” in operationalizing their new framework for security (as reflected in this book’s title under the same terminology). Additionally, this EU foreign policy towards the south could be explained with Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) (Buzan and Waever 2003) in terms of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex, whereby sub-Saharan Africa could be viewed as buffer-region to a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex under this theory. As the dynamics currently are not particularly intense between Europe and sub-Saharan Africa, this aspect of the EMP exceeds the limits of this dissertation.

![Figure 7.1: Sub-Saharan Africa (in beige)](source: www.exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/images/subsaha.... Accessed 8/24/08).

While the future geographic and political ENP-membership may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), the ENP’s potential is not\(^9^7\). The following sections will discuss these opportunities further.

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\(^{97}\) Compare Senyucel et al. 2006.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)

The GCC (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) and the EU have held regular ministerial meetings during the last two decades on issues of mutual interest, such as terrorism, WMDs, human rights and regional political issues pertaining to “ensuring security in a broad sense in a region of tension, and guaranteeing long-term prosperity and job creation by diversifying the economy and reducing dependence on oil income” (EU Council Interim Report 2006). Both the GCC and the EU view especially this area of energy and security on a regional basis in need of enhanced regional and a wider international dialogue, e.g. through a stronger EU presence, enhanced coordination and higher visibility in the Gulf states (Ibid.). The GCC financial sector has been partially integrated with the West through Petro-investments. Reciprocally, global financial crisis of autumn 2008, however, left especially some Kuwaiti banks (e.g. Gulf Bank) weakened (England 2008). The financial “inter-regional” role of the GCC in the EU, beyond Petro-investment, is also exemplified by the $10.7 bn capital injection by Libya and Qatar into Barclays Bank (Financial Times 10/31/08), indicating that Arab Gulf banks are overall well capitalized).

As this interim report is an official EU document, it represents an authoritative “speech act” which explicitly states not only the inter-regional security significance between the EU and the GCC, but also the interest of the EU to especially support the mutual security concerns between these two regions. In this context, the EU welcomes elections in the regions (Ibid.).

The GCC has actively supported the EMP when brokered the Doha Agreement in 2008 to normalize relations between Lebanon and Israel (compare Chapter Five),
Section Conclusion: Transnational Political Will in the Euro-Med

Throughout the evolution of the EMP some of its member states have increasingly set “more collective goals and ambitions, not least in external spheres such as defence, previously shielded from collective decision-making, if not collective action, … the gap between expectations and capabilities\textsuperscript{98}, between declaratory policy and its implementation” (Spencer 2001, 13) in the EU (as some have lamented about the EU as a foreign actor, especially during the first years of the EMP). Spencer (Ibid.) suggests that this could i.a. be related to an absence of ‘political will’ (as an absence of concrete incentives and penalties attached to action) either in the beginning or during the progress of a policy’s implementation. The EU as a security actor in the Mediterranean shows the blurring of the internal and external security agendas\textsuperscript{99} (Spencer 2001, 14), which vary according to their (inter-) national context, sometimes quickly. While in the Mediterranean at times migration topped the security agenda, recently oil has also risen (again) towards the top, and with it the EMP’s inter-regional poignancy in terms of new actors’ alliances in the region (e.g. Russia’s cooperation with Libyan exploration) or renewed inter-regional alignments (e.g. Turkey’s “turnstile”-role vis-á-vis the Black Sea region, becoming ever more significant – and subject to realignment - with the recent destabilization in the Caucasus.

\textsuperscript{98} Compare Hill 1993
\textsuperscript{99} The EU security agenda overall expressed in previous sections on EU values in terms of neighborhood economic and socio-political stability and prosperity
Strategic Intergovernmental Organizations pertaining to the Euro-Mediterranean

While it would exceed the limits of this dissertation to evaluate all aspects of the EMP with neighboring IGOs in detail, the reciprocal effect between them can be a positive or negative security enhancement in the EMP, and are hence listed in light of this.

Organization for Security Cooperation Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE’s role in security cooperation needs to be understood in the context of the end of the Cold War and the years following it. The OSCE, with currently fifty-six member countries, is the largest security organization. It builds on the Conference on Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) of the early 1970s (culminating in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975) as a forum of dialogue between East and West. As the above map shows, it involves a broad

Figure 7.2: OSCE Member states (green), Partners for Cooperation (orange)

(Map courtesy of Chris Hanson, University of Miami Department of Geography GIS Laboratory)

membership ranging from North America to five former Soviet Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kirghizistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and the European countries in addition to the Partners for Cooperation countries.
Following the shifting security dynamics post-Cold War it was decided during the Paris Conference of 1990 (culminating in the Charter of Paris for a New Europe) that the OSCE’s activities should evolve from predominantly meetings and conferences to greater field involvement, i.a. through the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the Office of the Representative on Freedom of the Media, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, in addition to the field missions and activities in member countries (Ghebali and Warner, 2001 and Hopmann, 2003, quoted in Attina 2005, 8). This security structure complements the European Security Partnership as operative agreements to the Declarations of fundamental agreements (Attina 2005, 8). Its first test during the Balkan unrest at the end of the last century showed which of these aspects required improvement.

The significance of both the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe lies in providing the intellectual basis, as well as the structural frameworks for other regional security partnerships and communities, such as the EMP.

The Helsinki Final Act of 1975 already contained a Three-Basket structure, i.e. the “Principles Guiding Relations between States” as follows:

1. Sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty
2. Refraining from the threat or use of force
3. Inviolability of frontiers
4. Territorial integrity of States
5. Peaceful settlement of disputes
6. Non-intervention in internal affairs
7. Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief
8. Equal rights and self-determination of peoples
9. Co-operation among States
10. Fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law”
Additional agreements included areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, science and technology, and the environment, as well as commercial exchanges, industrial cooperation and projects of common interest, as well as provisions concerning trade and industrial cooperation, the harmonization of standards and arbitration, and the exploration of possibilities for improving cooperation, such as in agriculture, energy, new technologies, the rational use of resource, transport technology and environmental concerns.

Questions relating to *security and cooperation in the Mediterranean*, and cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields were *specifically* addressed in a dedicated section of this Charter (was it not intended as a framework for peace in the Middle East), including education exchanges (compare also with the Union for the Mediterranean of 2008, as delineated further in Chapter Five).

The *Paris Charter of 1990* for a New Europe, building on the framework of the Helsinki Final Act, was to herald in a “New Era of Democracy, Peace and Unity,” presupposing that “the ten Principles of the Final Act will guide us towards this ambitious future, just as they have lighted our way towards better relations for the past fifteen years. Full implementation of all CSCE commitments must form the basis for the initiatives we are now taking to enable our nations to live in accordance with their aspirations, i.a.:

1. Human Rights, Democracy and Rule of Law
2. Economic Liberty and Responsibility
3. Friendly Relations among Participating States
4. Security, including terrorism
5. Unity
6. The CSCE and the World

100 In terms of “The destiny of our nations is linked to that of all other nations. We support fully the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice. We
7. Human Dimension (respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms)
8. Economic Co-operation
9. Environment
10. Culture

It further specifically stated that “We consider that the fundamental political changes that have occurred in Europe have a positive relevance to the Mediterranean region.” Hence we note that the multi-dimensional structure of the EMP is based on the very broad multilateralism in the context of an, one might speculate, Euro-Mediterranean Regional Super Complex according to Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Waever 2003), considering the multilateral agreement to it, represented by the large number of signatories to both the Helsinki Act of 1975 and the Paris Charter of 1990. This Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex’ institutional structure would refer back to these two documents as well.

Furthermore, both the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter of 1990 indicate an interest-convergence among the members of the EMP in accordance with the agreements already made years, even decades before its own launch. The question one might ask is whether the whole of the OSCE could be considered a Regional Security Complex involving not only interest, but also actor/identity convergence. Attina (2004) has addressed a dichotomy within the OSCE, whereby the EU represents a security community, while the remaining members of the OSCE under its umbrella do not “because their security policies are tightly linked to the Central Asia security complex. Indeed, at the exception of Turkmenistan, they are members of the Central Asia security partnership” (Attina 2004, 7). While Attina (2004, 15) acknowledges “the problem of reaffirm our commitment to the principles and purposes of the United Nations as enshrined in the Charter and condemn all violations of these principles” (Paris Charter of 1990).

101 Exemplified by the broad institutional structure, represented by the OSCE for example.
including external actors [such as Russia] in the negotiation on the Mediterranean security partnership,” “the OSCE and NATO initiatives and the importance of the military presence of the United States in the Mediterranean area [may] signal the need” for this.

Globalization and the strategic changes driven by it affect relations between rich and poor states, IGOs and transnational actors (be they NGOs, terrorist organizations or others) beyond hard power, even soft power, to have security implications (Zellner 2007, 10). These newer conflicts, arising from economic inequality, social or political exclusion, cultural and religious identities make conflict prevention, which takes these differing identities into account, more salient. The OSCE has been active in mitigating many aspects of these security challenges through inclusive, cooperative diplomacy and public awareness raising. This has resulted e.g. in a decreasing intensity of ethno-political conflicts in Europe, with the 2001 Macedonia crisis being the last one in Europe (until possibly the Russian-Georgia “incident” of August 2008 in the broadest sense of “Europe”). While the overlap in peacemaking and peacekeeping activities of these various international security organizations has contributed substantially to the increased stability in the greater European region, this peace is neither permanent as this Russian-Georgian incident shows (though it is beyond the parameters of this dissertation to analyze in greater detail), nor is it reality homogeneously across the European Neighborhood.
NATO

While NATO's role was already alluded to previously in the context of the ESDP, it will be addressed here more specifically in reference to its role in the Mediterranean. The population of the EU today is approximating 450 million, that of the countries bordering the southern and eastern shores of the Mediterranean 350 million, with the number of people under fifteen years of age in this latter region reaching thirty percent of the total population by 2025 (Nachmani 1999, 95). Yet despite the similarity in population, the diversity in terms of religion, history, the wide income gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean, and strong population growth in the south- and eastern Mediterranean, to name a few, are adding risk factors to continued regional instability.

An area with such a relatively high population density and historical socio-political instability is naturally of security interest to its neighbors, not only to the north of the Mediterranean, but also south-east, such as Iran and Iraq and the Gulf region. While NATO solved the self-help game of Europe’s security dilemma which had governed Europe up to World War II, the post-Cold War paradigm of the “major power consensus model” (E. Haas 1964) of the U.S. vis-á-vis European collective security had changed. The regional Mediterranean security debate centered on the question of whether it was now a European (Weaver 2000) or a NATO responsibility (Brevin 2004, 9).


103 This dissertation focuses on Mediterranean security from a “regional” perspective. Hence specific issues such as Turkey, Cyprus, the Israel-Palestinian conflict, Russia’s role in the Partnership for Peace, the Adriatic portion of the Balkans or Bosnia Herzegovina per se as a de facto UN state-protectorate in the Adriatic corner of the Mediterranean region will not be discussed at length.
NATO ("the Alliance") recognized that security and stability in the Mediterranean is a significant factor in Europe’s security structures (NATO Handbook 2002, Ch. 3). Parallel to this re-evaluation of post-Cold War European security, other security debates took place, e.g. during the Maastricht Treaty negotiations West European governments agreed to full membership of the West European Union for Greece only if its Article V would be rewritten so that they would not be obliged to support Greece in war against Turkey (Brein 2004, 10).104

NATO changed post-Cold War from that of a collective defense organization to a collective security organization, seeking to avoid new polarizations and the creation of new dividing lines between formers friends and foes, but to seek cooperation between former adversaries through integration in Allied progress, e.g. Partnership for Peace (PfP) and special relationships as mechanisms for exporting stability to new member countries. These “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMP/UMed to co-constitute structures for peace hence would be balanced in an EMRSC e.g. with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region”105 as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) as well as the (now favored) non-Article 5 missions of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external threats.” This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8) – and it has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security Council approval (especially after the U.S.

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104 Peace with its neighbors also being a requirement of an EU applicant state, such as Turkey.
105 Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible”
overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of Iraq with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism).

**NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue** (“Dialogue”) was formally launched in December 1994, reflecting the alliance’s recognition of the Mediterranean’s unique regional security challenges. The Mediterranean Dialogue, as a sub-program of the PfP specifically seeks to improve the understanding of Mediterranean security perceptions and concerns of its partners, e.g. enabling low level military cooperation, such as emergency planning, peacekeeping and peace supporting (*Said 2004*). This Dialogue started initially with five countries (Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Israel and Egypt), with Algeria and Mauritania joining later. Subsequently, it also involved talks with the Gulf Cooperation Council (Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Initially, this initiative was limited to “dialogue,” as NATO had other pressing priorities, such as enlargement and developing the post-Cold War relationship with Russia. New members of the dialogue were weary of NATO’s image as a Cold War institution and preferred to concentrate on “soft” security and economic issues to develop mutual confidence and trust, rather than “hard” security issues of defense and military cooperation. In the first dozen years post-Cold War, NATO was much more actively engaged in Eastern Europe and as a result of the hesitations by its Mediterranean partners only sporadically engaged there (*Nachmani 1999, 97*).

The Dialogue was also intended to reach out to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s Mediterranean security and stability
projects as its mandate also shifted post-Cold War from defending a clearly delimited territory to a new strategy of committing member states to defend unbounded interests beyond Europe’s theater of operations: NATO’s new mandate is as global as the Western interests it has pledged to defend … [implying] that the Arab world will received its fair share of NATO attention … [such as] crisis operations … to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises (which could affect Euro-Atlantic stability) at an early stage (El-Gawhary 1999, 16/7).

The Dialogue was also intended to reach out to non-NATO member countries who might be interested in collaborating with NATO’s Mediterranean security and stability projects. These “partners” would not be allies at the beginning but would be involved in confidence building programs, to become members when some major qualifications were met, e.g. irreversible commitments to democracy, civilian control of the military and development of a nation’s military capability to a level of interoperability with those of NATO members” (Kaplan 1999, 195).

Meeting in June 2004 in Istanbul, NATO leaders decided to elevate the Alliance's Mediterranean Dialogue to a genuine partnership, and to launch the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with select countries in the broader region of the Middle East. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue has successfully contributed to confidence-building and cooperation between NATO and its seven Mediterranean partners: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. The enhanced Mediterranean Dialogue will contribute to regional security and stability, by promoting greater practical cooperation, enhancing the Dialogue's political dimension, assisting in defense reform, cooperation in the field of border security, achieving interoperability and contributing to the fight against terrorism, while complementing other international efforts.
At the same time Alliance leaders decided to reach out to the broader region of the Middle East through the **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)**, by promoting practical bilateral cooperation with interested countries of the region, starting with countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This Initiative aims at enhancing security and stability through a new transatlantic engagement, offering tailored advice on defense reform, budgeting, and planning as well as civil-military relations, promoting military-to-military cooperation to contribute to interoperability, fighting terrorism through information sharing and maritime cooperation, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and fighting illegal trafficking. It is understood that the words "country" and "countries" in the document do not exclude participation, subject to the North Atlantic Council's approval, of the Palestinian Authority in cooperation under this initiative. The enhancement of NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue and the launching of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative resulted from high-level consultations conducted by NATO's Deputy Secretary General with the countries of the Mediterranean and the broader region, according to the principle of 'joint ownership'. These are two complementary, progressive and individualized initiatives.

**From Security Community to Security Complex?**

Security in the Euro-Mediterranean has been described as asymmetrical between the Northern and the Southern shores (Schumacher 2003, 223): While security in (EU-) Europe has traditionally had a multi-lateral character, largely due to Cold War constellations, with EU member states also NATO- and OSCE-members, security
policies in MENA states are generally more unilateral (Ibid.). This has been historically linked to distrust of new European involvement in MENA, and resulted in a more limited polarization during the Cold War between the shores of the Mediterranean (Ibid.), whereby Israel would represent the exception to this North-South as well as “South-South” status.

Beyond the debate of European identity and cultural definitions is also, implicit in the context of regional security community and –cooperation, such as Javier Solana’s (1997, 2, quoted in Spencer 2001, 18) pronouncements as then NATO Secretary General of the “common space, common concerns and common heritage” linking Europe to its southern partners. Nevertheless, beyond NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue, EMP members had in the past insufficiently developed a dedicated vision or commitment to the indivisibility of security in their shared space, especially regarding issues which have risen to the top of many member states’ security agendas, such as environmental pollution, trafficking (whether human, drugs, weapons or cash), or societal security (e.g. pertaining to certain gender segments of a population).

Sarkozy, as president of the 2nd semester 2008 EU-presidency, confirmed that EU defense would not undermine NATO (EurActiv.com 7/11/08), despite the EU’s focus on immigration, development and security, especially vis-à-vis the Mediterranean in light of the recent launch of the UMed. Traditional neorealist theory holds that the preconditions of the international system enable states to take certain foreign policy actions but not others (Waltz 1979). Waltz (1959) also suggested that to understand state action in terms of war (as a foreign policy behavior), one needs to understand the dynamics of the international system as well as its internal characteristics, such as leadership, as they may
explain the immediate reasons why a war is undertaken. However, the multilateralism described above does not call to mind the realist realm of international relations, one characterized by a constant struggle to maintain sovereignty from other states in anarchy. Rather, I propose here that the “international system” of the Mediterranean region and the institutional structures of the Dialogue and the EMP are neither the “finite” system of a zero-sum game, nor (due to the supra-national aspects of the EU at least), are the dynamics of the “Med” exclusively state-centric (with states as the only actors of note, privilege, or agency) (Neak 2003, 19).

Neither does liberalism help explain the dynamics of the EMP’s and Dialogue’s multilateralism in promoting security in the Med, since the prima facie assumption of this theory, as one of underlying harmony in the international relations of this region, could not be further from the truth. While liberalism conceptualizes the “interaction of multiple actors pursuing multiple interests and using different types of resources and methods of interaction” (Ibid.) to achieve them, including underlying norms in the “service of a greater, collective good” (Ibid.), in my opinion this theory is also insufficient to explain the process of multilateralism in the Med in addressing the security challenges there.

Rather, in order to transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the tradition referent object in matters of war and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi
2001, 2). In the post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors and hence deterrence is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer. Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by both IGOs, acknowledging other securitizing factors, e.g. the domestic factors in state governments. The complementarity of these two multilateral IGOs, the Dialogue and the EMP, reduces transaction costs by avoiding duplication of the security and defense mechanisms.

The debate concerning the future of the Dialogue now consists of moving it to one of concrete Partnership with the development of a common view among Mediterranean member countries in terms of general strategic expectations for a future Partnership, especially terrorism and border control, and a willingness to take advantage of existing instruments in the context of the need for the U.S. to formulate a coherent policy on the greater Middle East (Monacco 2004, 2).

While NATO remains committed to Europe, the CFSP continues to evidence incidents of dis-harmony, especially with a downgrading of the commitment to unity in favor of nationalist impulses, evident e.g. in the formulation of the Lisbon Treaty. To what extent this will affect the ESDP remains to be seen. Additionally, the European NATO-members’ hesitations in Afghanistan (Schreer and Toje 2008) raise some questions about the EU’s ability to coordinate the ESDP with NATO (in line with M. Albright’s “Three D’s”: no decoupling of NATO from Europe, no duplication of efforts, no discrimination against non-EU members, such as Turkey). Let us hope that the Union for the Mediterranean will be a fresh breath to strengthen the Euro-Mediterranean region
for the security challenges which Europe, the Arab nations bordering the Mediterranean and, via the transatlantic umbilicus, North America, face as a region as well as inter- and intra-regionally in all a security sectors, from the political, the economic to the socio-cultural in the future, as security is, in fact, largely indivisible especially in the Euro-Mediterranean region despite the political-cultural variations to it among EMP members.

Overall, Brevin (2004, 12) argues that the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of responsibility for peace in the (Eastern) Mediterranean in the future. In his analysis he argues that it is essential to understand the differing interests of parties in conflict – although the protection of heterogeneous European interests would not be the main criterion. Rather, Brevin states that according to social contract theory, the parties are in a social relationship (rather than a power political relationship based on fear of the power of the other parties) (Ibid.). This would mean that the first priority of such a social relationship is the respect of the political liberty of the parties involved in the conflict, and the second priority to promote the economic interests of the least advantaged (be they Israeli citizens threatened by a nuclear bomb, or Palestinians losing their olive groves).

This dissertation takes a constructivist approach and, although acknowledging aspects of realism inherent in it such as rational actors, by contrasting the hard power and soft power approaches in the institutional analysis (in order to understand the history, culture and institutional dynamics post-Cold War) of the EMP and the Dialogue. Klotz and Lynch (2007, 3) views this in terms of the end of the Cold War shattered stable antagonisms and alliances… This destabilization widened the political and intellectual spaces - and increased the need – for scholars to ask questions about the cultural bases of conflict, alternative conceptions of national identity, [and] the ethics of intervention…

106 By definition, in this dissertation in particular, the association of NATO *per se* with “war”/Article V missions
Individuals and groups are not only shaped by their world but can also change it. People can … set into motion new normative, cultural, economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional wisdoms and standard operating procedures.

As much as the EU is about soft power to support development as security, NATO’s activities include besides the new non-Article V activities post Cold-War also still “Article V”: within a day of September 11, NATO members invoked for the first time in their history Article V of the Atlantic Treaty, demonstrating not only European support for the War on Terror, but also its willingness to undertake out-of-area missions in support of Alliance-wide security in order to help defeat terrorism in Afghanistan. Without the U.S. partnership in the Dialogue (and the Alliance overall), Europeans would lack military capability in the security complex which is the EU and its neighborhood (continuing post-Cold War since the ESDP, as discussed above, was not meant to duplicate NATO capabilities), but compensate with their ability to pick up the bill for post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan, for example.

The diversity of interests and political orientations of the Mediterranean partner countries to the EMP and the Dialogue reflect their differing economic and internal social development problems, and their interests, identities and structures overall. What then is the future of these two organizations in the Mediterranean? Some observers have pointed to a possible competition in the Mediterranean between the EMP, NATO, as well as other organizations, e.g. the OSCE’s Mediterranean Initiative, and possible redundancy. Chris Patton (2004) acknowledged in a speech a couple of years ago that on the one hand the EU needs to take more responsibility in relations with Islamic countries from Morocco to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, “depressingly, witlessly, we have to a great extent shaped our
disaster-in-waiting” (Ibid.). He distanced himself from the U.S. to the point of stressing that Arabs need to have control of their agenda, presumably so that the conditionality of European aid, which he favors, would be agreed to by Arab negotiators (quoted in Brewin 2004, 18). Although Patton admitted that “in the dreadful situation in Iraq…America and Europe have to work together to try to end the whole affair in tolerable order.” (Ibid., 19).

What then are some of the options the EU and the U.S. have available to not only administer peace in the Mediterranean post-Iraq, but also to contribute to those socio-economic and political developments supportive of political regional stability? The studies cited point to similar conclusions about support for peace, security and sustained development through an intensification of the Dialogue and, parallel to this, more hard power option.

In contrast, the EMP’s soft power approach encourages good governance, education, human rights and democracy. Thiele et al. (2005, 88) suggest as a policy option a strategic partnership through an enhanced EU-NATO Security Cooperation in the Mediterranean would maximize rather than duplicate institutional cooperation, especially in crisis management projects, and involve pragmatic burden sharing. This type of collaboration would permit the U.S. a continued presence in the Mediterranean post-Iraq through a multi-lateral approach towards common issues and interests, and hereby balance the extra “interest bestowed upon” the Eastern Mediterranean in contrast to the Western Mediterranean by NATO partner programs. This dual approach could be considered useful in dealing with issues of in-security spill-over from Iraq in the intermediate future by having all member states trained and prepared in conflict
prevention, crisis management and sub-regional security regimes, and hopefully be able to make progress in the development of democracy and upholding of human rights in this region (Thiele et al. 91).

**Cooperation in peacekeeping among the Euro-Mediterranean (Dialogue)**

**armed forces** has changed in the post-9/11 security environment, i.a. with respect to the Mediterranean, and in particular to the Dialogue in terms of geography, modi operandi of change and changed value systems.

1. **Geography**

Following 9/11 and the Afghan and Iraq military “campaigns, the potential geographic space for security cooperation between NATO and Dialogue countries has expanded eastward all the way to Afghanistan and possibly beyond” (Said 2004). This might affect the alliances’ “per se” logistics of in terms of planning, training, command and control, strategic transport, and intelligence operations (Ibid.) in this security system.

2. **Modi operandi for change**

As geography refers to space, the modi operandi for change relate to time frames and levels of urgency, efficiency, cost and evaluation of consequences (Ibid.).

While the “Clintonian” approach to MENA emphasized dialogue, treaties, confidence building and economic incentives, the last four years saw more intrusive, pre-emptive and interventionist policies by trans-Atlantic allies (Ibid.).

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107 Examples are Egypt, Jordan and Morocco who have already worked under NATO command in the Balkans and might be suitable for involvement in Alliance operations elsewhere to combat terrorism and WMD-proliferation (Assessing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue)
This more interventionist approach is questioned on ethical, legal and political grounds and leads to inquiries about regional\textsuperscript{108} and international responsibility for stabilization and reconstruction (\textit{Said 2004}). Thiele et al. (2005) suggest the following future security strategies for the Mediterranean, recognizing the differing priorities of national interests between N. European and S. Europeans in this, but addressing it EU-jointly:

a. Formation of a partnership between NATO and the EU for joint initiatives in the Med among those partners, e.g. Algeria, which prefers to avoid a tete-a-tete with the U.S., but are able to engage via NATO with them multilaterally (Thiele et al.). The other option would be endless bi-lateral arrangements, which, though not invalid per se, do not contribute to the same stability as multilateral arrangements do, because bilateral arrangements are i.a. open to much more exacerbated power balancing maneuvers, especially with respect to the position of Turkey and Israel\textsuperscript{109} (and a lesser extent e.g. Greece/Cyprus).

b. This partnership would capitalize on the strength of both organizations and avoid their weaknesses in light of the common goal to make it a win-win for all partners: Benefits for the EU would be reducing frictions within the EU concerning its relationship with NATO, becoming more capable in preventive actions and crisis management, and the EU would become a more engaged transatlantic partner, balancing U.S.-unilateralism in the Med and encourage more multi-laterality. This would counteract the suspicion by

\textsuperscript{108} The Afghan and Iraq campaigns appear to have accelerated plans for reforming the “Arab League, social, democratic and human rights reforms in Egypt and Libya’s unilateral decision to give up its weapons of mass destruction (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{109} Some readers might view these as privileged
the Arab dialogue countries that the ESDP represent a post-colonial instrument of influence – or worse, of intervention – by the EU in MENA.

Benefits for NATO coordination with the ESDP (and the EMP) would expand NATO’s policy dimensions and scope in areas where U.S. involvement was previously low (e.g. North Africa except Morocco). Benefits for MENA would be an increased transparency in EU and NATO programs concerning their region, and a complementarity in programs rather than duplication or non-complementarity between EU and NATO initiatives, as well as country-specific cooperation in good governance programs in economic, political, social and military programs to overcome mistrust, unresolved disputes, and possibly Islamic fundamentalist opposition movements.

c. Conflict prevention and crisis management in sub-regional security regimes can also be enhanced by a comprehensive approach through arms control of conventional as well as WMDs, especially in light of EU enlargement, potentially along the Adriatic and its connection to the Mediterranean.

d. Encouragement and support of good governance, human rights and democracy programs along the European Security Strategy of December 2003 to stabilize the region, promoting a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and along the borders of the Med. Additionally, support for the importance of economic and structural changes (although an open door policy towards the Mediterranean is utopian at the moment).

e. Other policy options to induce developments within Mediterranean Dialogue Partner countries would be common benchmarks, conditionality through gradualism and cross-issue linkage, cooperation with NGOs in Med to strengthen the starting points for
the development of civil society and development aid to safeguard certain standards to guarantee the constant progress of human rights and good governance.

The recent more interventionist U.S. approach to the Middle East emphasizes changes in the region’s value system to align it to more democratic Western models (Said 2004). This is set against the imbalance created by the vast U.S. military superiority currently in the region which might provoke further acts of terrorism and instability (Ibid.). The current and potentially future regional instability would require additional approaches for future cooperative strategies between NATO, Dialogue members countries and other actors in the region (Ibid.), as previous items on their agenda, such as combating terrorism and the proliferation of WMDs, disaster relief and humanitarian response missions, de-mining and peacekeeping operations, as well as building regional infrastructure remain there (Ibid.).

Observers have pointed that NATO “supply” had been greater in the Euro-Med than demand for NATO from MENA (except for Jordan and Israel). Nebraska Senator Chuck Hegel (quoted in Rubin 2007) stated that “the great challenge of the future will be the reintroduction of America to the world.” Former national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in his recent book faults all three post-Cold War American presidents for failing to capitalize on the U.S.’ unique standing as “global leader,” by either not pushing hard enough for a Middle East peace accord following the 1991 Gulf War, for assuming that economic globalization alone would solve human problems, rather than exacerbate some, or for pursuing a “self-declared existential struggle against the forces of evil” (quoted in Rubin 2007) – which ironically might instead undermine America’s moral stature in the world (Ibid.). While military power is important in the global balance, the
next American president will need to demonstrate that the U.S. exercises it on a collective basis as a genuine partner for the world community and as proof of the U.S. capacity for global leadership (Ibid.).

**EMP Enlargement**

The EU has currently three candidate countries: Croatia, Turkey and the FYR Macedonia, and has additionally signed Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) as a first step towards potential EU candidacy with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia and Kosovo (under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244). While the current “limbo”-status of the Lisbon Treaty does not make enlargement particularly urgent for the EU, regional stability continues to be a priority for it. Hence progress of its signatories under SAAs continues to be pursued by the EU with great dedication, as

> gaining the region’s agreement to a clear set of objectives and conditions. In return for the EU’s offer of a prospect of accession on the basis of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 1993 Copenhagen criteria and an assistance programme to support that ambition, the countries of the region undertook to abide by the EU’s conditionality and use the Stabilisation and Association Process, and in particular the Stabilisation and Association Agreements when signed, as the means to begin to prepare themselves for the demands of the perspective on accession to the EU (EU Commission Enlargement website).

Hence EU enlargement will affect the membership of the EMP’s successor program, the Union for the Mediterranean as of July 13, 2008 according to these specific guidelines.
Other Select Actors of Significance to the Euro-Med

Nachmani (2004) points out that in the discourse of the *West*, external support takes place as *shared with* Arab political leadership. However, this discourse does *not* exist in *Arabic* countries, where political leaders “do their utmost to guard the borders of the states, as if all the state’s plights and diseases are something external, as if it always comes from abroad, as if nothing that causes any wrong is to be found within our borders, inside our states” (Ibid., 28). The Arab Human Development Report (2002) points out the “existence of deeply rooted shortcomings in Arab institutional structures” (Ibid., 27) which pose obstacles to building human development (Ibid., 27/28) in terms of deficits relating to freedom, empowerment of women and knowledge. While the EMP may not yet have achieved complete success, this may have been attributable in the past to this sense of lacking *necessity* for reforms. While internal shortcomings in MENA are being recognized\(^{110}\), it is hoped that the dialogue between the northern and south- and eastern members of the EMP is shared to a greater extent to achieve an enhanced utilization of the multilateral and multilevel mechanisms available to EMP members for the purpose of development in the political, economic and socio-cultural arenas. As Krahmann (2003, 34) confirms,

> multilevel network theory proceeds from the premise that political actors seek to ensure that their political preferences will be served by the outcome of the decision-making process… The interactions which evolve due to these attempts are a result of the structure of the network on one hand, and the distribution of preferences with regard to a political issue on the other… Actors can choose among their network linkages [and]… actors choose whether to change their preferences and join a coalition in favour of a particular policy. … By hypothesizing about the choices of network actors, multilevel theory proposes a causal link between the structure of the network and the behaviour of political agenda in the decision-making process.

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\(^{110}\) Such as limited South-South linkages, or internal unequal access to education
Hence in the EMP we observe multilevel connections beyond it, not only to other networks, such as the OSCE and NATO, but also interregional connections, especially with some countries of particular significance, play a role in defining the Euro-Mediterranean region as a security complex.

**Iraq** is singled out briefly as a particularly complex inter-regional intervening variable to the EMP’s dynamics. The concept of hegemony, based on control and force, may be relevant to the maintenance of security communities (in terms of a neo-Gramscian form of hegemony), or may be traced back to Thucydides, as *hegemonia*, founded on moral, cultural and intellectual leadership, and based on consent and rooted in legitimacy among the secondary states (Flockhart 2007). When Turkey’s bid for EU membership becomes successful, the EU will border at that point Iran, Iraq and Syria. With these countries as potential new EU neighbors, it is understandable that the EU is not only following developments in Iraq very closely, but showing a definite self-interest in the current developments there. From its position of strength in soft power, European Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, is actively participating in the Iraqi Compact as “a new partnership with the international community aiming to help Iraq on the path of peace and political and economic reconstruction” (EU News release 5/3/2007). While Iraq is not an EMP MS, and while only few EU countries were militarily involved in the recent invasion, the EU is providing soft support in Iraq’s reconstruction in keeping with its goal of assisting a stable and prosperous neighborhood.

Amidst the formation of a national unity government, the adoption of a National Reconciliation plan, Iraq is committed to implement political, social and economic
reforms despite its unstable internal security, especially the sectarian conflicts hampering reconstruction efforts, i.a. by leading to a brain drain (EU Council EUSPMME Interim Report 2006, 14). Against the backdrop of EU assistance for the political and economic transition in Iraq, the country favors closer cooperation with the EU in terms of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement, continued political, human rights and good governance, rule of law and democracy, anti-terrorism and non-proliferation, conflict prevention and resolution dialogues (Iraq Joint Declaration on Political Dialogue of September 2005, quoted in Ibid.).

While the EU Council’s “EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East” provides a useful global framework for the EU’s relations with Iraq, as well as “an opportunity for enhancing the consistency and coordination of EU activities in Iraq” (Ibid.), its potential in areas where the EU can offer added value, linked to the reform agenda of the government, such as the rule of law and governance, respect for human rights, reconciliation process and constitutional review have not yet been adequately exploited.

The EU views its relationship with Iran to depend on addressing its concerns regarding terrorism, the proliferation of WMDs, Iran’s approach to the Middle East peace process, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as other regional issues. While the EU seeks a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue, no effective Iranian response has been received by the EU to its demarches. Iran continues to be unwilling to engage in an EU-Iranian human rights dialogue following the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee resolution of November 2006 about the deteriorating human rights situation.
in Iran (EU Council Interim Report 2006). Currently, Iran’s future political course will probably depend to a large extent on the foreign policy of the Obama administration, and its reciprocal effect on Iran’s relationship inter-regionally with its neighbors and Europe.

The current EU relationship with Russia is based on the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) of 1994 (entering into force on December 1, 1997), which regulates their political, economic and cultural relationship. The Russian Federation (“Russia”), as a regional power in its own right, has pivotal economic relationships towards the West both with Europe and in the wider Mediterranean region. The substantial economic relationship between the EU and Russia involved\textsuperscript{111} e.g. seventy-five percent FDIs from EU-MS\textsuperscript{112}, and is tightly interlinked with the EU-Russian political relationship due to Russia’s strategic use of its petroleum exports. The most persistent challenge to the European Union’s energy security is its reliance on an increasingly mafia-like Russia and its client states, which are politically potentially more unstable than the Middle East.

From an EU standpoint, the political and economic unreliability of Russia as a petroleum source became exacerbated i.a. when expanded it’s questionable reputation further extra-territorially into the EMP per se by signing an agreement with Algeria to restrain foreign investments (particularly in the petroleum sector) in the latter country (Dombey 2006). This means e.g. inhibiting multilateralism and open markets in Algeria.

\textsuperscript{111} While the research for this dissertation concluded in the summer of 2008, Georgian-Russian crisis of August 2008 is recognized as reducing investor confidence in Russia. Additionally, it impeded the signing of the replacement of the current PCA.

\textsuperscript{112} Such as the liberalization of the state-controlled electricity industry through the sale of strategic stakes to “foreign power groups, such as Germany’s E.on, Italy’s Enel, and” (Wagstyl 2008c) the Finnish Forum (in addition to big Russian investors).
(an EMP member state). The energy-aspect of regional security extends into the inter-
regional, and this section seeks to examine the interconnectedness of these diverse
security aspects and their reciprocal geo-political as well as socio-economic significance
in the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) from a regional perspective, being made more salient
by the conflicts bordering it (i.e. Iran and Iraq) (Fernández 2007).

However, the alarm over its peaceful intentions which Russia raised in Europe
following its operations in Georgia in late summer of 2008 endangered Europe’s trust,
and as Russia appears to realize of late, this reciprocally might slow down the successor
agreement to the PCA, as a “deep and comprehensive economic integration agreement
between the EU and Russian economies” (European Commission – External Trade 2008,
1), which was envisioned for the first half of 2008. An additional consequence of these
recent political and economic crises might also be reflected in a slowdown to the progress
of Russia’s WTO membership aspirations. The complexity of the EU-Russian
relationship became further complicated as a result of the global financial crisis in the
autumn of 2008, which saw a substantial fall in petroleum prices. This appears to have
moderated the Russian revisionist assertiveness of the August 2008 Georgian crisis in
favor of a more cooperative tone by early fall 2008.

Judging by Russia’s more conciliatory tone at that time, it appears that Russia
understands that it can ill afford European distrust at this stage, especially under
conditions of the “perfect storm” of dwindling gas prices (as Russia’s prime source of
income), a global financial system which appears to simultaneously have lost much
investor confidence (especially pertaining to FDIs in emerging economies, such as
Russia, with domestic economic/financial institutional structures which have yet matured
since the Cold War): With shrinking revenues, any country’s soft as well as hard security can be compromised\textsuperscript{113}, especially in countries relying on oil exports.

The membership of most European countries in NATO became a new irritant to Russia in light of the positioning of missile defense shields in Eastern Europe (i.e. Russia’s western neighborhood), despite NATO’s extensive Partnership for Peace (PfP)-confidence building programs with Russia. The 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest indicated the EU’s lack of resolve for a common position over the question whether Ukraine and Georgia should become NATO candidates, showing Russia’s skill in the “divide and conquer” tactic (EurActiv 4/9/08)\textsuperscript{114}. While Russia’s enthusiasm for NATO is nil, it is itself active in flying strategic bombers off the American coast and within touching distance of the British border, as well as deploying battleships and submarines capable of carrying nuclear warheads in the Mediterranean and Caribbean (SpiegelOnline 6/25/08).

The significance of the EU-Russia relationship to the Mediterranean is its reciprocal effects on other (inter-)regional relationships. An example would be how sensitive EU-Russia relationship is amplified by the (inter-) regional (vis-à-vis the Euro-Med) effect e.g. of the Nabucco pipeline (compare Figures 4.5 and 4.), which bypasses Russia in carrying oil to the Black Sea and on to Europe, as it represent a strategic Western response to the unreliable EU-Russia relationship. In light of the continuing un-

\textsuperscript{113} It must be noted that Russia had created a stabilization fund in 2003 at the start of the rise in petroleum prices, and “paid off the accumulated state debts and amassed gold and foreign currency reserves” (Gaidar 2008), giving it a cushion to cope with unfavorable economic changes.

\textsuperscript{114} Nevertheless, the EU appears to have understood Russia’s critique that the EU is disadvantaged strategically by not speaking with one voice as itself does, but with twenty-seven voices (EurActiv 6/26/08), the EU responded with unity in addressing the financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 with a solid common position (especially in light of its significance for European security).
ease/lack of trust, with which Europe views Russia. Hence the Black Sea region continues to gain significance for Europe as the EU seeks to diversify its energy supplies in order to overcome its dependency on Russia (EurActiv 6/24/08).

Figure 7.3: Nabucco Pipe (in green)

(Map courtesy of Chris Hanson, University of Miami Department of Geography GIS Laboratory)

Russia countered this “evasion” of its control by proposing the South Stream pipeline “to take gas under the Black Sea from Russia to Bulgaria” (Hoyos and Crooks 2008) to allegedly provide Europe with reliable gas supplies.

This includes also the geo-political “turnstile”-role the Black Sea in light of the current Turkish EU-candidacy, which involved a further geo-strategic pivot eastward with Nabucco bordering the Caspian Sea. While Turkish EU-membership would bring Iran into the EU-“neighborhood,” Europe’s relationship with Iran will gain saliency with the construction of the trans-Caspian pipeline. Iran’s foreign policy, in turn, experiences a closeness with Russia as the uranium supplier for Iran’s nuclear facilities.
Russia’s relationship with MENA is equally sensitive as indicated at the beginning of this section. While Russia is not considered a direct sponsor of Hezbollah, Shia militia have smuggled arms via the Russian customers (though not strategic allies), Syria and Iran. Also, “Russia secured a $7.5 billion deal to supply Algeria with fighter aircraft, tanks and anti-aircraft missiles” (Economist.com 2/8/08, 2) to counter the perceived American effort to create a unipolar world. Yet Russia has also arbitrated the dispute over Iranian nuclear enrichment in the UN Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency as Russian engineers “are understood to have slowed completion of the

115 This argument is not completely plausible in light of the US-Russian deal on civil nuclear power to rein in Iran’s nuclear program (Butler 2008).
plant at Bushehr” (Ibid., 3), as well as declining Iranian requests for more advanced anti-aircraft missiles. Additionally, cooperation with Russia in the fight against terrorism or possibly the environment can be imagined by the EU (EurActiv 4/9/08).

The Russian response to these security dilemmas, and in light of its goal to consolidate its ambitions as an aspiring world power and revisionist country, is its interest in a new “security forum.” Yet, Wolf (8/30-1/08) writes that

Russia still lives in a conceptual world of zero-sum relations, not only because it views international relations as based on a hierarchy of power, but because it has the same view of domestic politics Imperialism and autocracy go together, to employ a useful Islamic terminology, the new Russia, alas, still lives in the ‘House of War’116.

The preceding paragraphs have indicated the vast security implications of Russia not only with respect to the EU and its foreign and security policies, but on overall inter-regional stability. This stands in relation to the Russia attempts to leverage its petroleum wealth to increase its strategic global position while it still can in light of the declining oil yields in western Siberia and the need for huge investments in eastern Siberia, the Caspian Sea and the Arctic seas to compensate for it (Hoyos and Belton 2008).

116 By contrast, only a year ago then-Russian president Putin wrote that “The founding fathers of the pan-European movement dream about ‘the prosperity, peace and independence of the continent’. They were right in guessing the future, realizing that security and wellbeing are indivisible. … But it was only the end of the cold war that brought about real conditions for the fulfillment of the ‘fundamental’ European idea – the unification of the continent” (Putin 2007, 1). In a similarly pacifist sounding statement, current Russian president Medvedev (2008) said that “this war [in Georgia in August 2008] was not a war of our choice. We have no designs on Georgian territory.”

While these are certainly authoritative speech acts (reflecting no doubt wishful thinking by its neighbors on all sides), Russia’s actions speak louder and are interpreted by its neighbors differently: Russia’s announcement that it “plans to form a state grain trading company to control up to half of the country’s cereal exports [i.e. not a question of guaranteeing domestic supplies], intensify[ed] fears that Moscow wants to use food export as a diplomatic weapon in the same way as Gazprom has manipulated natural gas sales” (Blas 2008a) (italics added). This implicates Russia in the “unholy trinity” of manipulating its neighbors with the (potential) withdrawal of food, “heat” (most significantly in the cold Northern European region), and an aggressive mindset, never mind numerous “irregularities,” such as alleged price-gouging of a Russian steel and coal group, which Putin himself exposed (Belton 2008c). The hesitance of Russia’s neighbors to enthusiastically endorse its WTO membership ambitions, uranium exports, and proposals for a revision of global security organizations are to be understood in this context.
Yet, the question of “trust” in a relationship with Russia remains unresolved: Both from a realist perspective (e.g. as some have argued, Russia views NATO’s presence in eastern Europe as affecting the regional pan-European power equilibrium to its disadvantage), from a neo-liberal perspective (e.g. can Russia be trusted in international organizations as being competitive, but not offensively aggressive), and from a social-constructivist perspective (e.g. how can Russia’s paranoia be assuaged and its “consciousness” be broadened to at least entertain the perspective of post-hegemonic orders) this dilemma persists in Russia’s relationship with the West\textsuperscript{117}. Whether Russians will ever be perceived in the West as “European” (as Piotr Dutkievicz in an interview (EurActiv 5/20/08) claimed) is questionable – and irrelevant in a second/third generation regionalism debate. The relative decreasing significance of nationalism in the International Relations of the EU, e.g. in the Mediterranean region, is to be viewed as a significant difference in “perception” which Russia cannot comprehend – and until it does, it will likely continue a foreign policy of “national paranoia.”

The role of the U. S. in Mediterranean Security is of course tremendous, and almost equally as significant as the EU’s both in the hard as well as the soft security context. Joffé (2001, 51) writes that “the United States, for whom the Mediterranean is not significant in national security terms, has, nonetheless … a much more complex appreciation of security problems there.” One could partially disagree with this

\textsuperscript{117} One could revert to the “confidence building measures” (CBMs) utilized in similar security dilemmas of insufficient trust, such as in the Euro-Mediterranean region: in the case of Russia it could reduce the reciprocal mistrust its actions engender by loosening “its grip on its oil and gas pipelines” (Bounds and Tait 2004). On the other hand, judging by the direction of Russian pipelines currently one hundred percent going towards Europe, without plans for additional pipelines at the moment towards Asia, is one indication of Russia’s “commitment” to Europe (EurActiv 5/20/08)
assessment: The US has historically had substantial geo-political interests in MENA out of national security considerations, which it has supported both with its military and soft power (e.g. Free Trade Agreements) engagements there. While the US successfully utilizes the analytical approach to the greater Mediterranean as regions and sub-regions (i.e. “interregional relations in the wider sense” (Link 2006, 149)), unilateral US assessments of the greater Euro-Mediterranean region have not necessarily been sufficient complex to avoid miscalculations on occasion. Link (Ibid.) proceeds to state that the

EC/EU-US relationship…was and still is restricted to the field of economics and trade, whereas security is provided by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in which EU member states and non-member states operate as independent actors side by side with Canada and the United States, the hegemonic power in that military alliance.

This might be an oversimplification of the US-EU relationship: economic interests i.a. inform strategic interests, and can be reflected as a result in the military assertion of a country. An example is NATO, though a multilateral actor, its (benevolent) hegemon, the US, pointing to the assertion that the US is acutely interested in stability, beyond Europe, also in the Euro-Mediterranean region in the broadest sense as a national security interest with an economic base: petroleum resources.

Reciprocally, EU-MENA multilateralism is not meant to exclude the U.S. On the contrary, the values of democracy and multilateral organizations are identical to the US’. If anything, some have expressed that the “fear in Europe is that a disillusioned US [after its recent l’etat c’est moi Iraq excursion] will retreat into itself…rather than recommitting itself to the world (Thornhill 2006). As global infrastructures of communication and increasing awareness of common interests facilitate transnational cooperation between
peoples have never been as favorable as today (Held et al. 1999, 5), the U.S. represents an integral player in this region (Joffe 2001, 52). This role involves hard as well as soft power, i.e. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue in the case of the former, and the US Middle East Free Trade Area in the latter.

In terms of **hard power**, combating terrorism and freeing the Middle East from weapons of mass destruction were priorities for the Arab Dialogue countries already in the 1990s, though not yet for NATO (and perhaps the U.S. as NATO’s largest partner) at that time (Assessing NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue). However, Kaplan (1999, 211) states that “the challenge of a radical Islamic movement on the southern rim of the Mediterranean may be the central mission of the alliance in the new millennium.” MENA’s half-hearted participation in the EMP and the Dialogue reflected their disappointment in the Middle East peace process, and the differences in perspective they signaled against constructive thinking for the region’s future (Ibid.).

Enhanced integration between the members of NATO and the EMP would be the ideal scenario in terms of neo-functionalism (a la Jean Monnet: “to make war unthinkable and materially impossible”), especially if augmented by a full free trade area between MENA and the EU in order to support stability economically through development\(^{118}\). As mentioned in a preceding section, the 2004 launch of NATO’s Istanbul Cooperation Initiative with the intent to extend the framework of the organization’s Mediterranean Dialogue to Gulf states (Youngs 2006, 8) represents a step in this direction, as it

\(^{118}\) MENA as the south/eastern Mediterranean neighborhood of the EU will always be this: the EU neighborhood and not a member state.
“included a commitment to intensify the as yet limited focus on strengthening civilian control over military forces in the Middle East” (Ibid.).

Some authors have perceived a U.S. withdrawal from Soft Power in the region, such as from “a vast array of multilateral negotiations on issues ranging from money laundering to combating AIDS” (Mohamedi and Sadowski 2001, 12), which is viewed as having not only angered old allies, nor not necessarily made the world safer for democracy either. It is suggested that the underlying logic of multilateralism is that countries have a voice in shaping policies, which also binds them to contribute to their execution and share its burdens in order to prevent new dividing lines from forming, specifically in this case, between the north and the south and east of the Mediterranean.

The US-Middle East Free Trade Area (US MEFTA) of 2003 (with a completion date by 2013) could be interpreted as one such step. Its objectives are i.a. supporting WTO membership of MENA countries, expand the Generalized System of Preferences for some 3,500 products, negotiate Trade and Investment Framework Agreements, to negotiate comprehensive FTAs with interested countries, to help target more than $1bn in annual US funding, and spur partnerships with private organizations and business supporting trade and development.

