From Promoting Security to Enforcing It: The Integration of the European Security Strategy during the Solana Era

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FROM PROMOTING SECURITY TO ENFORCING IT: THE INTEGRATION OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY DURING THE SOLANA ERA

By

Maxime H. A. Larivé

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Miami in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida

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the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

FROM PROMOTING SECURITY TO ENFORCING IT: THE INTEGRATION OF
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY DURING THE SOLANA ERA

Maxime H. A. Larivé

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The European Union (EU) has been unable to formulate a common security and defense policy. Although the EU has continuously confronted multiple internal and external security threats endangering the stability and security of the Union and its Member States, it has chosen repeatedly to orient its priorities towards economic, social, and cultural consolidation under the protection of the US/NATO military umbrella rather than developing a robust defense and security capabilities. The literature on the EU argues that it is a “normative” actor composed mainly of soft power with a total commitment towards multilateralism. This research project proposes to examine the evolution of EU security arrangement during the “Solana Era,” beginning with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) through the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). Given the plethora of collective domestic and international threats, why has the process of European security and defense unification and integration been so halting and of such limited scope?

In order to assess the degree of further or lesser integration, this dissertation applies an eclectic theoretical approach on three case studies. Each case study looks at one level of analysis: domestic, homeland counter-terrorism against radical Islamic terrorism; regional, EU energy security vis-à-vis Russia; international, the EUPOL
Afghanistan mission of training the Afghan National Police. This multi-case study analysis allows assessing at which level of analysis one should consider and expect the highest level of integration in facing the threat.
This dissertation is dedicated to my wife Cristina without whom such project would simply have not been possible. Her support, patience and love were central in bringing this project to an end. I am also forever grateful to my parents – Laurence and Jacques – for always believing in my work and me.

I also want to express my gratitude and thank to my mentor, advisor, and Chair of my dissertation, Dr. Joaquín Roy. His support throughout my Ph.D. at the University of Miami has been invaluable. His passion and considerable work on the EU was contagious and led me to write this dissertation. I also want to express my thanks to Dr. Roger E. Kanet for sharing his ideas and taking a considerable amount of his time reading my work. His comments and criticisms have always been right on and forced me to push myself. I cannot thank enough Dr. Bruce M. Bagley for his time. His analytical skills and knowledge are a model that one can only hope to equal. Last but not least, Dr. Natividad Fernandez-Sola was a veritable asset in criticizing and commenting on my work. Her practical and theoretical knowledge of the EU undeniably help me in tightening my argument.

Dr. Roberto Dominguez was the first person to pave my path towards the Ph.D. program at UM. I had the honor to be his assistant at Suffolk University and I cannot thank him enough for his mentorship. Dr. Ruth Reitan and Dr. Hasmet Uluorta have also contributed as teachers and “bosses” throughout my graduate education in sharpening my mind and understanding of world politics. And Steve Ralph, our hour-long discussions have always been unique and surprising.
My survival throughout the Ph.D. process would not have been possible without my close friends. I had the pleasure to meet so many great people that it would be difficult to thank all of them. However, a few of them have truly had an impact on my work, and most importantly my life. The writing of my dissertation would not have been possible without the unconditional support and fantastic friendship of Ana. Our shared hours of writing, joking, and debating on our respective research topics have contributed to my success. She is a unique and invaluable friend. I also want to thank Jose for our friendship. I cannot look back at my time at UM without including our great lasting amity. Menaka has also been a fantastic friend. Her comments and razor sharp criticisms have just been fantastic instruments in order to make my research, arguments rigorous and precise. I cannot thank Hans enough in allowing me to keep my sanity and forgetting my research for enough time to catch a movie. My first years in Miami were also directly linked to my friendship with Cathinka. I want to thank Maria and Astrid for welcoming me at the EU Center and guiding me throughout my studies. Last but not least, I want to express my greatest gratitude to Anna and April for creating the Dissertation Writing Group and leading it with care and passion. The DWG has been a fantastic platform allowing me to interact with other Ph.D. Candidates – especially Roxane and Kathleen – writing their dissertations. This group played a key role in keeping me on schedule with my research and writing.

Last but not least, I had the opportunity to work for and assist two outstanding individuals and great mentors during my internships. First, Fredericke Tschampa has been a fantastic mentor teaching me the “real” functioning of EU and UN diplomacy. Her work ethic, rigor, and warmth are a true model of leadership. I always looked back at this
internship with great pleasure. Second, Dr. Richard Weitz, that I know only virtually, has offered me a great opportunity challenging my research and analytical skills on diverse international security questions throughout the summer. Once more his work ethic and knowledge were fantastic templates to follow and learn from.

I also want to thank all the experts, officials, and faculty – that will remain anonymous on paper for legal reasons – that were kind enough to spend some of their precious time answering my questions and raising insightful new lines of research. Without these many rounds of interviews this project would have been different and probably less relevant.
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<td>AFSJ</td>
<td>Area of Freedom, Security and Justice</td>
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<td>AIVD</td>
<td>Dutch intelligence service</td>
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<td>ANA</td>
<td>Afghan National Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANP</td>
<td>Afghan National Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>COPS</td>
<td>Comité Politique et de Sécurité</td>
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<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>CSTC-A</td>
<td>Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Counter-terrorism</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Counterterrorism Coordinator</td>
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<td>Counter Terrorism Group</td>
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<td>CTTF</td>
<td>Counter Terrorist Task Force</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>EAW</td>
<td>European Arrest Warrant</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
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<td>ECSC</td>
<td>European Coal and Steel Community</td>
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<td>ECT</td>
<td>Energy Charter Treaty</td>
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<td>EDA</td>
<td>European Defense Agency</td>
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<td>EDC</td>
<td>European Defense Community</td>
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<td>EDU</td>
<td>Europol Drugs Unit</td>
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<td>EEC</td>
<td>European Economic Community</td>
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<td>EGF</td>
<td>European Gendarmerie Force</td>
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<td>EPC</td>
<td>European Political Cooperation</td>
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<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>ETA</td>
<td>Euskadi Ta Askatasuna</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>EUBAM</td>
<td>EU Border Assistance Mission</td>
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<td>EUBG</td>
<td>European Union Battlegroup</td>
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<td>EU Military Force</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Military Committee</td>
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<td>EUMM</td>
<td>EU Monitoring Mission</td>
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<td>EUMS</td>
<td>European Military Staff</td>
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<td>EUNAVFOR</td>
<td>EU Naval Force</td>
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<td>EUPAT</td>
<td>EU Police Advisory Team</td>
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<td>EU Police Mission</td>
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<td>EUPOL</td>
<td>European Union Police</td>
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<td>EUPOL-A</td>
<td>European Union Police mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<td>EURATOM</td>
<td>European Atomic Energy Community</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ERRF</td>
<td>European Rapid Reaction Force</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUTM</td>
<td>EU Training Mission</td>
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<td>FSB</td>
<td>Federal Security Service</td>
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<td>FYROM</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia</td>
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<td>GPPO</td>
<td>German Police Project Office</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>High Representative</td>
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<td>IPCAG</td>
<td>Interagency Police Coordinated Action Group</td>
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<td>IPCB</td>
<td>International Police Coordination Board</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<td>LNG</td>
<td>Liquefied Natural Gas</td>
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<td>LOFTA</td>
<td>Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan</td>
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<td>MS</td>
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<td>NATO Response Force</td>
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<td>NTM-A</td>
<td>NATO Training Mission - Afghanistan</td>
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<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Partnership and Cooperation Agreement</td>
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<td>Police Chiefs Task Force</td>
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<td>POCO</td>
<td>Political Committee</td>
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<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
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<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>QMV</td>
<td>Qualified Majority Voting</td>
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<td>Red Army Faction</td>
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<td>RTC</td>
<td>Regional Training Center</td>
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<td>Single European Act</td>
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<td>Situation Center</td>
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<td>WMDs</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

Thirteen years ago France and the United Kingdom met in the medieval town on the Atlantic coast of France, Saint Malo, and laid out the foundations for a new chapter of European integration in the sector of defense and security. The 1998 Declaration of Saint Malo, made by French President Jacques Chirac and British Prime Minister Tony Blair, marked a turning point in European history. The roots for such a declaration can be traced back to the failed attempt of 1954 to establish the European Defense Community (EDC), and the implementation of the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht establishing the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The 1990s were a turning point for European integration, as the world witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union, the rise of the United States (U.S.) as an undisputed hegemon, and raging wars in the Balkans. The balance of power of the 1990s abruptly changed in 2001 with the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. As a result, the first decade of the 21st century has been a period of transition, reflection, and mutation for the Europeans, the European Union (EU), and the U.S. The early desires in 1998 of incorporating a military dimension into the EU, through the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), as envisioned by the French, but hit a wall due to financial, political, economical, human, and leadership realities. The EU has now become a civilian/soft power malgré lui.

The establishment of the ESDP, known as the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, marked the beginning of a new era for the EU as a global actor. Between the 1999 European Council of Cologne, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, the EU underwent institutional
transformations under what is known as the Solana era. Under Mr. Solana, the first High Representative for the CSFP from 1999 to 2009, the EU deployed its first ever civilian and military missions abroad, and defined its lines of conduct in the security and defense realm.

However, in the questions of defense and security, EU Member States remained the leading actors, the decision-makers, and the financial and material/human providers. The EU depends on its Member States in order to deploy troops and forces abroad as defined in the Treaties. Within the group of Member States, a distinction must be underlined on the inequalities of power and voice on the questions of security and defense. The expression often times used in Brussels of “all the states are equal, but some are more than others” summarizes well the reality on the ground (Orwell, 2003).

The reflection on the first decade of the 21st century is central in order to understand the current evolution of the CSDP institutionally and politically since the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon. The Solana period is considerable as it can be described as the most successful attempt in the construction and integration of EU security and defense policies. The economic context as well as the regional and international balance of power were favorable in the deepening process of EU integration. The 1990s were the ignition to a new process with the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as the recurrent crises on the European continent. The two wars in the Balkans considerably affected the perceptions of the threat regionally, but also led the Europeans to realize their inabilities to react to crisis without the assistance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As opposed to the previous decade, the early 2000s can be divided into three

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1 “The point is not that other countries never matter, but rather that Germany, France and Britain matter most” (Jones, 2007: 12).
periods: first, the implementation; second, the deployment; and third, the reflection. The first period or the implementation period consisted of adjusting and reforming the institutions through a series of treaties and councils. The second period starting in 2003 concerned the deployment of the first EU mission abroad and the active role played by the EU on the international stage. The last or the reflection period is embodied in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon in order to establish the EU as a more efficient and powerful as a global security actor. This dissertation seeks to analyze the construction of the EU as a global security actor during the first decade of the 21st century, of what will be referred to as the Solana period, from 1999-2009.

I. Research Question

This dissertation proposes to examine the evolution of the EU security arrangement during the “Solana Era,” beginning with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) through the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon (2009). The central question asked in this dissertation is: given the plethora of collective domestic and international threats, why has the process of European security and defense integration been so halting and of such limited scope?

II. Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research design combined with simple quantitative tools in order to explain the degree of convergence and/or divergence in the integration process of EU security and defense policies. A method of structured, focused comparison of multi-case study analysis can contribute to the understanding of such questions by comparing three issue areas. This method “borrows the devise of asking a set of
standardized, general questions of each case […]” (George & Bennett, 2005: 69). The “structured” dimension consists in analyzing similar questions in each case study allowing the researcher to make systematic comparison, while the “focused” aspect comprises only certain aspects examined (George & Bennett, 2005: 67). This method is wildly used in order to generate considerable empirical knowledge. As underlined by Bennett and George, there are three requirements for such kind of study: first, identification of the universe; second, valid selection of case studies; third, application of theoretical interests for explanation (2005: 69). Each case looks at similar independent variables in order to assess which one is the most powerful in explaining integration or not.²

1. Case selection

In order to avoid flaws in the research design, the selection of the three case studies was carefully effectuated (George & Bennett, 2005; King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994; Gerring, 2007). The main rationale is dual: first, lead to some theory testing; second, identifying the field in which integration will occur first or as what is often described as “real-world problem” (George & Bennett, 2005: 264). In order to explain EU security and defense integration, this analysis shall combine theoretical and empirical studies. The three case studies selected offer the empirical ground in order to assess security and defense integration within the EU.

² The case study method is quite unappreciated and often described as producing weak science because of the issue of case selection biases and nonreplicability (Gerring, 2007). However, the case study method has generated a large literature and empirical results shaping the general field of social science. This is the case of this dissertation seeking to answer a large and important question in order to advance the study of the field of European studies. This dissertation is much more focused on problem-driven rather than method-driven analysis (Walt, 1999).
The case selection is based on several criteria: first, the selection of EU Member States; second, selection of case studies sharing an existential threat to the security and stability of the Union and its Member States; third, choosing security threats at different levels of analysis. Based on this criteria, three case studies have been selected for this research: the first case, EU homeland counterterrorist policies against radical Islamic terrorism; the second case, EU energy security policies towards Russia; and last, EU contribution to the war in Afghanistan through the EUPOL Afghanistan mission. Each case study looks at one specific level of analysis – homeland, regional and international – in order to understand under which circumstances and at which level, one should expect deeper integration.

The purpose behind the selection of cross-level issue-areas is to access, first, the overall integration process of EU security and defense policy, and second, to define at which level of analysis the highest degree of convergence and/or divergence EU integration would take place. Each issue brings specific explanations to the research question on the integration of EU security policy. The timeframe covers the Solana era starting in 1999 until 2009. This historical period under the mandates of the High Representative Solana has been fundamental in the shaping and designing of future policies, strengthening the integration process of the EU in security and defense policies. The selection process was made on the basis of the degree of variation brought by each issue. Aside from the above, they all contain shared variables – lack of common political will from EU Member States in the pooling of power under common institutions; threats to the stability of the EU as a whole; a limited level of coordination in the design of security strategies; common perceptions of threat to stability of each Member State; and
lack of vertical and horizontal distribution of capabilities – while diverging in their explanatory power – policy divergence or convergence.

Table 1.1: Variables and Degree of integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Case 1: Counterterrorism against Radical Islamic terrorism</th>
<th>Case 2: Energy Security towards Russia</th>
<th>Case 3: EUPOL-Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Analysis</strong></td>
<td>Homeland</td>
<td>Regional</td>
<td>International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV1: International system</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV2: Institutionalization</td>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV3: Agents’ perceptions</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV4: Political will</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV: Integration</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table 1.1 illustrates the overall research of this dissertation by laying out the case studies as well as the variables (four independent variables (IV) and one dependent variable (DV)). The DV consists in explaining the degree of integration process in the EU security and defense policy. The three case studies selected permit to explain if there is a variation in accordance of the level of analysis as well as in the impact of the variables selected. The measure of variation/integration is defined by low, medium or high. Each of the three measures are necessary in order to understand which IV is more influential than the others, but also in terms of expectation for the coming process of integration. High means a current and foreseeable integrated policy wherein Member States speak with a common voice through EU institutions; medium, wherein Member States are guarding their national sovereignty, but understand the long term need for deeper integration in order to deal appropriately with threat; low, means that Member States do not have any
desire to commit on a general common policy and their commitments will depend on a case by case basis.

Returning to the selection process of the case studies, the first criterion in the selection of the EU Member States was the necessity of belonging to the “Big Three,” Britain, France, and Germany. In the first case study, Britain, France, Germany and additionally Spain stand apart from other EU Member States considering their direct experience with past and recent terrorist attacks. In the second case, selecting France, Germany, and Britain increase the validity of the argument due to their dependence on Russian exports and investments. Even though their economies considerably depend on foreign energy sources, their strategies diverge, affecting the creation of a common energy policy. In the last case the selection encompasses the Big Three as they are not only part of the NATO alliance and ISAF mission, but also play a major military role in the EUPOL Afghanistan and training of police forces. Naturally, the EU, as an autonomous agent, as the main case study is important because the degrees of coordination and cooperation are low and limited in the field of security and defense. While the three EU Member States selected are examples of nation-states yielding up their sovereignty and their national grandeur. The non-selection of new EU Member States, like Poland or the Czech Republic, follows three logics: first, their late integration

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3 France and Germany have not encountered recent terrorist attacks as experienced by Spain and Britain. However, their history in fighting terrorism and countering recent attempts on their respective territory validate the selection of these Member States. Thus, they all share a common aspect, the rise of home-grown radical Islamic terrorists.

4 The non-selection of Member States like Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Czech Republic is that they are new Member States with limited influence upon their entrance. However, Poland has progressively become a powerful and influential Member State within the Union. Nevertheless one of the criteria for the selection of the Member States in this study is the necessity to be an established Member State during the full length of the Solana’s mandates.

5 Once more Poland has been involved since the launching of the EUPOL-A mission in 2007 and in the ISAF operation.
to the Union limits the process of generalization of their political weight onto EU security and defense policy-making and arena. Second, their impacts on policy-making in security policy have been too limited in the early period of the Solana era. Last but not least, the Big Three share similar strategic culture as well as a common history during and after the Cold War. Their influences on the decision-making process in Brussels in security and defense matters have been considerable since the Maastricht Treaty and even before. Integrating new EU Member States would affect the overall reliability of the study. 

The second rationale in the selection process of the three case studies is that they all share an existential threat to the security and stability of the Union and its Member States in the post-Cold war period. These three issues combine “traditional” and “new” security threats (Kirchner & Sperling, 2002; Buzan et al., 1998; Marsh & Rees, 2011) as identified in the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS (Council of the European Union, 2003; Council of the European Union, 2008d). The security issues selected contribute to the broadening of the security agenda moving beyond the traditional state-centered approach. Each issue reveals important questions on the current limits of EU strategies in security and defense matters. The case studies all share a lack of horizontal and vertical distribution of competences and resources, limiting the development of “effective” and binding unified

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6 Studying the relations between the Big Three and new EU Member States in security and defense matters could be the topic of another dissertation. One of the reasons is the inequality in the balance of power in the decision-making process in Brussels between the old Member States and the new ones.

7 This dissertation’s overall analysis looks at security and defense questions. Both terms have different meanings and rationale. The question of defense is closely connected to the identity of the nation-state with the role of the army in the protection of the borders from within and/or outside threats. Some even try to differentiate between threat and risks (Hassner, 2011: 14). On the other side, the issue of security has considerably changed since 1989 and after 2001. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, scholars have criticized the fact that every matter causes a security question leading to a certain cacophony in the field. Being aware of these two dimensions, the dissertation looks at both questions – defense and security – with the selected case studies looking at different threats: terrorism, energy, and regional instabilities.
strategies. Moreover, EU Member States have historically controlled the degree of security integration in order to maintain national supremacy over the sectors of EU security and defense. Furthermore, the EU, in each issue area, has been working and/or publishing strategies in order to deal with security issues threatening the stability of the Union, but has fell short in their policy-recommendations and implementations. Last but not least, each security matter was undertaken under the leadership of the High Representative for the CFSP, Javier Solana.

The last rationale consists in choosing security threats at different levels of analysis in order to test the theories of international relations and assess the degree of integration. Because each threat is perceived at existential, the degree of integration should be equal, however, it appears that looking at different levels of analysis could offer a new reading of European integration in the field of security and defense. The levels of analysis, homeland, regional and international, could bring a new light to the political will of the EU Member States in boosting the integration and pooling process.

Table 1.2: Impact of the IVs on “Big Three” and EU’s decision to foster integration

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case 1: Counterterrorism against Radical Islamic terrorism</th>
<th>Case 2: Energy Security towards Russia</th>
<th>Case 3: EUPOL-Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IV1*</td>
<td>IV2*</td>
<td>IV3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DV*</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Measure scale: from 0 to 2. Zero being no impact and two being the most impact on the will to foster integration.

*IV1: International System; IV2: Institutionalization; IV3: Agents’ Perceptions; IV4: Political Will;  
• DV: Integration towards deeper integration of the policy
The table 1.2 illustrates the impacts of the IVs on the Big Three, Britain, France, and Germany. The measure of the impacts is based on a scale of zero to two. Zero represents no impact on the Member State, while one consists to a limited impact, and two being the most significant. These three Member States are the basis of analysis as they have had the most influence on the field of security and defense during the Solana period, as opposed to other Member States. The initiative and political will to engage together as an integrated Union have emerged from these three Member States. This measure is important to assess the higher degree of integration in the EU’s security and defense policies during the Solana period.

2. Data Collection and Analysis

To measure convergence and/or divergence in the integration process, two categories of sources have been used. The first category is based on interviews. A semi-structured, open-ended interview research design\(^8\) of 20 knowledgeable informants from EU institutions,\(^9\) U.S. government,\(^10\) leading European and U.S. think tanks\(^11\) and the United Nations\(^12\) allowing the identification of the key variables as well as bringing about a more pragmatic understanding of the problems.\(^13\) The second category is composed of primary

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\(^8\) The research design was approved by the University of Miami’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) under the protocol ID of 20100198. See the appendix in order to have access to a sample of the questionnaire.


\(^10\) The U.S. Department of State. See appendix for further details.


\(^12\) Experts from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation (DPKO) in New York city. See appendix for further details.

\(^13\) The anonymity of the interviewees will be maintained as per an agreement with the Institutional Review Board of the University of Miami. All the interviewees were top experts in the field of European
and secondary sources. Primary documents issued from the EU institutions – Commission, Council of the EU, European Council, Parliament, ESDP missions and other agencies (EDA, Europol, etc.) – are accessible on the three issue-areas. They are also based on speeches, hearings and addresses from the executive power in Britain, France, Germany; speeches from ministries of European affairs; addresses from top civil servants of the Directorate-General of External Relations; addresses from the European Council; addresses from chiefs of military command in charge of European missions in Afghanistan. Most of the primary documents are accessible online. A large amount of secondary documents exist and have been published by different European and American think tanks.

Furthermore, as a way to measure the degree of implementation and integration in each issue-area, process-tracing will offer an interesting tool to trace the historical process from creation to implementation. In the case of this research, process-tracing offers two strengths: first, in the identification of a single or several paths to an outcome; second, by proposing alternative explanations to existing theories, which have failed in their predictions about causal processes (George & Bennett, 2005: 215). Due to numerous series of decision-making procedures in CFSP, this technique will increase the explanatory power by bringing clarity in the process of policy implementation, and by comparing the output (the projected results) to the outcome (the actual result).

security with consistent research. However, each interviewee will qualify under the appellation of knowledgeable informant considering their specialty in each issue area. They are all leading experts in their respective fields of research.

14 On the relevance of process-tracing in social science, Goldstone argues that “to identify the process, one must perform the difficult cognitive feat of figuring out which aspects of the initial conditions observed, in conjunction with which simple principles of the many that may be at work, would have combined to generate the observed sequence of events” (in George & Bennett, 2005).
Also, basic descriptive statistical analysis will be included in order to measure the spending of each EU Member State on their national defense and security programs in order to compare them with their investments in European programs. It is most likely that the higher level of spending on European structures will be on homeland security, as opposed to their spending on EU military equipment and programs designed for the “out-of-area mission” of Afghanistan. Also included is the comparison of the financial investments and material capabilities from EU Member States to NATO and the EU structures. Lastly, thanks to the collection of data from opinion surveys such as Transatlantic Trends surveys of the Marshall Fund and Eurobarometer data, I will measure the gap between public opinion and the degree of integration of specific EU policies.

III. From Construction to Deconstruction: Expanding the Field of European Security Studies

By examining the integration process in three distinct security realms affecting the stability and credibility of the EU as a global actor, this project builds on recent efforts to construct a more comprehensive framework for the study of the EU as a security actor. Framing European security with an eclectic theoretical approach can solve some of the previous limitations, while opening up the possibility of a new research agenda on the EU as a security actor. Presently, few analyses of EU security integration through the eyes of neorealism exist, as European security community symbolizes “a marked degree of great power cooperation and muted security competition” (Hyde-Price, 2007: 2). The case of the CFSP represents a challenge for realism, because the creation of the CFSP is a
composition of internal and external factors (Bronstone, 2000).

In addition, through the selected cases and research method, this project broadens the present knowledge of the different processes of European security and defense integration, while demonstrating under which circumstances one should expect divergence or convergence in EU security integration. The interviews effectuated on both side of the Atlantic raise interesting questions on the divergent perceptions of the question of EU as a security actor.

The broader impact of this project is to offer a comprehensive analysis of the pre-Lisbon period, allowing for a better understanding of the EU integration process in the field of security. The conclusions of this dissertation, along the lines of policy recommendations, will contribute to the field in several aspects: first, it will offer a needed study of the current situation in the field of European security, while foreseeing the possible future degree of security integration and cooperation in the post-Lisbon era. Second, the findings of the dissertation will contribute in developing a generalization of the entire body of EU security. Third, it will evaluate and examine the Solana era, a pivotal period in the physical and ideational materialization of a EU security and defense doctrine. Such work has yet to be accomplished by the academic and non-academic literature.
CHAPTER II: THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE FIELD OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

This dissertation seeks to explain the integration process of EU security and defense policy. In order to tackle this considerable task, an eclectic theoretical approach – combining neorealism, neoliberalism, social constructivism, and liberal intergovernmentalism – allows to draw a more comprehensive and multi-faceted picture of the field of European security. Five bodies of literature have been identified in order to explain the rationale behind the selection of each four independent variable – international system, institutions, agency/identity, liberal intergovernmentalism –. Each variable is informed by one of the theoretical paradigm discussed in this chapter.

This literature review chapter consists in highlighting the core theoretical debate and components applied throughout this dissertation. Even though the primary purpose of this dissertation is not to test theory, each IV identified directly emerges from a specific body of International Relations theory. Explaining the meaning and ideas behind each IV is crucial in order to understand the broader spectrum of this dissertation.

Each theory offers a set of hypotheses shaping the narratives and the larger research question of this dissertation. The last body of literature gives an overview of the current state of the art of the field of European security.

I. Distribution of Power and the International System

In the field of security studies and international relations neorealism stands as one of the most influential theoretical approaches.\(^1\) The starting point of the neorealist paradigm

\(^1\) Neorealism emphasizes on the maintenance and indivisibility of sovereignty of the main actor of world politics – the state – while assuming that the structure of the international system – anarchy and
focuses on the structural effects of the international system on states’ behaviors. In the case of this research, neorealism’s contribution is dual: it emphasizes the effects of American power\textsuperscript{16} on EU Member States and on the overall structure of the international system. States, understood as the main actors, are theorized as rational actors in search of security and power in this anarchical system (Morgenthau, 1963; Waltz, 1979; Walt, 1987; Mearsheimer, 2001). Since the end of the Cold War, the changing structure of the system – shifting from bipolar to unipolar to the current multipolar order – has been central in explaining the evolution of the EU defense project and its integration process (Waltz, 1979; Jones, 2007; Mearsheimer, 2001a). According to neorealism the changing distribution of power is the leading independent variable (Jones, 2007). The concept of power is defined along the line of military and material capabilities and it is the means and end of states (Morgenthau, 1973; Waltz, 1979; Hoffmann, 1965; Mearsheimer, 1994/95).\textsuperscript{17} Power is also perceived in relative terms (Grieco, 1988). Given the anarchical structure of the international system, states cannot be certain of the intention of others due to lack of transparency and sharing of information. However, in the case of the EU, at the regional, sub-systemic level, one should understand the European regional distribution of power as a “mitigated anarchy” wherein states will seek cooperation and integration (Collard-Wexler, 2006). Even though the EU is Kantian within, neorealists

\textsuperscript{16} In the case of this dissertation, American power is seen as the main driver of integration in security and defense. China and Russia also affect the Member States and the international structures but in a different fashion as their relationships are much more competitive than cooperative for historical, cultural, political and economical reasons.

\textsuperscript{17} However, power is seen as relative (Grieco, 1988). Power, defined as material capabilities, is fundamental for states in order to guarantee their survival in the anarchical system.
argue that the EU will still behave along Hobbesian lines. The anarchical structure forces any actors to seek for their survival, no exception for the EU.

The debate within neorealism about the factors behind the EU integration process in security and defense policies has been divided into two explanations. On the one side, neorealists like Mearsheimer have argued that defense cooperation among European powers will not be possible and will not last considering the post-cold war international system. On the other side, others have argued that the pressure of the international system will push European powers closer together (Posen, 2006). One of the foremost neorealist arguments has been that, with the changing distribution of world power, the future of Europe will be a story of competition rather than cooperation (Mearsheimer, 2001b). Waltzian neorealism emphasizes the fact that states will balance rather than bandwagon with one another. States fear that today’s ally will become tomorrow’s enemy (Waltz, 1979; Collard-Wexler, 2006). Without the “US pacifier,” stability and peace would not be maintainable on the European continent because of great powers competition.

Studying the EU integration process raises the issue of cooperation. According to neorealism, cooperation is difficult to attain considering the anarchical structure of the international system, which creates competition among states forcing them to be concerned with relative gains in power by actual or potential competitors (Grieco, 1988). Neorealism argues that two factors limit the possibility of international cooperation: first, states are concerns about cheating; second, states are concerned about relative gains (Grieco, 1988: 487). Both factors are the result of anarchy forcing states towards survival

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18 According to neorealism, cooperation is difficult to establish for several reasons (Collard-Wexler, 2006: 400). First, in an anarchical system cooperation is seen as a prisoner’s dilemma. Second, there is a main concern in distribution of gains and relative gains. Last, as argued by Waltz (1979) autarchy is better strategy as opposed to interdependence leading to state vulnerability.
rather than cooperation. For the realist, “cooperation might someday result in lost independence or security” (Grieco, 1988: 502).

1. Balancing, Bandwagoning, or Buck-Passing?

The neorealist literature counts a wide range of hypotheses and rationales trying to explain and theorize the integration process of the EU in defense and security policies. Three paths can be identified: bandwagoning, balancing, and buck-passing. In the case of the EU, a large set of realist literature argues that it is a form of “soft-balancing” (Art, 2004; Posen, 2004; Pape, 2005; Paul, 2005; Walt, 2005; Jones, 2007: 10). The EU strategy and defense integration has not been to balance against the United States, because the latter does not represent a threat to the survival of the EU. Additionally, neorealism has dismissed the importance of institutions such as the EU, which are seen as epiphenomenal and subject to the distribution of material power in the international system. EU Member States have been able to pursue economic integration under the US umbrella (Waltz, 1979). With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the European integration process will stop due to emerging concerns by EU Member States of their security and relative gains (Mearsheimer, 2001a). The tumultuous international and regional climaxes of the 1990s were such that crises and threats have been catalysts in the integration process.

Instead, this neorealist hypothesis fails on empirical grounds as the deepening of the integration process was explained through two factors: first, in the 1980s the EU

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19 Such argument was proven false through the deepening of European integration with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 establishing the EU and the common currency, the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 extending the voting through qualified majority and the strengthening of supranational institutions, the Saint-Malo summit in 1998 launching the European Security and Defense Policy, the creation of the
wanted to compete with US and Japanese economies, and, second, in the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War, the EU was concerned with the unification of Germany and the US diminishing its military presence in Europe (Grieco, 1996). Member States were concerned with the rise of Germany as an economic hegemon. Grieco (1996) claims that France and Italy insisted on creating a European and a Monetary Union as a bandwagoning rather than balancing strategy with Germany. Collard-Wexler argues that in fact, “EU security cooperation was pursued as part of a deliberate ‘institutionalizing’ strategy to contain and enmesh Germany, a potential hegemon” (2006: 416). In fact, Walt argues that states align against what they perceive as threats rather than against economic and military power.20

Structural realism on the question of the ESDP is divided into three narratives (Rynning, 2011). First, the ESDP is a balancing tool to US power (Posen, 2004; Posen, 2006). Second, the ESDP has been developed in order to keep the US involved in the Euro-Atlantic affairs. Third, it has been implemented in order to balance and contain German power. In such a case, the US should be acting/behaving as an offshore balancer because military dominance cannot be projected across large body of water limiting the possibility of global hegemony (Mearsheimer, 2001 tragedy). The emergence of the ESDP can be explained by the changing nature of the balance of power and the way Member States seek to increase their relative gains bargaining at the European and international levels. Following such an argument would emphasize the anarchical nature of the international system and the centrality of States as independent and autonomous

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20 As argued by Katzenstein (1996), it is a major departure from realism because Walt’s emphasis on threat perception diverges from the systemic and material explanation. Ideational factors, such as ideology, become a part of Walt’s thesis.
actors. Many have argued against this position and shown the limits of the arguments (Ashley, 1986; Milner, 1993).  

Neorealist theory has underlined the centrality of material power and the resilience of the state. Neorealism has often expressed its dismissal of institutions such as the EU seen as epiphenomenal due to the distribution of material power of the international system. Waltz (1979) argued that the process of EU integration was possible thanks to the US as it guaranteed security on the European continent. At the beginning of the 1990s, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the shift towards a bipolar system, Mearsheimer predicted that EU Member States would increase their concerns over security and relative gains ultimately hurting the integration process. Historically, the 1990s was a period of deeper integration with a series of Treaties (Maastricht, Amsterdam), the creation of the EU, and so on. In reaction, Grieco (1996) argued that the integration process was caused by a bandwagoning behavior from France and other EU Member States with Germany. Such move has been described in order to control the power of the newly unified Germany soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

Even though France and other Member States tried to control the rise of Germany, the US has been providing the overall security of the European continent and ultimately protecting the development of the European project through the use of NATO. But why is it that the US has always carried a disproportionate share of NATO’s burden? (Layne, 2001: 5). This strategy has allowed free-riding within the community since the beginning of the Cold War until today. On the other side, Europeans have over time passed the buck, asking the US to carry a greater share of the costs and risks. Theorists like Layne have

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21 This is a core discussion of the neo-neo debate. This neoliberal approach will be studied in the following section.
argued recently that the new US internationalist strategy should be to leave Europe and strengthen the military autonomy of Europe. By doing so, ties between the US and the EU will be stronger than the ones maintained by NATO, and would limit the process of overstretching of US power. Some have argued that balancing the US is too difficult and costly, which explains the behavior of EU Member States to instead either bandwagon through NATO, or balance through the EU (Posen, 2006: 158).

2. Balance of Power versus Balance of Threat

Neorealists argue that a bipolar system is more stable than a multipolar one. Under multipolarity, the risk of competition between states can ultimately lead to war (Waltz, 1964; Waltz, 1979; Mearsheimer, 1990). In a bipolar system, balancing tends to be more effective in maintaining the status quo, whereas under multipolarity, states will “pass the buck” to their allies (Van Evera, 1990/91: 37). The bipolarity of the Cold War created a non-anarchical subsystem, where Member States could focus on absolute rather than relative gains (Posen, 2006). In a unipolar system the US military supremacy has created incentives for European powers to cooperate, in order to increase EU power. States usually join forces in order either to balance against threats they face or to bandwagon through alliance with a greater power (Walt, 1997: 158). Thus, the neorealist argument claims that alliances are only short-term and will dissolve soon after the victory. This was the argument around NATO’s future in the 1990s (Walt, 1997: 158; Mearsheimer, 1994/95; Walt, 1987). However, neorealists claim that alliances dissolve due to a “change in the identity or nature of the threat that produced the original association” (Walt, 1997: 163). Such argument has been proven wrong by the fostering of EU integration as well as
the survival of NATO since the end of the Cold War. On the issue of transatlantic relations, neorealism argues that discord between EU Member States and the US is explained by disparities of power. At the end of the Cold War the interests and strategies of the transatlantic partners have drifted from one another due to uneven distribution of power (Kagan, 2003; Jervis, 2009; Fernández-Sola & Smith, 2009; Kauffman & Dorman, 2011).

Wivel claimed that the EU security behavior is more towards bandwagoning rather than balancing the US for three reasons: first, costs of balancing in a unipolar system will be too high financially and politically; second, the power gap between the US and EU is too wide; third, EU Member States are dependent on US power (2008: 295-96). Others argue that the EU has decided to be involved in the security business in order to balance US power not because it represents a threat to its survival but rather because of strategic disagreements (Posen, 2006: 150-51).

A second trend of neorealism developed the argument of balance of threat as opposed of balance of power, in order to explain that states’ behavior is a response to the perceptions of threats (Walt, 1987; Jervis, 2009). The balance of threat argument emphasizes that alliances between states are possible. Based on the balance of threat argument (Walt, 1987), three factors illustrate a change of EU behavior in security and defense policies: first, the development of European institutions such as the ESDP, CFSP and the High representative; second, the drafting and adoption of the 2003 European Security Strategy and then 2008 Implementation of the ESS (Wivel, 2008: 299-301); and last, the increase of cooperation in European defense production (Jones, 2006; Larrabee and Jones, 2005/06).
3. Hypotheses

The neorealist argument suggests three possible outcomes for the future of the EU as a more integrated security actor. First, the EU will seek to bandwagon with the US causing a status quo on its integration process. It is cost-free for the EU and it has functioned since the end of World War II. Second, due to emerging new threats and the uncertainty of the American military commitment to Europe, the EU will seek to balance against the US leading to deeper security integration. Third, security cooperation is a tool to balance against Germany at a sub-regional level in order to monitor Germany growth.

To understand whether EU policies will pursue strategies of free-riding or balancing, systemic analysis is not sufficient. One needs to look at inter-domestic decisions made by EU Member States. This requires moving to a second level of analysis, which is inside the EU.

II. Cooperation and Institutions: Fostering Integration in High Politics?

The neorealist explanation of the continuity of the European integration process has been that “these alliances [Cold War alliance of democratic powers] clearly remained intact because the member-states believed that abandoning such arrangements would leave them worse off” (Walt, 1997: 171).

The historical and theoretical roots of neoliberalism are grounded in three previous theoretical paradigms: functionalist integration theory in the 40s and 50s (Mitrany, 1966; Haas, 1964); neofunctionalist regional integration theory in the 50s and 60s (Haas, 1958; Nye, 1968; Lindberg and Stuart, 1971); and interdependence theory in
the 70s (Cooper, 1972; Keohane and Nye, 1977). These bodies of literature have been central in order to explain the integration process of the European experiment since the creation of the ECSC. In the case of this study, neoliberalism offers more adequate set of hypotheses in order to explain cooperation and integration between EU Member States.

Neoliberals draw on neorealism as they understand anarchy as a major shaping force affecting states’ preferences and actions. However, neoliberals claim that institutions, as independent forces, can facilitate cooperation between states (Keohane, 1984; Keohane and Nye, 1977; Milner, 1983). As argued by Keohane, institutions are designed and established by a hegemonic power; however, institutions will endure even after hegemony (Keohane, 1984), as illustrated by the cases of NATO and the EU. Even though neoliberals agree with neorealists on several points such as the rational behavior of states and the effects of anarchy on states’ behaviors, they also claim that international institutions can alleviate anarchy and strengthen cooperation (Grieco, 1988). In the 1980s the literature started to connect the study of international regimes/organizations with the concept of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane, 1984; Lipson, 1984; Krasner, 1983). In the 1990s, the main research question of neoliberalism concerned the impact of institutions on state behaviors (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 742). “Institutions can affect prevailing ideas and norms” (Wallander et al., 1999: 10). For

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22 Finn Laursen 2008’s article reviewed in depth the regional integration theory and his one of the references in the genre.

23 The neoliberal argument underlines that regimes, defined as “sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner, 1983), promote cooperation. In the case of the EU, an institution is defined as a formalized regime embodied explicit and rigorous rules and decision-making procedures (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 130).
example Jean Monnet understood the role of institutions as central pillar for the European construction as “nothing is lasting without institutions” (in Laursen, 2010: 155).  

Neoliberals claim that institutions are both the results of states’ choices and the consequences of them (Martin and Simmons, 1998: 473). Institutions promote cooperation for the reasons that they establish rules and procedures, to increase the level of information, increase the cost of defection, reduce transaction costs, and promote interstate socialization – the sharing of norms and values (Keohane, 1984). Institutions play an important role in security relations, as they help states to overcome the problem of uncertainty linked to the lack of information (Wallander et al., 1999: 3). One way to invest in gaining information is to create institutions. Ultimately, institutions can alter the weight of the security dilemma (Jervis, 1978). The argument is that collective security is central in promoting cooperation rather than balancing behavior. The case of NATO illustrates this argument.

However, even though neoliberals acknowledge anarchy as defining the structure of the international system, they argue that “cooperation under anarchy” is possible (Keohane, 1984; Keohane & Nye, 1977). Arrangements – treaties, institutions – solve coordination problems and make cooperation easier, thereby leading to “complex interdependences” between nation-states (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Furthermore, institutions restrain states from cheating, while benefiting them with absolute gains (Keohane, 1994; Krasner, 1983; Martin and Simmons, 1998). This institutionalist approach is relevant to explain the degree of cooperation and compliance between EU

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24 This quote is taken from Swiss philosopher Frédéric Amiel who wrote that “Rien ne se crée sans les hommes, rien ne dure sans les institutions.”

25 As argued by Keohane (1984), international institutions provide a platform for states in order to overcome problems of collective actions, transaction costs, and information deficits.
Member States in the field of security and defense policy.\textsuperscript{26} In theory institutions are generating path-dependent effects that deepen the degree of cooperation among their members. In the case of the EU, the creation of security institutions early in the integration process has strengthened the degree of cooperation and interdependence. Ultimately, institutions are used in order to overcome problems of cooperation and collaboration (Keohane & Axelrod, 1985; Oye, 1985; Martin & Simmons, 1998). In order to strengthen cooperation, institutions are designed in such way that they will provide a forum for interaction, increasing the sharing of information, reduce transaction costs, and ultimately reduce uncertainty (Keohane & Axelrod, 1985; Milner, 1997; Koremenos, Lipson & Snidal, 2001). The neoliberal argument insists on the fact that institutions independently impact states’ behaviors and shape their preferences and interests.\textsuperscript{27} Also, the “form” and “design” of institutions are central in the neoliberal literature (Lipson, 1991; Martin, 1992).\textsuperscript{28} These variables are relevant in the study of the EU and explaining the deepening process of EU integration. The current institutions and agencies designed by EU Member States, which are responsible for security and foreign policy, remain under an intergovernmental decision-making process and have a set of rules for protecting the sovereignty of each member. For this reason, some EU institutions have had limited impact on the convergence of interests of EU Member States in developing a unified CFSP.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{26} For further analysis on cooperation and compliance see: Martin, 1992; Garrett, 1992; Ruggie, 1992.

\textsuperscript{27} The realists on the other side maintained the fact that institutions are still dependent on the nation-states. Jones argues that “cooperation is thus a function of relative power” (2007: 47).

\textsuperscript{28} As developed by Koremenos et al. (2001) five factors are fundamental in the design of institutions in order to make them an effective or powerless: membership, issue scope, centralization of tasks, rules for controlling the institution, and institutional flexibility.

\textsuperscript{29} However, this statement does not imply that supranational institutions, such as the European Commission, produce convergence of interests among EU Member States.
However, on the issue of cooperation, neoliberal institutionalist theory has focused on the question of cooperative arrangements between mutual dependence and defection. The problem raised is that common interests and collective gains may not be sufficient, in order to maintain cooperation (Martin, 1992; Snidal, 1985; Krasner, 1983; Martin and Simmons, 1998). In the case of the EU, the argument has been that European nation-states have created European institutions in order to maintain the peace, perceived as a collective good. “European states have created a European security institution to increase the prospects for mutual gain” (Jones, 2007: 46).

The notion of collective security encompasses the idea of all against one. It also incorporates two dimensions: first, providing more robust deterrence to any aggressors; second, the institutionalization of collective security provides a setting for cooperation rather than competition (Kupchan and Kupchan, 1991: 118). Kupchan and Kupchan claimed that collective security ultimately provides a more stable environment for three reasons: first, better deterrence towards aggressors; second, institutionalization of cooperation; third, reduce probably of cheating (1991: 125). Institutions may affect states’ strategies to make them calculate the costs and benefits of joining it. The EU offers economic and political stability, while NATO provides collective defense.

Another dimension of neoliberalism consists in studying how institutions adapt and change to their environment: adaptation for institutions is important in order to survive. In the case of the EU, the Treaties of Maastricht, Amsterdam, and Lisbon were important in order to adjust the role and functioning of the EU in a post-Cold War era. In the case of NATO, its institutional design has not evolved, but NATO has become pro-

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30 The pay-off for defection may be higher than cooperation, and states will not achieve a high degree of cooperation due to the concerns of “free-rider” dilemma.
active and survived by launching and leading series of military operations. In the case of the ESDP, its role has evolved from its design in 1998 to what it is today. As first conceived, the ESDP was seen as the foundation of a European army; it has since become an instrument for civilian and military operations.

Institutions persist even after the disappearance of the threat because they are costly to create, but less costly to maintain (Keohane, 1984; Wallander, 2000: 705). However, Wallander has claimed that institutions will persist only if they serve the interests of their members even though the cost-benefit relationship may be altered. US power cannot be the main explanation for the maintenance of institutions in the post-Cold War era as the EU has continued to deepen and widen without US power (Wallander, 2000: 707). Institutions establish new relationships and commitments among their members, which ultimately increase the cost of change (Wallander, 2000). As argued by Jones (2007) and Ikenberry (2002), EU Member States should not fear US power as it has been institutionalized by NATO.

As described below, cooperation is possible and will lead to interdependence on economic and normative issues or what is defined as low politics. However, the real challenge to neoliberalism is the question of cooperation in the field of security and defense, or high politics. Can the European institutions lead to a spillover effect deepening integration in the field of security and defense? Two hypotheses emerge from the institutionalist literature. First, economic and normative cooperation will not lead to unified cooperation in the security field because of intergovernmental institutional design. Second, supranational supervision of the sector of EU defense and security will not
emerge considering the centrality of the Member States and the nature of the sector, high politics.

III. Interactions between Domestic and International Politics

As underlined by Bono, “one criticism of [the neoliberal] hypothesis is that it assumes that international organizations are primary factors in the evolution of EU/NATO policies and so fails to explain satisfactorily the relationship between domestic factors and supranational ones” (Bono, 2002: 10). The balance of power is a central part of the neo-neo argument, and it fails to address the question of interest formation.

In order to understand state preferences one needs to look at domestic politics (Milner, 1997; Moravcsik, 1997). State preferences are shaped by agendas pushed by the preferences of individual, groups, and organizations at the domestic level (Keohane et al., 1999: 336). In the case of the EU, “policy-making in Europe is a result of complex web of domestic and European-level influences” (Wivel, 2008: 291). In such case, the state is not seen anymore as a rational actor, a black box, but instead as “a conglomerate of coalitions and interests, representing individuals and groups” (Doyle, 1997).

During the 1990s, the EU theoretical agenda focused on the development of a liberal intergovernmentalist theory of European integration (Moravcsik, 1993). Andrew Moravcsik (1998) has been able to model interstate bargaining and institutional compliance in order to explain the process of EU integration. One of the main variables

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31 The literature on EU integration has had a certain influence on Moravcsik’s work and beyond. A review of this literature is made here: Balassa, 1961; Chryssochou, 2001; Cowles, Caporaso, & Risse-Kappen, 2001; Diez & Wiener, 2004; Etzioni, 2001; Haas, 1958; Kelstrup & Williams, 2000; Nelsen & Stubb, 2003; Rosamond, 2002.

32 Finn Laursen argued that “Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism (Moravcsik, 1993 and 1998) has become an important reference point for most recent studies of integration, especially the big decisions he refers to as ‘grand bargains’” (2008: 6).
is that cooperation between EU Member States occurs in response to domestic pressures and social actors (Moravcsik, 1998). Moravcsik’s argument underlines that the EU integration processes result from rational choices made by leaders seeking to maximize their interests, which ultimately, in case of convergence of interests, leads towards deeper integration. The concepts of power and interests are central in explaining integration. Moravcsik argues that interests are shaped by the balance of power, but also preferences of domestic political actors (Bono, 2002: 7). The process of integration follows a three-steps model emphasizing the theory of national preferences, intergovernmental theory of bargaining, and theory of institutional choice. Ultimately, the institutions adopted through these intergovernmental bargains serve the interests of Member States, but do not “lead to the transfer of authority or loyalty from nation-states to a new centre” (Pollack, 2001: 226).

To explain EU security integration, the literature on the interaction between international politics and domestic politics offers an important perspective (Gourevitch, 1978; Putnam, 1988). The two-level game approach offers an analytical tool in order to understand the dynamics that policy makers and European leaders are facing from domestic and international pressures. In the case of European security cooperation, this

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33 As developed Moravcsik argues that Liberal Intergovernmentalism has three core assumptions: actors are rational; second, states are representative institutions of domestic coalitions and social actors; third, the configuration of preferences shapes states behavior.

