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The United States and the Caribbean in the 21st Century: Towards a New Era of Engagement?

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A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CARIBBEAN IN THE 21ST CENTURY: TOWARDS A NEW ERA OF ENGAGEMENT?

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Did the United States neglect or increase its engagement with the Caribbean during the twenty-first century? I argue that from the Bush to the Obama administrations (2001-2016), there was an effort by the United States to increase engagement with the Caribbean nations. My main research question was, why did the United States increase its engagement with the Caribbean during the twenty-first century? I focus on the Anglophone Caribbean and I examine the cases of The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana. By measuring engagement based on levels of U.S. foreign assistance, legislative changes, regional initiatives, and high-level diplomacy, I demonstrate that there was an increase rather than decrease in U.S. activities in the Caribbean over the last fifteen years. My results show that engagement activities in the Caribbean fell into five categories: security, energy, health, development, and humanitarian. By examining the variables U.S. security interests, U.S. economic interest, political ideology and development concerns, I conclude that American engagement was driven by a combination of factors, but principally by U.S. security concerns. Security however from a U.S. perspective was viewed as a multidimensional concept therefore funding in areas of development, health
and energy was part of a broader national security strategy. There was much consistency in policies from conservative to liberal administrations given the consensus that a stable and prosperous Caribbean is in the interest of the United States.
For my father and grandfather,

who did not live to see this dream come true,

but whose voices and spirits guided me to the very end.
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INTRODUCTION

“We spend a great deal of time focusing on challenges and opportunities in faraway places. But it’s important that we never lose sight of our interests closer to home. Indeed, we should be working to strengthen our ties with countries in the Caribbean.”

Eliot L. Engel, Ranking Member on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in support of his bill, the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 (H.R.4939), June 13, 2016.¹

Puzzle

There has been much hyperbole by Latin American and Caribbean scholars regarding U.S. foreign policy in the region - the United States has abandoned and forgotten its hemispheric neighbors since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11). I argue that the prevailing narratives of neglect and abandonment are overblown and inaccurate. Rather, the twenty-first century witnessed a renewal of American interest and engagement in the hemisphere, including with the Caribbean countries. These small states did not receive as much attention nor assistance compared to countries in regions which are of greater geostrategic importance to the United States. Neither is it realistically expected that the United States would pay as much attention to these nations as it would to places in the Middle East and Central Asia. I contend that a closer examination of engagement activities reveals that the Caribbean has re-gained some level of visibility and reappeared on the radar of U.S. policymakers over the last fifteen years. This research therefore addresses the question, why has the United States increased engagement with the Caribbean in the twenty-first century? Other research questions include: How has the United States

increased its engagement with the Caribbean? Which areas have received U.S. attention? Which areas have not? What explains the variation in engagement among the case studies? Is the United States helping or hurting the Caribbean countries? Should the United States engage more or less with its Caribbean neighbors? The Anglophone Caribbean, a region often overshadowed by hotspot countries and neglected in the literature on Latin America and the Caribbean will be the focus of this research. The case studies selected include: the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana.

**Findings**

This dissertation has traced America’s historical engagement in the British Caribbean from the period of European discovery to the twenty-first century. The West Indies, being former British colonies, has a unique history and relationship with the United States, one quite distinct from the Spanish, French or Dutch colonies. Great Britain essentially passed the hegemonic baton to America by the end of the nineteenth century, entrusting her interests in the Western hemisphere to the United States. This Anglo-American alliance shaped the future of U.S.- Anglophone Caribbean relations. From the mid-nineteenth century to the end of World War II, U.S. economic and security interests drove interactions and policy in the British Caribbean. The extraction of natural resources such as asphalt, oil, and bauxite attracted U.S. entrepreneurs and firms to Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and Guyana. During World War II, the Caribbean became a strategic location for American military bases which were established on leased British territories, the most significant being in Trinidad and Tobago.
After World War II, the British was preoccupied with securing an orderly decolonization process within its Caribbean territories while the Americans became obsessed with opposing any Communist threats in its “backyard.” Between the 1950s and 1980s, the Cold War dictated U.S. policy in the Caribbean and the British took American demands into account when dealing with its colonies. The Americans kept a close eye on the independence movements in the Caribbean and post-independence they monitored any signs of leftist behavior by regional leaders, fearing the emergence of another Fidel Castro in the region. It was a period of increased U.S. foreign assistance and U.S. meddling in the Caribbean. With the ending of the Cold War, U.S. foreign aid levels declined significantly during the 1990s and the United States focused its energy on transnational crime like drug trafficking and economic issues such as free trade. While levels of U.S. foreign assistance declined during the post-Cold War era, the Caribbean countries continued to be engaged with the United States in its counter-narcotics efforts, signing on to multilateral, regional and bilateral agreements in the area of international criminal control. The Caribbean also benefited from preferential trading arrangements with the United States which began in the 1980s and which were updated during the 1990s.

The twenty-first century witnessed renewed interest and increased U.S. engagement with Caribbean countries. I define “engagement” as the active participation of the United States in the Caribbean bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally. I measured engagement by examining levels of U.S. foreign aid, legislative changes, regional and multilateral initiatives and high-level diplomacy. This research has found that over the period 2001 to 2016, engagement activities by the United States in the Caribbean fell into five main areas:
security, development, health, energy and humanitarian. Total U.S. foreign aid levels to the Caribbean in the post-9/11 era was higher than in the post-Cold War era. Foreign assistance and levels of engagement however varied among the four case studies. Jamaica received the highest levels of aid followed by Guyana, the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. There was also diplomatic engagement by high level government officials accompanied by legislative changes including the amendment of the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act to cater for aid to the Caribbean region in 2001, and the signing into law of the U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016.

Why was the United States more attentive to the Caribbean over the last fifteen years? U.S. policy in the Caribbean reflected trends of U.S. foreign assistance globally and regionally, was part and parcel of broader presidential initiatives, and responded to specific international events, emerging problems, and crises in the Caribbean. One important finding of this study was that despite differences in political ideology, on average roughly the same amount of foreign aid was allocated to the Caribbean under both Republican and Democratic administrations in the twenty-first century, indicating continuity in policies from the Bush to the Obama administration (2001-2016). What then accounted for these five areas of engagement?

a) Security: Transnational security threats, in particular terrorism and drug trafficking and the escalating violence and crime in the Caribbean over the last fifteen years kept the United States engaged in the region. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 led to a transformation of U.S. foreign policy around the world. While resources were principally allocated to the Middle East and Asia, it also heightened
the need to secure America’s often overlooked “Third Border.” It also led to a recognition that the Caribbean and the United States were economically interdependent and open trade required secure borders. Terrorism continued to pose a threat in the more recent years with a high number of Caribbean nationals leaving to fight for ISIS and this further increased U.S. interest in the Caribbean. By 2015, most of the aid allocated to the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago was for conflict, peace and security. Regional security initiatives included the Third Border Initiative (TBI) and the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). The CBSI complemented other security programs established for Mexico and Central America.

b) Development: In the context of post-9/11 era, U.S. foreign aid became an important tool to achieve U.S. national security objectives and funding for development became part of United States national security strategy. In addition to security interests, funding for development was also allocated based on recipients’ development needs. Jamaica and Guyana, the two countries with comparatively lower levels of GDP, received the most development aid in the Caribbean.

c) Health: Health diplomacy was one of the most outstanding features of U.S. global engagement in the twenty-first century. The HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa led to an escalation of funding for health, led principally by President Bush’s signature program the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) and which was continued under the Obama administration. PEPFAR funding also included the Caribbean, specifically Guyana which benefited from significant levels of U.S. foreign aid in this area.
d) **Energy:** Funding for renewable energy projects in the Caribbean was spearheaded by the Obama administration with complementary projects for both Central America and the Caribbean. The Caribbean benefited from the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA) and the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI).

e) **Humanitarian:** The United States has historically responded to natural disasters in the Caribbean, the twenty-first century being no exception. Islands affected by hurricanes did receive funding for disaster relief and reconstruction. Also, food aid under the Food for Peace program was part of all humanitarian relief efforts.

**Why does this matter?**

The current literature is not an accurate depiction of United States – Caribbean foreign relations in the twenty-first century. It does not reflect actual U.S. policies and levels of cooperation in the region. If the abandonment narrative becomes accepted wisdom, then it leads to misunderstandings and a lost opportunity for policymakers to capitalize on the current impetus towards strategic engagement. Given that one of the problems with U.S.-Caribbean relations is the lack of a coherent Caribbean policy, this study will shed some light in understanding what this policy has in fact been to better inform policymakers both in the United States and the Caribbean. On the Caribbean side, if policymakers understand that finally the United States is paying attention, they can monopolize on this momentum to further increase cooperation on critical areas of mutual interest and to build a stronger relationship with its most vital economic and security partner. On the American side, this study can contribute to an understanding of a region often neglected because of its
democratic stability, to synthesize policies which are conducted by multiple U.S. agencies, and help in some small way to assess whether the U.S. is doing enough to help its vulnerable neighbors. On a personal level, being a national of Trinidad and Tobago, I understand that the problems and transnational threats facing the Caribbean cannot be handled only at a national level, and the future of the Caribbean’s stability and prosperity depends in large part on a strong, cooperative relationship with the United States.