The U.S.-role post-September 11 and its Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) are an indication of the traditionally great U.S. support of peace processes and security overall in MENA. Nevertheless, its impartiality has often been
questioned, and viewed alternately helpful (e.g. the Camp David accords), or negative (in terms of its extraordinary material and moral support of Israel). In particular with respect to the security implications of the September 11 terrorist attacks, however, some writers (compare Schumacher 2003, 229) have postulated that they had “hardly any impact on Euro-Mediterranean relations within the first Chapter” (Ibid.), judging by the two-month lag until early November 2001 to formally discuss these latest developments and their repercussions on the EMP, and that of the thirty paragraphs of the Belgian Presidency’s conclusions only two related directly to September 11 events (Ibid.).

The BMENA was agreed on at the G8 meeting in Sea Island, GA/USA in June 2004 to address “‘political modernization’ rather than ‘democratization’ of the Middle East” (Youngs 2006, 8), with the intent of systematic consultations with Arab governments, and Italy assuming the joint chairmanship with Turkey and Yemen. BMena’s Forum on the Future, held in Morocco in December 2004, appeared to have consolidated at the highest political levels (Ibid.). European governments resisted pooling “EU and US resources into a common democracy fund, the BEMENA contained a number of significant initiatives to enhance reform dialogue in the Middle East and facilitate better trans-Atlantic coordination” (Ibid.). The second BMENA meeting of the Forum on the Future was held in Bahrain in 2005. On this occasion an independent foundation of fund democratic reform projects was founded with an initial $50 million fund.

These intensified multilateral institutionalization efforts transatlantically, involving MENA, appear to indicate a paradigm shift in US policy, as well as perhaps symbolic of the role the US plays directly and indirectly with respect to the First Chapter
of the EMP: while relatively little is written, much more is informally discussed and
negotiated bilaterally and multilaterally. One might remember that especially in political
and diplomatic situations with the sensitive breadth, such as the cause and the
implications of September 11th between the US and the Euro-Med, “less” might be
considered “more” strategically in terms of de-emphasizing the (offensive) power of
some actors. Once might speculate that it also indicates why quantitative analyses in the
Euro-Mediterranean often have yielded neither accurate nor useful data explanations. But
that they affirm the constructivist approach of this dissertation as an alternative in
delineating the dynamics of ideas, values, preference formation, actors and structures
within the EMP to more properly assess their security significance.

Much national blood and treasure has been lost by the US being the world’s
unilateral policeman. Countries will cooperate in a coalition instead if it is in their interest
to do so. Shifting to the multilateralism inherent in offshore balancing also shifts the
burdens in achieving peace through a return to international institutions to promote
international cooperation. These would serve to extract needed funds, troops and
legislation from other states for this purpose, whether for direct military preparedness,
such as through NATO (in complementarity now with the European defense force), the
norming “effect” of the UN (such as through sanctions), or by addressing underlying
structural challenges in MENA (which had made peace unstable so far), such as through
programs of the EMP. Brzezinski (2007) suggests approaching American foreign policy
“post-Iraq” with complete information in all languages (both literally, and, one might
surmise, as a constructivist approach as well), including all “tools” (beyond intelligent
analysis also integrity), the long-term foreign policy goals per se (i.e. multinational, multi-agency, including sub-regional).

This might favor some Mediterranean EU members with greater familiarity in the region, as compared to the northern EU members, (per Calleya 2004), accountability to domestic as well as global citizens, “morality” (e.g. the “Golden Rule”) – and soft power\textsuperscript{119}, i.e. the role low politics and high politics in regional peace. Neak (2003, 66) positions this at the intersection where “New Foreign Policy” diverges from the past with respect to moral (“conforming the standards of what is right or just in behavior; virtuous” (American Heritage Dictionary)) positions and values.

Considering that offensive realists assume great powers to behave like rising states, continually seeking to increase their power) (Kupchan 2006, 137), while defensive realists, in contrast “assume that great power can and do behave like status quo states, constantly seeking to enhance their security, but not always to enhance their power” (Ibid.) (italics added), we have to wait to observe US “post-Bush doctrine”-foreign policy pertaining to MENA under the new administration in 2009. Will it correspond to Walt’s (1987) work in which he asserts that states balance threats rather than power per se through their strategic choices and assessment of intentions, which represent the relationship between structure and the behavior of international power poles (referenced in Kupchan 2006, 137) (italics added)? This is interpreted to mean that

\textbf{liberal internationalism among status quo powers is primarily a product of threat, not opportunity. Whereas rising states regularly seek to alter the international system to their advantage when they have the chance to do so,

\textsuperscript{119} In this context one might be reminded of the “love not war”-slogans (\textit{a la} Ghandi) in the final days of the Vietnam war with the current popular sentiment parallels, especially along the northern Mediterranean coast at the onset of the Iraq war, which were expressed e.g. by the Peace Movement at that time with rainbow flares blowing from many, many windows.
status quo powers are motivated principally by threats to the existing system (Kupchan 2006, 137).

While managing democracies and the Western world requires an elaborate network of (multilateral) institutions (Ibid., 140), US unilateralism was nevertheless already emerging in the Cold War, only to strengthen after its end. Kagan (2008, 6) writes that in the Middle East, where anti-Americanism runs hottest and where images of the US occupation in Iraq and memories of Abu Graib continue to burn in the popular consciousness, the strategic balance has not shifted against the United States. Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia continue to work closely with the United States, as to the nations of the Persian Gulf that worry about Iran.

The evolution of post-Cold War institutions was intended to provide security and stability and avoid the re-emergence of new dividing lines. Link (2006, 149) posits whether with the waning of the East-West conflict the transatlantic relationship will also shift from a “structured and partial interregionalism to full-fledged interregionalism.” Since the end of the Cold War events have certainly proven Link (Ibid.) right who stated that, in contrast to Kupchan’s (2002) argument, the EU-US relationship will not be of declining utility in an interregional analysis. If anything, in light of the Russian-Georgian confrontation in August 2008, the EU-US relationship might be propelled into interregionalism, with the concomitant effects on the greater European regions, such as the Euro-Mediterranean. The same might be said about the 2008 financial crisis, which will likely force Europe (if not Asian countries) to demand a greater say in inter-regional financial regulation – and the material (and ultimately strategic) consequences this entails.

This “differentiated integration” (Link 2006, 151) is not only unique to the EU-US relationship, but evident even among EU member states, and within the EMP as well.
Link (2006, 151) asserts further that “the existing and emerging European-American interregionalism exerts – so far as the internal relations are concerned – foremost the function of coordination and, to a certain degree, the function of balancing” common strategies and common rules in their external economic functions, which in turn provide “the main incentive for the continuation of EU-US interregional cooperation” (Ibid.). Utilizing this author’s analysis would again underscore my assertion that the EU’s external relations exist neither in a vacuum nor are they purely bilateral. Rather, there is much consensus in the recent academic literature of transatlantic as well as Euro-Mediterranean regionalism. I further assert that this evidence underscores my research questions that the evidence points to a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex, with a transatlantic link which expands it into a Regional Security Super Complex in Buzan and Waever’s (2003) terminology, proposing to present this as an adjustment to the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex which Buzan and Waever (Ibid.) had postulated.

Some authors have raised the question in what way the US’ invasion of Iraq has played a role in the finalization of the ENP. While the Strategic Partnership for the Mediterranean and the Middle East was presented by the Irish EU presidency, the Council Secretariat and the Commission in early 2004 (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 37), “the Strategic Partnership was not foreseen at the time ‘wider Europe’120 was published, suggesting that it was instead simply borne out of the objective to complement – or counterbalance – the U.S.-led Greater Middle East Initiative with a separate

120 This concept, as the predecessor of the formal ENP, was proposed by Romano Prodi, as President of the European Commission, in a speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference. Jean Monnet Project. Brussels, 5-6 December 2002 under the title “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability “Peace, Security And Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”
European policy approach” (Ibid.). The U.S.-invasion, and the potential for the spillover beyond Iraq of refugees and crime towards the borders of the EU, one might argue, motivated the latter to proactively seek to strengthen its neighborhood “buffer zone” through an enhanced ENP, especially in light of Turkey’s impending EU-candidacy and the implication of its eventual success will have on the security of the south-eastern border of an enlarged EU at that time.

Last, but not least, the role of the EU at the UN, in terms of global governance in a regional security super complex 121 will be briefly addressed for its reciprocal influence vis-à-vis the Euro-Mediterranean region. As was discussed in previous chapters, the EU’s CFSP is based largely on universally accepted values, such as declared by the UN.

In terms of their role in a developmental aspect, A. Sen refers to political freedoms as referring broadly as those under which people “determine who should govern and on what principles, and also include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of political expression and an uncensored press” (Sen 1999, 39).

This recommendation is echoed in the Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on the United Nations – Civil Society Relations “We the peoples: Civil society, the United Nations and global governance” (2005, 1): It states that

the involvement of a diverse range of actors, including those from civil society and the private sectors, as well as local authorities and parliamentarians, is not only essential for effective action in global priorities but is also a protection against further erosion of multilateralism.

The UN must evolve in today’s world where boundaries have become so porous and improved communication give voice to many in all corners of the world. Globalization has enabled groups of like-minded citizens around the world to have aggregate voices in politics while traditional democracy still relies on the community to channel its requests into the political system. This convergence of the voices of civil society and traditional government affects how the global multilateral agenda is shaped today. While previously foreign policy actors represented their national interests on the global stage, today it is not unlikely that communities of interest will bring issues to the global attention. Likewise, solutions to these issues today frequently involve multilateralism both of state actors and civic entities (Ibid., 8).

As an entity observer with an official delegation at the UN, the EU is more than an IGO but rather a hybrid socio-politically,

where EU members have pooled rather than abandoned sovereignty, so an expression of the European ‘national interest’ on the world stage would of necessity derive from the integration project and reflect thus EU foreign policy interest that are themselves ‘derivative’ (Jorgensen and Laatikainen 2004, 6).

Consequently, the data in this dissertation diverge from Smith’s (2003, 568) assertion that the EU is simply a trading state because “the EUs influence on IMF matters is rather limited” (Smaghi 2004, 230). Since the EU’s performance at the IMF is not really relevant to the EU’s role at the UN, Ian Manners’ (2003, 389-390) argument that
the EU is a unique entity that transcends narrow national interests, appears more plausible.

Is the EU’s multi-lateral vision behind its commitment to the UN then classically interest-driven, i.e. “interests determine policy,” or is the causality, as Jorgensen and Laatikainen (2004, 5) suggest, social-constructivist, i.e. that the causality of the EU’s activity flows from identity (i.e. value and principles) to interests which then effect policy? Jorgensen and Laatikainen (Ibid.) point out that similar values however, do not necessarily translate into similar norms of interaction. An examination of official UN documents, as compared to EU date show that the EU’s norms of interaction synchronize with UN programs on multiple intergovernmental and civil society levels on issue areas ranging from the social to the political, the security standpoint, development considerations, disease control and many others. There is also a great overlap between UN and EU objectives and values, such as the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of friendly relations among nations, cooperation in solving international economic social, cultural, human rights, trade and humanitarian problems, as well as the promotion of democracy, solidarity, sustainability, market-based economies, cultural diversity and the rule of law (Ibid.).

The EU is committed to ensuring a stable and peaceful Europe while expanding its role in global multilateralism. As a non-state entity, permanent observer at the UN, the EU works with all UN departments and programs from development policy to peacemaking, humanitarian assistance, environment, human rights and culture throughout the world to reinforce the UN’s quest for multilateral solutions based on its charter. While the EU is represented in most cases by the EU Presidency in UN bodies, the EU
Commission speaks for and acts as negotiator for the EU and its Member States in areas where powers have been transferred to it (e.g. trade, fisheries, agriculture and aspects of development and environmental policy) (EU@UN – Description of the European Commission Delegation in New York. Accessed April 28, 2006).

The EU is represented at the UN in several ways: it is represented by the state holding the presidency of the EU Council, by EU member states in the Security Council, plus through Liaison Offices with the UN as part of the Secretariat and an office in Geneva. This UN-EU Commission cooperation was institutionalized in the Commission Communication of May 2001 on “Building an effective partnership with the UN in the fields of development and humanitarian affairs” (Ibid.). It provides for an increase in policy dialogue with UN organizations, and increased activities in UN policy and decision-making bodies as well as strategic partnerships with UN agencies, funds and programs, especially the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), such as poverty eradication, universal primary education, promotion of gender equality and women’s empowerment, reduction of child mortality, improvement of maternal health, HIV/AIDS and malaria reduction, and environmental sustainability (Ibid.).

The role of the EU at the UN today is the political and security dimension (such as peacekeeping and peacebuilding), the economic and social dimension of poverty (e.g. the control and prevention of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and environmental degradation) and the institutional dimension (such as addressing the need to look for more effective ways to cope with the existing linkages between poverty, human security and conflict multilaterally in order not to let the unity of purpose slip from within the
global community’s grasp) (Ferrero-Waldner 2004, 2), i.e. to pursue the possibility of multilateral action to realize interests to which both the EU and UN are dedicated to.

EU cooperation with the UN has evolved “from ad hoc, project based collaboration towards more systematic and programmatic cooperation” (Europa-eu-un.org website “A new era of EU-UN development cooperation,” accessed April 28, 2006. The EU development policy can offer a comparative advantage to UN programs, especially in the areas of: trade and development (including obtaining a final multilateral agreement in the WTO on the Doha Declaration on trade-related aspects of international property rights and financing for Development), regional integration and cooperation, macro-economic policies linked with poverty reduction strategies, particularly the strengthening of social sectors like health and education, reliable and sustainable transport as a strategic link between access to social services and economic progress, food security and sustainable rural development strategies and institutional capacity-building, good governance and the rule of law (Ibid.), a common EU defense policy which includes the Rapid Reaction Force and civilian as well as permanent political and military crisis management capabilities (Ibid.).

While the preceding functions of the EU at the UN also support the reciprocal programs within the EMP, the EU’s role in the Middle East was also specific as a member of the “Quartet” (together with the Russian Federation, the US and the UN) in launching the “roadmap for peace” between Israel and the Palestinian Authority.

Conflict prevention has been on the EU agenda even before the development of the CFSP through a range of effective and proactive instruments, such as trade policy, development policy, cooperation and association agreements, social (e.g. long-term...
development policies in a mutually reinforcing and coordinated fashion) and environmental programs, humanitarian assistance (the EC Humanitarian Office – ECHO), cooperation mechanisms in the fields of justice (e.g. horizontal measures against the illicit trade in small arms and “conflict” diamonds”) and home affairs, diplomatic tools (declarations, visits, demarches, special envoys) and political dialogue (e.g. the comprehensive an innovative strategies to promote stability and prosperity in a complex region through the Euro-Med Partnership launched at the Barcelona conference in November 1995), and the strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, the EU contributes to all UN disarmament and arms-control efforts through its involvement with the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (such as small arms and light weapons), the Convention on Conventional Weapons, the Biological Weapons Convention, the chemical Weapons Convention, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer Anti-Personnel Landmines and their destruction, as well as several initiatives aimed at preventing the proliferation of weapons for mass destruction, especially by non-state actors, such as terrorists, through EU activities in chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarine dismantlement, fissile materials security and disposition, and the re-employment of former weapons experts.

Terrorism is today one of the most serious challenges facing the international community as it constitutes a threat to internal and external security, to the peaceful relations between states and to the development and functioning of democratic institutions and principles (Ibid.). The EU support UN Security Council resolutions on counter-terrorism by applying autonomous economic and financial sanctions to persons, groups and entities providing directly or indirectly funds supporting terrorists as well as
disrupting the links between organized crime, drug trafficking and terrorism. Additionally, the EU assists with capacity building within the police and judiciary border security as part of their development assistance in development programs. The Treaty of the EU’s institutional framework against transnational crime is synchronized with the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols on smuggling of migrants, trafficking in human beings, trafficking in fire arms, as well as the inter-linked UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (Ibid.).

The EU Treaty mandates also that member countries foster cooperation with third countries in the sphere of culture. On the UN level, this translates into active EU involvement with UNESCO. Among the current political challenges the EU welcomes UNESCO’s participation in the reconstruction of Afghanistan, especially in the fields of education, heritage and communication, and it actively supports UNESCO’s efforts to protect and recover the cultural heritage of Iraq (Ibid.). The EU contributes particularly to the discussion and resolution of issues pertaining to language, international communication, freedom of expression, free-flow of information, the arts and other culture-related social issues. The EU also works with UNESCO on programs strengthening genuine dialogue between cultures and civilizations as a lever to achieve peace.

The EU and UN recognize that respect for human rights is closely linked to democracy and development. The clauses of the UN Charter were among the guiding principles in the establishment of the EU since the Treaty of Rome in 1957. The EU places a high priority on the “global task for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms as laid down in the Universal Declaration on Human
Rights and its complementary core human rights conventions, as well as other international and regional instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights” (Ibid.) and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, adopted at the Nice European Council meeting in December 2000. Since May 1995 the EU has usually included a human rights clause in its bilateral trade and cooperation agreements based on the principle of stainable, equitable and participatory human and social development and the promotion of human rights, democracy, the rule of law and good governance.

The EU-27, because it represents the coordinated socio-political and economic aims – as well as the combined overseas assistance - of its members at the UN, it is also in a position to support the UN’s missions and goals synergistically and pro-actively in a manner also reflecting its values. Since many problems are intertwined, such as poverty and socio-political instability with migration and international asylum requests, and since many EU member states are directly affected e.g. due to their geographic proximity to Africa, the Middle East and the NISs, the EU is highly motivated to address these issues from legitimate (intergovernmental) multilateral angles.

In 1994 Boutros-Ghali declared development a human right in his “An Agenda for Development” within the framework of interdependence, peace, economy, civil society, democracy, social justice and environment. This positioned “development” in a security and social context beyond simply economic growth. (Weiss, Forsythe, Coate 2001, 248). While the UN had been directly concerned with quality of life in the context of de-colonization, “good governance,” government for the people, was to develop as countries started to control their own destinies. The Cold War, however, hid many shortcomings in global governance and the economy behind the East-West political veil. Since the end of
the Cold war international diplomacy focused on “good governance” which was operationalized by the World Bank as democratically elected governments, respect for human rights, eradication of corruption and accountable governments. This shift in the meaning of development in the global political context came to embrace four widely share global values: Peace, human security, sustainable human development and ecological balance and the growing appreciation of the indivisibility of human social order and natural earth system” (Ibid., 255). The issues arising from the implementation of these values are supranational and may even override national sovereignty (Ibid. 295).

This led to a drastic increase of UN mandates and the need for new partnerships among states, markets and non-governmental groups. The increased recognition during the last decade about the importance of non-state actors in the work of the UN, especially for development projects beyond mere basic human assistance requires both local (non-centralized action and cooperation) and global thinking (e.g. coordination of resources) (Weiss, Forsythe and Coate 2001, 246).

The EU, being party to more than fifty UN multilateral agreements and conventions as the only non-State participant” (website “The European Union at the UN,” accessed April 28, 2006), is hence especially poised to support the EMP through this UN-multilateral legitimacy. On September 10, 2003 the EU presented its renewed commitment to the UN system and multilateral foreign policy in a communiqué “argues that the EU can and should act as a ‘front-runner’ in developing and in implementing UN targets” (Ibid.), taking a pro-active approach to UN resolutions and protocols, and moving forward in a more systematic policy of partnership with the UN in the field and to develop more stable, long-term funding relationships and strengthen the policy
dialogue with selected UN development and humanitarian aid agencies, and in the field of crisis management. The EU avails itself to a more dynamic, flexible and coherent force in policy debates in the UN, capable of arriving at common, coordinated positions in most UN policy forums. The UN needs to move from a culture of reaction to a culture of prevention (Ferrero-Waldner 2004:1), e.g. peace-building and addressing the root causes of terrorism (including the UN office on drug control and crime prevention, and human trafficking).

It is in this multiplicity of global dynamics at the UN through which the EU translates governance and legitimacy into its inter-regional dynamics, such as within the EMP.

Social-Cultural Widening of the EMP

**Globalization vs. New Regionalism in the Euro-Mediterranean**

Many of the so-called “new security threats” are not new at all (Aliboni 2002, 9). Rather, due to the closer interconnectedness globally, whether through facilitated transport, or information and ideas, they have also facilitated spillovers of security threats and made them “more intrusive and palpable” (Ibid.).

The Mediterranean has been recognized as “a complex case of regionalism” (Attina 2007, 197). Regional cooperation has been analyzed in International Relations from a variety of perspectives. Attina (Ibid.) proposes the traditional and new regionalist perspectives per Vayrinen (2003). In traditional regionalism, very much related to Deutsch’s (1957) view of political communities, regional cooperation is viewed as positively related to the similarity of their social and political institutions in the common
political and cultural traditions of states in a region. Deutsch’s concept, which
distinguishes between amalgamated (i.e. those that share political institutions), and non-
amalgamated communities (i.e. those that do not), has limited explanatory power for
current regional processes (Attina 2007, 198), which New Regionalism has been able to
address better.

Under New Regionalism, the current processes of cooperation in different parts of
the world are interpreted as “strategic decisions by national governments and various
stakeholders who consider regional cooperation the best way to face interdependence
problems” (Ibid.), i.e. regional cooperation results under this model from the need by the
states in a region for coordinating their public policies to optimally respond to economic,
environmental, cultural, migration, health and crime-related problems caused by
globalization. In this context, scholars have posited that absent common institutions and a
great cultural distance would present extraordinary obstacles to cooperation in cases
when national leaders “perceive domestic policies as being heavily dependent on
coordination with neighbouring countries, and agree to give common institutions the task
of supervising regional cooperation” (Attina 2007, 198).

The objective of integrating the entire Euro-Mediterranean region into global
competition explains the EU’s reform pressure on its southern Mediterranean partners, as
they recognize that they cannot be competitive in the world economy without country
modernization in their domestic politics and social structures (Ibid., 199). While Action
Plans can map out progress in harmonization among EMP members neatly on a desk in
Brussels, they ignore the intermediate human drama and intermittent measures which
have to be taken with much foresight by local governments until reform measures are
installed and proceeding smoothly in all geographic, political and sociological levels. For example, illegal immigration is not solved by simply making funds available to SMEs in MENA, but the local government needs to ensure that they are utilized as much as possible. Nevertheless the living standards may not rise noticeably for a few years, and it will continue to be difficult to change people’s habits of crossing the Mediterranean into the EU, in search of an alternative to a better life viewed as easier than attempting new procedures and models in their own country where physical needs have a long history of being insufficiently met. These de-stabilizations caused by accelerated reforms to achieve the objectives, e.g. of a free trade area, can be compensated for through the financial aid and preferential trade agreements furnished by the EU, even if it is hesitant to relinquish its protectionism in the agricultural sector. Nevertheless, other authors (Attina 2007, 199) remind that “the European Union is incapable of sustaining strong and coherent political initiatives to help manage the domestic crises that unfold in the partner countries when governments design social and political reforms that provoke harsh domestic reactions.”

In the case of the EMP (under the ENP) one must remember that even though its goals are similar as during the enlargement process (i.e. faster economic growth and socio-political stability), the final commitment by the EU to neighbors differs from that to EU-candidate countries. Hence the urgency in the process does as well, necessitating flexibility in adapting to problems it faces, even if the process is similar in terms of moving from the economic to the political dimension (Attina 2007, 199).

This problematique indicates the interconnections between globalization pressures in the Euro-Mediterranean region requiring a domestic response by the national governments in the region that requires cooperation on many levels if the stability and
survival of their countries is to be assured – the ultimate security question for a state’s international relations. Hence even if not all EMP partners share all views completely in this process of shared (security) community, all stand to profit from financial and commercial cooperation, despite its inherent dangers, such as commercial liberalization leading to the erosion of domestic industrial take-off capabilities rather than to fast economic development, the danger of social instability as the inevitable consequence of the restructuring policies, and the danger of reducing intra-area (or sub-regional) economic integration opportunities as the consequence of the asymmetrical integration into the European market (Attina 2007, 199).

In addition to these socio-economic challenges are political grievances of MENA states in terms of their inability to stronger influence Europe on crucial problems in the Middle East and the visa and migration issue (Ibid.). While this dissertation does not delineate the as yet non-formalized policies of the proposed UMed, the hope is nevertheless that the latter will in fact address this critique e.g. through its planned shared presidency.

This chapter then delineated the inter-regional levels of securitization beyond the Euro-Mediterranean, extending to other countries as well as to IGOs and other regional organizations, which augment to differing degrees the Euro-Med region’s security significance as a region.
Part III

Chapter Eight

Data Analysis

Research Questions

The EU formally identified the threats to it in the European Security Strategy of 2003, as delineated in Chapter Five, as failed and rogue states, regional conflicts, civil wars, political instability and terrorism, in their implications for the EU at the global, regional and (member) state levels (Senyucel et al. 2006, 6).

This dissertation seeks to explore the security implications of the EuroMed Partnership. Through process tracing of primary (in elite interviews and from information provided by governments and related institutions) and secondary data it addressed these three research questions:

1. How do the structure and the dynamics of the EMP contribute to regional integration in the Euro-Mediterranean and thereby affect regional stability, and possibly reduce violent conflicts in this area in the future, increase prosperity and the application of human rights more uniformly among all residents in member states as well as?

To transcend millennia of clashes, we should explore the possibility of changing the assumptions about peace in the Mediterranean definition of security to identify post-structural, sub- and supra-state agents (such as terrorist groups, NGOs and of course the post-Westphalian EU) post-Cold War. Although the traditional referent object in matters of war and peace has been the state, its centrality is questioned as criteria like the mutual co-constitution of interests, identities, agency and structure of the individual or society have been identified as decisive in the security community discourse (Bicchi 2001, 2). In the
post-Cold War environment, despite the continuing nuclear and terrorist threat, mutually
assured destruction is not necessarily assumed by state actors, and hence deterrence, as a
Realist response, is not necessarily the primary motivation in foreign policy any longer.
Rather, the possibility of escaping from this limited military perspective is explored by
IGOs, acknowledging other securitizing factors, e.g. environment or citizens’ welfare and
governments. Some authors (Aliboni et al. 2006, 7) have pointed out that the role of the
EMP in conflict prevention is systematically supported by the EU, but has appeared to be
of limited interest to the EMP’s southern partners in the early years, despite their
agreement to it in common EMP agreements. The result in this area has consequently been
weak at that time. The objective of the ENP’s action plans, despite their individual
variances in weight and detail, are “stability and security through shared values and
security policy cooperation (shared security objectives), plus the reduction of the North-
South prosperity gap through development” (Senyucel et al. 2006, 13).

Aliboni et al. (20076, 7) suggest that the multilateralism of the broad security
relationship between EMP-partners can be viewed as having shifted to a “more pragmatic
set of ‘hub and spokes’ type of relations, which the ENP is seeking to establish in the
region,” keeping in mind that the joint ownership on which the EMP was based, is
reflected in the ENP. Aliboni et al. (2006, 8) point out the dialectic between donor and
recipient countries and the relationship between their respective interest and objective
convergences, stating that “joint ownership is based on, first, a convergence of will and,
second, the empowerment of recipients to implement the common will.” This could also be
addressed as “taking ownership” of the process, i.e. taking responsibility for the
commitment to one’s actions (not simply in being a recipient, but also in terms of contribution. Hence “will” is not only the “self”/“state,” but in an IGO, such as the EMP, it would be the collective effort based on trust, reflecting the “will” for the ideas (the “desire” by MSs for stability and prosperity” in the most simplified terminology) to materialize), and the assurance, built on trust among MSs, that the own/state interest will be satisfied through the common success of the project. This would represent a neo-liberal/social constructivist analysis of the EMP.

It contrasts with a Marxian approach because in the EMP the “individual” (state) interests are the driving “engine” in the collective (EMP) effort, yet “security” is shared in the region, as it is indivisible regionally (per collective security theories), requiring collective “inputs” (such as cooperation on issues pertaining to security, in its most simplistic terms) to receive a collective “output” (“peace” and stability). This is not a “zero-sum” calculation between recipients and donors, but rather necessitates equivalent commitment (and inputs) from all members. For the EMP (or its successor, the UMed) to evolve, the distribution of this “ownership” among the three chapters of the EMP by member-country is flexible, as long as the commitment exists for all. Hence, “once objectives are shared, cooperation is assured and strong. So the introduction of the principle of ownership may be of particular importance for the EMP and, more generally speaking, the entire regional cooperative endeavors in which the EU is engaged” (Aliboni 2006, 9).

Bicchi (2001), as other authors, favors a constructivist approach to the European security concept, whereby we examine rather than the existence of a “natural” threat how
security and the security threat, were constructed through discourse and practice (Adler and Barnett 1998), such as the importance of language and the definition of security. For example, does “threat” emphasize the existence of a “real” threat which underlines aggregate power, proximity, capability (these three factors being objective), and offensive intentions (relating to mutual understandings and communications, whereby a threat does not exist unless it was perceived as a threat) (Wolfers 1962), as was the position of classical realists, such as Walt (1985, 8-13), or “challenge” it (Campbell 1992). These represent three points on a continuum going from supporting the view of a real-reality to those who believe in pure language (and de-constructing power games).

From the EU-standpoint, its Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East (EUSPMME) contributes to fostering partnerships, if marginally in some cases, such as vis-à-vis the GCC, towards the greater inter-regional dynamics involving other state and regional actors. Nevertheless, in the beginning the EUSPMME has been useful internally for EMP-member states to harmonize their actions and refocus the EU’s attention to the domestic and regional realities as well as the impact of its programs.

While this idealistic discourse was perfectly “real” post-Cold War but pre-9/11, changes in security perceptions post-9/11 are reflected in foreign policy afterwards, tending towards a more “robust” explanation for foreign policy changes since then. Comparisons of perception within a single geographical region can reveal differences in perception by actors, especially with respect to foreseeable “post-Iraq” scenarios (Bicchi 2001, 17). In light of this, the “soft” power ideas and programs of the EMP to co-constitute structures for peace will have to be balanced with NATO’s Article 5 mission: “Security is
indivisible within the Euro-Atlantic region” 122, as a pact against war (Yost 1998, 6) vs. the now favored “non-Article 5 missions” of collective security of an alliance to “deter, and if necessary defend, against one or more identifiable external threats” (Ibid.). This goes back to the Wilsonian conviction that collective security is an international morality superior to that on which the realist balance of power system is based (Yost 1998, 8). It has always been understood that NATO would not undertake a mission without UN Security Council approval (especially after the U.S. overcame this restraint on national action with the invasion of Iraq in 2003 with limited success at the time of this writing, partially due to this unilateralism).

Hence in light of the archival examination of actors and structures in the Euro-Mediterranean region, which interact directly or indirectly with the EMP, as well as comparing the analyses of other scholars pertaining to the Euro-Mediterranean region, my research data indicate that the EMP (as the independent variable) functions, in conjunction with other IOs (such as NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative) and the UN, create vestiges of a Mediterranean Regional Security Complex (as the dependent variable).

2: How do these structures and dynamics change EMP member states’ self identity and interests in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex?

As the data delineated in the previous chapter show, while the interests pertaining to security of the states on the northern Mediterranean are similar to those of the countries on the southern Mediterranean, i.e. the preservation of the state’s territory, many other

122 Comparable to the theme of the League of Nations that “peace is indivisible”
perceptions of security and the preferred routes to achieve it vary considerably among EMP members since its founding 1995.

However, security is not a zero sum game, especially regionally. Hence a security community, especially in view of the last decades’ proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and accelerated threats post-Cold War, such as illegal drug, arms and human trafficking, must be viewed ever more urgently beyond national borders also region-wide. Specifically, this research, particularly when viewed from within the structures of the EMP, confirms Attina’s (2004) suggestion that the Mediterranean region has been progressing from a security partnership to potentially a security community. While the concept of a security partnership, developed in Europe following the Helsinki Process, is structured as an approach to international security involving the majority of states in the region as well as extra-regional regional powers in a single arrangement (Attina 2004, 5), it is often constituted by countries which are “characterized by conflict divisions, irregular flows of transactions and communication, and a small sharing of values and institutions” (Attina 2004, 5). A security community, by contrast, originates from the consensus of a region’s states to cooperate from the recognition of “war as an obsolete instrument of conflict resolution” (Deutsch et al, 1957, quoted in Attina 2004, 4). The EMP then could be considered as evolving in the direction of a loosely coupled pluralistic security community (Adler and Barnett 1998, quoted in Ibid.). The EU would represent internally a more tightly coupled portion of the EMP as an evolving security community as divergent approaches to national security which converge institutionally and procedurally, especially from the socio-economic angle.
In terms of institutional democratic legitimacy Majone (2001, 77) points out the distinction between procedural versus substantive legitimacy: while the former implies that the institutions are created by democratically enacted statues, or duly ratified treaties, which define the institutions’ legal authority and objectives, [and] that their heads are appointed by democratically accountable executives and decisions, … taken according to well-defined procedures,… substantive legitimacy depends on such factors as expertise, problem solving capacity, and accountability by results.

Both procedural and substantive legitimacy depend to a large extent on good institutional design… [though] in the final analysis… the democratic legitimacy of nonmajoritarian institutions depends on their capacity to engender and maintain the belief that they are the most appropriate ones for the functions assigned to them.

It is significant that with respect to both of these aspects of legitimacy, the EMP represents a legitimate institutional approach and valid dynamic as a EMRSC\textsuperscript{123}, as the data on its institutional structure, design, accountability as well as the continued cooperation (last but not least measured by an increase in membership) (compare Appendix 2: original EMP member states vs. 2008 membership status and UMed member states) and integration accomplished by its member states indicates. Joffé (2001, 54) indicates that some shift from state-centric sovereignty, equivalent to the processes in the EU, might have to be considered to reap the ultimate benefits, not as cultural or social homogenization, but to “preserve cultural, social and political specificities within an integrative framework” (Ibid.), and to gain a better deal over economic development: “All these issues also inform the much wider global agenda that international affairs commentators seek to interpret, so that the Barcelona Process really does become a paradigm in itself for the future” (Ibid.).

\textsuperscript{123} In terms of a paradigm-shift from the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex suggested by Buzan and Waever (2003) in particular, due to the density of levels and sectors as well as their dynamic, as indicated in the preceding three data chapters in particular.
While some authors had initially questioned the notion of the Mediterranean areas as a “region” and one common space, they concur that the EMP has overcome this doubt (Schumacher 2004, 91).

3. What are the theoretical implications in International Relations of the above evolution, shifts and developments?

This dissertation examined a specific form of security cooperation in international relations, that of a regional security partnership in the Euro-Mediterranean. It is consistent with the characteristics of the current state of global power competition without polarized competition involving American hegemony. This is expressed by Attina in terms of “the predominant security culture of the current international system, that is the emergence of cooperative and comprehensive security principles together with the traditional principles of national military doctrines based on the so-called security dilemma” (Attina 2005, 2).

The theoretical shift proposed by Boening (2008a and b) of the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex delineated by Buzan and Waever (2003) into an ontological more appropriate Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex seems indicated in light of the preceding research. This can be extrapolated into a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Super Complex in view of the strong historical security “connection” trans-Atlantically, continuing unabated such as among NATO-members, in addition to the U.S.’s engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian peace processes for many decades, and, more recently, with the launch of NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue as well as the Istanbul Initiative. While European preference for “cooperative and comprehensive security has been tempered by the so-called new discourse of threat and danger” (Attina 2005, 9) in light of the new
worldwide conditions of *in*-security (Ibid., italics original) in order to cope with governments “perceived as aggressive, irrational and unreceptive of cooperative mechanisms, and the problem of dealing with the threats of terrorism, the European governments have been increasingly concerned with upgrading their military preparedness” (Ibid.), including developing the ESDP for worldwide use and the “enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international stability and peace” (Ibid.). Hence, despite perceived cultural differences, the transatlantic-Euro-Med security environment is perceived by scholars as linked intensely through political, financial and cultural institutional structures as part of the EMP and NATO.

**Research Purpose**

The research purpose of this dissertation was to delineate the dynamics in the Mediterranean as a macro geo-political region in which the nations around its rim are joined through their common concerns and shared interests. In this dissertation I process-traced i.a. the thinking contributing to, and the re-imagining of the Mediterranean ‘region’ (Euro-Med) politically, geographically, and socio-culturally by conceptualizing its past social construction with the underlying assumptions, as well as to determine how the future of this region appears to evolve under the soft power approach within the EMP, in particular with respect to a “new” Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex (EMRSC) identity. Even in a security partnership one would expect to find discourse on “a certain extent of defence de-nationalization” (Attina 2004, 6). Hence in the EMP as a regional security community, one finds indeed certain aspects of supra-national defense,
such as the ESDP and NATO as well as the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Initiative as operative, multilateral agreements, supported by agencies and inter-governmental organizations, as outlined in Chapter Four of this dissertation.

In examining the security implications of the EMP in this dissertation since its founding in 1995 until it is being superseded starting on July 13, 2008 by the Union for the Mediterranean, it became obvious that some authors on all shores of the Mediterranean had frequently lamented its lack of measurable progress throughout the EMP’s existence (e.g. Chourou 1998; Schumacher e.g. 2003). I have shown through my data that it is simplistic to evaluate a regional security complex exclusively with rigid criteria which

124 This represents a contrary reading to Schumacher (2003, 221), who writes that the lack of “a clear-cut definition of security to which the EU and the respective TCM could refer… [are a] sign of incomplete contracting … [and are] problematic for it always offers every partner country exit-options and the possibility to interpret the content of the first chapter according to its own needs and interests” (italics original).

This type of interpretation is first of all extremely disrespectful of EMP-member states, who should be respected as partners with equal commitment and interest in the success of the EMP, just as EU-members would be expected to be respected equally, regardless of individual size, GDP etc. (regardless of certain differences in influence on certain occasions). Secondly, just as in the EU, EMP-member states are expected to represent their national interest. Only with this type of motivation can they even be troubled to enter an inter-governmental process such as the EMP. And, just as in the EU, EMP-members have recognized that a collective security effort with a greater regional aim will also benefit them domestically.

Hence to interpret the success of the EMP by judging only the thin veneer of the actual complex negotiations taking place beneath it, has been detrimental to it and the learning processes, which needs to take place by all partners to reach understanding and agreement – especially in the particularly complex greater context of the tremendous post-Cold War global political and economic transformations occurring, as well as the socio-cultural domestic pressures exerted on national governments in their international negotiations as a result!

While some writers may interpret the Peace and Stability Pact, “intended to provide for normative institutional frame for political dialogue and crisis prevention, … is seen by most of the Arab TCM as by far too ambitious” (Schumacher 2003, 218), I would argue that this is exactly the point: as possibly less developed countries, and with the EU already having fifty-one years experience with balancing a supra-/intergovernmental arrangement among themselves, it is unrealistic, not to say unconscionably arrogant (keeping in mind that the EU at that point was already aware, through their accession proceedings with the Central- and Eastern European EU-candidate countries, how difficult this process of harmonization and modernization is) to expect a region, which had not only recently just been freed from colonialism, but beyond this not had a chance to stabilize internally (especially in the absence of an extreme pressure, which the Central- and Eastern European countries experienced following the dissolution of the Soviet Union), let alone develop “international” relations on a Westphalian (in light of continuing nomadic tribes in MENA today, whose internal organization is along tribal, rather than nation-state lines), never mind post-
demand 100% obvious compliance with its rules, by-laws etc. etc., rather than evaluating the complex shadings of the processes in addition to the actors and institutions, which constitute this Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex into which the EMP has evolved in thirteen short years.

General Statement of Dissertation Problem Area and Data Discussion

With the end of the Cold War, the European Union recognized the evolution of the new European order as an opportunity to develop its external role. With the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as part of the Maastricht Treaty a renewed Mediterranean Policy was introduced in December 1990. Nevertheless, the EU still had not adopted long-term policies to address the increasing disparities between the countries on both sides of the Mediterranean until 1995 as the official start of the EuroMed Partnership (EMP) through the Barcelona Declaration. This dissertation is a single case study of the EMP and its security relevance in the integration of the Euro-Mediterranean.

The preceding analyses of this dissertation show several problematiques in these “black-and-white” analyses of the EMP from a security standpoint. As recently as at least 2003 (e.g. Schumacher 2003), some authors have lamented the lack of progress in “security” within the Barcelona process, e.g. by ostensibly “the term security or any references to it” (Ibid., 221) having been excluded from the Economic and Socio-Cultural Chapter, while they were intended to be complementary (Ibid.). This shows a woefully inadequate analysis of the EMP by these scholars. Rather, the research of this dissertation

Westphalian basis, as “failing to live up to their commitments” within the EMP. Their protests can hardly be interpreted as lack of interest or motivation, but were more likely “invitations” for help in struggling with a tremendously steep learning curve during this period.
shows that in terms of the security analysis parameters of *sectors* and *levels* proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) within the EMP, the Euro-Mediterranean region exhibits extensive institutionalization and structures (if incompletely developed during the short time period of their existence), reflecting how it has deepened and widened as a Euro-Mediterranean regional security community, rather than having mostly stagnated in its thirteen years’ existence, as claimed by several other authors.

Research Problem and Discussion of Findings

This dissertation addressed three facets to the research problem:

1. *What are the socio-economic and political dynamics of the EMP in the Euro-Med today?*

   This dissertation sought to establish the socio-economic and political dynamics of the EMP in the Euro-Mediterranean region during the research period in 2008 as a start in order to determine e.g. the sectors and levels which could be determined in terms of a regional security complex according to Buzan and Waever (2003) and Buzan, Waever and del Wilde (1998). No definitive studies had been done according to these parameters. Rather, the literature on occasion attributed e.g. “incomplete contracting” by member states to the EMP and its 3-basket structure (Schumacher 2002, 221) on occasion. This dissertation found i.a. that this appears to have improved since the EMP’s founding in 1995, e.g. through the application of not only negative but also positive reinforcement through MEDA programs, and has become less problematic later in the EMP. Granted the EMP contains an “exit option” for member states, but this is certainly not a fatal flaw, and
is outweighed as a significant mechanism to bring potential members 1995 into the Partnership.

In cases of this “incomplete contracting” to the EMP’s programs within the 3-basket structure, the “utilization” of an exit option (Schumacher 2003, 232) by some MNMCs has raised the question as to “why” it was used by EMP member states: as an excuse and for what? Was it simply an unwillingness of these governments to participate more fully in the EMP, or was it perhaps a way to camouflage/“save face” when they had neither the political, institutional, nor social “capital” to comply with all mandates of the EMP? This dissertation did not gather data for this phenomenon. However, it seeks to point out that the frequent “critiques” of the Barcelona Process were probably based on inadequate research and analysis of its mechanism and dynamics, and should serve as a caveat in setting up and later evaluating the Union for the Mediterranean from this perspective.

(2) What is the security relevance of these dynamics in terms of regional integration?

Many authors (e.g. Aliboni 2004, 1) have questioned whether the Euro-Mediterranean can even be considered as a “region” in light of its socio-political diversity. In light of its shared geography and history, I would agree with Aliboni that this Euro-Mediterranean identity, whether as a new “construct” or an “imagined community” is not unreasonable. If anything, one might argue that the lack of acting on the shared geography of the Euro-Mediterranean region in a peaceful, cooperative manner has led to zero-sum inspired competition (particularly in the bi-polar world of the Cold War, which coincided with the de-colonialization in MENA), which then led to the socio-political fragmentation
we are faced with today. Certainly, post-Cold War, many identities globally, but especially in the Euro-Mediterranean region, have been “in flux.”

We need to remember that identity studies show that all humans have several “identities” which do not have to exist to the exclusion of each other, but overlap to varying degrees. The strategic and geopolitical reality of the Mediterranean with its current flashpoints among political oppositions internally and intra-regionally might be well served by a stronger institutional structure, which integrates Euro-Arab-Israel (rather than e.g. a Euro-Israeli plus Arab constellation) relations (Ibid.) with the objective of absolute gains (if sub-optimal, as there is no single “winner”) for each member states rather the attainment of relative gains which had been the historic foreign policy perspective in the Euro-Mediterranean for millennia. This shared Euro-Mediterranean identity can be viewed as a “unifying factor, stirring cooperation between diverse peoples” (Ibid., 2). This tri-lateral, basic soft power approach (ignoring the hard power aspect through the trans-Atlantic relationship at the moment), which includes both official governments and non-governmental organizations, is in a strong position to address the numerous security challenges faced by its member states (Ibid.), including the religious aspect, whereby one observes a dispersion of the major religions in the area, Christianity, Islam and Judaism (in alphabetical order) throughout (e.g. Jews and Muslims in Europe, and Christians in the Middle East and North Africa – often leading e.g. to today’s Muslim immigrants in Europe becoming its citizens tomorrow (Ibid.).

As elaborated on in Chapter 4 in the section of the U.S., “rhetoric” is per se an important tool in negotiation (more often than not behind the scenes) among as
heterogeneous a partnership as the Euro-Mediterranean Regional Super Complex. While certainly not all regulations were followed to the letter and on time by every member, this is not a fatal flaw, especially in the early years of the EMP. The increased (in-)formal elite discourses on the Mediterranean as a security community\textsuperscript{125} following the founding of the EMP shows \textit{ipso facto} increased openness and in the harmonization among member states (even if initially “monopolistic” governments in some member states had to live with EU benchmarks).

While I agree that some EMP-member countries, such as Syria and Lebanon have in the past blocked progress on some fronts in order to use it as bargaining chips in the Israeli-Palestine conflict\textsuperscript{126}, authors who look for simple linear results are not evaluating the underlying processes which go into the resolution of millennia-old conflicts. The preceding chapter has shown that Euro-Mediterranean regional security can be more properly evaluated through the New Framework for Security Analysis proposed by Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998), which suggests security sectors and levels, as were applied in this dissertation. Positing these in this dissertation in the Euro-Mediterranean region, a regional security complex becomes clearly delineated whose progress has steadily evolved throughout the EMP’s existence in the great number of dimensions, which the previous chapter was only able to elaborate on briefly, in terms of co-constituting its agents and structures in line with social constructivist theory.

\textsuperscript{125} As evidenced e.g. by the engagement with the EMP per se, as well as academic discourse on related topics to the Mediterranean as a security community, as per Chapter Six and Seven of this dissertation.

\textsuperscript{126} Keeping in mind the strategic imbalance and territorial occupation in the Middle East, which contributed substantially to this stance.
This takes the analysis in the Euro-Mediterranean beyond traditional (military) security from a state-centric perspective in terms of protecting its borders, territory and citizens, to include e.g. the U.N. definition of human security, which identifies *economic security* (i.e. ensuring an adequate individual income), *food security* (i.e. guaranteeing access to food), *environmental security* (i.e. the protection from long- and short term natural and man-made disasters), *personal security* (i.e. protection from any perpetration of violence or arbitrary arrest), *community security* (i.e. the protection from the loss of traditions and values, or from secular and ethnic violence), and *political security* (i.e. ensuring individual basic human rights) (compare e.g. U.S. National Security Policy 2007).

In this light, the critique by some authors (compare Schumacher 2003, 234), that Euro-Mediterranean “security” was inadequately addressed in the EMP’s First Chapter, can be countered by pointing out that, in fact, the Second and Third Chapters of the EMP are also contributing by not only reciprocally improving e.g. structural problems of the EMP as well as increase trust per se through confidence- and later partnership building measures, and hereby improve the actor security capabilities within the Euro-Med. This is a process, rather than something which appears simultaneously, e.g. with the mere definition of the CFSP of the EU, but must evolve in tandem with the ideas and interests of these cooperative new programs.

(3) *In light of the preceding findings, does a revision of the term “Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex,” prevalent in the existing literature (e.g. Buzan and Waever 2003), seem indicated?*
Some authors (Spencer 2001, 29) had suggested that

the Mediterranean has always been too unwieldy a focus to permit of properly integrated or balanced European foreign policy... there is scope for addressing a number of security-related issues in a framework of this [EMP] size, even if measurable results are difficult to achieve over specific issues

This contrasts with Joffé (2001, 31), who states that the Barcelona Process, beyond an exercise in European policy-making, in which MENA members have little choice but to acquiescence, is “an attempt to reorganize Europe’s southern periphery, an exercise in European [soft] power projection in order to deal with security threats and risks in terms that the European Union itself can articulate” (Joffé 2001, 31).

Attina (2001, 41) suggests viewing security in the Euro-Med in a wider context of a) the systemic properties of security in the contemporary world as well as to b) consider it in “the new dimensions of security and security community building” (Ibid.) (emphasis added), and c) from European as well as Arabic security cultures. An analysis of the inner context, by contrast, focuses on the processes aimed at building security through the framing of the EMP (Ibid.). In fact, the data in this dissertation confirm all three perspectives of the Euro-Med as a regional security complex:

a. Beyond international relations, the data indicate hybrid governance within the EMP in a Neo-Westphalian system where the member states play a significant role on the national level, in co-existence with the role the region plays intra-regionally (i.e. the EU within the EMP), and inter-regionally (e.g. with the Black Sea region, or with its trans-Atlantic link to American initiatives, which some authors such as Joffé (2001, 32) have gone so far as to state are necessary before European policies in the Southern Mediterranean can achieve their objectives).
b. The EMP can be identified as a regional security complex in terms of Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Weaver, 2003), as it displays the criteria characteristic of it, i.e. involvement with security sectors and levels (as per Buzan and Waever (2003), and Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998)), delineated at length in Chapters Six and Seven of this dissertation.

c. The coordination of European and Arabic security cultures is based i.a. on the Action Plans established under MEDA with some southern Mediterranean partner countries, and, if one were to extend the Euro-Med as a regional security super complex according to the New Regional Security Complex Theory proposed by Buzan and Waever (2003) via a transatlantic umbilical cord, the European and Arabic security culture could be viewed as including NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative.

d. The internal construction of the Euro-Med as a regional security complex is based i.a. on the commitments started in the Barcelona Process and its institutional (e.g. through MEDA institutionalized financing) and “agent” “construction.” While Attina (2004, 10) suggests that “the Barcelona Declaration has the nature of the fundamental agreement of a regional security partnership,” I would argue that since then, and in light of its apparent future within the Union for the Mediterranean, the EMP has started to evolve into a security community in terms of a Regional Security Complex according to Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan and Waever 2003), suggesting a shift from the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex these authors identified. Yet is is still heterogeneous, not so much in the perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability today in the Euro-Mediterranean, but as to the logistics of accommodating
national interests within the EMP-framework (such as via the EU’s *Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East*\(^{127}\) document and MEDA).