34 The third step of theory of institutional choice did not figure in the first theoretical design of Moravcsik (1993). It was developed in his book The Choice for Europe (1998) in order to bring his model closer to rational choice institutionalism. As explained by Pollack (2001: 232) and Laursen (2008: 6-7), Moravcsik combined three middle-range theories into his rationalist model: theory of national preferences, intergovernmental theory of bargaining, and theory of institutional choice. The first step consists in identifying the formation of national preference. Heads of state and governments aggregate interests of domestic constituencies. The second step looks at the intergovernmental EU bargaining process. Governments bring their national preferences to the “bargaining table.” However, the role of supranational institutions (the Commission) is very limited and not relevant. The last step highlights the rational choice of institutional choice, meaning that EU Member-states seek for the pooling of power into supranational institutions in order to prove their commitment to the integration process.
approach offers a method explaining policy choices made by European leaders seeking equilibrium between international expectations and domestic preferences. The main argument is that “governments are assumed to act purposively in the international arena, but on the basis of goals that are defined domestically” (Rieker, 2004: 5). Walt’s 1997 influential article, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” underlined the centrality of domestic politics in the either the continuity or dismantlement of alliances. Domestic politics and debates shape the discourses and position of their respective states on the international arena.

Even though this dissertation utilizes an eclectic theoretical approach, Moravcsik’s framework offers some insights on the case of ESDP, as it can be explained as a product of bargaining powers from Member States shaped by their domestic agenda. The formation of national preferences is an important driver to foster integration. Liberal Intergovernmentalism argues that the pooling of capabilities in the field of defense and security would occur if the most powerful EU Member States decide so and it would ultimately serve their interests. In 1998, President Chirac of France and British Prime Minister Blair met in Saint-Malo, which led to the creation of the ESDP. The ESDP was then handled by Germany during its Presidency in 1999.

The role of domestic politics, especially in France and the UK, has been central in shaping and establishing the ESDP. The period of 2000-2001 had an important impact on EU-US relations.
1. Hypotheses

Emerging from this body of literature, two hypotheses can be identified. First, when the threat is greater, should one expect higher security cooperation and integration? Or, secondly, in such circumstances should one expect lower integration and limited cooperation due to domestic preference?

IV. Ideational and Cognitive Explanations to European Security Cooperation

Social Constructivism offers a very important contribution to the question of security integration in the European Union. Neorealism has had major difficulty explaining the interests of Member States after the Cold War to maintain and deepen the integration process. As expressed by Giegerich, “the responses to fundamental international change had to be defined and imagined” (Giegerich, 2006: 29). Rationalist theories argue that institutions are platforms for rational actors to adopt strategies along their preferences. Whereas, constructivists theorize institutions as composed of informal norms and intersubjective understandings, as well as formal rules (Pollack, 2001: 234). Ultimately, constructivist scholars have argued that institutions shape behaviors, identities and preferences of individuals and Member States within Europe (Risse, 1996; Jorgensen, 1997). Institutions are in fact a “materialization” of social interactions. By focusing on individuals, constructivism argues that their construction of their realities is based on

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35 As expressed by Checkel, constructivism goes beyond the research question raised by neorealism and neoliberal: “the conditions under which relative or absolute gains-seeking behavior occurs” (Checkel, 1998: 324). Instead, constructivism focuses on two assumptions: first, the environment in which agents/states take action is social as well as material; second, understanding agents/states’ interests (Checkel, 1998: 325). As simply defined by Adler “constructivism is the view that the manner in which the material world shapes and is shaped by human action and interaction depends on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material world” (Adler, 1997: 322). Constructivism is not a theory of international relations per se, however, it can greatly contribute to enhancing the understanding as it challenges the ontological and epistemological roots of neoliberalism and neorealism.
their observations and preferences. Institutions are also central as they facilitate the implementation of actions shaped by these preferences and beliefs (Katzenstein, 1996; March and Olsen, 1998; Finnemore, 1996). Social constructivism understands cooperation as a result of social interaction and collective identity formation rather than inter-state relations or bargaining power (Rieker, 2004: 6). However, this does not mean that states have no impact in shaping a collective identity. Political decisions are not only calculations of interest maximization but are also shaped by normative consideration (Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001: 692).

Constructivism opens the door to new explanatory factors by looking at the “interaction between ideas, discourses, preferences and interests across different levels of governance” (Meyer and Stickmann, 2011: 63). Institutions for constructivists are understood not only as formal rules but also informal. Norms and rules embedded within the institutions will ultimately shape the identities and preferences of agents (Pollack, 2005: 365). Constructivists have argued that EU institutions affect EU Member States’ preferences and identities (Jorgensen, 1997). And this goes the other way around. This is part of the agent-structure dilemma.

In a nutshell, social constructivism brings very powerful tools in order to study European integration and identify important factors: first, agency and structure are co-constitutive; second, change is key component as identities and interests are not fixed as they evolve from social interaction; last, ideational and material factors are both extremely important (Adler, 1997; Finnemore, 1996; Wendt, 1992; Wendt, 1999; Ruggie, 1998). Ultimately, constructivism does not take for granted the identities and interests of actors as they are constructed through social interactions and evolve over time. Thus, the
structure can change as it is shaped by ideational and material factors, as opposed to solely material variables as argued by rationalist theories (Ruggie, 1998; Wendt, 1999). Structure and agents shape one another.\(^{36}\)

1. Narratives on European Security

The research on ideas and discourses in European politics are central to offer an alternative, a different side of decision and policy-making (Schmidt and Radaelli, 2004; Vennesson, 2007; Howorth, 2004). It opens up the door to the study of the “first image,” which argues that international politics are a consequence of the perceptions, decisions and behaviors of agents.\(^{37}\)

Studying the CFSP and ESDP needs to be done by looking at the ideational and material changes since the mid-1990s. Since their creation, the ESDP and CFSP have seen major ideational turning points such as the UK acceptance of European defense autonomy, the formulation of European Security Strategies, and many strategic documents in the defense and security field (Meyer and Stickmann, 2011: 61). Concretely, the ESDP can “be understood as an institutional context within which actors’ identities and interests develop and change through interaction” (Giegerich, 2006: 35). Constructivism emphasizes two aspects: first, the domestic ideational variables of ESDP;

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\(^{36}\) The meta-theories have a much more fixed vision and interpretation of international relations and state relations. The anarchical structure of the international system is a given, whereas social constructivists see it as evolving, as defined by the different cultures of anarchy.

\(^{37}\) The concept of “first image” refers to Waltz’s explanation of the causes of war and international politics in his 1959 book, *Man, the State, and War*. He claims that there is three levels of analysis or image. The first one, international relations are a consequences of agents’ perceptions and decisions. The second image, international relations are shaped by domestic constrains. And the third image, international relations are mold on the anarchical structure of the international system. Waltz argues that only the third image offers the best explanation on the causes of war and international politics.
second, the identity-shaping effects of European integration on national agents (Checkel, 1999).

Constructivist research has proven that the existing divergences between EU Member States’ foreign policies and strategic cultures do not always limit the development of the CFSP and ESDP. The Saint-Malo declaration is a proof of such an argument.³⁸ Constructivism claims that “critical junctures,” crisis or political failure, lead to a challenge of existing norms (Hyde-Price & Jeffery, 2001: 693). However, change – often initiated by crisis/critical juncture – is also continued by “moral entrepreneurs” (Checkel, 1999).

Following the end of the Cold War, “new thinking and new ideas eventually played a vital role in the shift towards new policy preferences and even a new policy paradigm” (Howorth, 2004: 211). The shift of national security policies in France – Gaullism –, UK – Atlanticist –, and Germany – pacifist – have shaped the EU security strategy. The evolution of discourses and narratives of EU Member States can be seen in the publication of their respective defense white papers. Howorth discussed in his article on the evolution of discourses and narratives in France, Germany and the UK between political elites at the national and European levels in the late 90s leading the way to the establishment of the ESDP (2004). This coordinative discourse was central in generating consensus among the political elites. Constructivism has contributed by underlining the differences between each EU Member States in their traditions in foreign policy, defense strategy, and security cultures leading to deeper cooperation at the EU level (Meyer, 2006; Meyer and Stickmann, 2011).

³⁸ Even though, France and the UK had diverging vision of role of the ESDP, this did not affect its development as the ESDP became soon active.
Discourses are also a central variable in the constructivist literature. Discourses of European leaders have shaped the development of the CFSP and ESDP. Political elites of leading EU Member States, as argued by Howorth, through their discourses materializing their ideas have influenced new European narratives seeking deeper coordination (Howorth, 2004). Epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) have also played a central role in the development and drafting of a EU security strategy (Ortoleva, 2008: 13). Ortoleva claimed that the European epistemic communities have affected the transformation of EU’s international identity towards a 21st century great power status (2008: 19). HR Solana and his entourage have had considerable impact on the transformation of EU’s identity as a security actor. Kurowska’s work on the drafting of the ESS is very interesting as she underlines the role of the “Solana milieu” in the process (Kurowska, 2009: 529). She claimed that few high-level officials in the Council Secretariat were involved in the drafting. In fact, “the process validates the argument about the entrepreneurial role of the ‘Solana milieu,’ not only through managerial coordination, but also via conceptual engineering, agenda management and practical execution” (Kurowska, 2009: 529). She concludes, “the mere existence of the strategy has been recurrently presented as a success in itself and evidence of major accomplishments of the EU in the realm of security policy” (Kurowska, 2009: 529).

2. Agents of Change

With the different waves of enlargement, the role of ideas and the contribution of epistemic communities, all these factors have been important in overcoming national legacies and policies. Furthermore, “the Saint-Malo ‘breakthrough’ was largely the result
of ideational interactions between a handful of key officials in Paris and London, who, in
tussling with the problems of making the WEU work, eventually generated an alternative
idea – ESDP – which led to the shelving of WEU and the promotion of the EU as a new
locus for the delivery of European security” (Webber et al., 2004: 17)

Robert Cooper, a British diplomat, right hand of Mr. Solana and one of the writers
of the ESS, wrote that “in Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain the use of military power
has – for good historical reasons – low legitimacy. And for equally good historical
reasons, most European countries would prefer to live in a world of law than one of
power” (2003: 158-9). Jacques Chirac, the French President, argued in 2003 that “any
community with only one dominant power is always a dangerous one and provokes
reactions. That’s why I favor a multipolar world in which Europe obviously has its place”
(Ford, 2003).

The constructivist argument has claimed that the development of the CSDP
emphasized the socialization and identity-shaping effects of the European integration
project on national agents (Checkel, 1999). Agents, also identified as “entrepreneur for
change” (Hyde-Price & Jeffery, 2001), are theorized as having the potential to set new
agendas. In the case of Germany, Schroder, Kohl, and Fischer have been important
transitional and transformational agents in integrating Germany, emotionally, politically,
and cognitively, within the EU and the international community in out-of-area missions
(Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001). Berenskoetter and Giegerich asked the following
question: “what did Germany hope to gain through CFSP/ESDP that NATO did not
already offer?” (2010: 409). Their argument, embedded in social constructivism,
derlines that “states invest in international security institutions because they enable
states to gain (and sustain) ontological security by negotiating a shared sense of international order with friends” (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010: 410). The concept of ontological security means that states will try to bridge their domestic and international understanding of order, such as the use of force, with other states (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010: 450; Steele, 2005; Mitzen, 2006).

Constructivism has been used at several occasions in order to understand the change of politics within Germany especially when it comes to be involved militarily and its role within the EU (Zehfuss, 2001; Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001). “In terms of Germany’s role in Europe, it has become widely accepted that reflexive multilateralism before 1990 was socially constructed embedded in deeply rooted norms that colored German perceptions of rationality” (Hyde-Price and Jeffery, 2001: 691).

3. A Constructed European Security?
In the words of Adler, “understanding security must begin not just with a set of previously constructed and thus reified categories, but also, and primarily, with the recognition that policy-makers may have the ability to act upon the world with new knowledge and new understandings about how to organize security” (Adler, 1997: 345).

On the concept of security, social constructivism focuses on opening up its meaning. Security and threats are in fact a result of social constructs. As expressed by Katzenstein (1996) and later by Berenskoetter and Giegerich (2010) “security interests are defined by actors who respond to cultural factors.” The Copenhagen School demonstrated that an issue becomes a threat when it is recognized and presented as such by an actor, which is defined as securitization (Buzan et al., 1998). In the case of the EU,
radical Islamic terrorism and energy supplies have been securitized sectors and seen as threats to not only the security and stability of the state, but also of the Union.

The notion of “security communities” is important in order to understand the role of institutions in strengthening cooperation and peace between states (Adler, 1997: 345; Adler and Barnett, 1998). Constructivists explain that institutions should be seen as “sites of socialization and learning, which help promote mutual trust and foster regional culture around commonly held attributes” (Adler and Barnett, 1998). The European institutions, Parliament, Commission and the EU as such, are part of the process limiting the probability of war. Such an argument was raised by Karl Deutsch in his notion of a “security community” (Deutsch, 1957). Deutsch argued that a group of sovereign states sharing a sense of community could be sufficient in order to assure stability. Even Wæver explains that the EU is a security actor in the sense that it is the only way to limit the probability of war (Waever, 2000). This is possible in the case of the EU “through the creation of supranational structures and the pooling of sovereignty, the interests of its Member had become so intertwined as to represent a ‘Security Community’” (Marsh & Rees, 2011: 4).

On the issue of ESDP, d’Argensson argues that the future of the ESDP is directly linked to the question of European identity, shaped by a feeling of membership and common vision (Argensson, 2009). European identity is the common denominator in order to maintain and strengthen the evolution of the ESDP.

A central component of constructivism is the role of norms as agents of integration. For example, Risse-Kappen argues that alliances like NATO band together due to global norms rather than mutual threats (Risse-Kappen, 1996). Norms issued and
designed at the European level, which include European institutions, could shape a common culture among EU Member States. “States adapt to their environments, either by changing the security discourse and policies at the national level, or by trying to change and influence the security discourse and policies at the European level” (Rieker, 2004: 9).

Even though state sovereignty is central in the field of security and defense, constructivists have argued that EU institutions and organs, such as the High Representative, influence the decisions and discourses of EU Member States in this field.

4. Hypotheses

The constructivist literature permits to raise a certain number of hypotheses that will be tackled throughout the dissertation. First, have the changing perceptions of France, Britain, and Germany’s national security led to a more or less integrated security and defense policy? which factors were behind the evolution of national perceptions? Second, to what extent did individual agents, such as HR Solana, heads of state and government of the Big three, and other have affected the evolution of the nature of the EU as a security actor? Last, but not least, how important were the critical junctures – such as the different waves of terrorist attacks, energy crisis, and 9/11 – in pushing forward the integration process in the sector of defense and security?

This list of questions/hypotheses composes the broader IV – agents/perceptions – that is used in order to measure the degree of integration in the field of EU security and defense policy.
V. Visiting the Literature on European Security

After reviewing the four bodies of theoretical literature, the last section will specifically focus on the overall literature, more empirical, of European security. This literature is considerable and needs to be reviewed. At the end of this section, an overall reflection on the chapter will take place in order to underline and establish the theoretical and empirical foundations of the dissertation.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large discussion emerged on the future of European politics considering the questions of nationalism, ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe, the German question, the future of Russia, and the future of the US endeavor in European affairs (Van Evera, 1990/91). Two arguments have emerged on the US interests in European affairs. First, in order to maintain stability on the European continent, the US needs to maintain close cooperation with its European partners through soft power, but also military assistance. Others like Mearsheimer (1990) have argued that the US will withdraw from the European continent. This question of transatlantic cooperation is one of the many factors in order to explain the development of the CFSP and ESDP. Even before the launch of the CFSP and ESDP, European integration has always been closely intertwined with security in European and American minds.

In the context of this chapter, the literature on European security will be divided into two sections: first, that encompassing the issue of CFSP and ESDP, as the notion of the EU as a security actor; second, on the literature of strategic culture.

The question of the emergence of the ESDP has been a central part of the literature during the last ten years, wherein many variables have been identified and measured at the international and domestic levels (Howorth, 2007; Jones, 2007;
Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2010). These variables look at the decline of US power, the changing balance of power on the European chessboard, the decline of US interests in European affairs. On the domestic level, variables such as change of leadership in major European powers (France, UK, Germany), domestic debate and fear of marginalization in the UK, and lower military and defense budget stressing the need of budget sharing have been major research starting point (Bickerton, Irondelle and Menon, 2010).

1. The EU as a Security Actor

The literature on the convergence/divergence of EU security policy is divided into two schools. On one side, the argument advanced is that the EU is increasing its military and institutional capabilities, but also that this is accompanied by an increasing ideational convergence in EU security and defense policies (Howorth, 2002; Cornish and Edwards, 2001). On the other side, some argue that EU Member States still strongly disagree on the notion of common threats and the use of military force limiting its chances of success in time of crisis (Heiselberg, 2003; Rynning, 2003). In the classical literature of security studies, security policies are described as ensuring the protection of the territory, political autonomy from military and non-military threats and risks (Giegerich, 2006: 49). One main question connected to the concept of security is about “what and who can threaten the referent object?” (Giegerich, 2006: 51). The notions of threat versus risk have challenged the traditional study of security studies (Wallander and Keohane, 1999). In the case of European security, the European Union does not face pressing military threats that could lead to invasions of its territory. This justifies the ambiguous nature of the ESDP. However, “EU’s Member States have come to recognize that the changed military
agenda, the broadened nature of security and an ongoing global redistribution of power
demand that they take more coordinated action at the Union level” (Marsh & Rees, 2011: 16).

The current literature on the question of the development of ESDP divides it
along two paths: on the one side, national perceptions of the role of ESDP; on the other
side, the motivation of its design (Giegerich, 2006). On the issue of motivation of the
design, Howorth argues that the distinction should be made between the Europeanists on
one side and the Atlanticists on the other (Howorth, 2003). The UK, or Atlanticist, has
been developing the capabilities for the ESDP in order to deepen transatlantic
cooporation strengthen NATO, while France has been seeking to counterbalance NATO
and the US through the development of European military structures.

a. A Normative Power?
Since 1998, “moving away from using only civilian tools in overseas policy has been the
most dramatic cultural change for the Union as an international actor” (Deighton and
Mauer, 2006: 20). As an international actor, the EU has been theorized and described as
“normative,” “civilian,” and/or “ethical” power (Manners, 2002; Manners, 2006;
Duchene, 1972; Sjursen, 2006). Based on Duchene’s explanation, the notion of civilian
power implies that the EU as an international actor can shape the international arena
based on its characteristics: rule of law and democracy. Bull (1982) saw a contradiction
between the terms civilian and power. This notion of “civilian actor” identifies the
EC/EU as an actor with limited access to military means, which uses persuasion rather
than coercion (Nye 2005). The EU acts in a normative way for three reasons: first, its
historical heritage; second, its characteristics as a hybrid polity; and, third, its political-legal constitution (Manners, 2006). In addition, with the publication of the ESS by the European Council, a set of literature has been studying the meaning and development of a European security strategy on the construction and utilization of the ESDP (Biscop, 2004; Biscop & Andersson, 2008; Bronstone, 2000). The question of European defense has been central in recent years to the study of European integration. Bull has argued that defense is the key to the development of the Community’s place on the international arena (Bull, 1982). The EC, now the EU, needs power projection in order to assume its role and status. The power projection of the EU goes through the wide use of instruments, from traditional defense ones to trade and aid. However, in this mission to act as an international actor, the emergence of a “capacity-expectation gap” between EU’s ability to act, to agree, and the resources and instruments at its disposal has been a major limit to EU actorness and credibility (Hill, 1993). One of the challenges is the point wherein the Union is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations held to it.

2. A European Strategic Culture?
The literature on strategic culture emerged in the 1980s as a group of scholars incorporated the notion of “culture” into security studies (Snyder, 1977; Gray, 1999; Hones, 1990). Snyder defined in his 1977 piece strategic culture as the “sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behavior that members of the national strategic community have acquired though instruction or imitation and share with each other...” (Snyder, 1977: 8). This concept was primarily applied to a nation-state rather than an organization or a sui generis actor like the EU.
Giegerich’s understanding is the most encompassing as it reads that “strategic culture is best understood as an ideational milieu that limits choices of states in relation to the use of military force including the questions of when, under which circumstances, and in which context military force is to be used as a political tool” (Giegerich, 2006: 40). The ideational milieu should be understood as the historical experiences of any given society. But in the context of European security and defense policies, the development of a European strategic culture would be difficult due to incompatibilities of national strategic cultures.

Taking into consideration the main literature on strategic culture (Gray, 1999; Johnston, 1995; Johnston, 1999), Meyer defined strategic culture as “compromising the socially transmitted, identity-derived norms, ideas and patterns of behavior that are shared among the most influential actors and social groups within a given political community, which help to shape a ranked set of options for a community’s pursuit of security and defense goals” (Meyer, 2006: 20). Such a definition is a comprehensive tool as it can offer many dimension in order to discuss the emergence of a European strategic culture.

Thus, the analysis of the cultural context allows a better understanding of the shaping strategic interests, as culture is a powerful variable shaping “policy reflexes” (Krause and Latham, 1997). A big question remained unanswered: “are national strategic cultures becoming more similar over time, allowing [a common] strategic culture to emerge?” (Meyer, 2006: 15). With the increasing institutionalization of norms, ideas, values shared by EU member states, a constructed image of the Union as an international
actor promoting multilateralism and the rules of law has been increasingly perceived (Howorth, 2007).

Scholars looking at the question of national strategies and strategic cultures argue that cultural factors shape national security policies and preferences on using force (Meyer and Strickmann, 2011; Longhurst and Zaborowski, 2004; Miskimmon, 2004). These variables have also influenced the construction and development of the CFSP and ESDP. Thus, institutional socialization and learning experience through common European missions have helped in the shaping process of a European strategic culture.

Howorth and Biscop argued that ideas shaping a EU strategy should come first in order to identify the need for capabilities (Howorth, 2007; Biscop, 2009; Meyer and Strickmann, 2011).

Part of the security culture of the EU has been shaped by the role played by NATO in ensuring the security of Member States since 1949. Last, in studying the question of European security, one needs to look at the question of NATO and its relationship with the EU since the creation of the military institution in 1949 (Goldgeier, 2010; Howorth & Keeler, 2004). NATO is part of the problem and part of the solution of EU security integration. Throughout European integration, NATO has been the military umbrella under which the EU was able to grow. The “lesson of Kosovo” pushed the Euro-Atlantic to rethink the European defense cooperation not as a tool to undermine NATO, but rather to provide the EU the instrument to enforce security in its neighborhood (Van Ham, 2000: 218). Presently, with the development of the ESDP, a strategic dilemma between EU and NATO Member States has been limiting the development of EU military integration. As expressed by Layne in several publications,
the US can be an internationalist power with an independent European military force and a temporary NATO (Layne, 2001; Layne, 2006). Thus, from the end of the Clinton presidency to the end of Bush’s, a major disagreement with the Euro-Atlantic community emerged on the following question: how far should the Europeanization process of defense policy go?

The literature on the creation of the ESDP offers different alternatives such as the change of the British government in 1997 and the Kosovo war of 1999 (Van Ham, 2000). It is also underlined the “third option” argument (Cogan, 2001). Following the Helsinki Summit three options were theorized: first option, military operations will be conducted by NATO; second option, EU will command the crisis management operations, while using NATO capabilities; third option, the EU will run the mission independently of NATO.

3. Foundations for an Eclectic Approach

The research question of this dissertation seeks to explain under which circumstances the process of European security and defense integration do or not take place despite the considerable threats facing the EU Member States and the Union. In order to assess the degree of integration in the field of EU security and defense (DV), four IVs (IV1: International System; IV2: Institutionalization; IV3: Agents’ Perceptions; IV4: Political-Will) have been identified. Each IV represents one of the four bodies of literature studied in this chapter. Each body of literature illustrates one particular theoretical paradigm offering a specific set of hypotheses and reasoning. Bridging rational (neorealism, neoliberalism, and liberal intergovernmentalism) and cognitive (social constructivism)
theories together permits a deeper degree of understanding and explanation for an issue as complex as the integration of EU security and defense policies. Thus, by implementing an eclectic approach, this dissertation will prove that the combination of theories is necessary in order to enhance the explanation of this complex problem of security integration. Few research such as Wigla’s have been conducted utilizing a multi-causal and multi-level analytical model (2008). This complex and multi-theoretical chapter seeks to establish the theoretical and conceptual foundations behind each variable. The primary purpose of this dissertation does not seek to test one theory over another, but rather to use each theory in order to understand at which level and which factors have the greater explanatory power in order to explicate integration or not of EU security and defense policy.

Furthermore, the identification of four IVs, each based on a theoretical paradigm, allows a more reliable study of three case studies as they each look at one unique level of analysis. This literature review is important as this dissertation looks at different levels of analysis – homeland, regional, and international – in order to assess at which one the deeper degree of integration will take place. Implementing an eclectic approach is vital in order to avoid any sorts of theoretical and empirical restrictions, as such kind of research – multi-level analysis and cross-security issues – is not conventional. The eclectic model will be implemented on the study of the three case studies further in the dissertation.

The following chapter will move away from the theoretical and conceptual debates, and will instead establish the historical, political, cultural, institutional roots and

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39 “The complexity may give raise to problems for uni-causal integration theories that are often used in studies of the CSFP or of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)” (Wilga, 2008).
construction of the CSFP and ESDP briefly prior and mainly during the Solana period – 1999 to 2009.
CHAPTER III: THE CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SECURITY

The third chapter of this dissertation focuses on establishing the historical, political, and military contexts of the large question of European security and is structured around three sections. The first one briefly looks at the historical evolution of the field of European security from 1954 to 1998. The second section covers the core period – which is the dissertation timeframe – of the construction and deployment of European security from 1998 to 2009. Last but not least, a special emphasis on the role of the first High Representative for the CFSP, Mr. Solana, has been brought on.

This chapter on the history of the construction of the field of European security is central for the overall analysis of the dissertation. The construction since the early 1950s until today has been possible through numerous external and internal dynamics. Such chapter not only explains the construction, but also identified a number of factors – institutions, international events, agents (Member States and individual actors) – shaping the development of European security. Last but not least, this chapter shows the complexity behind the construction of European security.

I. Historical Evolution of the Construction of European Security

1. 1954-1970: The Need for a Defense Community?

In the aftermath of World War two, Europe was completely destroyed at the architectural, demographic, emotional, financial, economic, political, and military levels. The United States emerged as the “big” winner with overwhelming military, economic, financial and political superiority. The European project emerged from the ashes of war and
destruction. The architects of the European vision were Jean Monnet, Robert Schuman, and Konrad Adenauer. Their approach was to unify the production of two commodities, coal and steel, under the supranational supervision of the “High Authority,” predecessor of the European Commission. The idea behind such a project was to develop a high degree of interdependence and interconnection between France and Germany in order to make war “unthinkable” and “materially impossible” (Schuman, 1950). This project led to the establishment of a common market of two products, coal and steel, among France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries (Aybet, 2011: 70). The birth of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was institutionally initiated in 1951 with the Treaty of Paris. The common market has grown to become until today the cornerstone and soul of the European Union. Since the establishment of the ECSC in 1951, the EU has been described as a “civilian power” due to its considerable amount of soft power materialized in different modalities of economic, diplomatic, ideological and cultural influences (Duchene, 1972; Orbie, 2003). Even though the EU represents a successful case of cooperation and integration, and has provided its Member States with both stability and peace, its security and defense policies have never been fully common and integrated. Historically, the driver behind the development of a common European defense program existed prior to the European experiment with the scheme of the Western Union in 1947.

a. The Early Need for a Common Defense: The European Defense Community

In the international and regional climax of the 1950s, the communist threat created a need to develop a European defense program, which would include the rearmament of German
forces. For that reason, Jean Monnet, at the time General Commissioner of the National Planning Board of France, decided to create a supranational European defense program. In the meantime, the US was pressuring European allies to start the rearmament of West Germany. The project was submitted to the French National Assembly in 1950. French Premier Minister, René Pleven, proposed to develop after the signature of the ECSC Treaty a “European army.” Such an army would include German troops and remain under a single military and political European authority. Under the Pleven plan in 1950, which was a proposition to create a supranational European Army as part of the European Defense Community (EDC), the European army would be composed of 100,000 soldiers under the command of a European Minister of Defense. The army would be financed by a common budget and placed under the supreme command of NATO. The Treaty establishing the European Defense Community was signed in 1952 and laid out several major differences: the European army would be composed of 40 national divisions of 13,000 soldiers under a same uniform. At the institutional level, three organs were identified: a Collegial Commissariat, a Council of Ministers, and a EDC Assembly in

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40 In his speech on October 24, 1950 before the French National Assembly, Pleven, at the time President of the French Council of Ministers, presented the core aspects of the European army:

“The solution to the problem of the German contribution must be uncompromising and sought without delay, looking both at the potential for immediate action and towards a future united Europe… As soon as the Plan has been signed, the French Government wants to see a solution to the question of Germany’s contribution to the creation of a European force that takes heed of the cruel lessons of the past and looks forward to the kind of future that so many Europeans from all countries hope to see in Europe.

It proposes the creation, for the purposes of common defence, of a European army tied to the political institutions of a united Europe. (Applause from many benches on the left, centre and right.)

This proposal is directly inspired by the recommendation adopted by the Assembly of the Council of Europe on 11 August 1950, calling for the immediate creation of a unified European army with a view to cooperating with American and Canadian forces in the defence of peace.

A European army cannot be created simply placing national military units side by side, since, in practice, this would merely mask a coalition of the old sort. Tasks that can be tackled only in common must be matched by common institutions. A united European army, made up of forces from the various European nations must, as far as possible, pool all of its human and material components under a single political and military European authority.”
charged of the creating a European political authority. The EDC reflected the desire to create a “united Europe.”

The French National Assembly ultimately rejected it in 1954 for several reasons. First, as expressed in his speech of 1950 before the National Assembly, Pleven declared that the EDC was too ambitious and could not overcome the major fears and concerns of that time: “The Government is fully aware of the technical and psychological difficulties that will have to be overcome in order to attain the goal that it is proposing to the European nations. But all the obstacles can be surmounted, provided that there is the will, imagination and faith to do so and provided that the American people, like the peoples of Europe, actively sympathize with and support this project” (Pleven, 1950). Second, a major division occurred between France political parties. On one side the Mouvement Républicain Populaire led by Robert Schuman pushed for the ratification of the EDC as it was seen as a cornerstone to European integration. On the other side, the Partie Communiste Français and the Rassemblement du peuple français led by General de Gaulle opposed the ratification. Their rationale was that the EDC would cause a major loss of national sovereignty. Third, many saw the rearmament of Germany as being inappropriate strategy considering the recent war. Fourth, France was involved in Indochina at that time and perceived the EDC would weaken the French army. Fifth, the domestic political climax was very unstable as proven by the governmental crises during the Fourth Republic. The government of Mendès France was also divided on the question.

The United States always saw the EDC as a piece of the European security’s puzzle. President Eisenhower in his speech of April 16, 1954 claimed that

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41 To learn about the internal discussion of the French Assembly as well as the regional climax around the question of the EDC, see Aybet, 2001: 76-82.
The European Defense Community will form an integral part of the Atlantic Community and, within this framework, will ensure intimate and durable cooperation between the United States forces and the forces of the European Defense Community on the Continent of Europe. I am convinced that the coming into force of the European Defense Community Treaty will provide a realistic basis for consolidating western defenses and will lead to an ever-developing community of nations in Europe (Eisenhower, 1954).

President Eisenhower understood the importance of the EDC in order to strengthen the stability on the European continent, while maintaining US troops in Europe and NATO.

The failure of the EDC caused a major step back to the integration process. In order to revive such project, a sectoral approach to integration was introduced focusing on the economic, energy, and trade sectors as a way to boost the reconstruction of Western economies. Less than three years after the EDC failed project, the Treaties of Rome (1957) established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The Treaty founding the EEC is the foundation of the European integration project as it laid the ground for the development of a common market on specific sectors. The common market has grown into becoming the heart and soul of the EU.

On political and strategic questions, French President, Charles de Gaulle, envisioned a strong France on the global stage. One of the strategies was to boost the integration process, while strengthening the relations with Germany, as proven by the Franco-German Treaty of Friendship of January 14, 1963 fortifying cooperation on security and diplomatic matters. However, de Gaulle always rejected the ideas of losing national sovereignty at the expense of a supranational institution. On a military standpoint, de Gaulle wanted to reform the Atlantic Alliance along French preferences, which did not happen. Ultimately, he announced in 1966 the withdrawal of France from
NATO military command, while maintaining French membership in NATO. Following a period of “empty chair” and the rejection of British’s membership to the EEC twice, the integration process was extremely limited. After the election of George Pompidou as French President, he called for a Heads of State and Government meeting in order to discuss the future of the Community. His programs could be resumed into three points: “completion, deepening, enlargement.”


a. From Tensions to Revival: European Political Cooperation

By the meeting in The Hague, “EU leaders called for Member States to cooperate on foreign policy in a procedure known as European Political Cooperation” (Dinan, 2005: 582). It was an attempt to “achieve better mutual understanding, harmonization of views, coordination of positions and a common approach to foreign policy” (Howorth & Keeler, 2003: 6). It is only with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Helsinki in 1970 and the signature of the “Helsinki Final Act” in August 1975, that the EC finally developed some sort of identity and allowed the European Political Cooperation (EPC) to become more operational. Furthermore, the Luxembourg Report of 1970, followed by the 1973 Copenhagen Report laid down the functioning of the EPC. Four levels of coordination were identified, in order to facilitate cooperation: first, meetings of the Heads of State and Government should provide the main policy guidelines (this became the European Council); second, meetings of foreign ministers dealing with regular foreign policy issues, while preparing summit meetings; third, meetings of the political committee preparing foreign ministers meetings; fourth, working
groups preparing reports and working as liaison between foreign ministries and Political Committee (Dinan, 2005: 582-583). In terms of decision-making, consensus was the informal rule, as there was no voting. However, the EPC structure proved to have a limited role in the coordination process. The international climax, known as the “Second Cold War,” the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and other crises, proved to be too much to handle for the EPC. These crises led to the drafting of reports in the 1980s in order to strengthen the EPC and broaden its policy agenda by including security and defense matters. For example, the 1981 London Report called for procedural reforms, while emphasizing the need to coordinate national foreign policies. Then, the Genscher-Colombo proposal tried to encompass EC external economic policies with the EPC. The EPC established the foundations for the CFSP introduced later in the Maastricht Treaty.

b. The 1986 Single European Act

In the mid-1980s during an intergovernmental conference, the EU Member States looked again into re-launching the EPC. The argument was to make the EC external economic policies more consistent with Member States’ foreign policies leading to further discussions during the Single European Act (SEA) negotiations, wherein the EPC saw a codification of its practices and procedures. As described by Dinan, the SEA stressed the necessity to seek a higher degree of consistency between the external policies of the EC and policies agreed in Political Cooperation, which will be ensured by the presidency and the Commission (Dinan, 2005: 585). Thus, the SEA introduced the notion of “European security.”
With an abrupt end of the Cold War, new security concerns challenged the stability of the region. Working in collaboration between the Council presidency, the Commission and the secretary, a joint EC-EPC was established in order to broaden the degree of cooperation between EC external economic relations and Member States’ foreign policies in assisting the transformation of Eastern and Central Europe.


a. The Treaty of Maastricht

The Treaty of Maastricht came at a time where the European Community needed to adjust its policies and institutions in accordance with domestic, regional and international transformations (Aybet, 2000; Aybet, 2001). The collapse of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 leading to the prospect of Germany reunification was haunting European politics, especially in France (Aybet, 2001: 169). Thus, many European politicians and experts thought that NATO would not outlive the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was pointed out that “several European leaders and most notably French president François Mitterrand assumed that the European Community would now aspire toward some form of autonomous security capacity” (Howorth & Keeler, 2003: 7). Later in 1991, the President of the Commission, Jacques Delors, delivered a speech calling for an autonomous European security (Delors, 1991). The first year of the 1990s was marked by major international events caused by the shift of regional and international balance of power: Serbia invasion of Slovenia and the beginning of the Gulf War (Aybet, 2000). Due to limited European actions, European partners and former US President, George H. Bush, discussed a new strategy for the Alliance. And the “1991 Gulf War had made it
abundantly clear to both Washington and the main European capitals that Europe was far from being in a position to move toward anything approaching security autonomy” (Howorth & Keeler, 2003: 7). Member States understood the need to reform the EPC in order to adjust European policies to regional and international priorities.

Back in April 1987, the Luxembourg Presidency introduced a draft treaty, which presented an institutional structure divided into pillars: first pillar, the European communities; second pillar focusing on the common foreign and security policy (CFSP); third pillar concerning cooperation in the domains of justice and home affairs (JHA). The draft was the base for the Treaty of Maastricht signed by the Heads of State and Government of the 12 Member States on February 7, 1992. However, even though major doubts were expressed in France and Germany, Denmark and the UK were the most hostile members towards the treaty. Denmark was skeptical of the new institutional innovations of the EU, a special statute within the Union allowing the country to opt out of areas such as currency, defense, and justice was implemented. The UK also sought an opt out on two policies: the single currency and social policies. Ultimately, the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) came into force on November 1st, 1993. On the contentious topic of security and defense, Mazzucelli claimed that “the Treaty on European Union was an attempt by some Member States to forge a security and defense policy that gave the Union some leeway vis-à-vis the dominance of the United States in NATO” (2008: 9)

The general institutional structure of the TEU is based on a three pillars structure. The first pillar, European Community, is part of the community structure, meaning under supranational decision-making. Pillars two and three are intergovernmental structures. The Council is the most powerful institution as its powers covered all three pillars. Even
though, the Commission monitored the activities of the Council, it only retains right to propose legislations in the affairs of the Community. The European Parliament has only consultative powers in the second and third pillar.

i. The Second Pillar: CFSP

Title V – Provisions on a common foreign and security policy – of the TEU concerns the CFSP.\(^{42}\) In the first article of the provisions, it is clearly stated that “the Union and its Member States shall define and implement a common foreign and security policy” (article J.1.1 of TEU). The TEU provisions contained a series of policy’s objectives:

- to safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union;
- to strengthen the security of the Union and its Member States in all ways;
- to preserve peace and strengthen international security, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the objectives of the Paris Charter;
- to promote international cooperation;
- to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms (Article J.1(2) of TEU).

It is also written that Member States should follow the principles of “mutual solidarity” (Art.J.1.4 of TEU).

Legally, the Council is the one in charge of developing a common position and joint action. In term of voting procedures, due to the division between Member States on either qualified majority voting or unanimity, the TEU implemented a compromise. For the implementation of a joint action, the decisions within the Council have to be taken by a qualified majority, while the adoption remains on the basis of unanimity. Institutionally, the Treaty defined the role of European institutions. The principle of six-months rotating

\(^{42}\) Article J to J.11 focus on the characteristics of the CFSP.
presidency within the Council held by Member States is important, in order to represent the Union in the CFSP but also in implementing joint actions. It is a part of the “troika system.” As part of developing common policies in CFSP, a Political Committee composed of Political Directors is in charge of monitoring international evolution, while contributing to the development of policies and their implementation. The European Commission is defined as fully associated with the CFSP, while submitting proposals to the Council (Art. J.5(3) and J.9 of TEU). However, the European Parliament is the institution with the least role in the CFSP as its role is purely consultative. The Parliament has no power in the process of decision-making in CFSP (Art. J.7 of TEU).

Ultimately, the goal would be to develop a common defense. Article 4 lays the ground for the development of a common defense as it states that “the common foreign and security policy shall include all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy” (Art. J.4(1) of TEU).

However, the major limit of the TEU was that because the CFSP remains under intergovernmental decision-making processes, the Court of Justice was removed from any role of supervision limiting its capacities to enforce compliance among Member States.

b. Limits of Integration: The Yugoslavia War

Institutionally, the implementation of the CFSP was a challenge during the 1990s between the Secretariat of the Council, the Presidency, and Member States. Dinan argued that the “problem with the CFSP unit was not administrative but cultural” (2005: 589). Each actor had specific strategies, outlooks and interests. The war in Yugoslavia
illustrated the limited impact of the EU as an international contributor to security.\textsuperscript{43} The establishment of the Contact Group in 1994 that included France, Britain, Germany, Russia and the US, in order to deal with the Yugoslav war was a clear illustration. It was only in 1995, following NATO actions and bombardment, that the war came to an end marked by the signing of the Dayton Agreement. The war underlined two factors: first, the predominance of US power; second, the failure of the EU to end the war and act autonomously. The Yugoslav war exposed several elements: first, the existence of deep foreign policy differences within the Union affecting EU actions; second, the fact that foreign and security policies are nationally driven rather than communitarian; third, the existence of a gap between expectations and actions in the field of defense. For example, in July 1991, the Luxembourg foreign minister declared that “this is the hour of Europe, not the hour of Americans;” fourth, the war exposed the limit of European integration, while accentuating the challenge to coordinate national priorities in the field of defense and security.

c. The Treaty of Amsterdam

Resulting from the Turin European Council of March 1996, the Treaty of Amsterdam was adopted at the Amsterdam European Council on June 16 and 17, 1997. The treaty entered into force on May 1\textsuperscript{st}, 1999. From a legal standpoint, the Treaty amended certain provisions of the TEU by transferring to the Communities some areas of the field of JHA, reforming some aspects of the CFSP and extending the qualified majority voting (QMV).

\textsuperscript{43} When the war in Yugoslavia began, the EU had no instruments at that time to react as the Treaty of Maastricht came into force only in November 1993. By November 1993, it was already too late to stop the war.
The main themes in the field of security and defense concerned the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice, and the strengthening of the CFSP. EU failure to act during the war in Yugoslavia was on the mind of everybody. However, national governments agreed with the necessity to look at several points, such as the process of decision-making in CFSP. Since Member States did not want to rule out the principle of unanimity in all the areas of CFSP, the formula of “constructive abstention” was introduced allowing Member States to abstain on certain decision without disrupting the process. Furthermore, in order answer the problem of external representation, the Council created the position of High Representative (HR) allowing a better cohesion and transfer of power between each rotating presidency. This was the establishment of a troika, the Commission, the Council and the HR, in dealing with non EU Member States. Then, the issues of planning and budget were tackled. The establishment of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit in the Council Secretariat was an important step in strengthening the EU as an international actor increasing the degree of cooperation and information sharing between Member States and EU institutions. Additionally, the Amsterdam Treaty changed the budget procedure of CFSP operations, as they will be charged to the EU budget under the scrutiny of the European Parliament (Dinan, 2005: 594-595).

The Treaty of Amsterdam was a stepping-stone in the deepening process of EU foreign and security policy for the new century. Thus, all of the Petersberg tasks have been introduced within the structures of the EU. The Petersberg tasks underline the role of the Member States in safeguarding security in humanitarian and rescue operations.

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44 A special analysis and emphasis on the role of the HR has been made on this chapter. See section III.
peacekeeping operations, combat forces in crisis management like peacemaking, and peace enforcement.

II. Construction of the European Union Security Policies since 1998

International and regional crises throughout the 1990s, the emergence of new security threats in the post-Cold War era, and the deepening and widening of the EU created momentum for the EU to fill a void in the multipolar world, while contributing to security. One of the strategies to contribute to regional and international security was made through the creation of the ESDP. Three reasons can be identified in order to explain the decision made by the EU to create the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP): first, the end of the Cold War leading to a change of regional and international balance of power; second, internal dynamics of the European project known as widening and deepening. Last, external and internal crises, such as Kosovo, have had a major impact on the evolution and transformation of the EU in the field of security and defense policies, while influencing the relations between the EU and NATO.

This section first looks in depth at the institutional evolution of the EU security policies. Secondly, this part will also put into perspective the evolutions of the ESDP by demonstrating the “real” contributions of the EU to promoting and enforcing security.

1. Institutional Evolutions

The institutional and political background of the construction and implementation of the EU as a security actor can be divided into three periods: 1999-2003, when the institutional foundations were established; 2003-2007, or the period of turmoil; and 2007-
2009, when the EU embarked on a new direction. These historical compartments can also be applied to the EU-NATO relations (Foucault, Irondelle, 2011a). EU security and defense policy integration and developments are closely intertwined with the changing relations between the EU and NATO. Most of the literature on EU-NATO relations tries to answer one question: whether the two friends or foes? (Cornish, 2006; Howorth & Keeler, 2001; Hunter, 2002; Keohane, 2009). The European Security and Defense Identity’s (ESDI) purpose was to increase the degree of cooperation and coherence for the EU in NATO mission and activities. The development of the ESDP is closely done with NATO as many EU Member States are also NATO members.

a. 1999-2003: Construction of the EU as a Security Actor

Over five decades, several aborted attempts of common European military programs have led to the establishment of the CFSP by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, establishing the foundation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) created by a bilateral summit between France and the United Kingdom at Saint-Malo in 1998. However the roots of the ESDP could be found in the ESDI inside NATO launched in 1994. The ESDI was very limited, as it was only about identity rather than policy or capacity, even though it was created in order to allow the Europeans to assume more responsibility in military operations (Howorth & Keeler, 2003: 8).

The need for the creation of the ESDP and the deepening in the design of the EU as a more coherent and robust international actor illustrate the lessons learned by EU Member States during the 1990s. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Western European states were trying to find a strategy to deal with newly independent states of
Eastern Europe, while adjusting to the new regional balance of power. The 1990s were also marked by major military interventions and crises leading to strategic reflections by EU Member States. With the crises in the Balkans (1992-1995; 1998), Iraq, and Somalia, several factors were identified by major EU Member States. First, due to limited European military capabilities and political will from European leaders, the dependence on US military power was obvious. Second, foreign policy agendas between the US and European partners have been diverging limiting the degree of cohesion. Third, the lack of military projection by European partners proved to be a strategic disadvantage in maintaining stability at the regional level and credibility of their diplomatic efforts to solve crisis, especially in their “backyard.”

Two factors contributed to the establishment of the ESDP. First, the inability of the Europeans to send 40 to 50,000 troops to Kosovo, when EU Member States combined had 1.5 million individuals in uniform. Without US intervention through NATO, EU Member States would have not been in position to control the crisis in their own backyard. The second aspect was the willingness of London to build a military capacity within the Union (Biscop, 2005: 8). As emphasized by Howorth and Keeler, “the current ESDP project deserves to be taken seriously despite the failure of many previous initiatives” (2003: 6). The ESDP initial purpose was to put forward “capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military forces” (Joint Declaration, 1998). In its original design, ESDP was developed in order to provide Europeans military and civilian tools allowing them to manage Kosovo-like crisis. But, this security scheme has led to divergence of opinions on both sides of the Atlantic on issues like the role of NATO, European military autonomy and the sharing of regional and global security burdens.
In the aftermath of the St. Malo declaration, the Union was divided into two clans surrounding the transformation of the EU as a world player. On one side, a group believed in “the virtue of the civilian power dimensions of the EU as the starting point for a new, normative and pacific form of international relations” (Deighton & Mauer, 2006: 26). The Atlanticists did not want to undermine NATO, as did the nationalists, who wanted to protect national autonomy in the sector of security. The other group saw a shift/spill-over of integration in the sector of security and foreign policy and believed that the EU could balance against the US in the post-CW world (Deighton & Mauer, 2006).

The European Council of Cologne of 1999 is an important stepping-stone to the deepening of EU security and defense policies. Under Germany presidency, the Council expressed its commitment in framing a common defense policy, wherein the 15 EU Member States officially launched the “common European policy on Security and Defense,” which became known as the ESDP and also appointed Javier Solana at the new post of Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (European Council, 1999; Vaz Antunes, 2005). The Council of Cologne outlined the institutional framework of the ESDP, implemented in 2000, including: the HR (Javier Solana); a Political and Security Committee (PSC or COPS in French) composed of senior officials from each EU Member States monitoring crisis around the globe; a European Military Committee (EUMC) composed of EU Member States high military figures; and a European Military Staff (EUMS) working under the direction of the EUMC. This institutional design, modeled on NATO structures, is also a reflection of the decision by Member States to conduct conflict prevention and crisis management operations defined by the “Petersberg Tasks.” The Cologne European
Council “placed crisis management at the core of the process of strengthening the CFSP” (Hauser, 2006: 43). EU operations could be launched without the assistance of NATO.