Roadmap

This dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 1 will trace the growth of the British Caribbean from the period of European discovery up until the end of World War II (1492-1945). This chapter will also highlight the American interactions and influences in the British colonies during this time period. Chapter 2 examines U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean during the period 1823 to 1945, that is, from the Monroe Doctrine to FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. Chapter 3 explores United States relationship with the Anglophone Caribbean during the Cold War (1945-1989). This chapter will feature the decolonization period and the Anglo-American rapprochement by examining the cases of Trinidad and Tobago and British Guiana during the 1950s and 1960s. It will also investigate America’s response to Jamaica’s socialist experiment during the 1970s and 1980s. Chapter 4 looks at United States – Caribbean relations in the post-Cold War period. This chapter reviews the literature on the main foreign policy priorities of the United States during the 1990s and 2000s and discusses how the Caribbean was incorporated into America’s foreign policy agenda. Chapter 5 lays out the methodology for this research. Chapters 6 through 9 presents the results and analysis of the dissertation. Chapter 6 examines U.S.
in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century. It discusses the global and regional context for U.S. foreign assistance, the main areas of U.S. engagement in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century and the reasons for this engagement. Chapter 7 presents a trend analysis of U.S. foreign aid to the Caribbean. This chapter will first look at the trends of U.S. aid to the Caribbean during the Cold War, post-Cold War and post-9/11 periods. It will then give a detailed description of the trends of U.S. aid to the four case studies during the period 2001-2015. Chapter 8 presents the results of the quantitative analysis. Chapter 9 summarizes the results of both the qualitative and quantitative analysis. The dissertation then concludes.
CHAPTER 1

The Growth of the British Caribbean and American Relations (1492-1945)

The current situation of the Anglophone Caribbean can only be understood by reference to its past. The story of the British West Indies is connected to the wider Caribbean which includes Spanish, French, and Dutch speaking territories. The Caribbean’s history is rich in diversity in terms of geography, demography, society, economy and politics, entailing similar yet varied historical trajectories. This chapter will focus geographically on the countries which span the entire Caribbean region: the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. Viewed on the geographic canvas, these countries connect both the South American and North American continents. Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana all developed from plantation economies under British rule. The Bahamas given its geography, did not develop along those lines. The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago in the twenty-first century are the wealthier nations, while Jamaica and Guyana are poorer as measured by their Gross Domestic Product. In tracing these countries’ early developments from the period of European discovery, the similarities and differences in case characteristics are placed within its historical context.
The West Indies has always interacted with America over the centuries. Since both were former European colonies, a natural trading relationship existed between the tropics and the temperate regions via licit and illicit channels. The Caribbean islands were linked to the American colonies via the slave and trading networks: rum distilleries in New England demanded molasses and sugar from the West Indies, rum was then exchanged for slaves from West Africa to supply the West Indian plantations and the Southern colonies (Andreas 2013, 19). Protectionist trade policies such as the Navigation and Trade Acts (1651 to mid-1700s) and the 1733 Molasses Act led to shared frustrations and smuggling between the West Indian and American colonies. The Caribbean also contributed to America’s struggle for independence. After all, one of the founding fathers and key figures during the American War of Independence (1775-1783), Alexander Hamilton was born in 1755 in the British West Indies in the island of Nevis and came to America at the age of seventeen. Planters and merchants in the West Indies also supported American rebels during the Revolutionary War.

In other ways, the United States influenced the development and growth of the Anglophone Caribbean impacting economic, social and political life. The Caribbean and the United States are therefore connected historically through empire, slavery, war and trade. This chapter seeks to explain the growth of the British Caribbean from Columbus’s “discovery” to World War II and to elucidate the American influences and interactions over the centuries in these colonies. The historical account of the cases was determined by the level of American interaction and influence and will be discussed in the following order: the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and Guyana. In this chapter I will argue that
During the time period (1492-1945), the Bahamas was influenced the most by the United States while Trinidad and Tobago with its natural resources and location was of the most strategic interest to the United States up until World War II.

**Case Study 1: The Bahamas**

*Settlement*

The destiny of the Caribbean was shaped first and foremost by European colonization and to a great degree by American developments in the case of the Bahamas. When Christopher Columbus set sail from Spain in 1492 on his first voyage, he made his first landfall in the Bahamas on one of the islands he called San Salvador. The archipelagic state of the Bahamas is located in the Atlantic Ocean near to the State of Florida in the United States. The Lucayans, the original inhabitants on this island were eventually wiped out by disease and hardships. The Bahamas was not settled by the Europeans until around 1649 by English Puritans. During the years of the American Revolution (1775-1783), reaction in the colonies to the Declaration of Independence was mixed. Those who supported the British were called “Loyalists” and they opposed the declaration. Those who favored independence were the “Patriots”. Many Loyalists fled the colonies during the war to escape persecution by the Patriots. While the majority of the Loyalists went to Canada, others went to Great Britain and the Caribbean, specifically to the Bahamas (Garraty 1998). Many of the Loyalists brought not only their wealth but also their slaves. This determined the ethnic composition of the Bahamas, which until today has a majority black population and a small white and mixed population.
A tourist and smuggling economy

According to the Caribbean historian Gordon K. Lewis (2004) *The Growth of the Modern West Indies*, while a Caribbean country, the Bahamas was more akin to the continental colonies rather than the West Indian islands. Given the coral nature of the archipelago, the Bahamas did not develop an agriculture based economy nor full scale sugarcane plantation economies. The licit side of the Bahamian economy can be traced to the opening of the first hotel in New Providence in 1861 (Hamshere 1972, 122-124). The tourism industry continues to be the mainstay of the Bahamian economy in the modern era, with the majority of tourists coming from the United States. Consisting of islands, cays, and islets, the country developed firstly as a pirate economy, until Governor Woodes Rogers put an end to the pirate base in the eighteenth century. The Bahamas would later develop into a smuggling economy mainly due to blockade runners during the American Civil War (1861-1865), rumrunners during the era of Prohibition (1920-1933), and drug traffickers in the modern era. According to one of Thelma Peters’ Papers read to the Historical Association of Southern Florida in 1943:

The opening of the American Civil War in 1861 had the same electrifying effect on the Bahama Islands as the prince’s kiss had on Sleeping Beauty. The islands suddenly shook off their lethargy of centuries and became the clearing house for trade, intrigue, and high adventure. Most of the trade between the Bahamas and the United States had been through Southern ports. Both the Bahamians and the Confederates had had the same attitude toward slavery. Slave owners in the Bahamas had violently protested Britain’s freeing of the slaves in 1834. Between 1861 and 1865 about 400 vessels entered Nassau from Confederate ports, 156 of these coming from Charleston and 164 Wilmington. Nassau harbor, ordinarily quiet enough, was teeming with activity during these war years (16-20).

After the blockade running period ended in 1865, the Bahamas didn’t attract any attention until 1920, when the United States passed the Volstead Act which placed a national ban on
alcohol trade between 1920 and 1933. Thanks to all the rum made from Caribbean molasses and sugar, the proliferation of US rum distilleries, and Irish and German beer brewing immigrants, “America was born a nation of drinkers” (Andreas 2013, 227-230). As a result, “Prohibition was the culmination of a century-long backlash against America’s seemingly insatiable drinking habit” (Andreas 2013, 227-230). As such, The Bahamas once again rose to the spotlight by providing a convenient location for rumrunners “more than happy to quench America’s thirst” in the same way it did for the blockade runners during the Civil War (Andreas 2013, 227-230). As Andreas (2013) explained:

Prohibition turned Nassau into a smuggling boomtown and depot for U.S.-bound liquor. Much of the supply came from British distillers, who used the island to illicitly access an otherwise closed U.S. market. Nassau not only warehoused liquor but also provided legal cover for American rumrunners by registering their ships as British. From 1921 to 1922 there was a tenfold increase in the net tonnage of vessels with Bahamian registry. Flying the British flag made American smuggling ships immune from U.S. seizure in international waters. What consequently developed came to be known as Rum Row: fleets of liquor-laden ships idling just outside the three-mile limit, not far from U.S. urban markets (236-237).

The history of the Bahamas is therefore closely linked to the United States; its wealth tied in Lewis’s description to “the more socially retrogressive elements of American life” with the “bonanza adventurer types” from America making their way into the islands: “the counter-revolutionary American exile, the blockade runner, the Prohibition gangster, the amoral Hemingwayesque soldier of fortune who would do anything for a ‘fast buck’, usually on the wrong side of the law” (Lewis 2004, 327-328). When the Prohibition era ended, the modern era led to American capitalists investing in real estate in New Providence. All these historical variables contributed to the political dynamics in The Bahamas best explained by Lewis as follows:
Hence, out of all that, the phenomenon of the famous ‘Bay Street boys’, the Nassau mercantile oligarchy whose lifestyle was the resultant mixture of the luxuriant vulgarity of American wealth and British social snobbery, with the first the controlling element. [O]ligarchy ruled over the Negro majority in a manner that marked it out as perhaps the most narrow-minded ruling class in the entire English-speaking Caribbean. [The] white oligarchies presided over a socio-economic power structure in which they controlled the economic-financial apparatus. Unlike the West Indian islands proper, where British imperial rule, for all its defects, was a continuous reality, the powerful aristocracies of the Atlantic societies were granted almost complete independence of action by London. They became, then, real ruling classes and not mere agents of the imperial center (2004, 328-340).