**Significance of Study**

This study is significant for three reasons: First, this dissertation focuses on the Euro-Mediterranean region and the role of the European Union (EU) and its southern Mediterranean neighbors in the context of the EMP in “constructing” this space, and hereby giving it meaning in the context of regional stability.

Secondly, this integration could additionally lead to a reciprocal “re-construction” of EMP members’ self-identity and interests in the structural context of a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex. This would be significant in terms of the EMP’s role in contributing to the regional integration among countries surrounding the Mediterranean, and the overall Euro-Med regional development. This would contrast with the Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex, which Buzan and Waever have proposed (2003; and Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). If such a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex can be observed to have evolved through the dynamics of the EMP, this would have potential reverberations vis-à-vis a transatlantic Super Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex.

Third, the significance of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex is theoretical in terms of a possible sociological evolution within this complex from

\(^{127}\) as expanded on in the March 2003 Communication of the Commission on ENP, which names Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Libya and all the present members of the Barcelona Process, i.e. Algeria, Egypt Jordan, Israel, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and the Palestine Authority, plus Turkey as an EU-candidate country, expanded by Javier Solana’s document on *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, which also included the Southern Caucasus, i.e. Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
international system to international society, with parallels perhaps to a shift from Gesellschaft to Gemeinschaft\(^{128}\) potentially in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

The reassertion of pooled sovereignty and harmonized positions within the EU on the occasion of the “final version” of the UMed agreement also represents an important confirmation of the CFSP as representing all EU member states, rather than yielding to the re-emergence of split European colonial spheres of influence in its Neighborhood (Hall and Benoit 2008): an important example for non-EU EMP member states who are still unsure of supra-national mechanisms in regional integration.

In the meantime, the EMP’s goal of a Free Trade Zone by 2010 remains a priority for the Union of the Mediterranean, as well as the continued interest in energy security, Mediterranean Sea pollution control, Mediterranean maritime security in light of human and material trafficking in conjunction with the continued expansion of civil security cooperation, the expansion of the Erasmus exchange program to students of Southern Mediterranean partner countries, as well as a new emphasis on scientific epistemic communities (pioneered by Peter Haas in this area already several decades ago) (EurActiv 14 March, 2008). In this way the UMed will re-invigorate the Mediterranean region and contribute to a strengthening of the political, economic and socio-cultural security dynamics inherent in this Regional Security Complex. Only this approach will avoid the “divide and conquer” approach of Sarkozy’s original proposal for a Mediterranean Union, which sought to exclude and create a “second tier” degradation for the Southern neighbors.

\(^{128}\) Ferdinand Toennies had suggested these terms to describe ideal types of social organizations, distinguishing between the Gemeinschaft (i.e. the communal society of rural, peasant societies), and Gesellschaft (the associational society, where personal relationships are defined and regulated on the basis of traditional social rules).
from their current neighborhood-status (Khader 2008). At the moment, the UMed represents more of a “plus ca change, plus c’est pareil” in terms of goals, with the institutionalization yet to be sorted out, and the question of a possible expansion to include Croatia, Montenegro, Albania and Bosnia not yet answered (Emerson 2008), but plausible (at the latest when one of their EU candidacies become successful). One also hopes that EU procedures will become simplified rather than turn into more muddled, complex overlays.

Asymmetrical Neo-Westphalian Governance and Third Generation Regionalism in the Euro-Med?

It is in this context of socio-political shifts that opportunities for new perspectives in the CFSP, especially with respect to the ENP, arise. Klotz and Lynch (2007, 3) write:

The end of the Cold War shattered stable antagonisms and alliances… This destabilization widened the political and intellectual spaces - and increased the need – for scholars to ask questions about the cultural bases of conflict, alternative conceptions of national identity, [and] the ethics of intervention… Individuals and groups are not only shaped by their world but can also change it. People can … set into motion new normative, cultural, economic, social, or political practices that alter conventional wisdoms and standard operating procedures.

Hence the data in this dissertation suggest that the EMP (in conjunction with, or in its new “edition” as the “UMed”\(^{129}\)) as the soft-power manifestation of the EU’s ENP nevertheless also incorporates the hard-power potential of the ESDP, backed, as the EU has since its inception, by NATO, and in this case specifically, NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue and Istanbul Initiative. Hence the EMP embodies a strategic significance – and wide-reaching opportunity - in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex.

\(^{129}\) Little is known about it specifically at this time
This can, in Buzan and Weaver’s (2003) terminology, be extended transatlantically to include North America (as NATO partners), and the U.S. in particular, into a Regional Security Super Complex.

This analysis of course gained prominence following the emergence of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) of 1999 and “the need to examine the security and defence dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership” (Heisbourg 2001, 5). The role of the EU in the EMP, however, is so far one of predominant and significant soft power in all the security sectors identified by Buzan et al. (1998)\textsuperscript{130} - sectors, which are also reflected in the EU’s CFSP. This dissertation argues that the processes, e.g. norming, complex social learning, complex (post-hegemonic?) interdependence, agent-structure co-constitution of identities and interests within the “three-basket”- paradigm of the EMP contribute to the development of a regional security complex identity in the Mediterranean (which would deviate from Buzan and Waever’s (2003) suggestion of a Middle Eastern regional security complex). Hypothetically, part of the significance of this would be an extrapolation of these vestiges of a Euro-Med international society (per English School theorists) forming from the current international system in this region.

The security issues facing the countries bordering the Mediterranean today are addressed bilaterally (especially pertaining to those countries bordering the Mediterranean on both shores), inter-regionally (e.g. between the Euro-Mediterranean region and the Black Sea region), multilaterally (e.g. NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue), and also, as I am proposing here: (super-) regionally in terms of a Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security

\textsuperscript{130} With NATO’s Mediterranean Alliance addressing hard security issues under a large number of partnership-building programs
Complex – and, extrapolated, a transatlantic Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex (EMRSSC), utilizing Buzan and Waever’s (2003) terminology. One might view this apparent alignment in terms of Henry Kissinger’s (2008) observations:

No previous generation has had to deal with different revolutions occurring simultaneously in separate parts of the world[:] … (a) the transformation of the traditional state system of Europe; (b) the radical Islamist challenge to historic notions of sovereignty; and (c) the drift of the center of gravity of international affairs from the Atlantic to the Pacific and Indian Oceans.

**EMP Objectives: De-securitizing a regional security complex?!**

The deepening of the EMRSSC, which Aliboni and Qatarneh (2005, 5) also alluded to is beyond past the strategic differences between the U.S. and the EU towards the Mediterranean. However, recent changes in U.S. policies towards the Middle East and North Africa on the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, based on “a successful exit strategy from Iraq could in fact contribute to narrowing the transatlantic gap” (Ibid.) in the triangular nature (in Aliboni and Qatarneh’s words) of Mediterranean relations (i.e. a Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex?) between the U.S., the EU and the Arab states. One might view as an “out-of-area” - or neo-hegemonic? - institutional consequence of Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex activity the recent meeting between U.S. president Bush and Russian Prime Minister Putin at Sochi to discuss a replacement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), limiting the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads (Fidler and Blitz 2008). And while Washington had traditionally viewed
the EU’s plans to develop independent military capabilities as lessening their NATO commitments, the U.S. appears to welcome the complementarity between the ESDP and the U.S.’s hard power capabilities now (Fidler and Blitz 2008). This transatlantic mutual acceptance, even benediction, of NATO military capabilities is reflected by the call from the EU, exemplified by French President Sarkozy in France’s bid to re-join the alliance (The Economist April 3, 2008).

A further extension of the ENP is the EU-Africa Strategic Partnership\footnote{While would distinctly not place this within an EMRSC, it elaborates the multi-level (and inter-regional) security interactions taking place not only within an EMRSC, but among their memberstates and third parties.} (European Commission: EU-Africa Summit 2007) to provide a long-term vision to face common challenges, ranging from climate change to development, energy, migration, peace and security, trade and regional integration and good governance human rights, between the countries beyond the southern Mediterranean and the EU. While the future geographic and political ENP-membership may be contested (Lippert 2007, 183), the ENP’s potential is not\footnote{Compare Senyucel et al. 2006.}

In this context, the EMP/UMed are a manifestation of what van Langenhove (2008) has termed not a post-Westphalian world order, but a neo-Westphalian world order:

The old world of states has made positive developments in governance, but has also created what Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen called an illusion of destiny that has resulted in incredible violence. The multiple world of regions could be a way to replace the illusion of a single national identity with the more realist view that people hold plural regional identities. As such, the world of regions might not only be a more complex world but also one with more chances of peace and freedom. (van Langenhove 2008, 15).
It is being recognized transatlantically that America will not single-handedly shape a New World Order (SpiegelOnline 4/19/2003) as some speculated at the turn of this century. Instead, a neo-regionalism appears to be developing in many parts of the world, including the Euro-Mediterranean, with the potential for a more democratic paradigm through which to approach new and old security threats of partner countries – and to perhaps allay the fear of an all-too powerful America being replaced by a fear of its imminent weakening (British Council 2008).

This paradigm would fit Van Langenhove’s (2007) concept of a (hypothetical) “Third Regionalism,” whereby the institutional environment for dealing with ‘out of area’ consequences of regional policies would become fully consolidated, regions become more proactive in engaging with inter-regional arrangements and agreements, going beyond purely trade issues with a multidimensional character, and having the potential to affect more relations at the global level. And finally, in third generation regional integration, regions would become more actively engaged at the U.N. The EMP’s potential in contributing to regional security and stability as nested in the EU’s permanent delegation to the UN, despite its brief thirteen years’ existence, has the potential to consolidate the competing preferences intra-regionally, while building on the shared history and cultural and institutional structures existing today in the Euro-Mediterranean “region.”

Joffé recognizes the reciprocity between the evolution of societal values and political change, but he discounts the role of institutions in this process. I would point out Alexander Wendt’s (1999) and Ruggie’s (1998) arguments concerning the co-constitution of identities (e.g. societal, political), actors and structures (e.g. institutions) as the process
for social, political, economic etc. change. This reciprocal “construction” of a regional security identity within a EMRSC then has traditional military components, but also perception-based components (as social constructivists would argue) which co-constitute structures. A pertinent example would be the regional security implications of the current global financial crisis. This economic threat has the potential for severe political consequences (as did the economic crisis of 1929 for the Weimar Republic). Beck (2008, 2) writes that “the traditional methods of management and control are proving unreliable and ineffective in the face of global risks… the social and political explosive force of global market risks is becoming palpable. Governments are overthrown, civil wars become a threat.”

Analyzing the EMP within a EMRSSC from a multi-level governance perspective, organized around multiple foci (national and supra-national) rather than simply as a homogeneous integration process would also be an additional perspective for analysis of the EMP. It could be viewed as a multi-layered and polycentric (Schmitter and Karl 1991) governance, not as a “regional-state,” but possibly a new polity species, such as a neo-Westphalian regional integration construct, where national preferences are not fixed but co-constituted between agent- and structure through processes such as preference aggregation/convergence/transformation made more compatible and legally binding through regulatory, judicial and legislative channels (“Networks”) (Slaughter 2004).
Approaching the EU and its external relations form a social value standpoint, one could point to the EU public sector’s role of delivering high quality services of general interest through regulation or government spending and a strong ‘European dimension’ reinforces national systems on a European level (Ibid.). This type of integration can be analyzed within the EMP through the English School approach such as pursued by Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005). Utilizing this ontological approach, the EMP can be analyzed in terms of “second order society” (transnational order), consisting of the “power political” (the international system pillar of the traditional English School), “coexistence” (the core institutions of international society in a pluralist diplomatic, territorial, legal and great
power management balance), the “cooperative” within the public domain (i.e. “beyond coexistence but short of extensive domestic convergence,” Ibid., 13) and lastly, “convergence” (referring to “the development of a substantial enough range of shared values within a set of states to make them adopt similar political, legal and economic forms). Judging by the increase in financial commitment, e.g. of MEDA funding, as well as the number of projects undertaken, this was found in the EMP during the observations undertaken in this dissertation.

This more Kantian form of solidarism is differentiated from cosmopolitanism (Ibid.) as the “key primary institutions of sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, international law and nationalism became internalized more or less worldwide [including in the EMP], they are no longer depending on the coercion that originally delivered them to the non-Western world” (Ibid.). This would also argue against the EMP as a European neo-colonial instrument. Were one to make a detailed institutional analysis of the MENA region in the 20th century, one would find traditionally (i.e. pre-EMP) the “master institutions” (in Gonzales-Pelaez’ terminology, 2005) such as diplomacy, territoriality, equality of people, markets and nationalism. Derivative institutions, such as alliances, multilateralism, bilateralism, trade liberalization, and self-determination were less well developed in favor of conflict, patron-client relationships, and dynastic principles. One of the hopes by its founders is for EMP derivative institutions to become “cooperatively institutionalized” (in Buzan’s terminology, 2005) for the region as a whole, both from the perspective of processes as well as structures.
Some researchers, such as Kelley (2006, 34) concur that “there are many … examples [of] learning and adaptation in the ENP [of which the EMP is a part], but strategically the most prominent are the use of conditionality and socialization.” This is facilitated through a quid pro quo whereby in return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms ... the countries … should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further integration and liberalization of promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services and capital (Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours 2003, 4, quoted in Kelley 2006, 35).

In terms of the Euro-Med as a security complex vis-à-vis “terrorism as a fight that binds” and potential Iraqi instability, which might tear the region apart, the enlarged Dialogue might have to consider enlargement. This should not necessarily be based on geographic considerations alone, since Jordan is technically not a Mediterranean country, but might leave future membership open to Iraq, Gulf States and possibly Iran (Said 2004). Since (lack of) progress in the Middle East peace process is also undermining the efficacy of both the EU (especially in terms of the EMP), and NATO initiatives (such as the Dialogue). Hence increasing the multilateralism based on the security and conflict-resolution capabilities of these institutions might be a legitimate alternative to the heavily unilateral actions in the region of the last six years. Not only would this bring the focus back to the significance of development as one factor in improving regional security (Sen
but would additionally give a greater number of Dialogue and EMP member countries a stake in contributing to the “hard power” aspects of Mediterranean security.

Carlos Echeverria wrote in 1999 (preface) that when the Berlin wall crumbled, the fear was expressed that the security of Europe might occur at the expense of Mediterranean security requirements. During the Cold War, a major security concern by the West with respect to MENA was to prevent the Arab-Israeli conflict to “provide opportunity for Moscow to exploit the unrest by making significant inroads in the Arab world” (Papacosma 2004, 16). As the Cold War concluded, Soviet hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean waned (Ibid., 17). Unfortunately, claims of a new world order vanished as a new world disorder asserted itself (Ibid.). The “ongoing Arab-Israel dispute, the Persian Gulf War, Anglo-American invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan, terrorism and accompanying uncertainties over oil supplies exert a directing influence on global affairs” (Ibid., 19).

Hence we observe in this analysis of the EMP and its role in regional security, that it integrates factors of identities, norms, aspirations, ideologies, and simple ideas about cause-effect relationships (Ruggie 1998, 855) in literally attempting to construct, albeit slowly, not only a security community but a zone of shared prosperity and inter-cultural understanding in terms of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s Regional Security Theory (1998)\(^{133}\). As Max Weber (quoted in Ruggie, Ibid.) stated: “We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance.”

\(^{133}\) whereby its analysis seeks to answer where the security dynamics of different sectors are located, and what its trends are (Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998, 17).
The end of the Cold War necessitated a complete rethink about European regional security terms of the subtle dialectic between Atlanticism and Europeanism, which had been painstakingly knitted together over the previous decade through shifting patterns of interest (Howorth 2004). The EU does not usually challenge the US directly in MENA especially in light of the common NATO bond. However, the EU is likely to take on a greater sense of responsibility for peace in the Southern- and Eastern Mediterranean, based respect for the political liberty of the parties involved and through the promotion of the economic interests of all actors, including the least advantaged (Gokay 2005, 12), by seeking multilateral and bilateral constructive approaches on trade, cultural exchanges and security consultations with its Southern neighbors in the twenty first century, while the US might still be fighting demons from the last century (Carapico 2001, 28): although unipolarity may have proven easier for the US in the period immediately following the Cold War, multilateralism may become the forward approach in the twenty first century as it enhances cooperation and spreads transaction costs as “any country which had a voice shaping a particular policy is also bound to contribute to the execution of that policy” (Mohamed 2001, 15).

And in this dissertation I have shown that the EMP’s achievements in terms of multilateral institutions, cultural diversity and economic commitment, though not fully realized, implemented or complied with, are slowly contributing to creating a virtuous cycle on the collective regional level for societal security, based on development and freedom in the post-Cold War European Mediterranean neighborhood. September 11th only augmented the need for cooperation and coordination i.e. in the Mediterranean region as a
security community. How this will evolve vis-à-vis the ESDP dialogue remains to be seen. Fernandez and Youngs (2005, 158) confirm that the EMP’s first ten years had not fully achieved its mandate (partially because of the perception that the U.S.’ presence has been increasingly felt in the EMP’s evolution), and that its revitalization requires more than simply “doing more of the same.”

As we know, peace processes in the Middle East are still more hope than reality at the moment. However, the EMP’s purpose to extend beyond the EU a zone of “peace, prosperity and stability” applies a proven approach to address regional security in the Mediterranean – keeping in mind Baumann’s (1991, quoted in Holm 2004, 2) caution that “post-modernity cannot … posit itself as superior to modernity because the modern idea of progress has faded and because it expresses a mood of differentiation and variety, that is, of not excluding or destroying the different. Hence in post-modernity, modernity cohabits.” We will need to keep this in mind ever more as fears of a spillover into other countries cannot be excluded as Europe deals with impending new security threats, e.g. that of spillover from Iraq sliding into a civil war (Dinmore 2007), Jordan’s King Abdullah II announcing the desire of his country wanting its own atomic program (Miami Herald January 20, 2007 p. 17A) and of Russian president Putin “open” to forming a gas “Opec” with Algeria, Qatar, Libya, Central Asian republics and perhaps Iran (Peel 2/7/2007).

In terms of the difference between hard and soft power in institutionalization (e.g. in the EMP), we should take note that the logic of actors’ behavior changes, depending on whether the issue (“sector”) is political (power – JHA pillar III), economic (gains – Pillar I), or military (hard security – CFSP, Pillar II), allowing for a “hybrid-interest,” depending
on the “pillar.” Whether the EMP will progress at some point through several of the stages of economic integration: complex from *free trade area* to *customs union* to *common market* (to *currency union*, although this last stage is unlikely, as it would involve “sharing” institutions” beyond the current ENP-parameters) (= “4 freedoms”: labor, capital, goods, and services), i.e. more than just spill-over, but full economic integration and political integration is difficult to predict at the moment.

While this integration in terms of the ENP and specifically within the EMP has been “radiating” out from Brussels administratively (though with many institutes throughout the Euro-Med), which was viewed by some as (potentially) neo-colonial, this was partially due in the first decade due to the limited South-South political and economic linkages and appears to be strongly modified within the UMed with a “shared” North/South co-presidency for example.

Hettne (1991, 279) wrote that it is crucial to understand the interactions between ‘high” and “low” politics, i.e. security and development issues in understanding Europe’s recent history and immediate future. This is true today more than ever as regionalization in the world economy, the growth of sub-regionalism within Europe, and the development of smaller multinational economic regions create a new balance of power globally, one more economic than military (Ibid.). The complexity of socio-political and cultural asymmetries in the regions surrounding the Mediterranean, especially in the post-9/11 security context, possible spillover from post-Iraq instabilities and Russian revisionist moves continue to require a renewed commitment by the EU in its southern neighborhood rather than inviting complacency. While the EMP’s results are neither entirely positive nor completely
negative, “the very existence of the process already constitutes an important contribution by the EU to stability and prosperity in the zone, as well as building up a region in the political sense where it only existed in a geographical one” (Ortega in Batt et al., eds., 2003, 5).

Socio-historical developments which favor the evolution of the EMP, such as globalization pressures, international regimes and global governance, indicate that path-dependency which accelerate integration. While both the EMP and the EU continue to evolve, at this point intra-regional economic, political and social integration in MENA is weak (e.g. Schumacher 2004, 92). While north-south inter-regional integration between MENA and the EU is being nourished, inter-regional integration between MENA and regions to the east and west is also weak, but significant in light of the tectonic shifts some writers attribute to the current developments in Iran as well as in Iraq (e.g. Schumacher 2004, 95).

EMP Strategies: A Secular Approach? Political regionalization vs. domestic factors: Is a secular approach even an option for some southern EMP members?

In the preceding discussion of security in a regional context, little acknowledgement has been made of the domestic factors affecting political stability. The process of how domestic choices affect state behavior have been demonstrated empirically by liberal scholars, such as Moravcsik (1997, 515) in terms of how

the impact on state behavior of gains and losses to individuals and groups in society from transnational economic interchange …[and] apparently unrelated areas of inquiry… applying to liberal and nonliberal states, economic and national security affairs, conflictual and nonconflictual situations, and the
behavior both of individual states (‘foreign policy’) and of aggregations of states (‘international relations’).

Hence the dynamic of the EMP in contributing to regional stability among its member states is to be understood in the liberal theory of state preference formation. Additionally, the EMP, through its paradigm effects the rational-led authority that IOs embody gives them power independent of the states that created them and channels that power in particular directions. Bureaucracies … [not only] make the rules, but in so doing they also create social knowledge. They define shared international tasks (like “development”), create and define new categories of actors (like “refugee”), and transfer models of political organization around the world (like markets and democracy) (Barnett and Finnemore 1999, 699),

i.e. the dynamics of international organizations also create “social knowledge.”

While this “Second Image Reversed” (Gurevitch 1978) of the international sources of domestic politics exceeded the framework of this dissertation, it nevertheless is one of the leading causes for the (inter-)regional instability among EMP members, as has been outlined in the previous chapter. Some Islamic groups, have contributed to this instability, sometimes tending to be a domestic political dynamic and/or contest which then seeks to achieve many of its goals externally (BBC News 7/25/2007), leading reciprocally to the Islamophobia prevalent in the West especially during the last decade.

**EMP Targets for its Strategies** (as outlined in the preceding section):

a. Achieve the political objective of security and stability through a synergistic process with economic institutional integration?

“‘The cultural argument has gained considerable validity after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. It is reasonable to argue about the ultimate social, economic and political causes of terrorism” (Soltan 2004, 6).
The report by EuroMeSCo’s working group on integration and sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean/Charter for Peace and Stability (1998-2000) was a detailed proposal, incorporating flexible mechanisms and instruments for (sub-) regional Euro-Mediterranean enhancements, as well as i.a. accommodating the complementarity of other actors, such as the United States and the EU in the Middle East. Largely due to the renewed Palestinian–Israeli conflict in 2000 it was not adopted. The political developments in the region since then have convinced some states to focus on “economic development to reduce the huge amounts of government revenue traditionally earmarked for defence” (Kerr 2007).

Other authors (Joffé 2001, 46) hesitate to link legitimacy, especially in terms of rule-of-law, as an “irresistible tendency” by “supporters of the economic theory of politics” (Ibid.) as an economic prescription into the political sphere as well. He finds the linkage of political and economic spheres questionable, despite its advocacy by the current orthodoxy in the “match between liberal democracy and free market economies” (Ibid.). The Barcelona Process, however, in its much wider social and political ambitions also seeks to “stimulate the growth of civil society within the context of legitimized government” (Joffé 2001, 47). As such it exerts pressure, albeit inconsistently (comparing the treatment of Palestinians by Israel vs. internal processes of authoritarian member states) on the political systems of these members to become legitimized and participatory through a vibrant civil society.

Recognizing that international trade has distributional consequences (Goldstone 2007), which in turn affect these groups’ foreign policy preferences, the EMP’s objectives
are in part envisioned to address some of the resulting inequalities of globalization, in addition to the development of programs for conflict prevention and “peace restoration by means of conflict management and the use of coercive instruments” (Aliboni, Guazzzone, and Pioppi 2001, introduction). However, Action Plans have lacked follow-up in their implementation of the security dimension. This left peace-building in the early years of the EMP’s existence largely as an “automatic result of Euro-Med economic cooperation, rather than as a comprehensive early warning/conflict prevention concept or policy” (Aliboni, Guazzzone, and Pioppi 2001, introduction), though inroads were made according to studies and resultant models by the Italian foreign ministry as well as EuroMeSCo\textsuperscript{134} in particular.

A Euro-Med Free Trade Area, involving the dismantling of trade barriers, liberalization and structural adjustments, is considered not a panacea for all developmental problems in the southern Mediterranean nor has it been achievable quickly. Neither does liberalization represent the only source of welfare gains, but also imposes adjustment burdens on countries of both sides of the Mediterranean (Nienhaus 1999, 516/7). Hence he advises realistic expectations in the implementation and execution of free trade agreements, including an emphasis on the successful implementation of structural changes, such as to the financial sector (Nienhaus 1999, 518) to minimize frustration and political opposition, or worse, radicalization (Nienhaus 1999, 517).

Economic development, in addition to changing the political agenda, often affects the environment as well. While security, according to Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998) can be any threat to core values, climate concerns have also be securitized. Indrawati and

\textsuperscript{134} EuroMeSCo being a network of independent institutes from the thirty-seven member countries of the EMP, functioning “both as an official confidence-building measure within the EMP and as a source of analytical expertise in the policy and security fields with which it is concerned (EuroMeSCo website).
Zoellick (2007) write that sustainability and support for environmental protection in developing countries need to become an integral part of development assistance, rather than an either-or proposition. This interrelatedness of security sectors exists not only domestically or internationally, but is particularly relevant regionally, as environmental degradation does not stop at the border but usually also affects neighboring countries. The solutions, be they political, economic or social, can be addressed e.g. through mechanism such as the EMP offers both institutionally through cooperative programs resulting in complex learning or through epistemic communities as e.g. EuroMeSCo’s network of institutions provides.

b. Through complex (economic) interdependence to “Development as Freedom”:

Joffé (2001, 48) has argued that “only by creating effective civil societies and hence attitudes of mind towards government, rather than institutions, can real and legitimate political change be achieved.” However, the data in this dissertation confirm that there is an inter-linkage between institutions, be they economic or political, and the development of civil society, economic development and political stability. I concur with Joffé (2001, 49) that the institutions need not match on both sides of the Mediterranean, but harmonize with those “indigenous political traditions which seek participation and social justice.”

Aliboni (2002, 10) suggested that comprehensive security, discussed throughout this dissertation, is assured comprehensively when 1. security threats cannot develop into violent conflicts between states or within societies (also referred to as “de-securitization”
previously in this chapter), as a goal of security, 2. when within and among security levels as well as the sectors themselves evolve without threatening societies beyond their immediate or short-term, such as could be caused by natural catastrophes, economic instability, or threats to political or cultural identity, and 3. when options exist for the local communities and individuals to have a secure and risk-free existence.

However, the heterogeneity of the Maghreb is not only political, but also economical (e.g. income derived from oil vs. predominantly from agriculture). This complexity and fragmentation make a unified region difficult to achieve (Escribano and Lorca 2007, 1) – or perhaps that much more urgent, in order to undercut the vicious circle between lack of socio-economic and political development and insecurity. While this dissertation is not a macroeconomic analysis of EMP member countries, but rather focuses on its security implications for the region, the challenge to harmonized approaches for development in every sense is obvious.

One instance in which the significance of regional interconnectedness of security problems – and their solution – with other areas, such as economic, is most obvious in MENA is of course the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. Although this dissertation does not focus on this particular conflict per se, some writers, such as James Blitz (2007) have argued that Israel has to come to terms with the fact that its own security could not be guaranteed in the long term if unemployment in the Palestinian Authority (PA), already at 24 percent, would increase, i.e. if the economic sustainability of the PA is not given.
c. Social-Cultural harmonization and development: Complex learning (and common regional security complex identity “co-creation”?) through Habermasian et al. discourse logic?

Cultural change is an integral part of the process of making the Barcelona Process genuinely universal, as the non-EU EMP members seek (Joffé 2001, 49): not the McWorld or Coca Cola culture (Ibid.) is alternately fascinating and repulsive to MENA, or the contradictory desire to “emulate and exclude” (not only in an immigration/export-sense), but those processes which, ideally, permit the “Four Freedoms”: the free movement of labor, goods, services and capital, and find a moral and political middle ground of acceptance (vs. xenophobia/Islamophobia) and accommodation (vs. Jihad, or e.g. in terms of managing migration).

While the socio-philosophical considerations pertaining to the EMP are fascinating, Wurzel (2003) points out that the focus needs to be on operational basics, such as efficient public organization, shared responsibilities of state and civil society, efficient communication (e.g. to increase the transparency of all actors involved), conflict resolution (and just bellum) and compromise, fair distribution of stimulated development, contributing to cultural change, finding a balance between authoritarianism and participation, and developing a culture of inclusion, openness and creative competition overall despite recurring patterns of old dominating parties. These suggestions would be areas on which the UMed could focus on in the future.

This dissertation intentionally focuses on the secular, multilateral intergovernmental partnership to achieve development, social inclusion and to minimize the polarizing aspects of religions in this region in its intent to bridge elite ethos versus mass
consciousness as tied to religions in this region. Regardless of the label, we can say that religion (both in Islam, Judaism and Christianity) does affect the economy in MENA (as everywhere), and hereby economic security overall, considerably (as the extensive data sections on the economics, EuroIslam as well as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have shown from several lenses).

Additionally, the role of women in MENA (excluding Israel in this analysis) in the context of religion requires particular attention. Ararat writes that

Undoubtedly Islamic traditions which restrict the participation of women in social life reduce the influence of the society on business. Encouraging women to be active in social life as demanding customers, concerned parents for the future of children and as members of organised labour will dramatically improve the role society plays in driving the business. A vivid and active society cannot be without women. Supporting the education of women has been reported as one of the preferred themes of philanthropy in the region (Ararat 2006, 7)\textsuperscript{135}.

The gender aspect within the framework of the 3\textsuperscript{rd} “basket” of the EMP (the socio-cultural), as the data chapter six highlighted, are also addressed through a variety of approaches and programs to ensure “human security” from this aspect.

\textsuperscript{135} Compare Ahmed-Ullah (2006): “Muslim women find their voice”
Chapter Nine

Dissertation Discussion

Institutional and Governance Considerations

Summarizing the “processual aspects” of the EMP referred to in the introduction of this dissertation, the research of this dissertation has shown i.a. that legitimacy in the ENP involves the “partner countries in a construed process of ‘joint governance’ and ‘policy ownership’” (Gaenzle 2008, 4). The 2007 Lisbon strategy of “open method of coordination” (OMC) seeks to foster new problem-solving models to ensure convergence of national regulatory logics and systems towards common objectives in the neighborhood (Ibid.). On the occasion of the EMP’s tenth anniversary in 2005 a flexible approach was advocated overall (with the Euro-Mediterranean free trade zone in 2010/2013, depending on the estimate used, as the primary goal for the EMP). The particular novelty during the anniversary celebration was the definition of “cooperation” as “partnership” (Attina 2007, 196). This epitomizes the common will to abandon the unevenness of the past relationship “between the European states as donors and the Mediterranean partners as receivers (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, quoted in Attina 2007, 196).

In terms of “institutional process,” Attina (2007, 196) points out that neither an international organization nor an international legal instrument had been created at the time of writing this dissertation (i.e. pre-UMed) to direct the EMP, basing it on political, rather than legal documents, of which the Barcelona Declaration was the first, and the 2005 Barcelona Summit Declaration the most recent one (Ibid.). Their execution had
been based on different bodies, such as small number of institutional players, e.g. EU and partner state institutions, and a large number of expert networks (Attina 2007, 197) as outlined in chapter five and six.\(^\text{136}\)

Through the policy analysis model an explanatory framework can be utilized to combine actor-centered and institutionalist elements (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Knill and Lenschow 1998 and 2005; Knill et al 2008; quoted in Gaenzle 2008, 6). It argues “that the potential for change at the domestic level varies with respect to distinct governance patterns” (Gaenzle 2008, 6) as regulatory measures are the central element in the policy-making process, and national administrations key actors in implementing EU regulatory policy (Knill et al. 2008, 51, quoted in Ibid.). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005, pps. 11) suggest that the dynamics happen

\[\text{either through intergovernmental interactions or through trans-national processes via social actors in the target state or region... [whereby] EU conditionality, [i.e.] sanctions and rewards, reinforce consequentiality, and [hereby] ... change the cost-benefit calculations of involved or affected actors,}\]

either through the “logic of consequences” (Gaenzle 2008, 5), or alternately, actors “may be persuaded to adopt EU rules provided that they consider these rules legitimate and beneficial” (Ibid.) according to the “logic of appropriateness” (March and Olsen 1989, pps. 160, quoted in Gaenzle 2008, 7). The data in this dissertation indicate that the implementation of i.a. “better practices” and other political, trade, public administration or environmental protective measures are adapted to varying degrees in MENA,

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\(^{136}\) A short “briefing” about the Union for the Mediterranean, which was founded on July 13, 2008, at the conclusion of this dissertation’s data collection period, will follow below. Compare additionally Appendix 14a and 14b for the current legal framework, under which the EMP’s successor program, the UMed operates
depending on their level of development and national system of governance. Some scholars have viewed this as a failure of the EMP to produce “all-or-nothing”-results in the implementation of programs uniformly in all member states, or as a moral compromise of the EU in not insisting on a hardline adherence to shared values of human rights, democracy, environmental protection etc. in practice or in hard law in all member states.

Other scholars (Abbott and Snidal 2000, quoted in Kanner 2008, 6), however, have suggested that in situations of asymmetrical relations, as between the EU and the EMP members on the southern Mediterranean, and divergent interests, “soft legalization is often the best alternative” (Ibid.), as conceptualized by a continuum between the complete absence of legalization of EMP-structures in member countries, and a strong hard-law regime (Kanner 2008, 6). Countering legal “purists,” weighing the costs and benefits between soft and hard law, i.e. weighing the tradeoffs between the advantages and disadvantages between the two in determining the optimal outcome in different transactions within the EMP, Abbott and Snidal (2000, quoted in Kanner 2008, 6) point out that the benefit of soft legalization is that they can be easier achieved, are less threatening to sovereign autonomy, and often involve learning which can reduce the costs of future negotiations. The disadvantages to soft law frequently become more evident after an agreement has been in force for some time (Ibid.).

A number of authors have analyzed the effectiveness of institutions in terms of “compliance” (the extent to which states adhere to the provision of agreements) (Gomez-Mera 2008, 112), which, according to Gomez-Mera (Ibid.) is a function of
implementation ("the measures that governments take to translate international accords into domestic law and policy") (Ibid.) and commitment of norms, rules and regulations in an international organization. While "implementation and compliance are matters of degree" (Ibid.), commitment problems will ultimately undermine an IGO’s effectiveness (Ibid., 113), with enforcement often being a function of the material incentives for the (rational) actors (Ibid., 114).

The EMP involves multi-level governance as reflected in the amalgam of public, private, and NGO actors, with the level of institutionalization varying according to whether the level of governance involves actors from the global, regional, or national level. The EMP, nestled within the ENP and its Action Plans, encourages cooperation initiatives on the interregional, sub-national as well as cross-border levels, involving sectors as diverse as public health, broadening democracy and civil society, and strengthening the education system (Gaenzle 2008, 15).

From a security perspective, RSCT posits these levels as well as sectors, which in the Euro-Med are envisioned to proceed from cooperation to integration, including a stake in the EU’s internal market. Having analyzed the EMP’s dynamics in the preceding chapter through the primary and secondary data available, the hypothesis\textsuperscript{137} of this dissertation is confirmed. Gaenzle (2008, 13) suggests that “it is too early to say whether the ENP can be grasped in terms of new trans-national modes of governance.” I propose here that the Euro-Mediterranean region can be viewed as an EMRSC, and, with its transatlantic “umbilical cord,” a EMRSSC. This is reflected in statements made by

\textsuperscript{137} Referring to chapter one: the main hypothesis suggested in this dissertation is that regional integration is taking place to the point of a regional security complex being established among EMP-member countries\textsuperscript{137} (compare Appendix 2).
French President Sarkozy (compare Thornhill 2008) that “Europe must progressively affirm itself as a first-rank player for peace and security in the world, in cooperation with the United Nations, the Atlantic Alliance and the African Union, … [and that] Europe had to develop a common vision of the main challenges that confronted it and how best to respond to them.”

Despite the weakened peace process in the Middle East, support for regional security cooperation and the EU’s financial support for economic modernization of southern Mediterranean EMP partners towards a Euro-Mediterranean regional cooperation space, as a sub-region of the ENP, indicate a continued convergence between EMP members in line with the original objective of the EMP. While this integration among EMP members is a slow path, the action plans and association agreements of the ENP are showing positive economic results (Attina 2007, 200) to address security on a regional level from a development angle.

Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 29) define security as a negative, i.e. “as a failure to deal with issues as normal politics.” Attina (2001, 42) posits this in the EMP in that “[p]revention and avoidance of military conflict among dyads of countries is the prime goal of security dialogue in the Mediterranean,” suggesting the utility of confidence building measures as outlined in action plans and association agreements of the EMP. Buzan, Waever and de Wilde (1998, 29) write further that “desecuritization is the optimal long-range option.” Attina (2001, 42) relates this process to the Euro-Med in that

the exchange of views on security and military organisations has the merit of making public the aims of national armament policies and the conditions
and processes of national security policy-making. This objective is important in order to put under scrutiny national military policies and avoid misunderstanding the purpose of the military policy of the single state.

Attempts to build regional security through partnership and confidence-building measures are lastly aimed at changing the motivations of the political leaders to develop weapons systems and to introduce arms control and limitation in the region.

The analyses of securitization processes in the EMP undertaken in this dissertation compare favorably with the data in the relevant literature in confirming the hypothesis of this dissertation that the Euro-Mediterranean region, through the conflux of several international actors, especially within the structure of the EMP, is showing characteristics of regional integration beyond socio-economic harmonization to vestigial indications of a EMRSC. Additionally, these processes of regional security integration are supported by dynamics ranging from functionalism to neo-functionalism with respect MEDA programs being put into action in MENA, and to neo-liberal theories of complex interdependence, such as international regime theory in terms of market- and finance sector modernization taking place since the establishment of the EMP.

From a standpoint of collective security, the EMP can be analyzed in terms of security community, and regional security complex theory. Attina (2001, 43) points out that from a literal security perspective in the Euro-Mediterranean neither bilateralism can be applied (as during the East-West SALTs). Nor can multilateralism be applied unequivocally (such as in the case of UN universal arms control agreements) due to the asymmetry of weapons\textsuperscript{138} among EMP member states. Hence the EMP can well be

\textsuperscript{138} E.g. European states have abundant stores of conventional arms at their direct (France) as well as indirect (through non-European NATO partners) compared to non-European EMP members who have in
viewed as a Regional Security Complex, but under a type of “asymmetrical” Neo-Westphalian governance and Third Generation regionalism.

The discussion of security cooperation is significant in the contemporary international system as it is taking place in a dynamic of a declining prominence of military alliances, and the reciprocal rise in importance of composite regional security frameworks (Attina 2005, 3) following the end of Cold War bilaterialism, as the following “de-polarization of the international system” (Ibid.) has affected nations’ security cooperative behavior. Hence the past twenty years are a prime example of the time changes in security practices through the development of new ones, especially as this security cooperation is not only positively, but also functionally related to increased inter-regional economic cooperation (Ibid.). While through the ages foreign trade was protected more by a nation’s own military capacity (e.g. the armadas), today (especially regional) trade experiences “front-line” protection through the institutional framework of cooperative political and economic agreements, bolstered by socio-cultural confidence building measures (Attina 2005, 3). This “security regionalism” (Ibid.) has been analyzed in terms of levels of conflict and security among states of different regions (Singer and Wildavsky, 1993 and Kakowitz, 1998, quoted in Attina 2005, 4), or in terms of the relationship between conflict, integration and democracy (Gleditsch, 2002 quoted in

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139 E.g. involving i.a. multi-track weapons control negotiations, i.e. “distinct arms control negotiation for different kinds of armaments (Ibid.), or reach “strategic balance at the regional level through self-imposed and informally negotiated arms control measures, requiring Israel to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPY), and the Arab states to adhere to the Chemical and Biological Weapons conventions (Ibid.).
Attina 2005, 4), in addition to the other theories elaborated on previously in this dissertation.

However, this “security regionalism” based on regional security partnerships holds for analytical purposes (Attina 2005, 5) that states, who have come to an agreement on “co-managing security problems” as a result of their realization of reciprocal interdependence as well as common dependence on transnational problems, and, significantly, the “international relations in the regional are not polarized by great power competition” (Ibid., italics added). I would add, however, that the hegemonic impetus in the establishment of an effective intergovernmental organization should not be ruled out. Hence the EMP indicates a very diverse number of accomplished milestones since 1995, because the EU does not represent a “great power” polarization in it (countering the colonial argument raised against it), though it has contributed substantially both with logistic as well as financial support to its evolution in a region with millennia of disharmonious political and socio-economic relations.

This evolution in regional security partnership thinking received a new impetus following 9/11 through the “new discourse of threat and danger” (Attina 2005, 9) as national responses to deal with rogue states and political actors deemed aggressive and unreceptive to cooperative mechanisms. While these actors cannot be judged irrational from their viewpoint in attempting to achieve their own political agenda, states have taken steps to dissuage their interests, i.a. by enhancing their own military facility, “including the development of the ESDP for worldwide use, and in some cases, the enhancement of the Euro-Atlantic strategic preponderance as condition for international
stability and peace” (Ibid.). As a further authoritative speech act of a decade-long scholar in this area, this statement would confirm the identification of the Euro-Med beyond a Regional Security Complex as a Regional Security Super Complex transatlantically.

Proof of Hypothesis

The preceding analysis of my findings confirms the hypothesis of my dissertation, as emerging structures (in terms of underlying sectors and levels) of, and dynamics within the EMP can indeed be more appropriately referred to as an EMRSC, hereby adjusting the current concept of a Middle Eastern Regional Security Complex which other authors had proposed.

A Glance beyond this Dissertation into its Future:

The Union for the Mediterranean

This dissertation focused on the security implications of the EuroMed Partnership. However, upon the completion of the data collection stage, the EMP’s successor program, the Union for the Mediterranean (UMed), was inaugurated on July 13, 2008 (compare Appendix 11). A comparative study between the EMP and the UMed would exceed the space as well as temporal parameters of this dissertation, however, since extensive actual data will not be available about the UMed until some time after its launch. Nevertheless, due to the availability of preliminary announcements about the UMed, and indications in the literature and in this dissertation about projected improvements to the EMP, the previous chapter made brief references to the UMed. This
section will provide brief background information about the UMed in order to “anchor” the EMP’s future as the “UMed” from today’s perspective in the summer of 2008.

The agreed upon UMed in May 2008 evolved from the French, suspiciously neo-colonial sounding original 2007 proposal for a Mediterranean Union (Barber 2008). The UMed is an approach which had been anticipated for a re-invigoration of the Barcelona Process as Dependencia\textsuperscript{140}-concerns by some states to the originally proposed “Mediterranean Union” gave way to the compromise agreement worked out among all EU member states to ensure and equal role for all member states.

The launch of the UMed on July 13\textsuperscript{th} 2008, in the presence of UN secretary-general Ban Ki-Moon, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso and Arab League Secretary General Amr Moussa (Deutsche Welle 2008) as additional observers, was per se spectacular in that it presented a number of “firsts” in Mediterranean security, such as Palestinian Authority President Mahmud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert sitting at the same table, giving rise to the hope that the possibility of reaching a peace

\textsuperscript{140} Dependency theory holds that poverty and underdevelopment are a result of the peripheral position which allegedly the labor of some countries holds in the international division of labor in a capitalist world system. It is argued that the financial and technological assertion of developed capitalist centers of countries produces unbalanced economic structures between peripheral societies and limits the self-sustained growth in the periphery (Cardoso). World System analysis (e.g. Wallerstein 1974) views modern countries as societies (building on previous mini-systems, such as tribes, and later single state world-empires and more recently the world systems) which have never been societies themselves, but are political units of modern society’s interstate system and economy. In this world system Wallerstein also views a tripartite division of labor with core, semi-peripheral and peripheral zones. Andre Gunder Frank (e.g. 1978) has a similar view, taking the analysis back to early Asian cultures 4000 BCE.

The EMP and UMed, in contrast, are specifically interested in cooperation and development on an equal basis between all member states, there are security implications from a World System perspective in terms of Kondratiev cycles; long cycle theory allows long-term predictions that are important for military and political contingency planning, especially as some countries are more severely affected (in terms of severity of the downturn and the length of recovery phase) in Kondratiev downswings, especially in centralized countries with limited economic reforms accomplished – which implies often those countries viewed as “peripheral.” Nevertheless, the “Washington Consensus” reforms have not been the universal answer, as they have led to increased social gaps between rich and poor internally as well as globally.
accord was closer than ever. While many had blamed the limited success of the EMP on the flaring up of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict after its own launch in 1995, the start of

Figure 9.1: **Union for the Mediterranean member states July 2008**
Blue = EU members, Green: non-EU members, Pale Green: Observer State

(Map compliments of Chris Hanson, University of Miami Department of Geography GIS Laboratory)

the UMed explicitly appears to have been initiated with the doors of communication (and negotiation) open to these parties.

Additionally, on the evening of this summit, Syria, through its president, Bashar al-Assad’s presence in Paris, was “marking its comeback from diplomatic isolation, (following the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafīq Hariri in 2005” (Ibid.)), and Lebanon agreed to normalize their very difficult relations, and to set up diplomatic representations in each other’s countries (Ibid.) after the Qatari-brokered
Lastly, Libya was persuaded to send an observer (d'Othee 2008) to the UMed’s launch on July 13, 2008 in Paris, as it continued its “observer status” in the EMP (after the lifting of the UN embargo on September 12, 2003, but a lack of adopting the EMP’s (IAP 7/13/08; Biedermann 2008). Following indirect negotiations brokered by Turkey, Olmert also signaled his willingness to enter direct talks with Syria (AP 7/13/08). The intra-regional Syrian – Israeli – Palestinian – Lebanese “quartet”-constellation viewed from the perspective of the EMP was reciprocally destabilizing this subregion, and interfering with a progressive deepening of the Euro-Mediterranean economically, socially, and politically. Having offered more than just a symbolic olive branch during the UMed-launch, but building apparently on lengthy pre-launch negotiations, the EMP’s persistent stumbling block has hopefully been minimized in future regional security and peace building.

Beyond the *intra*-regional progressive deepening apparent in the UMed’s future, a “stabilization” of this quartet is significant from an *inter*-regional perspective as well, as Syria has been viewed as Iran’s pawn in disrupting MENA to gain influence for itself. Hence, as the Euro-Med defines its identity as a security community even more through the UMed, as it is anticipated that its stabilizing influence on its neighbors will reciprocally increase.

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141 This “Doha agreement” enables the Christian community to recover the institution to which they are constitutionally entitled, including paving the way for a more Christian-friendly electoral law (International Crisis Group report 7/15/2008). Hence in the intense Sunni/Shiite polarization, the Christian community has been given the ability to play the role of arbiter and advance community demands which had been long ignored (Ibid.). As importantly, it shows the significance of the role of inter-regionalism to the EMP, in this case with Qatar as a Gulf Cooperation Council member state.
“acquis” so far, e.g. due to human rights abuse\textsuperscript{142} and other disagreements between the EU and Libya). Libya’s foreign relations appear to be strongly governed at the time of writing by economic considerations, e.g. the oil-contracts with Italy, in part shared with Russia as discussed in the previous chapter. While there is debate whether ENI’s “creative” oil contract with Ghadafi not only gave it first-mover-advantage in that country over competitors (Hoyos 7/10/08), but whether also peaceful engagement is preferable at this stage to complete isolation. However, despite his ideological venom, Col. Ghadafy is a rational actor economically\textsuperscript{143}, - yet the choice to not join the UMed initially was his.