Bearing in mind the failure of the EU to act militarily and diplomatically in Kosovo in 1999, wherein the US had total leadership in each phase of the war, EU leaders reached an agreement on management and tasks of a European military structure. The two-day Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 launched formally the ESDP and designed the “Headline Goal” allowing the EU to contribute to humanitarian, crisis management and peace enforcement missions. The goal of the Helsinki meeting was to create a common European security and defense policies and develop the “Union’s military and non-military crisis management capabilities as part of a strengthened common European policy on security and defense” (European Council Helsinki, 2001). However, since the EU did not have its own army, or even a common defense budget, the political decisions remain in the hands of Member States whether to contribute or not to any ESDP mission. State sovereignty is at the heart of EU defense policies. The “Headline Goal” was adopted and projected that by 2003 the EU will be able to coordinate and deploy a force of 60,000 troops (the so-called European Rapid Reaction Force – ERRF), together with air and maritime forces (100 ships and 400 aircraft), plus command and control, strategic transports and additional services with only a 60 day notice and maintain this force for at least a year. Such a goal was extremely ambitious – and still remain to be implemented and functional yet – politically and militarily speaking, requiring a high degree of cooperation between each EU Member State. In addition, this force would be able to carry on several kinds of missions: non-
combat peacekeeping, humanitarian and rescue missions, crisis-management operations, and peacemaking.

Furthermore, the Helsinki Summit also called for the EU to develop two types of missions: one, EU operations without the use of NATO assets and capabilities; second, EU-led operations with NATO assets and capabilities. The latter was a way for the Europeans to ensure the continuity of the ESDI. Due to the major shortfalls in European defense capabilities highlighted by the Kosovo crisis, the degree of cooperation between the Union and the Alliance was increased. The Council of Cologne and Helsinki strengthened the relations, leading to the development of the ERRF. Several years later, at NATO’s Prague Summit in 2002, NATO developed the NATO Response Force (NRF), a small force of 25,000 troops deployable in 5 days for missions up to 30 days, which would be fully deployable by 2006 (Cornish, 2006: 13). The NRF was complementary to the ERRF. In Helsinki (1999) the EU leaders underlined the fact that the EU rapid reaction capability was not developed to offer a collective defense, or become a European army, but instead would contribute to crisis management operations defined by the “Petersberg tasks.” The aim of the Goals was to be able by 2004 to manage two simultaneous conflicts: one “hard” mission (military), and one “light” operation (civilian characteristics) (Bickerton et al, 2011: 5). Some authors (Bailes, 2005; Biscop, 2007) argue that the ESS found its roots in the Helsinki European Council because for the first time it created a political commitment from and by Member States to deliver a military response in times of crisis. As described in the “Food for Thought” paper developed by the Political Committee (POCO), the headline goals developed at Helsinki “includes insufficient detail for the purposes of military planning, raising questions such as where
EU-led task forces might be expected to operate, with whom, and how often” (Political Committee, 2000). The need for a consistent European security strategy was then obvious in order for the EU to act coherently as an international actor.\textsuperscript{45} The “Food for Thought” paper developed a six steps methodology to attain the goals of: step 1, outline the overall strategic context; step 2, key planning assumptions; step 3, selection of planning scenarios; step 4, identification of force capabilities in accordance with the previous scenarios; step 5, development of required capabilities; step 6, define the full range of requirements (Political Committee, 2000).

Right after the Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998, the American policy community was surprised to see an agreement between France and the UK on military and security policies. One of the first US reaction on ESDP came from former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, in her article published in the *Financial Times*, wherein she raised her concerns over the three D’s: decoupling, discriminating, and duplicating (Albright, 1998). Her argument was that the EU should not create a “new NATO.” Howorth and Keeler argued that the launch of the ESDP was not seen seriously by Washington because the Europeans had neither adequate military capabilities nor real plans to increase their military budget. But it was instead another institutional prototype empty of concrete desire to be involved in enforcing security (Howorth & Keller, 2003: 11). However, the ESDP was a concretization of US demand to the Europeans to share the burden of security especially at the regional level. Soon, the perception in the US shifted in early 2001 as proven by a joint statement between US President Bush and UK Prime Minister Blair, US President stressed US supports of ESDP as it intends “to make Europe a

\textsuperscript{45} Eight years later, the goals have still not be achieved and the EU is still far from accomplishing them. These goals should be seen as some sorts of timelines and guidelines in the construction of the EU in security and defense matters, rather than as deadlines.
stronger, more capable partner in deterring and managing crises affecting the security of the Transatlantic community” (White House, 2001). The ESDP was perceived as a way for the US to share the burden in contributing to security especially on the European chessboard.

The same year, 2001, the Nice European Council emphasized on the development of capabilities for EU external actions. Ultimately, the “Petersberg Tasks” were adapted by reevaluating budgets and capabilities, financing of the ESDP, and a common assessment of threats.

In May 2001, the EU-NATO had their first formal meeting. Prior to the signing of the “Berlin plus agreement” the Euro-Atlantic community had to identify how the EU use of NATO structures would function in practice. At first Turkey refused the agreement, but after further assurances made by the EU that EU military operations would not be used against a non-EU NATO member, Turkey accepted. Soon after Greece opposed the deal holding up the negotiation until the end of 2002, leading to the summit in Prague in November 2002 wherein EU access to NATO structures and military capabilities were agreed upon (Keohane, 2009a: 129). The obligations of members were clearly defined in the 2002 European Council and stating that the ESDP could be used against an ally and that NATO crisis management operations could not be undertaken against a EU Member States. The use of military assets either by the EU or NATO has been a central point raised by Greece and Turkey. Both states, including Cyprus in some issues, have had harming impact on the deepening process of NATO-EU relations due to nationalist domestic policies.
This first period of time did not concretely lead to the expected development of a “real” EU military force. Saint Malo and the following meetings were supposed to establish clear guidelines and deadlines, which were never met and are still trying to be fulfilled.

b. 2003-2007: The Period of Turmoil
In less than two years, the Euro-Atlantic community had shifted from being “all Americans,” as expressed by Le Monde after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, to a very divided community due to unilateral US aspirations materialized by its invasion of Iraq in 2003. The political, ideological, and strategic divisions led to a shift on the development of the ESDP vis-à-vis NATO. In the post-9/11 world, the EU has focused on the implementation of the institutions established and the applicability and utilization of the ESDP, while defining their cooperation with NATO. After institutional design, the priority was oriented towards the questions of capabilities development for civilian and/or military operations. As for the institutional design, the improvement and development of capabilities remain the responsibility of national governments and not the EU. Following the “Headline goals” many meetings in Brussels have taken place in order to define, revise and adjust the shortfalls and try to design programs in order to solve them. The main goal was to generate and coordinate capabilities in order to conduct crisis management operations and Europe own security (Giegerich, 2009: 25).

The first EU peacekeeping operation under the Berlin plus mechanism was launched in 2003 in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), so called Operation Concordia. The “Berlin plus” agreement was adopted on March 2003 and
came in four parts: “assured EU access to NATO planning capabilities;” “the presumption of availability to the EU of pre-identified NATO capabilities and common assets;” “identification of a range of European command options;” and “the further adaptation of NATO’s defense planning system to incorporate more comprehensively the availability of forces for EU-led operations” (in Cornish, 2006: 10). But this institutional and multilateral success was overshadowed by the transatlantic division around the question of the invasion of Iraq. In response, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg proposed to develop an independent operation planning staff. The US and the “coalition of the willing”\textsuperscript{46} saw it as a direct attempt to undermine NATO. The tensions increased after the deployment of an autonomous EU peacekeeping operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in June 2003 without disclosure to NATO. The US thought that NATO had the “right of first refusal” on any EU peacekeeping missions.

In the U.S., a growing sentiment felt that the European countries opposed to the war in Iraq were trying to strengthen the ESDP into a military alliance undermining the primacy and role of NATO. For example, in the drafting of the Constitutional Treaty of July 2003, a mutual assistance clause was included. Such a collective security clause was purposely targeting the primacy and uniqueness of NATO. This was later changed and stated that NATO remained the center-piece of collective security.

The other factor affecting the relations between the EU and NATO was the 2004 round of enlargement of both organizations. Nineteen countries were now members of both NATO and the EU, and the EU counted 25 Member States. As argued by Nicole

\textsuperscript{46} The term of coalition of the willing was first use in the 1990s. It was then used by President W. Bush in reference to states allied with the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Gnesotto, the year 2004 was “a very good year for the European Union’s role and resonance in the world” (2005: 7). 2004 was a year of political reconciliation and widening of the Union. It also marked the diversification of ESDP with the development of civilian crisis management. The ESDP was now a double-headed instrument: civilian and military. From 2004 to today, the main EU concern has focused more on the development of capabilities rather than institutional instrument. The only way to assess the potential military power of the EU is to look at capabilities within each Member States as military budgets, forces and so forth remain national matters.

The European Council of Brussels in June 17-18, 2004 was important for three reasons. First, the “Headline Goal 2010” was agreed on as the previous ones were not attained. Second, Member States reevaluated their objectives in consideration with the “existing shortfalls,” which led to the creation to the European Defense Agency (EDA) (European Council, 2004). The EDA’s mandate consists in overlooking the field of defense capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments. It also evaluates the military contributions pledged by EU Member States, while fostering cooperative European defense efforts. “As both ‘catalyst’ and ‘conscience,’ the EDA is intended to provide an element of ‘top-down’ guidance and to persuade governments to make meaningful commitments to the Headline Goal 2010” (Cornish, 2006: 18). Two years later in 2006, the EDA implemented a non-binding “Code of Conduct” in order to increase the transparency and competitiveness of the European defense market (Cornish, 2006: 18). The last aspect concerns the development of EU’s battlegroups (EUBG) as part of the Headline Goal 2010, which should be full speed by 2007. The EUBGs will be deployed either in “Petersberg tasks” missions (“humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking”) or missions tackling security threats identified in the 2003 ESS (Cornish, 2006: 14). Cooperation between the EU and NATO was done in order to limit duplication between NATO Response Force (NRF) and EUBG. As stated in the Annexes of the European Council’s conclusions, “these minimum force packages must be military effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battlegroups concept” (European Council, 2004). A concept of this sort underlines the necessity for the EU to implement rapid reaction calls of small arms battalions with rapid decision making, planning and deployment of the forces. In theory, these battlegroups should be active on the ground in less than 10 days prior EU decision to launch such operation. These EU Rapid Response forces also meant that the EU should maintain reserve forces at any time. “European countries, and Europe collectively, will have more influence as strategic actors if they have a rapid reaction capability and can be seen as ready to use it” (Giegerich, 2009: 31).

The Athena mechanism, instrument allowing to administer the costs for the financing of EU operations with military and defense implications, was also created in 2004 by the Council of the European Union (Council of the EU, 2004). Only civilian crisis management operations can be funded by the European Communities budget, as opposed to military missions falling under the financial responsibility of Member States (Grevi & Keohane, 2009: 76). HR Solana conceded that the “headline goals” would be difficult to meet, especially the 60-days deployment deadline as the forces would require “units configured, trained and equipped for rapid deployment. It is clear that to reach the goal, we must make certain improvements to our capabilities” (Solana, 2001b).
The French and the Dutch rejected the Constitutional Treaty through national referendum. This setback was a representation of domestic political disagreements with the ruling class interfering with European politics. At the European level, six new ESDP operations were launched as well as the creation of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). Even though Gendarmeries are police forces under military command, they are considered as part of the civil dimension of crisis management. The EGF has been a central component used by a select group of EU Member States in the reform of the police sector in Afghanistan. Thus, the EGF has grown as some sort of competitor to civilian ESDP mission.47

In order to deal with the scarcity of military capabilities for EU operations, the EDA launched a “Code of Conduct” in order to rationalize the European arms market. This was then followed by the publication of the “Long Term Vision” report in 2005. Such report led to several contributions: first, it implemented the “Code of Conduct;” second, finalize the EU Battlegroups; third, reinforced the civil capabilities of ESDP; and last, increase the coordination between civilian and military crisis management instruments.

c. 2007-2009: A New Direction?

The third period was marked by dramatic changes of the political landscape across the Atlantic with the elections of Chancellor Merkel (2005), President Sarkozy (2007), and Prime Minister Brown (2007) in Europe, and President Obama (2009) in the US. A rupture between the old political class and the new one was apparent (Keohane, 2009a:

47 Chapter VI on the EUPOL-A mission looks into more depth on the question of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF).
The French attitude towards the US and NATO led by President Sarkozy, a pro-Atlanticist as opposed to his predecessor Jacques Chirac, nicknamed “Sarkozy l’Américain” (Roy, 2007; Sciolino, 2007) dramatically changed. France re-joining NATO’s integrated military command in 2009 changed the perceptions on European motives behind the ESDP. With the end of the Bush administration and the beginning of Obama’s, US foreign policy was calling for an increasing burden-sharing in providing security, at least in the European neighborhood.

The year 2008 marked the 15th year of existence of the CFSP, the 10th anniversary of the Saint-Malo declaration, five years since the launched of the first ESDP mission, and the publication of the Report on the Implementation of the ESS. These anniversaries are extremely symbolic as they underlined the success, even though some are limited, of the EU in the field of international relations. The EDA also made considerable improvement regarding capabilities, with the consolidation of defense equipment market through the “defense package.”

Two major issues will continue to affect the deepening in EU-NATO cooperation: first, the ongoing political crisis between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus; second, the war in Afghanistan under NATO command since 2003 has been extremely divisive as Europeans are not willing to send more troops and Americans are pressuring them to contribute to the war effort. The case of EUPOL Afghanistan is a perfect example of the divergence of strategy and lack of commitments from Europeans.48

NATO is a relevant and important partner to EU crisis management operations either with civilian or military capabilities. Even after the post-2003 crisis, “the EU and

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48 Chapter VI looks in depth at the strategic divergences and differences between the EU and the ISAF led by NATO.
NATO share common interests in stabilizing Europe, by integrating Russia, the Ukraine, Central Asia and the Mediterranean countries in North Africa and in the Middle East into a Euro-Atlantic stabilization process exporting stability in these regions” (Hauser, 2006: 62). In the post-Cold War era and especially since the 9/11, NATO has become a source of legitimacy for the US in order to launch military operations as in Afghanistan, whereas Europeans see NATO as an instrument for projecting hard power (Goldgeier, 2010: 3). NATO’s attention shifted soon after 9/11 from providing security to Europe to areas outside, as in Afghanistan and Africa. The new strategic role of NATO in, so called “out-of-area” missions, has changed the dynamics in the transatlantic relationship but also between the EU and NATO. The new threats after the attacks on the US, like the terrorist attacks in Madrid in 2004, in London in 2005, then the cyberattacks on Estonia in 2007, energy cutoffs affecting Romania and Bulgaria, and the invasion of Georgia by Russia in 2008 have changed the principle of the Article V of the Treaty of Washington, but also the nature of NATO.

According to Goldgeier, a stable Europe is working to the advantage of the Alliance but also the US as they can focus on tackling new rising threats (2010: 5). Ultimately, as argued by former NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, “more Europe” does not mean “less NATO.” But instead a stronger Europe will ultimately strengthen the Alliance. On the other side, some have asked: will the development of ESDP mean that NATO would become irrelevant, especially if US and European strategic interests diverged? (Keohane, 2009a: 127; Howorth, 2007).
2. The Need for a European Security Strategy

a. The 2003 European Security Strategy

With the launch of the ESDP in St. Malo in 1998 a debate emerged within the EU concerning common security and defense policies as each Member State has a different perception of the role that the EU should play as a political and strategic actor on the international stage. Biscop summarized this debate by asking several questions: “What should be the scope of the EU’s foreign and security policy ambitions? What degree of autonomy should the EU have? And what then should be the precise role of the military instrument in EU external affairs?” (Biscop, 2005: 8). Such questions are central as they highlight the existing strategic void within the Union during the 1990s. On one side, the British saw the development of a stronger EU security actor as a way to enhance the power of NATO. On the other side, other EU Member States, more continental like France, saw the need of having an independent European actor counterbalancing NATO and the US. Furthermore, the absence of a common strategy was a problem in order to bridge the gaps between Member States’ expectations, to design a common vision of the EU as an international actor, and to unify external policies. Biscop goes further by arguing that “there was no common strategic vision behind the existing – but incomplete – consensus on the need to develop more effective military capabilities” (Biscop, 2005: 9). Last, during the 2002 State of the Union, President Bush presented his National Security Strategy calling for a new direction in American foreign policy based on unilateralism and the application of new strategic tools: preventive war. “Without having a clear strategy itself, the EU cannot escape the American framework of thought and
promote its own policy priorities in terms of both objectives and instruments” (Biscop, 2005: 9).

The year 2003 was axiomatic for the EU for two reasons. First, the road towards the drafting and adoption of the ESS went through the sensitive period of division between “old” and “new” Europe.49 The US attack on Iraq in March 2003 led to major divisions within the Union. On one side, the UK, Spain, Italy, and Poland, followed the US into Iraq, while on the other side, Belgium, France, and Germany denounced such military action. The strategic division led to a major transatlantic crisis. With a European strategy, divisions can be minimized, while strengthening the role of the EU through higher degree of coherence on the international stage. Second, on March 31, 2003 the EU deployed its first military mission, Operation Concordia. This peacekeeping mission in FYROM took over NATO forces in March and was mandated to keep peace between the Macedonia army and armed “rebels.” The first EU operation encountered unrest but was able to maintain order. Concordia was the first operation using the military instrument of the CFSP with HR Solana leading in the name of the EU (Gross, 2009a: 174).

During an informal meeting of the General Affairs and External Relations Council on May 2-3, 2003, HR Solana was assigned to the drafting of a European strategy. Several seminars (in Rome on September 19\textsuperscript{th}, Paris on October 6-7, and Stockholm on October 20\textsuperscript{th}) were organized with the aim to bring policy-makers, academics, researchers, experts, and media together in order to create comments and criticisms on the draft document pre-approved by a the European Council of Thessaloniki

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49 Prior to the 2003 war in Iraq, US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, during a speech in early 2003, made a distinction between the EU Member States in favor of the war and the ones against. Old Europe was composed of France, Germany, and other “older” EU Member States, whereas “New Europe” was composed of newer EU Member States such as Poland. It was a very polarizing moment.

The ESS defined the threats faced by the EU and exposed its common strategy: “effective multilateralism” and cooperation. In this short document, the EU identified five key threats to its security and survival: strategic terrorism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional conflicts; state failure; and organized crime. The document also stresses the necessary tools and policies in order to back up EU declarations. As expressed by Everts, “Europeans like to think of themselves as being good at “soft power.” But because of a lack of focus, coherence and self-discipline, the EU has underperformed for years in foreign policy” (Everts, 2003). The strategy is the first formal document addressing the interests and objectives of the Union as a coherent international security agent. But it ultimately comes down to EU leaders “to demonstrate that the strategy is not just well-meaning verbiage but real in its consequences” (Everts, 2003). The ESS states the global ambition of the EU that goes beyond trade and aid, and seeks to bring a military-political dimension to it. As written in the ESS, “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Council, 2003). Biscop argues that “the ESS must thus first of all be seen as the mission statement of the EU as an international actor” (Biscop, 2007: 5). Ultimately, the strategic objectives for the EU are to stabilize the European region, while contributing to the shaping of a new international order.
However, the implementation of such strategy created a number of existential questions for the Union, such as the adjusting of a common strategy in accordance with different foreign policy goals of each Member State, the legitimate use of force in the name of the Union, the co-existence of national military doctrines, and the diverse perceptions of threats. Each of these variables is considered a major factor of incoherence in the shaping of the ESDP and its strategy (Meyer, 2004). Even with the adoption of the ESS, a European strategic culture needs to emerge in order merge Member States’ interests with EU priorities. As advanced by Giegerich, “all threats combined lead to a set of characteristics that make any efficient response extremely complex thereby increasing the pressure on EU member states to cooperation within the EU framework” (Giegerich, 2006: 51). The ESS tried to address such concerns when it stresses that “we [Europeans] need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council, 2003: 11). As demonstrated in the previous chapter, there is an ongoing debate on the meaning and definition of strategic culture. However, as underlined in the final section of the document, the EU needs to be “more active, more capable and more coherent” (European Council, 2003). The EU claimed that under certain condition intervention is necessary.

But, over the years, a major problem has emerged since the adoption of the ESS: the gap between strategic goals and the practice in ESDP operations and capability development (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010). This strategic setback encountered by the EU was previously identified by Hill in his article on the existing “capability-expectation gap” (Hill, 1993). Such a problem was addressed later on in the 2008 Implementation of the
ESS, second strategic volume of the EU, stating that EU need “to prioritize [its] commitments, in line with resources” (Council of the EU, 2008d).


The Report on the Implementation of the ESS was adopted by the European Council in December 2008 several months after the Russian invasion of Georgia and in the middle of the ongoing war in Afghanistan.

The preface of the Report acknowledges the progress made by the EU since the adoption of the ESS, while claiming that its implementation is a work in progress still in need for more capabilities, coherence and activity. The report is an overview of the implementation of a holistic/comprehensive and multilateral approach. As claimed by Biscop, “Solana did not allow the debate to be hijacked by the events of August [invasion of Georgia] – strategy should not be about the last thing that happened to occur, but about fundamental interests and principles and long-term objectives” (2009: 6). The Report revised the security challenges and threats facing the EU by including new security paradigms such as cyber security, climate change, and energy security. The widening of the security scope of the EU is a clear evolution of the kind of security actor the EU is seeking to become. Thus the EU emphasizes on the importance of the security and development nexus. This understanding has pushed the EU to adopt a different approach in its operations in DRC, Guinea-Bissau, and even in Afghanistan. In the last section of the Report, three dimensions are developed in such way that it seems that the EU was trying to “elaborate a military strategy” (Biscop, 2009: 8). The first aspect undertakes the sensitive question of capability and interventions. The central point is reflected in the
argument that “we [the EU] need to prioritize our commitments, in line with resources” (Council of the EU, 2008d). The second concerns EU engagement in its neighborhood – Eastern Europe, Mediterranean – in order to promote social, economic and even political reforms. These partnerships are central as they could ultimately stabilize the region and defined by Biscop as “positive conditionality” raising one “dilemma of stability versus democracy” (Biscop, 2009: 11). The last dimension deals with the core component of European strategy, “effective multilateralism.” This approach was developed in the 2003 ESS, and calls for deeper cooperation between international institutions.

The revision of the 2003 Strategy in 2008 was the first step into having a debate on strategic question within the EU. Biscop argues that the next step would be an institutionalization of the review process (Biscop, 2009: 13). The conclusions of the document underline “how the EU would be a force for a fairer, safer and more united world” in a world affected by “evolving threats and shifting powers” (Council of the EU, 2008d: 12). Ultimately, “to build a secure Europe in a better world, we must do more to shape events” (Council of the EU, 2008d). The missing component in this report is the lack of strategy on the construction and adoption of military and civilian capabilities in order to contribute to international security and stability. The gap between EU ambitions and material requirements is not acknowledged in this strategic document focusing on the “implementation of the ESS.”

c. EU in Action: A Security Actor?

Since the creation of the ESDP in 1998, the EU has been involved in several military and civilian-military missions. In a period of over 10 years, the role played by the ESDP
evolved from its design of managing Kosovo-like crisis to becoming a civilian force for co-opting with international crisis. With the adoption of the 2003 and 2008 strategic documents, one should expect a deepening in the strategic dimension of the EU. The main concern has been described as material and financial, while other claims that it is in fact a political problem (Howroth, 2009: 17).

Even though the EU does not have a European army or even a common defense budget, EU Member States collectively spend $200 billion on defense per year, have around 2 million personnel in their armed forces, but cannot deploy 100,000 soldiers around the world (Grevi and Keohane, 2009: 69-70).

Since the launch of the first EU mission in 2003, the EU as an international actor has been involved in twenty-four operations (military and civilian-military combined). In term of geographical action, the EU has been principally focusing on launching operations in two regions: Europe-Eurasia and Africa counting 18 operations out of 24 with eight missions in Europe-Eurasia and ten in Africa. The EU has been less involved as a security provider in other part of the world such as Asia (one mission), Middle- East (three operations), and Central Asia (one mission).
Table 3.1: Completed and Ongoing ESDP Military Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2003)</td>
<td>Stabilize the area in the East of the country</td>
<td>1800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EUFOR RD Congo</td>
<td>Provide stability during presidential elections</td>
<td>2300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008-09</td>
<td>EUFOR Chad/CAR</td>
<td>Protect refugees, facilitate humanitarian aid, and assist the UN</td>
<td>3700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2004</td>
<td>EUFOR Althea in Bosnia</td>
<td>Stabilize the country after the civil war and NATO departure</td>
<td>1950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>EUNAVFOR Atalanta</td>
<td>Fight piracy off the coast of Somalia</td>
<td>1800 + 4 frigates and other vessels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since 2010</td>
<td>EUTM Somalia</td>
<td>Train Somali security forces in Uganda</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3.2: Completed and Ongoing ESDP Civilian-military missions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Operations</th>
<th>Missions</th>
<th>Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Completed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>EUJUST Themis in Georgia</td>
<td>Assist with the reform of the criminal justice system</td>
<td>12 experts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-05</td>
<td>EUPOL Proxima in the FYROM</td>
<td>Assist the country’s police</td>
<td>200 police and civilian officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>EU support to the AU Mission in Sudan</td>
<td>Mixed civilian-military operation proving advice, training and transport</td>
<td>50 civilian and military personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>EUPAT in the FYROM</td>
<td>Follow up mission to Proxima</td>
<td>30 police advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-06</td>
<td>Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia</td>
<td>Monitoring the peace agreement between Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement</td>
<td>Around 80 monitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005-07</td>
<td>EUPOL Kinshasa in the DRC</td>
<td>Support the Integrated Police Unit of the country’s national</td>
<td>Some 30 police advisors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Since 2003</td>
<td>EUPM in Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
<td>Assist the country reforming its police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>EUBAM in Moldova and Ukraine</td>
<td>Assist the two countries in borders management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>EUSEC in the DRC</td>
<td>An SSR mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>EUJUST LEX for Iraq</td>
<td>Training criminal justice officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2005</td>
<td>EUBAM Rafah in the Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Monitoring border crossing between Gaza and Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2006</td>
<td>EUPOL COPPS in the Palestinian Territories</td>
<td>Assisting police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
<td>EUPOL in the DRC</td>
<td>Assisting the country’s police, while following up on EUPOL Kinshasa mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2007</td>
<td>EUPOL in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Assisting afghan police forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>EUMM in Georgia</td>
<td>Monitoring the implementation of the Six point Agreement between Georgia and Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>EULEX Kosovo</td>
<td>Assisting the country in reforming police, judiciary, and customs areas sectors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Since 2008</td>
<td>EU SSR 50 in Guinea Bissau</td>
<td>An SSR mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The tables (3.1 & 3.2) prove that the EU as been an active international player this last decade. However, the gap between European expectations and the capabilities deployed, few staff, limited capabilities and short-term operations, still represent a major setback in counting the EU as a relevant and powerful security provider. In addition, these past and ongoing missions do not represent any major political and/or strategic risks

50 SSR: Security Sector Reform
for either the EU or its Member States. Last, the EU has been mostly involved in regions where European powerhouses’ (France and Britain) spheres of influence are still significant considering their colonial past: Europe and Africa. Therefore, looking back at these missions, one can only argue that the EU has been concerned with many issues without a clear overall strategy. The adoption of the ESS only brought limited coherence in EU actions and its implications in areas of crises.

As explained by Biscop and Coelmont, since the creation of the ESDP, it has become an important tool and proven its utility. However, “the overall lesson learned must be that if CSDP is detached from foreign policy strategy and operations are undertaken without reference to strategic priorities, it cannot but remain a limited and reactive instrument” (Biscop & Coelmont, 2010: 8).

Even though the EU’s actions can be seen as weak and limited in scope, as opposed to US interventions or even those of EU Member States, the EU has been focusing on developing its power and interventions based on the rule of law at two levels. First, the mandate of missions puts human rights at the heart of it. Second, it seeks approval from other international actors, such as the UN, underlining the importance of “effective multilateralism.”

One of the reasons behind the limited scope of engagement of the EU can be found in the diverging domestic politics and perceptions of individual Member States. Having or adopting a common position on high politics matters is extremely complex.

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51 The latest example has been the mission in Libya in 2011. France and Britain preferred using NATO at the expense of the CSDP simply because they had accessed to US military capabilities and share the financial burden. The CSDP has failed in the sense that it is not an adequate force in order to solve pressing military crises. The CSDP has become a civilian force.

52 Since the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, ESDP (European Security and Defense Policy) has become CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy).
Therefore, Member States tend to agree on fundamental issues like rules of law, democracy, and human rights. Member States share common norms and values thanks to the *acquis communautaire.* But, a lack of coordination on controversial issues can cause high political embarrassments and tensions within the Union.\(^{53}\) Leonard and Gowan rightfully argue that “as Iraq showed, the EU can retreat into factionalism over external affairs, not least because the larder states are not prepared to discipline themselves” (2004).

Critics have underlined the limited scale of EU missions and operations. “The at times cosmetic’ impact of EU action” suggested by Bickerton, *et al.* that “it is undertaken more in order to highlight the role of [ESDP] than to solve problems on the ground” (Bickerton *et al.*, 2011: 5). Thus, these operations have suffered of lack of resources, limited strategic successes, and highlighted bureaucratic tensions.

### III. A Solana Era?

High Representative Javier Solana was at the forefront in developing the mix of the design and development of the ESDP, CFSP and the EU as an international security actor. With a newly created post, Mr. Solana from 1999 to 2009 was the key political figure of the EU in the field of security and foreign affairs. His supervision and leadership had a direct impact on the shaping of the EU and the ESDP.

\(^{53}\) The 2011 Arab Spring was an example of European inactivity and diplomatic embarrassment. See Larivé, 2011.
1. The Position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy

The Treaty of Amsterdam, ratified in 1997, marks the creation of the position of High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The article J.8.3 of the Amsterdam Treaty mentions the position of HR and states that the Presidency will be assisted by the HR. The description of the job requirements was and remained during Mr. Solana’s mandate extremely broad, as it intends to contribute with assistance of the Council to the “formulation, preparation, and implementation of policy decisions” on foreign and security policy matters.\(^{54}\) The position of the HR was designed in order to bring a higher degree of coherence to the area of foreign and security policy, while maintaining the centrality of Member States’ in decision-making and finance on CFSP matters. The reasons behind the creation of the HR position were to increase the cooperation between the various actors in CFSP, bring coherence in the rotating processes of the six month presidencies, and make the EU a more visible international actor. Some argued that the position of HR was an answer to Mr. Kissinger’s question, “what is the phone number of Europe?” (Chopin & Lefebvre, 2010: 1).

However, it is only in 1999, two years after the implementation of the Treaty of Amsterdam, during the Cologne European Council of June 3-4, 1999 that Dr. Javier Solana was appointed for a five years mandate as the Secretary-General of the Council and High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). His mandate was renewed in 2004 until December 1\(^{st}\), 2009. Prior his appointment at the head of European foreign affairs, Dr. Solana was NATO Secretary General from 1995 to

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\(^{54}\) Treaty of Amsterdam. 1997. Article J.16
The appointment of such high political figure reflected the ambition of Member States to bring a higher degree of coherence to EU foreign and security policies, while reassuring American partners that Europe will maintain the transatlantic alliance at the heart its security policies, even after the creation of the ESDP in 1998. During his mandate as NATO Secretary General, he had been praised for his decisions and leadership on the handling of the bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and the integration of former Warsaw Pact members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, into NATO structures.

Mr. Solana understood the challenges of the position and sought throughout his mandates to increase the unity of the EU in world affairs. Soon after his appointment in 1999 he declared: “The Union in the 21st century will have a common currency. It should also have an effective policy of foreign affairs, security and defense” (BBC News, 1999).

A month after his appointment at the head of European foreign affairs, on November 11, 1999, HR Solana published a piece in the French newspaper, Le Monde, wherein he expressed his understanding of his task as HR, the role of the EU as a world actor, and the threats facing the EU as whole and its Member States (Solana, 1999d). He explained that as the HR, he will be seeking to work for the Member States and adapt their interests into common European interests.56 Looking back at the article J.16 of the Treaty of

55 Prior to his appointment at the head of NATO, Javier Solana served in the Spanish government of Felipe González from 1982 to 1995. His last mandate as the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain from 1992 to 1995 exposed him on the international arena, which contributed to his appointment at the head of NATO from 1995 to 1999. Many argue that Solana was a diplomatic and strategic politician allowing to become the only remaining politician from the original cabinet of González after 13 years. Prior to his political career, Javier Solana received a Fulbright Scholarship allowing him to study in the US. He graduated from the University of Virginia with a Ph.D. in physics.

56 In Le Monde article of November 11, 1999, he wrote in French: “j’entends mettre ma fonction de Haut Représentant au service des états membres de l’Union pour donner à celle-ci les moyens de jouer le role centre qui lui revient dans cette entreprise et de l’avènement d’un ordre européen plus stable” (Solana, 1999d).
Amsterdam, as expressed by a US official, Mr. Solana’s position was “ambiguous, ill-defined, and under resourced position.” Looking in retrospective, HR Solana declared in 2004:

When I took up my post five years ago, no one would have dared to bet that the Union would soon have direct responsibility for crisis management, have a military committee and military staff, be responsible for military operations, have an armaments agency, a solidarity clause in the event of a terrorist attack, and above all, a common vision of the threats we face and appropriate responses to them – in other words a genuinely European security strategy (Solana, 2004a).

Considering his background and accomplishments as a national minister, SG of NATO, “personal diplomacy was one of Solana’s strength” (Mayor, 2011: 194). Thus, Solana’s influence was mostly emanating not from his position of HR, but rather from his person. His levels of connections and contacts were and are very important, strengthening his influence on agenda setting and lobbying.

Even though we will emphasize the role of the person of Solana in this study, one should not assume that a single actor could have shaped the EU as he did. Kurowska has argued in her article that one should look in fact at the “Solana milieu” in order to understand all the actors involved in the evolution of the CFSP and ESDP being a constellation of organizational entities, including administrative bodies and HR special representatives (Kurowska, 2009). She goes further by arguing that several factors over the years influenced the decision of the Solana milieu: international events and the EU responses to them; rotating Presidency with different priorities, different perceptions of the role of the EU and different agendas.

“Lacking predecessor, a budget or even a consensus on what his job should be, he’s turned the role into whatever he can make of it” (Power and Ephron, 2002). This
personnel dimension is central in order to explain how successful was Solana as the first HR. But “to give Europe real global clot, he’ll have to give the role institutional heft, independent of his high-profile personality” (Power and Ephron, 2002).

2. Solana’s Worldviews and Perceptions

In order to understand to what extent HR Solana shaped the EU as an international actor, I selected 70 articles written by HR Solana between 1999 and 2009 for analysis. This section looks into depth in role of ideas and perceptions of agents such as Javier Solana. This psychological and ideational components are central in order to balance the rationalist argument by looking at the two sides of the coin (Christiansen, Jorgensen & Wiener, 1999: 541). The pieces selected for this study are composed of newspaper articles published in the American, Asian, and European press, articles published as introductions or prefaces in books, and even conference speeches. The selection of the articles was based on the content, which had to address the broad theme of European security. Articles focusing on specific issue areas, such as the Palestinian conflict or other issues, were not selected.

The purpose of this analysis is to frame and identify the main discourse shaped by Solana in his ten-year mandate at the head of the EU foreign and security policy. Solana argued early in his career as HR that the foreign affairs of the EU should follow three axes: first, the need to unify the European continent around common and shared values and interests; second, a new assessment of threats in and around Europe must be

57 All his articles and speeches can be found on the following website: http://consilium.europa.eu/javier-solana-offline?lang=en
58 An excellent book published in 2011 reviewed the Solana’s mandate as well as the position of the High Representative. See Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & Rüger, 2011.
implemented; third, the recognition that European integration is the right answer to globalization (Solana, 1999d). The purpose of this section is to underline Solana’s narrative and thereby providing a better understanding of the design and shaping of the European security policy through the ESS and other official documents.

Throughout his mandate, several themes have emerged and been developed. The themes can be regrouped into six major categories: historical dimension; perceptions of the international system; diplomatic dimension; military dimension; political coherence; and institutional dimension. Within each category, sub-categories have been identified based on recurrent key words and analysis.

Table 3.3: Solana’s Narratives from 1999 to 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Historical Dimension</th>
<th>Diplomatic Dimension</th>
<th>Military Dimension</th>
<th>Political Coherence</th>
<th>Institutional Dimension</th>
<th>Perceptions of Intl system</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference to violent European past</td>
<td>Transatlantic cooperation</td>
<td>Capabilities</td>
<td>Centrality of EU MS</td>
<td>Role of the HR – Amsterdam Treaty</td>
<td>Globalization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End of the Cold War</td>
<td>Centrality of NATO</td>
<td>Credibility to deliver</td>
<td>Enlargement of the Union</td>
<td>Coherence btw EU and MS</td>
<td>Understanding of world politics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-NATO sharing a common agenda</td>
<td>European strategy – culture of security</td>
<td>Speaking with one voice</td>
<td>Helsinki Summit – Headline Goals</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transatlantic division – Iraq</td>
<td>Development of global crisis management</td>
<td>Sharing common values</td>
<td>Rejection of Constitutional Treaty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. The Importance of History

Throughout his ten-year mandate HR Solana on many occasions stressed and mentioned the historical heritage of the EU. The reference to the “violent” European past has been a main message in order to bridge differences between the EU agenda/integration and European citizens. Stating the violent past offers one of the best arguments for Solana in
order to explain the rationale behind the European integration project being peace and stability (Solana, 2005g). Thus, this argument has been used at times where the European project was questioned like after the French and Dutch rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 (Solana, 2005g; 2005d). In the article, “Give Europe more weight in the world,” Solana wrote that the European integration has been the tool allowing to “exorcise the demons of our past” (Solana, 2005d).

Remembering the historical roots of the European project is a powerful unifying instrument in order to remind European citizens of their shared past, while building support for the construction of the EU as an international actor in crisis management and foreign policy. Ultimately, a gap between EU agenda on one side, and public opinions on the other side has always existed throughout European history. The current gap could be described as ideological and strategic. European public opinions do not see the EU as a military actor, but rather as a soft power, a civilian power. Two hypotheses could be made: first, historically, the European integration project was designed in order to limit the probability of war between EU Member States. Such a collective memory and reading of the European integration project and the role of the EU could be the reason behind the lack of support for a military Europe. Second, the misunderstanding centered around the creation of the ESDP and the deployment of ESDP operations could illustrate the fear of a construction of a European army at the expense of national armies. Armies, security and defense are core components of the sovereignty of states, but they also carry on the identity and values of a country.
b. Perception of the International System

As opposed to rationalist theories, constructivism emphasizes on the importance and impact of identity on actors’ behavior and policy-making, and how one defines oneself and sees the world (Anderson, 2008; Onuf, 1989; Wendt, 1992). Solana’s perceptions of the international system strongly impacted the direction of EU foreign and security policy and the design of the 2003 ESS and 2008 Report on the Implementation of ESS. This section can be divided into three sub-categories: globalization; understanding of world politics; threat assessments.

The concept of globalization is ever-present in HR Solana’s articles and speeches (Solana, 1999b; 2007c; 2007d; 2007e; 2009b). Solana perceives that the international system has directly been shaped by globalization making it ever-changing and unpredictable (Solana, 2006b). Globalization is the product of new technologies leading to the creation of new powers and new threats making it a central variable and actor in his understanding of world politics. He sees the world not as a unipolar system but rather as moving towards a “system of continents” (Solana, 2006b).

His understanding of world politics – progressively shaped throughout his personal and professional life – has shaped his attitude towards the development of a common security policy in the early years of the 21st century. Two main reasons can be identified: first, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the changing nature of the international system will ultimately affect the role played by the US at the regional level. Second, with the crises in the Balkans and the deepening and widening of the EU, the EU needs better military and security structures in order protect them (Solana, 2000c). The development of a common European defense policy addressed
the question of global governance. Through global governance, frictions between states can be solved or at least minimized in an interdependent world. “To organized our increasingly globalized world, we in the West need to share power with new players, rethink power beyond the state paradigm and tame power by extending the rule of law internationally” (Solana, 2007c).

Solana’s understanding of globalization shaped the way he led the EU from 1999 to 2009. Globalization was more than just an economic concept. He had a holistic approach to it, and worked on developing comprehensive instruments for the EU. “An era when enemies aren’t nations but networks,” argued Power and Ephron, “and the weapons aren’t just nukes but box cutters – requires a new mix of weapons and creative diplomacy” (Power and Ephron, 2002). As expressed in the 2003 ESS and repeated on several occasions, Solana stressed the need to address several threats: energy security, terrorism, human rights, failed states, and proliferation of WMDs.

c. Institutional Dimension

On many occasion prior and/or after political, diplomatic and military junctures, HR Solana used his writing in order to address the need for the deepening of the Union and explaining the latest institutional changes. The main topics were the role of the High Representative, the Amsterdam treaty, the Helsinki Summit implementing the “Headline Goals,” the Constitutional Treaty, the relationship between the EU and MS in the field of foreign policy and defense, and naturally the Lisbon Treaty.

In the early days of his appointment, Solana spent time writing and talking about the role of the HR (Solana, 1999d; 2000a; 2000b). There was a sense of trying to
demystify the post of High Representative. In one of his first publications, he addressed his expectations as the HR, “j’entends mettre ma fonction de Haut Représentant au service des états membres de l’Union pour donner à celle-ci les moyens de jouer le rôle centre qui lui revient dans cette entreprise et de l’avènement d’un ordre européen plus stable” (Solana, 1999d). Such statement illustrates what Solana was able to make from his position of HR, as “within the given frame, the HR enjoyed considerable flexibility in defining his role and political responsibility” (Mayor, 2011: 194). A year later, in 2000, he clearly explained the different component of his role of HR, and stressed that he was mandated to conduct political dialogue with third parties (Solana, 2000b).

With the Helsinki Summit taking place in December 1999, HR Solana underlined the need for the EU to develop new capacity to respond to crises and to ultimately be able to deploy by 2003 a corps-level force up to 60,000 troops (Solana, 2000c). Solana presented the Helsinki Summit as a positive step in order to contribute to the development of a comprehensive approach to crisis management. He explained that the goal is not to militarize the EU and to compete against NATO. But in fact, Helsinki was a response to the EU and MS to act as a collective military force in Kosovo earlier on.

The decision-making process in the field of the security and defense policy has always belonged to the MS. The HR, also the Secretary-General of the Council, has the mission to maintain a degree of coherence in the Union’s foreign policy. The authority and responsibility for deciding in defense matter remains within the end of Member States (Solana, 2005e).
d. Diplomatic Dimension

Solana’s job diplomatically during his mandate had several aspects. First, as the HR, Solana worked to convince the US that the ESDP was neither a solution to NATO nor a European army. Second, with the Iraq crisis, Solana had to manage and maintain good relations with the US, while preserving a certain harmony within the divided Union. Third, he tried to merge the priorities of the EU with the US.

The diplomatic channel is an important one, as it is directly connected with the relations with the US and NATO. In the 1990s, NATO forces were deployed for the first time of its history in the Balkans. In the meantime, France and the United Kingdom established the ESDP following the famous Saint-Malo Declaration in 1998. The ESDP immediately created fear on the other side of the Atlantic. The appointment in 1999 of a former NATO Secretary-General, Mr. Solana, was a way to appease the transatlantic relations but also strengthen the relations between the ESDP and NATO. As soon as appointed, Solana undertook the famous 3 Ds – discriminating, duplicating, and decoupling – identified by former US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright (Albright, 1998). Solana at many occasion reassure that NATO is at the center of the European collective security architecture (Solana, 1999b; 2000b; 2009b), while the “ESDP is not about collective defense” (Solana, 1999b). Solana oftentimes underlined that NATO was the cornerstone of European security (Solana, 1999b; 2000b). In order to control the degree of criticism coming from the US, Solana underlined that the rationale for the EU was in fact to integrate military forces into a global crisis management strategy rather than trying to militarize the EU or compete with NATO (Solana, 2000c). The other argument emphasized earlier on by Solana was that the ESDP will ultimately strengthen
the European pillar of NATO in crisis management operation (Solana, 2000d; 2001d; 2002b), while contributing to the sharing of international security (Solana, 2000d; 2001b; 2002b; 2004e). Solana throughout his mandate stressed clearly that the EU was not in the business to compete and/or replace NATO. “It is not a design to militarize the European Union and to distract it from its goal of European integration” (Solana, 2000c).

The 2003 Iraq crisis dividing the Euro-Atlantic community was a major challenge for the EU and the HR in order to bridge both side and principally strengthen the centrality of multilateralism and the rule of law. This period starting in 2002 until the end of the Bush administration led to major discords between the two actors (Solana, 2001d; 2002a; 2002c; 2003d; 2005a; 2005i). Solana expressed the need to deepen transatlantic cooperation in order to deal with 21st century threats, while addressing the divergence of strategies between both sides. The US was frustrated with its European allies, while the EU was primarily concerned on the US unilateral strategy (Solana, 2002a). Following the US invasion of Iraq in March 2003, the transatlantic relations were at its lowest. Even at some point, Solana raised the question: “what has gone wrong with transatlantic relations?” in an article entitled “Atlantic Drift” (Solana, 2003b). Solana admitted that the Iraq crisis produced a real crisis within the Euro-Atlantic community, but was early in calling for a “post-Iraq healing” (2003b). The article of July 10 published in *Progressive Governance* was a turning point as Solana pondered about either reforming or reinventing the transatlantic community (Solana, 2003b). He conveyed the European perceptions/frustrations linked to US actions. The US was undeniably acting as a hegemon and seeking partner at any cost, as symbolized through the coalition of the willing. Solana was very critical on this point as he claimed that “the European Union is
not always an easy body to deal with. Despite this, it would be a mistake for the US to ‘cherry-pick’ from among its European allies” (Solana, 2003b). This article is also central, as he identified the strategic divergence between the “US method” – power – and the “EU method” – law.

One of the most symbolic events marking a turn in the transatlantic crisis was the adoption of the ESS by the European Council in December 2003. For the first time in European history, the Union had published a common security strategy underlining European redlines and strategy in solving international crisis. Many have argued that the ESS was a direct criticism to the 2002 US National Security symbolized by multilateralism versus unilateralism, rule of law versus interests. However many have claimed that the ESS was instead important in unifying the Union, which was politically divided less than a year earlier. With a strategy, the Union could not be criticized anymore for a lack of clarity and even lack of desire to affront international threats.

e. Seeking for Political Coherence

Oftentimes Solana called for a greater degree of coherence between EU Member States for Union’s external policies (Solana, 2000e). One of the major tasks that Solana had to undertake was to assure the centrality of Member States in the decision-making process and on the future of the Union (Solana, 2005e). He reminded that Member States decide in defense questions and in case of deployment of military operation (Solana, 2005e). Furthermore at the origin of the ESDP, Solana maintained that the ESDP was not an attempt to undermine the rights and sovereignty of Member States in the field of defense.
(Solana, 1999b). Ultimately, the Union does not project to build a European army or even to militarize the Union (Solana, 2000d; 2000e; 2007f).

With the widening of the Union through the two waves of enlargement in 2005 and 2007, Solana was a catalyst in order to advocate for the added value of this process. Furthermore, within a bigger Union, Solana called at several occasions for talking with a single voice as Member States share common interests and values. A higher degree of cohesion in foreign policy would allow the Union to be heard on the international stage (Solana, 2007d; 2007e).

f. Military Dimension

The military dimension focuses on two major issues: the first, the strategic design of the Union’s international role; the second factor emphasizes on the development of capabilities in order to back up European “rhetoric.” “The real choice therefore is not whether we play a global role, but how we play that role” (Solana, 2004e). From his early declarations, until the last ones, Solana always claimed that “unlike the empires or power-blocs of the past, we [Europe] are not in the business of exerting influence for its own sake” (Solana, 2000b). His understanding of the role of the EU was very holistic, and perceived it as a civilian power. As an international actor, the EU has been theorized and described as “normative,” “civilian,” or/and “ethical” power (Manners, 2002; Manners, 2006; Dûchene, 1972; Sjursen, 2006). This notion of “civilian actor” identifies the EC/EU as an actor with limited access to military means, which uses persuasion rather than coercion (Nye, 2005). The EU acts in normative ways for three reasons: first, historical background and the nature of European integration project; second,
characteristics as a hybrid polity; and, third, its political-legal constitution (Manners, 2006).