**Case Study 2: Trinidad and Tobago**

*Spanish Colonialism*

The twin island state of Trinidad and Tobago is situated between both the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic Ocean, lying just eleven kilometers off the coast of Venezuela. It was on Columbus’s third voyage in 1498 that he “discovered” Trinidad. The era of Spanish colonialism didn’t really begin until a century later in 1592, and for about two centuries Trinidad remained underdeveloped, whereas French, British and Dutch colonies were emerging as exporters of tropical crops. It was a period weak colonialism, since Spain was unable to provide goods the settlers needed. The original inhabitants of Trinidad were two groups of Amerindians: the Arawaks and the Caribs who had lived there for centuries. As Bridget Brereton (1981) documented in *A History of Modern Trinidad 1783-1962*, “It was the indigenous Arawaks who, up to the 1780s, supplied the labour for the Spanish-owned estates, and it was they who grew much of the island’s food. But, inevitably, their numbers declined rapidly and their economic position deteriorated under Spanish rule” (4-5).
The Spaniards realized that foreign immigration was needed to develop Trinidad, and this led firstly to an approval by Spain for French emigration in 1779, and led to the Cedula of Population in 1783. This opened immigration to Trinidad from mostly French Caribbean islands, attracting white French planters with their African slaves, adding to the Spanish-Amerindian population during the period 1783-97. Wealthy French planters controlled the plantation economy. African slaves became the basis of labor in this new society and British merchants were active in supplying slaves to the colony. The pre-English era therefore left a “certain Franco-Spanish cultural imprint” and important groups such as the French creoles constituted Trinidad’s ‘first families’ (Lewis, 2004).

British Colonialism

It was in 1797 that Trinidad was taken over by the British. The neighboring island of Tobago had changed hands thirty-one times between the Dutch, English and French since Columbus’s “discovery” in 1498. Tobago eventually came under British rule again in 1814, and in 1889 the island became a ward of Trinidad. Trinidad, like other colonies conquered by the British during the revolutionary Napoleonic wars (1793-1815), had direct supervision from London, in a system later to be known as Crown Colony government (Brereton 1981, 41). As explained by Brereton, the English interest in Trinidad was as follows:

The island was, in fact, a threat to the security of the British West Indies and an obstacle to Britain’s war strategy. The expedition that sailed to the Caribbean late in 1796 had as its first objective the capture of Trinidad. The island was rapidly becoming prosperous, and British merchants conducted a flourishing trade with Trinidad in the 1790s. Its geographical position made it the ideal base for British commercial penetration of the Spanish-American colonies. Even more important, in the troubled international
situation of the 1790s, the British were afraid that effective control of the island might pass from Spain to Republican France (1981, 32-33).

The British then took over the most important export at the time – sugar, with both British and American firms handling the business. Trinidad, however, was far from being a monoculture economy, as cocoa, grown principally by Spanish settlers continued to be important, as well as coffee and other products. With the passing of the Act of Emancipation in 1833, slavery itself was abolished in 1834, but the apprenticeship system continued, until in 1838 it was finally abolished. According to Brereton, Trinidad was “the model British slave colony, the Crown Colony in which new policies for improving the status of the slaves and giving rights to the free coloreds were to be tried out” (1981, 52). Trinidad therefore, had a comparatively shorter history with slavery compared to the rest of the colonies, and this according to Lewis meant that “the Trinidadian Negro…escaped the debilitating effects of centuries of bond slavery, which perhaps explains today his style of raucous ebulliency as compared to the social deference of those others” (2004, 202). In view of the relationship between the West Indies and America, it ought to be highlighted that it took the United States a civil war and thirty years later than the British West Indies to deal with emancipation. It was only on January 1, 1863 that Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation during the American Civil War, which eventually led to the abolition of slavery in the United States.

With the ending of slavery, labor was then needed on the sugarcane plantations as the ex-slaves withdrew from agriculture. Several new arrivals added to the already mixed population of the island. The United States was one option, since free blacks could be
swayed to migrate. Between 1839 and 1847, 1301 free blacks from the northern states came to Trinidad, persuaded by W.H. Burnley, an influential planter spokesman (Brereton 1981, 97). They could not however handle working on the sugarcane estates as they were not agricultural laborers, and so some returned and no more immigrants came from America. The British allowed the immigration of Portuguese laborers from Madeira to work on the cocoa estates starting in 1846. Many were put to work on the sugarcane estates but could not handle the hard labor. Chinese immigrants were also brought to Trinidad between 1853 and 1866, they were also not a viable solution to the agricultural labor shortage, many became shopkeepers. India then became the most lucrative source of cheap labor. In 1844, the British government authorized Indian immigration to Trinidad, British Guiana, and Jamaica. Between 1845 to 1917, indentured Indian labor became the backbone of the sugarcane industry in Trinidad, significantly altering the ethnic and cultural composition of the island. The “whip of slavery” was substituted for the “jail of indenture”, leading to racial and social divisions between the Negroes and the Indians, with the low-cost Indian labor driving the Negro laborer into the island’s northern areas of commerce and southern areas of oil (Lewis 2004, 206-207).

From Agriculture to the Petroleum Industry – the Beginning of American Interest

Sugar and cocoa remained important export crops for Trinidad at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even though Trinidad started off as an agriculture economy, it would become the first oil economy of the Caribbean, attracting British and American investment and expertise in its early development. Trinidad and Tobago would rise to the global stage during World War II for both its strategic location and its oil production.
As most Trinidadians know, the British explorer Sir Walter Raleigh in his search for El Dorado “discovered” the Pitch Lake in La Brea, Trinidad in 1595, when native Amerindians introduced him to asphalt which he used to caulk his ship. What is probably less known by most Americans, is that many of the first asphalt roads in cities such as New York and Washington D.C. were paved with asphalt from Trinidad. It was only in 1851 the first patent defining commercial use of asphalt was established by the British Admiral Thomas Cochrane, and later in 1864 J.W. Previte’s affiliation with the Lake led to its first commercial activity. Amzi Lorenzo Barber, an American businessman also known as “The Asphalt King”, became interested in Trinidad Lake Asphalt while developing the asphalt paving industry in the United States. Barber after his associations with Previte and lengthy negotiations, was able to secure in 1888 a concession from the Crown for twenty-one years covering the whole lake. The profit-seeking American and his monopoly exercised considerable power in the island, as the colony relied on the Yankee capitalist for the modernization of its incipient asphalt industry.

According to Trevor M. Boopsingh (2014), a geological survey of Trinidad conducted in 1860 led to much interest that oil may be produced from the pitch in the lake. Both Bridget Brereton and Trevor M. Boopsingh have attributed the combined efforts of an American company – Merrimac Oil Company and an American civil engineer - Walter Darwent, as the pioneers of the oil industry in Trinidad. As Brereton documented:

The first oil-well in Trinidad – perhaps the first successful oil-well in the world – was drilled by the Merrimac Oil Company of the USA at La Brea

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2 Source: trinidadlakeasphalt.com
in 1857. Oil was struck at a depth of 280 feet, but difficulties in getting capital, as well as the limited demand for oil in the 1850s, brought the venture to an end with the liquidation of the company around 1859. In the following decade, [the American civil engineer] Walter Darwent floated the Paria Oil Company in 1865, and drilled wells at Aripero and San Fernando in 1866-7. At least three struck oil. By 1868 a few wells were in operation around the Pitch Lake, and crude oil had been shipped to the USA and Britain. But a combination of primitive equipment, shortages of capital, heavy soils and transport difficulties forced Darwent to suspend his activities in 1868; he died at La Brea in that year, ‘the first martyr to the oil industry in Trinidad’, and his death marked the end of the early explorations. Drilling did not resume until the opening years of the twentieth century (1981, 199).

At the beginning of the twentieth century, the British government took an interest in developing the oil industry in Trinidad. The year 1908 marks the first year of commercial oil production, and in 1914 “Trinidad oil production passed its first one million-barrel mark” (Boopsingh 2014). By the end of the First World War, the oil industry was well established, enjoying a boom period between 1914 and 1924. During this period, …the administrative and technical staff was mostly British and European, the drillers tended to be Americans, and the semi-skilled or unskilled labor Trinidadian or ‘small-islander’…the social life of the oilfield staff camps was organized on a strictly ‘whites only’ basis, for the oil industry had accepted the racial segregation that was typical of Trinidad society until or after the Second World War. By the 1920s, the oil companies had begun to train local blacks as technicians, but many of them, resenting salary discrimination in favor of US drillers and technicians, left Trinidad to take part in the Venezuelan oil boom of these years, for in Venezuela they were treated on an equal basis with other expatriates (Brereton 1981, 204).

The presence of these American drillers in the colony according to Harvey R. Neptune, …would play a signal part in local contentions about America and Americans. Yankee oilmen envisioned themselves as no less courageous than Roosevelt and his renowned Rough Riders. As they saw it, their task in early-twentieth-century Trinidad was turning perilous, uninhabited jungles into profitable industrial estates. Drillers [were] men who shocked both the etiquette and the economy of colonial society. They scared elites with their driving, scandalized them with their dressing, and stole domestic
workers with their high wages. White American drillers also turned out to be embarrassments egregious enough to warrant expulsion from the colony. These men were not to publicly operate above the law, under the influence of alcohol, or across the color line. The stuff of scandal, such conduct stained the image of not only White Americans but, importantly, all white people (2007, 57).