The UMed will have a two-year rotating shared presidency between one delegate from the EU, and one from a MENA member state, with the first one consisting of Egypt's President Hosni Mubarak, co-presiding the summit with French President Sarkozy. Mubarak’s statement during the summit (as an authoritative speech act) that "we are linked by a common destiny" (Charlton 2008) also reinforces the hypothesis of this dissertation of the Euro-Mediterranean region as a regional security complex. Mubarak indicated that he anticipated the UMed to have a better chance of success than the previous cooperative efforts launched in Barcelona in 1995 because the new body focuses on practical projects parallel to efforts toward Mideast peace (Ibid.). As an authoritative speech act this can be interpreted that EMP member states recognize the relationship

\textsuperscript{142} one of the more pressing one for the EU, after Bulgaria’s EU accession, being the detainment of Bulgarian health workers by Libya – a situation resolved shortly before the launch of the UMed.
\textsuperscript{143} as was demonstrated at the end of October 2008 when Libya, together with Qatar finalized a capital injection of $10.7 bn into Barclays (Financial Times 10/31/08)
between socio-economic development and peace in the region, as discussed in the data-chapter of this dissertation in tracing the co-construction of structures (i.a. the institutions necessary for the de-securitization of the region, e.g. those supported by the MEDA program) by actors (EMP member states) with shared interests (i.e. security along its broad spectrum of levels and sectors which were examined in the previous chapter) (Wendt 1999). While the data of this dissertation indicate that these dynamics have already been established in the thirteen short years of the EMP itself, there is two-fold concern: a. do the MSs in MENA not necessarily appreciate the significance and necessity of the political-economic-social synergy to their overall national security, and b. do the majority of countries in MENA see nuclear power (as is allegedly was promised to many by Sarkozy as a carrot to join on July 13, 2008 in Paris for the UMed launch), as the only credible security mechanism for their country (“in defense” against Iraq,” or so it is alleged, when perhaps in reality the it represents the strongest political tool for the current regimes to hold on to power, in favor of the much more tedious and much less immediately apparent results of the synergistic security sector efforts discussed at length in Chapter Four)? If this were the case, it only reinforces the need for just this synergy ever more so…

144 Mubarak called on the new union to tackle reducing the wealth "gap" between north and south, and cited other southern Mediterranean "challenges" as education, food safety, health and social welfare. "The success of the Union will depend on ... reforms and durable development," (Charlton 2008) he said.
(Post-Modern) Regionalism –
From International System to International Society?
Unity in Diversity in the EMP:
Not one Road to Modernity, nor one Recipe for Regional Integration,
But Peace through Regional Integration as a Project in Progress as a valid,
But slow and Step-by-Step Approach

Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) have reiterated these other scholars’ and elites’ calls, especially on the southern Mediterranean, for institutional reform of the EMP, “based on their wish to play a more active role in the EMP” (Ibid.). The new beginning in terms of the UMed to this regional Euro-Mediterranean cooperative security process is poised to address these desires and needs, even though at the time of this writing the precise location of the new UMed permanent Secretariat has not been decided on. Aliboni et al. (2006, 30) emphasize that a greater effort needs to be allocated to bridging the security “culture”-gap between the Northern Mediterranean countries, who emphasize a regional security concept, and the Southern Mediterranean countries, where the “Arab trans-state community concept” is more natural, with the overall aim to “work towards a more comprehensive approach to conflict prevention” (Ibid., 31), encompassing beyond the three baskets also a “spiritual” dimension (Ibid.) – an aspect which was begun to be addressed already “holistically” in this dissertation in the data on Islam in terms of their socio-political and economic implication on states. Additionally, Aliboni et al. (2006, 31) suggest tackling a common security culture in the Euro-Mediterranean within a larger framework beyond party politics of only the EMP. This approach was also addressed in this dissertation an inter-regional perspective.

Already four years ago (well before Sarkozy’s proposal of an enhancement to the EMP through the UMed), some authors, such as Schumacher (2004, 94) suggested that a
permanent formal Euro-Med secretariat (other than the EU Commission) would contribute to the effectiveness of EMP members’ cooperation, and enable greater multilateralism among them. While the financing of the UMed would continue to derive from MEDA, Schumacher (2004, 94) suggested that the co-financing principle would make the EMP (and postulated later relative to the UMed) less Euro-centric and increase intra-cultural understanding by broadening the active status of its stakeholders, in terms of “a shared neighbourhood implies burden-sharing and joint responsibility for addressing the threats to stability created by conflict and insecurity” (European Commission “Wider Europe” communication). This might represent an opening for some non-EU UMed member-participation in the ESDP (Schumacher 2004, 96).

This Union for the Mediterranean is hoped not to distract from, or dilute the potential cohesion, solidarity and concerted socio-political evolution between the EU and Arab countries by not adding more bureaucratic layers without true identification with, or shared values and visions, beyond Sarkozy’s original fantasy of guaranteeing France, and French (especially energy) companies, a privileged position vis-à-vis the Southern Mediterranean, to the exclusion of other Southern European countries, and most certainly the EU’s commitments overall. The involvement of the EU Commission in shaping that version into the UMed, which was launched at last on July 13, 2008, did not put into question Turkey’s EU applicant status, and involved all EU members in toto (EurActiv.com 5/12/08).

The general goals of the UMed coincide,

even in terminology, with the Barcelona Declaration…[:] if the goal is to achieve a region of shared peace, stability and prosperity, develop human
potential, facilitate understanding among cultures and exchanges between societies, these are precisely the headings of the different sections of the Barcelona Declaration (Escribano and Lorca 2008, 23).

Overall, Sarkozy expressed the hope during the UMed’s launch as surmounting all the hatreds “[of the region] to make space for a great dream of peace and civilization” (Bennhold 2007, 1), anchoring the regional cooperation in energy (e.g. a solar energy program), security (including the expanded fight against disasters), counter-terrorism and immigration within a trade agreement (including the building of maritime and coastal land highways), an EU-Mediterranean university (2008) and the creation, at last, of a Mediterranean Investment Bank (MIB) to be modeled on the European Investment Bank (Ibid.). While this may appear to be significant in light of the widening wealth gap between the northern and southern Mediterranean (Saleh, Hall and Khalaf 2008) (at the time of writing), Chapter Four outlined several funding sources for the EMP already, which leads one to wonder whether the MIB would instead be a vehicle for money laundering, as the funding need is not clearly established.

Indeed, upon the launch of the UMed, French Foreign Minister Kouchner specified climate change, access to water and energy, migration, the environment and dialogue between civilizations as key areas for cooperation (AP 7/13/08). While the last three key areas were in fact already also mentioned in the Barcelona Process of 1995, the first three represent an additional focus for the new UMed. These three, climate change, and access to water and energy, are in fact also some of the security sectors identified in this dissertation as common to the Euro-Mediterranean region, contributing to its identity as a (more multi-centric) Regional Security Complex. This also points to an enhanced
Euro-Mediterranean Regional Security Complex within the UMed, which is enhanced by other authoritative speech acts, such as “The Mediterranean is a key to our influence in the world. It’s also a key for Islam that is torn between modernity and fundamentalism” (Sarkozy in a campaign speech in Toulon February 2008, quoted in Ibid., 2). A senior Israeli diplomat (anonymous) stated that “it [the UMed] gives us another opportunity to have a dialogue with countries that we sometimes have difficulties holding a dialogue with” (quoted in Ibid.). Again, these statements point to a deepening of the Euro-Med as security community, by integrating not only institutions, but also values (e.g. the major religions of the region), as well as a consciousness of its identity vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

It is particularly interesting to note that some writers, such as Escribano and Lorca (2008, 21) have explicitly viewed the proposed Union for the Mediterranean as a “constructive approach” to progress beyond the EMP in building a true geopolitical space, involving i.a. all twenty-seven EU member states, as well as all MENA states that are currently EMP members, in a spirit of “deepening” the relations between them (Ibid.). This would conform with the approach suggested in this dissertation as utilizing Social Constructivism as a particularly suitable “grand” International Relations theory as the most appropriate approach in its analysis, with the plethora of meta-theories as elaborated on extensively in previous chapters. Other theories, such as neo-liberal institutionalism, and realism would play a somewhat lesser role in the formation of an EMRSC.

AlJazeera (7/15/08), as a voice for many in MENA, viewed the UMed launch positively as a new “process of dialogue and cooperation” which, despite the failure of
the Lisbon Treaty, is intended to overcome the EMP’s shortcoming. Interestingly, this
publisher (Ibid.) writes that

[un]like its predecessors, the Union for the Mediterranean promised
much and asked little of its partners. There are no preconditions to join and
certainly no demands to improve human rights or establish democratic
systems of governance. Also missing were demands for apologies for past
colonial crimes in Northern Africa.”

If, indeed, this is the understanding of the UMed throughout MENA, it would prove,
however, rather disconcerting towards a region of shared security in many respects.

Certainly, the UMed has taken weight with forty-three members, against thirty-
nine of the EMP (compare Appendix 2) and twenty-three of the ENP (d’Othee 2008),
representing literally a “widening” of the Euro-Med, and as a Regional Security
Complex. However, to what extent will the great symbolism of the UMed’s launch be the
impetus to renew the EMP and to actually materialize remains to be seen. Some critics
point out that its future will be challenging. Pertaining to MENA in particular, the
demographics are very young, requiring a focus on the right skills for tomorrow with
appropriate investments. Another vocal critic, Col. Gadafy, predicted “that the Union
would provoke a backlash from Islamic militants ‘agitated’ by their countries’
membership in a European structure” (Saleh, Hall and Khalaf 2008). In terms of a Euro-
Mediterranean Regional Security Super Complex vis-à-vis the U.S., its response to the
UMed was cautious but supportive (www.chinaview.cn 2008).
A Euro-Mediterranean International Society or Post-National Constellation?

In this section I am extrapolating from EuroIslam beyond the EU/European region to include the broader region ("EuroMed") encompassing those neighbors surrounding the Mediterranean in its broadest "strokes"\(^{145}\) for the purpose of evaluating the possibility of the EuroIslam concept as one of peace to potentially extend from that of "theory" to one possibly as a "prescriptive" socio-political mechanism of a (regional) international society, i.e. the Mediterranean.

Buzan (2001, 471) states that "the English School is an underutilized research resource and deserves a larger role in IR than it currently has. Its distinctive elements are its methodological pluralism, its historicism, and its interlinking of three key concepts: international system, international society and world society." The English School maintains that despite anarchy a "society of states" exists. This can be detected in the ideas animating institutions of war, the great powers, diplomacy, the balance of power, international commerce and law – and in the mutual recognition of sovereignty of states. While some aspects of the concept of EuroIslam, as I indicated in previous sections, could be envisioned in post-national terms, its essential "legal" as well as "citizenship" aspect in Tibi’s usage does, in fact, encourage some "state-related-ness" (but not state-centrism, though).

Barry Buzan and Anna Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005 – permission to quote obtained from junior author) have undertaken a study

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\(^{145}\) This is a somewhat arbitrary decision made as a geographical delimitation for this dissertation, based partially on a political institution, the "EuroMed Partnership" (and its political significance to "Europe" as well as the, somewhat gingerly established, "realism"/security community-like grouping), as well as historical socio-economic significance of Muslim countries neighboring Europe, compared to those that don’t border the Mediterranean.
to sketch out the theoretical … elements of a research project which would seek to apply social structural concepts from English school theory to the Middle East … [with] the specific aim … to investigate whether or not significant, distinct international social structures exist at the regional level represented by the Middle East in either or both of the forms identified by the English school: a society of states, or a ‘world’ society rooted in the peoples and non-state actors of the region.

Neither the discussion of the English School in terms of Middle East International Society nor my comparison with it of EuroIslam privileges prima facie between the English School Pluralists or the Solidarists. I would argue that some aspects of both are applicable to the EuroIslam concept in that the solidarity and emancipatory aspects of the Solidarists, as well as the Pluralists’ concept of international society for the greatest independence for states, are relevant to the analysis of EuroIslam as a (post-national) construct for a peace process. One of Pluralism’s relevant to this discussion is its state-centricity (which, although I am not criticizing it or find it limiting per se, this analysis focuses in part on the supra-national aspects of the EU as they relate to “legal-ness” in the EuroIslam context) as well as, significantly, the regionality (“EuroMed-ness” of EuroIslam). One limitation of Solidarist English School, pertaining to its relevance to EuroIslam, is its “messianic” aspect, which in my opinion slants too much in terms of “us vs. them” ontologically, while in my analysis of EuroIslam I am specifically seeking the “bridging” aspect - like the Mediterranean itself\textsuperscript{146} - as one of unity. Others might interpret this “empathetic” aspect of the Solidarists as one of “identifying with,” and hence unity, however.

\textsuperscript{146} Although this is a geographic concept, perhaps it can serve as a focus in “visualizing” the intellectual concept of togetherness rather than of divisiveness in EuroIslam.
Hedley Bull (1977, 279), quoted in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (2005, 5), explains that “by a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built.” Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (Ibid.) argue that within the English School there are also sub-global interstate societies, which are “firmly occupied in the interstate and inter-human domains and perhaps in the transnational one …reflecting concerns with more political and/or cultural values” (Ibid.). This inter-human society is largely about collective identity (Buzan 2004), some overlapping, such as religious identities in relation to ethno-national ones, as is the case with EuroIslam. These authors argue that the global level is predominantly developed in the interstate domain (Ibid.), while I would argue in this dissertation that there can also be a trans-national cultural-normative process, such as EuroIslam as a Soft Power, which could (in fact needs to) play a significant role regionally (i.e. in the EuroMed).

I concur with Buzan and Gonzales-Pelaez that “by marginalising sub-global developments, the English school has sustained an emaciated conceptualization of what the whole idea of international/world society is about.” I would add that in the case of EuroIslam it adds another layer of density to the security significance of “region” in international- and global society. Applying English School concepts of social structure at the sub-global level involves an analysis of 1. the local relationship between the interstate and nonstate-domains, an important analysis in the dynamics of the concept of EuroIslam as Tibi proposed and one which seems to be playing out in practice in Europe. 2. the
interplay of social structures at the regional or sub-global and the global level derives from Weller (2002, 64-8, quoted in Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez 2005, 7) in terms of the degree of their dependence on shared geographical boundaries. This aspect, I maintain, is of lesser relevance in the discussion of EuroIslam “regionalism” along English School parameters. And 3. the interplay between “different social structures at the regional/subglobal level” (Ibid.), is an epistemologically significant process in my opinion in analyzing EuroIslam because it is exactly this process between the socio-religious traditions of Islam and their interplay on the sub-global scale with European/EU notions of ”belonging” which is necessary to give emphasis to the development of alternative processes and discourses for peace in the Euro-Mediterranean.

Analyzing EuroIslam from these perspectives indicates that it is more than just an Arabic regional international society, but potentially a Euro-Mediterranean International Society emanating from a post-national constructivist constellation. Buzan and Gonzalez-Pelaez (Ibid., 8) question that “subglobal international societies must automatically be in rivalry for global status” as the traditional English School discourse traditionally predicted in the Cold War context of Eastern and Western subglobal international societies to “almost inevitably fall… into struggle for universal dominion, in the process wrecking international society at the global level until one of them emerged victorious.” Today “there are clearly no grounds (other than an ideological commitment to a Machtpolitik view of the world) for any automatic assumption that subglobal developments must fall into such rivalry (Ibid., 9).
In this dissertation I examined the mutual roles of the EU vis-a-vis North Africa and the Levant beyond historical ties and current economic interests in a security context, and its potential to shift from the state-centric interests of a security complex to the potential security community in a regional international society and identity context. This dissertation shows that while the EU displays within its supra-national modus operandi many institutional and social constructivist approaches with distinct post-Westphalian characteristics, the same cannot (yet) be said of the southern rim of the EMP where nationalist, and often patrimonial, patterns are understandable following centuries of colonial rule, and pooling any aspect of this sovereignty are as yet unimaginable concepts.

The incomplete “project” of the EMP is due to a large extent to progress in this area which is dependent on the resolution of issues being worked out elsewhere, and the results of which only gradually feed into the security processes devised for the Mediterranean itself (Spencer 2001, 29). This includes the considerable number of issues which are (still) being dealt with on a bilateral basis, not an EU-MENA basis. The large amount of analyses critical of the (lack of) real and measurable accomplishments published following the ten-year anniversary of the EMP (compare Jerch, Lorca and Escribano 2005), together with the events of September 11\textsuperscript{th} and the subsequent Iraq invasion appear to have served as a wake-up call to the EU (Schumacher 2004, 99; Neugart and Schumacher 2004), as a new focus on the extensive programs of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and MEDA Regional Activities calendar (e.g. MEDA Regional Activities calendar 2005, or Goethe Institut 2007) shows. Hence, to state that
“as for the EU, its interest in the Mediterranean is likely to decline as its attention focuses on the admission of new members and other more important matters (Chourou 2001, 69) may reflect MENA anxieties, but not reality.

The goals of “stability and prosperity set out in the Barcelona Declaration can be achieved only if all signatories are equally committed to its realization” (Chourou 2001, 69) is indeed not only a North-South process, but requires South-South commitment as well. The traditional reflex of looking to colonial powers as the easy answer to problems in MENA is not only simplistic, and prevents not only the economies and societies, but also political processes in southern Mediterranean countries from maturing, because more difficult issues are not addressed. Chourou (2001, 70) confirms this when he states that

the Arab region is already highly integrated – but only on paper, as Arab regimes failed to put into effect any of the outstanding integration agreements that they have signed. Many have argued that there are too many divisive factors in the region to realistically contemplate unification, integration or even simple co-operation among Arab countries.

Experienced observers note that the EU’s constitutive member countries are probably similarly “unique” individually, as well as their historical relationships “divisive,” similarly as is observed in the Southern Mediterranean. Yet, they managed to overcome these challenges successfully, despite the fits and spurts during the EU’s evolution. To be disappointed, especially on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the EMP in 1995, in the purported lack of achievements of the EMP in MENA in terms of developing a zone of peace and prosperity is perhaps unrealistic and naïve: the EMP’s efforts at social and economic development contribute to the reciprocal evolution in the political sphere with greater participation.
The hard/soft power paradigms involve a delicate and complex balancing act in the EuroMed area (Joffé 2001, 32), one the one hand as the historical “Braudelian vision of the Mediterranean as a common cultural space” (Braudel 1982, quoted in Joffé 2001, 33). On the other hand, some of the security issues, such as all types of trafficking or illegal migration, pertaining to the northern and southern Mediterranean, are complicated – but indicate the need also for stronger intra-Mediterranean integration - by their trans-regional aspects i.a. with Central Asia and the Balkans (Spencer 2001, 29). Multilateral approaches involving the U.S. especially, such as the recent agreement by Israel and Palestine for a peace treaty by the end of 2008 following the Annapolis conference in November 2007 (Myers and Cooper 2007) or the G8 Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA) – are not, as some might argue, to mostly keep western interests from both sides of the Atlantic represented in MENA, but historically because Israel trusted the US more, while the Palestinians’ interests were in part represented more by the EU in the Mid-East peace process. BMENA is also indicative of the fact that the US well recognizes the significance of soft power in the transatlantic umbilicus to the EuroMed in addition to the overlap in membership within the hard-soft constellations of the EU vs. NATO and its Mediterranean Dialogue.

Was hence the assumption of a common Euro-Mediterranean space underlying the EMP, which would constitute a region in any meaningful sense of the word fundamentally flawed (Heller 2001, 76), or have we simply not evolved enough beyond national egos to perceive a common regional security identity and values? Do shared interests in peace and stability, prosperity, and mutual understanding “exist only at the
same high level of generality and abstraction that enables the entire world to gather under the wings of universal organizations like the United Nations” (Heller 2001, 76)? Or is it actually accomplished one step at a time, like in the EU, under a shared vision and commitment? Would challenges, such as the uneven Middle East process, really disturb such a firm commitment or was this simply an indication of the lack of commitment of EMP members to a lasting regional security community were expectations of the process among the EMP were unrealistic and naïve? This dissertation shows that as the EU evolves, the original concept of the EMP will become more relevant, rather less so as Heller (2001, 81) would have it, because all aspects of security have the potential of being addressed and reinforced in the framework of the EMP under which, with increasing globalization security threats, be they religious fanaticism-based terrorism, trafficking or illegal migration, are also accelerating.

The EMP could perhaps be viewed as that “mid-range approach to capturing the processes of large-scale change that are occurring in the international realm” (Lawson 2006, 397), which that author considers more effective in capturing the dynamics of processes (Ibid., 416), than the traditional micro-, macro, and meso-level explanations of contemporary international relations theory have been able to. One might even say that the EMP itself should be securitized\textsuperscript{147} for all members for all to reap its political-security, economic-developmental and societal benefits through this increased prioritization. Although a number of authors point out the intra-regional fragmentation due to latent tribalism and uneven development to prevent this unified commitment, the

\textsuperscript{147} To be understood in terms of Buzan, Waever and de Wilde’s (1998) definition of the terms as the extreme form of “politization” of an issue pertaining to the security of a country (or region).
EU-memberstates themselves are equally heterogeneous, and the EU functions in fact to preserve this “diversity in unity” as its motto states, while utilizing institutional and financial instruments to bridge the differences. Habermas (1997) finds that Europe has i.a. found solutions for governance beyond the nation-state.

Hedley Bull (1977, 10), developing Grotius’ concern for international society and building on Kant’s (1957) recognition of trans-national social bonds, differentiates between an international system, where states have such contact that the decision of one state have sufficient impact requiring foreign policy engagement between the two. He contrasts this with international society, which can be identified when states “conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share the workings of common institutions (Ibid.). Buzan and González-Peláez (2005, 21) were some of the first authors to apply this concept to the Middle East. While this dissertation is not focusing on an English School analysis of the EMP specifically, in terms of identity formation in the EMP beyond functionalist and institutionalist modi operandi, perhaps this self-image of a Euro-Mediterranean international society with shared political and ethical principles and interests it has been lacking. These, according to Bull arise i.a. through agreement on, and (institutional) execution of, procedures. While one would not want to be accused of E.H. Carr’s (1939) Utopianism, this could clarify a vision in the Mediterranean region as a regional security complex where order is maintained through a local and general balance of power system

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148 This is in contrast to the U.S’ motto “ex pluribus unum,” i.e. the goal of a melting pot.
to prevent hegemonic imperialism, international laws and institutions (Bull 1977, 97-116) to actually “live” the basic rules of coexistence among states and international society as the supreme normative principle of the political organization of mankind (Ibid.). Similar sentiments have been voiced, e.g. at the Mediterranean Forum of foreign ministers (2000) and Aliboni et al. (2006). Vobruba (2007) has shown that sociologically, institutionalization precedes the formation of consciousness of that population supportive of it.

Hence the security-significance of the EMP can be said to lie in its role contributing towards peace in the Mediterranean and a wider regional stability on a domestic, state, regional and international level overall by developing an international society from the international system for the purpose of a politically and socially more stable and prosperous region. The continued construction of Europe’s common security role beyond the EU in light of the security challenges to the region has been repeatedly reiterated by French president Sarkozy (Thornhill 2007). However, Beck (2004, quoted in Anderson 2007) states that “Europeanisation means creating a new politics. It means entering as a player into the meta-power game, into the struggle to form the rules of a new global order”). Nikolaidis (2002, 770-81), however, cautions against an overly “EUtopia,” while the EU appears to assert a distinct ethos in a distinct polity: Through an act of self-constitution, i.e. autopoiesis, the actual European institutions involve much bargaining and compromise rather than representing a homogenous demos. Yet, just this promotion of diversity can become the Achilles heel when it promotes resistance as the
French and Dutch expressed in their votes on the EU constitutional treaty of 2004 (Ibid. 784).

Discourse has an ideational dimension with cognitive and normative functions, as well as “an interactive dimension, with coordinative and communicative functions (Schmidt 2000, cited in Howorth 2004, 212). While the impact of ideas had been assumed to be the weakest factor in security and defense policy (Howorth Ibid.), policy elites in Europe restructured a radically transition from the Cold War to the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as a new “coordinative discourse” (Ibid). This slowly evolving common acceptance of an integrated European interventionism is based beyond national interests (‘British Atlanticism’, ‘French exceptionalism’ and ‘German pacifism’) but

on far more idealistic motivations such as humanitarianism and ethics” (Ibid.). The new willingness by Europeans to discuss their collective interests and preferences within the Alliances … [as well as move] towards a greater Euro-American balance in influence and responsibilities … [reflected] a growing European inter-subjectivity based on cultural norms and values (Howorth 2004, 214)

and was reflected in the Common Foreign and Security Policy emerging from the 2001 Treaty of Nice.

Gonzalo Escribano (2005) points out that the ENP’s (in contrast to the EMP’s region specific) economic prescriptions had been perceived as merely cosmetic in the past. However, security perceptions in particular

are a decisive component of Mediterranean security in North-South and South-North relations alike. In the minds of a number of European publics, political Islamism – identified with terrorism and, at its worst, confusingly identified with Islam itself – tends to replace the defunct Soviet threat as the number one enemy, potentially at its best (Vasconcelos 1999, 31).
Hence security in MENA is based partially socio-economically, and partially politically (e.g. through the radicalization of Islam). While the United States, especially through NATO, contributes substantially to the security perception in the Mediterranean (at least until the current Iraq war), the EMP’s role in Mediterranean security had been through deepening institutionalization (hence increasing trust among its partners through iteration and predictability) political spill-over in terms of Ernst Haas’ neo-functionalist theory, and social-cultural rapprochement, often through the efforts of NGOs.

Buzan’s argument that “the West” is trying to impose Westphalian notions onto the Maghreb and Mashriq is not really accurate either: the governments (whether based on ruling clans and/or families or not) of the (voluntarily) participating EMP countries had accepted concepts of sovereign states already decades earlier.
Chapter Ten

Conclusions

This dissertation shows that soft power has significant security implications, the optimal mix between the two is being constantly adjusted (Heisbourg 2001, 6/7), based on the political realities of the day as well as progress in the process of harmonization among EMP members. Heisbourg (2001, 7) points out that capability is not merely a function of military hardware, but equally a “function of strategic vision” (Ibid.). The EMP represents the soft power security-political interface among countries bordering the Mediterranean on the North and South via a vision of cooperative security. This contrasts with the past “vertical” North-South confrontations such as the Reconquista and the Crusades, or the South-North conflicts, such as the Battle of Potiers in the 8th century and the sieges of Vienna by the Ottomans (Heisbourg 2001, 7), or the contemporary South-South disagreements in this region.

Aid and debt relief, then, have not pivotally improved political stability or economic wellbeing in Africa adequately. Instead the EU prefers to support developing countries to commit themselves to good policies (Williamson and Beattie 2006) through the promotion of trade coupled with aid. While from the Southern perspective, partnership entails the process of political cooperation in which a number of soft-security issues (such as terrorism and migration) are dealt with on a case-by-case issue to avoid the “Second Image Reversed,” i.e. reciprocal domestic-international factor dynamics to affect MENA’s foreign policies (i.e. any threat to MENA’s concepts of national sovereignty), according to Chourou (2001, 62, quoting Aliboni 2000), contrasts this with
(t)he EU perspective [which] seems more complex and far-reaching. Partnership-building means that political co-operation has to be upgraded with a view to strengthening the broad and long-term foundations of security… by achieving sustainable development, political democracy and good governance … This entails a much closer interplay between inter-state and intra-state frameworks, for regional security is dependent on a set of domestic processes of democratization.

Theories of development would refer to this process as “self discovery” rather than merely focusing on issues of capacity building, greater participation and ownership in programs to develop own national poverty reduction programs.

In this analysis of the EMP in terms of regionalism and regional integration, adopts i.a. Pace’s (2003) concept that the Mediterranean is a social construction, based on the concerned actors’ acceptance of significance and meaning of the term. In the context of the EMP, this dissertation sought to examine some of the processes which geopolitical and socio-economic imaginings sustain this concept of a Mediterranean “region,” i.e. what and how this region is defined as such – and consequently institutionalized - by the principal actors’ reciprocal co-constitution of this entity’s structures in Wendt’s terminology, in order to understand its challenges and opportunities.

This transformational approach to accommodate competing interests can be visualized e.g. through the work of Buzan and González-Peláez (2005) who find that an analysis of Middle Eastern society through the English School lens is helpful in understanding the traditionally non-liberal mix of inter-human, transnational and interstate social structures of the classical Islamic world in a “layered international social structure in which some norms and institutions are shared and some not” (Ibid., 11). The EMP can be understood as functioning within this interplay of interregional and
global socio-political and economic structures. Indeed, it is a project of mutual learning on both shores of the Mediterranean, the traditional Judeo-Christian club of the EU (in tandem with Turkey’s current EU accession proceedings) opening itself socio-culturally to the Muslim world and actively engaging itself politically and socio-economically, with the reciprocal true for the MENA member states.

The EMP should be understood not as an attempt by the EU to invent a region that did not yet exist, and but to create a regional identity based neither on blood nor religion, but on civil society, economic interdependence, voluntary networks and civic beliefs, i.e. to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security community whose practices are synonymous of peace and stability. The EMP cannot be adequately analyzed solely in the neo-liberal theory of international cooperation (e.g. Keohane 1984) whose elements are the importance of international anarchy in shaping state behavior, with the state as the most important actor in world politics and the assumption of states as essentially self-interested when there is low interdependence between states. Rather, the establishment of new norms and institutions (i.e. explicit principles, norms rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations of the EMP) (Keohane 1984, 85-109) in EU relationships reduce international anarchy among its members (to varying degrees, depending on whether the topic is intra-EU or an EU-external relationship), thus inducing them to incur reciprocal obligations as cooperation demands. Could it not be possible that peace and prosperity, as foreign policy aims, be approached in terms of democracy, human rights, a market economy, and the rule of law in a region (compare EuroBarometer: The European Union

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142 Such as democracy, free markets, equal education access for youth or gender equality, the multilateralism of the EU, traditional religious values (both Christian, Muslim and Jewish), or institutionalized BSR
and its Neighbours 2006), rather than through massive military attacks which have shown in “the recent experience of the United States and Israel in the Middle East … [that they are] not only morally reprehensible, but useless in achieving the stated aims [i.e. democratization] – of those who carry them out” (Zinn 2006). The details of the EMP above have shown that the EU’s economic, political, and socio-cultural initiatives are for the purpose of extending the European area of stability south and to create a pluralistic security community whose practices are synonymous with peace and stability (Adler and Crawford 2004). The EMP was also “designed as the EU’s preferred tool for engaging Islam in a ‘dialogue of civilizations’, and its central foreign economic policy in the region as a whole” (Crawford 2005, 1).

This is, in my analysis, significant in the wider globalization setting, such as an analysis of the dynamics within the EMP (or its successor program, the UMed), as well as to capture not simply power gains and expansion spheres of political interest considerations, but to address the socio-cultural aspects of economic integration and eliminate dependencies in terms of the English School writers, such as Hedley Bull might, and hereby achieve the political harmonization within the area of the EMP which the European Coal and Steel Community achieved after World War II between France and Germany. While the research phase of this dissertation concluded before the global financial crisis became acute, it heightened the importance of addressing remedies for the defects of current global governance, not only in the financial sector specifically, but potentially corporate governance arrangements in the OECD (Tudway 2008) as independent supervisory structures in promoting effective accountability through wider stakeholder interests (Tudway 2008).
In the absence of another alternative for peaceful coexistence, we observe how the agreements between the EMP MSs have contributed to interdependence between them, enhancing the zone of increased trust (through predictable and stable institutions) as well as peace and prosperity due to functioning market economies, accountability and transparency. The EMP also contributes to a reduction of economic boundaries and cultural prejudices. This would serve to counteract the marginalization of MENA in the globalization processes and contribute to the stabilization of this region politically through economic integration with its neighbors across the Magreb and Mashreq as well as with the EU. Perhaps Robert Putnam’s proposal (in Lloyd, 2006) can be applied to the members of the EMP: “What we shouldn’t do is to say that they should be more like us: We should construct a new ‘us’,” such as a regional Euro-Mediterranean “us.”

In conclusion I would state the Euro-Med can be definitely considered a regional security complex based on the following facts with the EMP as its predominant dynamic so far: In addition to the historical political, economic, social ties, as of 2007, the EU has formally recognized its relationship with the (southern) Mediterranean and the Middle East as strategic (Council of the European Union report 16572/06) in all its implications: energy (e.g. EU-Africa-Middle East Energy\textsuperscript{143} Conference in Sharm El Sheikh November 2007), the humanitarian impact of environmental degradation, including controlled migration of especially North African populations who have historically a strong presence in the especially those EU members bordering the Mediterranean, youth exchanges (especially to contrast the active student recruitment by Chinese universities in Africa), and of course not only the establishment of an EMP free trade area by 2010, but in fact ultimately of a pan-African-European free trade area and the acceptance of EMP-

\textsuperscript{143} Energy in MENA does not refer to petroleum resources alone, but also solar energy (McKie 2007
membership application by Iraq once they fulfill the EuroMed’s *acquis* (Beatty 2007)\(^{144}\) to underscore a Euro-Med regional security complex.

In this light, the EMP is a liberal material as well as a Weberian value society, overcoming not only ancient tribalism, as the EU has overcome ancient internal civilizational confrontations, but the paradigm of the EMP parameters reflects this as well: while church and state are aspired to be separate, pure economic liberalism without values is not acceptable to many peoples in the EMP, but can be – and are - combined. Reminding ourselves that one of the goals of the ENP is “to share everything but institutions” (with the EU’s neighbors), it is perhaps not overly optimistic that the EMP is not simply an area of shared security, but also a sui generis of international society for the neighbors to maximize on the benefits of globalization, and buffer its negative consequences in their countries and across the region. Martin (2007) has a point when he suggests instead of an “either/or” thinking to adopt instead “integrative thinking,” which embraces contradictions to lead to more nuanced decisions and strategies.

While we strive for a positive-sum world (Wolf 2007), some relationships are more privileged than others. The EMP has earned this distinction, while recognizing that it is a continuous process: there is not one road to modernity (Hoffmann 1965; Taylor 1983), nor one recipe for regional integration, but peace as a step-by-step process through regional integration.\(^ {145}\)

\(^{144}\) Recognizing that some authors have sounded very pessimistic alarm bells in the past, e.g. Everts (2004, 155), who wrote that “The manner in which European leaders have chosen to handle, or rather mishandle, the Iraq crisis has inflicted serious and possibly lasting damage to the EU’s ability to frame and implement a credible set of policies towards the greater Middle East… Thus the prospects for a meaningful EU role, as opposed to national ones, are exceptionally poor.”

\(^{145}\) Which was after all started already some 3,000 years ago by the Phoenicians, with a divine nod according to mythology when the Greek Zeus sought his bride among them.
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APPENDICES

Appendix One

Euro-Mediterranean Partnership - Barcelona Declaration

(adopted at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference - 27-28/11/95)

• The Council of the European Union, represented by its President, Mr. Javier SOLANA, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain.

• The European Commission, represented by Mr. Manuel MARIN, Vice-President,

• Germany, represented by Mr. Klaus KINKEL, Vice-Chancellor and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Algeria, represented by Mr. Mohamed Salah DEMBRI, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Austria, represented by Mrs. Benita FERREROWALDNER, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

• Belgium, represented by Mr. Erik DERYCKE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Cyprus, represented by Mr. Alecos MICHAELIDES, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Denmark, represented by Mr. Ole Loensmann POULSEN, State Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

• Egypt, represented by Mr. A. Mr. MOUSSA, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Spain, represented by Mr. Carlos WESTENDORP, State Secretary for Relations with the European Community,

• Finland, represented by Mrs. Tarja HALONEN, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• France, represented by Mr. Hervé de CHARETTE, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Greece, represented by Mr. Károlos PAPOULIAS, Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Ireland, represented by Mr. Dick SPRING, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs,

• Israel, represented by Mr. Ehud BARAK, Minister for Foreign Affairs,
意大利，由Susanna AGNELLI女士，外交部长

约旦，由AbdelKarim KABARITI先生，外交部长

黎巴嫩，由Fares BOUEZ先生，外交部长

卢森堡，由Jacques F. POOS先生，副总理兼外交部长，外贸与国际合作部长

马耳他，由Guido DE MARCO教授，副总理兼外交部长

摩洛哥，由Abdellatif FILALI先生，总理兼外交部长

荷兰，由Hans van MIERLO先生，副总理兼外交部长

葡萄牙，由Jaime GAMA先生，外交部长

英国，由Malcolm RIFKIND QC MP先生，外交及联邦事务大臣

叙利亚，由Farouk AL-SHARAA先生，外交部长

瑞典，由Lena HJELM-WALLEN女士，外交部长

突尼斯，由Habib Ben YAHIA先生，外交部长

土耳其，由Deniz BAYKAL先生，副总理兼外交部长

巴勒斯坦权力机构，由Yassir ARAFAT先生，巴勒斯坦权力机构总统，参加巴塞罗那的地中海—欧洲会议：

• 强调地中海的战略重要性，并被其致力于赋予未来关系新维度的决心所感动，基于全面合作和团结，顺应了由邻里和历史建立的特权纽带；

• 意识到地中海两岸的新政治、经济和社会问题构成了共同挑战，需要协调的综合应对；

• 叙利亚，由Farouk AL-SHARAA先生，外交部长

• 瑞典，由Lena HJELM-WALLEN女士，外交部长

• 意大利，由Susanna AGNELLI女士，外交部长

• 约旦，由AbdelKarim KABARITI先生，外交部长

• 黎巴嫩，由Fares BOUEZ先生，外交部长

• 卢森堡，由Jacques F. POOS先生，副总理兼外交部长，外贸与国际合作部长

• 马耳他，由Guido DE MARCO教授，副总理兼外交部长

• 摩洛哥，由Abdellatif FILALI先生，总理兼外交部长

• 荷兰，由Hans van MIERLO先生，副总理兼外交部长

• 葡萄牙，由Jaime GAMA先生，外交部长

• 英国，由Malcolm RIFKIND QC MP先生，外交及联邦事务大臣

• 指出地中海的国家战略重要性，并被其致力于给予未来关系新维度的决心所感动，基于全面合作和团结，顺应了由邻里和历史建立的特权纽带；

• 意识到地中海两岸的新政治、经济和社会问题构成了共同挑战，需要协调的综合应对；
• resolved to establish to that end a multilateral and lasting framework of relations 
based on a spirit of partnership, with due regard for the characteristics, values and 
distinguishing features peculiar to each of the participants;

• regarding this multilateral framework as the counterpart to a strengthening of 
  bilateral relations which it is important to safeguard, while laying stress on their 
specific nature

• stressing that this EuroMediterranean initiative is not intended to replace the other 
  activities and initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and 
development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success. The 
participants support the realization of a just, comprehensive and lasting peace 
settlement in the Middle East based on the relevant United Nations Security 
Council resolutions and principles mentioned in the letter of invitation to the 
Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, including the principle land for peace, 
with all that this implies;

• convinced that the general objective of turning the Mediterranean basin into an area 
of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and 
prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, 
sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat 
poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all 
essential aspects of partnership,

• hereby agree to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants the 
  EuroMediterranean partnership through strengthened political dialogue on a 
regular basis, the development of economic and financial cooperation and greater 
emphasis on the social, cultural and human dimension, these being the three 
aspects of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

Political & security partnership: Establishing a common area of peace & stability
The participants express their conviction that the peace, stability and security of the 
Mediterranean region are a common asset which they pledge to promote and strengthen 
by all means at their disposal. To this end they agree to conduct a strengthened political 
dialogue at regular intervals, based on observance of essential principles of international 
law, and reaffirm a number of common objectives in matters of internal and external 
stability.
In this spirit they undertake in the following declaration of principles to:
act in accordance with the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, as well as other obligations under international law, in particular those 
arising out of regional and international instruments to which they are party;
develop the rule of law and democracy in their political systems, while recognizing in 
this framework the right of each of them to choose and freely develop its own political, 
socio-cultural, economic and judicial system;
respect human rights and fundamental freedoms and guarantee the effective legitimate exercise of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of association for peaceful purposes and freedom of thought, conscience and religion, both individually and together with other members of the same group, without any discrimination on grounds of race, nationality, language, religion or sex;
give favourable consideration, through dialogue between the parties, to exchanges of information on matters relating to human rights, fundamental freedoms, racism and xenophobia;
respect and ensure respect for diversity and pluralism in their societies, promote tolerance between different groups in society and combat manifestations of intolerance, racism and xenophobia. The participants stress the importance of proper education in the matter of human rights and fundamental freedoms; respect their sovereign equality and all rights inherent in their sovereignty, and fulfil in good faith the obligations they have assumed under international law; respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of States, as reflected in agreements between relevant parties; refrain, in accordance with the rules of international law, from any direct or indirect intervention in the internal affairs of another partner; respect the territorial integrity and unity of each of the other partners; settle their disputes by peaceful means, call upon all participants to renounce recourse to the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity of another participant, including the acquisition of territory by force, and reaffirm the right to fully exercise sovereignty by legitimate means in accordance with the UN Charter and international law; strengthen their cooperation in preventing and combating terrorism, in particular by ratifying and applying the international instruments they have signed, by acceding to such instruments and by taking any other appropriate measure; fight together against the expansion and diversification of organized crime and combat the drugs problem in all its aspects; promote regional security by acting, inter alia, in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes, and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons free zones including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.

The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms. Refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW. Promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation. consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.
Economic & financial partnership: Creating an area of shared prosperity

The participants emphasize the importance they attach to sustainable and balanced economic and social development with a view to achieving their objective of creating an area of shared prosperity.

The partners acknowledge the difficulties that the question of debt can create for the economic development of the countries of the Mediterranean region. They agree, in view of the importance of their relations, to continue the dialogue in order to achieve progress in the competent fora.

Noting that the partners have to take up common challenges, albeit to varying degrees, the participants set themselves the following long-term objectives:

• acceleration of the pace of sustainable socio-economic development;
• improvement of the living conditions of their populations, increase in the employment level and reduction in the development gap in the EuroMediterranean region;
• encouragement of regional cooperation and integration.

With a view to achieving these objectives, the participants agree to establish an economic and financial partnership which, taking into account the different degrees of development, will be based on:

• the progressive establishment of a free-trade area;
• the implementation of appropriate economic cooperation and concerted action in the relevant areas;
• a substantial increase in the European Union's financial assistance to its partners.

a) Free-trade area

The free-trade area will be established through the new EuroMediterranean Agreements and free-trade agreements between partners of the European Union. The parties have set 2010 as the target date for the gradual establishment of this area which will cover most trade with due observance of the obligations resulting from the WTO.

With a view to developing gradual free trade in this area: tariff and nontariff barriers to trade in manufactured products will be progressively eliminated in accordance with timetables to be negotiated between the partners; taking as a starting point traditional trade flows, and as far as the various agricultural policies allow and with due respect to the results achieved within the GATT negotiations, trade in agricultural products will be progressively liberalized through reciprocal preferential access among the parties; trade in services including right of establishment will be progressively liberalized having due regard to the GATS agreement.

The participants decide to facilitate the progressive establishment of this free-trade area through

• the adoption of suitable measures as regard rules of origin, certification, protection of intellectual and industrial property rights and competition;
• the pursuit and the development of policies based on the principles of market economy and the integration of their economies taking into account their respective needs and levels of development;
• the adjustment and modernization of economic and social structures, giving priority to
the promotion and development of the private sector, to the upgrading of the productive
sector and to the establishment of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework
for a market economy. They will likewise endeavour to mitigate the negative social
consequences which may result from this adjustment, by promoting programmes for the
benefit of the neediest populations;
• the promotion of mechanisms to foster transfers of technology.

b) Economic cooperation and concerted action
Cooperation will be developed in particular in the areas listed below and in this respect
the participants:
acknowledge that economic development must be supported both by internal savings, the
basis of investment, and by direct foreign investment. They stress the importance of
creating an environment conducive to investment, in particular by the progressive
elimination of obstacles to such investment which could lead to the transfer of technology
and increase production and exports;
affirm that regional cooperation on a voluntary basis, particularly with a view to
developing trade between the partners themselves, is a key factor in promoting the
creation of a free-trade area;
encourage enterprises to enter into agreements with each other and undertake to promote
such cooperation and industrial modernization by providing a favourable environment
and regulatory framework. They consider it necessary to adopt and to implement a
technical support programme for SMEs;
emphasize their interdependence with regard to the environment, which necessitates a
regional approach and increased cooperation, as well as better coordination of existing
multilateral programmes, while confirming their attachment to the Barcelona Convention
and the Mediterranean Action Plan. They recognize the importance of reconciling
economic development with environmental protection, of integrating environmental
concerns into the relevant aspects of economic policy and of mitigating the negative
environmental consequences which might result. They undertake to establish a short and
medium-term priority action programme, including in connection with combating
desertification, and to concentrate appropriate technical and financial support on those
actions;
recognize the key role of women in development and undertake to promote their active
participation in economic and social life and in the creation of employment;
stress the importance of the conservation and rational management of fish stocks and of
the improvement of cooperation on research into stocks, including aquaculture, and
undertake to facilitate scientific training and research and to envisage creating joint
instruments;
acknowledge the pivotal role of the energy sector in the economic EuroMediterranean
partnership and decide to strengthen cooperation and intensify dialogue in the field of
energy policies. They also decide to create the appropriate framework conditions for
investments and the activities of energy companies, cooperating in creating the conditions
enabling such companies to extend energy networks and promote link-ups;
recognize that water supply together with suitable management and development of
resources are priority issues for all Mediterranean partners and that cooperation should be
developed in these areas;
agree to cooperate in modernizing and restructuring agriculture and in promoting integrated rural development. This cooperation will focus in particular on technical assistance and training, on support for policies implemented by the partners to diversify production, on the reduction of food dependency and on the promotion of environment-friendly agriculture. They also agree to cooperate in the eradication of illicit crops and the development of any regions affected.

The participants also agree to cooperate in other areas and, to that effect:
- stress the importance of developing and improving infrastructures, including through the establishment of an efficient transport system, the development of information technologies and the modernization of telecommunications. They agree to draw up a programme of priorities for that purpose;
- undertake to respect the principles of international maritime law, in particular freedom to provide services in international transport and free access to international cargoes. The results of the ongoing multilateral trade negotiations on maritime transport services being conducted within the WTO will be taken into account when agreed;
- undertake to encourage cooperation between local authorities and in support of regional planning;
- recognizing that science and technology have a significant influence on socioeconomic development, agree to strengthen scientific research capacity and development, contribute to the training of scientific and technical staff and promote participation in joint research projects based on the creation of scientific networks;
- agree to promote cooperation on statistics in order to harmonize methods and exchange data.

**c) Financial cooperation**

The participants consider that the creation of a free-trade area and the success of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership require a substantial increase in financial assistance, which must above all encourage sustainable indigenous development and the mobilization of local economic operators. They note in this connection that:
- the Cannes European Council agreed to set aside ECU 4 685 million for this financial assistance in the form of available Community budget funds for the period 1995-1999. This will be supplemented by EIB assistance in the form of increased loans and the bilateral financial contributions from the Member States;
- effective financial cooperation managed in the framework of a multiannual programme, taking into account the special characteristics of each of the partners is necessary;
- sound macro-economic management is of fundamental importance in ensuring the success of the partnership. To this end they agree to promote dialogue on their respective economic policies and on the method of optimizing financial cooperation.

**Partnership in social, cultural and Human affairs: Developing human resources, promoting understanding between cultures & exchanges between civil societies**

The participants recognize that the traditions of culture and civilization throughout the Mediterranean region, dialogue between these cultures and exchanges at human, scientific and technological level are an essential factor in bringing their peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each other.
In this spirit, the participants agree to establish a partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. To this end:

they reaffirm that dialogue and respect between cultures and religions are a necessary pre-condition for bringing the peoples closer. In this connection they stress the importance of the role the mass media can play in the reciprocal recognition and understanding of cultures as a source of mutual enrichment;

they stress the essential nature of the development of human resources, both as regards the education and training of young people in particular and in the area of culture. They express their intent to promote cultural exchanges and knowledge of other languages, respecting the cultural identity of each partner, and to implement a lasting policy of educational and cultural programmes; in this context, the partners undertake to adopt measures to facilitate human exchanges, in particular by improving administrative procedures;

they underline the importance of the health sector for sustainable development and express their intention of promoting the effective participation of the community in operations to improve health and well-being;

they recognize the importance of social development which, in their view, must go hand in hand with any economic development. They attach particular importance to respect for fundamental social rights, including the right to development;

they recognize the essential contribution civil society can make in the process of development of the EuroMediterranean partnership and as an essential factor for greater understanding and closeness between peoples;

they accordingly agree to strengthen and/or introduce the necessary instruments of decentralized cooperation to encourage exchanges between those active in development within the framework of national laws: leaders of political and civil society, the cultural and religious world, universities, the research community, the media, organizations, the trade unions and public and private enterprises;

on this basis, they recognize the importance of encouraging contacts and exchanges between young people in the context of programmes for decentralized cooperation;

they will encourage actions of support for democratic institutions and for the strengthening of the rule of law and civil society;

they recognize that current population trends represent a priority challenge which must be counterbalanced by appropriate policies to accelerate economic takeoff;

they acknowledge the importance of the role played by migration in their relationships. They agree to strengthen their cooperation to reduce migratory pressures, among other things through vocational training programmes and programmes of assistance for job creation. They undertake to guarantee protection of all the rights recognized under existing legislation of migrants legally resident in their respective territories;

in the area of illegal immigration they decide to establish closer cooperation. In this context, the partners, aware of their responsibility for readmission, agree to adopt the relevant provisions and measures, by means of bilateral agreements or arrangements, in order to readmit their nationals who are in an illegal situation. To that end, the Member States of the European Union take citizens to mean nationals of the Member States, as defined for Community purposes;

they agree to strengthen cooperation by means of various measures to prevent terrorism and fight it more effectively together;
by the same token they consider it necessary to fight jointly and effectively against drug trafficking, international crime and corruption;
young they underline the importance of waging a determined campaign against racism, xenophobia and intolerance and agree to cooperate to that end.