In order to face the “dark side of globalization” affecting the shift of power from a unilateral to a multilateral world, the core strategy of the EU is to solidify its union. “In this new strategic landscape,” argued Solana, “Europeans will only be able to project and protect their interests if they are united” (Solana, 2007e). Unification and common security policy can be strengthened through the agreement on a common strategy. One of the first written mentions of a European strategy was developed in an article published by the *International Herald Tribune* wherein Solana talked of a European “culture of security” (Solana, 2002c). The understanding behind the concept of European culture of security was that it is “based on conflict prevention, political management and sensitivity to the economic and social roots of violence” (Solana, 2002c). Soon after the adoption of the ESS by the European Council, Solana explained that “the security strategy mirrors what the European Union is all about. We are neither a state, not a military organization. We are a global player that, on the basis of a political and economic project, gathers the civilian and military instruments that will allow us to play a role in crisis management” (Solana, 2003a). Such statement is a proof of the evolution of the perception of the EU as a civilian global actor.

The EU has been pursuing a holistic approach to contemporary security issues (Solana, 2002c) and has tried to foster regional and international cooperation. In addition the EU strategy addresses two elements: first a normative aspect to international actions by promoting democracy, the rule of law and human rights (Solana, 2000g; 2001b; 2001c; 2002d; 2005b; 2005c; 2005d; 2005h; 2007f). Also the EU strategy in order to
address international security issues is based on “effective multilateralism” (Solana, 2004f; 2009d). Multilateralism between international organizations, states and so forth is at the heart of EU strategy in promoting stability and peace. The concept of multilateralism is also recurrent in his interventions. As the political leaders of two of the most preeminent international organizations, NATO and the EU, it seems obvious that multilateralism would be at the heart of his approach to foreign and security policies. Solana often talked of the EU as a “new form of power” due to its commitment to multilateralism, international law and justice (Solana, 2006b). Second, by rejecting the fact that there is no monolithic threat, but instead a wide range of new security threats (Solana, 1999b; 2002b; 2005i; 2007f; 2009b) such as organized crime (Solana, 2002b; 2003a; 2004f; 2004e; 2007f), terrorism (Solana, 2002b; 2003d; 2003a; 2004f; 2004e; 2005a; 2007f), failed states (Solana, 2007f), nuclear proliferation (Solana, 2002b; 2003b; 2003d; 2004f; 2004e), migrations (2002b), disease (2002b), climate change and so forth.

One of the most recurrent themes throughout his mandates was on the need for the EU to develop and have capabilities. During a 2004 hearing before the House of Lords, Lord Maclennan of Rogart asked two questions: “we [the UK government] are conscious of the very grand rhetoric but how is it to be backed up? Can you say something about the translation of the rhetoric into solid prioritization by the Member Governments to enable you [Solana] to do some of the many things you are seeking to do?” (House of Lords, 2004: 6). The objective is to acquire capabilities to direct EU-led military operations in response to international crises and conflicts, wherein NATO is not engaged (Solana, 2000h). The EC, now the EU, needs power projection in order to assume its role and status. However, to act as an international actor, the emergence of a “capacity-
expectation gap” between EU’s ability to act, to agree, and the resources and instruments at its disposal has been a major limit to EU actorness and credibility (Hill, 1993). One of the challenges is the point wherein the Union is not capable of fulfilling the new expectations held to it.

From his appointment until the end of his mandate, HR Solana was very consistent in arguing that the EU needs more capabilities in order to deliver (Solana, 1999b; 2000a; 2000e; 2000f; 2009b). Without military tools the CFSP is not an effective instrument (Solana, 1999b; 2000a; 2000b; 2000d). The thematic of improvement of military capabilities has been recurrent throughout his mandate (Solana, 2000a; 2000b; 2001b; 2002a; 2003c; 2005c; 2005e; 2007f; 2009e). In Solana’s words, “we [the EU] are not an institution that has come from Heaven, we come from the Member States and whatever the Member States want to give us we can use” (House of Lords, 2004: 6). The improvements of European capabilities need to be done in several areas: sealift, strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, aerial surveillance, command and control assets, precision munitions, and means to suppress enemy air defense (Solana, 2001b). Such needs were based on the shortfall of the Kosovo campaign of 1999. Solana over the years and especially since 9/11 was always stressing three points: “capabilities, capabilities, capabilities.”

A last theme has been about the deepening of civilian tools for crisis management (Solana, 2000a; 2005e; 2009d) and the increase cooperation between civilian-military structures (Solana, 2005c; 2005e; 2007f; 2009e). The second point appeared later on in the narrative, as it reflects a change of perceptions on the role the EU can do and the role Member States are willing the EU to play. The purpose of ESDP evolved between its
design and early implementation seen as a military dimension and in the mid-decade, where it has been since perceived as a civilian instrument.

3. A Vision?\textsuperscript{59}

Focusing on one person like HR Solana could be seen as futile in developing one’s examination of overall EU policy, considering the size of the EU, the number of institutions, the power of Member States in security policies, and the effects of international politics on European affairs. But to a certain extent, the institutional role of Solana led the way to the construction and even sometimes to the modification of MS views on specific matter in order to converge their interests and ultimately to the implementation and adoption of common actions.\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, looking at an individual like HR Solana can offer a different angle of understanding on the construction and implementation of EU security and defense policies during this transitional period. “EU policy-makers conceptualize international relations,” argued Vennesson, “and the type of international system they consider desirable” (Vennesson, 2007: 1). In general, his vision/perception of the EU is very positive, maybe to some extent bias, as he declared that: “Europe is a magnetic pole of stability, of peace, of prosperity” (Barros-Garcia, 2007/08). In simple terms, a “force for good.” He also considered the EU to be well-seen from abroad due to its role of international moderator, civilian actors, and development and peace contributor. However some have argued that Solana was trying to develop in fact a militarized civilian power through the strengthening and use of the ESDP in

\textsuperscript{59} A section of the conclusion (Chapter VII) is dedicated to bring a critical assessment and review of the Solana doctrine and era.
\textsuperscript{60} One of the best examples is the adoption of the ESS in 2003 several months after one of the worst political crises between EU Member States.
civilian and military operations. “Whereas the Commission inhabits the world of civilan power Europe, […], the Solana milieu has ventured to make the EU a ‘militarized civilan power’” (Kurowska, 2009: 536).

HR Solana stresses that the EU is a young foreign policy actor considering its international role. But in order to act in security terms, the EU has developed a “comprehensive approach” combining civilan and military capabilities in order to adapt to the needs of today’s international crises (Solana, 2006b). The need of a clear strategy or doctrine, which was adopted in December 2003, was to finally bring a higher degree of coherence and relevance in EU foreign and security policies. As expressed in a speech in 2006, HR Solana declared that: “For years we had been giving large sums of money without getting much political influence. That was our Achilles heel” (Solana, 2006b).

Very early in his position of HR, Solana has been calling for the necessity for the EU to act militarily speaking. After going through the wake-up call of Kosovo in 1999, Solana expressed the necessity in a 1999 speech before the European Parliament for the EU of “having military capabilities” (Solana, 1999a).

It has been clear for some time that, if Europe is to take its rightful place on the world stage, it needs to have a European Security and Defense Policy, as well as a Common Foreign and Security Policy. First the Bosnia crisis and then Kosovo have made it clear that more is needed than just declarations of intent. In order to act military capabilities will be necessary. Solana’s understanding of the importance of military capabilities for the EU in order to contribute to crisis management ultimately increased European power and its normative agenda. Solana understood that a balance needs to be found in the development of European military capabilities as European citizens and at
some point Member States may not be willing to see the EU acquiring military capabilities.

Solana perceived the dichotomy, even the hypocrisy, in European politics between the expectation of the EU as a global actor involved in crisis management operations and the financial and human commitment needed for it. “Today, we [Europeans] want to play a major role on the international stage,” he expressed, “but in the meantime we are not ready to make some sacrifices in order to increase our military budgets” (Solana, 2003c).

On two separate occasions, one in Oxfordshire on July 11, 2009 and the other before the EU-ISS on October 22, 2009, HR Solana addressed the inevitable question: “what’s next for Europe?” He replied by addressing five next steps. First, Europeans have the responsibility of making “Europe function” in order to handle crisis. This coherence can be attained with the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon. Second, the EU needs more capabilities for crisis management. Its defense budget needs to be increased by EU Member States. Third, the EU should seek coherence in its Foreign Policy. The EU needs to be careful in not becoming a “service agency” for EU Member States. Fourth, the EU foreign policy must be adapted to accordingly face the 21st century challenges. Last, the EU needs to take more calculated risk-taking in order to be a relevant international actor.\(^{61}\)

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\(^{61}\) This chapter was central in order to lay out the foundation and history behind the creation and development of the EU as a security actor. Nevertheless, this chapter has also proven the difficulty encountered by the EU to become this “envisioned global security actor.” The degree of integration of security and defense policies remain at a low level with small financial, human, and material capabilities. The following chapters (IV, V, and VI) will show in more depth the extent of the limits of the EU as a security actor at different level of analysis on pressing domestic, regional and international issues.

Undeniably, the year of 2011 illustrated the weakness of the EU in dealing with the Arab Spring, in its inactivity in the military operation in Libya, in its weak contribution to the war in Afghanistan, and so on. Institutionally, the EU, with the newly created EEAS, was supposed to offer coherence and power to
On reflecting on his 10 years, HR Solana made a mix evaluation of his accomplishment by stressing the need for the EU to have better capacity to deploy forces for humanitarian and civilian operations. He also underlined success and impacts of EU interventions will depend on the complementarity and sharing of responsibilities in order to solve tomorrow’s crisis (Solana, 2009e). The development and possession of civilian-military capabilities by the EU has been a central focus of Solana throughout his mandate. Ultimately, one word can simply summarize the 10 years mandate of Mr. Solana at the head of the EU in foreign policy and defense matters: coherence. As described, Solana throughout his mandate was very careful in adopting the same approach to international affairs and sending the same image of the EU as an international actor within and outside European borders. At no time in his 10 years had Mr. Solana made a declaration or published an article creating confusion on the role of the EU internationally or even on the necessity of the ESDP. Solana also identified the concept of coherence as “the key of all success” (Solana, 2004a: 8). Coherence must be maintained as a strategic instrument but also political.

Looking back at Mr. Solana’s work by measuring the degree of success or failure of his 10 years mandate is a very difficult task. As one of the questions consistently raised during interviews, “was Mr. Solana a stepping-stone in creating a common EU security policy?”&62; Opinions among interviewees are divided. On one side, Mr. Solana was described as a fine and talented diplomat with a consistent vision. As expressed by a US official, HR Solana “made the most out of his position and with what he had.” He

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the Union, which has not been the case. The appointment of Ms. Ashton at the position of the High Representative has been one among many problems to the continuity of the construction of the EU as a security actor started by Mr. Solana.

62 Over 20 interviews with EU officials, US officials, and researchers at think-tanks were conducted in New York in July 2010 and in Washington D.C. in December 2010.
worked on managing relations between France, the UK, Germany and the US in order to foster the development of the CFSP. On the other side, Mr. Solana was perceived as a European leader working only for the sake of major European powers, France, Germany and the UK, while undermining the voice of smaller EU Member States. Some even went further by arguing that without US assistance, Solana would not have been as successful.

Solana has been extremely consistent in his message during 10 years. This consistency has been fundamental in laying down the foundation of the newly created EU foreign and security policy, and shaping the role of the EU. The emergence of the ESDP has one of the main intervention instruments over the years for any EU military and civilian operations is a due to Solana’s understanding of the need for the EU to become a visible international actor in crisis management operations.

The role of European security has been central for continental security and now international. As expressed by Solana, the EU was intended to secure peace in Europe, and today, it is about bringing peace in the rest of the world (Solana, 2007b).
CHAPTER IV: EU COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICIES AGAINST JIHADI TERRORISM

I. Introductory Remarks

The political, military, economic, and psychological consequences of September 11, 2001, and the attacks of 2004 in Madrid and 2005 in London have been considerable on both sides of the Atlantic as they initiated new institutional and political trends in order to face the rising threat of radical Islamic terrorism. Even though terrorism is not a new threat, the number of casualties and psychological trauma of the attacks orchestrated by jihadi terrorists have been unprecedented.

Back in 1992, the EU had institutionalized the inclusion of counter-terrorist policies in the Treaty of Maastricht, as part of the third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA). But until 9/11 the EU did not pay much attention to terrorism, as it was perceived as a matter of national security rather than an issue for the European Union. September 11 marked a turning point in the appreciation of the threat and the need to deepen the existing security structure of the Union. Since 9/11, “the first and foremost security threat to enable the construction of the AFSJ is terrorism” (Kaunert, 2010a: 66). The threat of radical Islamic terrorism has been recognized as “real” menace to not only the stability of EU Member States but also to the overall Union. However, in the case of the EU, the construction of the counter-terrorist structures at the EU level has been more reactive than preventive.

The timeframe for this study is from 1999 to 2009. This first case study looks at the domestic dimension, the first level of analysis, of the integration process in EU security policies. However, it has been noted that evolutions prior to 1999 contributed to
the latter construction of some EU agencies such as Europol and in the shaping of a EU strategy of CT. This case study focuses solely on the homeland security dimension of counter-terrorism. It does not look at the external dimension of EU counter-terrorist policies, nor at the question of the different models of integration, nor at the legal dimension between freedom and security. Moreover, only radical Islamic terrorism will be analyzed in this chapter. In the case of this study, radical Islamic terrorism and jihadi terrorism are considered as interchangeable. Jihadi terrorism draws on extreme interpretations of Islam, and its best exemplification is Osama bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (Pillar, 2008: 7). Even though there is no global definition of terrorism, and states have diverging view on it, terrorism has been described since 9/11 as the “greatest threat of our times” (Hoffman, 2006).

The case study of homeland EU counter-terrorism is quite interesting in light of its integration and development process within the structures of the Union. The field of counter-terrorism has been extremely event-driven and reactive as well as driven from national governments. Three critical junctures led in fostering the institutionalization process of counter-terrorist policies: post-9/11; post-Madrid; and post-London (Argomaniz, 2009: 152). Following these events, the EU has tried to develop a CT strategy in order to integrate policies and coordinate actions. EU counter-terrorism policies are identified in the “European Union Action Plan to Combat Terrorism” (Council of the European Union, 2004c) and became the so-called European Counter-
Terrorism Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2005c). As argued by Bossong, “the Counter-Terrorism Strategy did little more than to repackage and better publicly present the still incoherent and ill coordinated set of EU counter-terrorism policies” (2008: 41). One of the reasons behind the lack of integration resides in the fact that each EU Member State prefers limiting the development and pooling of common instruments and capabilities under the EU umbrella, causing the current institutional status-quo and the existing gap between expectations and capabilities (Hill, 1993).

As underlined by Europol in its 2007 EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT), “terrorism in the EU is essentially a transnational phenomenon. In order to counter terrorism effectively, law enforcement needs to share information, cooperate closely and coordinate its efforts at European level” (Europol, 2007: 36). Radical Islamic terrorism in Europe is not an existential threat *per se*, but it can have disastrous consequences on state and regional stability. Even though no terrorist attack has occurred within the EU since 2005, 33 failed attempts have been recorded between March 2006 and December 2010 (Vidino, 2011: 12-13). Not only Radical Islamist terrorists are testing traditional national counter-terrorist practices, but also the willingness of national government to integrate and give up some of their power/independence on the highly guarded field of intelligence and counter-terrorism.

The literature on the question of EU counter-terrorism is divided into two arguments. On the one hand, authors perceive the EU counter-terrorist policies as a “paper tiger” (Bures, 2006; 2010), meaning that the EU is an ineffective actor. On the other hand, the EU is seen as a major contributor by increasing cooperation and coordination (Zimmermann, 2006). Because of the nature of the threat, “the politics of
counter-terrorism have contributed to the blurring of differences between the so-called three pillars established by the Maastricht Treaty” (Edwards & Meyers, 2008). The current state of the EU in CT question is in the middle of these latter arguments.

The question of homeland/internal EU counter-terrorism is extremely contentious for several reasons: first, terrorism is a transnational threat forcing governments in spite of themselves to increase their cooperation; ⁶⁶ second, many policy areas are involved in counter-terrorism, such as finance, defense, intelligence, law enforcement, social and health policies, forcing various cross-pillar agreements; and, third, the balance between national sovereignty and European interests is difficult to find as Member States “are slow to give the Union the powers (such as investigation and prosecution) and resources (such as spies and money) it would need to be truly effective” (Keohane, 2005: 3).

Last but not least, this first case study is extremely relevant to the overall and broader question of this dissertation on the EU process of integration in security and defense policies. Rightfully, HR Solana did not contribute as much as in other areas, however, this does not mean that he had no impact on the shaping and development of the field of CT. ⁶⁷ Following the bombings in Madrid in 2004, HR Solana was instrumental in shaping a more integrated approach to CT policies by increasing the horizontal information sharing between EU institutions and agencies (Duke, 2011: 48).

In a first time, the broad question of terrorism and especially jihadi terrorism would be tackled. This is followed by an historical narrative of the construction of the

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⁶⁶ “The amount of cooperation and coordination among European law-enforcement and intelligence agencies has increased considerably in recent years, [yet] there continue to be substantial problems caused by legal and political differences, national and bureaucratic rivalries, outdated classification regimes and a degree of mistrust even among close political partners” (Neumann, 2006: 80).

⁶⁷ HR Solana did have a certain impact on the creation of the Situation Center and its counter-terrorist branch as well on the appointment of the CT Czar. Last but not least the overall question of this dissertation looks at the integration process of EU security and defense policy. Even though HR Solana is a part of the research, it is only one variable among others.
field of counter-terrorism within the EU pre- and post-9/11. Then, the second section focuses on the institutional construction and routine of EU institutions and agencies dealing with the question of counter-terrorism. Last but not least, the questions of EU CT strategies and national perceptions of jihadi terrorism will complete the overall analysis.

II. Reactive Institution Building in Response to Jihadi Terrorism

1. The Threat of Radical Islamic Terrorism on European soil

Radical Islamic terrorism figures as one of the many terrorist threats facing the EU. EU Member States have encountered over the years different sorts of terrorist groups like the IRA in the UK, ETA in France and Spain, individuals like Carlos the Jackal, the Red Brigades, so on and so forth. However, a new emphasis has been placed on radical Islamic terrorism in Europe, especially since the deadly attacks of September 2001 in the US.

The literature on the root causes of terrorism is extremely large and underlines a series of variables such as poverty, injustice, modernity, perceptions of threats, religion, and Western culture (Bures, 2011: 9; Bjorgo, 2005; Richardson, 2006; Hoffman, 2006). For the purpose of this chapter, however, the focus is not on explaining the radicalization process of the so-called jihadi terrorists, but on how have EU Member States and the EU dealt with it.

On the European continent several key terrorist attacks have led to tentatively deepen cooperation between EU Member States. However, counter-terrorist experts are witnessing a shift in the origins of alleged terrorists. For example, the cell in Hamburg linked to the 9/11 attacks was composed of foreign students; Moroccan immigrants were
behind the Madrid train bombings; but the killing of Dutch filmmaker, Mr. van Gogh, in 2004 was initiated by a European-born individual (Leiken, 2005: 125). European experts argue that the radical Islamic terrorist threat in Europe is entering a new phase, the emergence of “Middle East-style political assassinations as part of the European jihadist arsenal and disclosed a new source of danger: unknown individuals among Europe’s own Muslims” (Bures, 2010b: 62-63).

This previous distinction underlines the two existing categories of jihadists in Western Europe: insiders and outsiders. The Outsiders are legal aliens such as asylum seekers or students. Oftentimes they move to Western Europe in consequence of a crackdown against Islamists in the Middle East. The other category, Insiders, is composed of second- or third-generation immigrants, who were born in Europe (Leiken, 2005: 126-27; Laqueur, 2006). This second trend, of home-grown Islamist terrorists, has considerably increased since 2006 as reported by Europol (Europol, 2007; 2008; 2009).

“The UK has become a breeding ground for Islamist extremists” as proven by the legal existence of radical mosques in London’s area (Archick, 2005: 2). Muslim communities are quite different from one country to another due to different countries of origins, models of integration, and socio-economic climax. The responses of European governments have varied.

The extension of the jihad in Western Europe took place after 9/11 and after the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. Islamist terrorists have been finding their legitimacy in the foreign policies of EU Member States, as most of them are involved in military conflicts.

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68 For further reference on the Muslim communities across Europe refer to: Bures, 2010b; Leiken, 2005.
69 For more information concerning domestic politics and debate on the question of immigration and integration refers to Archick, 2005: 4-5.
such as in Iraq and Afghanistan. The two obvious examples are Spain and Britain suffering terrorist attacks in consequence of their involvement in Iraq. Many European Muslims perceive the “war on terror” as a war on Islam, while feeling a certain hypocrisy in the European governments’ foreign policies, especially for the ones supporting the US’s war in Iraq (Archick, 2005: 3). The increase of Jihadist websites and radical groups in Europe is increasingly appealing to young European Muslims.

In recent memory two successful terrorist attacks took place inside the EU: Madrid in 2004 with 191 causalities, and London in 2005, killing 52 people and injuring over 700 (Archick, 2005: 2). Though no successful attacks have been recorded since the deadly London bombings, the threat of a future attack is real, as illustrated by many failed attempts such as the attempt to poison Rome’s water supply with cyanide-based chemicals in 2002 by Al-Qaeda; the attempt to attack targets in France with ricin and botulinum bacteria in 2004; the targeting of the Christmas market in Strasbourg, and so on (Lugna, 2006: 103). Radical Islamic terrorist groups’ rationale for those attacks is based on several points: first, to promote a specific political/religious agenda; second, to cause mass casualties among civilians.

Furthermore, not only is the EU a target of radical Islamic groups, it is also a place of recruitment and logistical support for the jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya (Lugna, 2006: 105). The EU has become a platform to prepare and initiate terrorist attacks elsewhere (Europol, 2010: 43). The examples are the planning of the 9/11 attacks that took place in Germany and Spain (Archick, 2005: 2) and the failed attack in December 2009 in an American airliner from Amsterdam to Detroit.
Because of the nature of the threat and the interdependence among Member States, radical Islamic terrorism cannot be tackled solely at the national level. The establishment of the common market, after the Single European Act of 1986, allowing the free movement of labor, capital, goods, and services, has posed four challenges to EU Member States: first, it has increased the scale of organized crime activities; second, it makes it difficult to detect illegal trafficking; third, with a more open financial system, it facilitates money-laundering; last, the free movement of people facilitate movement of terrorists across internal borders (Walsh, 2006: 627).

2. Institutional Foundation of EU Counter-Terrorist policies

a. Pre-9/11

The question of cooperation between EU Member States on the matter of terrorism emerged in the 1970s due to an emerging trend of terrorist attacks in Western Europe. In the case of the external security of the Union, MS tentatively tried to institutionalize it, which only occurred at the Maastricht Treaty. However, in the case of CT policies, MS wanted to keep this sphere outside the structure of the EU. The periods post-Maastricht and then post-9/11, marking the institutionalization of CT policies, are central in order to understand the actual limits in the integration process of CT policies. This short section reviews the origins and the intergovernmental informal framework of cooperation established by the MS prior to the Treaty of Maastricht. These informal platforms of

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70 In fact Europe and the US when facing Islamic terrorism are facing “three circles of threat:” the first one being Al-Qaeda leadership; the second one is composed of terrorist groups sharing the same transnational ideology of the leadership fighting local wars; and the last circle being individuals, jihadist freelancers (Errera, 2005: 72-74).
discussion and cooperation among MS demonstrate the sensitivity and volatility of the issue of terrorism.

“Based on their experience of foreign policy cooperation, member states decided to set up a committee of senior officials from national ministries to share information on terrorist organizations and activities” (Dinan, 2005: 561). The year 1976 marked the creation of the TREVI Group (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extrémisme et Violence Internationale), which was an intergovernmental cooperation between the 12 Member States. The group worked at the margins of the EC as the Commission and Parliament were not included. The creation of the group was a result of several intergovernmental meetings taking place earlier on between ministers, senior police and secret service officials. As argued by Dinan (2005: 562), it is difficult to measure the efficiency of the Trevi group in the fight against terrorism, however it brought justice and interior ministers together which most likely enhanced the process of European integration.

Following the first meeting of EC Interior Ministers in 1976, five working groups were implemented. As described by Bunyan, Trevi 1 focused on developing measures to combat terrorism; Trevi 2 looked at the questions of scientific and technical knowledge and police training; Trevi 3 was set up in order to deal with security procedures for civilian air travel; Trevi 4 emphasized on the issue of safety and security at nuclear installations and transport; and Trevi 5 looked at the different measures, in order to deal with emergencies such as disasters, fire prevention and fire fighting (1993). In reality, only the two first working groups – Trevi 1 and 2 – ever met.

With the Schengen Agreement and the Treaty of Maastricht several considerable transformations have affected the development of EU policies in counter-terrorism. The
The Schengen Agreement of 1985 abolished the internal borders between all participating EU Member States creating a common external border and facilitating the movement of persons between countries. The Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 created a third pillar, Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) exclusively dealing with justice and legal matters. The JHA brought the informal EPC and TREVI frameworks under the new legal and structural framework of the EU (Bures, 2006: 59; Coolsaet, 2010: 857). The Treaty of Maastricht underlined as part of the JHA that the question of “police cooperation for the purposes of preventing and combatting terrorism” is part of the common interests (TEU, 1992, K.1).

The third pillar of JHA “aimed at fostering common internal security measures and the free movement of people within EU borders” (Archick, 2004: 1). Subsequently, a new institution was created to deal with law enforcement, Europol. This institution was supposed to facilitate coordination and transparency on criminal intelligence between each Member State. However, the limit of this process has been the “information-sharing” as Member States prefer being in charge especially on terrorism-related matters.

The European Council of Madrid in 1995 identified terrorism as a threat to democracy and stability, and terrorism was also defined as acting at the global level limiting the success of sole national policies. Two years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam changed the objectives of the EU in the JHA. Thus, a name change from JHA to Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ) was implemented. “While the Treaty of Maastricht had only described common areas of interests, in which cooperation could happen in order to attain the Community objectives, the Treaty of Amsterdam made the concept of

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71 The basis of internal security can be found on the Article 2 of the TEU: “Union shall set itself the objective to maintain and develop the Union as an area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.”
Freedom, Security, and Justice an objective in itself” (Kaunert, 2010b: 52). The Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 also identified terrorism as a major threat. However, it did also split up the JHA between a communitarized areas (asylum, immigration, external border controls, judicial cooperation in civil matters) and intergovernmental matters (police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters) (Lugna, 2006: 106).

But one major stepping-stone was established during the European Council of Tampere in 1999, wherein Member States agreed on developing a common agenda on strengthening cooperation in police and justice matters, which encompasses terrorism questions. The Tampere summit laid down the foundation of the policy umbrella established by the third pillar and was an opportunity for the formulation of counter-terrorism as a unique policy field (Argomaniz, 2009: 164).

Until 9/11, “the main characteristic of counter-terrorism in Europe has been to consider terrorism a crime, to be tackled through criminal law. Counter-terrorism has long been confined within national borders, aside from sporadic ad hoc cooperation in specific cross-border dossiers” (Coolsaet, 2010: 857). From the TEU to the attacks of 9/11, the EU had remained a slow actor in the field of counter-terrorism, – even with all the institutional innovations, creation of agencies and so on – progress was extremely limited due to Member States’ concerns concerning the protection of national sovereignty affecting cooperation and sharing of information across borders and services. Thus, jihadi terrorism was not perceived as the main domestic threat, but much more an external and foreign one. 9/11 changed it all.
b. Post-9/11

As argued by Bures (2006) and Den Boer & Monar (2002), many EU counter-terrorist policies and structures already existed prior the attacks of 9/11:

One could argue that several strata of counter-terrorism activities were already in place within the EU before 11 September: institutionally, a European police office competent to deal with terrorism-related offences; legally, conventions and additional legal instruments to facilitate extradition; and operationally, direct and regular contact between the heads of the European security services, an anti-terrorism repertory, and a regular update of the security situation (Boer and Monar, 2002: 21).

The attacks of September 11, 2001 have had a direct effect on fostering the development and deepening of counter-terrorist policies at the EU level. Notably, the EU was able to enhance cross-border cooperation in sharing of information and intelligence, extending the reach of arrest warrant, and strengthening external borders of the Union (Gallis, 2002: 1). The realization that Al-Qaeda cells were using the EU’s open borders and different legal systems at their advantage, thus making their prosecution and arrest difficult from one Member State to another, created a certain sense of urgency at the European homeland level (Archick, 2004: 1). Since then, the US has perceived the EU Schengen area as a platform for planning terrorist plots on its territory.

Nine days after the attacks, the JHA Council met and agreed on a series of measures to fight terrorism, which were endorsed the next day by an extraordinary Council meeting (Kaunert, 2010a: 67). The EU launched the “Action Plan to Combat Terrorism.” At this period of time, the EU emphasis was brought more on the question of tackling international Islamic terrorism rather than homeland Islamic terrorism. Argomaniz argued that the 9/11 events marked the first critical juncture leading to the
shaping of institutions and policies (2009: 154). The Action Plan called for the adoption of instruments and measures in five areas (Bures. 2006: 60):

1. enhancing police and judicial cooperation
2. developing international legal instruments
3. putting an end to the funding of terrorism
4. strengthening air security
5. coordinating the European Union’s global action

As argued by Bossong, the European Commission seized the opportunity offered by the crisis in order to promote a security policy (2008, 34). The JHA Council of September 20th was central in promoting the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), increasing the role of Europol and Eurojust in the fight against terrorism, increasing the sharing of information and data between national intelligence services, and the increasing the degree of cooperation between police and intelligence services across countries (Bossong, 2008: 36). The second concrete evolution was the agreement on a framework decision on defining a common concept of terrorist offences (Coolsaet, 2010: 859). The 9/11 attacks led as well to the development of proposals for the Tampere Program in order to harmonize internal laws in the realm of internal security (Coolsaet, 2010: 858). The post-9/11 period was a time of reflection on the jihadi threat, but also on establishing and agreeing on common legal and judicial terms and procedures.

c. Post-Madrid and London

Three days prior to the Madrid bombings of March 2004 an EU report exposed the major shortfalls in EU cooperation on counter-terrorism, underlining the lack of resources and intelligence capacities, poor coordination among officials, and the limited implementation of EU agreements by several Member States (Bakker, 2005). But as
argued by Coolsaet the bombings at the Atocha railway station in Madrid put an end to
the national reluctance in Europe toward pooling forces and sharing information (2010: 859). Madrid was a wake up call for the EU as whole forcing a needed boost in police
and judicial cooperation among Member States.

The bombings of London and Madrid considerably affected the construction and
integration of security policies of the Union. Despite the heavy casualties, these terrorist
attacks proved that the fostering of the integration process is closely connected to MS’s
willingness to move the integration process forward. Madrid and London are evidences
that only through further integration MS can increase the security of their borders and the
chances to contain future terrorist attacks. As demonstrated throughout the dissertation
and current chapter, the integration process starts with and from MS initiative.

i. Madrid

On March 11, 2004, Madrid was the target of a radical Islamic group causing the death of
192 civilians. The deadly action “made a political necessity to accelerate the
institutionalization” of EU CT policies (Argomaniz, 2009: 158). The attacks in Madrid
helped to advance certain policies, such as the EAW, and gave a new motion to the EU
counter-terrorist strategy leading to the creation of the SitCen and the post of Counter-
terrorist Coordinator both working under the HR for CFSP, Javier Solana. As argued by
Bossong, “there was also a new emphasis on improving and speeding-up the
implementation of many outstanding issues from the original anti-terrorism roadmap so
as to improve the credibility of the EU’s efforts” (2008: 41).
The bombings in Madrid contributed to clarify the strategy and give a new political momentum. For example, the EC’s “solidarity declaration” of 2004 was intended to renew political legitimacy and cohesiveness of EU efforts in counter-terrorism (Bossong, 2008: 41). Argomaniz underlined that the solidarity clause symbolized an Europeanization of the threat (2009: 158).

Following the European Council of March 25, 2004, seven strategic objectives for the EU’s Action Plan against terrorism were developed:

1. To deepen the international consensus and enhance international efforts to combat terrorism;
2. To reduce the access of terrorists to financial and economic resources;
3. To maximize the capacity within EU bodies and Member States to detect, investigate and prosecute terrorists and to prevent terrorist attacks;
4. To protect the security of international transport and ensure effective systems of border control;
5. To enhance the capability of the European Union and of member States to deal with the consequences of a terrorist attack;
6. To address the factors which contribute to support for, and recruitment into, terrorism;
7. To target actions under EU external relations towards priority Third Countries where counter-terrorist capacity or commitment to combating terrorism needs to be enhanced (Council of the EU, 2004b).

These points went further than the previous Tampere’s agreement by underlining the need to increase information-sharing between agencies and Member States. Furthermore, the Council meeting of March 2004 addressed for the first time the “root causes” of terrorism (Coolsaet, 2010: 860). The causes behind terrorism have been identified as radicalization, regional conflicts, failed states, education, globalization and socio-economic factors (Coolsaet, 2010: 867).

The Madrid bombings contributed in speeding up the process and trying to overcome the shortcomings. The Commission proposed a list of processes in order to
fight terrorism at the EU level (European Commission, 2004). One of the points stressed was the need to improve the sharing of intelligence and information among national authorities and at the EU level. The Commission also clarified the fact that no new institutions or bodies should be created. “[The EU] put existing Community, Union, international and national - networks in dialogue among themselves rather than losing time destroying existing and creating new procedurally time-consuming institutions and bodies” (European Commission, 2004). The need for improvement is on the information sharing and coordination. The only institutional evolution was the creation of the post of the Coordinator on Counter-terrorism in order to integrate the policies and lower the shortcomings. Such a post was created by the HR.

The post-Madrid period marked a Brusselization of counter-terrorist policies through the creation of new bodies and deepening of other agencies’ mandates such as Europol (Argomaniz, 2009: 160). However, neither the Hague Programme nor the Declaration or the Action Pan were successful in providing clear strategic guidance (Bures, 2011: 71).

At the domestic level, the bombing in Madrid led to a period of political instability and crisis. Following the attack, many Spaniards expressed their opposition to the Aznar government by claiming that “the tragedy would not have occurred if the Spanish government had not gotten involved in US President George W. Bush’s ‘war on terrorism’” (Cariboni, 2004). In addition, the Aznar administration mismanaged the post-attack period by claiming that the ETA, Basque terrorist group, was behind the attack. Spanish citizens read such political move as a way for the Aznar government to capitalize on the attack through the manipulation of information (Blakeley, 2006: 334-36). The
following Sunday or three days after the terrorist attack was a day of elections, which saw the rise of the socialist party, PSOE, led by Mr. Zapatero, a vocal opponent to Spanish contribution to the war in Iraq. Not only the Madrid attack led to a self-reflection on the role of the EU in CT matter, but also affected national politics.

ii. London

A year later London suffered from a series of bombings consequently leading the way to the adoption of a European Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Council of the EU, 2005c). “The July 2005 London bombings acted as a booster for enhanced cooperation” (Coolsaet, 2010: 860). London was struck by two attacks, one on July 7th 2005 causing the death of 52, and a failed one on July 21st of the same year. The UK held at that time the presidency (June to December) making the question of counter-terrorism on absolute priority. Following the 2005 attacks, the EU interior ministers agreed on implementing a series of measures: European evidence warrant; strengthening of Schengen and visa information systems; biometric passports; combatting terrorist financing; preventing recruitment and radicalization. Furthermore, the London attacks “led to an important change in the perception of the terrorist threat in Europe, [...] to homegrown terrorism as a product of intra-EU radicalization processes and terrorist recruitment” (Bures, 2011: 71).

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72 In an interesting article, Blakeley claims that the terrorist attacks of March 14, 2004 were not the sole factor leading to a change of government (2006). Blakeley argues that in fact the last four years of the PP government were the overall reason for the election of the PSOE. One example was the growing gap between the government and the Spanish citizens over the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Spaniards were principally opposed to the war at 87.5% (Blakeley, 2006: 333). Ultimately, “the bombings acted as a catalyst for change by shining the spotlight on past episodes which, had the bombings not occurred, may have remained at the edge of public consciousness rather than being hurled centre stage” (Blakeley, 2006: 346).
The UK also called for a EU strategy, which was very similar to the UK’s. The strategy identified four objectives/pillars: prevent, protect, pursue and respond. Prevent was concerned about the root causes of terrorism; protect consists in increasing the protection of citizens and infrastructure; pursue, as part of efforts to investigate, pursue terrorists across EU borders; and, respond, by enhancing management mechanisms. The strategy was adopted at the European Council in December 2005. The EU Strategy illustrates a shift to a crisis management approach to terrorism (Bures, 2011: 72). Furthermore, the Council adopted a Strategy for Combating Radicalization and Recruitment to Terrorism. The concept of radicalization has been identified as the main aspect of the EU counter-terrorist strategy as opposed to the other root causes identified a year earlier.

On a national level, one can draw similitudes with the 2004 Madrid attacks. British government led by Mr. Blair was also a supporter of the “war on terror” and also led Britain in Iraq on the sides of the US and Spain. British foreign policy was undeniably one of the reasons leading to a terrorist attack. The difference with Spain is that Britain, a more influential MS within the Union, was able to push forward its national CT strategy into the one of the Union. The power and influence of MS like Britain, France, and Germany have historically been a driving force in fostering the integration process in security and defense policies.

3. Legal Framework of Terrorism
The notion of terrorism is extremely complex and widely contested due to the existence of variety of definition and legal framework. In the case of the EU, terrorism is not
understood as an ideology or movement, but rather as a tactic or method for attaining political goals. This view was reflected in the Council Framework Decision of June 13, 2002 on Combatting Terrorism (Council of the EU, 2002). In the case of this chapter, the 2002 EU definition of terrorism will be the baseline.

The form of terrorism is often categorized according to their political motivations. As defined by Europol, four categories of terrorism, defined by their general motivations, exist with different agenda (Europol, 2007: 10):

- Islamic terrorism (ex: Al-Qaeda): motivated by an extreme interpretation of Islam and the use of violence is seen as a divine duty/sacramental act
- left-wing terrorist groups (ex: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Army): seeking for an entire change of the social, economic and political system to an leftist ideological model inspired by Leninist-Marxist ideology
- right-wing terrorist groups: seeking to change the entire social and political system by a extreme right model inspired by the late National Socialism.

Legally, domestic terrorism diverges from international and/or transnational terrorism. Domestic terrorism is confined within one country’s border, while transnational terrorism concerns several states making their policies interdependent. Without going into depth on the legal question, 9/11 proved the limits of a dis-integrated legal system in a borderless Union. Terrorist and other organized crime groups have been using this system to their advantage as extradition for example takes several months. Furthermore, the 9/11 attacks exposed the fact that EU Member States did not share a common definition and understanding of terrorism. Some Member States had divergent anti-terrorist legislations (Archick, 2004: 2).\(^73\)

\(^73\) France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the UK
Ultimately, the EU worked on the development of a common definition of terrorism in 2001 during the European Council trying to agree on a Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. In December 2001, EU Member States reached an agreement that “defines as terrorist offenses various types of crimes committed with the intent to intimidate a population or destabilize a country’s political or economic system” (Archick, 2004: 3). The Council framework of 2002 on combating terrorism brought a common definition of terrorism among EU Member States. This framework established a common definition of terrorist offences, the penalties, and jurisdiction and prosecution (Council of the EU, 2002). The 2008 Council framework decision went further than the previous one as it includes additional elements into the definition of terrorism and its offences such as public provocation, recruitment for terrorism and training for terrorism (Council of the European Union, 2008a). The 2008 framework addresses the shortfall of the first one as proven by the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London. The 2008 framework is oriented towards the rise of home-grown Islamic terrorists. Germany, France, the Netherlands, and especially the UK have observed this new trend of home-grown jihadists around mosques and immigrant neighborhoods.

The agreement at the EU level on a common definition of terrorism could seem to be a bureaucratic frivolity. However, a common definition is necessary and a considerable starting point in order for police forces to pursue terrorists and suspects across borders.

The 2002 Council framework was then amended by another Council framework in 2008.
4. Counter-Terrorist Policies

What are the tools and policies that can be either designed or implemented by a state or a group of states to counter terrorism? What are the approaches in dealing with terrorism? What are the methods of counter-terrorism chosen by the EU and its MS? Not surprisingly, the US and the Europeans have taken divergent roads in dealing with jihadi terrorism.

a. US Approach

Soon after the 9/11 attacks, the US strategy to counter-terrorism consisted in launching the “global war on terror.” The US strategy has been perceived as a war between the US and the terrorists. During the Bush’s presidency, the US has been involved in fighting terrorism by sponsoring regime change through the use of force, as it has been the case in Afghanistan and Iraq. As underlined by Coolsaet, the Bush administration claimed that the root causes were in fact “evil” rather than political/religious motivations (2010: 860). Furthermore, the US has had difficulties admitting and addressing the rise of home-grown terrorists. Americans, until recently, consider that the threat is located abroad – in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, and other places. President Obama has changed the narratives of the “war on terror” but still remains committed to the similar tactics and strategies implemented by his predecessor.

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75 Such feeling and perceptions have not changed. As proven by the latest terrorist attempts in Portland, New York, Fort Worth and other in the US, the question of home-grown terrorism has not been addressed. The Presidency of Obama has not changed the perceptions and even the narratives emanating for the US government on this matter have been very shy.
b. EU Approach

The European approach does not fit with the US strategy as it is perceived as “overactive and military driven” (Keohane, 2005: 7). Europeans do not see the US approach as a commitment to a long-term solution, but rather short-term militarized operations. The European approach is instead oriented towards addressing the “root causes” of terrorism. Furthermore, Europeans have expressed a problem in the narratives developed by Washington. Andréani’s article untitled *The war on Terror: Good cause, wrong concept* (2005) underlined the metaphorical problem with this expression reflecting the US strategy.

European governments have been more careful in their condemnation of terrorist activities for two reasons: first, terrorism has existed in Europe for centuries and major nationalist groups, such as ETA and the IRA, have been part of the political spectrum; second, with a large Muslim population, European governments cannot create a domestic clash of civilization that could lead to increasing the process of radicalization of young European Muslims (Keohane, 2005: 7-8). Ultimately, France, one of the EU MS with the largest Muslim population, as the other EU Member States have adopted a response against terrorism based on law enforcement rather than on the US overseas military actions’ approach (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 8).

Originally, after 9/11, EU Member States viewed terrorism as an external threat rather than internal and sought to deal with this threat through international actions and dialogues with states wherein terrorists emerged. It is only after proofs brought by the Dutch intelligence service (AIVD) that processes of radicalization and recruitment took place within the EU, that the understanding of the threats changed (Coolsaet, 2010: 868).
The murders of Pim Fortuyn, libertarian Dutch politicians, in 2002, and Theo van Gogh, filmmaker, in 2004 by lone wolf activists led the Dutch intelligence service to approach the problem of terrorism from a different angle (Coolsaet, 2010: 868). Only in 2003-04, the idea of home-grown terrorism germinated within security and intelligence circles in Europe. The AIVD introduced the notion of “decentralization of Islamist terrorism” (Coolsaet, 2010: 868).

Other intelligence services started to pay attention to radical Islamic circles in Europe especially in the UK. Young home-ground radical Islamists have gone to Pakistan and Afghanistan to receive training in order to carry attacks in Europe or plan attacks in the US. The 2005 “European Union strategy for combating radicalization and recruitment to terrorism” identified Al-Qaeda as the main terrorist threat to the Union in recent years (Council of the EU, 2005b: 1). This strategy tends to address the root causes of terrorism as radicalization and emergence of extremist thoughts by focusing on three levels: the national level (and even local one) wherein Member States need to combat radicalization and terrorism recruitment through social programs; at the European level, with an increase in cooperation in sharing information and the Commission channeling the information; at the international level, wherein the EU can play a role through political debate and assistance programs (Council of the EU, 2005b: 6). Europeans have agreed on not developing a “war approach” to dealing with Islamic terrorism, but instead implementing a long-term approach (Bures, 2010b: 71). Moreover, the US under Bush’s administration portrayed Islamic terrorists as fanatics and evil, while the Europeans did not join the US on it but took a more inward looking to the problem (Bures, 2010b: 71).
The European approach is based on police and court systems. Europeans, as explained by Leiken, developed an alternative strategy in shaping their counter-terrorist strategy by implementing “criminal surveillance and traditional prosecutions to launching a US-style ‘war on terrorism’ and mobilizing the military, establishing detention centers, enhancing border security, requiring machine-readable passports, expelling hate preachers, and lengthening notoriously light sentences for convicted terrorists” (2005, 130). The criminal justice model has been the base of the EU counter-terrorist policy and is materialized in the institutions, structures and agencies developed to fight radical Islamic terrorism.

III. Institutional Architecture in EU Counter-terrorism Policies: Agents’ Roles

As integrated as the EU counter-terrorism policies have become, it has never been planned to replace national policies. Until today, the “EU’s contribution has always been presented as a complement to national efforts, where added value was possible and desirable” (Coolsaet, 2010: 872). “The EU has no direct role in ensuring the internal security of its Member States. EU institutions are not actively engaged in the day-to-day business of preventing terrorist attacks: their chief contribution is to ensure that the legal and practical structures for counter-terrorism cooperation are robust and effective” (Brady, 2009: 7).

The institutional framework is extremely complex as each major EU institution control one dimension of the CT policies: the Council of the EU which includes the Secretary, Committees and Contact Groups; the Commission; agencies; and Member States (Lugna, 2006: 107). In this section, EU instruments and agencies will be directly
analyzed. Focusing on this institutional network is quite relevant to the overall question of integration of EU security policies. The vast network of institutions, agencies, and informal platforms is by itself a challenge to shaping a common approach considering the varieties of institutional and agency cultures affecting the development of common policies and actions. Furthermore, EU institutions and agencies are at the mercy of the MS controlling the gathering of information and the flow of their sharing among themselves and the European structures. This aspect cannot be underestimated as information is key in order to be successful in fighting terrorism. HR Solana tried to alleviate this by developing a branch within the SitCen and most importantly creating a central actor, the Counter-Terrorist Coordinator. This jungle of institutions and agencies dependent on the MS willingness to share power and provide information contribute to the tragedy of the integration process of the EU security policy.

1. European Arrest Warrant

One of the first actions after 9/11 was the implementation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The idea of the EAW germinated during the Tampere Council of 1999 as a way to improve the extradition process of criminals and terrorists. Because of the opposition by certain Member States, like Italy, the EAW was only adopted during the Laeken Summit in December 2001, with its legal adoption in 2002. The 9/11 events contributed to fostering the process of adoption forcing “the European leaders to recognize that the EU’s open borders and legal systems allowed terrorists and other criminals to evade arrest and prosecution” (Bures, 2006: 61). The EAW offers a speedier process in the

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76 For an overall picture of the institutions refer to Lugna (2006) and the Figure 4.1 in this chapter.
extradition procedures between EU Member States. However, the implementation of the EAW faced legal and institutional problems with three Member States, Germany, Poland and Cyprus. Each Member State had to reform their constitutions in order to adopt the EAW (Kaunert, 2010a: 87).

Kaunert argues that the Commission was the central actor in pushing for the adoption of the EAW (2010a: 76-82). He described the Commission as a supranational policy entrepreneur. Kaunert argues that the EAW is an important component in the European integration process for two reasons: first, it is part of the high-politics of nation-state; second, this new policy instrument affects the restructuration of Member States’ relations on the question of extradition (2010a: 69). For these reasons, some see an infringement of national sovereignty as the EAW appears to expand EU’s supranational legal power (Stevenson, 2003). Legally, the EAW is important as it is seen as creating a transnational or “European” law, a European extradition law (Kaunert, 2010a: 71).