**Opposition to Crown Colony, World War II and the ‘American Occupation’**

The beginning of the twentieth century witnessed an upsurge in labor mobilization and the emergence of a national society in Trinidad and Tobago. Inflation and deteriorating economic conditions during the immediate post-World War I era, led to strikes by the oil and asphalt workers, and discontent among the Indian population facing increased hardships. The 1930s were turbulent years for the colony. Both the Indian sugar workers and the oil workers marched on the streets and engaged in strikes in 1934 and 1935. Oil workers’ protests led by Turbal Uriah “Buzz” Butler, a Grenadian-born labor agitator, led to riots in 1937 and violence in the oil rich southern part of the island, leading to the spread of rebellion throughout the colony. It was also a period of the development of race consciousness among both ethnic groups in the island. According to Brereton, “it was the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935, and the failure of the western democracies to support the Ethiopians, that really stimulated black nationalism in Trinidad and the West Indies…and there is no doubt that West Indian blacks reacted strongly to the invasion” (1981, 174). It was also an era of artistic and literary movement led by young Trinidadian intellectuals whose works marked the start of an era of West Indian literature (Brereton 1981). To the credit of the English, the establishment of an education system in Trinidad resulted in an educated black class who eventually assumed political leadership and undermined the position of the white ruling class.
The different historical forces which created an ethnically and culturally heterogeneous society in Trinidad (Spanish cocoa planter, French elite, British businessman, ex-slave now urban worker, Chinese, Portuguese, Indian, Syrian and Lebanese merchants, the Indian sugarcane worker, the small islander oil worker) quite distinct from the other homogeneous British colonial societies like the Bahamas and Barbados, meant that there was little time historically for a sense of common identity. And so, according to Lewis, “the emergence of a national spirit out of this colonial obscurity began, in earnest, with Captain Cipriani and his labor movements after the First World War” (2004, 203). Cipriani, even though his roots were French, became the champion of the people and one of the most beloved West Indian heroes. Cipriani and the Trinidad Workingmen’s Association (TWA) fought for many issues including inter alia: workmen’s compensation and minimum wage, prevention of child labor on the Indian sugarcane estates, compulsory education, prioritizing local men over expatriates in the public service, a “White man himself, he opposed all forms of discrimination”, he started the “lengthy campaign to force the foreign-owned oil industry to accept heavier tax rates” (Lewis 2004, 209-210). As Lewis explained, Cipriani faced many obstacles including the Crown Colony System, a socialist program which he favored, and “the fatal ambiguity…in trying to be Empire loyalist and West Indian patriot at one and the same time. Cipriani, then, was inevitably superseded after 1938 by more militant leadership of the Butler type with whom he had little sympathy” (2004, 211-213).
The Americans therefore arrived during a complex and turbulent era in Trinidad’s history, with nationalism on the rise and opposition to the British colonial system. The Caribbean was a main theater during World War II, and Trinidad’s strategic location and its oil production made it one of Britain’s most valuable assets. According to Metzgen and Graham (2007) in their book *Caribbean Wars Untold: A Salute to the British West Indies*:

Ninety-seven German and 6 Italian U-boats operated in the Caribbean from February 1942 until April 1945. Each enemy U-boat operating in these waters sunk on average four ships. This probably made the Caribbean the most cost-effective campaign the Germans fought during the war. In both world wars, Great Britain was hugely dependent on ship-borne trade. For the British, Canadians, Americans and Germans alike, the North Atlantic was a decisive battleground between the German U-boat fleet and the naval and air forces of the Allies. Of all the imports to the United Kingdom in wartime, none was more important than oil. And in 1940 Trinidad had the largest oil refinery in the British Empire. The oil tanker was therefore of supreme importance – for the enemy to sink and for the Allies to protect (159-162).

In 1940, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill agreed to lease land in its Caribbean colonies for the development of naval and air bases in exchange for fifty old US destroyers. According to Metzgen and Graham (2007), the maritime situation had deteriorated for Britain in the Summer of 1940 due to U-boat attacks, and the tide turned against the British when France was defeated by Germany. The United States set up bases on leased land in the Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, Antigua and St. Lucia. Additionally, in 1941, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war, thus committing the U.S. to naval war in both the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. According to Neptune (2007), Trinidad was worth forty of the fifty destroyers, and “this claim has the merit of highlighting Trinidad’s distinction as host of the largest-by far-of the new military installations in the British Caribbean “base colonies” (2).
Most Trinidadians during these difficult years were mainly concerned about economic survival rather than Britain’s war against Germany. The local intelligentsia, some who were educated in the U.S., was more appreciative of the Americans than of the British during the ‘occupation’, recognizing good relations with America would only benefit the islands. As Neptune explained, it was not that the locals favored annexation, rather “support for Americanization expressed a demand for a social progress unaffordable under British rule” (2007, 75). The construction of bases had a huge socio-economic impact on the island, leaving both positive and negative influences and impressions. During a period of economic hardship, base construction created employment for thousands, with higher wages attracting workers from the sugar and cocoa estates, even teachers started leaving their professions for more lucrative American wages. As Neptune (2007) described it:

> It was the Yankee dollar, to a large extent, that lured locals to American employers. Included in this drove of base-bound locals were not only so-called unskilled laborers but also clerks, teachers and policemen - people, in other words, who gave up “good” jobs. The appeal of American work, furthermore, transcended ethnicity, too; Indo-Trinidadian agricultural laborers streamed to the bases no less purposefully than Afro-Trinidadian clerks. In the world of work, as in virtually every aspect of the social sphere in occupied Trinidad (dress, music, and sexuality), the notion of an ethnic divide was well-nigh negligible. Wages alone, however, cannot fully account for people’s choice of work. Base work, satisfied young people’s desires for liberty and novelty. It was for them exhilaratingly modern leisure (84-87).

On a sociological level, Americanization during the 1940s was described by Lewis as “disastrous” and “disruptive” as “the sophisticated prostitute, the ‘saga-boy’, the gang leader – are direct creations of American influence, of ‘working for the Yankee dollar’ (2004, 218). According to Brereton, “a great deal of money circulated, creating a boom-
time atmosphere in which prostitution and organized vice flourished under people like Boysie Singh, a well-known mobster in the 1940s, and gang conflict and violence increased” (1981, 192). During this period, local artistes found an audience among the Americans for their calypso music, an art form which bridged cultural divides and became an expression of Trinidadian identity. One of the most famous calypsonians ‘Lord Kitchener’ became popular with U.S. troops and later went on to perform in the United States, becoming internationally recognized. The U.S. presence encouraged local creativity during and after the war, inspiring other calypsonians such as the beloved ‘Mighty Sparrow’. His famous rendition ‘Jean and Dinah’ became an international hit in 1956, and was a commentary on the prostitution that the American bases supported, and the predicament of these prostitutes after the closure of the bases:

\[
\text{Well the girls in town feeling bad} \\
\text{No more Yankees in Trinidad} \\
\text{They going to close down the base for good} \\
\text{Them girls have to make out how they could} \\
\text{(Mighty Sparrow)}
\]

**Case Study 3: Jamaica**

**Settlement**

It was on Columbus’s second voyage in 1494 that he “discovered” Jamaica, an island located in the Caribbean Sea south of Cuba and to the west of Hispaniola. The era of Spanish colonialism didn’t begin until 1509. Like the rest of the Caribbean, the native Amerindians, the Taino Arawaks were treated harshly by the Spaniards, and with disease their population was decimated in about fifty years. Spanish rule ended in 1655 when Jamaica was seized by the British. With no Amerindian labor, the British brought English,
Irish and Scottish indentured servants and later African slaves to supply the labor force for agricultural production. After 1655 Jamaica essentially had three social classes: a white upper class (property owning class), a brown middle class (mix between white plantation owners and slaves), and a lower class (slave descendants). The British cultivated crops like cocoa, coffee, pimento, cotton, indigo and sugarcane. Sugarcane was the most important crop followed by coffee which was grown on the hilly landscapes of the island. During the American Revolution (1775-1783), some loyalists also came to Jamaica with their slaves. After the Haitian Revolution in 1791, many planters fled Haiti with their slaves and established coffee plantations in Jamaica.

With the complete abolition of slavery in 1838, a similar pattern occurred in Jamaica like in Trinidad. The need for labor on the sugarcane plantations led to the importation of Indian indentured laborers from 1845 to 1916. The East Indian inhabitants in Jamaica was comparatively small compared to Trinidad and Guyana where the Indians accounted for around 40 per cent of the population. Chinese indentured laborers also started arriving in Jamaica in 1854, but like the case of Trinidad, they could not handle the hard work and many went into retail businesses. While Trinidad became an ethnically heterogenous society, Jamaica still remained 90 percent African with the East Indians, Chinese, and White in the minority.

*Slavery, Rebellion and Resistance*

Jamaica also had a longer history of British rule and slavery than Trinidad and Tobago. According to Bernal (2015), the “well-known aggressiveness of Jamaicans has been
attributed to…the extreme brutality of slavery as practiced in Jamaica” (65). The harshness of the plantation system led to sustained resistance and revolts by the African slaves. There were slave revolts leading up to emancipation and even though slavery was abolished, a white minority continued to rule Jamaica. Unfair treatment to the Africans resulted in mass protests in the post-slavery period since former slaves became landless, exploited peasants. An influential peasant, Paul Bogle, led a rebellion at Morant Bay in 1865. The response by the planter class was ruthless with Bogle being hanged and hundreds executed and flogged. The Morant Bay affair was significant in Jamaica’s history as it culminated in the introduction of Crown Colony government.