**Follow-up to the conference**
The participants:
considering that the Barcelona Conference provides the basis for a process, which is open and should develop;
reaffirming their will to establish a partnership based on the principles and objectives defined in this Declaration;
resolved to give practical expression to this EuroMediterranean partnership;
convinced that, in order to achieve this objective, it is necessary to continue the comprehensive dialogue thus initiated and to carry out a series of specific actions;
hereby adopt the attached work programme:
The Ministers for Foreign Affairs will meet periodically in order to monitor the application of this Declaration and define actions enabling the objectives of the partnership to be achieved.
The various activities will be followed by ad hoc thematic meetings of ministers, senior officials and experts, exchanges of experience and information, contacts between those active in civil society and by any other appropriate means.
Contacts between parliamentarians, regional authorities, local authorities and the social partners will be encouraged.
A "EuroMediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" at senior-official level, consisting of the European Union Troika and one representative of each Mediterranean partner, will hold regular meetings to prepare the meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs, take stock of and evaluate the followup to the Barcelona process and all its components and update the work programme.
Appropriate preparatory and followup work for the meetings resulting from the Barcelona work programme and from the conclusions of the "EuroMediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" will be undertaken by the Commission departments.
The next meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs will be held in the first semester of 1997 in one of the twelve Mediterranean partners of the European Union, to be determined through further consultations.
Annex : Work Programme

I. Introduction
The aim of this programme is to implement the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration, and to respect its principles, through regional and multilateral actions. It is complementary both to the bilateral cooperation, implemented in particular under the agreements between the EU and its Mediterranean partners, and to the cooperation already existing in other multilateral fora.

The preparation and the follow-up to the various actions will be implemented in accordance with the principles and mechanisms set out in the Barcelona Declaration.

The priority actions for further cooperation are listed below. This does not exclude Euro-Mediterranean cooperation being extended to other actions if the partners so agree.

The actions may apply to States, their local and regional authorities as well as actors of their civil society.

With the agreement of the participants, other countries or organizations may be involved in the actions contained in the work programme. The implementation must take place in a flexible and transparent way.

With the agreement of the participants, future EuroMediterranean cooperation will take account, as appropriate, of the opinions and recommendations resulting from the relevant discussions held at various levels in the region.

The implementation of the programme should start as soon as practical after the Barcelona Conference. It will be reviewed at the next EuroMediterranean Conference on the basis of a report to be prepared by the European Commission departments, particularly on the basis of reports from the various meetings and Groups mentioned below, and approved by the "Euro-Mediterranean Committee for the Barcelona process" set up by the Barcelona Declaration.

II. Political and Security Partnership: Establishing a common area of peace and stability
With a view to contributing to the objective of progressively creating a zone of peace, stability and security in the Mediterranean, senior officials will meet periodically, starting within the first quarter of 1996. They will:

conduct a political dialogue to examine the most appropriate means and methods of implementing the principles adopted by the Barcelona Declaration, and

submit practical proposals in due time for the next EuroMediterranean Meeting of Foreign Ministers.

Foreign policy institutes in the EuroMediterranean region will be encouraged to establish a network for more intensive cooperation which could become operational as of 1996.

III. Economic and Financial Partnership: Building a zone of shared prosperity
Meetings will take place periodically at the level of Ministers, officials or experts, as appropriate, to promote cooperation in the following areas. These meetings may be supplemented, where appropriate, by conferences or seminars involving the private sector likewise.
Establishment of a EuroMediterranean Free Trade Area
The establishment of a free trade area in accordance with the principles contained in the Barcelona Declaration is an essential element of the EuroMediterranean partnership. Cooperation will focus on practical measures to facilitate the establishment of free trade as well as its consequences, including:
- harmonizing rules and procedures in the customs field, with a view in particular to the progressive introduction of cumulation of origin; in the meantime, favourable consideration will be given, where appropriate, to finding ad hoc solutions in particular cases;
- harmonization of standards, including meetings arranged by the European Standards Organisations;
- elimination of unwarranted technical barriers to trade in agricultural products and adoption of relevant measures related to plant health and veterinary rules as well as other legislation on foodstuffs;
- cooperation among statistics organizations with a view to providing reliable data on a harmonized basis;
- possibilities for regional and subregional cooperation (without prejudice to initiatives taken in other existing fora).

Investment
The object of cooperation will be to help create a climate favourable to the removal of obstacles to investment, by giving greater thought to the definition of such obstacles and to means, including in the banking sector, of promoting such investment.

Industry
Industrial modernisation and increased competitiveness will be key factors for the success of the EuroMediterranean partnership. In this context, the private sector will play a more important role in the economic development of the region and the creation of employment. Cooperation will focus on:
- the adaptation of the industrial fabric to the changing international environment, in particular to the emergence of the information society;
- the framework for and the preparation of the modernisation and restructuring of existing enterprises, especially in the public sector, including privatisation;
- the use of international or European standards and the upgrading of conformity testing, certification, accreditation and quality standards.

Particular attention will be paid to means of encouraging cooperation among SMEs and creating the conditions for their development, including the possibility of organising workshops, taking account of experience acquired under MED-INVEST and inside the European Union.

Agriculture
While pointing out that such matters are covered under bilateral relations in the main, cooperation in this area will focus on:
support for policies implemented by them to diversify production;
reduction of food dependency;
promotion of environment-friendly agriculture;
closer relations between businesses, groups and organizations representing trades and
professions in the partner States on a voluntary basis;
support for privatization;
technical assistance and training;
harmonization of plant health and veterinary standards;
integrated rural development, including improvement of basic services and the
development of associated economic activities;
cooperation among rural regions, exchange of experience and knowhow concerning rural
development;
development of regions affected by the eradication of illicit crops.

**Transport**

Efficient interoperable transport links between the EU and its Mediterranean partners,
and among the partners themselves, as well as free access to the market for services in
international maritime transport, are essential to the development of trade patterns and the
smooth operation of the EuroMediterranean partnership.
The Transport Ministers of Western Mediterranean countries met twice in 1995 and,
following the Regional Conference for the Development of Maritime Transport in the
Mediterranean, the Mediterranean Waterborne Transport Working Group adopted a
multiannual programme.

**Cooperation will focus on:**
development of an efficient Trans-Mediterranean multimodal combined sea and air
transport system, through the improvement and modernization of ports and airports, the
suppression of unwarranted restrictions, the simplification of procedures, the
improvement of maritime and air safety, the harmonization of environmental standards at
a high level including more efficient monitoring of maritime pollution, and the
development of harmonized traffic management systems;
development of east-west land links on the southern and eastern shores of the
Mediterranean, and
connection of Mediterranean transport networks to the Trans-European Network in order
to ensure their interoperability.

**Energy**

A high-level Conference was held in Tunisia in 1995 with a followup meeting in Athens
With a view to creating appropriate conditions for investment in and activities by energy
companies, future cooperation will focus, inter alia on:
fostering the association of Mediterranean countries with the Treaty on the European Energy Charter;
energy planning;
encouraging producer-consumer dialogue;
oil and gas exploration, refining, transportation, distribution, and regional and trans-regional trade;
coal production and handling;
generation and transmission of power and interconnection and development of networks;
energy efficiency;
new and renewable sources of energy;
energy-related environmental issues;
development of joint research programmes;
training and information activities in the energy sector.

**Telecommunications and information technology**

With a view to developing a modern, efficient telecommunications network, cooperation will focus on:
information and telecommunications infrastructures (minimum regulatory framework, standards, conformity testing, network interoperability, etc.);
regional infrastructures including links with European networks;
access to services, and
new services in priority fields of application.

Intensification of EuroMediterranean exchanges and access to the nascent information society will be facilitated by more efficient information and communications infrastructures.

A regional conference is planned for 1996 with the aim of paving the way for pilot projects to show the concrete benefits of the information society.

**Regional planning**

Cooperation will focus on:
defining a regional planning strategy for the EuroMediterranean area commensurate with the countries' requirements and special features;
promoting cross-border cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

**Tourism**
The Ministers for Tourism, meeting in Casablanca, adopted the Mediterranean Tourism Charter in 1995. The cooperation actions to be initiated will relate in particular to information, promotion and training.

**Environment**

Cooperation will focus on:
- assessing environmental problems in the Mediterranean region and defining, where appropriate, the initiatives to be taken;
- making proposals to establish and subsequently update a short and medium-term priority environmental action programme for intervention coordinated by the European Commission and supplemented by long-term actions; it should include among the main areas for action, the following: integrated management of water, soil and coastal areas; management of waste; preventing and combating air pollution and pollution in the Mediterranean sea; natural heritage, landscapes and site conservation and management; Mediterranean forest protection, conservation and restoration, in particular through the prevention and control of erosion, soil degradation, forest fires and combating desertification; transfer of Community experience in financing techniques, legislation and environmental monitoring; integration of environmental concerns in all policies;
- setting up a regular dialogue to monitor the implementation of the action programme;
- reinforcing regional and subregional cooperation and strengthening coordination with the Mediterranean Action Plan;
- stimulating coordination of investments from various sources, and implementation of relevant international conventions;
- promoting the adoption and implementation of legislation and regulatory measures when required, especially preventive measures and appropriate high standards.

**Science and Technology**

Cooperation will focus on:
- promoting research and development and tackling the problem of the widening gap in scientific achievement, taking account of the principle of mutual advantage;
- stepping up exchanges of experience in the scientific sectors and policies which might best enable the Mediterranean partners to reduce the gap between them and their European neighbours and to promote the transfer of technology;
- helping train scientific and technical staff by increasing participation in joint research projects.

Following the Ministerial meeting at Sophia Antipolis in March 1995, a Monitoring Committee was set up; this Committee will meet for the first time immediately after the Barcelona Conference. It will focus on making recommendations for the joint implementation of the policy priorities agreed at Ministerial level.

**Water**

The Mediterranean Water Charter was adopted in Rome in 1992.
Water is a priority issue for all the Mediterranean partners and will gain in importance as water scarcity becomes more pressing. The purpose of cooperation in this area will be as follows:
to take stock of the situation taking into account current and future needs;
to identify ways of reinforcing regional cooperation;
to make proposals for rationalising the planning and management of water resources, where appropriate on a joint basis;
to contribute towards the creation of new sources of water.

Fisheries
In view of the importance of conservation and rational management of Mediterranean fish stocks, cooperation in the framework of the General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean will be reinforced.

Following the Ministerial Fisheries Conference held in Heraklion in 1994, appropriate follow-up action will be taken in the legal sphere through meetings to take place in 1996. Cooperation will be improved on research into fish stocks, including aquaculture, as well as into training and scientific research.

IV. Partnership in Social, Cultural and Human affairs: Developing Human Resources, Promoting Understanding between Cultures and Exchanges between Civil Societies

Development of human resources
The EuroMediterranean partnership must contribute to enhancing educational levels throughout the region, whilst laying special emphasis on the Mediterranean partners. To this end, a regular dialogue on educational policies will take place, initially focusing on vocational training, technology in education, the universities and other higher education establishments and research. In this context as well as in other areas, particular attention will be paid to the role of women. The Euro-Arab Business School in Granada and the European Foundation in Turin will also contribute to this cooperation.

A meeting of representatives of the vocational training sector (policy makers, academics, trainers, etc) will be organised with the aim of sharing modern management approaches.
A meeting will be held of representatives of universities and higher education establishments. The European Commission will strengthen its ongoing MEDCampus programme.
A meeting will also be called on the subject of technology in education.

Municipalities and Regions
Municipalities and regional authorities need to be closely involved in the operation of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. City and regional representatives will be encouraged to meet each year to take stock of their common challenges and exchange experiences. This will be organised by the European Commission and will take account of previous experience.

Dialogue between cultures and civilizations
Given the importance of improving mutual understanding by promoting cultural exchanges and knowledge of languages, officials and experts will meet in order to make concrete proposals for action, inter alia, in the following fields: cultural and creative heritage, cultural and artistic events, co-productions (theatre and cinema), translations and other means of cultural dissemination, training.

Greater understanding among the major religions present in the Euro-Mediterranean region will facilitate greater mutual tolerance and cooperation. Support will be given to periodic meetings of representatives of religions and religious institutions as well as theologians, academics and others concerned, with the aim of breaking down prejudice, ignorance and fanaticism and fostering cooperation at grassroots level. The conferences held in Stockholm (15/17.6.1995) and Toledo (4/7.11.1995) may serve as examples in this context.

**Media**

Close interaction between the media will work in favour of better cultural understanding. The European Union will actively promote such interaction, in particular through the ongoing MED-Media programme. An annual meeting of representatives of the media will be organised in this context.

**Youth**

Youth exchanges should be the means to prepare future generations for a closer cooperation between the Euro-Mediterranean partners. A Euro-Mediterranean youth exchange programme should therefore be established based on experience acquired in Europe and taking account of the partners' needs; this programme should take account of the importance of vocational training, particularly for those without qualifications, and of the training of organizers and social workers in the youth field. The European Commission will make the necessary proposals before the next meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Ministers.

**Exchanges between Civil Societies**

Senior officials will meet periodically to discuss measures likely to facilitate human exchanges resulting from the Euro-Mediterranean partnership, especially those involving officials, scientists, academics, businessmen, students and sportsmen, including the improvement and simplification of administrative procedures, particularly where unnecessary administrative obstacles might exist.

**Social Development**

The Euro-Mediterranean partnership must contribute to improving the living and working conditions and increasing the employment level of the population in the Mediterranean partner States, in particular of women and the neediest strata of the population. In this context the partners attach particular importance to the respect and promotion of basic social rights. To that end, actors in social policies will meet periodically at the appropriate level.

**Health**

The partners agree to concentrate cooperation in this area on:

- action on raising awareness, information and prevention;
- development of public health services, in particular health care, primary health centres, maternal and child health care services, family planning, epidemiological supervision systems and measures to control communicable diseases;
- training of health and health-administration personnel;
medical cooperation in the event of natural disasters.

Migration
Given the importance of the issue of migration for EuroMediterranean relations, meetings will be encouraged in order to make proposals concerning migration flows and pressures. These meetings will take account of experience acquired, inter alia, under the MED-Migration programme, particularly as regards improving the living conditions of migrants legally established in the Union.

Terrorism
Drug Trafficking, Organised crime
Fighting terrorism will have to be a priority for all the parties. To that end, officials will meet periodically with the aim of strengthening cooperation among police, judicial and other authorities. In this context, consideration will be given, in particular, to stepping up exchanges of information and improving extradition procedures. Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat, in particular, drug trafficking and organised crime, including smuggling.

All these meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

Illegal Immigration
Officials will meet periodically to discuss practical measures which can be taken to improve cooperation among police, judicial, customs, administrative and other authorities in order to combat illegal immigration.

These meetings will be organized with due regard for the need for a differentiated approach that takes into account the diversity of the situation in each country.

V. Institutional contacts

EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue
An Inter-Parliamentary Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean was held in Valletta from 1 to 4 November 1995. The European Parliament is invited to take the initiative with other parliaments concerning the future EuroMediterranean Parliamentary Dialogue, which could enable the elected representatives of the partners to exchange ideas on a wide range of issues.

Other institutional contacts
Regular contacts among other European organs, in particular the Economic and Social Committee of the European Community, and their Mediterranean counterparts, would contribute to a better understanding of the major issues relevant in the EuroMediterranean partnership.

To this end, the Economic and Social Committee is invited to take the initiative in establishing links with its Mediterranean counterparts and equivalent bodies. In this context, a Euro-Mediterranean meeting of Economic and Social Committees and equivalent bodies will take place in Madrid on 12 and 13 December.
Appendix 2:

Membership Comparison: EU - EMP - NATO - Union for the Mediterranean - WTO
(Status: September 2008)

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# Appendix Three

## Security Implications of the EuroMed Part

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**Current State:** Exempt Approved

**Protocol ID:** 20080026  
**Principal Investigator:** Joaquin Roy  
**Contact Person(s):** Astrid Boening  
**Type of Review:** Exempt Review  
**IRB Assignment:** Social and Behavioral Sciences IRB  
**IRB Administrator:** Vivienne Carrasco

**History**

- **Activity:** Log Comment To Study Team  
  **Change Log: Page 7a. Alteration or Waiver of Informed Consent**  
  **Change Log: Page 4e. Description of Study**  

- **PT:** Changes Submitted  
  **Change Log: Page 4a. Description of Study**

- **Attached are the PDF, stamped versions of the questions, v**  
  20080026 Verbal Consent.pdf  
  20080026 Retrospective.pdf  
  20080026 Questions.pdf

**Creates a complete history of the study**

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2/26/2008
Appendix Four

Verbal Content for Open-Ended Interviews
for Dissertation: The Security Dynamics of the EuroMed Partnership
Astrid B. Boeving

Hi, my name is Astrid Boeving, and I am involved in a research study called "The Security Dynamics of the EuroMed Partnership" with Dr. Joaquín Roy at the University of Miami.

Purpose of the Study:
We are asking you to take part in a research study because we are trying to learn more about the socio-economic and political dynamics in the Mediterranean as a macro geopolitical region in which the nations around it are joined through their common concerns and shared interests. In this dissertation I plan process-tace i.e. the labelling, contributing to, and the re-configuring of the Mediterranean "region" (Euro-Med) politically, geopolitically, and socio-culturally by conceptualizing its post war social construction with the underlying assumptions and to determine how the future of this region appears to evolve under the soft power approach within the EuroMed Partnership (EMAP). In particular with respect to a "new" Euro-Mediterranean regional security complex (EMRSC) identity.

You will be asked to speak anonymously in a single session of your experiences and possible regrets about any aspect of the EuroMed Partnership at any length you desire. My questions pertain to the following:

Question #1: How do you view the structure and the dynamics of the EMAP as contributing to regional integration in the Euro-Mediterranean and possibly affecting regional stability, especially as it relates to reducing violent conflicts in this area in the future, to increasing prosperity and the application of human rights more uniformly among all residents in member states as well as?

Question #2: How do you view these structures and dynamics as potentially changing EMAP member states' self identity and interests in terms of a Euro- Mediterranean regional security complex?

Question #3: Do you perceive any theoretical implications for the field of International Relations in such a potential evolution, shifts and/or developments?

You will not be audio- or video taped during this interview. There is no risk involved to you, and you can terminate this interview at any time. You will have no direct benefit, such as any payment or reimbursement, from participating in this research study.

Your information will be analyzed anonymously by me in my dissertation, which will be read by the dissertation committee, the University of Miami Graduate School staff and potentially published. The information will be stored on password protected computers or in computer files, to which only 1 myself have access.
Appendix Five

Maps

Map A.1 | Indicators of Governance (2004)

Voice and Accountability
Political Stability

Governmental Effectiveness
Regulatory Quality

Rule of Law
Control of Corruption

The World Bank Institute has established aggregate governance indicators to try to make a quantitative comparative analysis of different countries. On the basis of the accumulation of hundreds of indicators a certain number of indices have been established (from -2.0 to +2.5) concerning six dimensions of governance:

Voice and accountability: A measure of political, civil and human rights. Includes indicators of citizens' ability to elect governments and the independence of the media, among others.

Governmental effectiveness: A measure of the competence and independence of the administration and the quality of the public services, and also of the credibility of governmental commitments.

Rule of law: A measure of the confidence in the effectiveness of a society's regulations. Includes the perception of the incidence of crime, the efficiency of the police system and the confidence in the application of contracts.

Political stability: A measure of the likelihood of an unconstitutional or violent threat to a government, including terrorism, that could have an effect on political continuity, or could undermine citizens' ability to elect and replace the government by peaceful means.

Regulatory quality: A measure of the incidence of market-unfriendly policies such as price control, or inadequate bank supervision, as well as the imposition of charges by excessive regulations in areas such as foreign trade or business development.

Control of corruption: A measure of the perception of corruption, and especially of the effects of corruption on the business environment, where they imply a lack of respect for laws and a failure of governance.

Own production. Source: www.worldbank.org/governance
Appendix Six

Facts and figures

Results in 2007

A total of EUR 1.4bn
invested in the Mediterranean partner countries

18 projects financed
with a direct impact on the economy and the improvement of living conditions in the partner countries

EUR 1bn earmarked for private sector development
in the form of credit lines in support of SMEs, private equity operations and the financing of energy and environmental projects undertaken by private promoters

The Mediterranean partner countries are Algeria, Egypt, Gaza/West Bank, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia. Following its elevation to the status of an EU Accession Country, Turkey still participates in the institutional dialogue initiated under FEMIP. Operationally, however, activities carried out in Turkey now come under the South-East Europe Department.

FEMIP operations in 2007 by sector

**EUR 625m**
In the form of credit lines in support of SMEs advanced to local intermediary banks.

**EUR 48.5m**
In private equity, mainly in support of SMEs in the form of equity participations in local firms or via investment funds.

**EUR 465m**
Invested in the energy sector for the construction and modernisation of gas pipelines, power plants and distribution networks.

**EUR 180m**
For the transport sector to improve the mobility of people and goods.

**EUR 120m**
For environmental protection to enhance water resource management capacity.
Results in 2002-2007

FEMIP, leading investor in the Mediterranean

Total FEMIP signatures (October 2002 - December 2007) Over EUR 7.3bn

- Since its launch in October 2002, FEMIP has advanced over EUR 7.3bn to finance 105 capital projects in the Mediterranean partner countries.

- The amount of disbursements, which is a very good indicator of the actual implementation of capital projects on the ground, has continued to increase in recent years from EUR 630m in 2003 to over EUR 1bn in 2007.

Sectoral and geographical breakdown

The infrastructure sector (energy, transport) is the main beneficiary of FEMIP financing. Support for SMEs and the environment are in second and third position respectively.

FEMIP support for the Mediterranean partner countries is evenly distributed between the Maghreb and Near East regions.
Increased private sector support

- Between 2002 and 2007, FEMIP channelled over EUR 2.9bn into private sector projects out of a total of EUR 7.2bn provided to the region (40%).
- This amount represents a substantial increase compared to the period 1998-2002, as shown below:

![Graph showing increased private sector support](image)

- With lending to the private sector increasing from an average of EUR 103m a year in the period 1998-2002 to an average of EUR 210m in the period 2003-2007, in absolute terms, Elb’s support for the private sector in the region has increased threefold since the establishment of FEMIP.

Between October 2002 and December 2007, EUR 1.1bn was channelled to local SMEs via credit lines, representing 43% of the volume provided to the private sector.

Direct loans issued to private sector companies in the energy, industry and environment sector accounted for 48% of private sector operations.

Private equity and subordinated debt accounted for 7% of total private sector lending volumes.

- Some 1,900 allocations were provided to €303m in the region through Elb credit lines between 2002 and 2007. The funding served to finance small firms with fewer than 50 staff as well as medium-sized companies and helped to generate or preserve more than 15,000 jobs in the Mediterranean partner countries.
Increased private sector support

Between 2002 and 2007, FEMIP channelled over EUR 2.4bn into private sector projects out of a total of EUR 7.2bn provided to the region (46%).

The amount represents a substantial increase compared to the period 1998-2002, as shown below:

With lending to the private sector increasing from an average of EUR 163m a year in the period 1998-2002 to an average of EUR 750m in the period 2003-2007, private banks have been supported in the region.

Between October 2002 and December 2007, EUR 1.1bn was channelled to local SMEs via credit lines, representing 47% of the volume provided to the private sector.

Direct long-term loans to private sector companies in the energy, industry and environment sector accounted for 48% of private sector operations.

Private equity and subordinated lending accounted for 3% of total private sector lending volumes.

Some 1,900 allocations were provided to €303m in the region through EIB credit lines between 2002 and 2007. This funding served to finance small firms with fewer than 50 employees as well as medium-sized companies and helped to generate or preserve more than 15,000 jobs in the Mediterranean partner countries.
Contributing to the transfer of expertise via technical assistance

- Technical assistance operations complement FEMIP's financing projects and aim at improving the quality of lending operations and increasing their development impact.
- Since the introduction of technical assistance in 2001, FEMIP has signed over 92 operations amounting to EUR 6.8m financed from the EU budget.

As far as the geographical breakdown is concerned, the three main countries to benefit from technical assistance are Syria, Tunisia and Morocco, followed by Egypt and Lebanon.

The infrastructure, environmental and human capital sectors are the leading beneficiaries of technical assistance, with a total of 46% of available funds allocated to these sectors. The financial sector received 18% of the available resources.
Appendix Seven

Headline Goal 2010


approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004
endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004

A. The 2010 Headline Goal

1. The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security. With the adoption by the European Council in December 2003 of the European Security Strategy, it affirmed the role it wants to play in the world, supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN. In this context of new dangers but also new opportunities, Member States' strong commitment to give the enlarged European Union the tools to make a major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well governed countries around Europe and in the world is stronger than ever. The EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats. The availability of effective instruments including military assets will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and/or in the post conflict phase.

2. Member States have therefore decided to set themselves a new Headline Goal, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology. Lessons learned from EU-led operations will also be taken into account. Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement.

1 EN

3. Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability will be at the core of Member States efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use...
of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces.

4. The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases, is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. These minimum force packages must be military effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response, and includes a combined arms battalion sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support. Rapid reaction calls for rapid decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces. On decision making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. The need for reserve forces should be taken into account. These high readiness joint packages (battlegroups) may require tailoring for a specific operation by the Operation Commander. They will have to be backed up by responsive crisis management procedures as well as adequate command and control structures available to the Union. Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages will require to be developed. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU's ability to respond to possible UN requests.

5. Member States have identified the following indicative list of specific milestones within the 2010 horizon:

Interoperability can be broadly defined as the ability of our armed forces to work together and to interact with other civilian tools. It is an instrument to enhance the effective use of military capabilities as a key enabler in achieving EU’s ambitions in Crisis Management Operations. Similarly, deployability involves the ability to move personnel and materiel to the theatre of operations, while sustainability involves mutual logistic support between the deployed forces. 2 EN

a) as early as possible in 2004, in conformity with the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and in line with the Presidency note annexed, the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, with the capacity rapidly to set-up an operation centre for a particular operation;

b) the establishment of the Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) in the course of 2004. This will also support, as appropriate, the fulfilment of the commonly identified shortfalls in the field of military equipment;
c) the implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations;

d) specifically for Airlift the transformation of the EACC into the EAC by 2004 is welcomed, as is the intention on the part of some Member States who so wish to develop a European Airlift command fully efficient by 2010;

e) the complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;

f) the availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008;

g) to improve the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010;

h) to develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training;

B. Process

6. This Headline Goal 2010 will generate the necessary analysis, adaptation and development of scenarios in view of the development of new Headline Goal Catalogues as required by the EU Capability Development Mechanism (including a clear categorisation of capabilities to

2 Doc. 6805/03 + COR 1 3 EN

3 tasks), incorporation of rapid response capability and further improvement of C2 capabilities on operations.

7. To achieve these objectives the EU will apply a systemic approach in the development of the necessary military capabilities, aiming at creating synergies between Member States’ forces in order to enhance the ability of the EU to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises.

8. This approach requires Member States to voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without prejudice to the prerogatives of Member States over defence matters, a co-ordinated and coherent development of equipment compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements and defence planning is a primary objective. In this regard, commonality of security culture should also
be promoted. Deployability, sustainability and other crucial requirements such as force availability, information superiority, engagement effectiveness and survivability will play an immediate pivotal role.

9. Interoperability must be considered in a broad framework including military, civilian and civil-military aspects. The EU will further strengthen the coordinated use of its civil and military capabilities acknowledging that modern Crisis Management Operations typically require a mixture of instruments. Work will be undertaken to consider interoperability issues including between the military and civilian assets in civil protection operations. Moreover the EU will promote the principle of interoperability in the field of military capabilities with its partners, notably NATO and the UN, and its regional partners, in line with the European Security Strategy. The strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has also a particular significance for the EU.

3 Of which some are civil crisis management instruments, and notably police components, that can be deployed together with military components and temporarily under military responsibility (ESDP Presidency Report to the Nice European Council), foreseeing also an integrated planning process. Such instruments will enhance the overall capability to respond to crisis management.

4 Doc. 15564/03, para. 4. 4 EN

10. Strengthening the United Nations is a European priority. Real world experience, with the successful termination of operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo, has shown the potential for the EU to conduct operations in support of UN objectives. Work with the UN DPKO at an institutional level could also be beneficial in this respect and as a valuable means to strengthen EU-UN relationship. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battlegroups, will strengthen the EU's ability to respond to possible UN requests.

11. As underlined by the European Security Strategy and demonstrated by operation CONCORDIA in FYROM, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management. The establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE and of NATO liaison arrangements at the EUMS as early as possible in 2004 will improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements. This will also enhance transparency between the EU and NATO embodying this partnership. Furthermore, promoting the further use of agreed standards will reduce unnecessary duplication and produce more effective forces for both the EU and NATO. In this framework the EU-NATO capability Group will continue to play a central role in accordance with its mandate as defined in the Capability Development Mechanism. Complementarity and mutual reinforcement of EU and NATO initiatives in the field of rapid response should be ensured.
C. Way Ahead

12. The relevant bodies of the Council and the European Defence Agency when established, will develop the necessary set of benchmarks and milestones in order to evaluate progress towards the achievement of these objectives notably in the field of interoperability, deployability and the other crucial requirements identified above. Work will proceed in the field of equipment, forces and command and control based on a systemic and coherent approach.

5 In line with para. 53 of the Capability Development Mechanism on consistent standards with NATO. 5 EN

13. In the field of equipment, the 2010 perspective should allow Member States to harmonise their respective future requirements and calendars in order to achieve a convergent fulfilment of capability needs.

14. In the field of forces:

   - all the forces contributed to the EU will be categorised on the basis of their combat effectiveness and operational readiness in relation to the range of possible tasks;

   - concerning Rapid Response, suitable force package requirements, taking also into account the agreed EU Battlegroups concept, should be identified at the beginning of the second semester of 2004 in view of allowing Member States to start contributing to the constitution of high readiness joint packages. In full respect with the voluntary nature of the process, the contributions should indicate when and for what period the force package would be available to the EU;

   - from 2005 onwards the EU will launch an evaluation process in order to scrutinise, evaluate and assess Member States' capability commitments, including Rapid Response;

   - qualitative requirements, such as interoperability, deployability and sustainability, as well as quantitative ones for the forces will need to be identified in greater detail;

   - forces available will be tested through HQ exercises as well as opportunities offered by national and multinational field exercises. In particular, Rapid Response elements will need to undertake regular realistic training, including multinational exercises;
- the collection of existing operational doctrines will be complemented with common concepts and procedures on the basis of work conducted in the framework of the European Capability Action plan and in coherence with NATO.

15. In the field of Command and Control, the ability to plan and conduct operations will be reinforced in the light of the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and by developments in the the European Capability Action Plan. Specifically:

- the work of the ISTAR Information Exchange framework Project Group will contribute to the development of an EU information-sharing policy and associated framework for implementation by 2010, with an interim architecture by 2006;

6 EN
- the work of the Space Based Assets Project Group will contribute to the development of an EU space policy by 2006.

16. Under the auspices of the Council and in the framework of its responsibilities for the political direction of the development of military capabilities the PSC, based on the opinion of the EUMC and in liaison, as appropriate, with the European Defence Agency, will direct the necessary steps leading to the more precise definition of the Headline Goal 2010 based on the elements set out in this paper and of the milestones identified in para 5. Taking into account the comprehensive Spring 2004 military capability assessment (Single Progress Report, Capability Improvement Chart) further progress will also be required on the recognised shortfalls and deficits from the 2003 Headline Goal. Implementing this Headline Goal 2010 will include the following steps:

- in 2004 : by the beginning of the second semester, preparatory development work on high readiness joint packages requirements in the framework of EU Rapid Response should be finalised.

Under broad guidance of the PSC, the necessary planning assumptions and scenarios preliminary to the definition of the military requirements necessary to fulfil the 2010 horizon should be elaborated by the EUMC in an iterative process with the PSC. In this framework focussed military scenarios could be presented for political approval. Work should also start on the capability evaluation process, notably on the definition of the necessary benchmarks and criteria. By the end of the year, framework nation or multinational high readiness joint packages should be contributed to the EU as an intermediate phase on rapid response development. A Conference on military capabilities will be organised in the second semester of 2004;
- by the beginning of 2005: establishment of a list of detailed capability target criteria;

- by mid 2005: finalisation of the Requirements Catalogue 2005, including Rapid Response, in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism. The capability evaluation process could be already launched;

7 EN 8 EN

6 - by the end of 2005: a bidding process could be launched in view of the production of the Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue. The database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian population against the effects of terrorist attacks, including CBRN, would be maintained in connection with the Force Catalogue, produced in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism;

- by 2007, complete development of rapidly deployable battlegroups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets;

- between 2006 and 2010 the normal iterations described in the Capability Development Mechanism will continue to take place with the involvement of the European Defence Agency7, as appropriate. Building on the Headline Goal 2010, a longer term vision beyond 2010 will be formulated with the objective of identifying trends in future capability developments and requirements and increasing convergence and coherence.

__________________________

6 See in particular the relevant paragraphs of and the annex to the Capability Development Mechanism concerning ESDP information requirements and the interaction with NATO.

7 Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments.
Appendix Eight

Calendar
of the
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership
(monthly updated)

Priority actions in the Barcelona process
(regional activities)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Contact Details</th>
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<tr>
<td>26-27 02 2008</td>
<td>EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Information Society</td>
<td>Cairo, Egypt</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ministry of Communications and Information Technology Egypt Ghada Houshydy Phone: +202 3534 1360 Fax: +202 3537 1010 <a href="http://www.mcit.gov.eg">www.mcit.gov.eg</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>4-5 03 2008</td>
<td>Senior Officials and EuroMed Committee meetings</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
<td>1,2,3</td>
<td>Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jasar Gersak jasna.gersak[at]gov.si</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 03 2008</td>
<td>III. FEMIP Conference “Promoting Sustainable Tourism in the Mediterranean: How to Address the Economic and Environmental Challenges</td>
<td>Berlin</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Jasar Gersak jasna.gersak[at]gov.si</td>
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<td>10-11 03 2008</td>
<td>EuroMed and the Media: Task Force</td>
<td>Ljubljana Slovenia</td>
<td>1,3</td>
<td>European Commission Thomas MCGRATH <a href="mailto:Thomas.MCGRATH@ec.europa.eu">Thomas.MCGRATH@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
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<tr>
<td>17-18 03 2008</td>
<td>EuroMed Seminar on the Respect of Human Rights and International Standards in the field of Counter-Terrorism</td>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Slovenian Presidency Anton Slapičar anton.slapnicar[ at ]gov.si European Commission Amir Kaza MIR MOTAHARI <a href="mailto:Amir.MOTAHARI@ec.europa.eu">Amir.MOTAHARI@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
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# Euro-Med Calendar

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<td>11-14 04.2008</td>
<td>XXIV. EuroMed Seminar for junior diplomats</td>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>Thomas McGRATH <a href="mailto:Thomas.MCGRATH@ec.europa.eu">Thomas.MCGRATH@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
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<td>3 - 4 04.2008</td>
<td>EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Tourism</td>
<td>Fes, Morocco</td>
<td>Mission of Morocco to the European Union</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Kamal El Bdhoudi <a href="mailto:elmahdouldi@missionmorocco-ue.be">elmahdouldi@missionmorocco-ue.be</a></td>
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<td>European Commission Pierre Desuy <a href="mailto:Pierre.Desuy@ec.europa.eu">Pierre.Desuy@ec.europa.eu</a></td>
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<td>8-9 04.2008</td>
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<td>Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>22.04.2008</td>
<td>EuroMed ad-hoc meeting on fight against terrorism</td>
<td>Brussels</td>
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<td>04.2008 (tbc)</td>
<td>EuroMed meeting on Strengthening the role of women in society</td>
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<td>29-30 05.2008</td>
<td>EuroMed Culture Ministerial Meeting on Culture and Cultural Dialogue</td>
<td>Athens, Greece</td>
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<td>Senior Officials and EuroMed Committee meetings</td>
<td>Portoroz, Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs&lt;br&gt;Jasna Gersak&lt;br&gt;<a href="mailto:jasna.gersak@mt.gov.si">jasna.gersak@mt.gov.si</a></td>
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<td>06.2008</td>
<td>Launching event of the Euro-Mediterranean University</td>
<td>Piran, Slovenia</td>
<td>Slovenian Presidency&lt;br&gt;Veronika Stabej&lt;br&gt;<a href="mailto:veronika.stabej@aoe.si">veronika.stabej@aoe.si</a></td>
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<td>Brussels</td>
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Appendix Nine

EU Common Strategy for the Mediterranean

This Strategy, which builds on the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona process), pursues cooperation between the EU, the Mediterranean region and Libya in a vast range of areas including security, democracy, justice and the economy. The objective is promote peace, stability and prosperity in the region. It was initially planned to run for four years up to 2004 but has been extended to January 2006.

ACTS


Summary

1. The Strategy covers all the EU's relations with all its partners in the Barcelona process and with Libya. It was initially adopted for four years (expiring on 23 July 2004) but was extended by the European Council on 5 November 2004 until 23 January 2006.

2. In view of the Mediterranean region's strategic importance for the European Union and the challenges it faces, the EU considers the two sides must work together as partners with a common vision and mutual respect. The principle of partnership implies active support by both sides to develop good neighbourly relations, improve prosperity, eliminate poverty, promote and protect fundamental freedoms, encourage cultural and religious tolerance, and develop cooperation with civil society including NGOs. The European Union will do so by supporting the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and contributing to the consolidation of peace in the Middle East.

Objectives

3. The European Union's goal is to help secure peace, stability and prosperity in the region. Its objectives also include promotion of core values such as human rights, democracy, good governance, transparency and the rule of law. Social, cultural and human affairs also play a role in promoting mutual understanding. Free trade, closer cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs, greater security through cooperation to promote peace and dialogue to combat intolerance, racism and xenophobia are further objectives.

4. Efforts will also be undertaken to enhance coordination, coherent and complementarity between the EU and its Member States and between its Mediterranean policy and policies for other partners.
Areas of action

5. On the **political and security front**, the Union will strengthen dialogue at all levels through cooperation and exchange of information in order to establish a common area of peace and stability. Conflict prevention and other issues such as anti-personnel mines are other central issues of concern. The EU also attaches great importance to the signature and ratification of non-proliferation instruments and the establishment of a Middle East zone free of weapons of mass-destruction and nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

6. On **democracy, human rights and the rule of law**, it is essential to strengthen democratic institutions and to promote good governance and accession to international human rights instruments. In more concrete terms the Union would like to see the death penalty abolished in the region.

7. In the **economic and financial field** implementation of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements to promote the progressive liberalisation of trade is the principal objective in strengthening the private sector and making the region more attractive to investors. Appropriate trade policies, accession by partners to the World Trade Organisation on the right terms, support for subregional cooperation and greater South-South trade are also goals. The Union will not neglect the need for interconnection of infrastructure, improved water management strategies and the creation of a market economy with a social dimension.

8. The impact of financial cooperation under the MEDA Regulation will be maximised through coordination of national and Community strategies, enhanced economic dialogue and coherent use of all the resources available.

9. **Environmental concerns** will also be taken into account to ensure sustainable economic development.

10. The core **social issues** are participation by civil society and NGOs in the partnership, cooperation to promote equal opportunities for men and women and dialogue. On the **cultural side**, the aim is to improve education and vocational training particularly for young people and women.

11. There are a number of issues in the **justice and home affairs** area. Migration is one of them. The EU intends to simplify visa issue procedures, combat illegal migration networks, ensure more effective border control, reduce the causes of migration and help ensure the integration into society of all persons residing legally in the Community and prevent their double taxation. There must be a review of the legal systems, and in particular civil law problems relating to the laws of succession and family law, including divorce, to make them more transparent and predictable. Refugees and measures to combat crime are two other European concerns in this area. Compliance with the Geneva Convention and accession to the United Nations Convention are also desirable.
Instruments and means

12. The Council and the Commission ensure the consistency, unity and effectiveness of the Union's action. The Council and its Presidency are assisted by the Secretary-General of the Council/High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Member States make appropriate and coordinated use of the instruments and means at their disposal.

13. The programmes, instruments and policies have to be reviewed by the Council, the Commission and Member States to maintain consistency. They must also make full and appropriate use of the instruments and means available and make greater efforts to coordinate and cooperate particularly within regional and international organisations.

14. More information on the EU's relations with the Mediterranean region can be found on DG Relex's website.

REFERENCES

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Appendix Ten

A Commitment to Peace:
Signing of The Israeli-Palestinian Declaration Of Principles

Text of

Declaration of Principles On Interim Self-Government Arrangements
("Oslo Accords")

(including signing ceremony speeches)

Following is the text of the Declaration of Principles between the Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) signed in Washington, DC, September 13, 1993, and released by the Office of the Spokesman.

The Government of the State of Israel and the P.L.O. team (in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace Conference) (the "Palestinian Delegation"), representing the Palestinian people, agree that it is time to put an end to decades of confrontation and conflict, recognize their mutual legitimate and political rights, and strive to live in peaceful coexistence and mutual dignity and security and achieve a just, lasting and comprehensive peace settlement and historic reconciliation through the agreed political process. Accordingly, the two sides agree to the following principles:

Article I

AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

The aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations within the current Middle East peace process is, among other things, to establish a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority, the elected Council (the "Council"), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not exceeding five years, leading to a permanent settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

It is understood that the interim arrangements are an integral part of the whole peace process and that the negotiations on the permanent status will lead to the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
Article II

FRAMEWORK FOR THE INTERIM PERIOD

The agreed framework for the interim period is set forth in this Declaration of Principles.

Article III

ELECTIONS

1. In order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free and general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and international observation, while the Palestinian police will ensure public order.

2. An agreement will be concluded on the exact mode and conditions of the elections in accordance with the protocol attached as Annex I, with the goal of holding the elections not later than nine months after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles.

3. These elections will constitute a significant interim preparatory step toward the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements.

Article IV

JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations. The two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.

Article V

TRANSITIONAL PERIOD AND PERMANENT STATUS NEGOTIATIONS

1. The five-year transitional period will begin upon the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

2. Permanent status negotiations will commence as soon as possible, but not later than the beginning of the third year of the interim period, between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian people representatives.
3. It is understood that these negotiations shall cover remaining issues, including: Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, security arrangements, borders, relations and cooperation with other neighbors, and other issues of common interest.

4. The two parties agree that the outcome of the permanent status negotiations should not be prejudiced or preempted by agreements reached for the interim period.

Article VI

PREPARATORY TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. Upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area, a transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the authorised Palestinians for this task, as detailed herein, will commence. This transfer of authority will be of a preparatory nature until the inauguration of the Council.

2. Immediately after the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles and the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, with the view to promoting economic development in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, authority will be transferred to the Palestinians on the following spheres: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. The Palestinian side will commence in building the Palestinian police force, as agreed upon. Pending the inauguration of the Council, the two parties may negotiate the transfer of additional powers and responsibilities, as agreed upon.

Article VII

INTERIM AGREEMENT

1. The Israeli and Palestinian delegations will negotiate an agreement on the interim period (the "Interim Agreement").

2. The Interim Agreement shall specify, among other things, the structure of the Council, the number of its members, and the transfer of powers and responsibilities from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Council. The Interim Agreement shall also specify the Council's executive authority, legislative authority in accordance with Article IX below, and the independent Palestinian judicial organs.

3. The Interim Agreement shall include arrangements, to be implemented
upon the inauguration of the Council, for the assumption by the Council of all of the powers and responsibilities transferred previously in accordance with Article VI above.

4. In order to enable the Council to promote economic growth, upon its inauguration, the Council will establish, among other things, a Palestinian Electricity Authority, a Gaza Sea Port Authority, a Palestinian Development Bank, a Palestinian Export Promotion Board, a Palestinian Environmental Authority, a Palestinian Land Authority and a Palestinian Water Administration Authority, and any other Authorities agreed upon, in accordance with the Interim Agreement that will specify their powers and responsibilities.

5. After the inauguration of the Council, the Civil Administration will be dissolved, and the Israeli military government will be withdrawn.

Article VIII

PUBLIC ORDER AND SECURITY

In order to guarantee public order and internal security for the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Council will establish a strong police force, while Israel will continue to carry the responsibility for defending against external threats, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order.

Article IX

LAWS AND MILITARY ORDERS

1. The Council will be empowered to legislate, in accordance with the Interim Agreement, within all authorities transferred to it.

2. Both parties will review jointly laws and military orders presently in force in remaining spheres.

Article X

JOINT ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN LIAISON COMMITTEE

In order to provide for a smooth implementation of this Declaration of Principles and any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, a Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee will be established in order to deal with issues requiring coordination, other issues of common interest, and disputes.
Article XI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC FIELDS

Recognizing the mutual benefit of cooperation in promoting the development of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel, upon the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Committee will be established in order to develop and implement in a cooperative manner the programs identified in the protocols attached as Annex III and Annex IV.

Article XII

LIAISON AND COOPERATION WITH JORDAN AND EGYPT

The two parties will invite the Governments of Jordan and Egypt to participate in establishing further liaison and cooperation arrangements between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian representatives, on the one hand, and the Governments of Jordan and Egypt, on the other hand, to promote cooperation between them. These arrangements will include the constitution of a Continuing Committee that will decide by agreement on the modalities of admission of persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, together with necessary measures to prevent disruption and disorder. Other matters of common concern will be dealt with by this Committee.

Article XIII

REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES

1. After the entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in addition to withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article XIV.

2. In redeploying its military forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be redeployed outside populated areas.

3. Further redeployments to specified locations will be gradually implemented commensurate with the assumption of responsibility for public order and internal security by the Palestinian police force pursuant to Article VIII above.
Article XIV

ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

Israel will withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, as detailed in the protocol attached as Annex II.

Article XV

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

1. Disputes arising out of the application or interpretation of this Declaration of Principles, or any subsequent agreements pertaining to the interim period, shall be resolved by negotiations through the Joint Liaison Committee to be established pursuant to Article X above.

2. Disputes which cannot be settled by negotiations may be resolved by a mechanism of conciliation to be agreed upon by the parties.

3. The parties may agree to submit to arbitration disputes relating to the interim period, which cannot be settled through conciliation. To this end, upon the agreement of both parties, the parties will establish an Arbitration Committee.

Article XVI

ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL PROGRAMS

Both parties view the multilateral working groups as an appropriate instrument for promoting a "Marshall Plan," the regional programs and other programs, including special programs for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as indicated in the protocol attached as Annex IV.

Article XVII

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

1. This Declaration of Principles will enter into force one month after its signing.

2. All protocols annexed to this Declaration of Principles and Agreed Minutes pertaining thereto shall be regarded as an integral part hereof.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel: (Shimon Peres)
ANNEX I

PROTOCOL ON THE MODE AND CONDITIONS OF ELECTIONS

1. Palestinians of Jerusalem who live there will have the right to participate in the election process, according to an agreement between the two sides.

2. In addition, the election agreement should cover, among other things, the following issues:

   a. the system of elections;
   b. the mode of the agreed supervision and international observation and their personal composition; and
   c. rules and regulations regarding election campaign, including agreed arrangements for the organizing of mass media, and the possibility of licensing a broadcasting and TV station.

3. The future status of displaced Palestinians who were registered on 4th June 1967 will not be prejudiced because they are unable to participate in the election process due to practical reasons.

ANNEX II

PROTOCOL ON WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM THE GAZA STRIP AND JERICHO AREA

1. The two sides will conclude and sign within two months from the date of entry into force of this Declaration of Principles, an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area. This agreement will include comprehensive arrangements to apply in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal.
2. Israel will implement an accelerated and scheduled withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area, beginning immediately with the signing of the agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho area and to be completed within a period not exceeding four months after the signing of this agreement.

3. The above agreement will include, among other things:

   a. Arrangements for a smooth and peaceful transfer of authority from the Israeli military government and its Civil Administration to the Palestinian representatives.
   b. Structure, powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority in these areas, except: external security, settlements, Israelis, foreign relations, and other mutually agreed matters.
   c. Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited locally and from abroad (holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents issued by Egypt). Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.
   d. A temporary international or foreign presence, as agreed upon.
   e. Establishment of a joint Palestinian-Israeli Coordination and Cooperation Committee for mutual security purposes.
   f. An economic development and stabilization program, including the establishment of an Emergency Fund, to encourage foreign investment, and financial and economic support. Both sides will coordinate and cooperate jointly and unilaterally with regional and international parties to support these aims.
   g. Arrangements for a safe passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area.

4. The above agreement will include arrangements for coordination between both parties regarding passages:

   a. Gaza-Egypt; and
   b. Jericho-Jordan.

5. The offices responsible for carrying out the powers and responsibilities of the Palestinian authority under this Annex II and Article VI of the Declaration of Principles will be located in the Gaza Strip and in the Jericho area pending the inauguration of the Council.

6. Other than these agreed arrangements, the status of the Gaza Strip and Jericho area will continue to be an integral part of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will not be changed in the interim period.
ANNEX III

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION IN ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

The two sides agree to establish an Israeli-Palestinian Continuing Committee for Economic Cooperation, focusing, among other things, on the following:

1. Cooperation in the field of water, including a Water Development Program prepared by experts from both sides, which will also specify the mode of cooperation in the management of water resources in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and will include proposals for studies and plans on water rights of each party, as well as on the equitable utilization of joint water resources for implementation in and beyond the interim period.

2. Cooperation in the field of electricity, including an Electricity Development Program, which will also specify the mode of cooperation for the production, maintenance, purchase and sale of electricity resources.

3. Cooperation in the field of energy, including an Energy Development Program, which will provide for the exploitation of oil and gas for industrial purposes, particularly in the Gaza Strip and in the Negev, and will encourage further joint exploitation of other energy resources. This Program may also provide for the construction of a Petrochemical industrial complex in the Gaza Strip and the construction of oil and gas pipelines.

4. Cooperation in the field of finance, including a Financial Development and Action Program for the encouragement of international investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel, as well as the establishment of a Palestinian Development Bank.