2. Counter-terrorist Instruments within the Council Secretariat

The SitCen and the Counter-terrorism Coordinator have been created soon after the Madrid bombings in 2004. Both are directly linked to the Council Secretariat, most precisely under the HR. HR Solana has been instrumental in the creation of the post of the CTC as well as pushing for the inclusion of a counter-terrorist unit within SitCen.

a. The EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator (CTC):

The position of Coordinator – also called Mr. Terrorism or the European terrorism czar –
was established by HR Solana after the Madrid bombings in March 2004. The CTC is often regarded as the Union’s flagship initiative in counter-terrorism in post-Madrid period (Argomaniz, 2009: 159). The Council welcomed the appointment of Mr. Gijs de Vries, a former Dutch interior minister, by HR Solana. According to the 2004 “Declaration on Combating Terrorism,” the position is defined as:

The Coordinator, who will work within the Council Secretariat, will co-ordinate the work of the Council in combating terrorism and, with due regard to the responsibilities of the Commission, maintain an overview of all the instruments at the Union’s disposal with a view to regular reporting to the Council and effective follow-up of Council decisions (Council of the EU, 2004b).

In sum, his role is to limit shortcomings and harmonize coordination in CT matters. The CT Coordination’s job is “to get governments to give EU agreements the force of law and to work with agencies like Europol and SitCen to brief the Member States on threat. But […] he] does not have powers to set policy or force Member States to implement EU rules” (Brady, 2009: 18). CTC de Vries declared in an interview that “the role of the Union is not to supplant our member states but to support them in working internationally. But the main thrust of Europe's defense against terrorism remains firmly at the level of national governments” (in Laitner, 2005). EU officials, especially in the field of security and defense, spend a considerable among of time re-affirming the primacy of the MS over the power of the Union. HR Solana understood this very well.

On September 19, 2007, Mr. Gilles de Kerchove, was appointed by HR Solana as the new EU CTC. In an interview published in 2009, he explained the challenge of the job as he needs to coordinate with the three major institutions: the Commission, the
Council and the European Parliament plus the 27 Member States (Eurojust, 2009).\textsuperscript{77} Since his appointment, he has focused on two aspects: first, strengthening cooperation between Eurojust and Europol in CT questions; second, on increasing the flow of information sharing between Member States and EU agencies. In 2009 he also talked about “CT fatigue” explaining the decline in EU CT activities due to: first, no major attacks had occurred since 2005; second, no new instruments seem needed (Coolsaet, 2010: 861).

At first, the position of CTC was not welcome by all the Member States after the attacks in Madrid. “Britain, France, Germany, Spain and Italy – effectively all Member States with advanced intelligence and counter-terrorism capabilities – vetoed the idea of a counter-terrorism czar and a pan-European intelligence agency” (Zimmermann, 2006: 134). Britain, for example, did not believe in the need to establish a new body for coordination. Whereas, EU officials were calling for deeper coordination, as one official quoted argued that “We [the EU] have to have something worth coordinating. It is inconceivable that any Member State had information about the atrocity in Madrid and didn’t share it. The more people are involved, the more reluctant people are to hand over information because the more likely it is to leak out and compromise their security services” (in Browne & Watson, 2004). Ultimately, the CTC does not have real power apart from persuasion (Bures, 2011: 2). This was also the karma of Solana as first HR of the Union. Sometime influence and persuasion are more powerful than institutions.

\textsuperscript{77} The CTC has “direct access to the President of the European Council, the High Representative, and all the relevant commissioners, as well as the pertinent ministries of the Member States” (Coolsaet, 2010: 862).
b. The EU Situation Center (SitCen)\textsuperscript{78}

The origin of SitCen can be traced back to the creation of the position of the HR in 1999, but it was formally created in 2000. SitCen is directly connected to the office of the HR and is part of the Council’s Secretariat.\textsuperscript{79}

The role of the SitCen is to contribute to early warning work of the Council and the EU through: the situation monitoring 24/7; situation assessments; providing organizational infrastructure for crisis taskforces; assisting in the EU field activities, the HR, EUSR, and so on (House of Lords, 2009). SitCen is an organ composed of national intelligence experts analyzing Member States’ assessments limiting its independence. However, Member States’ intelligence services decide on the type and nature of information that they wish to share and send to SitCen. The SitCen is dependent on Member States for information but also as national experts second the work of SitCen. SitCen also receives information from Member States’ diplomatic services, intelligence and security services.

Initially, SitCen was created in order to assess international threats, but in 2005 its focus was turned toward internal threat assessments fed by national intelligence agencies (Coolsaet, 2010: 865). Following the Madrid bombing, HR Solana did play a role in bringing a counter-terrorist unit within SitCen starting its operation on February 1, 2005 (Duke, 2011: 48). The decision to develop a CT unit came around the same time of appointing a Counter-Terrorist Coordinator. Since 2005, “SitCen provides the Council

\textsuperscript{78} The EU’s Joint Situation Center, also called SitCent, is one of the least studies agencies not because of a lack of interests, but because of the scarcity of information concerning it. EU and national officials always remain extremely vague on the matter, and EU experts have limited information on it or simply do not want to share information.

\textsuperscript{79} The SitCen was initially created in order to provide briefings and lines of communication to the HR, as well as news brief to the MS. With Solana’s increasing engagement in the Middle East and the Balkans, SitCen became inadequate. 9/11 provided the needed boost in order to transform SitCen into a more robust intelligence gathering platform (Duke, 2011: 45).
with strategic analysis of the terrorist threat based on intelligence from the Member States’ security and intelligence services” (Lugna, 2006: 112). From there, SitCen’s files combine intelligence gathered and share it with Europol (Brady, 2009: 8). Thanks to SitCen and Europol, the EU has the capacity to produce its own threat assessment reports (Argomaniz, 2009: 160).

Despite its possible positive contribution to intelligence gathering, sharing and analysis, SitCen has many considerable weaknesses. First, there is a certain aura of suspicion around SitCen from Member States, as they are concerned that they could be bypassed by the EU. But during a hearing before the House of Lords in 2010, Commissioner Malmström guaranteed that the SitCen was not an EU tentative in order to build a EU intelligence center (House of Lords, 2010: 6). SitCen has caused major problems to powerful European capitals as it has been perceived as an EU attempt to become in a long-run a powerful intelligence unit thanks to its centralized role. Second, as explained during a hearing before the House of Lords, “the EU counter-terrorism coordinator has no managerial or hierarchical relationship with SitCen and its staff. That said, he is the key interlocutor for EU SitCen in the CT area and whenever there is a significant event with a possible terrorism aspect the EU counter-terrorism coordinator is instantly alerted and kept informed throughout the crisis about the situation by the EU SitCen” (House of Lords, 2009). The lack of institutional coordination considerably affects the effectiveness of EU CT policies. Last but least, SitCen is extremely dependent on the intelligence gathering and contributions from MS. As argued by former director of SitCen, Mr. Shapcott, “SitCen, of course, has had no operational role so it has been limited essentially to sharing assessed intelligence with a view to producing evaluations
to support policy-makers in Brussels” (in House of Lords, 2010: 17). SitCen raises the question of information-sharing and national security. As underlined by former director of SitCen, national intelligence agencies do share information with foreigners and other Member States. However, the main problem for sharing nations is the “notion of sharing with a lot of foreigners” (in House of Lords, 2010: 17). These concerns are not minors and considerably affect the contributions of SitCent to fighting terrorism. Unfortunately, the Lisbon Treaty did not address these shortfalls.

3. The Increasing Power and Influence of Independent Agencies
   a. Europol

Europol was established by a provision in the Treaty of Maastricht. It originally started in 1994 as the Europol Drugs Unit (EDU). Progressively, other tasks were brought on Europol’s agenda such as terrorist activities. However, “Europol was unable to commence full activities until 1999, when the Europol Convention was finally ratified by all EU Member States” (Bures, 2006: 59). Since 1999, Europol’s mandate has increased to terrorism. A year after the extension of its mandate to terrorism, Europol started to be involved on the question of Islamic terrorism on top of its other tasks. After 9/11, Europol was asked to establish a Task Force for the Fight against Terrorism, activated in November of the same year (Den Boer, 2003: 11).

Following the Council of September 21, 2001, the Counter Terrorist Task Force (CTTF) was created within Europol. It became fully operational after the bombings in Madrid. The CCTF is supposed to collect data, analyze them, and develop a threat

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80 Europol’s tasks are fighting illegal trafficking; illegal immigration; terrorism; forgery; money-laundering

One of the bottom lines is that Europol is a work in progress, which needs to establish its credibility vis-à-vis national police forces, intelligence and security services. However, the enhancement of intelligence sharing and enforcement of policies needs to go through Europol. Europol’s yearly publication TE-SAT has become an important instrument assessing the threats of terrorism in Europe. Europol can contribute to counter-terrorism in two fashions: first, if it can produces something that Member States can do; second, the responsibility for certain form of intelligence product is transferred at the EU level (Bures, 2008: 509). But Europol has been at the heart of national skepticism. One major problem concerns information and intelligence sharing. Member States tend to bypass Europol and share information directly bilaterally. European intelligence services and police forces remain skeptical on the role and contribution of Europol, as it is perceived to limit their power and autonomy. “In the past, the main obstacle for Europol has always been the voluntary character of the information flow from national capitals to the Europol headquarters” (Coolsaet, 2010: 862). Thus national services do not want to lose their independence.

However, as underlined by Bures, there are divergences of perceptions within EU Member States on the role of Europol. For example, some Member States – the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium – would like to see the evolution of Europol into a role similar to the FBI in the US, while other Member States – Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the UK – would rather want to keep the institution as a coordinating platform (Bures,
European powerhouses in counter-terrorism fear for the secrecy and confidentiality of their information and sources, and it is even “harder,” as argued by the Head of Europol, Mr. Wainwright, “to convince those in the counter-terrorist environment” (in House of Lords, 2010: 53).

According to Shapcott, Europol is an underexploited tool considering its operational work and could do more if Member States used it more (in House of Lords, 2010: 19). Europol could find a role in providing a common terrorist threat assessment at the strategic level, something the EU and Member States lack (Bures, 2008: 510). Without such threat assessment, which is problematic to establish, it is difficult to set priorities and policies accordingly to the real threat.

b. The Judiciary Branch of CT: Eurojust

Development of a EU’s permanent judicial cooperation unit was decided around the same time than the EAW. Eurojust was established by the European Council of Tampere in 1999, as the Council held a meeting on the creation of an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU. In order to contribute to the fight against organized crime, the Council decided that a body (Eurojust) should be created and composed of national prosecutors, magistrates, and police officers detached by EU Member States. In December 2000, Pro-Eurojust was established as a provisional judicial cooperation unit. Its main purpose was to be a round-table between prosecutors of EU Member States. Eurojust is composed of two dimensions: on one side, high-level team of senior magistrates, judges, and legal experts; and on the other side, national representatives forming the College of Eurojust (Bures, 2010a: 238).
But with the attacks of 9/11, the EU and its Member States understood the challenges caused by terrorism at the local, national, regional and international levels. In consequence, Eurojust was created in 2002 and is an independent body composed of magistrates from EU Member States (Lugna, 2006: 114). Its tasks are to stimulate new cooperative arrangements between Member States and improve preexisting judicial cooperation (Brown, 2010: 123).

Even prior to 9/11, Eurojust considered the question of counter-terrorism as an important matter and often held discussion on issue of radical Islamic terrorism (Bures, 2010a: 239). Following 9/11, Eurojust organized meetings with EU Member States on the matter at three levels: operational level, national counter-terrorism magistrates focusing on ongoing investigations; tactical level, Eurojust representatives trying to gather information from Member States; and strategic level, annual meetings wherein Member States are reminded to share information with Eurojust (Bures, 2010a: 240).

Anti-terrorism coordination meetings have taken place since 2001, during the Pro-Eurojust phase, before Eurojust became part of the EU structure. The Pro-Eurojust was composed of seven magistrates from different EU countries dealing with Islamic radical terrorism. The establishment of the Terrorist Team has the role of ensuring coherence in terrorism coordination meetings, enhance exchange of information, and establish a general database of legal documents related to terrorism (Lugna, 2006: 114).

One of the main problems was the lack of trust among experts leading ultimately to a poor degree of cooperation. After 9/11, Pro-Eurojust included 15 EU Member States in order to discuss CT matters. Following this first meeting, several additional CT meetings were organized. In 2002 a Council Framework Decision established the first
common approach to terrorism offenses leading to national debates and ultimately to national legislation on counter-terrorism. Following the Madrid terrorist attacks, a Counter-Terrorism (CT) Team was created within Eurojust. The focus of the CT team is based on framing strategic and tactical coordination, while maintaining cooperation with Europol and the CTC.

The dependence on Member States is such that the potential of Eurojust has not been use at its full capacities. EU Member States have developed a minimalist approach in the use of Eurojust, as well as for Europol. Also the shortcoming of inter-agency cooperation with Europol is considerable because of mistrust between one another (Bures, 2010a: 252).

4. Outside the Council

Outside the EU structures a number of working groups are meeting in order to discuss and adjust national counter-terrorist policies accordingly. They deserve attention as they affect the making of EU policies in CT matters. These platform tend to be better seen from national governments as they are not part of the EU structures.

a. EU Working Groups

Following the Treaty of Maastricht, three working groups dealing with terrorism were created. The first one, part of the second pillar, the Working Party on terrorism (COTER) has been in charged of the external dimension of counter-terrorism. The second group, Terrorism Working Group (TWG), part of the Third Pillar, focuses on internal threat
assessments, and cooperation and coordination between EU structures. And the third group, the CP931, has been in charged of listing and de-listing terrorist suspects.

b. Counter Terrorism Group (CTG)

Intelligence and security services of Member States have met for several years in order to deal with terrorist question, under the informal structure of the “Club of Bern.” Following the 9/11 attacks, the same protagonists decided to establish a Counter-terrorism cooperation group, called the Counter Terrorism Group (CTG). The CTG meets every three months under the chairmanship of the current holder of the EU presidency, but outside of the Council’s structures (Lugna, 2006: 114).

The main purpose of the CTG is to tackle the threat of Islamic terrorism by fostering cooperation within the European intelligence services community. The role of the CTG consists in covering a range of “technical operations between, essentially, operational cooperation and it provides a framework for Member States to do some of that cooperation bilaterally” (House of Lords, 2010: 18). Up to today the 27 Member States plus Norway and Switzerland are members of the CTG, explaining why the CTG is not part of the Community’s structures.

c. EU Police Chiefs Task Force (PCTF)

This task force came into being in 2000 and meets every six months. The PCTF is headed by the presiding Member State of the EU. It is a “forum for EU police chides to engage in dialogue with each other and with Europol on best practices and trends in cross-border crime” (Archick, 2004: 27). This forum contributes to sharing practices and information
and planning join operations (Lunga, 2006: 116). One of the priorities of the group is to enhance cooperation between police services and Europol.

Working below the level of the PCTF, the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), established in 1979, provides operational communication between EU Member States police forces at the level of the heads of national counter-terrorism bodies (Lunga, 2006: 116). They meet twice a year.

5. Limits and Thoughts
The pace of European counter-terrorist policymaking is not dictated by politicians, but by the terrorists themselves (Bakker, 2005). The role of institutions, agencies and other bodies has been central in the development of a EU homeland counter-terrorist policy. As argued by Walsh, mistrust between different actors and Member States is one of the fundamental barriers to information-sharing (2006: 626).

During the last decade the focus has been on building new technologies and institutions – databases, committees and so on – in order to foster cooperation and sharing between EU Member States. “But on many occasions the Member States have not perceived it as in their interests to engage in such sharing on a regular basis because of mistrust. But EU institutions simply are not designed to overcome this mistrust” (Walsh, 2006: 639). In order to overcome such problems, Walsh argued that EU institutions should become more powerful in monitoring Member States’ compliance with bidding agreement on information sharing (2006: 639). Such scenario is very unlikely considering the fact that Member States would not give up their sovereignties in
one of the most vital components of their national security, unless a major future terrorist attacks occurs in more than one state simultaneously.

On the other hand, the multiplication of bodies outside EU structures and others within the EU has been caused by “the frustration of some Member States with the difficulties of reaching EU-wide consensus” (Bures, 2008: 511). The following graph published in 2004 shows the complexity of coordinating a common approach on CT and having strong information sharing.  

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81 This graph is outdated, however, it gives an interesting outlook of the cross pillars/institutions and different levels that the question of CT touches on.
Coolsaet argued that “the EU counter-terrorism architecture cannot but reflect the intricate web of overlapping decision-making levels and authorities that characterizes the EU itself” (2010: 872). This institutional jungle does not offer a propitious environment
in order to foster integration and cooperation and building confidence between MS and institutions.

IV. From European Strategy to National Perceptions

1. Shaping a EU Strategy on Counter-terrorism

Radical Islamist terrorist groups in Europe are a serious threat to security, but not the only one. As argued by Keohane, one of the “nightmare scenario for security official would be to discover, after a terrorist attack, that another EU government had held crucial information about a suspected attacker” (2005: 1). This is where the EU has an important role to play: shaping a common strategy on CT in order to identify common threats and objectives, and bring all the Member States at the same level of cooperation and coordination. Thus, the threat is much more Europeanized considering the borderless nature of the EU justifying the need for a concerted and collective security (Monar, 2007: 296-297).

The 2005 London attacks brought a new wake-up call leading to the creation of a “European Union Counter-terrorism Strategy.” The EU strategy, closely grounded on the British one as the UK held the rotating presidency during the second half of 2005, is based on four pillars: “Prevent,” “Protect,” “Pursue” and “Respond.” This strategy has remained the starting point for EU counter-terrorist strategy.
Such a strategy outlines the guidelines for actions and defines the adequate actors in accordance with the threats. Even though the Strategy contributed to improving the communication with the EU, “it did not live up to a stricter definition of strategy, which would present a clear set of priorities and make corresponding resource commitments” (Bossong, 2008: 42). The 2005 strategy “was mostly intended to show how the EU’s existing responsibilities were relevant to national counter-terrorism efforts both before (prevent and protect) and after (pursue and pretend)” (Brady, 2009: 7-8).

From this four pillars strategy it has been argued that the pillar “Protect” stands in the hand of the Commission; the “Pursue,” in the Member States’ powers; and limited
progress in Prevent and Respond (Coolsaet, 2010: 865). The first pillar, “Protect,” security standards at the EU-level have been developed in areas such as aviation and maritime security thanks to regulations issued by the Commission. The second pillar focusing on “Pursue,” consists of going after terrorists across borders and has been seen as positive. The use of the EAW by police forces has proven an efficient tool to prosecute suspects. Member States have increasingly been cooperating in case of cross-border investigations. The third pillar, “Respond,” has fallen short of its expectation. Member States have kept this dimension under their control. The crisis management dimension is important to the credibility of national authorities. Ultimately, the “appeals to create a US-style Homeland Security Department at the EU level have thus understandably failed to gain any traction” (Coolsaet, 2010: 866). The last pillar, “Prevent,” looks at limiting the recruitment of terrorist, while lowering the possibility for radicalization.

The questions of radicalization and recruitment are major components of the EU strategy. It represents one pillar, prevent, of the EU counter-terrorist strategy. However, because it is such a political problem, “it is a measure of the determination of the Member States to cooperate in the prevention of terrorism that they managed to overcome their differences and forge a collective approach” (De Kerchove & van Reedt Dortland, 2008: 148).

However, the strategy has fallen short because of a lack of implementation, and a weak counter-terrorist coordinator. The strategy offers a blueprint for action, but the EU has remained extremely weak especially in the “respond” pillar.
2. The EU’s Response to Jihadist Threats in Europe: Data versus Perceptions

“Most of the powers and capabilities in the field of counter-terrorism still remain with the member states, are subject to national threat perceptions and political discourses and are protected against any form of ‘communitarization’ by strong, persisting, notions of national sovereignty and the principle of territoriality of law enforcement” (Monar, 2007: 293). The national threat perceptions have had a considerable impact on trying to solve the problem of terrorism and radicalization at the national level rather than bringing it to the Union level.

a. EU Narratives

Europol’s narrative through the publication of its influential reports, TE-SATs, since 2005 is comforting the main perceptions that Islamic terrorism is the principal threat. However, in the TE-SATs, a large section of the report focuses on other sorts of terrorist activities. When touching on the question of radical Islamic terrorism, the narratives are extremely cautious and neutral avoiding any links between Islam and terrorism. The reports use instead the concept of “Islamic extremism.”

From the standpoint of the Commission, the Commission at several occasions has criticized the “culture of secrecy” maintained by Member States limiting the sharing of information. The Commission has been very involved in the shaping of the CT field at the Union and is trying to increase its power. However, the MS are opposed and closely monitoring the role of the Commission in CT matters.
b. Reality of the Jihadist Threats in Europe

Based on the work published on a yearly basis by Europol, TE-SAT, the data has shown that there is a gap between the reality of the jihadist threat and the actions undertaken to limit it. According to the numbers (figures 4.3; 4.4; 4.5; 4.6), there is a gap between the actual threat of radical Islamic terrorism and the perceived threat. Furthermore, it is difficult “to speak about common public perception of the threat lying behind the EU’s definition of the common threat” (Monar, 2007: 301).

The fear/obSESSION behind radical Islamic terrorism does not match with the actual threat presented in the Europol’s TE-SAT over the years. There is a certain gap between the perceptions of the threat and the actual danger of it. Especially when the case of radical Islamic terrorism is compared with the other kinds of terrorist activities in Europe, the emphasis on jihadi terrorism is much higher (Figure 4.3).

The degree of threat perceptions vary from old Member States, with 10 per cent, to new Member States, with 2 percent (Monar, 2007: 300). This can be explained by the previous exposure to terrorist attacks, domestic politics, and cultural attitudes.
Even though, between 2001 and 2006, 31 jihadi terrorist incidents were identified (Bakker, 2008: 73-74), and then 5 from 2006 to 2009 (Figure 4.4), the threat remains considerable and could have had disastrous consequences.

Source: Europol TE-SAT

Figure 4.4: Total Number of failed, foiled or successfully executed attacks within the EU (2006-2009)
The legal and judiciary systems across Europe have been extremely active in judging individuals on radical Islamic terrorism charges as opposed to other sorts of terrorist activities (Figure 4.5). Interestingly enough, a large set of the literature on radicalization and recruitment identifies prisons as one of the ultimate recruiting place in Europe, especially in France, the UK, and Spain (Ranstorp, 2010; Coïssait, 2008).

Figure 4.5: Numbers of Verdicts for terrorism charges within the EU (2005-2009)

Source: Europol TE-SAT

“Perceptions of the terrorist threat therefore clearly represent an important variable in the fight against terrorism at both the EU and national levels” (Bures, 2011: 31). The figures illustrate the fact that radical Islamic terrorism has not been the most active terrorist group, but rather the separatist groups.

c. EU Member States

Within the Union Member States have experienced terrorism differently and identified the threat quite differently until the 9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, only six Member States
recognized terrorism as a direct threat to national security. France for example, considering its history in North Africa and the different waves of terrorist actions on its territory, acknowledged the potential destructive threat of radical Islamic terrorism. Jean-Louis Bruguière, in charge of coordination of the counter-terrorist section declared that “in France we have always thought … that the Islamic threat was a dangerous one and that the Algerian problem was not a political, diplomatic or bilateral problem for France, but was the premise of much more global threat. That was not perceived by all our partner” (Bures, 2010: 52). However, the Islamic terrorist threat was not the priority in other Member States, such as Germany, Spain, Italy, and the UK, as they were dealing with different terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades, the IRA, or the ETA. Nevertheless, these countries had experience in counter-terrorism.

According to Shapcott, the question of counter-terrorism and the perceptions of the threats are contentious topics. He claimed that one of the main roles of the EU structures is to share, develop, and foster a common understanding of the threat. Shapcott argued that Member States can be divided into three groups: the first one, the ones whom are threatened and understand it, which is composed of the UK, France, and Germany (figure 4.6); the second group is composed of Member States possibly threatened, but do not entirely realize it; and the last group, which is much smaller, composed of Member States not really threatened (in House of Lords, 2010: 21-22). The informal groups, such as the CTG, or formal agencies, like SitCen, are central in channeling information among Member States.
France has a long history of counter-terrorism starting back in the 1960s with Algerian separatists. In the 1990s, radical Islamists tried to orchestrate an attack against France, but the only successful one took place in 2002 in Karachi against French naval employees. Since then, France has regarded Al-Qaeda and radical Islamic terrorist groups as the greatest threat to its security (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 9).

Following the Madrid attacks of 3/11, Member States and EU institutions’ officials called for deeper information sharing. “French interior minister Nicolas Sarkozy pointed out that creating a stronger EU intelligence capability would be difficult because of the need felt by each Member States to protect its sources” (Walsh, 2006: 638). Such statement makes absolute sense coming from a state with powerful domestic and international intelligence services. The sharing of information remains a sensitive topic in
France. But, France has increasingly coordinated its counter-terrorist policies with EU partners (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 9).

Furthermore, France has one of the most aggressive domestic counter-terrorist strategies in Europe, as it is based on preventive arrests and extraditions due to its longstanding fight against terrorist groups. France has been oftentimes criticized by Human Right groups as extraditions of suspected terrorists occur sometimes without a trial (Klausen, 2009: 407).

As shown in the Eurobarometer chart below French citizens have a positive vision of the EU contributing to the fight against terrorism (table 4.1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>France</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>DK - Don't kn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-03</td>
<td>51.70%</td>
<td>13.80%</td>
<td>28.10%</td>
<td>6.30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-04</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-05</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-05</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-06</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer

Based on the polls from the Pew center (figure 4.6), the French citizens have remained quite concerns about the threat represented by the radical Islamic groups even though France has not directly suffered from a terrorist attack. But this can be explained by the fear emanating from the attacks of 9/11, 3/11, and 7/7 as well as the terrorist attacks against French citizens in North Africa and other regions.

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ii. Germany

Since 9/11, Germany has devoted large resources to prevent terrorist attacks on its soil. Like France, Germany perceives terrorism as one of the principal threats to its national security as it has faced the problem of terrorism for decades with the left-wing anarchist group, the Red Army Faction (RAF).

The 9/11 attacks were a wake up call for German authorities, as three hijackers lived in Hamburg for years wherein they prepared the plot thanks to liberal asylum policies and low levels of surveillances. “Germany now sees radical Islamist terrorism as its primary security threat and itself as a potential target of attack” (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel 2006, 20). German citizens also understand the role of the EU as an asset in the fight against terrorism (Table 4.2).

Table 4.2: And in your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither positive nor negative role regarding the fight against terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany date</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>DK - Don't kn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-03</td>
<td>58.70%</td>
<td>7.70%</td>
<td>23.70%</td>
<td>9.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-04</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-05</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-05</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-06</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometers

iii. Spain

Spain’s recognition of the Islamic threat was immediate after the Madrid bombings of March 11, 2004. The attacks were orchestrated by a branch of Al-Qaeda linked to the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. As underlined by a group of US experts, the elected
socialist government of Prime Minister Zapatero had “been careful to note that it did not see a military solution to the problem of terrorism, preferring to focus on law enforcement cooperation and by pursuing an ‘alliance of civilizations’ with the Muslim world” (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 32). The direct actions undertaken by Zapatero’s government were to address the resource shortfalls and coordination problems among the police and intelligence community vis-à-vis Islamic threat (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 32). The immediate consequence was a considerable attention to boosting national counter-terrorism. As the French model, “Spain has also pushed strongly for stronger law enforcement, intelligence, and border control cooperation within the EU” (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 35).

In the aftermaths of the attacks in Madrid, the opinion of the Spanish citizens on the EU’s contribution in counter-terrorism has been decreasing (Table 4.3). Interestingly enough, the government has followed the guidelines agreed on at the Union level in order to shape its counter-terrorist policy encompassing fighting radicalization of the Muslim communities in Spain. However the decline in positive perception started after the London bombing of summer 2005, but did not lead to an increase in the negative perception. The considerable increase has taken place in the category “don’t know.” This could be explained by a certain confusion concerning the role of the national government and the role of the EU. This confusion has been a recurrent problem in European capitals as citizens oftentimes perceive EU contributions as simple duplications of national policies.

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83 One of the examples of resource shortfalls was that Spanish police threw away tapes of March 11 suspects because of a lack of Arabic translators (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel 2006, 34).
Table 4.3: And in your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither positive nor negative role regarding the fight against terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Spain date</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
<th>Neither</th>
<th>DK - Don't kn</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-03</td>
<td>59.60%</td>
<td>8.40%</td>
<td>23.10%</td>
<td>8.90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-04</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-05</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-05</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-06</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer

Following the attacks of 2004, the Spanish government implemented initiatives, which directly coincided with the EU’s strategy for combating terrorism and the radicalization (Alonso, 2010: 219). The measures implemented sought to increase intelligence capabilities, increase the contact with Muslim communities, and confronting radicalization in prisons. In almost a year, 600 new policemen were recruited to fight Islamist terrorism (Alonso, 2010: 220). The increase of human capabilities was similar in other branch of the security sectors plus the close attention in developing and strengthening the cooperation and coordination between security agencies and government structures.

iv. The United Kingdom

The UK has a long history of counter-terrorism in dealing with the IRA. 9/11 led to further consideration of the Islamic threat and a sole focus on violent jihadism. In 2004, the UK published a Counter-terrorism Strategy (CONTEST) based on “4Ps:” prevent, pursue, protect and prepare. Such strategy was the backbone of the EU counter-terrorist strategy of 2005 also based on 4 pillars: prevent, pursue, protect, and respond. The UK’s CONTEST is a cross-pillar one. The attacks on London’s public transportation system on
July 7, 2005 tested this strategy. “Despite the fatalities and the damage […] many assess that the government and emergency services responded competently and effectively in the immediate aftermath of the crisis” (Archick, Ek, Gallis, Miko & Woehrel, 2006: 37).

Since the attacks of 2005 domestically the UK has strengthened its attention towards domestic Muslim communities and developed a community-policing strategy to its counter-terrorism enforcement (Klausen, 2009: 404). This is a key component of the Counter-Insurgency (COIN) strategy of the British government to win the “hearts and minds” of the communities wherein jihadists evolve (Clutterbuck, 2010: 160).

Table 4.4: And in your opinion, does the European Union tend to play a positive role, a negative role or neither positive nor negative role regarding the fight against terrorism?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK date</th>
<th>Positive</th>
<th>Negative</th>
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<th>DK - Don't kn</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nov-03</td>
<td>42.90%</td>
<td>18.70%</td>
<td>22.40%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-04</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun-05</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct-05</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep-06</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurobarometer

As illustrated by Table 4.4, the positive perception of the EU in the field of CT, which is on average around 50 percent, is the lowest among western EU Member States. The low approval rate can be explained through the historical trend of euroskepticism within and outside British political scenes. The UK prefers taking care of the CT matter unilaterally or bilaterally, but not so much within the EU platform.

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84 The principles behind community policing are to win the hearts and minds of British Muslims and engage Muslims in the fight against extremism (Klausen, 2009: 407). Klausen’s article focuses on this question of community-policing in the UK (2009).
The UK has been focusing its strategy on countering the processes of radicalization and recruitment. Out of the four suicide bombers of 2005, three of them were UK-born and one UK-raised. The UK approach has become more holistic based on the rule of law and primacy of the judiciary system. It has also worked in order to strengthen cooperation and coordination between the different security organs, a multi-agency approach (Clutterbuck, 2010: 163).

V. Conclusion

In order to conclude this chapter analyzing the integration process of EU CT policies, this section will look at each variable identified in order to see which one is the most relevant in order to explain why has the process of integration been so halting in the field of CT. The case study of EU counter-terrorism focused solely on the domestic/homeland level of analysis.

1. Variables
   a. International System

Radical Islamic terrorism is perceived by EU Member States as one of the greatest security threat to themselves and the Union. As argued by the first CTC, Gijis de Vries, the fight against terrorism is changing the role and functioning of the EU (in Bures, 2011: 2). Counter-terrorism, police and intelligence services remain central component of state’s sovereignty and security. However since 9/11, a considerable trend of European institutionalization has taken place because of the nature of the threat (Argomaniz, 2009: 152). Member States have been unwilling to fully expand the degree of integration to the
European level considering the nature of the threat and the national security component behind it. The question of trust, protection of assets, protection of information and its sources, plus the sacrosanct state sovereignty are key rationales for a low degree of integration of EU policies.

b. Institutional Motivation?

On the question of the role of institutions, the Neoliberal literature emphasizes that institutions foster trust among members as a platform for cooperation (Keohane, 1984). Walsh raised two important questions: “do the Member States of the EU have sufficient trust in each other to share intelligence effectively? How, if at all, do EU institutions facilitate sharing?” (2006: 631). Two dimensions need to be underlined: first, we have seen a trend of Europeanization of the counter-terrorist policies; second, the newly created bodies and agencies remain somehow weak.

One of the important criteria of this case study is that “EU institutions have capitalized on the presence of this ‘security threat’ in order to drive forward the process of European integration” (Kaunert, 2010a: 66). Kaunert argues that the Commission and the Council Secretariat were able to push forward common policies, such as the EAW, since 9/11 (2010a: 66). New instruments, such as the EAW and other bodies, are contributing to the deepening of the integration process. As argued by Kaunert, European integration through the EAW has reached the sphere of “high-politics” (2010a: 70). The Commission was an important actor in pushing forward the EAW and was even described as a supranational policy entrepreneur. European institutions, especially the Commission, have been seen as an actor pushing for the development of a European
rather than a national solution (Kaunert, 2010a: 210). The momentum was offered by the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid and London but has not translated into increasing their power and influence. EU institutions are too weak and dependent on Member States’ intelligence services and polices, which oftentimes prefer to deal on bilateral and case-by-case basis rather than collectively (Bures, 2006: 72). The institutionalization process of CT policies has mostly been about cooperation and coordination rather than integration and harmonization (Argomaniz, 2009: 168). The counter-terrorist organs of the Union, such as the CTC, SitCen, Europol, Eurojust and so on, have a weak institutional capacity. The degree of cooperation and coordination needs to be improved at several levels: on one side between Member States and the other side at the Union level with a lack of cross-pillar coordination. EU agents have been emphasizing the fact that this has not been an attempt to Europeanize national security (House of Lords, 2010).

Also the game of bureaucratic politics has been such that the lack of coordination and cooperation between Brussels and the capitals, due to national suspicions, is affecting negatively the development of a common strategy. Lugna underlined the fact that the CTC could offer a bridge between the Council and Commission, but each institution has its own agenda and perceptions of the CTC, it has been complex (2006: 118).

The creation of the common market opening up to the free movement of capitals, labor, goods and services, as well as the Schengen agreement have led to considerable progress, but also to an Europeanization of threats such as terrorism. These positive and negative evolutions have created incentives for Member States to pool further resources and share-information (Walsh, 2006: 626). Unfortunately, the institutions do not have
enough power to enforce the implementation of policies agreed at the EU level domestically and are purposely too depend on the Member States.

c. The Centrality of the Member States

“Traditionally, law enforcement and criminal justice have been jealously guarded national prerogatives” (Archick, 2004: 15). EU Member States are facing a double-sword challenge. On one hand, they recognize the danger of the threat and its transnational nature in a borderless Europe. A homeland Europe has indirectly been created by transnational threats. On the other hand, Member States cherish their national sovereignty and national security limiting their will to sharing information and data. A EU diplomat summarized the main problem of information sharing and coordination as “everybody says they are in favor of coordination but nobody is in favor of being coordinated, the reflex of interior ministers is to jealously protect their powers on the national level even though the fight against terrorism is a global one” (in Bures, 2006: 63).

Member States have played a crucial role after each juncture to build new institutions and agree on new strategy, while maintaining their supremacy in the realm of CT. Member States’ choices “reflect the contradiction inherent in Member States’ conviction of the need to involve the EU in combating terrorism but their equal reluctance to provide the EU institutions with greater powers due to the political sensitivity of this issue” (Argomaniz, 2009: 168). The behavior of EU Member States is an obvious form of intergovernmental bargaining (Den Boer, 2003: 22). Thus the Member States have remained reluctant to see an Europeanization of their judicial, police and intelligence services. Back in 2006, EU CTC, Mr. de Vries, argued that
The fight against terrorism is and will remain, primarily the responsibility of national authorities… Police forces, intelligence agencies, the judiciary, customs officers and other officials all remain instruments of national governments, under the control of national parliaments. The EU’s role is to support these national authorities, not to replace them or to duplicate their work (in Bures, 2008: 512).

Bilateral agreements, as it has always been done, are still preferred by EU Member States’ agencies and intelligence services. The case of cooperation between France and Spain in fighting separatist terrorists is a clear example of this historical bilateral trend. The success of agencies such as Europol has been undermined by bilateral preferences from EU Member States to share information and cooperate. The development of a network of informal committees such as the Police Working Group on Terrorism (PWGT), Counter-terrorism Group (CTG), and the G6 group have used in order to bypass the multilateral framework offered by the EU (Coolsaet, 2010: 864).

Member States have not transferred any competences to the EU and have been cautious in the institutional and legal design of European agencies, institutions, and laws. Even with the contribution of Europol, SitCen and so on, Member States continue to assess the level of the threat at the national level with their own services. Ultimately, Member States prefer to enhance intergovernmentalism over a Europeanization of counter-terrorist cooperation. The case study of counter-terrorism as the other ones, underlined the power of political will from Member States alter the process of integration in the security and defense realm.

d. The Power of Threat Perceptions
The common perception of the threat of homeland radical Islamic terrorism has been a driving force for shaping a common position and on agreeing on a common definition of
terrorism. However, EU Member States have different perceptions of the nature and gravity of the threat of terrorism because there is “no independent common terrorist threat assessment […] currently available at the EU level” (Bures, 2010b: 68).

Perceptions of the threat of radical Islamic terrorism are very subjective and agents tend to identify it and react to it differently.

Policing strategies have changed in response to the changing perceptions of the threat (Klausen, 2009: 404). After Madrid and London, EU Member States recognized the deadly nature of radical Islamic terrorism, new laws were implemented and penalizing new dimensions such as recruitment and training of terrorists. However, the EU as a security actor has been careful since 9/11 to avoid in all its official documents to identify Islam or the Muslims as a threat or the enemy (Bures, 2011: 35). This has not been the case from EU Member States that oftentimes have linked Islam to terrorism. The language emanating from the EU has been extremely cautious on such matter by speaking of radical Islamism rather than Islamism.

The threat of radical Islamic terrorism has doubtlessly been securitized by governments of the EU Member States and by the European institutions. The securitization process, which really started right after 9/11, and was strengthened after Madrid and London’s bombings, has remained extremely high. The process has led to the creation of new agencies, instruments, and institutions at the Union level, but has not led towards deeper integration. It is undeniable that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated for instrumental and strategic reasons (Bures, 2011: 45). The concept of “irrational

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85 The TE-SAT published on yearly basis by Europol does not qualify for the reasons that the data are sent by national police and intelligence services. Europol cannot gather data on its own.
anxiety” builds on consequence of terrorism, can also be used by governments in order to push for legislations (Nicholson, 2003).

But since 2002, the rise of far-right parties in the UK, France, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria and the Netherlands has had an impact on the domestic debate on pooling resources in this sensitive sector. Far right movements and euroskeptics are shaping the debate by claiming that they are stopping any kind of federalist moves. They also claim that because EU Member States have given up their authority in border control and other aspect of their national security, the threat is greater.

The EU and Member States understand the threat as a home-grown one. On that matter, the EU has been an active agent shaping the debate around the question of counter-radicalization. These have been well received by the different European governments. With the issue of radical Islamic terrorism, the question of threat perceptions is central. Until today, the perceptions of the threat remain national and vary from one Member State to another. Because the threat is perceived as national, its response ought to be national (Monar, 2007: 309). Unfortunately, the reality is quite different.

2. Final Remarks

The question of European homeland counter-terrorism will remain a hot topic for decades to come. This case study focused on the case of radical Islamic terrorism. But in recent years, an emerging trend is re-emerging, conservative rightwing terrorism. On Friday 22 of July 2011, a Norwegian right-wing extremist bombed a government building in downtown Oslo and then went for a shooting rampage on the island of Utoya, wherein
the annual Labor Youth movement assembly was taking place. His actions were supposed to launched a “conservative revolution.” This kind of terrorist events is a reminder that extremist right-wing movements can be as violent as radical Islamist groups. Since September 11, Western governments have prioritized their actions through a securitization process against radical Islamist terrorism rather than “white” home-grown terrorism. The sentiment of Islamophobia has really affected perceptions of threats as they are simply governed by fear. In consequence, Europol has announced the development of a task force focusing on non-Islamist threats in Scandinavian countries. The Director of Europol, Mr. Wainwright, declared on the Norwegian terrorist attack that “We've been monitoring the right wing extremists in Europe for many years,” however, “the threat of jihadist terrorism is still out there. It is still a real and substantial threat, but of course at the same time we have to monitor other possible terrorist activities” (Mahony & Pop, 2011).

It is fair to argue that the EU has considerably struggled in leading in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism at the domestic level. The question of homeland terrorism is so contentious than Member States are unwilling to pool their instruments under the umbrella of the EU. The issues of sovereignty and national security are at the heart of the problem. According to Monar, there are three limits in EU’s response to this common threat: first, EU’s response is based on coordination and cooperation rather than integration; second, limited implementation of the measures agreed as a Union; third, the EU does not have the legitimacy that it needs to succeed (Monar, 2007: 308-311). Considering the transnational nature of the threat and the borderless area of the EU,
Europeanizing the counter-terrorist polices would have more sense than maintaining its intergovernmental nature.

Since the Madrid bombings, Islamist terrorism in the EU has been trying to aim at causing indiscriminate mass casualties (Europol, 2008: 42). Counter-terrorist policies and institutional developments have historically followed terrorist attacks. Initiatives to deepen cooperation on counter-terrorist policies within the EU have been on reactive rather than on preventive decisions. As argued by Coolsaet, “the dynamics behind EU counter-terrorism can be compared to successive shock waves, propelled by major attacks, but gradually winding down once the sense of urgency had faded away (2010: 858).

As demonstrated throughout the chapter, the EU will not be able anytime soon to fully run integrated European counter-terrorist operations with European police services, intelligence services, and so forth until MS remain unwilling to turn over these authorities to the Union. “Therefore, one has to be clear about what the EU can and cannot do, so as not to create expectations the EU could not meet” (Lugna, 2006: 120). For such reasons, the EU has been described as more of a coordinator than an actor in the field of counter-terrorism (Keohane, 2005). Thus the extent of its coordinating power and influence are dependent on MS capabilities but also willingness to work within the EU framework.

The best conclusion for this chapter on counter-terrorist policies can be found in Jean Monnet’s famous comment, “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” Even though the real threat of jihadi terrorism, EU response to terrorism has been purely reactive in a first time followed by periods of inertia.
CHAPTER V: THE RUSSIAN GAS DILEMMA TO THE EUROPEAN UNION’S INTEGRATION

“In the European Union, the largest importer and second largest consumer of energy in the world, energy policy is not abstract ideas; it is everyday life” Benita Ferrero-Waldner, former Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy

I. Introductory Remarks

The combination of the 2006 gas cut-off, the 2007 cyberattack against Estonia, the 2008 Georgia war, the 2009 gas cut-off, as well as the occasional Russian verbal attack has undeniably established Russia as a real threat to the stability of the European continent, as well as affecting the stability of energy security of the EU and its Member States. Russia, since the election to the Presidency of Vladimir Putin in 2000, has become an increasingly active international actor in search of its “lost soul” to reestablishing itself as a superpower, regionally and internationally. The use of realpolitik as the foundation of Russian foreign policy has been troublesome for the EU (Nygren, 2008b; Kagan, 2008). Gas and oil have been increasingly used as a weapon especially towards its Western neighbors.

Until 2006, energy had not been perceived as a major security matter by the EU and its Member States. Russia is seating over “34 percent of global natural gas reserves and some 13 percent of global oil reserves” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 10). Almost 50 percent of EU’s gas comes from Russia with 80 percent of it through Ukraine (BBC, 2011). Since 2000, the EU-Russia relations have been fluctuating. However, the only constancy has been in the increasing dependence of EU Member States on Russian energy. The degree of dependence is not uniform and varies among EU Member States from low to high...
dependence. Germany and France, for example, figure as mid-level dependency. The EU-Russia relation is a case of mutual dependency as Russia needs the access to the European market and Europeans needs Russian hydrocarbons. Energy security has been another focal point of disagreement and tensions between the EU and Russia. It is a typical case of balance of power.

In the case of the EU Member States, their commitments to the market-based rationales and the unity around the common market have not been a major factor in leading to the convergence of their policies in order to speak with one voice. Member States have individually sought to maximize and maintain a high level in the imports of gas to their market at the expense of the EU unity. The EU, as a single actor, has struggled to maintain and establish an overarching rule and policy in dealing with Russia on the question of gas imports. On the other side, Russia has made sure to limit the unity of the Europeans.

One of the alternatives, in order to limit the energy dependence from Russia, has been the diversification of resources. France, Germany and Italy have been the most active in this approach.\footnote{Interestingly enough, these same countries have also been the most active in developing new pipelines from Russia as it is the case of the latest one, North Stream opened in November 2011. The question of diversification should be perceived instead as one part of the solution.} However the transport of gas from African nations, such as Nigeria, to Europe via pipelines is not possible at the exception of shipping liquefied gas, which is costly. In the case of Europe, gas flows directly from Russia via underwater or on the ground pipelines. Therefore, the gas coming from such large distance transit through numerous transit countries. But, pipelines have been used as a political weapon in the hands of Russia (Esper \textit{et al}, 2011: 81) as well as the transit states like Ukraine.
This second case study contributes to the discussion of this dissertation in identifying which variables affect and trump cooperation within the EU in key security areas where national interests are converging and/or diverging. Gas import from Russia is a core security concern for EU Member States and the EU and has been perceived as a clear component to national and European security. The case of energy security – Russian gas – fits within the larger spectrum of this dissertation for several reasons: first, it looks at the integration process of security policy facing a regional threat; second, energy security has increasingly become a core component of the International Relations security literature; third, EU Member States agree on the challenge, with a certain variation among MS, created by Russia on the stability of the Union as a whole. The issue of energy security follows Riley’s definition as “the prospect of energy dependence which undermines the economic security of the Union and threatens as a result of the dependence to restrict the power of the Union and its Member States to act independently” (2007: 4). However, this chapter will not incorporate the questions of climate change, global warming, of the environmental consequences of the transports of gas throughout Europe, or the connections between lobbying and policy-making.

The question of energy security has not been fully integrated as one of the core questions of the CFSP (Youngs, 2009: 5). The core of this chapter will emphasize on several dilemmas – such as market versus geopolitics, and interests versus governance – limiting the shaping of a common voice towards Russia. Last but not least, this chapter seeks to analyze the degree of integration of EU policies on energy security at the regional level.
II. Historical and Institutional Context

1. Energy and Security in Europe

The issue of energy security is not new. The energy crises of the 1970s had major impacts on the world’s economic growth, but also on nation-states’ perceptions of the security of imports and access to energy markets. “Modern society has grown more dependent on energy in almost all human activities” (Bahgat, 2009: 156).

The question of energy is central for Europeans for several reasons. First, the issue of energy incorporates existential and cognitive values as “energy and energy security have been at the heart of European integration from the outset” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b: 14). Energy, especially coal in the early years of the EU, has been the engine of the European integration project. Second, the EU common market is powerful economic instrument. Without stable imports of energy, national economies will stall, and the rationale of the governments as provider of security and stability will be questioned by European citizens. According to the European Commission, energy security is “the ability to ensure that future essential energy needs can be met, both by means of adequate domestic resources worked under economically acceptable conditions and maintained as strategic reserves, and by calling upon accessible and stable external sources supplemented where appropriate by strategic stocks” (in Bahgat, 2006: 965).

The gas shortage of winters 2005-2006 and 2008-2009 directly affected EU Member States, reminding the European Union of its dependence on Russian gas. As a consequence of the gas shortage, countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) were able to increase exports towards the EU. Another sequel of the first gas shortage of the winter of 2005/2006 has led the EU into launching a pipeline project
connecting Europe directly to Central Asia.\textsuperscript{87} Since then, the EU and some EU Member States have been involved in an energy diplomacy program, especially with Turkmenistan. The best example is the project of the Nabucco pipeline, which was re-launched after the second Russia-Ukraine crisis of winter 2008-2009. Russia and Gazprom (the major Russian gas company), however, have been working in keeping their monopoly over the transit of gas of Central Asia and “at present, more than 90% of Central Asian gas goes to Russia” (Kassenova, 2009) and through Russia to Europe.