The Crown Colony system, however, led to further discontent and a black political movement was led by Marcus Garvey. Garvey was deeply concerned with the indignity the ex-slaves experienced in Jamaican society. He sought an Afro-American audience in the United States and on his return to Jamaica in the 1920s he brought his American experience in political activism. He also opened the eyes of many to believe in themselves despite their race. “Garveyism” according to Lewis (2004) left two important contributions in Jamaica – racial self-respect and organized political party (181). Like Trinidad, the 1930s in Jamaica was a time of rising nationalism, economic hardship, labor protests, and trade union mobilization. During the 1937-38 period, a socially-conscious middle class rallied to the cause of the labor movement in Jamaica. Two major political parties were formed: the People’s National Party (PNP) in 1938 led by Norman Washington Manley, and the Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) in 1943 led by Manley’s cousin, Alexander Bustamante. Both parties linked to trade unions, emerged out of a working-class militancy of the 1930s
and their collective struggles for constitutional change fostered a Jamaican national consciousness. The two-party system which was developed during the colonial period would make the transition to independence.

*Jamaican Economic Development and U.S. Influence*

Jamaica remained principally an agriculture and tourist based economy up until World War II. In addition to sugarcane, the banana industry developed in the 1880s. Bananas during that period was an exotic fruit and small ships transported the fruit from Jamaica to the United States. An American company, the United Fruit Company of Boston (1885-1899) which later became the United Fruit Company was in the business of production, export and marketing of bananas. Eventually the company started the cultivation of bananas on abandoned sugarcane plantations in Jamaica (Wiseman 1950, 81). The United Fruit Company exercised a sort of banana empire owning acres of land used for banana plantations in Jamaica and Central America. Because of Jamaica’s white sandy beaches and agreeable weather, its north coast became a tourist center beginning from the latter part of the nineteenth century when British and American tourists wanted to escape winters in the north. According to *The Gleaner* (1968), the first hotels were built in Montego Bay and Port Antonio, areas to the north of the island. As explained by Hamshere (1972), it was the Jamaica Exhibition of 1891 that really started the tourist business and by the 1930s Montego Bay was a well-known tourist destination (209). The tourism industry would become Jamaica’s largest earner of foreign exchange by the 1990s, with the majority of tourists coming from the United States.
While Trinidad and Tobago became a prosperous oil economy by World War II, Jamaica had nothing much but agricultural produce. According to *The Gleaner* (1968), while as far back as 1869 it was known that the red soils of Jamaica contained bauxite, it was not until the period 1938-1942 that attention was given to the use of alumina for the production of aluminum:

In 1944, after a period of extensive field work, intensive research and pilot plant tests in the United States of America to determine suitable economic processing methods of the Jamaican ore, Jamaica Bauxites Limited, a company established by Aluminum Limited of Canada, and Reynolds Metals Company of Richmond, Virginia, started the process of acquiring properties in the island with bauxite deposits. A third large American Corporation, Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, entered the field. Bauxite mining commenced in 1952 and in that same year the first regular export was made by Reynolds Jamaica Mines Limited. In 1953 Kaiser Bauxite Company commenced shipping ore. A fourth company, Alcoa Minerals of Jamaica Inc., a subsidiary of the Aluminum Company of America…began the production of bauxite in 1963 and making its first shipment [also] in 1963 (1968, 30-31).

American aluminum companies turned to Jamaica for the island’s rich bauxite deposits. War and the defense industry made alumina a strategic metal for the United States. Bauxite mining in the Caribbean began in British Guiana in 1916, but in the 1940s American companies subsequently focused their attention to a nearer source - Jamaica. According to Keith and Girling (1978) *Bauxite Dependency: Roots of Crisis*, the U.S. government was a “silent partner” with American firms by not only providing a guaranteed market for government stockpile but also by financing parts of their investments in Jamaica. As the authors pointed out, Jamaica had more locational advantages than British Guiana, the higher quality of bauxite ore deposits were located nearer to the surface of the land making extraction easier, and the geographic proximity to the United States made transport easier. American and Canadian multinationals owned and controlled 100 per cent of the bauxite
and alumina industry in Jamaica. The politics of aluminum multinationals and the strategy of economic development would play out in the 1970s when the Jamaican government tried to gain some control over its resources.

Case Study 4: British Guiana (Guyana)
While the Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were all “discovered” by Christopher Columbus on his first, second and third voyages respectively, the discovery of Guiana on mainland South America was the work of other explorers. The conquest of Peru by Pizarro and the looting of gold from the Incas led other explorers in search of El Dorado in the South American continent to Guiana. Sir Walter Raleigh, the English explorer was the first European to discover Guiana in 1595, but it was the Dutch who made the first permanent settlement on Guiana’s coast in the early 17th century. According to the historian Vere T. Daly (1975) A Short History of The Guyanese People, Guiana’s coast served both as a base for the search for El Dorado and also as a trading post and Raleigh’s account of The Discoverie of the large and bewtiful Empire of Guiana attracted readers in Europe, especially the Dutch (36). Holland discovered annatto dye in Guiana and thought of setting up a colony to control supplies. It was private enterprise which drove the colonization process under the aegis of the Dutch West India Company in Guiana. Along the major rivers - Essequibo, Berbice and Demerara, the Dutch West India Company developed colonies to trade with the native Indians in the interior of the country.

By mid-18th century, sugar became an increasingly important crop and overtook the trade with the native Indians as the most significant economic activity. Due to labor shortages,
the Dutch West India Company encouraged the movement of planters from British West Indian islands to develop the sugarcane plantations in Guiana. The three colonies changed hands between the British and the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars. The colonies were officially ceded to the British in 1814 as part of a peace settlement. In 1831 Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice became the single colony of British Guiana. Like Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica, the same Crown Colony system of government developed but at a much later date. The British Guiana Act of 1928 which was passed through the British parliament abolished the old Dutch constitution and introduced a Crown Colony system of government (Daly 1975, 292).

The same pattern followed as in the other British colonies: slavery, emancipation, Indian, Chinese and Portuguese immigration between 1838 to 1917. Like the rest of the British West Indies, the Chinese and Portuguese could not tolerate hard labor and went into retail trade and the East Indians worked as indentured laborers on the sugarcane estates while the Negroes went into urban areas. While the development pattern of British plantation colonial society was the same, Guyana’s trajectory was distinct with poverty, racism, and violence plaguing the country on a scale far bigger than Trinidad or Jamaica. Guyana’s ordeal can be explained by many factors. Dr. Eric Williams in an article entitled The Historical Background of British Guiana’s Problems (1945) pointed out that Guiana’s dilemma stemmed from entering the British Empire too late, consequently suffering from a labor shortage. As Williams explained (1945):

Where the Dutch colonist developed a garden, the English colonist established a plantation. British Guiana passed too late into the possession of the British Crown. Had it been annexed in the middle of the eighteenth century…when the sugar colonies of the Caribbean were the apple of their
mother country’s eye, the whole history of the colony and the British West Indian islands would have been different. The problem of labor would have been solved by the slave trade. But British Guiana became British only in the early years of the nineteenth century, when the West Indian colonies were falling from grace and sugar’s throne was toppling (361-363).

The racial tensions between Indians and Negroes in Guyana originated according to Lewis from the distinct occupational roles they were assigned in the colony, the separation of town and country, where the Indians lived a “degraded life just above the poverty line”, illiterate because they were denied educational opportunities, and so an economic-racial separation led to two separate worlds. The blacks not wanting to associate with the degrading life of agriculture moved to coastal towns and the city, gaining more opportunity for education and jobs in the civil service and police force. Additionally, the “absentee character of English colonialism” meant that the sugar industry was characterized by “intense corporate concentration” unlike the multiple ownership system in places like Barbados (Lewis 2004, 273). Booker Brothers, McConnell and Company, better known as Bookers, a London-based company exercised significant power in British Guiana, becoming a “veritable state within the state” according to Lewis. Bookers owned most of the sugar plantations in Guyana and eventually they were involved in all aspects of the Guyanese economy. Guyanese often joked that the country should be named ‘Bookers Guiana’. Daly (1975) has pointed out that the planters used their political power to prevent any other economic activity that would pull the already short supply of labor away from the sugarcane estates (275). This corporate concentration and political power of the planter class prevented the economic diversification of British Guiana. The consequence was the failure of the growth of a small-scale peasant farmer class, and “a comparative failure to
develop a vigorous creole business class…in contrast to the growth of such a class in the Jamaican and Trinidadian economies” (Lewis 2004, 274-275).

**Resource endowments and American Interest**

It was the search for gold which led Europeans to explore South America and it was gold which contributed to the boundary dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. Alluvial gold was found in significant quantities in Guiana in the 1880s and this led to an upsurge in mining activities in the early 1890s (Daly 1975, 276). After a peak in the 1890s, production declined. Part of the reason for the slow development of the gold industry was the planter class’s ability to prevent communications lanes to the prospecting areas (Daly 1975, 276). Guiana not only had gold but also diamonds. The first recorded year of diamond exports from Guiana was 1901-02 (Daly 1975, 277). Towards the end of the nineteenth century, large deposits of bauxite were discovered in Guiana. In 1913, a Scottish geologist George Bain Mackenzie bought lands for mining on the eastern bank of the Demerara River. In 1914, the Demerara Bauxite Company was founded. It was the discovery of bauxite which spurred U.S. interest in British Guiana when American aluminum companies began their global search for the raw material – bauxite ore. In 1916 the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) incorporated the Demerara Bauxite Company. In 1929, Alcoa handed over operations to its Canadian associate Alcan. The Berbice Bauxite Company, a subsidiary of American Cyanamid, started production in 1942. By the end of the 1940s, Guyana was the world’s second largest producer of bauxite.