5. Cooperation in the field of transport and communications, including a Program, which will define guidelines for the establishment of a Gaza Sea Port Area, and will provide for the establishing of transport and communications lines to and from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip to Israel and to other countries. In addition, this Program will provide for carrying out the necessary construction of roads, railways, communications lines, etc.

6. Cooperation in the field of trade, including studies, and Trade Promotion Programs, which will encourage local, regional and inter-regional trade, as well as a feasibility study of creating free trade
zones in the Gaza Strip and in Israel, mutual access to these zones, and cooperation in other areas related to trade and commerce.

7. Cooperation in the field of industry, including Industrial Development Programs, which will provide for the establishment of joint Israeli-Palestinian Industrial Research and Development Centers, will promote Palestinian-Israeli joint ventures, and provide guidelines for cooperation in the textile, food, pharmaceutical, electronics, diamonds, computer and science-based industries.

8. A program for cooperation in, and regulation of, labor relations and cooperation in social welfare issues.

9. A Human Resources Development and Cooperation Plan, providing for joint Israeli-Palestinian workshops and seminars, and for the establishment of joint vocational training centers, research institutes and data banks.

10. An Environmental Protection Plan, providing for joint and/or coordinated measures in this sphere.

11. A program for developing coordination and cooperation in the field of communication and media.

12. Any other programs of mutual interest.

ANNEX IV

PROTOCOL ON ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN COOPERATION CONCERNING REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

1. The two sides will cooperate in the context of the multilateral peace efforts in promoting a Development Program for the region, including the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, to be initiated by the G-7. The parties will request the G-7 to seek the participation in this program of other interested states, such as members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, regional Arab states and institutions, as well as members of the private sector.

2. The Development Program will consist of two elements:

   a. an Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.
   b. a Regional Economic Development Program.
A. The Economic Development Program for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will consist of the following elements:

(1) A Social Rehabilitation Program, including a Housing and Construction Program.

(2) A Small and Medium Business Development Plan.

(3) An Infrastructure Development Program (water, electricity, transportation and communications, etc.).

(4) A Human Resources Plan.

(5) Other programs.

B. The Regional Economic Development Program may consist of the following elements:

(1) The establishment of a Middle East Development Fund, as a first step, and a Middle East Development Bank, as a second step.

(2) The development of a joint Israeli-Palestinian-Jordanian Plan for coordinated exploitation of the Dead Sea area.

(3) The Mediterranean Sea (Gaza)-Dead Sea Canal.

(4) Regional Desalinization and other water development projects.

(5) A regional plan for agricultural development, including a coordinated regional effort for the prevention of desertification.

(6) Interconnection of electricity grids.

(7) Regional cooperation for the transfer, distribution and industrial exploitation of gas, oil and other energy resources.

(8) A Regional Tourism, Transportation and Telecommunications Development Plan.

(9) Regional cooperation in other spheres.

3. The two sides will encourage the multilateral working groups, and will coordinate towards their success. The two parties will encourage inter-sessional activities, as well as pre-feasibility and feasibility studies, within the various multilateral working groups.
AGREED MINUTES TO THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON INTERIM SELF-GOVERNMENT ARRANGEMENTS

A. GENERAL UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Any powers and responsibilities transferred to the Palestinians pursuant to the Declaration of Principles prior to the inauguration of the Council will be subject to the same principles pertaining to Article IV, as set out in these Agreed Minutes below.

B. SPECIFIC UNDERSTANDINGS AND AGREEMENTS

Article IV

It is understood that:

1. Jurisdiction of the Council will cover West Bank and Gaza Strip territory, except for issues that will be negotiated in the permanent status negotiations: Jerusalem, settlements, military locations, and Israelis.

2. The Council's jurisdiction will apply with regard to the agreed powers, responsibilities, spheres and authorities transferred to it.

Article VI(2)

It is agreed that the transfer of authority will be as follows:

1. The Palestinian side will inform the Israeli side of the names of the authorised Palestinians who will assume the powers, authorities and responsibilities that will be transferred to the Palestinians according to the Declaration of Principles in the following fields: education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, tourism, and any other authorities agreed upon.

2. It is understood that the rights and obligations of these offices will not be affected.

3. Each of the spheres described above will continue to enjoy existing budgetary allocations in accordance with arrangements to be mutually agreed upon. These arrangements also will provide for the necessary adjustments required in order to take into account the taxes collected by the direct taxation office.

4. Upon the execution of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will immediately commence
negotiations on a detailed plan for the transfer of authority on the above offices in accordance with the above understandings.

**Article VII(2)**

The Interim Agreement will also include arrangements for coordination and cooperation.

**Article VII(5)**

The withdrawal of the military government will not prevent Israel from exercising the powers and responsibilities not transferred to the Council.

**Article VIII**

It is understood that the Interim Agreement will include arrangements for cooperation and coordination between the two parties in this regard. It is also agreed that the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the Palestinian police will be accomplished in a phased manner, as agreed in the Interim Agreement.

**Article X**

It is agreed that, upon the entry into force of the Declaration of Principles, the Israeli and Palestinian delegations will exchange the names of the individuals designated by them as members of the Joint Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee. It is further agreed that each side will have an equal number of members in the Joint Committee. The Joint Committee will reach decisions by agreement. The Joint Committee may add other technicians and experts, as necessary. The Joint Committee will decide on the frequency and place or places of its meetings.

**ANNEX II**

It is understood that, subsequent to the Israeli withdrawal, Israel will continue to be responsible for external security, and for internal security and public order of settlements and Israelis. Israeli military forces and civilians may continue to use roads freely within the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area.

DONE at Washington, D.C., this thirteenth day of September, 1993.

For the Government of Israel:
(Shimon Peres)
For the P.L.O.:
(Mahmoud Abbas)

Witnessed By:
The United States of America:
(Warren Christopher)

The Russian Federation:
(Andrei Kozyrev) (###)

ITEM 2:

Ceremony for Signing of the Israeli- Palestinian Declaration of Principles

President Clinton, Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, PLO Executive Committee Member Mahmoud Abbas, Secretary Christopher, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, and PLO Executive Committee Chairman Yasir Arafat

The following remarks were made in Washington, DC, September 13, 1993, and released by the White House, Office of the Press Secretary on the same day.

President Clinton. Prime Minister Rabin, Chairman Arafat, Foreign Minister Peres, Mr. Abbas, President Carter, President Bush, distinguished guests: On behalf of the United States and Russia, co-sponsors of the Middle East peace process, welcome to this great occasion of history and hope.

Today, we bear witness to an extraordinary act in one of history's defining dramas—a drama that began in the time of our ancestors when the word went forth from a sliver of land between the River Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea. That hallowed piece of earth, that land of light and revelation is the home to the memories and dreams of Jews, Muslims, and Christians throughout the world.

As we all know, devotion to that land has also been the source of conflict and bloodshed for too long. Throughout this century, bitterness between the Palestinian and Jewish people has robbed the entire region of its resources, its potential, and too many of its sons and daughters. The land has been so drenched in warfare and hatred, the conflicting claims of history etched so deeply in the souls of the combatants there, that many believe the past would always have the upper hand.
Then, 14 years ago, the past began to give way when, at this place and
upon this desk, three men of great vision signed their names to the Camp David accords.
Today, we honor the memories of Menahem Begin and Anwar Sadat, and we salute the
wise leadership of President Jimmy Carter.
Then, as now, we heard from those who said that conflict would come
again soon. But the peace between Egypt and Israel has endured, just so this bold new
venture today, this brave gamble that the future can be better than the past must endure.

Two years ago in Madrid, another president took a major step on the road to peace by
bringing Israel and all her neighbors together to launch direct negotiations. And today
we also express our deep thanks for the skillful leadership of President George Bush.
Ever since Harry Truman first recognized Israel, every American President--Democrat
and
Republican--has worked for peace between Israel and her neighbors. Now the efforts of
all who have labored before us bring us to this moment--a moment when we dare to
pledge what for so long seemed difficult even to imagine: that the security of the Israeli
people will be reconciled with the hopes of the Palestinian people, and there will be more
security and more hope for all.

Today, the leadership of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization will sign a
declaration of principles on interim
Palestinian self-government. It charts a course toward reconciliation
between two peoples who have both known the bitterness of exile. Now
both pledge to put old sorrows and antagonisms behind them and to work
for a shared future, shaped by the values of the Torah, the Koran, and
the Bible.

Let us salute, also, today the Government of Norway for its remarkable
role in nurturing this agreement. But of all--above all, let us today
pay tribute to the leaders who had the courage to lead their people
toward peace, away from the scars of battle, the wounds, and the losses
of the past toward a brighter tomorrow. The world today thanks Prime
Minister Rabin, Foreign Minister Peres, and Chairman Arafat.

Their tenacity and vision has given us the promise of a new beginning.
What these leaders have done now must be done by others. Their
achievement must be a catalyst for progress in all aspects of the peace
process, and those of us who support them must be there to help in all
aspects. For the peace must render the people who make it more secure.
A peace of the brave is within our reach. Throughout the Middle East,
there is a great yearning for the quiet miracle of a normal life.

We know a difficult road lies ahead. Every peace has its enemies—those who still prefer
the easy habits of hatred to the hard labors of
reconciliation. But Prime Minister Rabin has reminded us that you do
not have to make peace with your friends. And the Koran teaches that if the enemy inclines toward peace, do thou also incline toward peace?

Therefore, let us resolve that this new mutual recognition will be a continuing process in which the parties transform the very way they see and understand each other. Let the skeptics of this peace recall what once existed among these people. There was a time when the traffic of ideas in commerce and pilgrims flowed uninterrupted among the cities of the fertile crescent. In Spain and the Middle East, Muslims and Jews once worked together to write brilliant chapters in the history of literature and science. All this can come to pass again.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Chairman: I pledge the active support of the United States of America to the difficult work that lies ahead. The United States is committed to ensuring that the people who are affected by this agreement will be made more secure by it and to leading the world in marshaling the sources necessary to implement the difficult details that will make real the principles to which you commit yourselves today.

Together, let us imagine what can be accomplished if all the energy and ability the Israelis and the Palestinians have invested into your struggle can now be channeled into cultivating the land and freshening the waters, into ending the boycotts and creating new industry, into building a land as bountiful and peaceful as it is holy. Above all, let us dedicate ourselves today to your region's next generation. In this entire assembly, no one is more important than the group of Israeli and Arab children who are seated here with us today.

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Chairman: This day belongs to you. And because of what you have done, tomorrow belongs to them. We must not leave them prey to the politics of extremism and despair, to those who would derail this process because they cannot overcome the fears and hatreds of the past. We must not betray their future. For too long, the young of the Middle East have been caught in a web of hatred not of their own making. For too long, they have been taught from the chronicles of war. Now we can give them the chance to know the season of peace. For them, we must realize the prophecy of Isaiah—that the cry of violence shall no more be heard in your land, nor wrack nor ruin within your borders. The children of Abraham, the descendants of Isaac and Ishmael, have embarked together on a bold journey. Together, today, with all our hearts and all our souls, we bid them shalom, salaam, peace.

Foreign Minister Peres. Mr. President, your excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I would like to thank you and the great American people for peace and support. Indeed, I would like to thank all those who have made this day possible. What we are doing today is
more than signing an agreement, it is a revolution. Yesterday, a dream; today, a commitment.

The Israeli and the Palestinian people who fought each other for almost a century have agreed to move decisively on the path of dialogue, understanding, and cooperation. We live in an ancient land. And as our land is small, so must our reconciliation be great. As our wars have been long, so must our healing be swift. Deep gaps call for lofty bridges. I want to tell the Palestinian delegation that we are sincere, that we mean business. We do not seek to shape your life or determine your destiny. Let all of us turn from bullets to ballots, from guns to shovels. We shall pray with you. We shall offer you our help in making Gaza prosper and Jericho blossom again.

As we have promised, we shall negotiate with you a permanent settlement, and with all our neighbors a comprehensive peace--peace for all. We shall support the agreement with an economic structure. We shall convert the bitter triangle of Jordanians, Palestinians, and Israelis into a triangle of political triumph and economic prosperity. We shall lower our barriers and widen our roads so goods and guests will be able to move freely all over the places--holy and other places. This should be another genesis. We have to build a new commonwealth on our old soil--a Middle East of the people and a Middle East for the children. For their sake, we must put an end to the waste of arms race and invest our resources in education.

Ladies and gentlemen: Two parallel tragedies have unfolded. Let us become a civic community. Let us bid once and for all farewell to wars, to threats, to human misery. Let us bid farewell to enmity, and may there be no more victims on either side. Let us build a Middle East of hope, where today's food is produced and tomorrow's prosperity is guaranteed--a region with a common market, a Near East with a long-range agenda. We owe it to our fallen soldiers, to the memories of the victims of the Holocaust.

Our hearts today grieve for the lost life of young and innocent people yesterday in our own country. Let their memory be our foundation. We are establishing today a memory of peace on fresh and old pomp. Suffering is, first of all, human. We also feel for the innocent loss of Palestinian life. We begin a new day. The day may be long and the challenges enormous. Our calendar must meet an intensive schedule. Mr. President, historically, you are presiding over a most promising day in the very long history of our region, of our people.

I thank all of you, ladies and gentlemen, and let's pray together. Let's add hope to determination as all of us since Abraham believe in freedom, in peace, in the blessing of our great land and great spirit. From the eternal city of Jerusalem, from this green, promising lawn of the White House, let's say together in the language of our Bible:
peace, peace to him that is far off and to him that is near, saith the Lord, and I will heal him. Thank you.

Mr. Abbas (through an interpreter). Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: In these historic moments, with feelings of joy that are mixed with a maximum sense of responsibility regarding events that are affecting our entire region, I greet you and I greet this distinguished gathering. I hope that this meeting in Washington will prove to be the onset of a positive and constructive change that will serve the interests of the Palestinian and the Israeli peoples.

We have come to this point because we believe that peaceful coexistence and cooperation are the only means for reaching understanding and for realizing the hopes of the Palestinians and the Israelis. The agreement we will sign reflects the decision we made in the Palestine Liberation Organization to turn a new page in our relationship with Israel.

We know quite well that this is merely the beginning of a journey that is surrounded by numerous dangers and difficulties. And yet, our mutual determination to overcome everything that stands in the way of the cause for peace--our common belief that peace is the only means to security and stability, and our mutual aspiration for a secure peace characterized by cooperation--all this will enable us to overcome all obstacles with the support of the international community. And here, I would like to mention in particular the U.S. Government, which will shoulder the responsibility of continuing to play an effective and a distinct role in the next stage, so that this great achievement may be completed.

In this regard, it is important to me to affirm that we are looking forward with a great deal of hope and optimism to a date that is 2 years from today when negotiations over the final status of our country are set to begin. We will then settle the remaining fundamental issues, especially those of Jerusalem, the refugees, and the settlements. At that time, we will be laying the last brick in the edifice of peace whose foundation has been established today. Economic development is the principal challenge facing the Palestinian people after years of struggle during which our national infrastructure and institutions were overburdened and drained. We are looking to the world for its support and encouragement in our struggle for growth and development which begins today.

I thank the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation for the part they played and for their efforts and their sponsorship of the peace process. I also appreciate the role played by the Government of Norway in bringing about this agreement, and I look forward to seeing positive results soon on the remaining Arab-
Israeli track, so we can proceed together with our Arab brothers on this comprehensive quest for peace. Thank you.

Secretary Christopher. Mr. President; Mr. Prime Minister; Chairman Arafat; Members of Congress; distinguished visitors, guests, friends, and colleagues: I'm honored to have witnessed the signing of this agreement on behalf of the United States.

Millions of people have dreamed of this moment--this moment for this very region. The Israelis and the Palestinians have taken a dramatic step toward a just, lasting, and comprehensive peace that can lift the lives of the people of the Middle East. They overcame seemingly insurmountable obstacles in framing the Declaration of Principles and the terms for a mutual recognition. They've broken through the barriers of hatred and fear. Throughout the process, they've demonstrated extraordinary courage and statesmanship. This gives genuine hope that they will complete the journey that has been begun today.

This achievement was the product of a sustained effort, international in scope and thoroughly bipartisan here in the United States. The foundation for the breakthrough, as the President said, was laid at the Madrid Conference of October 1991, which overcame the impediments to direct Arab-Israeli talks and launched a real peace process. The Madrid success, in turn, could not have been realized without its own foundation, the 1978 Camp David accords and the 1974 and 1975 disengagement agreements involving Israel, Egypt, and Syria.

In the distinguished group here assembled today, I see those responsible not only for today's breakthrough, but also men and women who have toiled for decades in the search for peace in the Middle East. I salute and congratulate each one of you.

I also salute and congratulate those who have helped at particular times. In particular, I express appreciation to Foreign Minister Holst and his Norwegian colleagues, who worked under very difficult circumstances and made it possible to facilitate the negotiation of the Declaration of Principles. We also owe a debt of gratitude to Foreign Minister Moussa and his Egyptian colleagues and many, many others who gave unstinting help to the peace process. We are all proud of this remarkable achievement, but we also understand that much more remains to be done if this newly planted tree is to bear fruit.

The United States is committed to a comprehensive peace between Israel and all of its Arab neighbors. We hope and believe that this agreement will spur progress in the talks between Israel and Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon. The United States is prepared to do its part in the negotiations that lie ahead. We will spare no effort in helping the
parties turn the agreements at the table into realities on the ground. We will remain a full partner in the search for peace.

But, certainly, we are not the sole partner. We need the entire international community to join us in this work and to oppose any effort to subvert the peace. This Israeli-Palestinian agreement cannot be permitted to fail. Many, many problems remain to be solved. Today's historic agreement demonstrates that the Middle East does not need to be a cauldron of hostility; it can, instead, be a cradle of hope.

Thank you.

Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Mr. President, Mr. Prime Minister, the Chairman: On behalf of President Yeltsin, I would like to congratulate you and other colleagues and friends here who made possible, through their committed effort and goodwill, this major step on the long road to comprehensive peace in the Middle East.

I think it's really time to rejoice but no time for euphoria. Unfortunately, this is only the first step--major, but first step--on the long, long road. And I would like to assure you that Russia is one of the co-sponsors, not only witnesses, but co-sponsors. So the peace process will spare no effort together with the United States, with the United Nations, and other interested parties to go on--on this road--and not let this major event fail. It is only ironic that, in time when the Middle Eastern peace process seems to be on track--and I'm sure it will move toward lasting peace--there are other forces which threaten security in the region.

Three days ago I was in Kabul, Afghanistan, and on the Tajik-Afghan border. And even there, we can see those forces of subversion, terrorism, and extremism--religious, and not only religious, political extremism--doing their destructive job. I know that in other parts of this region, there are also signs of this new danger, and I hope that we will not limit our joint effort only to the peace between Israel and its neighbors, not only for the cause of Palestinians to gain their legitimate rights, but also to see for stability in the whole region. And in this, Russia will be also a true and determined co-sponsor.

Once again, thank you for the effort done by all of the distinguished presidents, foreign ministers--actual and former. And I hope that further generations of politicians will be not so much doing with the peace, but rather with a peace dividend in the Middle East. It's high time for that.

Thank you.

Prime Minister Rabin. President Clinton, the President of the United States; your excellencies; ladies and gentlemen: This signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles here today, is not so
easy--neither for myself, as a soldier in Israel's war, nor for the people of Israel; not to the Jewish people in the diaspora, who are watching us now with great hope mixed with apprehension. It is certainly not easy for the families of the victims of the wars, violence, terror, whose pain will never heal, for the many thousands who defended our lives with their own, and have even sacrificed their lives for our own. For them, this ceremony has come too late. Today, on the eve of an opportunity--opportunity for peace--and perhaps the end of violence and wars, we remember each and every one of them with everlasting love.

We have come from Jerusalem, the ancient and eternal capital of the Jewish people; we have come from an anguished and grieving land; we have come from a people, a home, a family, that does not know a single year--not a single month--in which mothers have not wept for their sons. We have come to try and put an end to the hostilities so that our children, our children's children, will no longer experience the painful cost of war, violence, and terror. We have come to secure their lives and to ease the soul and the painful memories of the past, to hope and pray for peace.

Let me say to you, the Palestinians: We are destined to live together on the same soil, in the same land--we, the soldiers who have returned from battles stained with blood; we, who have seen our relatives and friends killed before our eyes; we, who have attended their funerals and cannot look into the eyes of their parents; we, who have come from a land where parents bury their children; we, who have fought against you, the Palestinians. We say to you today in a loud and a clear voice: Enough of blood and tears! Enough! We have no desire for revenge. We harbor no hatred toward you. We, like you, are people. People who want to build a home, to plant a tree, to love, live side by side with you in dignity, in empathy, as human beings, as free men. We are today giving peace a chance and saying to you: Enough! Let us pray that a day will come when we all will say farewell to the arms. We wish to open a new chapter in the sad book of our lives together, a chapter of mutual recognition, of good neighborliness, of mutual respect, of understanding. We hope to embark on a new era in the history of the Middle East.

Today, here in Washington at the White House, we will begin a new reckoning in the relations between peoples, between parents tired of war, between children who will not know war. President of the United States, ladies and gentlemen: Our inner strength, our higher moral values have been derived for thousands of years from the Book of the Books, in one of which correlate, we read:

To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under Heaven; a time to be born and a time to die; a time to kill and a time to heal; a time to weep and a time to love; a time to love and a time to hate; a time for war and a time of peace.
Ladies and gentlemen: The time for peace has come.

In 2 days, the Jewish people will celebrate the beginning of a new year. I believe, I hope, I pray that the new year will bring a message of redemption for all peoples; a good year for you, for all of you; a good year for Israelis and Palestinians; a good year for all the peoples of the Middle East; a good year for our American friends, who so want peace and are helping to achieve it. For presidents and members of previous administrations, especially for you President Clinton and your staff, for all citizens of the world: May peace come to all your homes.

In the Jewish tradition, it is customary to conclude our prayers with the word Amen—as you said, Amen. With your permission, men of peace, I shall conclude with words taken from the prayer recited by Jews daily and, whoever of you volunteer, I would ask the entire audience to join me in saying, Amen.

Chairman Arafat (through an interpreter). In the name of God, the most merciful, the passionate; Mr. President; ladies and gentlemen: I would like to express our tremendous appreciation to President Clinton and to his Administration for sponsoring this historic event, which the entire world has been waiting for. Mr. President, I am taking this opportunity to assure you and to assure the great American people that we share your values for freedom, justice, and human rights—values for which my people have been striving.

My people are hoping that this agreement, which we are signing today, marks the beginning of the end of a chapter of pain and suffering which has lasted throughout this century. My people are hoping that this agreement, which we are signing today, will usher in an age of peace, coexistence, and equal rights. We are relying on your role, Mr. President, and on the role of all the countries which believe that, without peace in the Middle East, peace in the world will not be complete.

Enforcing the agreement and moving toward the final settlement, after 2 years to implement all aspects of UN Resolutions 242 and 338, in all of their aspects and resolve all the issues of Jerusalem, the settlement, the refugees, and the boundaries will be a Palestinian and an Israeli responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the international community, in its entirety, to help the parties overcome the tremendous difficulties which are still standing in the way of reaching a final and comprehensive settlement.

Now, as we stand on the threshold of this new historic era, let me address the people of Israel and their leaders, with whom we are meeting today for the first time. And let me
assure them that the difficult decision we reached together was one that required great and exceptional courage.

We will need more courage and determination to continue the course of building coexistence and peace between us. This is possible. And it will happen with mutual determination and with the effort that will be made with all parties on all the tracks to establish the foundations of a just and comprehensive peace. Our people do not consider that exercising the right to self-determination could violate the rights of their neighbors or infringe on their security. Rather, putting an end to their feelings of being wronged and of having suffered an historic injustice is the strongest guarantee to achieve coexistence and openness between our two peoples and future generations. Our two peoples are awaiting today this historic hope, and they want to give peace a real chance. Such a shift will give us an opportunity to embark upon the process of economic, social, and cultural growth and development, and we hope that international participation in that process will be as extensive as it can be. This shift will also provide an opportunity for all forms of cooperation on a broad scale and in all fields.

I thank you, Mr. President. We hope that our meeting will be a new beginning for fruitful and effective relations between the American people and the Palestinian people. I wish to thank the Russian Federation and President Boris Yeltsin. Our thanks also go to Secretary Christopher and Foreign Minister Kozyrev, to the Government of Norway, and to the Foreign Minister of Norway for the positive part they played in bringing about this major achievement.

I extend greetings to all the Arab leaders, our brothers, and to all the world leaders who contributed to this achievement. Ladies and gentlemen, the battle for peace is the most difficult battle of our lives. It deserves our utmost efforts because the land of peace--the land of peace yearns for a just and comprehensive peace. Thank you Mr. President, thank you, thank you, thank you.

President Clinton. We have been granted the great privilege of witnessing this victory for peace. Just as the Jewish people this week celebrate the dawn of a new year, let us all go from this place to celebrate the dawn of a new era, not only for the Middle East, but for the entire world.

The sound we heard today, once again, as in ancient Jericho, was the trumpets toppling walls--the walls of anger and suspicion between Israeli and Palestinian, between Arab and Jew. This time, praise God, the trumpets herald not the destruction of that city, but its new beginning.
Now let each of us here today return to our portion of that effort, uplifted by the spirit of the moment, refreshed in our hopes and guided by the wisdom of the Almighty, who has brought us to this joyous day.

Go in peace. Go as peace-makers. (###)
Appendix Eleven

Joint Statement Annapolis Conference November 27, 2007

The representatives of the government of the state of Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organization, represented respective by Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, and President Mahmoud Abbas in his capacity as Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee and President of the Palestinian Authority, have convened in Annapolis, Maryland, under the auspices of President George W. Bush of the United States of America, and with the support of the participants of this international conference, having concluded the following joint understanding.

We express our determination to bring an end to bloodshed, suffering and decades of conflict between our peoples; to usher in a new era of peace, based on freedom, security, justice, dignity, respect and mutual recognition; to propagate a culture of peace and nonviolence; to confront terrorism and incitement, whether committed by Palestinians or Israelis. In furtherance of the goal of two states, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security, we agree to immediately launch good-faith bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty, resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues, without exception, as specified in previous agreements.

We agree to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations, and shall make every effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008. For this purpose, a steering committee, led jointly by the head of the delegation of each party, will meet continuously, as agreed. The steering committee will develop a joint work plan and establish and oversee the work of negotiations teams to address all issues, to be headed by one lead representative from each party. The first session of the steering committee will be held on 12 December 2007.

President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert will continue to meet on a bi-weekly basis to follow up the negotiations in order to offer all necessary assistance for their advancement.

The parties also commit to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based road map to a permanent two-state solution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict, issued by the Quartet on 30 April 2003 -- this is called the road map -- and agree to form an American, Palestinian and Israeli mechanism, led by the United States, to follow up on the implementation of the road map.

The parties further commit to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the road map until they reach a peace treaty. The United States will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitment of both sides of the road map. Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the road map, as judged by the United States.

Congratulations for your strong leadership. (Applause.)
The Palestinian people are blessed with many gifts and talents. They want the opportunity to use those gifts to better their own lives and build a better future for their children. They want the dignity that comes with sovereignty and independence. They want justice and equality under the rule of law. They want freedom from violence and fear.

The people of Israel have just aspirations, as well. They want their children to be able to ride a bus or to go to school without fear of suicide bombers. They want an end to rocket attacks and constant threats of assault. They want their nation to be recognized and welcomed in the region where they live.

Today, Palestinians and Israelis each understand that helping the other to realize their aspirations is key to realizing their own aspirations -- and both require an independent, democratic, viable Palestinian state. Such a state will provide Palestinians with the chance to lead lives of freedom and purpose and dignity. Such a state will help provide the Israelis with something they have been seeking for generations: to live in peace with their neighbors.

Achieving this goal is not going to be easy -- if it were easy, it would have happened a long time ago. To achieve freedom and peace, both Israelis and Palestinians will have to make tough choices. Both sides are sober about the work ahead, but having spent time with their leaders, they are ready to take on the tough issues. As Prime Minister Olmert recently put it, "We will avoid none of [the historic questions], we will not run from discussing any of them." As President Abbas has said: "I believe that there is an opportunity not only for us but for the Israelis, too. We have a historic and important opportunity that we must benefit from." It is with that spirit that we concluded -- that they concluded this statement I just read.

Our purpose here in Annapolis is not to conclude an agreement. Rather, it is to launch negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For the rest of us, our job is to encourage the parties in this effort -- and to give them the support they need to succeed.

In light of recent developments, some have suggested that now is not the right time to pursue peace. I disagree. I believe now is precisely the right time to begin these negotiations -- for a number of reasons:

First, the time is right because Palestinians and Israelis have leaders who are determined to achieve peace. President Abbas seeks to fulfill his people's aspirations for statehood, dignity and security. President Abbas understands that a Palestinian state will not be born of terror, and that terrorism is the enemy standing in the way of a state. He and Prime Minister Fayyad have both declared, without hesitation, that they are opposed to terrorism and committed to peace. They're committed to turning these declarations into actions on the ground to combat terror.

The emergence of responsible Palestinian leaders has given Israeli leaders the confidence they need to reach out to the Palestinians in true partnership. Prime Minister Olmert has expressed his understanding of the suffering and indignities felt by the Palestinian people.
He's made clear that the security of Israel will be enhanced by the establishment of a responsible, democratic Palestinian state. With leaders of courage and conviction on both sides, now is the time to come together and seek the peace that both sides desire.

Second, the time is right because a battle is underway for the future of the Middle East -- and we must not cede victory to the extremists. With their violent actions and contempt for human life, the extremists are seeking to impose a dark vision on the Palestinian people -- a vision that feeds on hopelessness and despair to sow chaos in the Holy Land. If this vision prevails, the future of the region will be endless terror, endless war, and endless suffering.

Standing against this dark vision are President Abbas and his government. They are offering the Palestinian people an alternative vision for the future -- a vision of peace, a homeland of their own, and a better life. If responsible Palestinian leaders can deliver on this vision, they will deal the forces of extremism a devastating blow. And when liberty takes root in the rocky soil of the West Bank and Gaza, it will inspire millions across the Middle East who want their societies built on freedom and peace and hope.

By contrast, if Palestinian reformers cannot deliver on this hopeful vision, then the forces of extremism and terror will be strengthened, a generation of Palestinians could be lost to the extremists, and the Middle East will grow in despair. We cannot allow this to happen. Now is the time to show Palestinians that their dream of a free and independent state can be achieved at the table of peace -- and that the terror and violence preached by Palestinian extremists is the greatest obstacle to a Palestinian state.

Third, the time is right because the world understands the urgency of supporting these negotiations. We appreciate that representatives from so many governments and international institutions have come to join us here in Annapolis -- especially the Arab world. We're here because we recognize what is at stake. We are here because we each have a vital role to play in helping Palestinians forge the institutions of a free society. We're here because we understand that the success of these efforts to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians will have an impact far beyond the Holy Land.

These are the reasons we've gathered here in Annapolis. And now we begin the difficult work of freedom and peace. The United States is proud to host this meeting -- and we reaffirm the path to peace set out in the road map. Yet in the end, the outcome of the negotiations they launch here depends on the Israelis and Palestinians themselves. America will do everything in our power to support their quest for peace, but we cannot achieve it for them. The success of these efforts will require that all parties show patience and flexibility -- and meet their responsibilities.

For these negotiations to succeed, the Palestinians must do their part. They must show the world they understand that while the borders of a Palestinian state are important, the nature of a Palestinian state is just as important. They must demonstrate that a Palestinian state will create opportunity for all its citizens, and govern justly, and dismantle the infrastructure of terror. They must show that a Palestinian state will accept its
responsibility, and have the capability to be a source of stability and peace -- for its own citizens, for the people of Israel, and for the whole region.

The Israelis must do their part. They must show the world that they are ready to begin -- to bring an end to the occupation that began in 1967 through a negotiated settlement. This settlement will establish Palestine as a Palestinian homeland, just as Israel is a homeland for the Jewish people. Israel must demonstrate its support for the creation of a prosperous and successful Palestinian state by removing unauthorized outposts, ending settlement expansion, and finding other ways for the Palestinian Authority to exercise its responsibilities without compromising Israel's security.

Arab states also have a vital role to play. Relaunching the Arab League initiative and the Arab League's support for today's conference are positive steps. All Arab states should show their strong support for the government of President Abbas -- and provide needed assistance to the Palestinian Authority. Arab states should also reach out to Israel, work toward the normalization of relations, and demonstrate in both word and deed that they believe that Israel and its people have a permanent home in the Middle East. These are vital steps toward the comprehensive peace that we all seek.

Finally, the international community has important responsibilities. Prime Minister Fayyad is finalizing a plan to increase openness and transparency and accountability throughout Palestinian society -- and he needs the resources and support from the international community. With strong backing from those gathered here, the Palestinian government can build the free institutions that will support a free Palestinian state.

The United States will help Palestinian leaders build these free institutions -- and the United States will keep its commitment to the security of Israel as a Jewish state and homeland for the Jewish people.

The United States strongly feels that these efforts will yield the peace that we want -- and that is why we will continue to support the Lebanese people. We believe democracy brings peace. And democracy in Lebanon is vital, as well, for the peace in the Middle East. Lebanese people are in the process of electing a president. That decision is for the Lebanese people to make -- and they must be able to do so free from outside interference and intimidation. As they embark on this process, the people of Lebanon can know that the American people stand with them -- and we look forward to the day when the people of Lebanon can enjoy the blessings of liberty without fear of violence or coercion.

The task begun here at Annapolis will be difficult. This is the beginning of the process, not the end of it -- and no doubt a lot of work remains to be done. Yet the parties can approach this work with confidence. The time is right. The cause is just. And with hard effort, I know they can succeed.

President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert, I pledge to devote my effort during my time as President to do all I can to help you achieve this ambitious goal. I give you my personal commitment to support your work with the resources and resolve of the
American government. I believe a day is coming when freedom will yield the peace we desire. And the land that is holy to so many will see the light of peace.

The day is coming when Palestinians will enjoy the blessings that freedom brings -- and all Israelis will enjoy the security they deserve. That day is coming. The day is coming when the terrorists and extremists who threaten the Israeli and Palestinian people will be marginalized and eventually defeated. And when that day comes, future generations will look to the work we began here at Annapolis. They will give thanks to the leaders who gathered on the banks of the Chesapeake for their vision, their wisdom and courage to choose a future of freedom and peace.

Thanks for coming. May God bless their work. (Applause.)

END 11:22 A.M. EST
Executive Summary

Five years on from adoption of the European Security Strategy, the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its history.

The EU remains an anchor of stability. Enlargement has spread democracy and prosperity across our continent. The Balkans are changing for the better. Our neighbourhood policy has created a strong framework for relations with partners to the south and east, now with a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern Partnership. Since 2003, the EU has increasingly made a difference in addressing crisis and conflict, in places such as Afghanistan or Georgia.

Yet, twenty years after the Cold War ended, Europe faces increasingly complex threats and challenges.

Terrorism and organised crime have evolved with new menace, including within our own societies. Conflicts continue to flare in different parts of the world, even in our neighbourhood. The Iranian nuclear programme has significantly advanced, representing a danger for stability in the Middle East and for the whole non-proliferation system. States on the edge of failure impact on security through crime and, most recently, piracy, and often lead to human suffering and illegal immigration.

Globalisation has brought newfound opportunities and wealth. High growth in the developing world, led by China, has lifted millions out of poverty. But globalisation has also made threats more complex and interconnected. The arteries of our society - such as information systems and energy supply - are more vulnerable. Global warming and environmental degradation, fuelled by economic growth, is altering the face of our planet. Moreover, globalisation is accelerating shifts in power and exposing differences in values. Recent financial turmoil has shaken developed and developing economies alike.

Europe will rise to these new challenges, as we have done in the past.

Drawing on a unique range of instruments, the EU already contributes to a more secure world. We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity. The EU remains the biggest donor to countries in need. Long-term engagement is required for lasting stabilisation.

Over the last decade, European Security and Defence Policy has grown in experience and capability, with over 20 missions deployed in response to
crisis, ranging from post-tsunami peace building in Aceh to protecting refugees in Chad.

These achievements are the results of a distinctive European approach to foreign and security policy. But there is no room for complacency. To ensure our security and meet the expectations of our citizens, we must be ready to shape events. That means becoming more strategic in our thinking, and more effective and visible around the world. We are most successful when we operate in a timely and coherent manner, backed by the right capabilities and sustained public support.

Lasting solutions to conflict must bind together all regional players with a common stake in peace. Sovereign governments must take responsibility for the consequences of their actions. It is important that all abide by the fundamental principles of the UN Charter and OSCE Principles and Commitments. We must be clear that respect for the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states and the peaceful settlement of disputes are not negotiable. Military force cannot be allowed to solve territorial issues - anywhere.

At a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order. The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. We have a unique moment to renew multilateralism, working with the new US administration and with our partners around the world. For Europe, the transatlantic partnership remains an irreplaceable foundation, based on shared history and responsibilities. The EU and NATO must deepen their strategic partnership for better co-operation in crisis management.

The EU has made substantial progress over the last five years. We are recognized as an important contributor to a better world. But, despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in progress. For our full potential to be realized we need to be still more capable, more coherent and more active.
Introduction

The European Council adopted the European Security Strategy (ESS) in December 2003. For the first time, it established principles and set clear objectives for advancing the EU’s security interests based on our core values. It is comprehensive in its approach and remains fully relevant.

This report does not therefore replace the ESS, but reinforces it. It gives an opportunity to examine how we have fared in practice, and what can be done to improve our approach.

I. Global challenges and key threats

The ESS identified a range of threats and challenges to our security interests. Five years on, these have not gone away: some have become more significant, and all more complex.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Proliferation from both terrorists and states was identified in the ESS as ‘potentially the greatest threat to EU security’. That risk has increased in the last five years, bringing the multilateral framework under pressure. While Libya has dismantled its WMD programme, Iran, and also North Korea, have yet to gain the trust of the international community. A likely revival of civil nuclear power in coming decades also poses challenges to the non-proliferation system, if not accompanied by the right safeguards.

The EU has been very active in multilateral fora, on the basis of the WMD Strategy, adopted in 2003, and at the forefront of international efforts to address Iran’s nuclear programme. The Strategy emphasises prevention, by working through the UN and multilateral agreements, by acting as a key donor and by working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation.

We should continue this approach, with political and financial action. A successful outcome to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010, with a view in particular to strengthening the non-proliferation regime, is critical. We will endeavour to ensure that, in a balanced, effective, and concrete manner, this conference examines means to step up international efforts against proliferation, pursue disarmament and ensure the responsible development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy by countries wishing to do so.

More work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably in ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.
Terrorism and Organised Crime

Terrorism, within Europe and worldwide, remains a major threat to our livelihoods. Attacks have taken place in Madrid and London, while others have been foiled, and home-grown groups play an increasing role within our own continent. Organised crime continues to menace our societies, with traffic in drugs, human beings, and weapons, alongside international fraud and money-laundering.

Since 2003, the EU has made progress in addressing both, with additional measures inside the Union, under the 2004 Hague Programme, and a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, adopted in 2005. These have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, also from 2005, is based on respect for human rights and international law. It follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment and the factors behind them; protecting potential targets; pursuing terrorists; and responding to the aftermath of an attack. While national action is central, appointment of a Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been an important step forward at the European level.

Within the EU, we have done much to protect our societies against terrorism. We should tighten co-ordination arrangements for handling a major terrorist incident, in particular using chemical, radiological, nuclear and bioterrorism materials, on the basis of such existing provisions as the Crisis Coordination Arrangements and the Civil Protection Mechanism. Further work on terrorist financing is required, along with an effective and comprehensive EU policy on information sharing, taking due account of protection of personal data.

We must also do more to counter radicalisation and recruitment, by addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination. Inter-cultural dialogue, through such fora as the Alliance of Civilisations, has an important role.

On organised crime, existing partnerships within our neighbourhood and key partners, and within the UN, should be deepened, in addressing movement of people, police and judicial cooperation. Implementation of existing UN instruments on crime is essential. We should further strengthen our counter-terrorism partnership with the United States, including in the area of data sharing and protection. Also, we should strengthen the capacity of our partners in South Asia, Africa, and our southern neighbourhood. The EU should support multilateral efforts, principally in the UN.

We need to improve the way in which we bring together internal and external dimensions. Better co-ordination, transparency and flexibility are needed across different agencies, at national and European level. This was already identified in the ESS, five years ago. Progress has been slow and incomplete.

Cyber security

Modern economies are heavily reliant on critical infrastructure including transport, communication and power supplies, but also the internet. The EU Strategy for a Secure Information Society, adopted in 2006 addresses internet-based crime. However, attacks against private or government IT
systems in EU Member States have given this a new dimension, as a potential new economic, political and military weapon.

More work is required in this area, to explore a comprehensive EU approach, raise awareness and enhance international co-operation.

**Energy Security**

Concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years. Declining production inside Europe means that by 2030 up to 75% of our oil and gas will have to be imported. This will come from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability. We are faced therefore with an array of security challenges, which involve the responsibility and solidarity of all Member States.

Our response must be an EU energy policy which combines external and internal dimensions. The joint report from the High Representative and Commission in May 2006 set out the main elements. Inside Europe, we need a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection, particular attention to the most isolated countries, and crisis mechanisms to deal with temporary disruption to supply.

Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes, is essential, as is good governance and investment in source countries. EU policy supports these objectives through engagement with Central Asia, the Caucasus and Africa, as well as through the Eastern Partnership and Union for the Mediterranean. Energy is a major factor in EU-Russia relations. Our policy should address transit routes, including through Turkey and Ukraine. With our partners, including China, India, Japan and the US, we should promote renewable energy, low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency, alongside transparent and well-regulated global markets.

**Climate change**

In 2003, the ESS already identified the security implications of climate change. Five years on, this has taken on a new urgency. In March 2008, the High Representative and Commission presented a report to the European Council which described climate change as a “threat multiplier”. Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources exacerbate conflict, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration. Climate change can also lead to disputes over trade routes, maritime zones and resources previously inaccessible.

We have enhanced our conflict prevention and crisis management, but need to improve analysis and early warning capabilities. The EU cannot do this alone. We must step up our work with countries most at risk by strengthening their capacity to cope. International co-operation, with the UN and regional organisations, will be essential.
II. Building stability in Europe and beyond

Within our continent, enlargement continues to be a powerful driver for stability, peace and reform.

With Turkey, negotiations started in 2005, and a number of chapters have been opened since. Progress in the Western Balkans has been continuous, if slow. Accession negotiations with Croatia are well advanced. The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has obtained candidate status. Stabilisation and Association agreements have been signed with the other Western Balkan countries. Serbia is close to fulfilling all conditions for moving towards deeper relations with the EU. The EU continues to play a leading role in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but, despite progress, more is required from local political leaders to overcome blockage of reforms. In Kosovo, we are deploying EULEX, our largest civilian ESDP mission to date, and will continue substantial economic support. Throughout the region, cooperation and good-neighbourly relations are indispensable.

It is in our interest that the countries on our borders are well-governed. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2004, supports this process. In the east, all eligible countries participate except Belarus, with whom we are now taking steps in this direction.

With Ukraine, we have gone further, with a far-reaching new agreement which is close to being finalised. We will soon start negotiations with the Republic of Moldova on a similar agreement. The Black Sea Synergy has been launched to complement EU bilateral policies in this region of particular importance for Europe.

New concerns have arisen over the so-called "frozen conflicts" in our eastern neighbourhood. The situation in Georgia, around Abkhazia and South Ossetia, has escalated, leading to an armed conflict in August 2008. The EU led the international response, through mediation between the parties, humanitarian assistance, a civilian monitoring mission, and substantial financial support. Our engagement will continue, with the EU leading the Geneva Process. A possible settlement to the Transnistrian conflict has gained impetus, through active EU participation in the 5+2 negotiation format, and the EU Border Assistance Mission.

The Mediterranean, an area of major importance and opportunity for Europe, still poses complex challenges, such as insufficient political reform and illegal migration. The EU and several Mediterranean partners, notably Israel and Morocco, are interested in deepening their bilateral relations. The ENP has reinforced reforms originally started under the Barcelona process in 1995, but regional conflict, combined with rising radicalism, continues to sow instability.

The EU has been central to efforts towards a settlement in the Middle East, through its role in the Quartet, co-operation with Israel and the Palestinian Authority, with the Arab League and other regional partners. The EU is fully engaged in the Annapolis Process, and is contributing sustained financial and budgetary support to the Palestinian Authority, and capacity-building, including through the deployment of judicial, police and border management experts on the ground. In Lebanon, Member States provide the backbone of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. On Iraq, the EU has supported the
political process, reconstruction, and rule of law, including through the EUJUST LEX mission.

Since 2003, Iran has been a growing source of concern. The Iranian nuclear programme has been subject to successive resolutions in the UNSC and IAEA. Development of a nuclear military capability would be a threat to EU security that cannot be accepted. The EU has led a dual-track approach, combining dialogue and increasing pressure, together with the US, China, and Russia. The High Representative has delivered a far-reaching offer for Iran to rebuild confidence and engagement with the international community. If, instead, the nuclear programme advances, the need for additional measures in support of the UN process grows. At the same time, we need to work with regional countries including the Gulf States to build regional security.

The ESS acknowledged that Europe has security interests beyond its immediate neighbourhood. In this respect, Afghanistan is a particular concern. Europe has a long-term commitment to bring stability. EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mission, and the EU is engaged on governance and development at all levels. The EU Police Mission is being expanded. These efforts will not succeed without full Afghan ownership, and support from neighbouring countries: in particular Pakistan, but also India, Central Asia and Iran. Indeed, improved prospects for good relations between India and Pakistan in recent years have been a positive element in the strategic balance sheet.

**Security and development nexus**

As the ESS and the 2005 Consensus on Development have acknowledged, there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Threats to public health, particularly pandemics, further undermine development. Human rights are a fundamental part of the equation. In many conflict or post-conflict zones, we have to address the appalling use of sexual violence as a weapon of intimidation and terror. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1820 on sexual violence in situations of armed conflict is essential.

Conflict is often linked to state fragility. Countries like Somalia are caught in a vicious cycle of weak governance and recurring conflict. We have sought to break this, both through development assistance and measures to ensure better security. Security Sector Reform and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, which have been a focus of our missions in Guinea-Bissau or DR Congo, are increasingly important. This is most successful when done in partnership with the international community and local stakeholders.

Ruthless exploitation of natural resources is often an underlying cause of conflict. The Kimberley Process and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative offer an innovative model to address this problem.

**Piracy**

The ESS highlighted piracy as a new dimension of organised crime. It is also a result of state failure. The world economy relies on sea routes for 90% of trade. Piracy in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden has made this issue
more pressing in recent months, and affected delivery of humanitarian aid to Somalia. The EU has responded, including with ATALANTA, our first maritime ESDP mission, to deter piracy off the Somali coast, alongside countries affected and other international actors, including NATO.

**Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), Cluster Munitions and Landmines**

In 2005, the European Council adopted the EU Strategy to combat illicit accumulation and trafficking of SALW and their ammunition. In the context of its implementation, the EU supports the UN Programme of Action in this field. The EU will continue to develop activities to combat threats posed by illicit SALW.

The EU has given strong support to the concept of an international Arms Trade Treaty and has decided to support the process leading towards its adoption. The EU is also a major donor to mine action. It has actively supported and promoted the Ottawa Convention on Anti-Personnel Landmines worldwide. The Oslo Convention on Cluster Munitions, agreed at Dublin in May 2008, represents an important step forward in responding to the humanitarian problems caused by this type of munitions, which constitute a major concern for all EU Member States. The EU plays a leading role in promoting the adoption of a protocol on this type of munitions in the UN framework in order to involve all major military powers.

**III. Europe in a changing world**

To respond to the changing security environment we need to be more effective - among ourselves, within our neighbourhood and around the world.

**A. A more effective and capable Europe**

Our capacity to address the challenges has evolved over the past five years, and must continue to do so. We must strengthen our own coherence, through better institutional co-ordination and more strategic decision-making. The provisions of the Lisbon Treaty provide a framework to achieve this.

Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict early on must be at the heart of our approach. Peace-building and long-term poverty reduction are essential to this. Each situation requires coherent use of our instruments, including political, diplomatic, development, humanitarian, crisis response, economic and trade co-operation, and civilian and military crisis management. We should also expand our dialogue and mediation capacities. EU Special Representatives bring EU influence to bear in various conflict regions. Civil society and NGOs have a vital role to play as actors and partners. Our election monitoring missions, led by members of the European Parliament, also make an important contribution.

The success of ESDP as an integral part of our Common Foreign and Security Policy is reflected by the fact that our assistance is increasingly in demand. Our Georgia mission has demonstrated what can be achieved when we act collectively with the necessary political will. But the more
complex the challenges we face, the more flexible we must be. We need to prioritise our commitments, in line with resources. Battlegroups and Civilian Response Teams have enhanced our capacity to react rapidly.

Appropriate and effective command structures and headquarters capability are key. Our ability to combine civilian and military expertise from the conception of a mission, through the planning phase and into implementation must be reinforced. We are developing this aspect of ESDP by putting the appropriate administrative structures, financial mechanisms, and systems in place. There is also scope to improve training, building on the European Security and Defence College and the new European young officers exchange scheme, modelled on Erasmus.

We need to continue mainstreaming human rights issues in all activities in this field, including ESDP missions, through a people-based approach coherent with the concept of human security. The role of women in building peace is increasingly recognised. Effective implementation of UNSCR 1325 on women, peace, and security and resolution 1612 on children and armed conflict is essential in this context.