Russia has the largest world reserve of natural gas with an estimated 44.7 trillion cubic meters, then followed by Iran with 27.8 trillion and Qatar with 25.6 trillion (EurActiv, 2011). Russia is also the largest producer of natural gas with 607 billion cubic meters in 2007 (EurActiv, 2011). Quite differently from oil, gas is a commodity that is extremely difficult to transport and store.\textsuperscript{88}

The meaning of energy security varies between countries. “Countries’ definition of energy security has much to do with their own particular energy situation and how they view their vulnerabilities to energy supply disruptions” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 6). The concept of energy security is a complex term incorporating legal, political, foreign policy, economic, political, and military components (Kirchner & Berk, 2010: 864). In the case of Russia the perception of energy security is linked to the exports, while for the EU it is connected to the security of supply. The first decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century has seen a number of considerable crises either affecting the supply of gas to Europe or fostering

\textsuperscript{87} As of 2012, this pipeline project still lacks of funding to start. The gas shortage was a wake-up call leading to the emergence of a series of projects. Some of them remain at the experimental phase. For information on the politics of pipeline see section III.4 and figure 5.6.

\textsuperscript{88} Liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been also an alternative especially for its transportation wherein pipelines do not exist. However, the problem of liquefied gas is it very high cost for transportation and then storage. Furthermore, a third option has emerged, natural gas capture through hydrofracking technique. This last option has considerable environmental consequences: pollution of water streams and potentially earthquake.
fear within EU Member States. One of the main concerns for the EU and its Member States is establishing the security of energy supply. The first gas stand-off of 2006 was the wake-up call.

a. The 2006 Crisis: The First Gas War
The 2006 crisis between Ukraine and Russia has been perceived by Europeans as a wake-up call pushing the issue of energy security on top of the national and European agendas (Youngs, 2009: 24). The President of the Commission, José Manuel Barroso, declared “the fact is that energy was, until recently, a forgotten subject in the European agenda. Now it is back at the heart of European integration, where it began with the creation of the Coal and Steel community, and the EURATOM Treaty. And where it belongs” (in European Communities, 2007: 7).

Ukraine is fully dependent on Russian gas with 80% of its total gas imports. The first gas war had a considerable consequence, “the decision [to cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine by Moscow], however, backfired, damaging Moscow’s reputation in Europe as a reliable supplier” (Larrabee, 2010: 40). The reason for the gas cut-off by Moscow was caused by a price dispute between Kiev and Moscow several years after the Orange Revolution. In consequence of a considerable price hike, Kiev decided to “tap” gas meant to Europe. But the obvious lesson for Europe from this 2006 crisis is the risks of dependence on few energy suppliers. Furthermore, the EU got caught up in a dispute between Russia and Ukraine, a transit country. After this event, EU Energy commissioner, Mr. Piebalgs, declared that “it is clear that Europe needs a clearer and more collective and cohesive policy on security and energy supply” (in Bahgat, 2006: 962). The map

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89 For more detail see Nygren, 2008a: 5-6.
below (figure 5.1) illustrates the degree of dependence of EU Member States and Russia’s neighbors on Russian gas back in 2006.

Figure 5.1: Fall in gas following the 2006 gas cut-off


Prior to 2006, “the external security dimensions of EU energy policy barely appeared on the radar screen until the first cut-off of Russian gas supplies to Europe in January 2006” (Tekin & Williams, 2011: 1). The 2006 crisis has remained in the minds of all European leaders. During the informal meeting in Lathi of EU leaders, Putin was
also present. President Barroso declared that “We agreed that Russia needs predictability from Europe, just as Europe needs predictability from Russia” (European Communities, 2007: 11). The commotion created by the crisis between Kiev and Moscow literally changed the European perceptions of Russia as a reliable energy provider (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 72).

b. The 2008 Georgian Crisis

The invasion of Georgia during the Summer of 2008 was another considerable blow to EU strategy vis-à-vis Russia. Russia’s military attack was a direct challenge to the EU normative approach in its partnership. The European reaction for the first time was to seek greater autonomy from Russia as opposed to the decade long statement of “mutual dependence.”

In addition of the energy and political consequences of this attack, the 2008 invasion of Georgia was also a major wake-up call for the Euro-Atlantic community to rethink on the enlargement per se of NATO to include Ukraine and Georgia. This also changed the dynamics of relations between the EU and Eastern Europe. Thus, the motivation for Moscow behind the August 2008 war was to alter the balance of power in South Caucasus undermining Brussels’ intention to diversify (Fernandes & Simão, 2010: 117).

Additionally, the 2008 invasion holds, as well, two geopolitic components. First, an energy component since Georgia is “a key transit state for both Caspian oil and gas and provides the only land-bridge for hydrocarbons trying Central Asia to downstream European markets” (Rosner, 2009: 166). This attack has been a blow to the Europeans
concerning the viability and security of the Nabucco project. However, on the non-energy side, it was an illustration that “Russian leaders did not fear the imposition of EU sanctions on their country. The Kremlin would expect ‘friendly’ countries like Italy, which is central to the Gazprom jigsaw, to veto all hard-hitting decisions” (EurActiv, 2011). Second, a political one for Russia in quest of re-building the Great Russia. Countries in poor political terms with Moscow, such as Georgia and Moldova, have seen a price hike in their gas imports, while their separatist regions, such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, have received preferential/lower gas prices (Nygren, 2008a: 14).

Following the attack, US Senator Lugar spent several weeks in Europe and Eastern Europe and was lobbying for the development of an “Energy Article 5” (in Cornell, 2010: 64). This was a clear statement made by the US that energy security has become one of the top security concerns.

c. The 2009 Crisis: The Second Cut-Off

The second gas war during the winter of 2009 started because of Russia’s accusation that Ukraine was stealing Russian gas. However, the root causes were that after a substantive rise of the price of Russian gas, Kiev decided to increase the transit prices. Ultimately, Moscow cut off the supply of gas to Ukraine on December 31, 2008. Consequently, Kiev then started siphoning off Russian gas in transit to Europe. By early January 2009, several EU Member States – Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece – ended up with a total halt in their energy supplies (EurActiv, 2011). Several of them did not have sufficient

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90 The 2009 gas cut-off affected around 14-15 countries mostly in the Balkans and South-East Europe.
reserves to make up for the difference. By mid-January, Russian Prime Minister Putin and his Ukraine counterpart, Yulia Timoshenko, struck a deal ending the dispute.

Since the January 2009 gas dispute between Ukraine and Russia, both actors “undermined their reputations as a reliable supplier and transit country respectively” (Kassenova, 2009). One of the consequences of the 2009 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine has fostered a new interest in pipeline development in Europe (Paillard, 2010: 66). These new pipelines have for objective to bypass transit states in order to avoid similar situation in the future.91

d. The Perpetual Growing Addiction

European dependence on natural gas is like American dependence on oil (Rosner, 2009: 166). A large part of the gas exports to Europe from Russia transit by pipelines through Ukraine. However, Moscow can only use the gas weapon against Kiev to a limited extent, as it would ultimately affect the export of gas to Europe. But as argued by Larrabee, this will change with the new pipeline, Nord Stream, bypassing transit countries (2010: 40).

Three factors have been recurrent in EU-Russia relations: first, doubts have risen concerning the maintenance of gas supplies to Europe; second, lack of economic reform in Russia and lack of innovation and reform in the Russian energy sectors; third, increasing awareness by Europeans of the danger of over-dependence on Russian gas (Bahgat, 2006: 970). As illustrated by the map, chart and table below (figure 5.2; Table 5.1; Figure 5.3), European dependence on Russian’s gas is extremely high.

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91 The opening in November 2011 of the North Stream connecting directly Russia to Germany is a perfect illustration.
As shown by the map above (figure 5.2), the dependence is not equal among EU Member States. Newly integrated Member States share a very high dependence on Russian gas, whereas older ones, still remain extremely dependent, but to a lesser extent.

Table 5.1: Gas Imports since 1990 (in Mtoe)

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>163.34</td>
<td>179.90</td>
<td>241.46</td>
<td>317.45</td>
<td>338.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>42.69</td>
<td>55.32</td>
<td>61.09</td>
<td>73.53</td>
<td>76.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>24.67</td>
<td>28.11</td>
<td>36.46</td>
<td>41.62</td>
<td>42.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>25.33</td>
<td>28.56</td>
<td>47.05</td>
<td>60.16</td>
<td>56.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
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<td>5.84</td>
<td>6.64</td>
<td>8.57</td>
<td>8.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>7.52</td>
<td>15.47</td>
<td>30.25</td>
<td>31.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>1.51</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>13.42</td>
<td>35.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Commission. 2011. EU Energy in Figure. (Accessed on September 29, 2011)
The table above (table 5.1), as well as, the graph below (figure 5.3) illustrate the progressive increase in dependence on Russian gas since the 1990s. Even though there is no distinction between supplier (table 5.1), one can appreciate the increasing dependency on gas in order to fuel European economies. The gas imports of the EU 27 doubled in less than 20 years. The chart below demonstrates the considerable import of gas from Russia since 2000.

Figure 5.3: Russian Gas dependence from EU-27


From the economic dependence to perceptions, European public opinions consider the “threat of energy dependence” as a reality (figure 5.4). Following the gas cut of 2009 and the increase of prices, one could suspect numbers even higher today.
Behind the question of dependence, the EU’s strategy has been to buy stability with Russia. The interdependence between both actors is central. Ultimately the EU perceives dependence as a way to promote democracy into supplier countries. The argument has been than dependency and even interdependency on Russia’s gas has been a necessary evil, as otherwise Russia could develop an even more confrontational foreign policy towards its neighbors (Giuli, 2011: 5). This strategy could be seen as a failure considering the many crises that took place since the arrival of Putin at the head of Russia.

2. In Search of Power and Leverage: Russia during the Leadership of Vladimir Putin

The collapse of the Soviet Union, followed by the tumultuous 1990s have left Russia “weak and frustrated” especially after the frustrations of the Yeltsin period (Larrabee, 2010: 34; Fernandes & Simão, 2010: 115). The election of Vladimir Putin to the
presidency of Russia in 2000 had a major impact on the behavior of Russia regionally but also internationally, as well as leading to considerable domestic transformation of the Russian political system. Since Putin’s rise to power, Russia foreign policy has been extremely revisionist taking in consideration its military intervention in Georgia in 2008 and the use of energy as a weapon in 2006 and 2009. “One of the main factors that has permitted this has been its economic performance and the income from energy production and exports” (Fernandes & Simão, 2010: 115).

President Putin has embodied a new trend in Russia, seeking to re-impose Russia’s power and influence regionally and internationally. During his presidency, Putin has sought to rebuild Moscow’s lost empire by first controlling energy resources and then seeking regional economic domination (Nygren, 2008a: 3). Thus, “in Putin’s conception, restoring Russia’s power and influence abroad required rebuilding the power of the Russian state at home, particularly halting the erosion of power form the ‘center’ to the periphery that had occurred under Yeltsin, and regaining state control over the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy” (Larrabee, 2010: 35). The use of energy has a foreign policy weapon by Putin should be interpreted as a way to rebuild the “Great Power” status of the former Soviet Union by dominating former Soviet republics (Nygren, 2008a: 4). Europe’s dependence on Russian gas is only the financial tool to finance such project.

Russian leaders, Putin and Medvedev, have implemented, what has been called a “managed democracy” or “sovereign democracy.” According to Nikolay Petrov and Michael McFaul, the characteristics of this managed democracy are: first, a strong presidency and weak institutions; second, state control of the media; third, control over
elections allowing elites to legitimize their decisions; fourth, visible short-term effectiveness and long-term inefficiency (2005). Such a system has been perceived more or less as a democracy à la carte and a challenge against Western values and norms promoted through their cooperation with former Soviet states. In addition, corruption has been rampant at the highest levels of Russian government and society affecting economic redistribution and eroding the roots of democracy such as the independence of the judiciary system. A wave of assassination has been perpetuated against the opposition of the regime with the most notable victim, Anna Politkovskaya, a journalist highly critical of the Putin government.

Putin has worked at centralizing power around the presidency, as defined by the constitution, but also around a few “men of influence.” These men of influence are from the circles of the FSB, formally the KGB, energy sector, and most importantly reliable friends and government associates of Putin are known as the siloviki and have been receiving leading positions in energy companies, such as Gazprom and Rosneft, with the “explicit purpose of defending state interests” (Nygren, 2008a: 4). Such strategic move by Putin should not be seen as a nationalization process, but rather as a re-unification of state and energy companies (Nygren, 2008a: 4). After two mandates, Putin stepped down to become Medvedev’s Prime Minister in 2008. However, this has not limited his control over Russia’s power. As argued by an expert, “Putin envisages the state not as the great re-nationalizer, but the biggest shareholder in a newly privatized society” (in Cohen, 2009: 98). Ultimately the connection between the political elites and the oligarchs, individuals at the head of energy companies, is extremely intertwined, thereby increasing corruption, but also affecting the productivity and innovation in the energy sector.
However, the increasing link between the energy sector and the Kremlin is an indication that Russia will not anytime soon give up the use energy as a foreign policy instrument and embrace market-liberalization.

The progressive transition to authoritarianism in Russia is of considerable importance for Europeans. European dependence on Russian energy is such that Russia would maintain its position of leader in gas exports for the years to come. Russia’s strategy has been dual: first, control of routes of transit; second, diversify its exports. Concerning the control of routes of transit, Russia has been focusing on four aspects: first, strengthening the monopoly of its enterprises such Gazprom and other; second, by trying to become one of the majority holder of shares of foreign companies; third, by building pipelines; last, through Russia’s control of transit countries’ governments such as Ukraine, Belarus, and Turkmenistan (Esper et al., 2011: 113). This progressive construction fits within the greater plan of Vladimir Putin, which is to rebuild Russia status of Great Power.

Following the 2006 crisis, President Putin understood early on the leverage that he had over EU Member States as it took over three-weeks for the EU to respond to the shut down of the gas supplies. Furthermore, “many Member States insisted on diluting the reaction” (Youngs, 2009: 82). Italy was one of them as it has been under Prime Minister Berlusconi a considerable ally. A year later at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Putin underlined that Russia was back in the forefront of international politics and sought to maximize its national interests. The Georgia invasion of 2008 was a materialization of Putin’s words into actions to not only challenge this euro-atlantic community, but also strengthen its grip over the CIS region (Nygren, 2008a). The
invasion was a clear statement made by Putin that Russia remains a powerful actor and also “wants the West to accept that the post-Soviet space is part of a Russian sphere of influence” (Larrabee, 2010: 37).

Russia has been seeking to maximize its power through the use of energy as an economic and geopolitical weapon. Two strategies have been implemented by Moscow. First, one core component of Russia’s foreign policy consists in seeking individual deals with EU Member States as opposed to dealing with the EU as a whole leading to price discrimination (Cohen, 2009: 93). The price discrimination is visible between new and old EU Member States.92 Second, Russia’s monopoly is double-headed, Gazprom in the gas sector and Transneft in the oil. But most importantly, Russia has been carefully seeking for the control of infrastructures such as pipelines across Europe and Eurasia. The use of hydrocarbons reflects in fact that, “Moscow is pursuing a comprehensive, state-formulated and implemented geo-economic strategy that may exacerbate Europe’s political and economic dependence on Russia’s energy supply” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 10). The dependence of EU on Russian gas also incorporates the limited room to maneuver away from transit countries such as Ukraine and Belarus.93

So far under Putin, Russia’s energy strategy has followed several lines of conduct: energy is used as a foreign policy tool in order to increase Russia’s influence over lost

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92 However the argument of price discrimination must be put into context. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union Russian authority wanted to maintain its influence over the newly independent states by subsidizing the export of energy to former Soviet states. For over a decade, former soviet states were importing energy far below market price. This changed after the election of Vladimir Putin, who for the first time started using energy as a foreign policy instrument. Russia offered two options: either a price increase; or threaten to increase price to world market prices. This policy has been done on case-by-case basis, and usually comes as part of a political package to influence neighboring states.

In the case of the EU, price discrimination does exist, however, this needs to be taken carefully as some most recent MS may certainly receive pressures from Russia to act along Russian interests.

93 EU MS receive energy from other non-democratic countries, and do not have the problem of import security for the simple reason that they control the mean of transportation. In the case of Russian gas, EU MS are not only dependent on Russian resources, but also on third parties, transit countries.
III. Diverging Strategies in Dealing with Russia

1. The European Union

So far the multilateralist approach has not been at the heart of EU-Russia relations\textsuperscript{94} because of the EU Member States’ preferences for bilateral relations on one side, and Russia’s strong preference to deal individually with EU MS and outside of the EU structures. The lack of integrated energy policy has limited the ability of the EU to speak with one voice. Thus, since 2006, Brussels and Moscow have taken diverging routes: under the Barroso Commission, the Union has pursued the goal of a market-rules and transparent energy sector, while, Russia is seeking to protect its strategic sector (Fernandes & Simão, 2010: 116).

a. From the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement to…

Since the creation of the EU, energy has been at the heart of the European experiment. In the 1950s, at the time of the ECSC, a common energy framework was first introduced (Baumann, 2010: 81). Political cooperation was necessary, but interestingly integration took place in the sector of trade and business rather than in energy at the exception of EURATOM. However, the question of energy, especially hydrocarbons, has been a field of tension between the Community and the Member States “defending their national competencies and monopolies in these strategic sectors and the European Commission

\textsuperscript{94} For further information on the EU-Russia relations see: Kanet, 2009; Larivé, 2008; Serra, 2010; Vogel, 2009.
favoring the establishment of an Internal Energy Market and a Common Energy Policy” (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 73). Three elements have emerged and been advanced continuously by the EU: first, the centrality of energy security; second, the importance of institutions and agreement in dealing with Russia; finally, the development of a common voice. The question of energy security has progressively emerged within the EU because of the Commission. The European Commission has been speaking of energy security as early as 1974 following the first oil crisis. According Rosner, the EU’s approach to energy security follows three policy paths: “internal mechanisms to ensure sustainable energy supply; external steps to integrate energy into a European common foreign and security policy; internal and external steps to deal specifically with critical infrastructure protection” (Rosner, 2009: 161).

The relations between the EU and Russia have been regulated around three institutional agreements. The first step was made in 1994 with the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA). The PCA came into force in 1997 for a ten years period. It has been automatically extended beyond 2007 on an annual basis because of the inability to date of the parties to finalize a new agreement. The PCA is aimed at strengthening a mutual partnership by developing strong political, economic, commercial and cultural ties. However, since 2008, the EU and Russia have been working on designing a new agreement based on the PCA. The process has been very lengthy as both actors envision very different types of agreement. On one side, Russia is seeking a “brief framework agreement supplemented by a system of sectoral agreements while the EU aims at a comprehensive agreement based on common values” (Efthymiou, 2009).
The second step was with the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue established in October 30th, 2000 at the EU-Russia Summit in Paris, in order to establish the foundation of an arrangement for a EU-Russia energy partnership. The aims are to improve investment opportunities in Russia’s energy sector, while providing commitment on both sides. From there, many reports and papers have been published by the Commission laying out two aspects: first, strengthening the relations between the EU and Russia; second, establishing an agreement between the two sides.

And the last agreement was the definition of the Four Common Spaces at the 2003 Summit of St. Petersburg. They cover four areas: Common Economic Space; Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice; Common Space of External Security; and Common Space of Research and Education.

b. …Multiple Green Papers

The Commission has been a considerable engine in the sector of energy since 2000 with the publication of several influential green papers. Some authors even talk of the process of green papering of the EU energy security (Tekin & Williams, 2011: 22). The multitude of green papers should be seen as the desire by the Commission to establish a framework leading towards a common energy approach internally and externally.

The 2000 Green Paper, “Towards a European strategy for the security of energy supply,” produced by the European Commission, “initiated a broad debate about a
common European energy policy resulting in several legislative packages” (Baumann, 2010: 82). This green paper is considered as one of the most significant. The Commission talked about the need of diversification in order to increase import independence.

Even though the 2003 ESS is not a green paper and was written by HR Solana, it does briefly mentioned the dependence on energy. Even though the mention is minimalist, the identification of energy dependence has a security threat needs to be underlined. Russia is also highlighted as a central player in geopolitics. The ESS, which was approved by all the heads of state and government, is an example of norm transmission and process of securitization.

The year 2006 was a turning point in the understanding of energy security as a considerable threat to European stability economically and politically as demonstrated by the Russo-Ukrainian crisis. This event led to the publication by the Commission of the 2006 green paper, “A European Strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy” (European Commission, 2006a). As opposed to the previous report, this green paper is broader and identified six issue areas in need to be addressed by the EU: first, competitiveness and the internal energy market; second, diversification of the energy mix; third, solidarity; fourth, sustainable development; fifth, innovation and technology; and last, external policy (European Commission, 2006a: 4). Concerning the external policy, the Commission claimed that “It would be a break from the past, and show Member States’ commitment to common solutions to shared problems” (European Commission, 2006a: 14). A common approach would include unity at the Community

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97 The question of energy security is underlined in the ESS as “Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50% of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa” (Council of the EU, 2003: 3).
and national levels. The commission emphasized the need for diversification of suppliers, new infrastructures, single voice, and establishing partnerships. On the case of Russia, the Commission is pushing for the establishment of a new partnership based on the late PCA. This Green Paper pushes the dialogue within the EU on a more integrated vision and understanding of energy security domestically and internationally. During the 2006 Brussels Conference, President of the Commission Mr. Barroso underlined that

Russia needs predictability from Europe, just as Europe needs predictability from Russia. We need to acknowledge, and exploit, this interdependency to our mutual benefit. That requires transparency, the rule of law, reciprocity, non-discrimination and a level playing field in terms of market opening, market access and fair competition (Barroso, 2006: 11).

The 2007 Commission document entitled “An Energy Policy for Europe, Strategic Energy Review” emphasized a number of important elements, such as the internal energy market, the solidarity among Member States, environmental criteria, and so on (European Commission, 2007). Experts have argued that the Strategic Energy Review of 2007 could be the foundation for a full-fledged energy policy (Baumann, 2010: 83).

In 2009 the European Parliament underlined the need to diversify the sources and routes of supply and pushed for the Nabucco project. On dealing with key partners, such as Russia, the European Parliament is pushing for a guarantee in the security of supply. Furthermore, the European Parliament called on the Commission and the Member States to find the legal framework for the establishment of an internal energy market. Last but not least, the Parliament underlined the need for a new agreement replacing the 1997 PCA, which would include the Chapter on Energy of the Energy Charter Treaty (European Parliament, 2009).
The EU has been unable to foster a strong, united, and focused voice facing Russia’s coercive use of energy in its relations with neighboring countries (Luft & Korin, 2009: 344). All the documents emerging from the Commission and other European institutions have not led to the establishment of a coherent and integrated policy. The Commission’s strategy has been quite consistent by trying to develop first a common internal market, and second a common external policy. This can be explained by the simple fact that the Commission’s power on the common market is much greater than on external policies. By controlling the internal market, the Commission could ultimately increase its grip over the external dimension.

c. The Energy Charter Treaty

The tension around the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which Russia signed in 1994, but has yet to ratify, is to some extent caused by the Transit Protocol that would allow access to Russia’s transit infrastructures to third parties. The Energy Charter has been advanced by the EU in order to “engage Russia in a more reliable energy cooperation framework, […] designed to promote energy security through greater openness and competitiveness of the energy markets, while respecting the principles of sovereignty over energy resources” (Cohen, 2009: 103). Russia has refused to ratify the Energy Charter, as it would limit its autonomy and increase the transparency of its energy sector. Russia’s rationale has been concerned about the supposed loss of national sovereignty in this strategic sector. Russia sees the ECT as “the West’s attempt to gain access to Russia’s energy resources and transit routes” (Feklyunina, 2008: 139). One of the EU responses
has been to diversify its sources of imports by creating a new pipeline, Nabucco, and to strengthen its position in Central Asia and Eastern Europe.

The EU has pursued a dual line of attack. On the one side, the EU has focused on dealing with Russia directly by persuading Russia to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty and its transit protocol. The second line of attack has been internal by pushing for the creation of an internal European energy market, by “addressing anticompetitive market distortions, encouraging diversification and new technologies, and initiating its own critical infrastructure protection programs” (Bell, 2009: 267).

According to an official from the European Commission, an agreement between Brussels and Moscow on the EU Energy Charter is not reachable all at once. Ferran Tarradellas Espuny argues that nobody really expect an agreement on the Energy Charter as this question has been around for over 10 years (Geropoulos, 2009). In addition, “Putin’s government has also made it clear that it has no intention of ratifying the Energy Charter Treaty, a set of rather liberal international rules for trade and investment in the oil and gas sector” (Barysch, 2007: 5). The other reason why Russia refuses to ratify the European energy charter is the fact that it would open its energy sector to foreign investments.

According to Zagorski, “Moscow would prefer to speedily negotiate a pretty short agreement, which would lay out basic principles of cooperation, while leaving the job of specifying the details of cooperation to sector agreements” (Euractiv, 2011). On the other side, the European Union “wants a reasonably detailed document with provisions on many issues that are relevant to EU-Russia relationship” (Euractiv, 2011). To sum up, there is a common understanding that sector agreements are necessary. The energy sector
is often perceived as one of the issues on the agenda linked to areas of cooperation with Russia. As explained by Zagorski, “the biggest issue on the agenda is which set of rules is EU-Russia energy cooperation going to be governed by in the future” (Euractiv, 2011).

In his controversial article, Kagan claimed that the EU and Russia are two very different kinds of powers speaking different languages (2003). On one side, the EU is described as a 21st century power, a post-modern state; while on the other hand, Russia is portrayed as a 19th century power behaving along its realpolitik foreign policy. Even though this statement is quite reductionist, it seems to highlight an interesting point explaining the limits of institutional cooperation. On the one side, the EU conceives of state relations regulated by agreements, treaties and so on; whereas on the other side, Russia perceives agreements as factors constraining state sovereignty and national interest. This has been the case ever since the election of Vladimir Putin and one should not expect any changes.

2. The Role of the High Representative (HR) in Energy Security

The role of the HR in energy security is considerable as the energy question falls under his/her responsibility. Until the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, HR Solana and EU External Relations Commissioner, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, were leading the question of energy security. HR Solana represents the Council and ultimately the Member States, whereas Ms. Ferrero-Waldner speaks in the name of the Community.

Even though Solana declared in one of his speeches that “hardly a day goes by that I am not confronted in my role as High Representative with the impact that energy

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98 In order to study the role of HR Solana on the question of energy security, sixteen articles and speeches have been studied. Not surprisingly, the majority of his addresses and writing took place after 2006, or the first energy crisis faced by the EU.
has: from Sudan to Venezuela, from Iran to the Caucasus and beyond” (Solana, 2006d), his role in dealing with Russia on the energy question seems to remain minimal. The number of his articles, speeches and addresses on energy security vis-à-vis Russia is quite low compared to those on other questions such as Kosovo and Palestine. On the few papers and public addresses, his narratives on the Russian dilemma have been quite conventional and soft. Back in 1999, at the origins of the Partnership, Solana underlined that three elements needed to be included in the relations between the EU and Russia were security, economics, and political and social factors (Solana, 1999c). However, Solana recognized the need for Russia to develop democratic mechanisms, as well as accepting Russian governmental procedures.

Solana underlined in all his addresses the mutual dependence between both actors. However, he framed the question differently by claiming that the dependence is two sided, Russia needs the EU as much as the EU needs Russia. Solana described Russia as the most important neighbor and a key partner of the EU (Golovanova, 2007). “Russia will remain the mainstay of our energy imports. We are right to insist on a genuine partnership based on a simple reality: interdependence” (Solana, 2008c). However, Solana emphasized the need of higher reciprocity upstream and downstream. The rule of law and reciprocity are the bases for a European framework for energy (Solana, 2008d).

In the energy sector, HR Solana warned that:

… there is a justified concern across Europe about Russia seeming more interested in investing in future leverage than in future production. Contrast Gazprom’s spending spree abroad with the lack of investment and waste at home…(Furthermore) it is up to us to avoid the kind of fragmented bilateral negotiations which leave us all worse off. A more united and comprehensive approach would enhance our bargaining power (in Barnes, 2008: 126).
As emphasized by Solana, the liberalization process of energy needs to take place internally and externally. Having an internal liberalized energy market “to increase competition and drive down prices” is not enough until liberalization of the supply sides take place (Solana, 2006d). One solution to this problem goes through the diversification of suppliers. With diversification security of supply will follow (Solana, 2006d; 2008c). On the question of diversification, Solana claimed that Nabucco would offer an alternative to Russian energy leading to Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia resources.

Following the 2006 gas crisis, Solana called for a common voice from EU Member States in order to increase their influence when dealing with Russia (Solana, 2006e). Solana called for the forging of “a European energy diplomacy based on common interests and shared principles” (Solana, 2006e).

Mr. Solana’s narratives vis-à-vis Russia had been considerably watered down. One of the reasons is that this allowed Mr. Solana to maintain very peaceful and crisis-free relations with Russia and its leadership. All the controversial issues – energy cut-off, lack of rule of law, assassinations, Estonia, the ban of Polish products, Chechnya and so on – had publicly been avoided by Solana during his two terms as HR. Most of his work probably took place backstage with only limited traces for researchers.

3. EU Powerhouses’ Relations with Russia

EU Member States have played a contradictory role when addressing Russia. Because of their energy interests, Member States have counter-balanced the EU, especially the Commission, and softened the common narratives and actions vis-à-vis Russia. In certain
cases, EU Member States end up mediating tensions between Russia and other Member States rather than supporting themselves (Youngs, 2009: 95).

As underlined by former DG RELEX Commissioner, Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, “EU’s Member States have often regarded energy policy as a domestic, not European issue; in their energy relations with Russia, for example” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b: 13). However the question of energy security has appeared in Council’s meetings, especially since the 2006 crisis. “Some Member States in particular acted as catalysts for this debate on energy security, by emphasizing the geopolitical dimension of energy policy” (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 80). Germany was one of the catalysts.

Furthermore, the three EU Member States selected for this case study are quite interesting as they have divergent energy policies and ultimately different perceptions of Russia. To sum up, “each EU country has its own bilateral relationship and special deals with Russia over energy,” said Pal Dunay, an energy expert at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “We don't have to rebuff Russia’s moves into the EU’s energy sector. What we need is more harmonization among the EU countries and reciprocity when it comes to foreign companies wanting to have access to Russian pipelines. None of this is happening” (Dempsey, 2007). The figure below (Figure 5.5) illustrates the diverging perceptions of Russia as an energy provider.
France’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons is considerable, but not dramatic as it is for Germany or other Eastern EU Member States. France’s energy policy has historically been more diverse composed of nuclear energy, gas providing from North Africa and Russia, as well as oil from North Africa. France’s energy policy has sought to diversify its imports from different regions of the world, as well as the sources of energy – nuclear, natural gas, LNG, and oil. Following the 2006 crisis, France’s approach was to develop an internal energy dimension rather than an external policy. This inward looking strategy by France was more related on issues of electricity interconnections, internal diversification of the energy mix, increased energy efficiency and use of renewable energy rather than energy security as such (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 81).
The powerful state company, Gaz de France, has had an impact on the way France has dealt with Russia. Gaz de France has maintained strong cooperation with its Russian counterpart, Gazprom, especially on agreements on the South Stream pipeline. In addition, France has been working to sell weapons to Russia such as a Mistral-class warship. The investments made by Gaz de France in the South and North Stream pipelines go against the interests of the Nabucco pipeline, which is backed by the US and the EU. As argued by François Heisbourg, “the French involvement in the pipelines would give Paris strategic options in natural gas supply, potentially a wise move in light of Russia’s decision to curb exports via Ukraine in recent years” (in Saltmarsh & Kramer, 2009).

Back in 2007, Sarkozy said that Russia had acted with a “certain brutality” in the oil and gas markets (Kishkovsky, 2007). Then during the 2008 French Presidency of the EU, France was working, in addition to solving the Georgian crisis, to make a common energy policy a priority for the EU. “Paris was trying to organize a central authority to buy energy for the entire Union, the way Europe shares electricity in an emergency” (Erlanger, 2008). This initiative did not go far and did not survive the end of the French presidency.

The relations between Paris and Moscow have been historically quite good. In his official visit to Paris in 2008, Putin underlined that France was the vector enabling deeper cooperation between the EU and Russia (Europolitics, 2008). France and Germany have remained slow in the process of domestic liberalization of the energy sector, compare to their British counterpart. The rationale for France and Germany is “in an effort to maintain the place of their ‘national champions’ that could become ‘European champions’
once the single energy market is consolidated” (Tekin & Williams, 2011: 30). France as well as Germany’s national interests considerably overweight the one of the Community.

b. Germany and the Dilemma of Dependence

Germany is the largest gas market of Russia. The economic and energy relations between the two actors have had considerable impacts on the relations between the EU and Russia. German dependence on Russian gas and oil is such that Germany’s interests are greater concerns than the ones of the Community. Larrabee assessed that one considerable reason for the emergence of Russia as a more assertive power politically and economically is linked to the “special” relationship between Russia and Germany (2010: 46).

Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder implemented a “Russia first” foreign policy and maintained very close ties with Putin. “Relations with Eastern Europe were downgraded and not allowed to disturb the primary objective, which was to intensify economic ties to Russia” (Larrabee, 2010: 47). Furthermore, the decision to create the famous Nord Stream pipeline, bypassing Ukraine and the Baltic states, emerged during the Schroeder administration. However, in order to maintain close ties with Russia, Germany has been reluctant to incorporate Ukraine and Georgia institutionally into Western programs such as the NATO Membership Action Plans in 2008.

“While there is not one sole state to blame, Germany played a key role in facilitating divergent approached within Europe toward Russia” (Paillard, 2010: 79). German dependence on external sources of energy is extremely high. Germany does not

99 Today, Gerhard Schroeder holds the Chairmanship of the Nord Stream pipeline, which became active in September 2011.
include major oil and gas companies, and its main source of energy is produced from its nuclear power plants.

The election of Angela Merkel changed the relations between Germany and Russia, as she has openly criticized Russia’s domestic and foreign policies. However, this was not the case after the Georgia invasion in 2008, when Chancellor Merkel dropped her critical tone in order to make sure of not offending the Kremlin (Waterfield & Blomfield, 2008). As argued by Chancellor Merkel, the question of energy security has become “deeply political” (in Bell, 2009: 269). On the question of energy security, Germany has been one of the leading states pushing for deeper integration and framing energy security as a geopolitical case. Germany has even talked of developing a common foreign energy policy (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 80). Germany approach to the question includes several aspects: first, increasing stability in the different regions – Europe, Caucasus, North Africa –; second, increase solidarity among EU Member States; third, lower dependency on Russia.

c. The United Kingdom, the Producer

The case of the United Kingdom is quite different from the two previous cases, as its energy policy is very autonomous and diversified. Even though Britain is not a recipient per se of Russian gas, it is one of the largest investors in energy in Russia. Britain is much more autonomous than its two European neighbors, France and Germany. Britain’s relations with Russia tend to be shaped more by the market and the competition to the access of resources rather than direct imports. The latest energy race between Russia and Britain consists of accessing the Artic gas reserves.
However, Britain perceives “Russia’s use of its vast natural resources to promote the state’s interests” (Almond, 2011). One of the reactions by the British government to the Russian energy game and the gas shortages of 2006 and 2009 has been to establish emergency gas stockpiles in order to maintain the supply to costumers but also limit the volatility of prices.

The tensions with Russia are less about energy, and more about politics. Relations between the UK and Russia have been at their lowest since the assassination of Alexander Litvinenko in London in 2006. This action led to a visa bans for the Russian elite and Russia closed the British Council. As argued by Youngs, the Russian’s move “elicited no tangible solidarity from the UK’s European partners” (2009: 97).

Following the Georgia invasion by Russia in August 2008, Britain tried to limit the “business as usual” relationship with Russia by attempting to limit the EU to reopen its trade relations with Russia (Waterfield & Blomfield, 2008).

4. Non-State Actors: The Influence of Private Companies

EU-Russia relations in the importation of gas import, the role of non-state actors – multinational corporations, energy companies, and pipeline companies – have had considerable impact on states’ relations. One of the most important impacts has been their influence on limiting the development of a common external energy policy. “Energy companies most commonly espoused free-market solutions, which pushing in practice for

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100 As underlined in his article, Güllner argued that looking at only the states as actor in the question of energy security would be a mistake (2008). “Commercial actors are mainly driven by economic benefits and therefore have different interests, motivations and instruments from state actors” (Güllner, 2008: 150).

101 However, in the case of this dissertation, the analysis on the role of the MNCs will be very limited. The debate around the questions of FDI, rent-seeking and so on will not be addressed.
their own preferential free-market deals and geopolitical backing from national governments” (Youngs, 2009: 5).

However, the complexity around the question of multinational corporations (MNCs) consists in assessing the roots of their decisions and interests. Are MNCs working in promoting national interests? Or are they only seeking commercial gains and a better positioning in the energy market? Youngs raised an important question on the shaping of energy security strategies, “Had energy security constraints been pushed onto the agenda by private-sector actors seeking foreign-policy changes to shore up their own narrow commercial interests?” (2009: 14). In this strategic sector of energy, energy companies tend to be closely connected to the state they serve. However, “companies differed on the role of markets, geopolitics and good governance standards” (Youngs, 2009: 152).

Private actors are important actors in the relations between Russia and the EU. Thus, “the recent nationalization efforts of energy assets in place like Venezuela, Russia, and Bolivia promise more government control and less hospitable investment climates” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 342). The monopolies and nationalization limit the foreign direct investments in the energy sectors affecting technological innovations, but also market access. As underlined by Paillard, in order “to understand the tricky energy relationship between Europe and Russia, one must first understand Gazprom, the three main east-west gas pipeline projects currently underway” (Paillard, 2010: 65). These state-controlled companies have been used as “proxy agents of foreign policy” (Nygren, 2008a: 3) in order to increase Russian leverage.
a. The EU’s Relationship with Private Energy Actors

A central question in the relationship between the EU and Russia is the role of private energy actors. What are there real impacts on dividing EU Member States? Or could they contribute to the fostering of a common voice?

So far players like Gazprom, Russian’s principal energy provider, which is closely connected to the highest sphere of Russian government,102 have had important impacts on the relationship between the EU and Russia. For example, it has been argued that “the EU cannot achieve much-needed unity on issues of energy security due to Gazprom’s policy of bundling its operations, and drawing up bilateral deals with key member states” (Petersen, 2009). One of the reasons is that Gazprom is interested in investing in the EU (Euractiv, 2011). One of the strategies of Gazprom is to “acquire gas infrastructure, while working to gain direct access to European consumers” (Sánchez Andrés, 2007).

If one looks at three of the large importers of Russian energy – France, Germany and Italy – one realizes the importance of private actors. In France, French gas company Gaz de France signed an agreement with Gazprom extending supplies from 2012 to 2030 (Sánchez Andrés, 2007). In Germany, “since in addition to the direct investments that have been made in gas infrastructure in Germany, construction has begun on the Northern European Gas Pipeline which, on the one hand, guarantees a direct supply of Russian gas to Germany, and on the other, makes the country a transport route to the rest of Europe” (Sánchez Andrés, 2007). Last, in Italy, Gazprom has received direct access to the Italian distribution network, including long-term contracts (Sánchez Andrés, 2007). Three large and powerful EU Member States have direct and long-term relations with Gazprom.

102 See Kjaernet, 2010.
through their states’ companies. The interests of the companies are ultimately linked to the interests of the state, thereby affecting their commitments to the interests of the Community. Implementing or even designing an integrated European energy policy is not possible until the most influential Member States – institutionally and historically speaking – have private interests with Russian companies. This example illustrates the current dilemma between national and EU interests.

Gazprom has become such a crucial actor, beyond its original role as “middleman” that it has become routine to claim that “What is good for Gazprom is good for Russia” (Poussenkova, 2010: 113). Energy companies such as Rosneft and Gazprom, which are state-controlled, have increasingly developed interests merged with the one of their respective government, transforming their interests into cases of raison d’état. The rampant corruption within the Russian political system and companies, plus the control of foreign investment in the Russian energy sector, are major concerns for the long-term sustainability of Russian energy power (Broache, 2010: 234). Furthermore, Gazprom “holds nearly one-third of the world’s natural gas reserves, produces nearly 90 percent of Russia’s natural gas and operates the country’s natural gas pipeline grid” (Bahgat, 2006: 970). Even though Gazprom holds considerable assets and receives important political support, it has become crippled by the lack of investment in technology and infrastructure (Rosner, 2009: 166).

Back in 2006 Gazprom sought many bilateral contracts with European companies from France, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Hungary and Austria. These deals offered a greater market access to Gazprom and ultimately the development of competition between Member States to become the key hub (Youngs, 2009: 82). The EU has almost
no way to influence the behavior of European companies, which tend in some cases to undermine the efforts to promote good governance in Russia. Furthermore, EU Member States’ energy companies are also playing a role in limiting the degree of integration within the Union. Major European energy companies have signed long-term contracts with Gazprom for the supply of gas with Gaz de France until 2030, Ruhrgas until 2035, and ENI until 2035 (Kirchner & Berk, 2010: 868). From these long-term bilateral contracts one concern has emerged: the lack of reciprocity. The problem of reciprocity, as Russian companies such as Gazprom all have access to the Union – meaning pipelines, power plants, storage facilities –, whereas European companies have a limited access to Russia and are restricted to 49% share of Russian assets (Riley, 2007: 8). This lack of reciprocity has two consequences: first, the rise of monopolies such as Gazprom; and, second, the lack of innovation and development in Russia.

Last, the European energy market is very divided considering the amount of non-state actors and energy companies. The creation of a common EU energy and gas market is a long-term process and it will need to design an agreement including not only Member States but also companies. “Interconnectedness is the key factor for the creation of interdependence between a set of actors, as increasing interconnectedness turns energy issues from national security concerns into collective security concerns” (Kirchner & Berk, 2010: 868). The competition between national energy companies is such that a common EU energy policy and internal energy market will take a long time to emerge.
b. The Great Game of Pipelines\textsuperscript{103}

The construction of pipelines throughout Europe for the supply of European markets has led to the return of the “Great Game” (Kanet & Freire, 2010). This Great Game consists in increasing the influence of the EU in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, while Russia tries to maintain its supremacy in the region (Nygren, 2008a; 2008b). Pipelines have become the objects of all attention as they offer alternative sources of energy as well as bypassing unstable transit countries such as Ukraine.\textsuperscript{104}

As underlined by Kirchner and Berk, “dependence on a single supplier turns the pipeline into an umbilical cord raising concerns about the disruption of energy supply flow to consumers” (2010: 864). Pipelines have become an instrument of foreign policy for companies, but also governments. As argued by Poussenkova, “export pipelines enable Gazprom to influence foreign consumers and transit countries, and their construction seems to be number one on the company’s agenda” (2010: 114). Gazprom is the largest shareholders for two important pipelines: Nord Stream and South Stream. However, the European dependence on Russian infrastructures – especially pipelines – is a main concern considering the lack of innovations and maintenance from Russia’s companies.

Part of the Russian strategy has been to limit as much as possible the diversification of the EU suppliers by maintaining and increasing its control over the pipelines. In the case of this chapter, only three pipelines will be emphasized. Three major routes of pipelines have been under-construction: Nord Stream and South Stream

\textsuperscript{103} Several reports and edited volume looks into depth at the question of pipelines and their impacts on the EU-Russia relations: Barysch, 2008; Mankoff, 2009; Ziegler, 2010

\textsuperscript{104} For more detail on the role of Ukraine as a transit country see, Nies, 2009.
(supported by Russia) and Nabucco (supported by the EU and Turkey). The map below (figure 5.6) illustrates the pipeline routes crossing Europe.

Figure 5.6: Pipeline routes in Europe

The map below (figure 5.6) illustrates the pipeline routes crossing Europe.

The Nord Stream or “North European Gas Pipeline” (NEGP) offers a direct route from Russia to Germany. Nord Stream’s main rationales are to avoid the transit states (Ukraine and Belarus) and to maintain a constant flow of gas with around 55 billion cubic
meters per year. German and Dutch companies,\textsuperscript{105} as well as Gazprom, are the main investors in this pipeline. Gazprom holds 51 percent of the shares. However, critics have claimed that Nord Stream is an instrument for Gazprom to control the entire market of gas in Europe. The pipeline has been in used since September 2011, a year behind schedule. As underlined in his article, Mr. Paillard described the divergence between the European Commission, pro-pipeline, and the European Parliament, opposed to the pipeline as it could affect the relations between the EU and Russia (2010: 66-67). One way to limit the criticism was the appointment of former German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, as the head of the shareholders’ committee. Land Transit countries Poland and the Baltic states have been opposed to the project and raised concerns over the environmental risks of such a pipeline.\textsuperscript{106}

South Stream is the other pipeline route from Russia to Europe under the Black sea directly to Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria, and Italy. European companies\textsuperscript{107} have been involved in this route. It would bypass both Ukraine and Turkey. The completion is expected to be done by 2015. South Stream is supposed to carry 63 billion cubic meters per year (Paillard, 2010: 67). As underlined by Cohen, “South Stream pipeline will increase the EU’s dependence on Russian energy supply” (Cohen, 2009: 97).

The third route is the Nabucco project back up by the European Commission. Nabucco is supposed to offer an alternative to Russian gas by directly tapping in Caspian gas. One of the main concerns around the viability of the Nabucco project has been the lack of identification of the source country. The doubts around the viability of supplies

\textsuperscript{105} The two German companies are BASF and E.ON holding each 20% of the shares, while the Dutch firm NV Nederlandse Gasunie has 9% of the shares.

\textsuperscript{106} Sweden also voiced serious concerns over the pipeline.

\textsuperscript{107} The shares are divided between France’s EDF (15%), Wintershall (15%), Italy’s ENI (20%) and Gazprom (50%) (Gronholt & Torello, 2011).
are considerable: will it be Iran? Or Azerbaijan? The actual reserves of gas in the region, without including Iran, make the project not profitable unless the pipeline includes access to Iraq and Central Asia. So far, Nabucco is expected to carry 33 billion cubic meters per year, so the smallest among the three pipelines. Furthermore, the Nabucco project can be seen as an example of lack of cooperation among EU Member States in the sector of energy (Esper et al., 2011: 109). The project was initiated out of fear of an unreliable neighbor, Russia, and the fear that Russia could stop all gas exports. Because of the inequalities among EU Member States on the dependence on Russian gas, Europeans often lack pragmatism on the question. Thus, “Gazprom and Transneft are consistently working to undermine the European Nabucco project” (Cohen, 2009: 94). Gazprom and the Russian Federation have been working on closing down supply sources for Nabucco by seeking contracts with potential customers of Nabucco and buying minority shareholders (Riley 2007, 6).

The development of pipelines in order to diversify the gas imports has been one of the EU strategies. The EU has been careful to underline that the pipelines must be operated distinctly from energy production and should allow competitors to use them. However, in the reality the EU has been helpless in the area of construction of pipelines facing a powerful competition. MS have pursued their own interests at the expense of

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108 The EU has been lobbying for the Nabucco project for years. In an article published in November 2011, Petersen declared that the “Nabucco pipeline is dead” (2011). According to other sources, Nabucco should start delivering natural gas from Central Asia by 2018 and not 2017 as originally plan. The construction has also been postponed to 2013 (Oil and Gas Journal, 2011).

109 However due to the vulnerability of pipelines, the EU established in 2007 the Network of Energy Security Correspondents (NESCO) counting representatives of the Commission, Council Secretariat and Member States. The role of NESCO consists in “the monitoring and exchange of information […] as well as providing] early warning of potential threats to the security of energy supply” (Rosner, 2009: 171).
seeking a common energy policy. The case of the Nabucco pipeline illustrates the argument of MS’s interests versus community’s interests.

IV. Conclusion

1. Assessing the Power of each Variable

   a. Power Politics in the Energy Realm

   The question of energy security between the EU and Russia is extremely contentious for two reasons: national interests and state owned companies. Both components are clear symbols of the primacy of states. The guarantee of supply and demand limits any sorts of long-term agreement. As underlined in their chapter, Luft and Korin talked about energy security realists, whose views are directly informed by the neorealist literature (2009: 340-42). States’ actions are shaped by their national interests, either of demand for energy or supply. In the case of Russia, energy is seen as a “legitimate tool of foreign policy” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 340). Energy security is a concrete example of a security dilemma between the EU and Russia. The EU has been seeking to increase the security of its gas imports through the sponsorship of new pipeline routes, imports of LNG from Africa and the Middle East. On the one side, the EU is looking for security of imports, while on the other side, Russia uses energy as a foreign policy instrument allowing it to shape relations with its neighbors and control its sphere of influence.