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3 The history of the bauxite industry was found on the website: http://www.guyana.org/features/guyanastory/chapter101.html
**Concluding Remarks**

American interest and interactions in the British colonies began at different periods for each of the countries over the centuries. In the case of the Bahamas, events in the United States such as the American Revolution (1775-1783), the American Civil War (1861-1865), and the Prohibition era (1920-1933) had a big impact on the archipelagic state given its proximity to the continent. In this regard, historically the Bahamas has felt the impact of the United States for a longer period and its development influenced by the U.S. more than any of the other case studies. Its strategic value lied in its location mostly for illicit activity. In terms of the level of interest shown by the United States (state and non-state actors), Trinidad and Tobago received the most attention during this period with American capitalists and firms seeking to gain profits from the asphalt and oil industries. Trinidad and Tobago viewed from a security perspective was the most valuable of all the British base colonies. On the metrics of economic and security interests, the United States interest in Trinidad and Tobago was highest compared to the other cases. There were economic interests in Jamaica in the banana and bauxite industries, but Jamaica’s importance in terms of a military base was low compared to Trinidad. While British Guiana also served as a military base, its importance was also low compared to Trinidad and Tobago. Guiana’s bauxite reserves however attracted American multinationals seeking to exploit the country’s deposits. These findings are summarized in Table 1 below.
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<th>Interest / Activity</th>
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CHAPTER 2
From European Domination to American Hegemony: The Caribbean in the Context of U.S. Foreign Policy (1823-1945)

The beginning of the nineteenth century was a period of expansion for the newly established United States of America and it was during this era that the U.S. started taking its place on the global diplomatic stage. The Western Hemisphere and the Caribbean region in particular became America’s launching pad into hegemony. It was a time of fortune beginning with the Louisiana Purchase from France in 1803, which significantly increased the size of the U.S. In 1819, the Adams-Onis Treaty was signed between the United States and Spain in which Spain surrendered Florida. In less than twenty years, the United States gained a significant amount of territory. Because of revolutions led by figures such as Simon Bolivar, most countries gained independence from Spain during the 1820s. The United States welcomed these newly independent nations, but also feared European expansion. The Caribbean, still divided among European powers during the 1820s, started appearing in America’s foreign policy agenda. The British territories were not of any concern, but the Spanish colony Cuba was in America’s interest. It was Secretary of State John Quincy Adams who expressed this on April 28, 1823 in a letter to the new head of the U.S. mission to Spain, Hugh Nelson:

…the dominion of Spain upon the American continents, North and South, is irrecoverably gone. But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally and so far really dependent upon her. These islands, from their local position, are natural appendages to the North American continent; and one of them, Cuba, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the
political and commercial interests of our Union. But there are laws of political as well as of physical gravitation; and if an apple severed by the tempest from its native tree cannot choose but to fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only towards the North American Union....as in the event of the overthrow of the Spanish constitution...their only alternative of dependence must be upon Great Britain, or upon the United States. The transfer of Cuba to Great Britain would be an event unpropitious to the interests of this Union (Holden and Zolov 2000, 8-10).

With the possibility of other European powers gaining territories in the fallen Spanish Empire, British foreign minister George Canning had suggested a joint declaration with the United States against further intervention in the Americas. On the advice of John Quincy Adams, President James Monroe was persuaded to make a statement alone since a joint statement would have prevented the U.S. from taking over Cuba in the future. The resulting statement came to be known as the *Monroe Doctrine*, the most important foreign policy declaration where the U.S. warned European powers not to colonize any further in the New World in return for America’s non-interference in European affairs. In President Monroe’s address to Congress on December 2, 1823 he stated:

> We owe it, therefore, to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the Governments who have declared their independence and maintained it...we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States (Holden and Zolov 2000, 13).

U.S.-style imperialism began in the 1890s and was best displayed with a case involving British Guiana in mainland South America. The British territory of Guiana had a
longstanding dispute with Venezuela over the location of its boundary. Secretary of State Richard Olney sent a memorandum to the U.S. ambassador in Great Britain on July 20, 1895 arrogantly claiming that the dispute fell within the reach of the Monroe Doctrine, even claiming it to be law. According to Holden and Zolov, “…the timing of its release [has] made it a key indicator of the passage to hemispheric hegemony, at the expense of Great Britain, by the United States in the 1890s” (2000, 64). Olney wrote:

There is, then, a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle and abundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and requires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the forcible assumption by a European power of political control of an American state. The application of the doctrine to the boundary dispute between Great Britain and Venezuela remains to be made and presents no real difficulty. The political control…concerns a domain of great extent…and if it also directly involves the command of the mouth of the Orinoco, is of immense consequence in connection with the whole river navigation of the interior of South America…the United States may legitimately insist upon the merits of the boundary question being determined, it is equally clear that there is one feasible mode of determining them, viz., peaceful arbitration (Holden and Zolov 2000, 66-67).

After Britain’s rejection of Olney’s arguments and President Cleveland’s willingness to go to war for Venezuela, the British agreed to arbitration. While the British lost control of the mouth of the Orinoco River, they retained most of their territory. Ironically, Venezuela had almost no say in the arbitration process and was forced to select an American as its representative, and so the arbitration panel ruled in favor of the British. According to Langley (1989), “Olney’s note provided a rationale for empire, an empire composed, not of colonies (except for Puerto Rico), but of small, politically unstable republics with fragile economies” (13). As Jerald A. Combs explained, “Even though the Senate later rejected the general Anglo-American arbitration treaty…the incident had clearly shocked the United States and Great Britain into a new recognition of their mutual interests” (2012,
After the Venezuelan-Guiana dispute, the British acknowledged that of all the rising powers, the United States posed the least threat to its vital interests. Consequently, Great Britain handed over the Western Hemisphere to the United States entrusting British interests to American hegemony (Combs 2012, 13-14).

During the period 1865 to 1917, the United States increased the size of its territory and became both an industrial nation and a world power. In addition, it moved away from a position of isolationism towards expansionism and involvement in world affairs. In 1867, the United States purchased Alaska from Russia, expanding its continental territory even further. During the 1890s, economic depression hit, and many saw the problem as the lack of a dynamic export economy. According to Lester D. Langley (1989), “in the economic crisis of the 1890s, it was the industrial manufacturers who stumped for an expansionist economic policy as a palliative to the depression and a cure for the social discontents of the age…for the first time, the search for foreign markets had been integrated into American strategic thought” (10-11). The publication of Alfred Thayer Mahan’s book *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783* in 1890 coincided with the economic depression at the time, and strengthened the argument for the need for foreign markets to alleviate excess production. A U.S. Naval Officer but also one of the architects of America’s early foreign policy, Mahan was instrumental in developing America’s concept of sea power and the Caribbean Sea as strategic to the United States. In his book, he compared the Caribbean Sea to the Mediterranean Sea both in terms of military and commercial strategic interests, he advocated for a Panama Canal, he spoke about American military bases in the Caribbean, and the need for naval expansion to accommodate U.S.
transition to a world power. Additionally, the United States also purchased the Danish West Indies which was renamed the U.S. Virgin Islands in 1917.

When Cubans began fighting for independence from Spain in 1895, a series of factors led to the United States entering the war against Spain in 1898. These factors concerned the mysterious sinking of the *U.S.S. Maine* in Cuba, news reports about atrocities against Cuban rebels, and American economic interests on the island. The Teller Amendment which stated that the U.S. had no intentions of the annexation of Cuba, was a measure to protect the United States from being accused of going to war for hegemonic reasons, but it also avoided recognizing the Cuban rebel government. The United States established a temporary military government and the terms under which it would hand over Cuba to a legitimate government. The Platt Amendment which the Cubans were forced to accept permitted the United States to intervene on the island to protect Cuban independence and maintain stability. The U.S. occupation ended, but in conformance with a treaty negotiated on the basis of the Platt Amendment, the U.S. Navy established its military base at Guantanamo Bay (Combs 2012, 55). The U.S. also seized the Spanish island of Puerto Rico during the victorious war. According to Langley (1989), the only European power who expressed sympathy with the United States over its victory over Spain was Britain, and “the American war against Spain stood as symbolic evidence of the extension of Anglo-Saxon rule over backward societies” (22-23).

By the end of the Spanish American War, the United States got rid of Spanish rule in Cuba and Puerto Rico, islands of strategic interest in terms of controlling sea access to a future
isthmian canal in Central America. The 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty between the United States and Britain stipulated that any canal would be neutral with the parties agreeing not to have any exclusive control over the canal. The United States, however, wanted exclusive control and was able to convince the British to sign the second Hay-Pauncefote treaty on November 18, 1901 which stated:

[the] present Treaty shall supercede the afore-mentioned Convention of the 19th April, 1850. It is agreed that the canal may be constructed under the auspices of the Government of the United States... the said Government shall have and enjoy all the rights incident to such construction, as well as the exclusive right of providing for the regulation and management of the canal... (Holden and Zolov 2000, 83-84).

The United States chose the Isthmus of Panama which was part of the territory of Colombia for the site of the canal over Nicaragua. After the Colombian state rejected the Hay-Herran Treaty in 1903 which, would have given the United States a 100-year lease on territory to construct the canal, President Theodore Roosevelt in cahoots with some Colombians supported a Panamanian secessionist movement, Panama declared independence, and then the United States signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty with Panama with more favorable conditions to the United States.

Theodore Roosevelt would later comment, “By far the most important action I took in foreign affairs during the time I was President related to the Panama Canal” (Holden and Zolov 2000, 93). The British Caribbean was instrumental in the construction of the Panama Canal between the period 1906 to 1914. The Americans sourced English-speaking black West Indians to work on the canal to replace Panamanians on the job. According to
Langley (1989), “American foremen knew how to “work niggers” and were disinclined to learn Spanish” (67). As Combs explained (2012),

The United States officially segregated the Canal Zone by race, grouping the Panamanians with the West Indians as blacks. American labor bosses, often white southerners, treated the Panamanians and West Indians as they had treated blacks at home. Discrimination even extended to the currency in which laborers were paid: American citizens received gold, while the Panamanians and West Indians were paid in less valuable silver (59).