For civilian missions, we must be able to assemble trained personnel with a variety of skills and expertise, deploy them at short notice and sustain them in theatre over the long term. We need full interoperability between national contingents. In support of this, Member States have committed to draw up national strategies to make experts available, complemented by more deployable staff for mission support, including budgeting and procurement. The ways in which equipment is made available and procured should be made more effective to enable timely deployment of missions.

For military missions, we must continue to strengthen co-ordination of our efforts on capabilities at European level, as well as mutual collaboration and burden-sharing arrangements. Experience has shown the need to do more, particularly over key capabilities such as strategic airlift, helicopters, space assets, and maritime surveillance (as set out in more detail in the Declaration on the Reinforcement of Capabilities). These efforts must be supported by a competitive and robust defence industry across Europe, with greater investment in research and development. Since 2004, the European Defence Agency has successfully led this process, and should continue to do so.

**B. Greater engagement with our neighbourhood**

The ENP has strengthened individual bilateral relationships with the EU. This process now needs to build regional integration.

The Union for the Mediterranean, launched in July 2008, provides a renewed political moment to pursue this with our southern partners, through a wide-ranging agenda, including on maritime safety, energy, water and migration. Addressing security threats like terrorism will be an important part.

At the same time we must pursue an ambitious programme for closer cooperation with our Eastern neighbours. The Eastern Partnership will
strengthen and deepen our relations with these countries, complete transition, consolidate their statehood and enhance stability and security. [to be updated after Cion proposal on 03.12].

Lasting stability in our neighbourhood will require continued effort by the EU, together with UN, OSCE and the US, and can only be achieved in cooperation with Russia. Our relations with Russia have deteriorated over the conflict with Georgia. The EU expects Russia to honour its commitments in a way that will restore the necessary confidence. Our partnership should be based on respect for common values, notably human rights, democracy, and rule of law, and market economic principles as well as on common interests and objectives.

We need a sustained effort to address conflicts in the Southern Caucasus, Republic of Moldova and between Israel and the Arab states. Here, as elsewhere, full engagement from the beginning of the new US administration will be key. In each case, a durable settlement must bring together all the regional players. Countries like Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have played an increasingly important role in the region, whereas this has not been the case with Iran. There is a particular opportunity for the EU to work with Turkey, as a bridge to the Muslim world.

**C. Partnerships for Effective Multilateralism**

The ESS called for Europe to contribute to a more effective multilateral order around the world. Since 2003, we have strengthened our partnerships in pursuit of that objective. The key partner for Europe in this and other areas is the US. Where we have worked together, the EU and US have been a formidable force for good in the world.

The UN stands at the apex of the international system. Everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives. The EU works closely in key theatres, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, DRC, Sudan/Darfur, Chad and Somalia, and has improved institutional links, in line with our joint 2007 EU-UN Declaration. We support all sixteen current UN peacekeeping operations.

The EU and NATO have worked well together on the ground in the Balkans and in Afghanistan, even if formal relations have not advanced. We need to strengthen this strategic partnership in service of our shared security interests, with better operational co-operation, and continued work on military capabilities. Since 2003, we have deepened our relationship with the OSCE, especially in Georgia and Kosovo.

We have substantially expanded our relationship with China. Ties to Canada and Japan are close and longstanding. Russia remains an important partner on global issues. There is still room to do more in our relationship with India. Relations with other partners, including Brazil, South Africa and, within Europe, Norway and Switzerland, have grown in significance since 2003.

The EU is working more closely with regional organisations, and in particular the African Union. Through the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, we are supporting enhanced African capacities in crisis management, including
regional stand-by forces and early warning. We have deepened links with our Central Asia partners through the Strategy adopted in 2007, with strengthened political dialogue, and work on issues such as water, energy, rule of law and security. Elsewhere, the EU has developed engagement with ASEAN, over regional issues such as Burma, with SAARC, and Latin America. Our experience gives the EU a particular role in fostering regional integration. Where others seek to emulate us, in line with their particular circumstances, we should support them.

The international system, created at the end of the Second World War, faces pressures on several fronts. Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved, and decision-making in multilateral fora made more efficient. This means sharing decisions more, and creating a greater stake for others. Faced with common problems, there is no substitute for common solutions.

Key priorities are climate change and completion of the Doha Round in the WTO. The EU is leading negotiations for a new international agreement on the former, and must use all its levers to achieve an ambitious outcome at Copenhagen in 2009. We should continue reform of the UN system, begun in 2005, and maintain the crucial role of the Security Council. The International Criminal Court should grow further in effectiveness, alongside broader EU efforts to strengthen international justice. We need to mould the IMF and other financial institutions to reflect modern realities. The G8 should be transformed. And we must continue our collective efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals.

These issues cross boundaries, touching as much on domestic as foreign policy. Indeed, they demonstrate how in the twenty-first century, more than ever, sovereignty entails responsibility. With respect to core human rights, the EU should continue to advance the agreement reached at the UN World Summit in 2005, that we hold a shared responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

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Maintaining public support for our global engagement is fundamental. In modern democracies, where media and public opinion are crucial to shaping policy, popular commitment is essential to sustaining our commitments abroad. We deploy police, judicial experts and soldiers in unstable zones around the world. There is an onus on governments, parliaments and EU institutions to communicate how this contributes to security at home.

Five years ago, the ESS set out a vision of how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world. We have come a long way towards that. But the world around us is changing fast, with evolving threats and shifting powers. To build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now.
Appendix Thirteen (a)

Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean

Paris, 13 July 2008

Under the co-presidency of
the President of the French Republic and the President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

In the presence of

The EUROPEAN UNION represented by
HE Mr Nicolas SARKOZY President of the European Council
HE Mr José Manuel BARROSO President of the European Commission
HE Mr Javier SOLANA Secretary-General of the Council of the European Union / High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

***

ALBANIA represented by
HE Mr Sali BERISHA Prime Minister of the Republic of Albania

ALGERIA represented by
HE Mr Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

AUSTRIA represented by
HE Mr Alfred GUSENBAUER Federal Chancellor of Austria
BELGIUM represented by
HE Mr Karel DE GUCHT  Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA represented by
HE Mr Haris SILAJDŽIĆ  Chairman of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

BULGARIA represented by
HE Mr Georgi PARVANOV  President of the Republic of Bulgaria

CROATIA represented by
HE Mr Stjepan MESIĆ  President of the Republic of Croatia

CYPRUS represented by
HE Mr Demetris CHRISTOFIAS  President of the Republic of Cyprus

CZECH REPUBLIC represented by
HE Mr Alexandr VONDRA  Deputy Prime Minister for European Affairs of the Czech Republic

DENMARK represented by
HE Mr Anders FOGH RASMUSSEN  Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Denmark

EGYPT represented by
HE Mr Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK  President of the Arab Republic of Egypt

ESTONIA represented by
HE Mr Andrus ANSIP  Prime Minister of the Republic of Estonia

FINLAND represented by
HE Ms Tarja HALONEN  President of the Republic of Finland
HE Mr Matti VANTHANEN  Prime Minister of the Republic of Finland
FRANCE represented by
HE Mr Nicolas SARKOZY President of the French Republic

GERMANY represented by
HE Mrs Angela MERKEL Federal Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

GREECE represented by
HE Mr Kostas KARAMANLIS Prime Minister of the Hellenic Republic

HUNGARY represented by
HE Mr Ferenc GYURCSANY Prime Minister of the Republic of Hungary

IRELAND represented by
HE Mr Brian COWEN Taoiseach of Ireland

ISRAEL represented by
HE Mr Ehud OLMERT Prime Minister of the State of Israel

ITALY represented by
HE Mr Silvio BERLUSCONI President of the Council of Ministers of the Italian Republic

JORDAN represented by
HE Mr Nader DAHABI Prime Minister of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan

LATVIA represented by
HE Mr Valdis ZATLERS President of the Republic of Latvia

LEBANON represented by
HE General Michel SLEIMANE President of the Lebanese Republic

LITHUANIA represented by
HE Mr Gediminas KIRKILAS Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania
LUXEMBOURG represented by
HE Mr Jean-Claude JUNCKER Prime Minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg

MALTA represented by
HE Mr Lawrence GONZI Prime Minister of the Republic of Malta

MAURITANIA represented by
HE Mr Sidi Mohamed OULD CHEIKH ABDALLAHI President of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania

MONACO represented by
His Serene Highness ALBERT II Sovereign Prince of Monaco

MONTENEGRO represented by
HE Mr Milo DJUKANOVIC Prime Minister of Montenegro

MOROCCO represented by
HRH Prince Moulay RACHID

PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY represented by
HE Mr Mahmoud ABBAS President of the Palestinian Authority

POLAND represented by
HE Mr Lech KACZYŃSKI President of the Republic of Poland

PORTUGAL represented by
HE Mr José SOCRATES Prime Minister of the Portuguese Republic

ROMANIA represented by
HE Mr Traian BĂSESCU President of Romania

SLOVAKIA represented by
HE Mr Robert FICO Prime Minister of the Slovak Republic
SLOVENIA represented by
HE Mr Janez JANŠA Prime Minister of the Republic of Slovenia

SPAIN represented by
HE Mr José Luis RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Spain

SWEDEN represented by
HE Mr Fredrik REINFELDT Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Sweden

SYRIA represented by
HE Mr Bachar AL-ASSAD President of the Syrian Arab Republic

THE NETHERLANDS represented by
HE Mr Jan Peter BALKENENDE Prime Minister of the Kingdom of the Netherlands

TUNISIA represented by
HE Mr Zine EL ABIDINE BEN ALI President of the Republic of Tunisia

TURKEY represented by
HE Mr Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey

UNITED KINGDOM represented by
HE Mr Gordon BROWN Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

***

UNITED NATIONS represented by
Mr BAN KI-MOON Secretary-General of the United Nations

EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT/EMPA represented by
Mr Hans-Gert PÖTTERING President of the European Parliament and President of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA)
COOPERATION COUNCIL FOR THE ARAB STATES OF THE GULF represented by
His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa AL THANI Emir of Qatar; President-in-office of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES represented by
Mr Amr MOUSSA Secretary-General of the League of Arab States

AFRICAN UNION represented by
Mr Jean PING Chairperson of the African Union Commission

ARAB MAGHRIB UNION represented by
Mr Habib BEN YAHIA Secretary-General of the Arab Maghreb Union

ORGANISATION OF THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE represented by
Mr Ekmeleddin IHSANOGLU Secretary-General of the Organisation of the Islamic Conference

***

AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK represented by
Mr Donald KABERUKA President of the African Development Bank

EUROPEAN INVESTMENT BANK represented by
Mr Philippe MAYSTADT President of the European Investment Bank

WORLD BANK represented by
Mr Juan Jose DABOUB Director General of the World Bank

***

ALLIANCE OF CIVILISATIONS represented by
Mr Jorge Sampaio UN High Representative for the Alliance of Civilisations
ANNA LINDH EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FOUNDATION FOR THE DIALOGUE
BETWEEN CULTURES represented by
Mr André AZOULAY
President of the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean
Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures

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Draft Joint Declaration of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean

Paris, 13 July 2008

Euro-Mediterranean Heads of States and Government meeting in Paris on 13 July 2008, inspired by the shared political will to revitalise efforts to transform the Mediterranean into an area of peace, democracy, cooperation and prosperity, agree to adopt the following joint declaration:

The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, building on the Barcelona Declaration and its objectives of achieving peace, stability and security, as well as the acquis of the Barcelona Process, is a multilateral partnership with a view to increasing the potential for regional integration and cohesion. Heads of State and Government also reassert the central importance of the Mediterranean on the political agenda of all countries. They stress the need for better co-ownership by all participants and for more relevance and visibility for the citizens.

They share the conviction that this initiative can play an important role in addressing common challenges facing the Euro-Mediterranean region, such as economic and social development; world food security crisis; degradation of the environment, including climate change and desertification, with the view of promoting sustainable development; energy; migration; terrorism and extremism; as well as promoting dialogue between cultures.

It will encompass all EU Member States and the European Commission, together with the other States (members and observers) of the Barcelona Process. The Arab League shall be invited to the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, in pursuance of its participation in the Barcelona Process. Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean welcomes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Monaco and Montenegro which have accepted the acquis of the Barcelona Process.
A strategic ambition for the Mediterranean

1. Europe and the Mediterranean countries are bound by history, geography and culture. More importantly, they are united by a common ambition: to build together a future of peace, democracy, prosperity and human, social and cultural understanding. To achieve these common objectives participants agree to continue with renewed dynamism the quest for peace and cooperation, to explore their joint problems and transform these good intentions into actions in a renewed partnership for progress.

2. Heads of State and Government underline the important role played by the Barcelona Process since 1995. The Barcelona Process has been the central instrument for Euro-Mediterranean relations. Representing a partnership of 39 governments and over 700 million people, it has provided a framework for continued engagement and development. The Barcelona Process is the only forum within which all Euro-Mediterranean partners exchange views and engage in constructive dialogue. It represents a strong commitment to peace, democracy, regional stability and security through regional cooperation and integration. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean aims to build on that consensus to pursue cooperation, political and socio-economic reform and modernisation on the basis of equality and mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty.

3. Heads of State and Government underscore the importance of the active participation of civil society, local and regional authorities and the private sector in the implementation of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

4. To take advantage of the opportunities offered by an enhanced framework of multilateral cooperation, Heads of State and Government decide to launch a reinforced partnership - The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

5. This initiative is also the expression of a common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security according to the Barcelona Declaration of 1995, which, inter alia, promotes regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.
The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms; refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and subregional cooperation; consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

6. It shows the determination to favour human resource development and employment in line with the Millennium Development Goals, including alleviating poverty. Heads of State and Government underline their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism by the expansion of participation in political life and the embracing of all human rights and fundamental freedoms. They also affirm their ambition to build a common future based on the full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms, as enshrined in international human rights law, such as the promotion of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, strengthening the role of women in society, the respect of minorities, the fight against racism and xenophobia and the advancement of cultural dialogue and mutual understanding.

7. Heads of State and Government reaffirm their support for the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process, as referred to in the Lisbon Euromed Ministerial Meeting (November 2007) and according to the Annapolis process. They recall that peace in the Middle East requires a comprehensive solution and in this regard welcome the announcement that Syria and Israel have initiated indirect peace talks under the auspices of Turkey, in accordance with the Madrid Conference terms of reference for peace.
8. Heads of State and Government reiterate their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations and their determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors and they reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism in order to enhance the security of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect of the rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective counter-terrorism policies and deeper co-operation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets and to manage the consequences of attacks. They emphasise the need to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations without qualification, committed by whomever, wherever and for whatever purposes. They also reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion or culture with terrorism and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance, improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for all religious and beliefs. Such actions serve directly the interests of the people of the Euro-Med region and work against the interests of the terrorists and the networks.

Scope and main objectives

9. Heads of State and Government agree that the challenge of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is to enhance multilateral relations, increase co-ownership of the process, set governance on the basis of equal footing and translate it into concrete projects, more visible to citizens. Now is the time to inject a new and continuing momentum into the Barcelona Process. More engagement and new catalysts are now needed to translate the objectives of the Barcelona Declaration into tangible results.

10. The Euro-Mediterranean partnership continues to be an inclusive process driven in all its aspects by the principle of consensus, for which the modalities in terms of projects will be decided by the next Foreign Affairs Ministerial meeting in November 2008.
11. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will build on the acquis and reinforce the achievements and successful elements of the Barcelona Process. The Barcelona Declaration, its goals and its cooperation areas remain valid and its three chapters of cooperation (Political Dialogue, Economic Cooperation and Free Trade, and Human, Social and Cultural Dialogue) will continue to remain central in Euro-Mediterranean relations. The Five-Year Work Programme adopted by the 10th Anniversary Euro-Mediterranean Summit held in Barcelona in 2005 (including the fourth chapter of cooperation on "Migration, Social Integration, Justice and Security" introduced at that stage) and the conclusions of all ministerial meetings will remain in force. Heads of State and Government acknowledge the progress and economic benefits of the creation of a deep Free Trade Area in the Euromed region by 2010 and beyond, and the strengthening of regional economic integration in all its dimensions. They support the main lines of the Euromed Trade Roadmap till 2010 and beyond, and, in particular, to study the establishment of a smooth, efficient and business-friendly trade facilitation mechanism which would bring further transparency and trade and investment opportunities.

12. Heads of State and Government underline that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean aims to achieve a future of peace and shared prosperity in the entire region by implementing projects that will enhance the flow of exchanges among the people of the whole region. In this regard they acknowledge the human and cultural dimension of this initiative. They underline the commitment to facilitate legal movement of individuals. They stress that promoting orderly managed legal migration in the interest of all parties concerned, fighting illegal migration and fostering links between migration and development are issues of common interest which should be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach.
13. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be complementary to EU bilateral relations with these countries1 which will continue under existing policy frameworks such as the Association Agreements, the European Neighbourhood Policy action plans, and, in the case of Mauritania, the African Caribbean Pacific framework. It will also be coherent and complementary with the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. While complementing activities concerning its regional dimension, the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be independent from the EU enlargement policy, accession negotiations and the pre-accession process.

14. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean gives a new impulse to the Barcelona Process in at least three very important ways:

- by upgrading the political level of the EU's relationship with its Mediterranean partners;

- by providing for further co-ownership to our multilateral relations; and

- by making these relations more concrete and visible through additional regional and sub-regional projects, relevant for the citizens of the region.

Upgrading of relations

15. Heads of State and Government agree to hold biennial summits. The summits should result in a political declaration and a short list of concrete regional projects to be set in motion. The conclusions should endorse a broad two-year work programme for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Annual Foreign Affairs Ministerial meetings will review progress in the implementation of the summit conclusions and prepare the next summit meetings and, if necessary, approve new projects.

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1 The countries concerned are: Algeria; Egypt; Israel; Jordan; Lebanon; Mauritania; Monaco; Morocco; Palestinian Authority; Syria; Tunisia. Croatia and Turkey, negotiating candidate countries to the EU. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Montenegro, potential candidates to the EU. Libya, invited by the Presidency since the Euromed Stuttgart ministerial meeting of 1999.
16. The summit meetings should take place alternately in the EU and in Mediterranean partner countries. The host country should be selected by consensus. All countries party to the initiative will be invited to Summits, Ministerials and other plenary meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

17. The Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly will be the legitimate parliamentary expression of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. Heads of State and Government strongly support the strengthening of the role of the EMPA in its relations with Mediterranean partners.

18. The Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures as a Euro-Mediterranean institution will contribute in an effective manner to the cultural dimension of the initiative in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilizations.

Increased co-ownership and institutional governance

19. Heads of State and Government agree on the creation of a co-presidency and also decide that a joint secretariat will be established. Participation in the co-presidencies and the secretariat will be open to all members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

20. The current structures of the Barcelona Process should be preserved and adapted when new modalities are approved by the Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers.

Co-Presidency

21. Heads of State and Government establish a co-presidency in order to improve the balance and the joint ownership of their cooperation. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries. The co-presidency shall apply to Summits, all Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, experts/ad hoc meetings within the initiative.
22. The establishment of a co-presidency

- from the EU side must be compatible with the external representation of the European Union in accordance with the Treaty provisions in force;

- from the Mediterranean side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-renewable period of two years.

Institutional governance and Secretariat

23. Heads of State and Government agree to establish new institutional structures which will contribute to achieving the political goals of this initiative, especially reinforcing co-ownership, upgrading the political level of EU-Mediterranean relations and achieving visibility through projects.

24. They agree that a joint Secretariat for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will be established, with a key role within the institutional architecture. The Secretariat will give a new impulse to this process in terms of identification, follow-up, promotion of the projects and the search for partners. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case by case basis. The Secretariat will work in operational liaison with all structures of the process, including by preparing working documents for the decision-making bodies. The Secretariat would have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status.

25. The mandate of the Secretariat is of a technical nature while the political mandate related to all aspects of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Senior Officials.

26. The Joint Permanent Committee based in Brussels will assist and prepare the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-up; it may also act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.
27. The **Senior Officials** will continue to convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial meetings, including projects to be endorsed, take stock of and evaluate the progress of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean in all its components and submit the annual work programme to Ministers of Foreign Affairs.

28. **Details of the mandate** of the new institutional structure, the functioning of the co-presidency, as well as the composition, seat and funding of the Secretariat will be decided on the basis of consensus by the Foreign Affairs Ministers in November 2008, taking into account thorough discussions and proposals submitted by all partners.

**Projects**

29. The project selection process will be in conformity with the Barcelona Declaration objectives notably achieving peace, security and stability. The partners will set up a favourable environment for the implementation of projects taking into account the regional, sub-regional and trans-national character of proposed projects as well as their size, relevance and interest for the parties involved, in line with the scope and main objectives of the initiative. The potential to promote balanced and sustainable development, regional and sub-regional integration, cohesion and interconnections will be considered and their financial feasibility including the maximization of private sector financing and participation will be sought. Senior Officials will prepare the criteria for the selection of projects to be approved by Foreign Ministers.

30. Heads of State and Government underscore the potential offered by the reinforced cooperation through the principle of variable geometry projects in line with the scope and main aims of the initiative. Such an approach will enable member countries with affinities, shared objectives and complementarities to give momentum to the process and reach the goals of the Barcelona Declaration.
Funding

31. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will mobilise additional funding for the region, mainly through regional and subregional projects. Its capacity to attract more financial resources for regional projects, with a high degree of donor coordination, will constitute its added value mainly through the following sources, inter alia: private sector participation; contributions from the EU budget and all partners; contributions from other countries, international financial institutions and regional entities; the Euro-Mediterranean Investment and Partnership Facility (FEMIP); the ENPI Euro-Med envelope, the Neighbourhood Investment Facility and the cross-border cooperation instrument within the ENPI, as well as the other instruments applicable to the countries covered by the initiative, for which the usual selection and procedural rules will continue to apply.

Concluding points

32. The Participants stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is an historic opportunity to revitalise the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Process and upgrade it to a new level. The ultimate success of the initiative also rests in the hands of citizens, civil society and the active involvement of the private sector.

33. Heads of State and Government invite Ministers of Foreign Affairs to finalise, during their next meeting in November, the modalities for the institutional set-up of the initiative. The new structures for the initiative should be fully operational before the end of 2008. All participating countries and the European Commission will work in close coordination to achieve this objective.

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ANNEX

The future of the Euro-Mediterranean region lies in improved socio-economic development, solidarity, regional integration, sustainable development and knowledge. There is a need to increase co-operation in areas such as business development, trade, the environment, energy, water management, agriculture, food safety and security, transport, maritime issues, education, vocational training, science and technology, culture, media, justice and law, security, migration, health, strengthening the role of women in society, civil protection, tourism, urban planning, ports, decentralised co-operation, the information society and competitive clusters.

In addition, they stress the importance of strengthening food security, especially taking into account the consequences of climate change on food crops within the context of sustainable development policies.

The importance of water is acknowledged: the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference in Jordan in October 2008 will define a Mediterranean water strategy, promoting conservation of water resources, diversifying water provision resources and efficient and sustainable use of water.

The priorities set out in the Regional Indicative Programme for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, as well as those of future programmes, will continue to apply and any potential Community contribution to the new regional projects listed below will not be financed at the expense of the existing bilateral allocations under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument or the Pre-accession Instrument (or in the case of Mauritania the European Development Fund).

It is crucial to translate the goals set by the Barcelona Declaration of 1995 and the work programme of 2005 into major regional concrete projects. As a first stage, it is decided to launch a number of key initiatives, listed hereafter, which the future Secretariat is mandated to detail.
De-pollution of the Mediterranean: The Mediterranean is resonant with culture and history. But it is much more than a symbol or an icon for the region. It also provides employment and pleasure for its people. However, its environmental quality has suffered serious degradation in recent times. Building on the Horizon 2020 programme, the de-pollution of the Mediterranean, including coastal and protected marine areas, particularly in the water and waste sector, will therefore be of major benefit for the lives and livelihoods of its people.

Maritime and Land Highways: The Mediterranean is a sea that joins, not separates, its people. It is also a highway for commerce. Easy and safe access and flow of goods and people, on land and sea, is essential for maintaining relations and enhancing regional trade. The development of motorways of the sea, including the connection of ports, throughout the entire Mediterranean basin as well as the creation of coastal motorways and the modernisation of the trans-Maghreb train, will increase the flow and freedom of the movement of people and goods. Particular attention should be devoted to cooperation in the field of maritime security and safety, in a perspective of global integration in the Mediterranean region.

Civil Protection: The global landscape is littered with examples of the devastation caused by man-made and natural disasters. The effects of climate change are evident for all. The Mediterranean region is particularly vulnerable and exposed to such disasters. A joint Civil Protection programme on prevention, preparation and response to disasters, linking the region more closely to the EU Civil Protection Mechanism, is, therefore, one of the main priorities for the region.

Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan: The recent activity on energy markets in terms of both supply and demand, confirms the need to focus on alternative energy sources. Market deployment as well as research and development of all alternative sources of energy are therefore a major priority in efforts towards assuring sustainable development. The Secretariat is tasked to explore the feasibility, development and creation of a Mediterranean Solar Plan.
Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University: A Euro-Mediterranean University (with its seat in Slovenia) can contribute to the understanding among people and encourage cooperation in higher education, following up on the objectives of the Catania Process and of the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research (Cairo, June 2007). Through a cooperation network of partner institutions and existing universities from the Euro-Med region, the Euro-Mediterranean University will develop postgraduate and research programmes and thus contribute to the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education, Science and Research Area. Partner countries are encouraged to make full use of possibilities offered by existing higher education cooperation programmes such as Tempus and Erasmus Mundus, including the External Cooperation Window. Particular attention should be paid to enhancing quality and ensuring the relevance of vocational training to labour market needs.

The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative is aimed at assisting the existing entities in partner countries operating in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by assessing the needs of these enterprises, defining policy solutions and providing these entities with resources in the form of technical assistance and financial instruments. It will be based on the principle of co-ownership and its activities are expected to be complementary to those of the existing entities working in the field. Contributions by countries from both rims of the Mediterranean will be done on a voluntary basis.

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NOTA DE TRANSMISIÓN

Asumo:

Declaración conjunta de la Cumbre de París por el Mediterráneo
Paris, 13 de julio de 2008
- Declaración conjunta

Se adjunta a las Delegaciones el siguiente documento:

ANEXO I: Declaración conjunta de la Cumbre de París por el Mediterráneo,
Paris, 13 de julio de 2008
ANEXO I

Proyecto de Declaración conjunta de la Cumbre de París por el Mediterráneo
Paris, 13 de julio de 2008

Bajo la copresidencia
del Presidente de la República Francesa y del Presidente de la República Árabe de Egipto

En presencia de

La UNIÓN EUROPEA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Nicolas SARKOZY Presidente del Consejo Europeo
El Excmo. Sr. D. José Manuel BARROSO Presidente de la Comisión Europea

* * *

ALBANIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Sali BERISHA Primer ministro de la República de Albania

ARGELIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Abdelaziz BOUTEFLIKA Presidente de la República Argelina Democrática y Popular
ALEMANIA representada por
La Excma. Sra. Dña. Angela MERKEL Canciller Federal de la República Federal de Alemania

AUSTRIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Alfred GUSENBAUER Canciller Federal de Austria

BÉLGICA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Karel DE GUCHT Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores del Reino de Bélgica

BOSNIA Y HERZEGOVINA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Haris SILAJDŽIĆ Titular de la Presidencia colegiada de Bosnia y Herzegovina

BULGARIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Georgi PARVANOV Presidente de la República de Bulgaria

CHIPRE representado por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Demetris CHRISTOFIAS Presidente de la República de Chipre

CROACIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Stjepan MESIĆ Presidente de la República de Croacia

DINAMARCA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Anders FOGH RASMUSSEN Primer ministro del Reino de Dinamarca

EGIPTO representado por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Mohamed Hosni MUBARAK Presidente de la República Árabe de Egipto

ESPAÑA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. José Luis RODRÍGUEZ ZAPATERO Presidente del Gobierno del Reino de España
ESTONIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Andrus ANSIP Primer ministro de la República de Estonia

FINLANDIA representada por
La Excma. Sra. Dª Tarja HALONEN Presidenta de la República de Finlandia
El Excmen. Sr. D. Matti VANHANEN Primer ministro de la República de Finlandia

FRANCIA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Nicolas SARKOZY Presidente de la República Francesa

GRECIA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Kostas KARAMANLIS Primer ministro de la República Helénica

HUNGRÍA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Ferenc GYURCSÁNY Primer ministro de la República de Hungría

IRLANDA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Brian COWEN Primer ministro (Taoiseach) de Irlanda

ISRAEL representado por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Ehud OLMERT Primer ministro del Estado de Israel

ITALIA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Silvio BERLUSCONI Presidente del Consejo de Ministros de la República Italiana

JORDBANIA representada por
El Excmen. Sr. D. Nader DAHABI Primer ministro del Reino Hashemita de Jordania
LETONIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Valdis ZATLERS Presidenta de la República de Letonia

LÍBANO representado por
El Excmo. Sr. General Michel SLEIMANE Presidente de la República Libanesa

LITUANIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Gediminas KIRKILAS Primer ministro de la República de Lituania

LUXEMBURGO representado por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Jean-Claude JUNCKER Primer ministro del Gran Ducado de Luxemburgo

MALTA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Lawrence GONZI Primer ministro de la República de Malta

MARRUECOS representado por
Su Alteza Real el Príncipe Moulay RACHID

MAURITANIA representada por
El Excmo. Sidi Mohamed OULD CHEIKH ABDALLAH Presidente de la República Islámica de Mauritanía

MÓNACO representado por
Su Alteza Serenísima D. ALBERTO II Príncipe Soberano de Mónaco

MONTENEGRO representado por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Milo DJUKANOVIĆ Primer ministro de Montenegro

LOS PAÍSES BAJOS representados por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Jan Peter BALKENENDE Primer ministro del Reino de los Países Bajos
POLONIA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Lech KACZYŃSKI Presidenta de la República de Polonia

PORTUGAL representado por
El Excma. Sr. D. José SOCRATES Primer ministro de la República Portuguesa

LA REPÚBLICA CHECA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Alexandr VONDRA Vicepresidente del Gobierno encargado de Asuntos Europeos de la República Checa

RUMANIA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Traian BĂŞESCU Presidente de Rumania

EL REINO UNIDO representado por
El Excma. Sr. D. Gordon BROWN Primer ministro del Reino Unido de Gran Bretaña e Irlanda del Norte

ESLOVAQUIA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Robert FICO Primer ministro de la República Eslovaca

ESLOVENIA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Janez JANŠA Primer ministro de la República de Eslovenia

SUECIA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Fredrik REINFELDT Primer ministro del Reino de Suecia

SIRIA representada por
El Excma. Sr. D. Bashar EL-ASSAD Presidente de la República Árabe Siria

TÚNEZ representado por
El Excma. Sr. D. Zine EL ABIDINE BEN ALI Presidente de la República de Túnez
TURQUÍA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Recep Tayyip ERDOGAN Primer ministro de la República de Turquía

LA AUTORIDAD PALESTINA representada por
El Excmo. Sr. D. Mahmoud ABBAS Presidente de la Autoridad Palestina

***

LAS NACIONES UNIDAS representadas por
D. BAN Ki-MOON Secretario General de las Naciones Unidas

EUROMEDITERRÁNEA representados por
D. Hans-Gert PÖTTERING Presidente del Parlamento Europeo y Presidente de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Euromediterránea

EL CONSEJO DE COOPERACIÓN DE LOS ESTADOS Árabes DEL GOLFO representado por
Su Alteza el Jeque Hamad ben Jalifa AL THANI, Emir de Qatar, Presidente de turno del Consejo de Cooperación de los Estados Árabes del Golfo

LA LIGA DE ESTADOS Árabes representada por
D. Amr MOUSSA Secretario General de la Liga de Estados Árabes

LA ORGANIZACIÓN DE LA CONFERENCIA ISLÁMICA representada por
D. Ekmeleddin IHSANOGLU Secretario General de la Organización de la Conferencia Islámica

LA UNIÓN AFRICANA representada por
D. Jean PING Presidente de la Comisión de la Unión Africana
LA UNIÓN DEL MAGREB ÁRABE representada por
D. Habib BEN YAHIA Secretary General de la Unión del Magreb Árabe

* * *

EL BANCO AFRICANO DE DESARROLLO representado por
D. Donald KABERUKA Presidente del Banco Africano de Desarrollo

EL BANCO EUROPEO DE INVERSIONES representado por
D. Philippe MAYSTADT Presidente del Banco Europeo de Inversiones

EL BANCO MUNDIAL representado por
D. Juan José DABOUB Director General del Banco Mundial

* * *

LA ALIANZA DE CIVILIZACIONES representada por
D. Jorge Sampaio Alto Representante de las Naciones Unidas para la Alianza de Civilizaciones

LA FUNDACIÓN EUROMEDITERRÁNEA ANNA LINDH PARA EL DIALOGO DE LAS CULTURAS representada por
D. André AZOULAY Presidente de la Fundación Euromediterránea Anna Lindh para el Diálogo de las Culturas

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Declaración conjunta de la Cumbre de París por el Mediterráneo

Paris, 13 de julio de 2008

Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno euromediterráneos reunidos en París el 13 de julio de 2008, inspirados por la voluntad política de revitalizar los esfuerzos para transformar el Mediterráneo en un espacio de paz, democracia, cooperación y prosperidad, han acordado la adopción de la siguiente declaración conjunta:

el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo, que se basa en la Declaración de Barcelona y en sus objetivos de alcanzar la paz, la estabilidad y la seguridad, así como en el acervo del Proceso de Barcelona, constituye una asociación multilateral con vistas a incrementar el potencial de integración y de cohesión regionales. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno también reafirman la importancia central del Mediterráneo en el programa político de todos los países. Subrayan la necesidad de una mejor apropiación compartida por todos los participantes y de una mayor pertinencia y visibilidad para los ciudadanos.

Comparten la convicción de que la presente iniciativa puede desempeñar un importante papel a la hora de hacer frente a los desafíos comunes a que se enfrenta la región euromediterránea, como por ejemplo el desarrollo económico y social, la crisis de la seguridad alimentaria mundial, la degradación del medio ambiente, incluidos el cambio climático y la desertificación, con miras a promover el desarrollo sostenible, la energía; las migraciones; el terrorismo y el extremismo, así como el fomento del diálogo entre culturas.

Abarcará a todos los Estados miembros de la UE y la Comisión Europea, junto con los demás Estados (miembros y observadores) del Proceso de Barcelona. La Liga Árabe será invitada a las sesiones del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo, con el fin de que participe en el proceso de Barcelona. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo acoge con satisfacción a Bosnia y Herzegovina, Croacia, Mónaco y Montenegro, que han aceptado el acervo del Proceso de Barcelona.
Una ambición estratégica para el Mediterráneo

1. Europa y los países mediterráneos están unidos por la historia, la geografía y la cultura. De manera aún más importante, están unidos por una ambición común: construir juntos un futuro de paz, democracia, prosperidad y comprensión humana, social y cultural. Para lograr estos objetivos comunes los participantes acuerdan proseguir con renovado dinamismo la búsqueda de la paz y la cooperación, explorar sus problemas comunes y transformar estas buenas intenciones en acciones dentro de una asociación para el progreso renovada.

2. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno subrayan el importante papel desempeñado por el Proceso de Barcelona desde 1995. El Proceso de Barcelona ha venido siendo el instrumento central para las relaciones euromediterráneas. Al representar una asociación de 39 gobiernos y más de 700 millones de personas, ha proporcionado un marco para un compromiso y un desarrollo permanentes. El Proceso de Barcelona es el único foro en el que todos los socios euromediterráneos intercambian impresiones y participan en un diálogo constructivo. Representa un firme compromiso con la paz, la democracia, la estabilidad regional y la seguridad a través de la cooperación y la integración regionales. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo pretende basarse en este consenso para proseguir la cooperación, la reforma política y socioeconómica y la modernización sobre la base de la igualdad y el respeto mutuo de la soberanía de cada cual.

3. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno recalcan la importancia de la participación activa de la sociedad civil, de las autoridades locales y regionales y del sector privado en la realización del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo.
4. A fin de aprovechar las oportunidades que brinda la mejora del marco de la cooperación multilateral, los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno han decidido acometer una asociación reforzada: el "Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo".

5. Esta iniciativa también constituye la expresión de una aspiración común de lograr la paz y la seguridad regional de conformidad con la Declaración de Barcelona de 1995, que, entre otras cosas, fomenta la seguridad regional actuando en favor de la no proliferación nuclear, química y biológica mediante la adhesión y el cumplimiento de una combinación de regímenes de no proliferación internacionales y regionales, y de acuerdos de control de armamento y de desarme como el Tratado de no proliferación, la Convención sobre armas químicas, la Convención sobre armas bacteriológicas y toxínicas, el Tratado de Prohibición Completa de los Ensayos Nucleares (CTBT), o arreglos regionales como zonas libres de armas con sus correspondientes regímenes de verificación, así como mediante el cumplimiento de buena fe de sus compromisos en virtud de los convenios de control de armamento, desarme y no proliferación.

Las partes aspirarán a una zona de Oriente Próximo libre de armas de destrucción masiva, nucleares, químicas y biológicas y de sus vectores, susceptible de verificación mutua y efectiva. Además, las partes estudiarán medidas prácticas para impedir la proliferación de armamento nuclear, químico y bacteriológico así como la acumulación excesiva de armamento convencional; se abstendrán de desarrollar capacidades militares por encima de sus necesidades de legítima defensa, reiterando a la vez su resolución a lograr el mismo grado de seguridad y confianza mutua con los niveles más bajos posible de tropa y armamento y la adhesión a la Convención sobre las armas convencionales; fomentarán la creación de las condiciones capaces de desarrollar unas relaciones de buena vecindad entre sí y apoyarán los procesos que tengan por objeto la estabilidad, la seguridad, la prosperidad y la cooperación regional y subregional; estudiarán cuanta medida de creación de confianza y seguridad pueda tomarse entre las partes, con miras a la creación de una "zona de paz y estabilidad en el Mediterráneo", incluida la posibilidad, a largo plazo, de suscribir un pacto euromediterráneo para tal fin.
6. Demuestra la determinación de favorecer el desarrollo de los recursos humanos y el de empleo en sintonia con los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio, incluido el de reducción de la pobreza. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno subrayan su compromiso de fortalecer la democracia y el pluralismo político mediante la expansión de la participación en la vida política y la adhesión a todos los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales. Afirman asimismo su ambición de construir un futuro común basado en el pleno respeto de los principios democráticos, los derechos humanos y las libertades fundamentales, contenidos en la legislación internacional sobre derechos humanos, como la promoción de los derechos económicos, sociales, culturales, civiles y políticos, el refuerzo del papel de la mujer en la sociedad, el respeto de las minorías, la lucha contra el racismo y la xenofobia, y la promoción del diálogo cultural y de la comprensión mutua.

7. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno reiteran su apoyo al proceso de paz israelo-palestino, según lo anunciado en la sesión ministerial euromediterránea de Lisboa (noviembre de 2007) y conforme al proceso de Annapolis. Recuerdan que la paz en Oriente Próximo requiere una solución global y en este aspecto acogen con beneplácito el anuncio de que Siria e Israel han acordado iniciar han iniciado conversaciones de paz indirectas bajo los auspicios de Turquía, con arreglo al mandato para la paz de la Conferencia de Madrid.

8. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno reiteran su condena del terrorismo en todas sus formas y manifestaciones, y su firme voluntad de erradicarlo y de combatir a sus promotores, y reiteran su compromiso de aplicar íntegramente el Código de conducta para luchar contra el terrorismo con objeto de mejorar la seguridad de todos los ciudadanos dentro de un marco que garantice el respeto del Estado de Derecho y de los derechos humanos, en particular mediante unas medidas más eficaces de lucha contra el terrorismo y la profundización de la cooperación para desarticular todas las actividades terroristas, proteger los posibles objetivos y gestionar las consecuencias de los atentados. Destacan la necesidad de hacer frente a las condiciones que propician la diseminación del terrorismo en todas sus formas y manifestaciones sin calificativos, sea cual sea la persona, el momento o el propósito de su comisión.
Reiteran asimismo su rechazo total de los intentos de asociar cualquier religión o cultura al terrorismo y confirman su compromiso de hacer cuanto sea posible para resolver el conflicto, acabar con la ocupación, enfrentarse a la opresión, reducir la pobreza, promover los derechos humanos y el buen gobierno, mejorar la comprensión entre las culturas y garantizar el respeto de todas las religiones y creencias. Este tipo de acciones favorecen directamente los intereses de las poblaciones de la región euromediterránea y obran en detrimento de los intereses de los terroristas y las redes.

Ámbito y principales objetivos

9. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno convienen en que el reto del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo consiste en mejorar las relaciones multilaterales, incrementar la apropiación compartida del proceso, establecer la gobernanza sobre la base del tratamiento en pie de igualdad, y plasmarla en proyectos concretos, más perceptibles para los ciudadanos. Ha llegado el momento de imprimir un impulso nuevo y permanente al Proceso de Barcelona. Se necesitan ahora un mayor compromiso y nuevos catalizadores para traducir los objetivos de la Declaración de Barcelona a resultados tangibles.

10. La Asociación Euromediterránea sigue siendo un proceso incluyente, movido en todos sus aspectos por el principio del consenso, cuyas modalidades en cuanto a los proyectos serán decididas en la próxima reunión de los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores de noviembre de 2008.
11. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo se basará en el acervo del Proceso de Barcelona y reforzará los logros y elementos fructíferos de dicho Proceso. La Declaración de Barcelona, sus objetivos y sus ámbitos de cooperación, siguen siendo válidos y sus tres capítulos de cooperación (diálogo político, cooperación económica y libre comercio, y diálogo humano, social y cultural) seguirán siendo centrales en las relaciones euromediterráneas.

Seguirán vigentes el programa de trabajo quinquenal adoptado por la Cumbre Euromediterránea del 10.º Aniversario, celebrada en Barcelona en 2005 (incluido el cuarto capítulo de cooperación sobre "migraciones, integración social, justicia y seguridad" introducido en aquel momento), y las conclusiones de todas las reuniones ministeriales. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno reconocen el progreso y los beneficios económicos que se derivarán de la creación, para 2010 y más allá de dicha fecha, de una zona profundizada de libre comercio en la región euromediterránea, y el refuerzo de la integración económica regional en todas sus dimensiones. Apoyan las pautas generales del plan de trabajo euromediterráneo sobre comercio, hasta 2010 y después de esta fecha, y en particular, el estudio de la creación de un mecanismo de agilización del comercio ágil, eficiente y favorable a las empresas, que aportaría más transparencia y más oportunidades de comercio e inversión.

12. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno subrayan que el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo se propone alcanzar un futuro de paz y prosperidad compartida en toda la región mediante la ejecución de proyectos que potenciarán el flujo de intercambios de los pueblos de toda la región. En este sentido, reconocen la dimensión humana y cultural de esta iniciativa. Subrayan su compromiso de facilitar la circulación legal de personas. Insisten en que el fomento de unas oportunidades de migración legal, administradas de modo ordenado en interés de todas las partes afectadas, la lucha contra la migración ilegal y la promoción de los vínculos entre migración y desarrollo son cuestiones de interés común que deben abordarse aplicando un planteamiento global, equilibrado e integrado.
13. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo tendrá un carácter complementario respecto de las relaciones bilaterales de la UE con estos países ¹, las cuales proseguirán dentro de los actuales marcos políticos, tales como los acuerdos de asociación, los planes de acción de la Política Europea de Vecindad, y, en el caso de Mauritania, en el marco de la asociación con África, el Caribe y el Pacífico. Asimismo, será coherente y complementario respecto de la Estrategia conjunta UE-África. Al tiempo que complementará las actividades relativas a su dimensión regional, el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo será independiente de la política de ampliación de la UE, de las negociaciones de adhesión y del proceso previo a la adhesión.

14. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo aporta un nuevo impulso al Proceso de Barcelona al menos en tres importantes aspectos:

- elevando el nivel político de las relaciones de la UE con sus socios mediterráneos;

- aportando una apropiación compartida más profunda a nuestras relaciones multilaterales; y

- haciendo que estas relaciones sean más concretas y visibles mediante nuevos proyectos regionales y subregionales que afecten a los ciudadanos de la región.

¹ Se trata de los siguientes países: Argelia, Egipto, Israel, Jordania, Libano, Mauritania, Mónaco, Marruecos, la Autoridad Palestina, Siria y Túnez; Croacia y Turquía, países candidatos que negocian su adhesión a la UE; Albania, Bosnia y Herzegovina y Montenegro, candidatos potenciales a la adhesión a la UE, y Libia, invitada por la Presidencia desde la reunión ministerial de Euromed celebrada en Stuttgart en 1999.
Elevación del nivel de las relaciones

15. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno acuerdan celebrar cumbres bienales. Las cumbres deberían dar lugar a una declaración política y a una preselección de proyectos regionales concretos que se pondrán en marcha. Las conclusiones deberían refrendar un amplio programa bienal de trabajo para el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo. En las reuniones anuales de Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores se hará balance de los progresos registrados en la aplicación de las conclusiones de las cumbres, se prepararán las cumbres siguientes y, en caso necesario, se aprobarán nuevos proyectos.

16. Las cumbres deberían celebrarse alternativamente en la UE y en los países socios mediterráneos. El país anfitrión debería elegirse por consenso. Todos los países que participen en la iniciativa serán invitados a las cumbres, reuniones ministeriales y otras reuniones plenarias del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo.

17. La Asamblea Parlamentaria Euromediterránea será la expresión parlamentaria legítima del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno apoyan firmemente el fortalecimiento del papel de la Asamblea Parlamentaria Euromediterránea en sus relaciones con los socios mediterráneos.

18. La Fundación Euromediterránea Anna Lindh para el Diálogo de las Culturas, como institución euromediterránea contribuirá de manera efectiva a la dimensión cultural de la iniciativa, en cooperación con la Alianza de Civilizaciones de las Naciones Unidas.
Aumento de la apropiación compartida y de la gobernanza institucional

19. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno acuerdan crear una copresidencia y deciden asimismo que se establecerá una secretaría conjunta. La participación en las copresidencias y en la secretaría estará abierta a todos los miembros del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo.

20. Deberían mantenerse y adaptarse las estructuras actuales del Proceso de Barcelona cuando los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores euromediterráneos aprueben nuevas modalidades.

Copresidencia

21. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno establecen una copresidencia incrementará con el fin de mejorar el equilibrio y la apropiación compartida de su cooperación. Uno de los copresidentes será de la UE, y el otro, de los países socios mediterráneos. La copresidencia se aplicará a las cumbres, a todas las reuniones ministeriales, a las reuniones de altos funcionarios, a las reuniones del Comité Permanente Conjunto y, cuando sea posible, a las reuniones de expertos o ad hoc en el marco de la iniciativa.

22. En cuanto a la creación de una copresidencia,

- por lo que respecta a la parte UE, deberá ser compatible con la representación exterior de la Unión Europea, de conformidad con las disposiciones vigentes del Tratado;

- por lo que respecta a la parte mediterránea, el copresidente será elegido por consenso por un período de dos años no renovables.
Buena gestión institucional y Secretaría

23. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno convienen en crear nuevas estructuras institucionales que contribuyan al logro de los objetivos políticos de la presente iniciativa, reforzando, en particular, la apropiación compartida, la elevación del nivel político de las relaciones euromediterráneas y el logro de la perceptibilidad por medio de proyectos.

24. Convienen en la creación de una Secretaría conjunta para el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo, que desempeñará un papel fundamental en la estructura institucional. La Secretaría imprimirá un nuevo impulso a este proceso, en forma de determinación, seguimiento y promoción de proyectos y de búsqueda de asociados. La financiación y la ejecución de los proyectos se determinarán de manera individual. La Secretaría funcionará en contacto operativo con todas las estructuras del proceso, también mediante la preparación de documentos de trabajo para los órganos de decisión. La Secretaría tendría personalidad jurídica independiente y un estatuto autónomo.

25. El mandato de la Secretaría será de carácter técnico, en tanto que el mandato político en relación con todos los aspectos de la iniciativa sigue siendo responsabilidad de los ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y altos funcionarios.

26. El Comité Permanente Conjunto, con sede en Bruselas, colaborará con las reuniones de altos funcionarios y se encargará de su preparación y de su adecuado seguimiento; podrá actuar igualmente como mecanismo de reacción rápida si se plantea una situación excepcional en la región que requiera la consulta de los socios euromediterráneos.
27. Los **altos funcionarios** seguirán reuniéndose de manera regular para la preparación de las reuniones ministeriales, ocupándose entre otras cosas de determinar los proyectos a los que se vaya a prestar apoyo, de examinar y evaluar los avances del Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo en todos sus componentes, y de presentar el programa de trabajo anual a los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores.

28. Los **ponentes del mandato** de la nueva estructura institucional y el funcionamiento de la copresidencia, así como la situación, la sede y la financiación de la Secretaría, se decidirán por consenso de los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores en noviembre de 2008, atendiendo a conversaciones exhaustivas y propuestas presentadas por todas las partes.