   So far, European energy security has not been pursued along the lines of that of the US, which is militarized. The US has used force on several occasions in the Gulf in order to ensure the flow of energy. The EU has undertaken a softer approach. The use of force in order to maintain steady import of gas has not been an option, at least at the
European level. EU divisions and low levels of influences have been a recurrent problem in facing the *realpolitik* implemented by Vladimir Putin. This Russian foreign policy has been based on the protection of Russia’s sphere of influence and maintaining “Russian privileged territories.” The war in Georgia during the summer of 2008 and the second energy shortage in Ukraine during winter 2008-2009 are direct reminders to the EU and NATO of Russian power.

The EU looks weak in dealing with Russia for the reason that Russia has refused to sign on a common agreement and has used the market on its own terms. “The EU’s focus on primarily technical cooperation produced meager results, unable significantly to counter-balance the more political obstacles to EU-Russian energy-market integration” (Youngs, 2009: 98). Even the question of pipelines falls under the same dilemma as security of supply. National considerations and perceptions of the threats vary from Member State to Member State, thus limiting the development of a common external policy. Ultimately, one core argument should be about the counter-balancing of Russia by EU Member States through the implementation of a common energy policy. It has also been argued that the EU should not seek a broad agreement with Russia but instead follow a “China model” combining strategic partnership with sector specific agreements (Emerson *et al.*, 2006). The nationalist approach has not been successful in the guarantying the supply of gas.

b. The Power of Institutions in Regulating the EU-Russia Relationship?

The EU-Russia relationship based on gas export/import is a unique case of complex interdependence. The cooperation between both blocs should ultimately lead to deeper
interdependence establishing standard of governance and cooperation. As per as Ms. Ferrero-Waldner, “energy is a perfect example of common sense driving integration” (Ferrero-Waldner, 2006b: 14). The need for a more integrated external policy and a common market of energy are in the benefit not only of the Member States, but also the European citizens, the consumers. It is a simple question of guarantee of supply.

The question of the market and politics is central, as the common market is the heart and soul of the EU. The common market offers the structure for the establishment of a common voice and embodies one of the best solutions for a common external energy policy especially towards Russia. The common market, in addition to the supranational institution of the Commission, can offer the basis for the liberalization of the energy market leading to a common voice. The establishment of a EU energy agency, which has been in the agenda since 2008, could also make sense (Youngs, 2009: 31). The creation of a European gas agency could facilitate cooperation and coordination. The agency could be at the regional levels encompassing EU institutions, Member States and Russia. On top of a common energy agency, the design of the position of an Energy Czar would also strengthen the unity of the EU in international for a, but also serves as a bridge between Member States and European institutions.  

An additional point emerging from this approach concerns the role of institutions to facilitate the imports of Russian energy to the European Union. The most important independent/supranational European institution in charge of the energy sector is the European Commission. As argued by Rosamond, “one powerful rationalist account conceptualizes the growth of supranational institutions in principal-agents terms. […] The growth of EU governance is thought to be the consequence of deliberate self-
regarding action by Member States (principals) which – motivated by convergent preferences – delegate common tasks to supranational institutions (agents)” (Rosamond, 2005, 468). Such theoretical questions are raised, in order to understand the divergences and conflict of interests between the Commission and EU Member States. Because, on a such vital subject – supply of energy – it seems at some point that some Member States are more concerned with their national interests in receiving energy than by the common European good. Can we see an increase of competition between the Commission and some Member States? As argued by Rosamond, “the extent of European institutionalization is always explained by the level of preference convergence among the (key) Member States” (2005). This approach is important in order to understand the different levels in the design and shaping of agreements between the EU and Russia.

Part of the difficulty in designing and establishing a common energy market is caused by the emergence of inter-institutional conflict between the Council and the Commission. The Commission has been pushing for market liberalization, as it falls under its sphere of competence and would ultimately increase its power over the energy question. Whereas, Javier Solana, speaking from the side of the Council, underlined that market liberalization is only one part of the solution. Youngs claimed that it was really much a debate between market and politics (2009: 40). President of the Commission Mr. Barroso argued that “the era of 27 EU mini markets, and mini policies, must end. In its place must come a common approach, internally and externally” (European Communities, 2007: 12).

What seems certain is that “the threats of using the energy weapon […]], and Russia’s repeated use of the natural gas weapon can be avoided through stronger
integration of European markets and enhanced dialogue with Moscow” (Luft and Korin 2009, 341). But this remains on theory.

c. Energy, an European Story

The question of energy security is directly linked to European identity. The European integration project started with the pooling of two resources – coal and steel. The 1955 Messina Declaration underlined that a European priority was to put “more abundant energy at a cheaper price at the disposal of the European communities...” (in Barroso, 2006: 11). Fifty years later, energy security is back in with new component to it, security of import.

One of the emerging observations has been about the framing of the question of gas import as a matter of energy security in order to push for a Common Energy Policy. However, one of the consequences of the framing of the question of gas as security has been an increase the legitimization of the EU Member States and seeking for national solution rather than a community one (Natorski & Surrallés, 2008: 71). Besides, the framing of the energy problem in Europe has been very interesting. For example, the Commission and certain Member States have underlined that it is more an economic problem than a political one. The European Commission, and especially its President, José Manuel Barroso, has pushed throughout the first decade of the 21st century for a “single voice” in dealing with Russia. In most of his speeches, Mr. Barroso has called for a “single voice.” Hence, the European Commission “has developed a unique set of practices driven by a specific set of assumptions about what energy security is and what should be done about it” (Rosner, 2009: 160). When it came to the role of the HR,
Solana’s interests were much more focused on the Middle East and the Balkans than on energy security. One of the reasons is that “Council meetings had not engaged in an overarching strategizing of energy issues within the context of broader EU security identity” (Youngs, 2009: 43).

The EU and Russia are working on a new treaty to replace the existing Partnership and Cooperation agreement, which will include new legal instruments. Each side has its own vision of the treaty. The constructivist argument is important in order to understand and take into consideration the objectives, identities, and social realities in which decisions are made. As argued by Farrell, “what is relevant here is the way in which actors interpret their reality, and often the importance that is attached to the role of ideas” (Farrell, 2005). Each MS and state’s realities are different considering their history, political and economic situation and perceptions of world politics. In the case of the EU-Russia relations, reality different from each side of the negotiation process.

Another core component of the issue of energy security touches on the question of securitization. The issue of energy security in Europe has become securitized since 2006, when the first gas stand-off between Russia and Ukraine occurred. Ultimately, the dependence on a single gas supplier, Russia, could be framed as a major threat to the stability of the EU (Riley, 2007: 4). Both actors are seeking security, one security of demand, and the other one security of supply. The actions of one lead to the creation of fear for the other ultimately leading to the perception of threat. “National interests were now ‘constructed’ within common EU forums and constantly adapted to a dynamic of ‘shared problem solving,’ as opposed to being separately predetermined and fought out within standard realist-style competitive negotiation” (Youngs, 2009: 17).
Finally, behind the energy question lies down a core political question concerning the shared neighborhood. The increasing connection through NATO and EU enlargement plus the Partnership for Peace and the European Neighborhood Policy between Western Europe and the former Russian neighbor has led to the perception of energy as the last instrument to balance Western influence. Such a development is leaving Moscow insecure and increasing its fear of losing influence over former Soviet states. The main difference between both players is the perceptions of the threat. For Brussels, threats can be tackled through cooperation and institutional design. For Moscow, foreign policy is representative of a 19th century state seeking domination and expanding its sphere of influence over foreign territories. Mr. Medvedev, the current Russian president, calls the former Soviet countries a part of the Russian “privileged sphere of influence” (Smith, 2009; Nygren, 2008b). The fact that the EU is becoming more and more involved with Eastern European states through two ways: enlargement and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), Russia sees it as a real threat to its powers and legitimacy.

d. The Power of Interests

The role of non-state actors, especially multinational corporations, has had a crucial impact on the integration process of the EU. “European energy multinationals were the architects of many cartel-like alliances and cooperative arrangements with third-country suppliers” (Youngs, 2009: 169). The divisions between European security interests and European companies’ interests have been considerable. Divergences between Member States are so high that it affects any probability of common energy position. France and
Germany usually lead the way with some sort of partnership, but in the case of energy, no partnership between the two states exists.

Each side houses powerful private actors – Gazprom, Gaz de France, and so on – that influence and are influenced by national governments. These private actors are also used as bargaining tools.

2. Final Thoughts

To conclude this chapter, four points must be underlined: first, diversification; second, common internal energy market; third, cooperation agreement; fourth a common EU approach to energy.

The first point that needs further explanation and will undeniably shape future EU policies is the question of diversification, because “as long as more than half of the EU’s oil and 80 percent of its gas imports originate from only four countries – Russia, Norway, Libya, and Algeria respectively – global markets remain a chimera” (Bauman, 2010: 91). Energy security is one of the greatest security concerns of any state. In the case of the EU, Member States and the EU must secure their supply of energy, especially gas, in order to maintain the standard of living of European citizens, as well as the high level of productivity. On top of the security of supply, the cost of energy needs to be guaranteed at a lower level especially in times of crisis. The development of new routes of pipelines is only one aspect of the solution. The EU and the Member States need to be more consistent in dealing with Russia.
This map above (figure 5.7) illustrates the need for diversification and the fact that the EU remains slow in such process. Even though the gas imports from Russia have slowed down in recent years due to an increase in the imports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) from the Middle East and Africa, it has not been enough in order to speak of a major shift in the process of diversification. On the question of diversification, which seems the only way out of the ‘Russian trap,’ Winston Churchill declared in 1913, when talking about oil dependence, but can still be applied to gas dependence, “safety and certainty in oil lie in variety and variety alone” (in Luft & Korin, 2009: 336). The variety or diversification is simple geopolitical calculus as it leads towards new sources of energy. In the case of Europe, the Middle East and North Africa can provide it, as well as new kind of energy, such as green energy.
The second point looks at the internal energy market. In order to seek a common voice, national politics and interests need to be controlled to a certain extent. To bypass politics, the establishment of a common energy market could occur through deeper liberalization of the energy market. In order to maximize European energy security, the solution stands in an integrated internal energy market and common external voice. The process for a common external voice, especially in dealing with Russia, can only start from within. The absence of a common EU energy policy has played to the advantage of Russia. The lack of unity among EU Member States limits the voice of the EU in dealing with Russia and has “given the Kremlin greater political influence, to the detriment of Europe’s economic security” (Luft & Korin, 2009: 344).

The third point looks at the role and power of institutional agreements. Since the arrival into power of Vladimir Putin, Russia has shifted into a 19\textsuperscript{th} century power. Historically, the EU has sought to establish agreements with third partners in order to define the rules of relationships and export European values and norms. In the case of Russia, the institutional road seems to be the wrong one, as Russia, so long as Putin is in power, would most likely not bind itself to a set of rules. The failure to sign the PCA, the difficulties in agreeing on the ECT, and so on are concrete example of Russia’s behavior. Furthermore, the fact of not having a common set of rules allows Russia to maintain its bilateral relations with EU Member States instead of dealing directly with the EU. The power relation is at the heart of the relationship. The only way to see the design and signatory of an agreement between the EU and Russia will take place after the implementation of a common energy market. The EU strategy of setting up rules first through agreement with Russia is only one side of the coin. As underlined by Bauman,
the new great game about resources, influences, and power will be about infrastructures and access to deposits (2010: 86).

Last but not least, the current situation is also caused by the fault of the EU MS. Russia will always pursue a policy of “divide and rule.” The European institutions have some power in shaping a common energy strategy, but are powerless when it comes to implementing it and bringing all the MS together. MS’s interests are too dominant affecting the development and integration of a common EU energy policy. Only if and when the EU MS actually decide to join together and refuse to deal Russia individually, then the situation will most likely change. The political will of MS to integrate and speak with a common voice remains to be seen.
CHAPTER VI: EU INVOLVEMENT IN THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN THROUGH THE EUPOL-AFGHANISTAN MISSION

The conflict in Afghanistan and the efforts at reconstruction are a veritable political ticking-bomb in Europe. The domestic political debates in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom concerning the war in Afghanistan have been extremely limited due to increasingly popular opposition to the war and each country’s involvement in combat operations. These countries are key military and financial contributors to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European war efforts. This third and last case study explores the paradox in the existence of the European Union Police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL-A), a civilian ESDP operation in time of war.

NATO military operations in Afghanistan started in consequence of the attacks of 9/11. The event marked the first time NATO’s members used the Article 5 of the Treaty of Washington. The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) was created in 2001 at the Bonn Conference with the purpose of restructuring the government and stabilizing Kabul and Afghanistan. NATO assumed the leadership of ISAF in 2003 as well as the command, coordination and planning of the strategy. The original ISAF mandate limited the operation to Kabul and the close region; then, the United Nations Security Council resolution 1510 expanded the mission to the entire country.

Prior to 2007, which marks the beginning of EUPOL Afghanistan, the EU was a small contributor to the effort of the war with the exception of humanitarian assistance and other economic programs orchestrated by the European Commission. In 2007 the EU launched EUPOL Afghanistan, in order to complement and coordinate the actions of various NATO allies: the European Union Special Representative (EUSR), the EU
Delegation in Kabul, and EU Member States involved in the ISAF operations. EUPOL Afghanistan is a civilian ESDP mission providing a “civilian surge” complementing the US/NATO military deployment (Korski & Pothier, 2009). The operation has often been criticized because of its limited budget – EUR 81.4 million from 2008 to 2010 – and inadequate human resources (European Union. European Security and Defense Policy, 2010). The ESDP mission is very limited in its range, and receives low support and commitment from EU Member States, but has a huge task, reforming the Afghan National Police (ANP) a central component of the US counter-insurgency strategy.

Paradoxically, EUPOL Afghanistan is considered one of the most demanding ESDP missions to date because of the excessively militarized and violent theater, but it does not receive the recognition and assistance needed. In addition, establishing an effective civilian mission is constrained by other security challenges and ongoing military operations: counter narcotic strategy, negative influence of private security actors, and cultural and religious differences. EUPOL-A “has suffered from weak leadership, excessive security restrictions, a limited mandate, and a lack of strategy” (Buckley, 2010: 4).

Methodologically, the case of Afghanistan looks at the abilities of the EU to adjust and try to unify its policies at the international level. Thus, Afghanistan is considered as an out-of-area mission for the EU and NATO. The case of police reform is central for the EU, as it should illustrate its superiority in civilian security matters. Interestingly, a large section of the literature on EU police reform focuses on the case of
Kosovo, and a limited one on Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{111} Even the numbers of speeches and articles produced by Javier Solana on Afghanistan are considerably lower than those dealing with Kosovo and Palestine. The ESDP operation in Afghanistan has been identified as a “must-win” mission for the EU, in order to confirm its desire to become a relevant international actor not only vocally, but also through actions. This is a case wherein the EU needs to excel in enforcing security.

The case study of Afghanistan offers a great added value to the study of European security considering the large number of actors on the grounds – NATO, the UN, the European Commission, the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF), civil societies, NGOs, and so forth –. The change of public opinion was at first very emotional soon after 9/11, and then became more rational over time, meaning skeptical of the overall Afghan endeavor.

Last but not least, the case of Afghanistan concludes the series of case studies selected for this dissertation. This case study, on the international level contributes to the discussion on the integration process of EU security and defense policy. the deployment of EUPOL-A took place at a crucial moment in EU security integration, as it should illustrate after years of institutional design, strategic agreement, its contribution to the enforcement of security. Establishing stability and peace in Afghanistan has been portrayed by EU MS as an important mission in order to provide to international peace

\textsuperscript{111} During an interview with a French expert on the question of Afghanistan, the interviewee tried to convince me to study a different case of police mission, since Afghanistan has become the black sheep of EU police missions.
and security. Thus, the EUPOL-A mission is vital to future of independent CSDP mission with civilian component.\footnote{This trend can be seen at the highest level of policy-making of EU security policy. In December 2011, HR Ashton declared, informally, that future CSDP missions could be put on hold until the conclusions of internal reviews identify the current and recurrent shortfalls such as personnel shortage, limited material capabilities, weak financial supports from MS.}

I. Roots of the Instable Afghan Theater

1. The Afghan Drama

Afghanistan has been at war for more than three decades now. Since the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979, the progress in the development of a professional police force made in the 60s and 70s by the Federal Republic of Germany had been destroyed. After the departure of the Soviet Union in 1989, the domestic security situation has been extremely dire. The Afghan National Police’s (ANP) role was limited to traffic control and neighborhood watch (Dalh Thruelsen, 2010: 82). After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1989, Germany was involved in the development of a new Afghan police force. To do so, Germany established a Police Academy in Kabul. This experiment disappeared with the arrival in power of the Taliban.

In line with Afghan culture and tradition, villagers have been contributing to their own security.\footnote{Afghanistan, prior to the arrival of Western powers, did not have a centralized government. Security and politics took place, and still today in some regions, at the local/village level.} With the departure of Western powers in the early 1990s, the country underwent a civil war from 1992 to 1996 seeing the emergence of warlords and the demise of Kabul, its institutions, and central government. By 1996 the Taliban was in control of 90 percent of the country and implemented the Department of Vice and Virtue in charge of policing (Dalh Thruelsen, 2010: 82). The police force became a religious...
police force working with religious courts. In the post-civil war period, regional commanders developed their own militias directly challenging the central government. Afghanistan in this purgatory period preceding western intervention has been often called a “forgotten humanitarian emergency” before becoming one of the most urging global security concern (Ponzio & Freeman, 2007: 173).

Following the fall of the Taliban in Fall 2001 linked to the military operation launched by the West leading to the liberation of Kabul and the installation of Hamid Karzai at the head of the interim Afghan government, the main challenge to fill the power vacuum was to create civilian police forces from untrained forces belonging to factional commanders and their militias (Wilder, 2007: vii). These forces had no training, no equipment, and were unpaid, a situation favorable to corruption. In 2002 the task of creating and reforming a civilian police force based on the respect of the rule of law and human rights was developed. From 2001 to 2005 the Bonn Agreement was the centerpiece of the state-building process in Afghanistan in order to develop a democratic system of governance through newly developed institutions.

2. The Factors of Engagement of the International Community

The Bonn Agreement of December 5, 2001, marked the beginning of the plan of reconstruction of the ANP, the so-called Agreement on Provisional Arrangement in Afghanistan Pending Re-establishment of Permanent Institutions. Following the UNSCR 1386 of December 2001, the UN authorized the formation of ISAF, in order to assist the Afghan authority in maintaining stability in the capital, Kabul. At this point the ISAF, launched in 2002, was separate from the US Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Perito, 2009: 2).
Based on the Security Sector Reform (SSR) program, a division of labor was implemented at the 2002 Geneva conference of donors. Based on the four pillar of the SSR, the US took responsibility for the military; Germany, the police; Italy, the judiciary; Britain, the counternarcotic; and Japan, the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants (Sedra, 2006: 330). As argued by Perito, donor countries did not coordinate their policies around the axe of the SSR, and “none of the donors focused on the need to strengthen the one Afghan institution – the Interior Ministry – that would be responsible for overseeing and supporting the Afghan police” (2009, 3).

The Security Sector Reform concept was developed in the early post-Cold War period in parallel of the new understanding on security studies underlining the nexus between security and development. The “SSR model is built upon the notion that the creation of a responsible, accountable, and effective security sector will engender conditions conducive to development, poverty reduction and democracy” (Sedra, 2006: 325). The SSR model, among other strategies, contributes to implementing post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction of the judiciary sector; however, one of the central conditions for success of the SSR model consists in having a high degree of cooperation between the actors of the international community and local stakeholders. The SSR was mentioned for the first time in the 2003 European Security Strategy, and was ultimately implemented by the EU in Afghanistan to reform the police and judiciary sectors.

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114 A special issue on the SSR model will be published in 2012 in the journal of European Security.
115 Such nexus is at the heart of the EU strategy to promote and enforce security. See Council of the EU, 2003; 2005a; 2008.
In the case of Afghanistan, the SSR “seeks to increase the ability of a state to meet the range of both internal and external security needs in a manner consistent with democratic norms and sound principles of good governance, human rights, transparency and the rule of law” (Council of the EU, 2005a). The SSR is an important document and was merged with EU’ strategy in 2005 emphasizing the contribution of the EU to supporting the SSR in civilian and military operations. Thus, the SSR plays an important role in serving EU’s strategic objectives outlined in the ESS. Through the military and civilian tools and instruments of the ESDP, it can contribute to SSR by promoting development.

The 2003 ESS mentioned the role that the EU needs to play by increasing the capabilities of its missions and expanding the spectrum of its missions by contributing to “joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building” (Council of the EU, 2003). In the case of the EUPOL Afghanistan mission, focusing on reforming the Police Sector, the EU can provide assistance in several domains:

- assessment of policing needs
- defining the objectives of a comprehensive policing policy and strategy
- developing a methodology for achieving objectives
- organizing the police sector (budget, administration, etc.)
- educating the police sector in the principles of modern policing and police management (respect human rights, international law, gender issues)
- guiding and accompanying the police force in their daily tasks
- co-locating experts to the national ministry of home affairs to monitor, mentor and advise
- launching public awareness campaigns in order to secure the trust and cooperation of the community (Council of the EU, 2005a).
The challenges of building a police force in Afghanistan are enormous. In Brigadier General Gary O’Brien’s words “there are some parts of Afghanistan where the last thing people want to see is the police showing up… The police (in some areas) are corrupt. They are part of the problem. They do not provide security for the people – they are the robbers of the people” (Cotter, 2007). The challenges are major and difficult on several levels: at the human level – there is corruption; involvement in kidnapping and other criminal activities; drug trafficking; violation of human rights –, at the institutional level – corruption and weak institutions dominate with a factionalized Ministry of Interior, no equipment, weak judiciary institution limiting the implementation of the rule of law –, and at the state level – there exists corruption of the political elites, non-existence of a feeling of national belonging, and a weak central government.

II. The Civilian Approach to the Afghan crisis: EUPOL-A

1. The pre-EUPOL period

Afghanistan is a pivotal test for the Euro-Atlantic community, as EU’s credibility as a global actor is at stake. Germany and the US were the first two actors involved in the reform of the Afghan police and armed forces. However, their approaches to reforming the security sector have been divergent. The US has focused on militarizing the police with a short-term strategy and utilization of contractors, whereas Germany and now the EU have implemented a civilian approach based on a long-term strategy. “Whereas the German vision focused on the police as a civilian law and order force, the US regarded police as a security force that also could play a counter-insurgency role” (Gross, 2009b:
Tensions within the Euro-Atlantic community have emerged due to divergent police training techniques and methods.

a. The German Police Project Office

Europeans, with the exception of the UK, see the war in Afghanistan as part of a state-building process. Germany launched its operation of reforming the ANP in 2002 until the transfer of power to EUPOL in 2007. Germany in 2002 was the lead actor in the police reform program. Germany was welcomed in Afghanistan as it was – at the time both the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic were involved – an important actor in the 60s and 70s in providing assistance in the development of a police force. Germany created an Interagency Police Coordinated Action Group (IPCAG) in charge of coordinating all the actors involved in the police reform program. Germany also appointed a Special Ambassador to lead the police reform program. The turning point in increasing the interest in the reform and training of the ANP was in 2006 with the deteriorating security situation of Afghanistan. It was the German Police Project Office (GPPO) in charge of assisting the re-structuring and training of the ANP. The GPPO focused on increasing ANP salaries, restructuring tasks and organization for the police, fight crime and narcotics, control borders, and included women in ANP (Gross, 2009b: 27). However, the Germans’ approach, “Training the Trainers,” based on a long-term training program has not been successful for two reasons: lack of personnel and limited resources. The German approach in its early stage was to reform rather than

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116 In 2002, the duties of the GPPO were finalized based on the Seat and Status Agreement between the MoI and the Federal Republic of Germany, which focused on advising the Afghan security authority in order to rebuild an Afghan police force; assist in the training; setting up a police academy; coordinate with international actors for the establishment of the Afghan police force (Federal Foreign Office, 2005).
rebuild (Dalh Thruelsen, 2010: 82). However, the main problem with this approach was that there were no police structures to reform.

Germany’s initial goal was to develop a police force ethnically balanced and respecting the rule of law. However, as underlined by Perito, “given Afghanistan’s size and population, creating a national police force represented a far greater challenge than anything the international community had attempted in peace operations in Haiti and the Balkans” (2009: 3). Furthermore, the case of Afghanistan is unique, as Germany and now the EU have been trying to develop a police force in a period of war, which has never been done before.  

Germany implemented a system continued by the EU, which consists of first establishing an Academy, the Kabul Police Academy (KPA), that will train officers at university level, and noncommissioned officers receive a short period of academic training. The Academy opened in 2002 counting 1,500 officers for a five-year training program, and three months of training for 500 noncommissioned officers (Perito, 2009: 3). The initial German goal was to create a force of 70,000 officers. Since the launching of the GPPO, the target number of police officers is 62,000, including 12,000 for border control (Federal Foreign Office, 2005). Such a program would take several decades to fulfill. “Between 2002 and 2006, Germany contributed approximately $80 million towards rebuilding the police sector in Afghanistan” (Wilder, 2007: 19).

The GPPO was a considerable strategic failure leading to the implementation of the EUPOL-A. The Germans were not able to contribute extensively to the reform of the

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118 In the 1970s the Afghan police forces were composed of around 150,000 police officers.
ANP despite their past success. Since then, the Germans have extremely lowered their role and have provided a small contribution to the war efforts and the training of the ANP.

b. A Militarized Approach to the Police Reform

The US has been involved in reforming the police in Afghanistan, as well, since 2003, after the creation of the GPPO. The beginning of US’s involvement in the police training started in 2004 for the Afghan Presidential Elections, as “there was a growing realization that while the German training programme at the Kabul Police Academy was addressing the training needs of commissioned and non-commissioned police officers, no one was providing basic training for police patrolmen and new recruits” (Wilder, 2007: 21). Thus, in 2004 “when it became clear that the German role in directly implementing and financing police reform efforts would be limited, the US became more active in the sector” (Wilder, 2007: 25), which created coordination problems among the international actors.

This program transferred the power from the Department of State (DoS) to the Department of Defense (DoD). The Combined Security Transition Command - Afghanistan (CSTC-A) has been in charge of training the ANA and ANP since then. As expressed in a report of the DoS and DoD of 2006, US trained Afghan policemen were unable to conduct routine law enforcements and the total number of trained man was too high (Inspectors General, US Department of State and US Department of Defense, 2006).

The US realized that training an ANA without having a strong ANP would affect the success of the overall operation. As opposed to the German’s long-term approach, the US implemented a short-term/rapid training program. The US employs US soldiers and
private security companies,\textsuperscript{119} such as DynCorp International, in order to train through an eight weeks period future police officers. DynCorp International’s approach to the training of police officers is based on the similar model implemented in the Balkans during the previous decade. Afghanistan remains a US-led war through the NATO/ISAF operations. It is also the first of NATO’s “out of area” operations and its biggest in terms of military capabilities and forces deployed. Since the beginning of US intervention, the US has seen Afghanistan as part of the war against terrorism. The US perceives this military endeavor in Afghanistan as part of a counter-insurgency strategy. Since 2005, US efforts have remained the same with the Department of Defense involved in various projects: training Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) including the ANA and ANP; CSTC-A adapting mission in accordance with US Chief of Mission; assistance of ANP in order to build institutional capacities. The CSTC-A encompasses all the areas of police reform counting over 2,500 personnel in charge of police reform, plus the assistance of private contractors especially Dyncorp. The US budget in this area was approximately $5.9 billion from 2005 to 2008 (International Crisis Group, 2008: 9). Since 2008-09 the US has demanded more troops and commitments from Europeans in burden-sharing, especially contributing to ISAF and even EUPOL missions, creating tensions between the transatlantic partners.

\textsuperscript{119}Reports from the US government have emerged these last years concerning the limits of employing private security companies (U.S. Department of State; U.S. Department of Defense, 2006). Some of them connect the remaining problem of corruption to these companies (U.S. House of Representative, \textit{Warlords, Inc.} 2010).
c. Divergence of Strategy, a Zone of Transatlantic Tension

The case of police reform in Afghanistan is interesting as it highlights different perceptions of the war in Afghanistan and different strategic visions within the international community. On the one side, Germany and now the EU envision a long-term strategy based on a civilian approach focusing on training, capacity development and mentoring. On the other side, the US and NATO have developed and implemented a counter-insurgency strategy, a militarized and quantitative approach. The divergence of strategy has existed between the two partners and are going in different direction: the EU with it civilian mission seeks to contribute to the construction of an Afghan state with credible and stable institutions; while, the US with the militarization of the ANP seek to use it in order to contribute to its counter-insurgency efforts. The divergence of strategies has led to “a proliferation of bilateral police assistance programs that reflected the policing practices of donor countries” (Perito, 2009: 1). This lack of common vision is affecting the overall progress as well as slowing down the reconstruction of the Afghan security sectors.

2. Implementation of EUPOL Afghanistan

a. *Mise en place* of the EUPOL-A

In November 2005 the Council addressed its commitment for a new EU Afghan Partnership between the EU and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan. Following the publication of the “Afghanistan Compact” in 2006, wherein the international community committed itself to assist the Government of Afghanistan in developing rules of law, good governance, and enforcement of human rights.
Furthermore, in its 2006 Joint EU Assessment Mission report, which analyzed the situation in Afghanistan, the EU considered a possible role in assisting in the reform of the police sector. A three-week mission in Afghanistan, from November 27 to December 14, 2006, was launched in order to advise on the sort of police mission necessary. The Council approved the Crisis Management Concept in 2007 for an EU police mission in Afghanistan. After the approval by the Council of a EU police mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL), the Government of Afghanistan welcomed in May 16 the intervention of EUPOL on its ground. EUPOL-A faces many bureaucratic and logistical problems as encountered at the launched of the mission in 2007, which was postponed by several months. The objectives of EUPOL Afghanistan are to:

contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system, in keeping with the policy advise and institution building work of the Community, Member States and other international actors. Further the Mission will support the reform process towards a trusted and efficient police service, which works in accordance with international standards, within the framework of the rule of law and respects human rights (Council of the EU, 2007).

The EUPOL-A mission follows the German approach of “Train the Trainer,” which is supposed to develop an autonomous Afghan police-training program. EUPOL-A has been involved in training and developing an ANP capable of providing intelligence, urban security, training its own forces, mobilizing troops, fighting corruption. The police-training program of the ANP is at the heart of the counter-insurgency strategy for the reason that developing and having a national police force capable to enforce the rule of law is central to state-building. EUPOL Afghanistan mission is to support the reform process in order to develop a police forces and service working with the framework of the
rule of law and respecting human rights. Six areas of activities have been identified: intelligence-led policing; criminal investigations; police chain of command control and communication; anti-corruption; linkages between police and prosecutors and gender and human rights (EU Council Secretariat, 2009).

In Solana’s words, “the objective of the [EUPOL] mission is not to train the police but to train the trainers, to organize a system, a police concept, that really is long lasting and benefits the people of Afghanistan” (2008a). Ultimately, the role of EUPOL is dual: the establishment of the rule of law and police reform. The dimension of the Police Reform of EUPOL focuses on criminal investigation, checkpoint duty, city security, training and education; while the Rule of Law dimension consists in judicial sector reform, mentoring prosecutors and judges and strengthening human rights (Dalh Thruelsen, 2010: 85-86). Both dimensions are necessary in order to establish solid foundations for the Afghan security sectors.

The decision behind the creation of EUPOL Afghanistan was to answer multiple complications: national fragmentation, difficulty between transatlantic partners with the US calling for burden-sharing, and limited success of the GPPO. All these factors led to the decision of implementing an ESDP mission. The type of ESDP mission was debated among France, the UK and Germany, as they all share diverging visions concerning the role and types of ESDP missions. Holding the EU presidency the first half of 2007, Germany made the decision to launch a civilian operation.\textsuperscript{120} The 2007 Council Joint Action describes the different processes leading to the recommendation of the creation of

\textsuperscript{120} The decision made by EU Member States to launch a civilian ESPD mission is that Civilian missions are usually less controversial to launch and agree on compared to military operations as they require less financial commitment from the MS and neither national authorization –as it is the case in Germany or the Netherlands. As per Major, “civilian missions are financed from the community budget whereas military missions follow the ‘cost lie where they fall’ rule” (Mayor, 2011: 175).
a Police Mission (Council of the EU, 2007). EUPOL mission is designed on the GPPO model. In addition to training, EUPOL mentors high ranked officers, the staff of the Ministry of the Interior, and regional chiefs of police. With its structure, EUPOL should allow a higher degree of coordination between EU Member States and especially with third parties.

Prior to the decision on the type of ESDP mission that would be deployed in Afghanistan, three political rationales are behind the EU decision to launch an ESDP mission in Afghanistan: first, there was a sense that the EU was punching below its weight and was not playing an important role in Afghanistan besides making financial contributions; second, individual EU Member States were more favorable, for political reasons, into launching a civilian operation rather than increasing the number of troops for NATO counter-insurgency; third, bureaucratic reasons leading to a division of labor between the Council (police) and the Commission (justice) (Wilder, 2007: 21-22).

Another considerable element needs to be taken into consideration: US pressure. With the increase of US deployment in Afghanistan, the Europeans were facing two options: either not sending any EU forces and be marginalized, which could have tremendous consequence on the transatlantic relationship; or joining the US by launching an EU mission with a civilian mandate as it was not ready for a military mission.121

The EUPOL-A has been so far the most demanding ESDP mission. It reflects a model of savoir faire of EU police mission as previously done in Kosovo, but does not have any executive powers. EUPOL-A on paper is a concrete materialization of EU soft power.122

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121 Interview with a EU expert in Paris on July 1st, 2011.
122 Interview with a EU expert in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
b. Structures

EUPOL Afghanistan took over the German police-training program in order to draw together all non-US efforts. But, since then, the structures of the international community have been more confusing than ever (International Crisis Group, 2008: 9). There has been an increase of bilateral agreements with Kabul causing cacophony on the ground. EUPOL strategies and work are coordinated with a large number of actors involved in the reform of ANP: US, NATO/ISAF, German Police Project, UNAMA, and others (Council of the EU, 2009a: 7). Thus the EU has several actors involved in Afghanistan: EU Special Representative (EUSR), European Commission, and the EUPOL. All three institutions sit in the International Policing Coordination Board (ICPB) and still have difficulties defining the role of each.

The ICPB was established in 2007, is chaired by the Minister of the Interior and includes eight members: EUPOL, UNAMA, ISAF, NATO, the US embassy, CSTC-A, EUSR, and the EC. On paper the ICPB should be the organ leading to cohesion and coordination of policies on the ground. Instead, it has been described as a “ghost that does not coordinate anyone” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 11). Thus, as expressed in a report of the European Police Centre, the EU struggles to establish a high degree of coordination with all its actors, “making it even less clear who speaks for Europe” (Islam & Gross, 2009). The ICPB has been unable to lead the coordination process among its members. This has hurt the overall effort in reforming the ANA and ANP. On top of it, the lack of coordination with the EU is also considerable.

Another important figure is the EUSR, appointed by the Council, and reporting directly to the HR and to Member States through the Political and Security Committee
The EUSR is the political figure of the EU in Afghanistan. Part of his mandate consists on giving local political guidance to the Head of EUPOL (Council of the European Union, 2008a).

Figure 6.1: EUPOL Command and Structure


The size of EUPOL mission is also a problem for its success, but also for the cooperation with other international actors, such as NATO, the UN, the US, and even the EU. The main problem concerns the degree of coordination with the different actors of the international community. For example, at the beginning the degree of cooperation with the US and NATO was not high enough for positive results. But, after ISAF understood the role and mission of EUPOL better communication, cooperation and continuity in their work allowed a better coordination in the police training of the ANP on the ground (ISIS Europe, 2009b).
c. Strategy

Since the creation of EUPOL, Europeans have followed a civilian framework similar to the one applied in the Balkans. However, such model is very difficult to implement in Afghanistan due to a different environment with on-going combat and violence in Kabul and the PRTs. “The EU can to take up this challenge by focusing on the areas in which it can offer tangible added-value: governance and the rule of law” (Bindi, 2009). State-building and peace-building are possible only as part of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, not in times of war. The EUPOL-A mission, which is to assist and establish the rule of law through the reform and reconstruction of the ANP, is the cornerstone of the EU’s civilian contribution through the deployment of its soft power. Unfortunately, “a common ‘European vision’ or approach that draws together member states as well as EU institutions’ efforts in the field has yet to emerge” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 10).

The strategy of EUPOL is based on the famous “monitoring, mentoring and advising.” According to Scholz the strategy is based on a top down approach - from the interior and justice ministries to the regions and the provinces, which means setting up proper command and control structures on a regional and provincial basis (Dempsey, 2008). In terms of training and mentoring, the GPPO reopened the KPA in 2002 and was focusing on the training of commissioned and non-commissioned policemen. On the other hand, the US hired a private contractor, DynCorp International, in 2003 in order to train patrolmen, first in Kabul and then the following year in Regional Training Centers (RTCs). EUPOL and the US, through DynCorp, have been involved in the mentoring program in Kabul and PRTs. As argued by Wilder, “an effective mentoring program could become a very important component of a comprehensive police reform strategy”
However, the difficulty with a mentoring program is to have enough qualified mentors and assure their protection. Thus, one of the problems with the mentoring approach is the high cost of such a program in men, capabilities, and time. The US has delegated this task to private companies such as Dyncorps, while the Europeans are attempting to do it through the EUPOL-A mission. The next section will show the extent of the failure and the limited contribution of the EU mission to the reconstruction of Afghanistan and of its police.

3. Challenges facing EUPOL-A

a. Administrative and Bureaucratic Challenges

At the beginning, EUPOL Afghanistan faced major problems: insecurity, conflict between the EU and NATO, personnel and administrative constrains. The administrative challenges since the early period of EUPOL have affected the credibility of the EU as a reliable international actor on the ground and on the international arena. Furthermore, the EU was and is still perceived as a late contributor to the war efforts as the EUPOL was only launched in 2007, six years after the beginning of the military operations, and four years after the reform of the ANSF.

A first problem concerns the lack of strategy. The EU and its Member States do not share any “common vision” for Afghanistan and are not willing to establish a common EU agenda on this matter. This lack of strategic vision has limited the success of the mission. In the early stages of the operation, the EUPOL mandate was not always clear among the actors involved on the ground. Since the creation of EUPOL and after agreement on its mandate in May 2007, EUPOL faced major constraints and delays in its

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123 Interview with a EU expert in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
deployment because of several problems: limited liaison with the Afghan administration, differences in security agreements to be discussed with NATO and ISAF, and the sudden resignation of the Head of Mission several months after his appointment (ISIS Europe, 2007).

Table 6.1: Heads of the EUPOL-A

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mandate</th>
<th>Heads of EUPOL-A</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 2007 to November 2007</td>
<td>Brigadier General Friedrich Eichele</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2007 to October 2008</td>
<td>Brigadier-General Jürgen Scholz</td>
<td>German</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 2008 to July 2010</td>
<td>Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup</td>
<td>Danish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 2010 to Present</td>
<td>Brigadier General Jukka Savolainen</td>
<td>Fins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Out of the four heads of mission, Danish Police Commissioner Vittrup is considered as one of the most influential leaders contributing to better cooperation and coordination within EU structures and reaching out to international actors on the ground. Ultimately, the Council postponed the deployment of EUPOL troops until March 2008.

A second challenge affecting EUPOL concerns a personnel shortage, which has been recurrent since 2007. As expressed in a EUPOL Afghanistan review on the period from May 30, 2007 to May 30, 2010, “the shortage of personnel has been at the heart of the mission’s criticism, the sole responsibility lies within Member States’ failure to respect agreements over capabilities” (ISIS Europe, 2009b). According to the EUPOL mandate, the personnel strength should be at 400 international personnel specialized in police, law enforcement and justice experts. The contributing nations are composed of 16

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124 Interview with a EU expert in Paris on July 1, 2011.
EU Member States and four non-EU Member States. They are deployed either at the central (Kabul), regional (regional police commands), or provincial levels (as a Provincial Reconstruction Teams – PRTs). The figure below (figure 6.2) illustrates quite well the difficulties to attain the full capacity of the mission.

Figure 6.2: Human Contributions to the EUPOL-A from November 2008 to June 2011


This issue of personnel shortages in the EUPOL mission has been an ongoing problem on the ground, in European debates, and with the US. At the EU level, overtime Member States have been reluctant to send more troops and personnel causing shortage.

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125 Contributing EU Member States are: Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Sweden, the UK. The non-EU Member States contributing to EUPOL-A are Canada, Croatia, New Zealand, and Norway.

126 Number of the international contributions to EUPOL-A prior November 2008 were not accessible.
of military and civilian personnel and even resources. EUPOL personnel commitments have never been met undermining the mission’s credibility. On the issue of staffing, two elements need to be underlined: quantitative and specialization. One of the problems for the EU has been to attract EU police experts to Afghanistan. Most European experts prefer going to the EU mission to Kosovo, which is the biggest European police mission to date and in a less dangerous theater (Islam and Gross, 2009). The competition between ESDP missions plus the lack of financial incentives to attract European policemen have been a serious challenge affecting the success of the operation. The second problem concerns the qualification of the personnel needed in Afghanistan ultimately affecting the recruitment in Europe.127

A third challenge relates to the financial and material dimension of EUPOL. EUPOL’s budget has been considerably lowered since its creation. In the Joint Action 2007/369 of May 30 2007, the EU agreed on a budget of EUR 43.600.000 from May 2007 to March 2008. This decision was later amended in the Council Joint Action 2008/643/CFSP of August 4, 2008, extending the length of the expenditure period from March until November 30, but not the budget. EU Member States have been at the center of the problem for the success of the deployment and implementation of the EUPOL mission for two reasons. First, EUPOL lacks capabilities due to limited financial contributions from Member States. “Financial incentives aside, most ministries of defense deem that sending highly qualified personnel (which are scarce and needed at home) to Afghanistan for the training of young and inexperienced recruits” (ISIS Europe, 2009a). Second, Member States have also lacked clear political will in their commitment to EUPOL.

127 Interview in Brussels taken place on June 22, 2011.
A fourth challenge concerns the Brusselization of the decision process. In this process, the Head of the EUPOL mission has very little autonomy and freedom of action, thus limiting the degree of adaptation of the mission. As argued in the House of Lords’ report, “the EU and Member States should examine whether a speedier system for reaching decisions can be created in Brussels when a need for an urgent political decision arises” (House of Lords, 2011: 31). In design, it seems that it is only a top-down system with no feedback loop. The lack of feedback limits the degree of understanding of the needs on the ground and the possibility of a change of strategy in accordance with political and military events in Afghanistan.

b. Challenges of an Instable Environment

In November 2009 several British soldiers were killed by an Afghan policeman. The infiltration of the Taliban into the police forces and training quarters raised concerns about the security of trainers and civilians. The lack of security provisions by the EU for its personnel is a major drawback in the ongoing success of the EUPOL mission as it limits its deployment throughout the country. EUPOL trainers are dependent on outside security, either private security companies or NATO forces. Without such security support, EUPOL trainers cannot exercise their mandate. For that reason, EUPOL has been employing private security companies for the protection of its staff outside of Kabul. Thus, the EUPOL mission is the first civilian operation undertaken by the EU in a time of crisis, in a warzone. The EU does not have the material capabilities and training to enforce the security of its forces on the ground. For this reason, most of the trainees are mainly located in Kabul within European infrastructures and other PRTs. The violence
and ongoing warfare in Afghanistan is one of the major causes for the limited progress in the counter-insurgency strategy.

Additional external factors have been real a challenge to the success of the mission such as illiteracy, gender-cultural sensitivity, identification of members of the Taliban within the civil society, corruption and the lack of infrastructure. All these challenges limits the progress and success of the EUPOL mission. The challenge of creating, training and developing a strong ANP comes with many difficulties. One central challenge is the Taliban. The Taliban “uses perceptions of the police’s poor performance and standing as a propaganda tool. They target the police not just with violence but also with morale-sapping vitriol” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 6). Oftentimes, police officers are involved in criminal activities: kidnapping, corruption and so on. The perception of ANP from a civilian angle is central in the success of the mission.

c. Challenges for Success – Competition

As argued by Eva Gross, EUPOL faces two major challenges in order to bring its mission to success: first, internal and external coordination of police reform; second, cooperation with Afghan stakeholders. On the issue of coordination, the US and the EU have increased their degree of coordination and cooperation through the EUPOL Afghanistan operation since 2009. However, the US still continues to implement their quantitative approach of police reform based on a short-term militarized training. One central challenge has been to find a higher degree of coordination within the international community limiting overlapping missions.
On an internal level, EUPOL faces several challenges. “The mission does not have the means to provide strong political or financial incentives to enhance the engagement of Afghan authorities” (Gross, 2009: 34). Thus, the EU strategy of reforming the ANP goes through a long-term strategy more costly in time, human and material capabilities, and finances. Developing a deep cooperation and coordination between the EU and NATO has been difficult for the reason that EUPOL was launched too late in the war effort and because of its civilian mandate. Thus, no formal agreement exists between the EU and NATO causing major problems for EUPOL’s mission. The reason is that Afghanistan is not seen as a Berlin Plus operation. NATO and the EU do not have a formal cooperation agreement allowing the protection of EUPOL personnel. The only agreement, informal, is in case of an emergency NATO will provide assistance to EUPOL. The lack of agreement between the EU and NATO on the protection of EUPOL personnel is a consequence of Turkey’s opposition until the Cyprus question is solved. As expressed by the House of Lords, “we [UK] still believe that the lack of a formal cooperation agreement between the NATO forces in Afghanistan and EUPOL on the security of EUPOL personnel has increased the risk to the lives of EUPOL personnel” (House of Lords, 2011: 27).

The second challenge concerns the implementation of the police reform and the reach to Afghan stakeholders. The central government is weak and has limited influence over the regions. And EUPOL operations are not being deployed all around the country, thereby affecting the reach and influence of the reforms. “EUPOL’s difficulties in deploying through PRTs aside, this raises issues over Western credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of Afghans; but also over the interactions between EUPOL and the Afghan
government” (Gross, 2009b: 34). The limited outreach of the EUPOL is a considerable shortfall.

As expressed in an International Crisis Group’s report, “weak leadership on the ground has failed to provide clear direction to the efforts of various member states” (International Crisis Group, 2008: 10). Thus, due to limited success, many Member States have not seconded their commitments on personnel and resources and are instead implementing bilateral commitments, as it is the case of the UK, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands and Canada. Often, the best-trained personnel are not sent to serve within the EUPOL structures.

Last, but not least, an intra-European competition exists since 2007 with the launch by France of the European Gendarmerie Force (EGF). The EGF was created by a treaty signed by the governments of France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands (Esquivel Lalinde, 2004/05). The unique character of a gendarmerie force is its dual police-military status, as it is a police force under the control of the Ministry of Defense. The EGF’s purpose consists to provide assistance in international policing operations during crisis management (Esquivel Lalinde, 2004/05; Weger, 2009: 3). As envisioned, the EGF should be able to undertake any sorts of policing mission in any scenarios. In the case of Afghanistan, “the aim is to find solutions to the ongoing lack of staff for the civilian mission of support for the Afghan police force, EUPOL Afghanistan” (Gros-Verheyde, 2009). The deployment of the EGF in 2009 can be explained by the simple fact that with its military status, the protection of the EGF falls under NATO, which is

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128 It is the official website, http://www.eurogendfor.eu/, which gives extremely limited information on its role and nature, especially in Afghanistan.
129 For further information on the question of the European Gendarmerie Force refer to: Esquivel Lalinde, 2004/05; Weger, 2009; and Madaro, 2004/05.
not the case of EUPOL-A, a civilian mission. As underlined by the official narratives, “its members are therefore accustomed to intervening in dangerous zones and they have armored vehicles and powerful means of defense and attack. They are more autonomous for protecting their own security and can therefore be integrated more readily into the NATO military force in Afghanistan (ISAF)” (Gros-Verheyde, 2009). Gendarmerie forces have several advantages over civilian police forces: quickly deployable, self-sustainable, and can be placed under military command (Weger, 2009: 36). “The main object of the EGF is to take advantage of the special characteristics of Europe’s paramilitary police force – such as the means at their disposal, their training and discipline –, which are far superior to those of all other existing police forces” (Esquivel Lalinde, 2004/05). It has been argued that gendarmerie forces have a comparative advantage over civilian police forces. “Gendarmerie forces are able to carry out policing in all circumstances, while a civilian police force is only used to working in conditions of peace” (Weger, 2009: 36). The deployment of the EGF, especially in Afghanistan, is preferred to a civilian mission considering the security challenges, the military command, and geographical constraints.