Theodore Roosevelt and his “Big Stick” diplomacy shaped U.S. policy towards the Caribbean in the early twentieth century. The United States became the predominant power in the Caribbean and the British entrusted its hegemony to America. In addition, Mahan’s ideas and vision were now fulfilled with a military base at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, the acquisition of Puerto Rico, and exclusive American control of the Panama Canal Zone. A second crisis in Venezuela involving its inability to pay its debt to Europe led to a response by Theodore Roosevelt. After European warships blockaded and bombarded Venezuelan ports in 1902, Roosevelt had initially supported the tactics by writing to the German Ambassador that it was ok to “spank” South American countries if they misbehaved. The Venezuelan crisis was resolved via arbitration, but Roosevelt feared that debt collection would be used as a pretext for European intervention, so he declared America’s position in his address to Congress on December 6, 1904. This became known as the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Roosevelt was also willing to extend the Platt Amendment principle to the entire Caribbean region. He stated in his address:

Chronic wrong-doing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such
wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power. If every country washed by the Caribbean Sea would show the progress in stable and just civilization which the aid of the Platt Amendment Cuba has shown since our troops left the island...all questions of interference by this Nation with their affairs would be at an end (Holden and Zolov 2000, 101-102).

European creditors now expected the United States to guarantee that the Caribbean countries would pay their debts. It didn’t take long for the Roosevelt Corollary to be applied, in this case, the Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic was plagued with crisis and a high level of foreign debt. As Combs (2012) explained, in 1903 civil war broke out in the Dominican Republic, European creditors were demanding their payments and their war vessels sailed Dominican waters. All of this led the President of the Dominican Republic to ask the United States to intervene in 1904. Instead of occupying the entire country, the U.S. only took over Dominican customs collections, establishing a customs house receivership on the island. As the United States took over European loans from poor countries in the Caribbean and imposed U.S. government control of their customs offices to guarantee payment to U.S. lenders, the Roosevelt “Big Stick” policy became known as Dollar Diplomacy under President William H. Taft (Holden and Zolov 2000, 100-101).

President Woodrow Wilson criticized interventionist policies such as dollar diplomacy and apologized to Colombia for Roosevelt’s “taking” of Panama; he sought to undertake a less interventionist policy in the Caribbean. He turned out, however, to be just as interventionist or even more so than his predecessors as the United States militarily occupied both Haiti and the Dominican Republic during his term. His brand of intervention was termed missionary diplomacy, and according to Langley (1989) was “By far the most systematic
and extensive intrusion into the internal processes of Caribbean countries” (68). The history of Haiti and the United States is long: American naval vessels landed marines to protect foreign lives and property eight times between 1897 and 1900; by 1910 the United States controlled about 60 percent of the country’s import market; the State Department enabled U.S. banks to gain control in Haiti’s National Bank controlling a 50 percent share which allowed the U.S. to dominate Haiti’s customs office (Combs 2012, 63). After seven of Haiti’s presidents were assassinated or removed from office between 1911 and 1915, the United States finally intervened in 1915 when the “Haitian president tortured and executed 167 political prisoners and in turn was dismembered by angry revolutionaries” (Combs 2012, 64).

The occupation of Haiti soon revealed American racism. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan commented, “Dear me, think of it. Niggers speaking French” (Langley 1989, 69). While the Haitian elite believed in two Haitis, the rulers and the ruled, the American occupiers saw the two Haitis as “the 99 percent of the “niggers” who went barefoot and the 1 percent of the “niggers” who wore shoes” (Langley 1989, 74). According to Maingot (1994), the “racism which characterized the occupation administration turned Haitians of all classes and skin color against them [the Americans]” (35). In 1916 U.S. marines landed in the Dominican Republic, a year after occupying Haiti. It was U.S intervention in the Dominican Republic which eventually led to the rise of Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, the brutal dictator trained by U.S. marines, whose bloody dictatorship (between 1930 to 1961) was supported by the United States until the regime became too much of an embarrassment for the Americans.
After World War I, there was a recognition in the United States that military interventions in Latin America and the Caribbean served no good. Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), who served as President from 1933 to 1945, rejected Wilsonian concepts of a Caribbean empire, he opposed intervention and promoted inter-American goodwill. According to Holden and Zolov (2000), the origin of the *Good Neighbor Policy* was really a phrase used by President Herbert Hoover who used the term ‘good neighbor’ during a tour of Latin America. FDR was advised by his political associates that during a period of rising nationalism and economic depression in the Caribbean, direct intervention would not serve American interests. According to Langley (1989), “to Roosevelt and his generation of Latin American advisers, choices often narrowed to style and means by which the United States achieved its historic goals of Caribbean security, political guidance, and subordination to the American economy” (121). FDR therefore articulated his Good Neighbor Policy in a speech on Pan-American Day on April 12, 1933 when he stated, “I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of the good neighbor - the neighbor who resolutely respects himself and, because he does so, respects the rights of others – the neighbor who respects his obligations and respects the sanctity of his agreements in and with a world of neighbors” (Holden and Zolov 2000, 141). The big stick was buried and a new era of collaboration was ushered in.

Because the United States now pledged to be a good neighbor without interventions, Latin American and Caribbean countries were expected to reciprocate in some form. With the outbreak of World War II, the fall of France in 1940, German U-boat attacks in the
Caribbean and the possibility that Hitler could force European countries to cede their Caribbean territories, the United States developed a hemispheric defense policy to prevent possible attacks by Germany and Italy in the Caribbean. By this time, America already possessed bases in Cuba and Puerto Rico to safeguard the Panama Canal, but there was a string of islands to the south which were British, French and Dutch colonies. The destroyers-for-bases deal was therefore part of FDR’s Good Neighbor Policy. The United States acquired 99-year leases for bases in the British territories of Bahamas, Jamaica, Antigua, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and British Guiana. Given its strategic geographical location and oil production, Trinidad was the by far the most important of the new military installations in the British Caribbean. Neptune (2007) described Trinidad as “Strategically situated at the “crossroads of the Atlantic,” the 1,900-square-mile territory guarded paths to North and South America, to the prized Panama Canal westward, and to the perilous combat zones eastward” (2).

The wartime relationship and the policy of the good neighbor also went beyond defense cooperation. According to Langley (1989), the United States also expanded cultural programs for the hemisphere, supported the Anglo-American Commission (created to study problems in education, health, agriculture, labor etc.), and given the disruption of commerce with Europe during the war, Caribbean markets became closely tied to the North American market with the exchange of food and manufactures (162-164). Parker (2008) described twentieth century Anglo-American alliance in the British Caribbean as “the passing of the imperial baton to the United States…as the younger brother became the richer, stronger guardian of the older” (10-14).
By the end of WWII, the United States had established military bases throughout the Anglophone Caribbean as part of its hemispheric defense policy. In the post-war years, the United States paid close attention to its Caribbean neighbors in terms of opposing any Communist threat. Any leftist political figure was viewed as a menace to U.S. interests, and all measures were taken to avoid another Fidel Castro and Soviet influence in the region. Events in Cuba determined U.S. foreign policy in the wider Caribbean. The British Caribbean was no exception, as the Americans monitored regional leaders who made any left turns and who were not loyal to their Cold War demands. During the post-war era these colonies began their movement towards gaining independence and the main concern of British policymakers was securing an orderly decolonization process. The British had to balance U.S. Cold War demands and a smooth transition to independence within its territories while maintaining its rapprochement with the Americans.

Two cases will be highlighted during the 1950s and 1960s - Trinidad and Tobago with Eric Williams and British Guiana with Cheddi Jagan. Both Williams and Jagan raised red flags for the Americans - in the case of Trinidad and Tobago it was more an issue of anti-Americanism with Williams’s campaign for the removal of the American base, in the case of British Guiana the problem was Jagan and his Communism. While the British was able to prevent American interference in Trinidad’s politics and ensure a peaceful transition to
independence, in British Guiana the British acceded to U.S. demands. U.S. intervention in British Guiana ignited racial warfare, denied Jagan power, and resulted in a violent path towards independence. According to Langley (1989), “In the early 1960s there was every indication that West Indians were exchanging one imperial master for another. Nowhere did the phrase “America in Britain’s Place” seem more apt than in the English-speaking Caribbean” (255). A third case study Jamaica will be examined during the 1970s and 1980s and will focus on Jamaica’s experiment with socialism and its relationship with the United States from 1972 to 1989 under Prime Ministers Michael Manley and Edward Seaga.

I. Decolonization, Anglo-American Rapprochement, and the Cold War (1950s & 1960s)

Case Study 1: Trinidad and Tobago

The struggle for independence in Trinidad and Tobago was a post-war movement (contrasted with Jamaica where it was a pre-war movement) with Dr. Eric Williams being the main political figure - an Oxford Scholar and Historian, faculty member at Howard University, and Research Secretary of the Caribbean Commission. Lewis (2004) has highlighted that while the Jamaican outlook with figures like Manley was shaped by the “English academic tradition”, in the case of Trinidad, “the Williams outlook was shaped, after Oxford, by the American” (2004, 220-221). Dr. Williams’s American perspective was important because according to Lewis (2004) C.L.R. James pointed out that:

…the American experience helped Williams (1) to absorb the American qualities of dynamic energy and rapid movement, of the urge to get things done, so much opposed to the traditional caution of the British national
outlook and (2) to learn at first hand about the race question in a society where the phenomenon could be seen in all of its nakedness and its deep historical roots, and in its tremendous effect on racialists and anti-racialists alike (221).