**Proyectos**

29. El proceso de selección de proyectos se realizará en consonancia con los objetivos de la Declaración de Barcelona, concretamente, de consecución de la paz, la seguridad y la estabilidad. Los socios crearán un entorno propicio a la realización de los proyectos, atendiendo al carácter regional, subregional y transnacional de los proyectos propuestos, así como a su tamaño, pertinencia e interés para todas las partes involucradas, de conformidad con el propósito y los principales objetivos de la iniciativa. Se tendrán en cuenta su capacidad para favorecer un desarrollo equilibrado y sostenible así como la integración, la cohesión y las interconexiones regionales y subregionales, y se perseguirá su viabilidad financiera y, en particular, el máximo aprovechamiento de la financiación y la participación del sector privado. Los altos funcionarios prepararán los criterios para la selección de los proyectos que deberán aprobar los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores.
30. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno ponen de relieve el potencial que ofrece la cooperación reforzada a través del principio de proyectos de geometría variable, de conformidad con el propósito y los objetivos principales de la iniciativa. Este enfoque hará posible que los países miembros que tengan afinidades, objetivos comunes y complementariedades den un impulso al proceso y alcancen las metas de la declaración de Barcelona.

Financiación

31. El Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo movilizará medios de financiación suplementarios para la región, esencialmente por medio de proyectos regionales y subregionales. Su capacidad de atraer mayores recursos financieros para proyectos regionales, con un alto grado de coordinación de los donantes, constituirá su plusvalía, esencialmente a partir de las siguientes fuentes, entre otras: participación del sector privado, aportaciones del presupuesto de la UE y de todos los socios, contribuciones de otros países, de las instituciones financieras internacionales y de las entidades regionales, el Mecanismo Euromediterráneo de Inversión y Cooperación (FEMIP), la dotación financiera Euromed del Instrumento Europeo de Vecindad y Asociación (IEVA), así como los demás instrumentos aplicables a los países cubiertos por la iniciativa, para los que seguirán aplicándose las normas habituales de selección y de procedimiento.

Consideraciones finales

32. Los Participantes han destacado que el Proceso de Barcelona: Unión por el Mediterráneo constituye una oportunidad histórica para revitalizar el proceso de la Asociación Euromediterránea y elevarlo a un nuevo nivel. El éxito final de la iniciativa depende también de la actuación de los ciudadanos, de la sociedad civil y de la participación activa del sector privado.
33. Los Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno invitan a los Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores a que ultimen durante su próxima reunión de noviembre los pormenores de la estructura institucional de la iniciativa. Las nuevas estructuras de la iniciativa deberían ser plenamente operativas antes de finales de 2008. Todos los países participantes, así como la Comisión Europea, trabajarán en estrecha coordinación para lograr este objetivo.

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ANEXO

El futuro de la región euromediterránea reside en la mejora del desarrollo socioeconómico, la solidaridad, la integración regional, el desarrollo sostenible y el conocimiento. Es menester incrementar la cooperación en sectores tales como el desarrollo de empresas, el comercio, el medio ambiente, la energía, la gestión del agua, la agricultura, la seguridad alimentaria, los transportes, las cuestiones marítimas, la educación, la formación profesional, la ciencia y la tecnología, la cultura, los medios de comunicación, la justicia y la legalidad, la seguridad, la migración, la sanidad, el refuerzo del papel de la mujer en la sociedad, la protección civil, el turismo, la planificación urbana, los puertos, la cooperación descentralizada, la sociedad de la información y los conglomerados industriales competitivos.

Asimismo, destacan la importancia del aumento de la seguridad alimentaria, sobre todo teniendo en cuenta las consecuencias del cambio climático para los cultivos alimenticios en el contexto de las medidas de desarrollo sostenible.

Se reconoce la importancia del agua: la Conferencia Ministerial Euromediterránea que se celebrará en Jordania en octubre de 2008 definirá una estrategia mediterránea del agua, que fomente la conservación de los recursos hídricos, la diversificación de los recursos de provisión de agua y la utilización eficiente y sostenible del agua.

Seguirán siendo aplicables las prioridades fijadas en el Programa Indicativo Regional de la Comisión Europea para la Asociación Euromediterránea, así como las de los futuros programas, y no se financiará ninguna posible contribución de la Comunidad a los nuevos proyectos regionales que se enumeran a continuación en detrimento de las dotaciones presupuestarias bilaterales procedentes del Instrumento Europeo de Vecindad y Asociación o del Instrumento de Preadhésión (o, en el caso de Mauritania, del Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo).

Es esencial plasmar los objetivos establecidos por la Declaración de Barcelona de 1995 y el programa de trabajo de 2005 en importantes proyectos regionales concretos. En una primera fase, se ha decidido poner en marcha una serie de iniciativas clave que se enumeran a continuación, y encomendar a la futura Secretaría que las detalle.
**Descontaminación del Mediterráneo:** El Mediterráneo significa cultura e historia. Pero es mucho más que un símbolo o una imagen de la región. También proporciona empleo y disfrute para sus gentes. No obstante, su calidad medioambiental ha sufrido un grave deterioro en los últimos tiempos. Con la vista puesta en el programa "Horizonte 2020", la descontaminación del Mediterráneo, incluidas las zonas costeras y las zonas marinas protegidas, en particular por lo que respecta al sector del agua y los residuos, redundará por lo tanto en un importante beneficio para las vidas y los medios de subsistencia de sus pueblos.

**Grandes vías marítimas y terrestres:** El Mediterráneo es un mar que une y no que separa a sus pueblos. Es también una vía principal para el comercio. La facilidad y la seguridad de acceso y de tránsito de mercancías y de personas por tierra y mar resulta esencial para mantener las relaciones y mejorar el comercio regional. Tanto el desarrollo de autopistas del mar, incluida la conexión de puertos, en toda la cuenca mediterránea, como la creación de autopistas costeras y la modernización del ferrocarril transmagrebí, aumentarán el caudal y la libertad de circulación de personas y mercancías. Debería prestarse especial atención a la cooperación en el ámbito de la seguridad y la prevención marítimas, en una perspectiva de integración global de la región mediterránea.

**Protección civil:** El paisaje mundial está cubierto de ejemplos de devastación provocada por catástrofes causadas por el hombre y naturales. Los efectos del cambio climático son evidentes para todos. La región mediterránea es particularmente vulnerable y está especialmente expuesta a este tipo de catástrofes. Un programa conjunto de protección civil en materia de prevención, preparación y respuesta a las catástrofes, que vincule a la región más estrechamente al Mecanismo Comunitario de Protección Civil, constituye, por consiguiente, una de las principales prioridades para la región.
Energías alternativas: Plan Solar Mediterráneo: La reciente actividad de los mercados de la energía, tanto en el ámbito de la oferta como en el de la demanda, confirma la necesidad de centrarse en las fuentes de energía alternativas. El despliegue de los mercados, así como la investigación y el desarrollo de fuentes alternativas de energía, constituyen por consiguiente una prioridad fundamental en el empeño por garantizar un desarrollo sostenible. La Secretaría estará encargada de explorar la viabilidad, el desarrollo y la creación de un Plan Solar Mediterráneo.

Enseñanza superior e investigación, Universidad Euromediterránea: Una Universidad Euromediterránea (con sede en Eslovenia) puede contribuir a la comprensión entre los pueblos y fomentar la cooperación en materia de enseñanza superior, siguiendo los objetivos del Proceso de Catania y de la primera Conferencia Ministerial Euromediterránea sobre la Enseñanza Superior y la Investigación Científica (El Cairo, junio de 2007). La Universidad Euromediterránea desarrollará programas de postgrado e investigación por medio de una red de cooperación de instituciones asociadas y de las universidades existentes en la región euromediterránea, contribuyendo así a la creación del Espacio Euromediterráneo de la Enseñanza Superior, la Ciencia y la Investigación. Se anima a los países socios a que aprovechen plenamente las posibilidades que les brindan los actuales programas de cooperación en materia de enseñanza superior, como Tempus y Erasmus Mundus, incluida la Ventana de Cooperación Exterior. Debe prestarse atención particular a la elevación de la calidad y a la garantía de la relación de la formación profesional con las necesidades del mercado laboral.

La Iniciativa Mediterránea de Desarrollo Empresarial tiene por objetivo asistir a las entidades existentes en países socios que desarrollen actividades de apoyo a las microempresas y a la pequeña y mediana empresa mediante la evaluación de las necesidades de dichas empresas, la definición de soluciones estratégicas y la facilitación a esas entidades de recursos en forma de asistencia técnica e instrumentos financieros. Se basará en el principio de apropiación compartida y se espera que sus actividades resulten complementarias de las desarrolladas por las entidades existentes que actúan en el mismo ámbito. Las contribuciones de países de ambas orillas del Mediterráneo se realizarán de forma voluntaria.

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Appendix Fourteen

The Paris Summit of the ‘Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean’ (Paris, 13 July 2008) injected a renewed political momentum into Euro–Mediterranean relations. In Paris, the Heads of State and Government agreed to build on and reinforce the successful elements of the Barcelona Process by upgrading their relations, incorporating more co-ownership in their multilateral cooperation framework and delivering concrete benefits for the citizens of the region. This first Summit marked an important step forward for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while also highlighting the EU and Mediterranean partners’ unwavering commitment and common political will to make the goals of the Barcelona Declaration — the creation of an area of peace, stability, security and shared prosperity, as well as full respect of democratic principles, human rights and fundamental freedoms and promotion of understanding between cultures and civilizations in the Euro-Mediterranean region — a reality. It was decided to launch and/or to reinforce a number of key initiatives: De-pollution of the Mediterranean, Maritime and Land Highways, Civil Protection, Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University and the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative.

Ministers propose that as from Marseille the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean” should be called “Union for the Mediterranean”.

Ministers decide that the League of Arab States shall participate in all meetings at all levels of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, therefore contributing positively to the objectives of the process, namely the achievement of peace, prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean region.

Ministers reaffirm their commitment to achieve a just, comprehensive, and lasting solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict, consistent with the terms of reference of the Madrid Conference and its principles, including land for peace, and based on the relevant UNSC resolutions and the Road Map. Ministers also stress the importance of the Arab Peace Initiative and underline their support for efforts to promote progress on all tracks of the Middle East Peace Process.

Ministers stress that the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean is not intended to replace the other initiatives undertaken in the interests of the peace, stability and development of the region, but that it will contribute to their success.

Ministers welcome the positive role played by the EU in the Middle East Peace Process, notably in the framework of the Quartet. They reaffirm their commitment to
support the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty resolving all outstanding issues, including all core issues without exceptions, as specified in previous agreements. They welcome the commitment of both parties to engage in vigorous, ongoing and continuous negotiations making every effort to conclude a peace agreement based on the Annapolis process, as agreed in November 2007. They also encourage the parties to intensify their efforts on the path of direct dialogue and negotiation in the fulfillment of the two states solution: a safe and secure Israel, and a viable, sovereign and democratic Palestinian State, living side by side in peace and security. Final status issues have to be agreed upon by the parties.

Ministers call on both parties to respect their commitment to immediately implement their respective obligations under the performance-based Roadmap to a permanent two state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and call on the parties to refrain from any measure that might prejudice the outcome of the negotiations.

Ministers welcome and support the indirect peace talks between Israel and Syria under the auspices of Turkey and encourage all efforts deployed to achieve stability, peace and security in the region.

Ministers welcome the establishment of diplomatic relations between Syria and Lebanon.

Ministers reiterate their condemnation of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, regardless of the perpetrators, and their determination to eradicate it and to combat its sponsors and reaffirm their commitment to fully implement the Code of Conduct on Countering Terrorism adopted in the Barcelona Summit on 28th November 2005 in order to enhance the security of all citizens within a framework that ensures respect for the rule of law and human rights, particularly through more effective counterterrorism policies and deeper cooperation to dismantle all terrorist activities, to protect potential targets and to manage the consequences of attacks. They also reiterate the complete rejection of attempts to associate any religion, civilization or culture with terrorism and confirm their commitment to do their utmost effort with a view to resolving conflict, ending occupation, confronting oppression, reducing poverty, promoting human rights and good governance, improving intercultural understanding and ensuring respect for all religions and beliefs.

Ministers reaffirm their common aspiration to achieve peace as well as regional security by acting in favour of nuclear, chemical and biological non-proliferation through adherence to and compliance with a combination of international and regional non-proliferation regimes and arms control and disarmament agreements such as NPT, CWC, BWC, CTBT and/or regional arrangements such as weapons-free zones, including their verification regimes, as well as by fulfilling in good faith their commitments under arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation conventions.
The parties shall pursue a mutually and effectively verifiable Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction, nuclear, chemical and biological, and their delivery systems. Furthermore the parties will consider practical steps to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons as well as excessive accumulation of conventional arms, refrain from developing military capacity beyond their legitimate defence requirements, at the same time reaffirming their resolve to achieve the same degree of security and mutual confidence with the lowest possible levels of troops and weaponry and adherence to CCW; promote conditions likely to develop good-neighbourly relations among themselves and support processes aimed at stability, security, prosperity and regional and sub-regional cooperation; consider any confidence and security-building measures that could be taken between the parties with a view to the creation of an "area of peace and stability in the Mediterranean", including the long term possibility of establishing a Euro-Mediterranean pact to that end.

The Ministers welcome the dedication and interest expressed by three new members of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Croatia and Montenegro, together with Albania, to add their efforts in contributing to a successful integration of the Adriatic countries in the existing and future initiatives and projects in the Euro-Mediterranean region.

I/ Institutional structures of the “Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean”

Euro-Mediterranean Heads of State and Government agreed in Paris on 13 July 2008 to establish new institutional structures to contribute to achieving the political goals of the initiative, especially reinforcing inclusive co-ownership, upgrading the political level of EU-Mediterranean relations and achieving visibility through projects.

On the basis of the Paris Declaration adopted by and mandate received from Heads of State and Government, Euro-Mediterranean Foreign Affairs Ministers approve the following guidelines, in line with its scope and main objectives:

Co-presidency

1. The co-presidency shall apply to Summits, all Ministerial meetings, Senior Officials meetings, the Joint Permanent Committee and, when possible, expert/ad hoc meetings within the initiative.

2. The co-presidents will assume the co-presidency of the Partnership as a whole.

3. One of the co-presidents will be from the EU and the other from the Mediterranean partner countries.
4. From the EU side, the co-presidency must be compatible with the external representation of the European Union in accordance with the Treaty provisions in force¹.

5. From the Mediterranean partners side, the co-president must be chosen by consensus for a non-renewable period of two years.

6. The two co-presidencies will call and chair the meetings of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean. The co-presidencies will submit for approval the agenda of the meetings.

7. The co-presidencies will conduct the necessary consultations with all partners, leading to the adoption of common conclusions of Summit, Ministerial, and other meetings when required, that shall be adopted by consensus, as well as consulting on all other issues relevant to the good functioning of the Partnership.

Senior Officials

8. The Senior Officials are mandated to deal with all aspects of the initiative. They will take stock of and evaluate the progress of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean in all its components including issues previously handled by the Euromed Committee. Senior officials will continue to convene regularly in order to prepare the Ministerial meeting, and submit project proposals to them as well as the annual work programme for adoption.

9. The biennial Summits of Heads of State will endorse the strategic priorities of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean passed to it through Foreign Ministers. Foreign Ministers mandate Senior Officials to approve guidelines and criteria for assessing the merits of project proposals. In doing so, the Senior Officials shall be guided by a broad, comprehensive and inclusive approach to the projects, which could be mutually beneficial and aiming at the prosperity of all.

They shall also uphold the principle that every project must:

- strive to contribute to stability and peace in the whole Euro-Mediterranean region;

- not jeopardise the legitimate interest of any member of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean;

¹ This includes the role of the Presidency and the European Commission in the external representation of the EU.
² If a State other than the two co-presidencies hosts a meeting, it will also co-chair the meeting.
³ Without prejudice to the consultations to be carried out within the EU in accordance with the relevant Treaty provisions.
- take account of the principle of variable geometry;
- respect the decision of member countries involved in an ongoing project when it
  is subject to further development.

10. In drawing up the agenda of the Senior Officials meetings, the co-presidencies
identify those items on which discussion is intended and items for information.
Delegations may submit particular items to the co-presidencies for inclusion in the
agenda.

Joint Permanent Committee

11. The Joint Permanent Committee will be based in Brussels. It will assist and prepare
the meetings of the Senior Officials and ensure the appropriate follow-up. The Joint
Permanent Committee will deal with issues previously handled by the Euronest
Committee that do not fall under the competence of the Senior Officials. The
Euronest Committee will thus be dissolved. The Joint Permanent Committee may
also act as a mechanism to react rapidly if an exceptional situation arises in the region
that requires the consultation of Euro-Mediterranean partners.

The Secretariat

12. The joint Secretariat will have a key role within the institutional architecture. The
Secretariat will:
- Give an impulse to this process in terms of identification, follow-up,
promotion of new projects and the search for funding and for implementation
partners.
- Work in operational liaison with all structures of the process, particularly with
the co-presidencies, including by preparing working documents for the
decision-making bodies.
- Have a separate legal personality with an autonomous status.

13. The mandate of the Secretariat is of a technical nature while the political mandate
related to all aspects of the initiative remains the responsibility of the Ministers of
Foreign Affairs and Senior Officials.

14. Tasks: The Secretariat will gather, within the project priorities, regional, sub-regional
or transnational project initiatives (from various sources such as sectoral ministerial
meetings, national or regional authorities, regional groupings, private sector, civil
society). The Secretariat shall examine project initiatives and inform on their
implementation to the Joint Permanent Committee and the Senior Officials after close coordination with concerned States and financing partners. Once approved, the Secretariat will work on the basis of the guidelines to be set by Senior Officials, as mentioned above.

The Summit, the Foreign Affairs Ministers Conference, the appropriate Euromed Sectoral Ministerial Meeting or the Senior Officials will instruct the Secretariat to propose the necessary follow-up in terms of initiating the promotion of the projects and the search for partners for their implementation. The funding and implementation of projects will be pursued on a case-by-case basis by the various interested partners according to their own procedures and by ad hoc sub-groups, if necessary, with the assistance of the Secretariat. The Secretariat will lead on monitoring and evaluation of projects implementation.

15. The Secretariat will inform the Joint Permanent Committee and report to the Senior Officials.

16. The statute of the Secretariat will be adopted by Senior Officials (on the basis of a proposal to be prepared by a drafting group of experts to be established for this purpose) before the end of February 2009, taking into account the legal system of the country in which the Secretariat will be established. It will be a lean Secretariat based on the following principles:

a. Composition: The objective is to achieve a sufficiently higher level of involvement of all partners to increase co-ownership and participation. There will be one Secretary General and five Deputy Secretaries General. They are to be selected by consensus by Senior Officials following proposals made by Euro-Mediterranean partners and on the basis of a short list presented by the co-presidency and the Commission, following consultations to be held with all partners. Their term of office will be of 3 years. The term of office may be extended once for a maximum of three years. The Secretariat will include seconded officials from participants in the process to be appointed by the Secretary General together with the Deputy Secretaries General on the basis of competence and geographical balance.

b. Funding: The running costs of the Secretariat (support staff, equipment etc) will be funded from an operating grant on a shared and balanced basis by the Euro-Mediterranean partners, on a voluntary basis and the Community

4 This drafting group will be composed as follows: host country, co-presidencies, incoming presidency, European Commission and General Secretariat of the Council, and will be open to interested countries.
5 The EU position shall be agreed in advance in the relevant working group.
6 The Secretary General will be chosen among candidates from Mediterranean partner countries.
7 For the first term of office, the five Deputy Secretaries General will be from the following Euro-Mediterranean partners: Palestinian Authority, Greece, Israel, Italy, Malta. All the Euro-Mediterranean partners are eligible for these posts on a rotational basis.
budget. Funding from the Community budget will come from existing resources within the ENPI (and other relevant instruments) and within the Financial Framework ceilings. The Community funding will need to follow the provisions of the Financial Regulation. The host country will provide the premises of the Secretariat free of charge. Seconded officials will be financed by their respective administrations (possibly through a trust fund). Senior Officials shall adopt the annual budget of the Secretariat upon proposal of the Secretary General and the Deputy Secretaries General (revenue and expenditure of the Secretariat including allocations of staff). Initial financial contributions shall be made available as soon as the statutes are adopted so as to allow the Secretariat to start functioning by May 2009. Funding provisions should aim at ensuring an uninterrupted and regular working of the Secretariat and reflect the EU and Mediterranean partners’ co-responsibility of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

c. The seat of the Secretariat will be in Barcelona. A Headquarters Agreement between the host country and the Secretariat will ensure the autonomous status of the latter, its legal personality to carry out its activities and the status, privileges and immunities of the Secretariat and its international personnel. The Headquarters Agreement shall be concluded before May 2009.

On the matter of the governance of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean, Ministers decide to continue their consultations in line with the mandate given by Heads of State and Government at the Paris Summit. Ministers agree that delegations may submit their proposals to the French-Egyptian co-presidency, which undertakes to consult Heads of State and Government, notably on the modalities for the establishment of the Secretariat and the new name for the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean.

Relations with Parliaments, local and regional authorities

The Ministers believe that the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly (EMPA) reinforces the democratic legitimacy of the Partnership. They duly take note of the EMPA recommendation adopted in Jordan on the 13th October 2008. The Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean requires a strong parliamentary dimension. Therefore the Ministers underline that the position of the EMPA should be further consolidated and its work better articulated with the other institutions of the Partnership.

The Ministers stress the need to promote the implementation of concrete action at local and regional level. In this respect, they commend the Forum of Local and Regional Authorities that was held on 22 and 23 June 2008 in Marseille. They also duly take note of the Committee of Regions’ opinion issued on 9 October 2008 and the proposal to create a Euro-Mediterranean Regional and Local Assembly. The Assembly’s members would represent EU local and regional elected officials and elected officials from Mediterranean partner countries equally, similar to parliamentary representation in the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly.
The Ministers mandate the Senior Officials to consider the possibility of the involvement of the EMRLA once it is established in the Partnership.

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II – Work Programme for 2009

Important steps need to be taken in 2009 to implement the Barcelona Five-Year Work Programme and the declaration of the Paris Summit in order to advance the regional integration process. The following meetings are a proposed indicative list for 2009:

- the 3rd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Water,
- the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on sustainable development projects,
- the 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Transport and Urban Development,
- the 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Higher Education & Scientific Research,
- the 6th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Energy,
- the 4th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on the Environment,
- the 2nd Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Strengthening the Role of Women in Society,
- the annual Euro-Mediterranean Economic Transition conference,
- the 9th FEMIP Ministerial Meeting,
- the 5th Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN Ministerial meeting,
- the 8th Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Conference,
- the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Food Security, Agriculture and Rural Development,
- the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Justice, Liberty and Security,
- the 11th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Foreign Affairs,
• the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Human Development.

III. Fields of cooperation to be pursued in 2009

A. Political and security dialogue

The political and security dialogue has focused on the following areas:

a. Regular review of the political situation in the Middle East.

b. Implementation of the Code of Conduct on countering terrorism. The Ministers agree to build on the recommendations of previous international and regional initiatives.

c. Deepening of the dialogue on ESDP and crisis management.

d. At the Paris Summit, the Heads of State and Government underlined their commitment to strengthen democracy and political pluralism through expansion of participation in political life and respect for all human rights and fundamental freedoms.

e. The Ministers acknowledge that the deepening of regional dialogue on joint cooperation, best practices and exchange of experience in the area of elections has been further pursued at Senior Official level. Ministers agreed that joint cooperation and exchange of experience could be developed on a voluntary basis upon the request of any of the partners.

f. The Ministers have highlighted the role of the regional ‘Bridge Programme (2004-2008) on Prevention, Mitigation and Management of Natural and Man-made Disasters’ and laid the foundations for a Long-Term Programme, the Euro-Med Programme for the Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters - PPRD (2008-2011).

B. Maritime Safety

The growing number of transit vessels, the increasing risks of accidents, the persisting terrorist threat, the rise in organised crime and illicit trafficking, especially drug trafficking, could tend to port infrastructures inefficiency and jeopardise trade flows. To enhance cooperation, the creation of a centre to coordinate the fight against drugs in the Mediterranean region could be explored.

In 2009, a forum of Mediterranean Coast Guard Services and, as appropriate, Maritime Services, could be organised. This event might represent an opportunity to
exchange experiences in the fields of marine and coastal environment protection from pollution, as well as safety of navigation, maritime search and rescue and safeguard of human life at sea. Italy is prepared to host this Forum.

Ministers recommend to study the possibility to develop initiatives in the maritime domain, for instance the implementation of integrated Vessel Traffic Management systems, systems for the management of intermodal transport and sea ports, integrated systems for the management and control of environmental risks and sea pollution with the participation of all willing and able Mediterranean partners.

C - Economic and Financial Partnership

Energy

Participants at the last Euromed Energy Ministerial Meeting (Cyprus, 17 December 2007) agreed on a Five-Year Action Plan focusing on three main areas: (1) improving harmonisation and integration of energy markets and legislation in the Euromed region, (2) promoting sustainable development in the energy sector, and (3) developing initiatives of common interest in key areas, such as infrastructure extension, investment financing and research and development. Furthermore several initiatives are being implemented such as the Euro-Mashrek gas cooperation, the integration of electricity markets in the Maghreb, the trilateral energy cooperation between the EC, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (including the Solar Energy for Peace Initiative) and cooperation among Euromed energy regulators (Medreg). In this context, a Ministerial meeting took place on 5 May 2008 in Brussels to discuss enhancing energy cooperation in the Mashrek. Overall progress in the implementation of the Action Plan Priorities is being monitored. Finally, alleviating energy poverty, in the framework of the Millenium Development Goals, has to be achieved. The outcome of these activities will lead to the third Ministerial Meeting hosted by France.

Transport

The Regional Transport Action Plan (RTAP) for the Mediterranean, which was approved by all representatives of beneficiary countries at the Euromed Transport Forum held in Brussels on 29-30 May 2007, proposes 34 actions in a number of areas including maritime transport, road transport, railway transport, civil aviation, multi-modal transport and transport infrastructure networks, as well as with respect to sustainability issues. These actions are being implemented by partner governments in the framework of their national policies and strategies or at the multilateral level through cooperation and the exchange of information. A meeting of the aviation working group and the ninth Euromed Transport Forum are planned before the end of 2008. The Trans-European Network-Transport (TEN-T) Workshop was held in Brussels on 14-15 October 2008.
Agriculture

Ministers recalled the importance of agriculture and rural development in the economy of the Mediterranean countries and in achieving food security. Ministers agreed to convene an agriculture Ministerial meeting on these subjects. This meeting should aim at identifying and promoting projects related to sustainable rural development, to the development and promotion of quality products and the coordination of agricultural research on topics such as water stress resistant plant species and water resources management. This conference should also support the pursuit and reinforcement of activities in the areas of sanitary and phytosanitary norms.

Urban development

Sustainable Metropolitan and Urban Development are at the heart of the major issues of the Mediterranean. Population growth and uncontrolled urban sprawl, concentrated mainly on the coasts, are significant and have a negative impact on the Mediterranean region’s development. Sustainable Urban Development implies that governments, developers and financiers to better anticipate future urban growth, need to better meet the basic needs of populations (housing, transportation, access to water, electricity and telecommunications) and integrate environmental constraints. This challenge implies the involvement of regional authorities to define appropriate planning through an integrated approach.

Water

The Euromed Ministerial Meeting on water will be held in Jordan. Ministers agree to define the Strategy for Water in the Mediterranean along the lines decided by the Heads of State and Government in the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean. They encourage a swift implementation of partnerships in order to implement concrete projects in line with the guidelines of the strategy.

Environment

The achievements since the Cairo Euromed Environment Ministerial Meeting together with the regional (Euromed) environmental activities and efforts with regard to the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean should constitute the basis for the Environment Ministerial Meeting which is planned to be held in 2009.

The annual meeting of the Horizon 2020 Steering Group will be held along with the meetings of each of the three sub-groups (pollution reduction, capacity building as well as monitoring and research) in addition to meetings for the transfer of know-how.

Studying the process of developing a harmonised maritime policy and promoting a foreseeable maritime strategy for the Mediterranean shall take particular
consideration within the Euromed Partnership in 2009 and beyond. A sectoral Euromed working group composed of national experts is clearly needed to formulate the guidelines, visions, priorities, objectives, means of implementation and funding mechanisms of such a policy, taking into account the variances between the Euromed countries. The task should take place in complete coordination and cooperation with both the competent regional and national entities to provide the guidance and technical assistance.

According to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, climate change could adversely affect the environment and human activities in the Mediterranean. Ministers recalled the need to intensify co-operation on climate change through the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Climate Change Network to provide the forum for the sharing of information and experience as well as to build relationships in an informal working environment in support of regional efforts to combat climate change. Euro-Mediterranean interaction on climate change may lead to enhancement of capabilities of implementation of projects and programmes of mutual interest.

**Information Society**

In the light of the Cairo Ministerial Declaration (28 February 2008), a new step is to be launched in Euromed dialogue on issues relating to the Information Society. Ministers agreed to intensify cooperation on regulatory issues for electronic communications, the connectivity of service platforms and networks and ICT research in areas such as multilingual e-content, e-learning, e-science, e-health, e-inclusion and e-government.

A dedicated public website has already been set up by the Information Society and Media Directorate General of the European Commission, based on the Ministerial agreement to use ICT to enhance communication among countries in the Euromed region by considering to create an electronic forum. The site is to be progressively improved to help share information among Euro-Mediterranean partners.

Ministers also agreed in the Cairo Ministerial Declaration that the Euromed Forum on Information Society will carry out a mapping exercise to match existing programmes on one side and identified priorities for the Euromed region on the other. Starting this mapping process during 2009 will positively accelerate the Euromed cooperation. It is also necessary to consider an appropriate mechanism for the implementation and follow up of the outcomes of the Ministerial meeting.

The Ministers also stressed the fundamental need to ensure interconnection of research networks to support, inter alia, the creation of grid-enabled scientific e-infrastructures able to make ICT research and development cooperation between Europe and the Mediterranean countries more efficient. They recognised the fundamental role that EUNET played in interconnecting the National Research and Education Networks (NRENs) in the region and with Europe, enabling
collaboration in multiple domains with high scientific and societal impact, and considered it essential to guarantee the sustainability and promotion of the initiative.

A specific Action Plan will be prepared for approval at the next meeting of the Euromed Forum of Senior Officials to be organised before the end of 2009. During the "Summit of cities and local governments of the Mediterranean" held in Malaga on 2 and 3 October 2008, the reduction of the digital divide between the two shores of the Mediterranean has emerged as a major challenge for ICT development with the involvement of relevant local and regional entities.

Tourism
In accordance with the first Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Tourism (Fes, Morocco, 2-3 April, 2008), Ministers agreed to take steps to prepare and implement cooperation actions, particularly in the areas of vocational education and training, cultural heritage, institutional capacity building, investment promotion and statistics, drawing on existing programmes and in favour of sustainable development of tourism. In this context, Ministers emphasised the paramount importance that should be given to reinforcing the identification of investment opportunities as well as the promotion of joint-ventures in the tourism sector. They reiterated the central role of the private sector in this field, as the flow of investments to the tourist destinations in Mediterranean Partner Countries constitutes an essential tool to further support and develop this vital sector. They also invited FEMIP to mobilise its whole range of financial instruments in order to foster the development of tourism and links with the Mediterranean partner countries and called on tourism senior officials to meet in order to prepare a Working Programme to be submitted to the next Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Tourism in 2010.

Ministers recalled the need to examine the impact of the climate change phenomena on the tourism sector in the Euro-Mediterranean region, and underlined that the environmental pressures may severely impact coastal areas, in particular around the Mediterranean.

Towards the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area
At the 7th Euro-Mediterranean Trade Ministerial Meeting held in Marseille on 2 July 2008, Ministers welcomed the ongoing work and instructed the Senior Officials to present a Euro-Mediterranean Trade Roadmap up to 2010 and beyond at the 2009 Trade Ministerial. The work of the Senior Officials Working Group has focused on how to diversify and enhance trade, to encourage industrial integration and European investments in the Mediterranean countries. The ultimate aim is the establishment of an ambitious, deep Euro-Mediterranean free trade area.

Bilateral negotiations with Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Israel on the liberalisation of trade in services and the right of establishment, launched in 2008, will continue in 2009. Regional consultations will also be pursued in order to ensure the transparency of bilateral negotiations and to prepare those Mediterranean partners with whom
bilateral negotiations have not yet been launched. Priority should be given to speeding up agreements on Conformity Assessment and Accreditation.

Bilateral negotiations will also continue on the establishment of a more efficient dispute settlement mechanism for the trade provisions of the Association Agreements. So far, the agreement with Tunisia has been initiated and substantial progress made in the bilateral negotiations with Morocco, which should lead to the initialising of the agreement in the near future. Discussions are expected to continue with other Mediterranean countries with a view to concluding the remaining bilateral protocols.

Important progress was achieved in the first half of 2008 in the negotiations on further liberalisation of agricultural, processed agricultural and fisheries products, in accordance with the Barcelona Declaration and the Rabat Euro-Mediterranean Road Map for Agriculture. Negotiations were recently concluded with Egypt and Israel, progress was made with Morocco and negotiations were launched with Tunisia.

The Ministers underlined the importance of strengthening capacity building and institutional development in trade and trade-related matters, either through the participation of Mediterranean Partners in certain EU programmes, agencies and bodies or through enhanced and targeted technical and financial assistance to help them to converge towards the trade-related acquis.

Economic dialogue

The 12th Economic Transition Conference (Brussels, 20-21 February 2008) focused on financial and banking services, which are at the heart of economic transition. The Ministers propose concentrating discussions at the upcoming Conference in 2009 on the international financial crisis. Ministers underline the importance of discussing the issue of the food prices crisis in a relevant Ministerial meeting.

The Euromed Network of Public Finance Experts was launched in 2008. The Terms of Reference of the network, as endorsed by the Ministers of Economy and Finance in Porto in 2008, identify three main areas for analysis: 1) fiscal consolidation as part of a broader agenda for public sector reform, growth and employment; 2) the efficiency and effectiveness of public expenditures; and 3) budget management systems and institutions.

The first meeting of the network took place in Brussels in September 2008, back-to-back with the Senior Officials meeting to prepare part of the agenda for this year’s joint Euromed ECOFIN/FEMP Ministerial. The next regular meeting of the Euromed Network of Public Finance Experts is expected in the lead up to the 2009 Ministerial meeting.

Ministers agree to keep improving the legal framework with the view to facilitate transfer and mobilisation of migrant remittances for long term investment in Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries.
Industrial Cooperation

The 7th Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting on Industrial Cooperation will take place in France (Nice, 5-6 November 2008), following a conference on facilitating industrial exchanges. The meeting will take stock of progress achieved so far, e.g. in following up and implementing the Euromed Charter for enterprise, the facilitation of industrial exchanges, innovation, regional dialogue on the future of the textile and clothing sector and investment promotion. Sustainable industrial development will be added to the traditional themes of discussion.

Further work could also be done on possible action to improve arbitration procedures in the region, notably for SMEs, for example with the setting up of a Mediterranean Court of Arbitration.

Ongoing work on statistics cooperation

Ministers take note of the important role of reliable statistics as an important factor in decision making. The statistical services in the Mediterranean partner countries are receiving technical assistance from the regional MEDSTAT II programme. The programme will run until September 2009.

D - Social, human and cultural cooperation

Developing a genuine social dimension

The 2007 workshop on employment policy helped to enhance the understanding of the challenges facing labour markets and employment policies in the context of globalisation, technological evolution and demographic change. The first Conference of Employment and Labour Ministers (Marrakesh, 9-10 November 2008) will provide a unique opportunity to develop a genuine social dimension in the partnership, based on an integrated approach combining economic growth, employment and social cohesion. Ministers will review socio-economic developments in the region and examine concrete initiatives and proposals to promote employment creation, modernisation of labour markets and decent work. Ministers should approve a framework of action setting out key objectives in the fields of employment policy, employability and decent employment opportunities. This framework will also address important cross-cutting issues such as strengthening the participation of women in the labour market, non-discrimination, the integration of young people within the labour market, the transformation of informal into formal employment and labour migration. Employment and Labour Ministers should also approve an effective follow-up mechanism, with reporting on national progress and exchange of practices. Successful social and employment policies require the involvement of all relevant stakeholders, namely the social partners. In this connection, the cooperation of social partners across the Euro-Mediterranean region should be further developed.

Ministers underline the commitment to facilitate legal movement of individuals and acknowledge that this has an important impact on the social dimension of the
partnership. For this purpose, Ministers mandate Senior Officials to identify ways and means to implement this objective.

Health

The second Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Health will take place in Egypt on 17 November 2008. The Ministerial meeting will discuss means to strengthen the health dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership in order to promote sustainable development in the Mediterranean region by improving all aspects of human health.

Human Development

The Ministers reiterate the importance of human development in the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean and they mandate the Senior Officials to prepare for the first Ministerial Meeting on Human Development due to be held in Morocco in 2009 or 2010.

Towards a Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education and Research Area

The inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia (Piran, 9 June 2008) marked an important step in building cultural and educational bridges between the North and South of the Mediterranean. This achievement will certainly encourage cooperation in higher education, following up the objectives of the Catania Process and the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research (Cairo, June 2007).

Ministers look forward to the implementation and follow up of the Cairo Declaration by reinforcing the role of the Monitoring Committee for Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation in RTD (MOCO) and the prompt creation of an expert group on Higher Education with a precise mandate to realize the objectives and actions of the Declaration.

Ministers consider that particular attention should be given to further promoting academic mobility, enhancing quality assurance mechanisms and to issues concerning the recognition of degrees and study periods which may lead to the development of joint degrees between institutions in European and Mediterranean countries. A second meeting of the Euro-Mediterranean Ministers of Higher Education and Scientific Research should be convened in the second half of 2009, once the results of projects, conferences, studies and other activities under the new Tempus IV, Erasmus Mundus I and Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Windows programmes are available.

Promoting dialogue between cultures, cultural diversity

2008 has been a very important year for the cultural dimension of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The third meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Culture Ministers (Athens, 29-30 May 2008), which took place during the 2008 European
Year of Intercultural Dialogue and the Euro-Mediterranean year of dialogue between cultures, has launched a political process that should lead to a new Euro-Mediterranean Strategy on Culture in two years time. This Strategy will be built around two distinct, but interlinked components: dialogue between cultures and cultural policy. Ministers also agreed to establish a follow-up mechanism for drawing up the Strategy, which will include the establishment of a Euromed Group of Experts on Culture. This ad hoc group should meet twice during 2009 and possibly once in 2010 ahead of the next meeting of Euro-Mediterranean Culture Ministers.

Ministers agree that the following areas for action should be given consideration and further explored: condemnation of trafficking and trade in cultural property and treasures that have been illicitly acquired through illegal excavations and pillaging of monuments in the light of the relevant UNESCO Convention of 1970. Ministers welcome as well the establishment of a network for recording and documenting Euro-Mediterranean underwater cultural heritage based on the exchange of best practices.

Following the revision of the statutes and the appointment of its new leadership, the Anna Lindh Foundation for Dialogue between cultures has been further strengthened. Henceforth, the Foundation will consolidate its capacity to promote intercultural dialogue, diversity and mutual understanding and raise its profile as a bridge between Euro-Mediterranean cultures, religions and beliefs, in cooperation with the UN Alliance of Civilisations. The partnership welcomes the observatory role that the Foundation is intended to play and the annual reports to be produced.

The new Euro-Med Heritage Programme, centred on the appropriation of cultural heritage by local populations, access to knowledge of cultural heritage and institutional and legislative strengthening got under way in 2008. The launching conference for the Euro-Med Heritage IV programme will be held at the beginning of 2009 in Marrakesh.

The audiovisual media and cinema as well as the promotion of cultural heritage and contemporary culture are excellent vehicles for intercultural dialogue between the Euro-Mediterranean countries. On the basis of the previous Euromed Audiovisual Programmes and the new strategy to enhance the Mediterranean audiovisual sector, approved at the Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial meeting on Culture in 2008, a new Euromed Audiovisual Programme could be launched in 2009.

Ministers welcome the initiatives launched by the COPEAM. These are the Terramed project, aiming at creating a TV satellite channel for the Mediterranean, and the setting-up of an internet portal on the audiovisual heritage of the Mediterranean.

Justice and Law

The Euro-Mediterranean area has the ambition to fully respect freedom, security and justice, rule of law, human rights, fundamental freedoms and respect for international conventions.
Practitioners, universities and legal actors will work to facilitate best practices and ensure, in the interests of the rule of law, the proper execution of conventions and judicial decisions and awards, including their participation in a network on a national and Euro-Mediterranean level.

The two other components of the regional Programme on Justice and Home Affairs (2008-2011), namely cooperation in the field of Justice (Euro-Med Justice II) and the Police (Euro-Med Police II), have also started their activities.

**Strengthening the role of women in society**

As part of the follow up to the Istanbul Ministerial Conference held in 2006 on “Strengthening the Role of Women in Society” and in view of a second Ministerial Conference in 2009 to be held in Morocco, Ministers encourage further concrete initiatives to accelerate the implementation of the Istanbul conclusions. A possible outcome could be a concrete set of joint activities in all fields approved in the Istanbul Ministerial Conclusions. In order to prepare for the coming Ministerial Conference, two working groups should be organized during 2009. Following the first thematic working group on “Women’s Participation in Political Life” that was held in Brussels in 2008, another thematic working group will be organised to complement all the pillars agreed in the Istanbul Ministerial on “Women’s Social Rights and Sustainable Development” and “Women’s Rights in the Cultural Sphere and the Role of Communication and the Mass Media”. The other working group will prepare the ministerial meeting.

**EuroMed Youth**

Euromed cooperation in the field of youth will be enhanced by entering a new phase. The Euro Med Youth IV Programme will continue to run in conjunction with the Youth in Action Programme, both of which share similar objectives, such as promoting mobility, active citizenship, non-formal learning and mutual understanding among young people as well as supporting youth organisations.

**Cooperation with civil society and local actors**

Civil society should be further empowered and its capability enhanced through improved interaction with governments and parliaments. To this end, a new regional programme has been launched in 2008 aiming at strengthening the role of civil society. Furthermore, Ministers take note of the recommendations of the Marseille
Civil Forum (31 October-2 November) and acknowledge the important contribution of the Euromed non-governmental platform. Efforts to organise subsequent Civil Fores should be encouraged by all partners.

Ministers acknowledge the important role and the contribution of the Economic and Social Councils and Similar institutions and take note of the conclusions of the Euromed Summit of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions, held in Rabat on 14-16 October 2008.

Enhancing the visibility of the Partnership

Ministers underline that the visibility of the Partnership is vital for its public understanding and acceptance, as well as its accountability and legitimacy. They acknowledge that the second Regional Information and Communication Programme aims to enhance people’s understanding of these relations through a variety of actions and activities. The four components of the new programme cover media activities, journalist training and networking, campaign support and opinion polling/surveys. The launching conference for the Programme will take place in the first half of 2009 with the participation of the main media in the region.

Furthermore, Ministers encourage continuing efforts to promote the different aspects of media development in the region. The Euromed and Media consultations will continue through the activities of its Task Force and networks (media, journalism schools and gender). Seminars and workshops will cover media-related issues in reporting terrorism, gender, dialogue between cultures and freedom of the press.

Migration

Ministers recalled that the issue of migration should be an integral part of the regional partnership and its related challenges namely legal migration, migration and development and the fight against illegal migration, as laid down in the agreed conclusions of the 1st Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Meeting on Migration, Albufeira, 18-19 November 2007, need to be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach. In this regard, some initiatives have began to be implemented this year with the launching of the regional Euro-Med Migration II Programme (2008-2011).

They underline the commitment to facilitate legal movement of individuals. They stress that promoting orderly-managed legal migration in the interest of all parties concerned, fighting illegal migration and fostering links between migration and development are issues of common interest which should be addressed through a comprehensive, balanced and integrated approach.
IV. State of progress in the implementation of projects listed in the Annex to the Paris Declaration

Ministers reviewed the progress made in implementing the priority projects selected by Heads of State and Government in the Paris Declaration.

A – De-pollution of the Mediterranean

Ministers welcome the progress on de-pollution of the Mediterranean, especially regarding a Mediterranean water strategy as well as actions taken to address climate change impacts.

At the joint Euro-Mediterranean ECOFIN and FEMIP Ministerial meeting, ministers agreed that FEMIP will in 2009 organise a conference addressing the theme of sustainable water financing including issues such as water infrastructure, water services, water efficiency, private sector involvement and environmental standards.

The results of the upcoming Water Ministerial Conference, together with the achievements since the third EuroMed Ministerial Meeting on Environment (Cairo), should form the basis for the next Environment Ministerial Meeting planned for 2009. The Ministerial meeting will take note of a list of concrete projects on both sides of the Mediterranean related to integrated water management and will identify further projects linked to the Water Strategy in the Mediterranean. The annual meeting of the Horizon 2020 Steering group will be held along with meetings of each of the three sub-groups (pollution reduction, capacity building and review monitoring and research). The questions of mitigation/adaptation to climate change, biodiversity protection and conservation of the Mediterranean seabed will be considered. France is prepared to host the relevant ministerial meeting.

B - Maritime and Land Highways

As a follow-up to the Paris Summit’s decision to develop a “Motorway of the sea” project, an expert group held two meetings on 17 July 2008 and on 17 October 2008. In these meetings, concrete and pilot projects were presented and support for their full implementation is being sought. The outcome of all these activities will lead to a Ministerial Conference to be hosted by Greece in 2009.

C - Civil Protection

The Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Natural and Man-made Disasters Programme (PPRD) will contribute to the development of stronger prevention, preparedness and response capacities in civil protection at international, national and local level. It will also aim to bring the Mediterranean Partner Countries
progressively closer to the European Civil Protection Mechanism and the envisaged European civil protection network against disasters. Furthermore, the joint Civil Protection project on prevention, preparation and response to disasters is one of the main priorities for the region. Therefore the development of the EuroMed Programme for the PPRD (2008-2011) is a matter of urgency. The collaboration between the civil protection institutions in the EU member states and the Mediterranean Partner countries for strengthening the cooperation in the field of training and on operational level is suggested.

D - Alternative Energies: Mediterranean Solar Plan

The Euromed Expert Group, reporting to the Euromed Energy Forum, met on 7 October 2008, reviewed progress achieved and agreed on future actions, which should further develop the decision of the Paris Summit for the Mediterranean, to launch a Mediterranean Solar Plan focused on market deployment as well as research and development of all alternative sources of energy. An expert workshop organised by Germany in cooperation with France, on the potential and cost of different renewable energy technologies and aspects of a future Master Plan, took place on 28-29 October in Berlin. A conference, organised by France and Egypt in cooperation with Germany and Spain, will convene on 22 November in Paris to discuss financing and project implementation of the Mediterranean Solar Plan. An Immediate Action Plan (IAP) could be agreed to list concrete and pilot projects to be launched in 2009-2010. The aim is to launch three power stations of 20MW in 2009.

E - Higher Education and Research, Euro-Mediterranean University

The inauguration of the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia (Piran, 9 June 2008) marked an important step in building cultural and educational bridges between the North and South of the Mediterranean. This achievement will certainly encourage cooperation in higher education, following up the objectives of the Catania Process and the First Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference on Higher Education and Scientific Research (Cairo, June 2007). Through a cooperation network of partner universities and other institutions in the Euro-Mediterranean region, the Euro-Mediterranean University will provide study, research and training programmes, and thus advance the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Higher Education Science and Research Area.

In this context, and in the spirit of co-ownership among all Euro-Mediterranean partners, Ministers welcome the Moroccan initiative to host a university with Euro-Mediterranean vocation in the city of Fez, complementary to the Euro-Mediterranean University in Slovenia. This will provide opportunities for fruitful exchange among students, researchers and universities from Euro-Mediterranean countries, thus
contributing to giving full substance to the concept of dialogue between cultures by investing in new human capabilities and cultural exchanges.

The Ministers consider that particular attention should be given to further promoting academic mobility, enhancing quality assurance mechanisms and to issues concerning the recognition of degrees and study periods which may lead to the development of joint degrees between institutions in the EU and Mediterranean partner countries. They welcome the initiative already proposed by relevant institutions, notably in the field of medicine and law. The ad hoc working group on higher education, which was convened for the first time on 5 June 2008, will facilitate mutual cooperation in these priority areas and prepare the second meeting of the Euromed Ministers of Higher Education and Scientific Research. The meeting should be convened in the second half of 2009, once the results of activities under the new Tempus IV, Erasmus Mundus I and Erasmus Mundus External Cooperation Windows programmes are available.

**F - The Mediterranean Business Development Initiative**

The 6th FEMIP Ministerial Meeting (Luxembourg, 7 October 2008) agreed to organise a conference focusing on financial assistance to SMEs in 2009. It also highlighted the importance of the Mediterranean Business Development Initiative aiming at assisting the existing entities in partner countries operating in support of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises by assessing the needs of these enterprises, defining policy solutions and providing these entities with resources in the form of technical assistance and financial instruments and based on the principle of co-ownership. Contributions by countries from both rims of the Mediterranean will be done on a voluntary basis. Italy is candidate to host an informal meeting in Milan involving Governments, the private sector and experts focused on promoting economic cooperation in the Mediterranean.

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean will meet in the second half of 2009 in order to take stock of the progress achieved in the implementation of the working programme for 2009, and the projects agreed and in particular the key initiatives as agreed at the Paris Summit, as well as prepare for the next summit in 2010.
Interpretative Declaration by the Co-
Presidency of the Union for the
Mediterranean

With regard to the second indent of paragraph 9 of the Marseille Declaration, the co-
presidency considers that the invocation by a State of its legitimate interests to oppose the
implementation of a project must be assessed by all the States of the Union for the
Mediterranean.