The Afghan case study, as well as the two other case studies, illustrates well the lack of enforcement of the EU in the sector of defense and security. The EU has been a large advocate of promoting security in instable regions throughout the world and especially Afghanistan and the Balkans. Unfortunately, the gap has increased between the decisions to promote security to its actual enforcement. The decision taken by the members of the Council to deploy a mission in Afghanistan was to contribute to the reconstruction of the country through an emphasis on SSR model and training of the ANP.
But, the EU has not been able for many reasons, as demonstrated throughout the chapter, to train in sufficient number the next members of the ANP. The Afghan mission is extremely important as it illustrates the ability and savoir-faire of the EU in civilian mission. Moreover, the EU cannot even contribute to the protection of its own troops on the ground. This recurrent process shows the considerable problems facing the EU in the sensitive sector of security and defense. One of the main limits in the enforcement dimension is the Member States, which want to control their destiny and maintain their autonomy in the sphere of defense and security. The deployment of the EGF is a perfect example of the importance of the MS in order to see a successful CSDP mission.\(^\text{130}\) The following section takes a more in depth look at the centrality of the MS in the Afghan fiasco.

### III. Member States’ Interests and European Public Opinions: In Contradiction with EUPOL-A?

By identifying the main narratives in French, British, and German officials’ discourses and also studying opinion polls from European citizens of each country will offer interesting tools in order to understand and assess a possible correlation between EU Member States’ actions and/or inactions and the limited success of EUPOL Afghanistan. The first sub-section looks at the three EU powerhouses’ – France, Britain and Germany – involvement in the war in Afghanistan. The following analysis emphasizes on the individual governments’ commitments to NATO and EUPOL-A. This permits to

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\(^\text{130}\) As of today, one of the most successful CSDP mission has been EUNAVFOR off the coast of Somalia. MS’ interests in lowering piracy are so high that they are contributing with considerable human and material capabilities as well as maintaining close relationship with NATO.
demonstrate the lack of coordination between each MS at a political and military level. The second sub-section studies the power and influence of national public opinion on MS’s decisions and commitments to the EUPOL-A.

1. EU Member States

In parallel to ISAF commitments, a division of labor, established during the 2002 Bonn Conference, exists between EU Member States in order to tackle specific sectors of security reform: Italy, justice sector reform; UK, counter-narcotic; Germany, police training. These remain national initiatives on the side of the EUPOL-A mission of reforming the ANP. As illustrated by the charts below (figures 6.3 and 6.4), the commitment and contributions made by EU MS to the ISAF since 2007 are quite low. Furthermore, the year 2007 marks the beginning of the EUPOL-A mission, which was initially deployed in order to contribute to the reconstruction of Afghanistan along with NATO. Neither national contribution to ISAF mission nor to the one to EUPOL-A could satisfy the US demands and expectations. This has been a strain on the transatlantic relations.
Figure 6.3: EU Member States contributions to ISAF/NATO


Figure 6.4: Overall EU contributions to NATO/ISAF since 2007

From the two previous charts (Figure 6.3; 6.4), one can argue that France is punching below its weight especially after reintegrating NATO military command. The UK and Germany stand out as the largest contributors to NATO/ISAF forces after the US.

From a research standpoint, it is difficult to find many substantial speeches and declarations on the role of the EU and/or Member States in Afghanistan. The themes are redundant and similar, and leaders do not clearly address the challenges, outside of the problem violence in Afghanistan, faced by NATO and the EU on the ground for obvious political reasons.

a. Germany

Since Germany’s initial involvement in Afghanistan in 2001, German operations have been limited for two reasons: first, the mission in Afghanistan has become extremely politicized and political parties have different understandings and strategies. Second, German military operations have been compromised due to an increase of violence in Afghanistan. As expressed by Noetzel and Rid, Germany has had to face two fronts: the first one domestically with the Bundestag under heavy popular pressure; the second one, the executive branch of German government has been under pressure from NATO and the US to increase its military forces on the ground (Noetzel & Rid, 2009: 72).

During the 2001 conference leading to the Bonn Agreement between Germany and Afghanistan, Germany committed to assist in the reconstruction of Afghanistan’s political future. One of the areas of contribution was the training of Afghan police force. In the 2007, the EU launched EUPOL Afghanistan in order to coordinate the training of Afghan police forces between the members of the international community. Therefore,
Germany has maintained its police-training mission. “The EUPOL mission is seen by some as a mean for Germany to substitute its commitment to Afghanistan from a military one to the civilian missions” (Gya, 2007: 5). In addition, the GPPO was not as successful as initially hoped in the training of the ANP.

Germany had a role in the premature launching of the EUPOL-A mission. The German government wanted to see a transition from the GPPO to the EUPOL during its presidency rushing the mission before its full readiness. “It had only four staff in Kabul at the time, and they had no access to the internet and no vehicles” (Buckley, 2010: 4).

The misunderstanding of the war in Afghanistan between the ISAF mission and other civilian operations, such as the EUPOL mission, in public minds has hurt the process. By assuming that any operations are in fact combat operations, public opinion is limiting the freedom of politicians to throw their weight to back up a civilian mission like EUPOL. Since 2008, with an increase of combat fatalities, public opinion has become more and more critical toward any operation in Afghanistan. According to Noetzel and Rid, “for German policymakers, there are three principal options in Afghanistan: do more, do less, or continue as in the past with minor adjustments” (Noetzel & Rid, 2009: 86). It is true that this statement mostly applied to military operations in Afghanistan as part of the ISAF mission. “Germany, in short, is trying to maintain a low profile” argued Neotzel and Rid, “by hiding politically behind bolder allies, rhetorically behind ‘networked security’ and geographically in what used to be a calmer north” (Noetzel & Rid, 2009: 88). Germany as of 2009 had around 3,000 military troops posted in the North of the country, one of the most stable regions.131

131 However since 2009, the region has become increasingly instable affecting the security of the German troops.
b. The United Kingdom

London sees the EUPOL mission as politically important for two reasons: UK influence in Europe and strengthening the US-UK partnership. The UK has the second-largest contingents in Afghanistan with over 8,500 soldiers contributing to the war effort and ultimately under NATO supervision. Since 2008, the UK has been calling for European partners to increase the number of troops in order to share the burden.

In 2011, the House of Lords published a very critical report on the EUPOL mission clearly stating the challenges faced by the mission on the ground and in Europe (House of Lords, 2011). The document calls for deeper transformation at many levels. The report stresses the lack of cooperation between the actors of the international community, while the limited degree of autonomy from Brussels. Very few governments have undertaken such a critical examination of the success and failure of EUPOL Afghanistan. Due to a more open debate on the question of Afghanistan in the UK and no future election in sight, the government feels that it can address the issue directly.

Gordon Brown, during his mandate as Prime Minister, maintained a strong commitment to the war in Afghanistan. In a 2009 speech, he declared that “The British forces will stay in Afghanistan until the Afghan security forces are capable of ensuring security in this country” (Bahrami, 2009). But, in British discussions several themes are recurrent: the fight against terrorism especially against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, the long term commitment to Afghanistan, the British commitment to NATO, and the training of the ANP and ANA. However, Brown envisioned a stronger ANA and ANP

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132 One of the main reasons is to maintain a strong and healthy “special relationship” with its American counterparts.
along the lines of the US strategy, which is to use them as part of counter-insurgency effort, so as part of their military plan.

At the end of his mandate, former Prime Minister Brown was politically playing defense in order to protect his Afghan strategy.

c. France

France, with around 3,500 troops, is the fourth contributor to NATO/ISAF after the US, the UK and Germany. The case of France in Afghanistan with NATO and the EUPOL is very peculiar. “We [France] are waging ‘war’ operations,” claimed former minister of Defense, Mr. Morin, “but we are not ‘at war’ in the constitutional sense of the term” (BBC, 2009). Thus, the French government always goes back to the fact that the international community has a UN Mandate in order to contribute to ensure peace and restore Afghan sovereignty (BBC, 2009). The fact that France is involved in Afghanistan is not linked to the fight against the Taliban but instead to the reconstruction of Afghan sovereignty.

In total there are very few speeches from French President Sarkozy on the role of France in Afghanistan, and on EUPOL Afghanistan. The themes developed are extremely redundant: France is not at war against the Afghans, but against terrorists; the problem is one of violence and instability caused by terrorist groups; and, lastly, drug trafficking causing major problem of corruption in Afghanistan. In addition, President Sarkozy underlines more often the role of France within NATO structures than the EU.

In parallel of the launching of EUPOL in 2007, France created with several other EU Member States the EGF. The aim of EGF in Afghanistan is to find a solution to the
lack of staff for the EUPOL-A civilian mission. The reality behind the utilization of the EGF in Afghanistan is that the gendarmes, who are part of a civilian military force, can receive protection from NATO as opposed to EUPOL, which has only a civilian police status.

2. The Influence of European Public Opinion on National Contributions

Public support in Europe and especially in Germany has declined considerably since the beginning of the ISAF/NATO mission in 2003. The question of the priority of the stabilization of Afghanistan as a major international problem for European leaders has received extremely low support from European citizens going from 2 percent to 11 percent (Table 6.2). The issue of the stabilization of Afghanistan ranked very low in the 2008 and 2009 polls, well behind the issues of management of international economic problems (on average at 30 percent in 2009) and fighting climate change (going from 5 percent to 26 percent in 2009). Even in the US, the approval rate is only of 7 percent.

Table 6.2: Should the stabilization of Afghanistan be the top priority for the American president and European leaders? (2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.3: European approval for greater EU responsibility in dealing with international threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spending more money on development</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase us of trade to influence other countries’ behavior</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commit troops for peacekeeping</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commit troops for combat actions</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As shown in a 2007 poll, Europeans are more willing to spend money on development (84 percent) than on committing troops for combat operations (20 percent) in order to deal with international threats (Table 6.3). This chart clearly identifies EU redlines as an international actor. Europeans and their leaders do not object to contributing to humanitarian and civilian operations. However, as soon as the question of the use of military force and the deployment of combat troops arises, the disapproval rate becomes extremely high. European military operations are not designed or perceived for fighting wars, but to contribute to softer issues such as: humanitarian, civilian rescues and peacekeeping operations. Table 6.4 illustrates very well this point with a high approval rate on humanitarian mission and a low one on combat operations. Military intervention is not conceivable. Since the existence of the ESDP, European operations have never included combat missions of crisis management or even peace making. European citizens understand foreign and defense policies through the use of soft power.133

The case of the EU’s involvement in Afghanistan symbolizes the differences of perception of the role the EU should be playing on the international stage.

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133 In the case of the Libyan mission back in April 2011, the situation was quite different. First of all, it was never question to use an CSDP mission. Second, the rationale for intervention was embedded in the R2P and in values very close to the European ones. Third, NATO operations have traditionally been perceived as American led.
Table 6.4: EU approval for committing troops (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>To provide humanitarian assistance in Darfur</th>
<th>Approve</th>
<th>Disapprove</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Maintain peace and order in Post-conflict Balkans</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To Contribute to International Reconstruction in Afghanistan</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To monitor and support ceasefire in Lebanon</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To conduct combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 6.4 illustrates the role of the EU in different regions of the world. On the case of Afghanistan, EU citizens approve at 67 percent the contribution of the EU in its contribution to international reconstruction in Afghanistan. However, they reject at 65 percent the role of the EU as a contributor to combat operations against the Taliban. European public opinion sees the role of the EU as a soft power, a civilian power, and do not approve a military behavior from the EU.

The following chart offers a domestic description of the perception of the EU in Afghanistan. Table 6.5 shows that at the exception of the US and the UK, all other EU Member States disapprove of the use of military forces in fighting the Taliban. However, the numbers are much higher when it comes to reconstruction.
Table 6.5: To what extent, would you approve or disapprove of the deployment of troops for the following operation: (2007)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conduct combat operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan</th>
<th>Contribute to international reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Topline Data

Such trend has remained the same since 2007.

The next table (6.6) validates the previous argument of popular support to program of reconstruction and low for combat operations.

Table 6.6: As you may know, many countries are engaged in different ways to stabilize Afghanistan. To what extent would you approve or disapprove of [COUNTRY’S] participation in the following efforts in Afghanistan (2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Providing security for economic reconstruction projects</th>
<th>Assisting with the training of Afghan police and military forces</th>
<th>Conducting combat operations against the Taliban</th>
<th>Combating narcotics production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
<td>Approve</td>
<td>Disapprove</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU11*</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Netherlands</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Topline Data

EU11: France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Romania
The EU11 have been very supportive in sending civilian operations to Afghanistan as opposed to a military one for political and institutional reasons. EU11 approve at 71 percent the training of ANP and ANA, which falls under a civilian contribution to crisis management (table 6.6). However, this approval is not translated into implementation on the ground with a very weak, understaffed EUPOL Afghanistan. With these tables, it is unclear if European citizens had in mind the EUPOL Afghanistan operations, or individual Member State’s contributions to the reform of the ANP and ANA, or simply express their opinions on the role the EU should be playing in Afghanistan.

However, what is certain is that European citizens do influence national policy-makers and politicians. They knew that the deployment of a small civilian mission would not hurt their interests and ultimately their mandates.

IV. Conclusion

1. Variables

   a. A Transatlantic Failure?

   Is the EUPOL-A a balancing tool of ISAF/NATO? Or at the opposite, are Europeans trying to free-ride under NATO umbrella?

   “Afghanistan has become a stress test for transatlantic cooperation in maintaining global stability” (Flanagan, Cipoletti, & Tuninetti, 2011: 183). The shift of the balance of power this first decade from a unipolar to a multipolar order has affected the foreign policy of the US in Afghanistan. In the direct aftermath of 9/11, President Bush went to Afghanistan as a part of the “War on Terror.” The US approach under Bush was a
military strategy seeking the destruction of Al-Qaeda. With the arrival of President Obama in 2008 at the White House, the US strategy in Afghanistan undeniably shifted to a new emphasis on civilian capacity-building by contributing to the reconstruction of the ANA and ANP by deploying trainers (Flanagan, Cipoletti, Tuninetti, 2011: 185).

However, the revitalization of transatlantic relations in 2009 also means a greater contribution from the European partners in dealing with the challenges of the 21st century. “Many Europeans may not welcome the request to assume more of the burden for managing global security that is likely to accompany the new U.S. willingness to consult and cooperate” (Larrabee & Lindley-French, 2009). Along the same lines, US Ambassador to the EU, Kristen Silverberg, claimed that “ESDP needs to have stronger capabilities on the hard security side. NATO also needs to be able to work with civilian actors” (Falletti, 2009). The transfer of power from President Bush to President Obama has put a lot of pressure on EU Member States to increase their contributions – human and material capabilities – to international security. The Bush presidency offered an excuse to European governments to maintain the policy of “Euro-timidity,” whereas since the election of President Obama, EU Member States are receiving increasing pressure to share the burden since the US has embraced the ESDP. However, for Americans, even in the post-Bush era, “NATO will remain the core European security institution” (Falletti, 2009).

A second element concerns the strategic split between the EU and the NATO. On the one hand, NATO’s strategy, based on counter-insurgency, brings a military dimension to crisis management. Whereas, the EU’s strategy consists in providing civilian assistance based on the SSR approach.
Figure 6.5: Contributions to ISAF/NATO Forces in Afghanistan since 2007

Figure 6.5 proves the limited contribution of EU Member States to the war effort in Afghanistan. Until October 2009, EU contributions represented more or less 50% of the overall NATO/ISAF forces. After this date, when President Obama turned his full attention to the war in Afghanistan, the military machine of the US completely overwhelmed and changed the relations between EU Member States and the US.

As expressed in a British Ministry of Defense’s report, “the success of the ISAF mission is of critical importance to the security of British citizens and the UK’s national interest, including the credibility of NATO, and to the reputation and long term future of the armed forces” (2009). The NATO umbrella and its overwhelming military superiority undermined European efforts in civilian reconstruction.

134 This was marked by a change of strategy to progressively move away from Iraq to Afghanistan. Soon after the election of President Obama, Afghanistan became the “war of choice.”
b. Institutional Cacophony?

Are EU institutions affecting the way EU Member States are involved in the war in Afghanistan? Is the war in Afghanistan a catalyzer for EU institutions leading to a spillover in the field of security?

Weak institutions cannot make states comply with the law and accountable for their commitments, but too many can affect the success of the mission. Considering the numbers of international actors – CSTC-A, GGPT, EUPOL, UNAMA, NATO, EGF, private contractors and individual countries – in the reform of the ANP, there is a lack of coordination between all these actors. As argued by Dalh Thruelsen, the limited results in the reform of the ANP have been affected by a “lack of orchestrated vision” (2010: 85). Furthermore, the weak multilateral agreements have been affected by the numerous bilateral agreements. “Many bilateral agreements reflect the specific national agendas of the countries involved, keen to ‘show the flag,’ and only a few want to be subject to EUPOL control” (Dalh Thruelsen, 2010: 85). One of the initial roles of EUPOL-A was to bring a better sense of coordination between all the international actors involved in the police reform in Afghanistan.

The question of the EGF could be a topic of a dissertation, as demonstrated by Madaro’s work (2004/05). The EGF raises questions about the role of the EU in crisis management in terms of relevance and efficiency. One of the reasons for the deployment of EGF in Afghanistan in 2009 illustrates the institutional limits of the EU. EUPOL-A falls under the second pillar of the EU, CFSP, wherein decision-making is made on a consensus/unanimity basis, which is not the case of the EGF, which has a status outside of EU’s structure. With a Union of 27, decision-making is much more difficult, as
opposed to the original group of six contributing to the EGF,\textsuperscript{135} which can bi-pass the institutional constrains of intergovernmentalism. Thus as argued by Esquivel Lalinde, “within the EU it would be necessary to overcome the considerable differences between Member States with highly disparate points of view, which would slow down the process” (2004/05). The EGF, with its civilian-military status, should not be seen as an institutional overlap but rather as a value-added, allowing additional contribution where EUPOL-A has failed. As argued by Madaro, the EGF should not be perceived as a materialization of the ESDP failure in crisis management, but rather as a value-added to the ESDP contributions (2004/05: 55).

Buckley claimed that the EU should be more active in crafting a strategy in Afghanistan but has failed to do so because “its institutions and Member States do not coordinate properly, and the EU’s various agencies and governments often work at cross-purposes” (2010: 2). Thus, the institutional complexity on the ground caused by a large number of EU actors such as the EUSR, the delegation of the EU, EUPOL, and bilateral missions of EU Member States, is affecting the credibility and effectiveness of the EU.

c. Domestic and Material Constraints

Considering the major opposition and reluctance from European public opinion to sending troops to Afghanistan, and the US pushing the Europeans for burden-sharing, have EU Member States strategically designed a civilian ESDP mission to satisfy both sides without a major political gamble?

With the deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan since 2007, a debate has emerged at the state level in France, Germany and the UK concerning the success of the

\textsuperscript{135} France, Italy, Portugal, Romania, Spain, the Netherland
ISAF, NATO strategy, and a possible exit strategy. In the case of Germany, German political parties have expressed their doubts concerning Germany’s military involvement (Kaim, 2008: 611). Prior to the federal elections of fall 2009, Afghanistan was the major problem on Merkel’s agenda and her weakest point. German politics is divided into two dimensions: on the one hand, the use of German forces in reconstruction programs such as building schools and infrastructure is seen as positive; on the other hand, the use of German forces as part of counter-insurgency mission within ISAF as negative. The German approach as civilian-centered for Afghanistan is so important that it has, to some extent, led to pushing towards a civilian ESDP mission.

As argued by Gross, the gap between capabilities and expectations is extremely significant in EUPOL-A (Dempsey, 2008). In terms of capabilities, the EU’s policies are extremely nonsensical. The EU Commission has spent large amounts of money in development programs in Afghanistan, while the budget of EUPOL and the number of police officers is extremely low.

As underlined in the Council Conclusion of October 2009, the EU and its Member States spend almost EUR 1 billion per year on various civilian, political, and development programs in Afghanistan, plus EU Member States’ contributions to the ISAF (2009). Between 2002 and 2010, the EU and its Member States combined invested over EUR 8 billions in aid for Afghanistan (European Parliament, 2010a: 10).

The EU Member States have not been committed in creating and designing an EU agenda on the question of EUPOL-A. This ultimately led to a failure of the EU of claiming the leadership in this civilian operation.
d. Narratives and Perceptions

European narratives have shown to what extent European capitals such as Brussels, Paris, London, Berlin, Rome, have felt uncomfortable with the war in Afghanistan since the beginning. As explained by French President Sarkozy in April 2009, “European vision with more focus on ‘building Afghan capabilities than on killing the Talibans’” (Flanagan, Cipoletti, Tuninetti, 2011: 187). In addition, a gap between governments’ declarations and policies and public opinions has been growing since 2007, the year of EUPOL Afghanistan’s implementation. The current gap could be described as ideological and strategic. European public opinions do not perceive the EU as a military actor, but rather as a soft power, a civilian power. Two hypotheses could be made. First, historically, the European integration project was designed in order to limit the probability of war between EU Member States. Such collective memory and reading of the European integration project and the role of the EU could be the reason behind the lack of support for a military Europe. Second, the misunderstanding centered on the creation of the ESDP and the deployment of ESDP operations could illustrate the fear of the construction of a European army at the expense of national armies. Armies, security and defense are core components of the sovereignty of states, but also carry the identity and values of a country.

This self-perception of the EU as a civilian actor and EU commitments have affected the development of a common vision for the EU as a global actor. The role of the EU in Afghanistan is a concrete illustration of the schizophrenic nature of the EU as an international actor.136 This schizophrenia comes from the double standard/commitment of EU Member States. On one side, Britain, France, Germany and others are contributing to

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136 Interview in Paris on July 1st, 2011
the military efforts under NATO. On the other side, the same countries are sending material and human resources to a civilian effort such as EUPOL-A. This illustrates Dempsey’s question: “how seriously is the EU taking the pledge of soft power?” (2008). With the transfer of power from Germany to EUPOL in 2007, the Afghan mission should have become one of the greatest illustrations of its power of soft power.

Last, in the case of Afghanistan and the EUPOL, HR Solana was not a driving force in shaping a common strategy and vision. As underlined by several interviewees, Solana is a real politician and knows which “fight to pick.” He was defined as a “strategic thinker.” Thus, the question of Afghanistan has not figured on the agenda of a European Summit showing the degree of priority on the matter. Solana’s attention to the case of Afghanistan is extremely minor compared to his work on Kosovo, Serbia and the Middle East as one could think from the limited numbers of speeches, addresses, and articles on the Afghan question. His approach to the question was very soft and only underlined the official narratives. Only in October 2007, following the difficult launch of EUPOL-A, did he claim that a EUPOL poorly armed and financed could be “very damaging for our credibility” (2007). On this matter, it appears that Solana did not want to clash with the European powerhouses and focused on other pressing issues.

2. Concluding Remarks

To sum up, EUPOL-A is the most demanding and dangerous ESDP mission ever launched. It reflects a model of an EU police mission based on the SSR model and also

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137 Interview with EU experts in Paris on July 1st, 2011 and Brussels on June 22, 2011.
138 Interview with EU experts in Paris on July 1st, 2011 and Brussels on June 22, 2011.
previous experiences. Unlike the situation in Kosovo, EUPOL-A has no executive power. EUPOL-A can be described as fitting the EU’s soft power model.¹³⁹

The case of EUPOL-A is unique, as it represents the sole EU mission in a time of war. Afghanistan does not represent the glorious influence of the EU in crisis management.¹⁴⁰ As argued by an EU expert, the EU has failed to claim the leadership in the civilian strategy in Afghanistan.¹⁴¹ The question of leadership has been a recurrent variable among EU experts on the question of Afghanistan. There is a sense that the EU failed to seize its moment. The question of weak leadership within EU structures seems to be pointed out as the explanatory power of the limited success of EUPOL-A. The issue of leadership underlined three factors: first, EU Member States are not committed to establishing a common EU agenda; second, there is no interest in creating a common vision; lastly, there has been an increase of looking inward.¹⁴²

The US strategic attitude towards Afghanistan changed to a civilian approach in 2009.¹⁴³ However, this civilian approach remained under military leadership. Expert such as Luis Peral of the EU-ISS argues that for a successful civilian strategy in Afghanistan, one should make a shift from a military to a civilian leadership (Peral, 2010). Because the EU missed the window to show its value-added in civilian strategy, the US is starting to jump in with limited savoir faire.

Last, the EGF, at least on paper, could be seen as the main winner as it combines civilian and military components. As a result, “the EGF would be preferred to using civilian police in more threatening security conditions or more demanding geographical

¹³⁹ Interview in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
¹⁴¹ Interview with a EU expert in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
¹⁴² Interview with a EU expert in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
¹⁴³ Interview with a EU expert in Brussels on June 22, 2011.
areas. Contrary to a civilian police force, gendarmerie forces can combine more robust policing tasks with basic policing activities” (Weger, 2009: 40). Thus, because of its exclusive membership, decision-making between a smaller group of Member States makes it more manageable. The EGF can be seen as a possible strategic solution for future scenarios of crisis management as it combines a civilian-military status. Unfortunately for the EU and the CSDP, the EGF represents the limit of integration in security and defense policies. The limits have clearly been established by the powerful MS, in this case France, in order to maintain their supremacy over the questions of defense. The lack of support by the EU powerhouses to EUPOL-A clearly illustrates the power of MS’ interests and will in order to make a CSDP mission a success or a disaster. EU institutions did not have the power to overcome the lack of support of MS due to institutional overlap and lack of coordination between EU institutions. The support of MS is undeniably one of the key components in order to have a successful CSDP mission.
CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

“EU Member States have come to recognize that these new sorts of security challenges lie beyond the capacity of individual States to solve. Unless there is a recognition of their shared vulnerability and a desire to combat these challenges collectively, they will not be effective” (Marsh & Rees, 2011: 9).

I. Construction of a Global Security Actor?

Since the end of the Cold War, the question of security has clearly changed in its nature, but also in agents’ perceptions. “Security threats are no longer limited to the existential question of national survival or territorial integrity” (Foucault, Irondelle, Mérand, 2011: 297). After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the EU has evolved along these new security threats. The role of the EU as a security actor has also been transformed from being an “instrument” to enforce peace and security through its initial raison d’être economic integration between its Member States regionally as a solution to rampant regional wars, to becoming an “actor” in promoting and enforcing security for and with the Member States regionally and abroad.

The research question of this dissertation is: given the plethora of collective domestic and international threats, why has the process of European security and defense cooperation been so halting and of such limited scope? In order to answer this question, four variables – international system, Member States, institutions, agents’ perceptions – were applied in three case studies – homeland counterterrorism; regional energy security;

\footnote{The issue of national survival and territorial integrity are not as preeminent today on the European continent, at the exception of the Balkans, thanks to the European Union. However, a large part of the countries in the world are still very much concerned with their abilities to survive and maintain their territorial integrity. In the case of the EU and EU MS, the survival is maybe not at the state level as it was once until the end of World War two, but at the human level. Buzan et al., 1998 makes this argument when looking at the question of security in the post-Cold war era.}

\footnote{The new security threats are underlined once more in Buzan et al., 1998 and in Foucault et al., 2011. They encompass soft and hard security issues such as economic, financial, environmental, societal and human.}
The eclectic theoretical approach – informed by neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism – combined with a cross-level analysis offer considerable new materials allowing to assess the process of cooperation and integration in each contentious security and defense sector of the EU.146 The eclectic theoretical approach implemented on three levels of analysis rends this dissertation unique.

The common aspect between the three case studies was the notion of threats – radical Islamic terrorism, gas security, and stability in Afghanistan – perceived as real and existential to the security and stability of the Union and its Member States. Even though these three threats are different by nature, the perceptions by the EU Member States are not only seen as existential, but also as major threats for the 21st century. Furthermore, the three threats are also evolving, ever-changing menaces, leading to perpetual transformations in policies and perceptions. This makes the dissertation relevant to the policy community, as it attempts to identify the failures – described as low integration – and successes – seen through deeper integration and cooperation – in different security and defense sectors. The notion of security has been at the heart of the international relations literature since the end of the Cold War with a reassessment of its definition and states’ perceptions (Buzan, 1991; Buzan, Waever, de Wilde, 1998). The security of the state and the Union goes beyond a military dimension, as it also includes economic, political and societal components.

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146 As discussed in chapter 2 of this dissertation the eclectic theoretical approach informed the design and phrasing of the four variables – international system; institutions; Member States; perceptions – as well as informing the selection of the three case studies – homeland counter-terrorism; regional energy security; and out-of-area CSDP mission in Afghanistan –.
According to the study conducted, the most powerful explanatory variable in assessing either deeper or lesser integration in each case study is the Member States. The decision-making and political will of the EU Member States are the driving forces of EU integration and cooperation. The other independent variables, institutionalist and systemic, have a lesser impact on explaining the integration process; however, they do influence Member States’ behaviors. The last variable, agents’ perception, has emerged as having limited influence to explain under which circumstances integration has or not occurred. Not only has this analysis been verified and illustrated by the results of this dissertation, but it has also been confirmed by the interviews conducted in the US and Europe. Such conclusion underlining the power and centrality of the Member States is not surprising considering the design and structure of the CSDP. What was known as the second pillar holds at its core the power of the Member States. The spill-over from the Member States’ power to the institutions has not taken place for several reasons: first, even with stronger institutions such as the EEAS and various agencies like Europol, Sitcen, Frontex and so on, the Member States still control the information, capabilities, and resources; second, decision-making remains in the hands of the Member States.

To answer the original research question, two factors can explain the limited integration in the cooperation process in security and defense questions: first, the contentious nature of the threats; and second, the political will of the Member States.

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147 The most important variable identified by all the interviewees was the Member States, followed by the systemic and institutionalist variables, and last agents’ perceptions.

148 Even though the three security issues are identify as a common security threat by EU MS, each MS has a national approach to solving and/or dealing with them. As proven throughout the dissertation, national and in some cases bilateral solutions tend to be favored at the expense of a Union’s solution as it was demonstrated in counterterrorism, energy and in Afghanistan. The concern of national security is so great in each case study that Member States prefer un-coordinated solution that would affect the overall security rather than a Union approach to security. The actorness of the EU has been undeniably, as demonstrated, affected by national government.
This answer is an illustration of the agent-structure dilemma; does the threat shape the behavior of the state, or vise-versa? One can safely assess that an existential threat does not lead to common and integrated security policies, but instead rely on the political will of the agents.

II. Reflection on the Sectoral Integration Processes

The three case studies selected for this dissertation make the research unique, as it seeks to determine at which level of analysis integration and cooperation of EU security and defense policy can be monitored. Reflecting on the three case studies selected for this dissertation, each of them looks at one specific level of analysis – homeland, regional, international – and at different security threats challenging the unity and stability of the Union. Each case study shares vital common variables: the EU as a security actor; and common perceptions of the threat as a security concern. So, at which level should one expect further integration?

Contrary to theoretical and personal expectations, the nature of the threats, as well as the expected integration process, are quite different that what was originally foreseen. At first, the case of homeland security appeared to be one of the most integrated with a higher degree of cooperation considering the nature of the threat – radical Islamic terrorism – and its considerable threat to the state. Second, initially the goal of unification seemed a possible and suitable common goal and outcome. But, instead, the concept of unification is not appropriate at the current stage of integration and also not accepted in major European capitals – Paris, Berlin and London –. The term “deeper cooperation” is
instead more suitable for the slow evolving and protected field of cooperation in security and defense.

At first, one could have expected that the homeland security question would be the most-integrated case. But, after numerous rounds of interviews, reading and research on the three cases, it has appeared that the soon-most unified security question should be the energy security dimension of the EU vis-à-vis Russia. A majority of the interviewees underlined the higher probability of integration on the energy question. Thus, in September 2011 the Commission announced an attempt to unify the EU energy voice. However, this statement needs to be taken with caution, as it will be a progressive and slow process in adopting a common voice in dealing with Russia. There are several rationales for such assumption: first, the question of energy has been a highly securitized issue since 2006; second, the energy sector is closely linked to the economic and social stability of the Member States; third, historically, the EU was created around the question of energy; fourth, the common market is the most powerful tool of unification, which could also lead to the creation of ramification to a common energy market. As opposed to the two other case studies, the example of energy security goes beyond the traditional question of states’ security. In the field of energy security, the role of non-state actors, such as MNCs and others, play a central role affecting states’ decisions. National energy companies are powerful actors with considerable influence on the shaping of national energy policies. Their inclusions within a common energy market will be quite difficult.

So what is the likelihood for a common EU energy policy? Kirchner and Berk argued along the same lines in their articles, when they claim that “although Member

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149 This is not a new trend as the Commission has been calling for years the EU MS to unify and speak with one common voice to Russia.
States continue to act nationally, factors such as the liberalization of energy markets, the importance given to a common energy policy, efforts to introduce a super grid of power supplies across the EU, and the spin-off from environmental policy will promote the establishment of a common energy policy within the EU” (2010: 876). Despite a number of developments, such as an inclusion of a clause on energy solidarity in the Treaty of Lisbon, the national fragmentations around the energy policy of the EU are too high to be overcome and ultimately lead to a coherent External Energy Policy (Barnes 2008, 109). Even though the Treaty of Lisbon includes weak language of cooperation, it does bring forward an energy solidarity clause (Tekin & Williams, 2011: 13). However, the European deadlock on a common energy policy remains considerable and divided on two points: first, states’ preferences for a market-liberalization; or, preferences towards a geopolitical approach of the question with bilateral agreement (Tekin & Williams, 2011: 36).

The two other cases, homeland security and the CSDP mission in Afghanistan, lead to different conclusions. First, concerning the case of homeland security, the degree of cooperation and unification is extremely limited considering the considerable dependence of EU agencies and institutions on the Member States’ resources, capabilities, commitment, and political will. The only way to see an increase in cooperation and better cooperation in homeland counterterrorism would be in the aftermath of a cross-border terrorist attack such as a 9/11 at the European level. Even though it seems a dark conclusion, the chapter on homeland terrorism underlines the event-driven nature of the field of counterterrorism. As accentuated by authors and experts, the integration process of the field of homeland security at the EU level has been more in a sleeping mode since
the aftermath of the London attack than in one of reflection and construction. The sharing of information as well as the increase of cooperation between Member States, national intelligence services and judiciary systems will take a considerable amount of time, effort, resources, and principally political-will. “The EU has pursued its efforts more of an *ad hoc* fashion in cooperation with the national efforts of its Members” (Marsh & Rees, 2011: 11). Unfortunately, the field of homeland counterterrorism is much more event-driven led integration process than a progressive, anticipatory one.

The last case study, EUPOL Afghanistan, is not perceived and described as a successful CSDP mission.\(^{150}\) The material, capabilities and financial and human limitations are too great to be overcome. The mandate of the EUPOL-A, based on a security sector reform approach, is too ambitious considering the lack of enthusiasm and political-will from the EU Member States. The war in Afghanistan is perceived as an American war and receives an extremely low approval rate in Europe. The domestic taboos around Afghanistan are considerable in France, Germany and Britain. Furthermore, EUPOL-A is unique in the sense that it is the first CSDP mission in time of war. The EU does not have the military capabilities to provide assistance and security to its personnel. Thus, the creation and deployment of the European Gendarmerie Force by France in 2007 is an example of the lack of commitment by EU Member States to CSDP missions. As argued by an expert, the case of EUPOL-A underlined the schizophrenic nature of the EU as a security actor: on one side EU Member States contribute to a CSDP mission based on a civilian approach; while on the other hand, the same Member States back a military

\(^{150}\) Such observation has emerged throughout the different interviews with EU experts on the question of Afghanistan as well as the literature on the Afghan question.
effort led by NATO. Not only was this mission supposed to show the EU savoir-faire in civilian missions, but it also underlined the limited commitment of EU Member States to CSDP operations. The mandate of EUPOL-A goes until May 2013 and a renewal of the mandate will depend on the US and its future strategy in Afghanistan.

III. An Assessment of the “Solana Method”

This dissertation used the Solana era as its historical framework. Even though Mr. Solana, as the head of the EU diplomacy and foreign affairs, was involved in each case studied in this dissertation, he and his personal role were not the primary purpose or focus of the research. The mandate of Javier Solana at the head of the CFSP for ten years offered an interesting historical framework, as it has been the most active and concrete period in the construction and development of the CSFP. But, trying to portray and assess the contribution of Mr. Solana as the first High Representative to the construction of the EU as a global security actor is quite a complex exercise.

The figure of Mr. Solana is interesting and inspirational. He was described after he stepped down in 2009, as a “quiet diplomat, master of the behind the scene diplomacy” (Rettman, 2009). It appears that Solana’s commitment to his role as the first HR was strongly shaped by his beliefs in Europe and, most importantly, in European values. As underlined in his speech in Aachen after being awarded the Charlemagne Prize in 2007, he described the European values as “democracy, tolerance, human rights, solidarity and

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151 Interview with an EU expert taking place in Paris on July 1st, 2011.
152 Most of the information laid out in this section are from second sources (books and individuals). Unfortunately, I was not able to interview Mr. Solana.
153 EU MS asked Javier Solana in 2008 if he wanted to continue building the CFSP after the Treaty of Lisbon. He did refuse. Since then he has been working as non-resident fellow at the Brookings Institution and in 2009 he became President of the Centre for Global Economy and Geopolitics at ESADE Business School.
social justice” (Solana, 2007g). These values and norms were recurrent in all his speeches, articles, and declarations.

Throughout the interviews conducted with European and American experts, two narratives arose: first, Mr. Solana is always described as a talented politician and strategic thinker. This goes back to his survival skills developed as a minister in Spain from 1982 as first Minister of Culture until he became Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1992 to 1995. Second, a split in the perceptions of Solana as a stepping-stone in the construction of the CFSP between Europeans and Americans can be identified. Europeans tend to perceive Solana as a powerful actor in shaping policy, while Americans have described him as a weak politician dependent on US assistance.¹⁵⁴

Cristina Gallach, spokeswoman of Javier Solana for fourteen years, describes clearly the root of Solana’s approach to foreign policy, as the “Solana Method,” which can be defined as:

a vision and tenacity, respect, discretion and at the same time appropriate visibility, he managed to lead a U-turn in many areas of EU diplomacy, crisis management and conflict resolution. His challenge was to ensure that Europe moved definitively from being a theatre to being an actor in the world scenery (2011, 12).

Solana’s mandate was extremely ill-defined forcing him to make the most out of it. However, this was not an end in itself for Solana as “in fact, one of the key elements of Solana’s time in office was his ability to develop and implement his own interpretation of his job description” (Mayor, 2011: 194). Solana was able to interpret his job for one simple reason: he never worked against the Member States, at the least the powerful.

One of the rationales for the creation of his job was the 1998 Kosovo crisis. Throughout his two mandates, Solana was extremely proactive in several regions: Middle

¹⁵⁴ Interview with an expert taking place in Washington, D.C. on December 7th, 2010.
East (Israeli-Palestinian conflict), Africa, and the Balkans. After his resignation Mr. Solana admitted that his most profound frustration was linked to the lack of progress in the Middle East peace process (Gallach, 2011: 15).

One of the best illustrations of Mr. Solana understanding of the role of the EU as a global actor as well as the need to maintain unity, occurred during the drafting process of the ESS in 2003. The adoption of the ESS sent a strong message of unity following one of the deepest political crises in European history caused by the divisions around the 2003 war in Iraq. Multilateralism and European unity were core components of his understanding of how the EU should function on the international stage, but also strengthen its voice.

Furthermore, Solana was strongly committed to transatlantic cooperation as well as the necessity for the EU to act independently. His Atlanticist commitment emerged during his years at the head of NATO. For this reasons EU security autonomy, in Solana’s mind, should not be understood in Gaullist terms – in a balancing mode – but rather as a contribution to fostering international peace.

So, was Mr. Solana a success story? None can disagree with the fact that Mr. Solana put the EU on the international map. Solana was successful in bolstering the role and voice of the EU in pressing foreign and security questions such as the 2003 EU3+1 negotiations with Iran. However, Mr. Solana, who has always been described as someone at the right time and place, benefitted from considerable support from Messrs. Blair, Chirac and Schroeder, as well as a stable economic period (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet & Rüger, 2011: 286-87). His legacy is considerable and will continue to be studied in the
years to come. As underlined by one of the interviewees, Solana was “always part of the solution, never of the problem.”

IV. New Lines of Research: From Construction to Deconstruction?

This dissertation reflected on the period of 1999-2009, or the Solana era. This reflection on this axiomatic period is necessary in order to understand and study the evolution in this second major stage of the construction of the EU as a global security actor. This dissertation offered the foundations for understanding the transformation of the EU institutionally, strategically, and ideationally taking place in the first decade of the 21st century facing new security threats. With the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, the EU institutional structure in the sector of security, foreign and defense policy has considerably evolved, with the creation of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the appointment of Catherine Ashton as the new High Representative as well as Vice President of the Commission.

In order to understand the complexity of the security questions around the CSDP, one needs to implement a cross-level eclectic theoretical approach as implemented in this dissertation. The comparison in types of threats and levels of analysis offers a better and wider understanding while identifying the recurring problems and trends.

Based on the structure of the dissertation and the questions raised, three future lines of research can be identified in the post-Solana era. The first line of research consists in studying the evolution of the EU in the post-Lisbon Treaty period and its impacts on the CSDP. The newly created institution, European External Action Service (EEAS), the so-called Diplomatic corps of the EU, has had limited successes under the

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155 Interview with an expert taking place in Brussels (Belgium) on June 22nd, 2011.
leadership of High Representative Catherine Ashton. HR Ashton has designed and headed this large institution with a considerable budget – quite a difference from Solana’s situation. So far, HR Ashton has been at the heart of criticism for her lack of strategic vision and miscalculations in times of crisis. She has been described as the “accidental diplomat” (O’Connor, 2010). The study of the EEAS as well as the CSDP missions is central in monitoring the construction or deconstruction of the EU as a global security actor. The relations between EU Member States, and especially with EU powerhouses, and EEAS have become a new line of research. The competition between the EU Member States and the EEAS – which also includes the delegations around the world – has increased considerably. EU powerhouses perceive the EEAS as a possible competitor in the great game of foreign policy. Studying Ashton’s impact, as well as her strategic vision will be an interesting contribution to the literature on the CSDP.

The second line for future studies consists in assessing the impact of the financial crisis on the continuity of EU integration in security and defense policies. The collapse of the financial markets in September 2008 led to a series of austerity measures undertaken by the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Considerable cuts have already been implemented in Britain, the US, and soon to come in France in their defense and foreign policy programs. Theoretically one could think that the burden-sharing between EU Member States would increase, leading to deeper defense and security integration. Instead, it appears that a new trend is taking place through the development of short-term

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156 HR Ashton “has considerably more tools at her disposal to effectively set the agenda, manage it, and shape a decision” (Mayor, 2011: 197). So far, two years in her mandate, she has not been successful in setting an agenda and/or leading towards one mission. What is certain is that institutional tools do not lead to more influence. Solana was a true politician and diplomat working in the grey areas. Thus, Solana worked during his mandates as HR to constantly increase his networks and connections with leaders around the world (Dijkstra, 2011: 74). Through this constant network building, Solana was able to play key mediating role like on Iran, Kosovo and others.
bilateral cooperation – mainly France and Britain\footnote{France and Britain have historically had very active foreign policies, which cannot be sustained without either the pooling of resources and/or cooperation with the US.} – under NATO auspices. The platform of NATO offers an access to US capabilities and leadership that are lacking from Europeans. The case of the 2011 Libya war illustrates this new trend of multilateral military actions orchestrated by the members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Europeans are increasingly becoming unable and unwilling to launched purely EU missions in strategic regions.

However, with increasing defense cuts in the US, the US commitments to NATO as well as its strategic concerns, increasingly looking towards Asia, are also changing. Since the election of President Obama, the Americans have been asking their European counterparts to increase their commitments and contributions to NATO, but also to international security. The latest signs – for example the war in Libya – has appeared that NATO will become more active in order to promote the interests of Paris and London, while CSDP operations could be used as an alternative in order to solve smaller threats to the Union located mostly in Africa and the Balkans. Africa is perceived by EU Member States, especially those with a Mediterranean coast as a considerable threat to the unity of their countries as well as their stability, due to mass migration from North Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa as well as the smuggling of illegal products.

The third and last line of research involves looking at the EU Eastern and South neighborhoods. The neighborhood policies of the EU have become a core component of the CSDP for several reasons: energy security, regional stability, and increasing EU sphere of influence. The question of energy security has emerged as a vital one for the EU and its Member States since 2006. Energy security encompasses several dimensions
in need for further study: diversification of European imports, which includes the game of pipelines as well as the development of new agreements with states in Central Asia; the environmental consequences of the construction of these infrastructures as well as the impacts on the environment of alternative energy resources such as the production of shale gas; the construction of an common energy market. Not only a common energy market will be necessary for the shaping of a common voice, but it will be considerable in order to access new markets and interact with undemocratic regimes.

The financial and Euro crises have become central in affecting Member States’ behaviors, and the raison d’être of the EU has been increasingly questioned. If the heart and soul of the EU, its common market, is mistrusted, how will the CSDP emerge from this tumultuous period? Although time will have to tell, it is certain that the future in the construction or deconstruction process of the CSDP will need to be studied with an eclectic theoretical lenses as done in this dissertation. The survival of the CSDP and continuity in the construction process will depend on Member States’ political will and desires to continue the experiment. Since the Treaty of Lisbon, the CSDP has become more institutionalized, but less powerful, whereas during the Solana period, the CSFP was less institutionalized but more relevant in pressing international issues. An over-institutionalization of the field of security and defense security will not translate into automatic spill-over leading to deeper cooperation unless the Member States are willing to back it up.
APPENDIX I
INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD APPROVAL

March 14, 2011

Maxime Larive, Ph.D.
University of Miami
Department of International Studies
Coral Gables Campus
Ferre Building, Room FB329
Coral Gables, FL 33124

HSRO STUDY NUMBER: 20100198
STUDY TITLE: From Promoting Security to Enforcing It: The Unification of the European Security Strategy during the Solana Era
IRB ACTION DATE: 3/13/2011
STUDY APPROVAL EXPIRES: 3/12/2012
SPONSOR NAME: There are no items to display
FWA: FWA00002247

On 3/13/2011, an IRB Chair approved the following items under the expedited review process, with a waiver of Signed Consent.

APPROVAL INCLUDES:

New Research Protocol
Research Materials (English Versions Only)
  • Informed Consent Form
  • Questionnaire
  • Recruitment Email

NOTE: Translations of IRB approved study documents, including informed consent documents, into languages other than English must be submitted to HSRO for approval prior to use.

Sincerely,
### APPENDIX II

**LIST OF INTERVIEWS CONDUCTED IN THE US AND EUROPE**

Interviews conducted in the United States:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City, Country</th>
<th>Institutions</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Themes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York, USA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations - Asia and Middle East Division - Afghanistan Desk</td>
<td>July 21, 2010</td>
<td>Afghanistan; Police operation; SSR</td>
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<td>Afghanistan; Police operation; SSR</td>
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<td>July 28, 2010</td>
<td>EU-Russia; EU energy policy</td>
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<td>New York, USA</td>
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<td>July 29, 2010</td>
<td>Solana</td>
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<td>New York, USA</td>
<td>Council on Foreign Relations</td>
<td>November 30, 2010</td>
<td>EU-Russia energy relations</td>
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<td>Washington DC, USA</td>
<td>RAND Corporation</td>
<td>December 6, 2010</td>
<td>ESDP – EU security and defense policy</td>
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<td>Washington DC, USA</td>
<td>Center for Strategic and International Security (CSIS)</td>
<td>December 7, 2010</td>
<td>EU Security; ESDP; EU-Russia; Transatlantic relations</td>
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<td>Atlantic Council</td>
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<td>December 8, 2010</td>
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<td>December 10, 2010</td>
<td>ESDP; Transatlantic relations</td>
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<td>Washington DC, USA</td>
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<td>December 15, 2010</td>
<td>EU-Russia energy relations</td>
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Interviews conducted in Europe:

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