The People’s National Movement (PNM) was created in 1955-56 mainly by a black middle class of professionals who all united around the charismatic personality of Eric Williams. Unlike the Jamaican case, the PNM was not affiliated with any labor movements, neither did the party take any socialist stance. As explained by Brereton (1981),

The new party did not seek formal links with the trade unions, unlike similar national parties elsewhere in the West Indies. In no sense was the PNM’s ideology leftist or socialist, and the party was envisaged as a broad national movement that would somehow incorporate both capital and labor. During the campaign, Williams had explicitly rejected socialism; he had indicated his support for foreign capital investment, welcoming the Texaco takeover in 1956, and his economic policies – modelled on the Puerto Rican experience and involving the attraction of foreign capital for industrialization through tax concessions – were endorsed by many local businessmen (235-238).

Eventually a second political party, the Trinidad Democratic Labor Party (DLP) was set up in 1957 (a coalition of other parties) which would challenge the PNM. The DLP turned to Dr. Rudranath Capildeo as their leader, as he was the only one to match Dr. Williams in terms of academic excellence. Dr. Capildeo who also studied in England held a Ph.D. in Mathematics, was a qualified barrister, and a member of a prominent Hindu family. After 1958, both the PNM and the DLP appealed to race either openly or veiled as a major strategy of party politics (Brereton 1981, 239). After the 1961 election where the PNM defeated the DLP, the country was racially polarized and there was fear of racial war. Both Williams and Capildeo went to the Independence Conference in London in May 1962. Williams conceded to some points of the DLP such as placing checks and balances on the
Prime Minister, and he promised to consult with the DLP to reduce racial tensions. Capildeo accepted these reassurances. Trinidad and Tobago gained its independence on 31 August, 1962, twenty-five days after Jamaica, and Dr. Eric Williams became Trinidad and Tobago’s first Prime Minister. As Brereton (1981) explained,

Capildeo had accepted the offered compromise and averted possible racial violence, even partition; he knew, of course, that Indians would have been the main sufferers in any physical conflict, since the armed forces were predominantly black, and presumably pro-PNM. Abruptly, tensions relaxed, and Trinidad and Tobago heaved a collective sigh of profound relief (248-249).

The Chaguaramas Base Controversy (1958-1961)

Eric Williams’s supposedly ‘left turn’ and anti-Americanism came with his campaign to remove the Americans from the military base in Chaguaramas located in the North-West peninsula of the island, the proposed capital of the West Indies Federation. His affiliation with CLR James, a known Marxist who pushed the base agenda also raised concerns. Williams, a historian, discovered documentation by the Governor of Trinidad and Tobago, Hubert Young and realized that Young had resisted conceding the area for the American base. According to Spencer Mawby (2012) in his article “Uncle Sam, We Want Back We Land”: Eric Williams and the Anglo-American Controversy over the Chaguaramas Base, 1957-1961, in 1941 Young expressed frustrations about the “all take and no give” attitude of the Americans and regarded the proposed site as “quite unsuitable and wholly unacceptable” (124). This led Williams to demand that Chaguaramas be returned to Trinidad. Spearheaded by CLR James, an anti-imperialist rhetoric was espoused by Williams in his 1959 speech “from slavery to Chaguaramas”, where he declared that “we in the PNM did not form a political party in order to substitute American colonialism for
the British colonialism we pledged to fight” (Brereton 1981, 241). This was followed by
the PNM’s “march for Chaguaramas” in 1960 with the famous slogan “Uncle Sam We
Want Back We Land”.

The Chaguaramas controversy occurred during the period where the United States did not
hesitate to use its power to remove the cancer of Communism in the Western hemisphere.
The fear was that left leaning politicians in Latin America and the Caribbean would invite
Soviet influence in its “backyard” where Americans held significant economic and security
ties. One clear example of U.S. intervention was in Guatemala. The United Fruit Company
in Guatemala which owned most of the big banana plantations and which exercised
significant control in the country, launched their campaign against leftist President Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman who was elected in 1950 after he sympathized with workers and began
expropriating and redistributing United Fruit’s fallow land. The Dulles brothers who were
members of United Fruit’s law firm, together with the Eisenhower administration
organized a CIA-backed coup in Guatemala in 1954. According to Langley (1989),
“Guatemala…offered what Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles
interpreted as irrefutable evidence of Communist intrusion in the Americas” (189). The
Guatemalan affair, combined with the Cuban Revolution in 1959, meant that Eric
Williams’s campaign for the Chaguaramas base was not taken lightly by the Americans.
Eric Williams appeared on President Eisenhower’s agenda in his visit to London in August
of 1959. The President’s brief stated:

The Premier of Trinidad is a very complex individual who was educated at
Howard University and at Oxford. He is anti-US and to a slightly less extent, anti-British. He has made many slanderous remarks against the US,
particularly in regard to the US naval base at Chaguaramas. The British despite requests on our part, have taken no steps to curb Dr. Williams. It is believed that unless he is checked, we will continue to have trouble (Mawby 2012, 135-136).

As Mawby (2012) explained, the U.S. Navy began working with the opposition group the DLP in Trinidad to unseat Williams seeking intelligence from the DLP about Williams and his connection to CLR James. While the Defense Department was unyielding in its position of removing Williams, the British did not favor the American views over its own analysis of the situation. The British did not view Williams as another Fidel Castro. Williams never spoke of forming any alliance with Moscow and as Brereton pointed out, his party did not arise out of any labor movement nor did he adopt any socialist policies. According to Mawby, the British Governor Edward Beetham expressed frustrations about the American interference in Trinidad politics when he stated “there is nothing more than we can do at this juncture which would be of any material advantage: we cannot muzzle the Press or the politicians any more than you in the United Kingdom can do so” (2012, 131).

The Colonial Office decided that negotiations would be the best solution to the problem. As outlined by Mawby (2012), the British approach prevailed over the American for the following reasons: a) the State Department was briefed that after independence the Trinidad government would not be bound by the 1940-41 bases agreement which was carried out between the British and the Americans; b) the opposition group, the DLP was no real resistance to Williams neither was the State Department convinced that the DLP would remain loyal to U.S. interests; c) a new American Consul General, Edwin Moline was appointed in July of 1959 who was more understanding of the issues raised by the
Trinidad government. And so, in June of 1960, British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan came to Trinidad, gave assurances that Trinidad would participate independently in negotiations with the US, and urged the West Indies to ‘hurry up’ to independence (Brereton 1981, 243). CLR James was soon purged from the PNM party and in 1960 Williams declared that Trinidad was ‘historically, geographically and economically’ part of the West and warned that ‘if the communists and fellow travelers were counting on him to pull their chestnuts out of the fire they would be disappointed’ (Brereton 1981, 243). In the negotiated settlement, there was a partial American withdrawal from the bases until 1977 and the U.S. granted foreign aid for infrastructure development and the construction of a college (Brereton 1981, 243). Trinidad and Tobago was successfully able to arrive at an amicable settlement between the British and the Americans and Eric Williams was allowed to lead his nation to independence in 1962.

Case Study 2: British Guiana

British Guiana according to Cary Fraser (2000) is most “emblematic of the ‘imperialism of decolonization’ [where] British imperial disengagement after 1945 [resulted in] the “New Frontier [picking] up where the British Empire left off” (609-610). Yet, a review of the literature on U.S. relations with British Guiana proved scant in American textbooks while detailed accounts were given of U.S. interventions in Cuba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, and Guatemala. According to Waters and Daniels (2005), until 1996 U.S. government files on British Guiana were closed and what was known about the CIA’s involvement came from investigative reporting. When President Bill Clinton’s nomination
of William Doherty Jr. (a trade union official) as Ambassador to Guyana was rejected by the Cheddi Jagan government, Jagan said to the *New York Times* “Maybe President Clinton doesn’t know our history but the people who advise him should at least know their own history” (Waters and Daniels 2005, 280). It was only recently a detailed account was provided by Stephen G. Rabe in his 2005 book *U.S. Intervention in British Guiana: A Cold War Story*. According to Rabe (2005) “Scholarly neglect of British Guiana may indicate that the U.S. intervention does not rank as a significant Cold War event. But the actions of policymakers, past and present, seem to belie that judgment” (8). According to the United States Department of State archives⁴,

During the Johnson administration, the U.S. Government continued the Kennedy administration’s policy of working with the British Government to offer encouragement and support to the pro-West leaders and political organizations of British Guiana as that limited self-governing colony moved toward total independence. The Special Group/303 Committee approved approximately $2.08 million for covert action programs between 1962 and 1968 in that country. U.S. policy included covert opposition to Cheddi Jagan, the then pro-Marxist leader of British Guiana’s East Indian population.

The story of U.S. intervention in British Guiana during the 1950s and 1960s involves many levels of analysis. At the individual level, the protagonists included Cheddi Jagan, Janet Rosenberg Jagan and Forbes Burnham. At the state level of analysis, it involved not only the states of Britain and the United States, but American and British intelligence agencies. It also involved non-state actors which included Guyanese, British and American labor unions. At the international level, the Suez crisis and the subsequent dismantling of the

British empire, the 1959 Cuban Revolution, the aftermath of the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, and the Civil Rights Movement in the United States all contributed to the intervention in this poor and seemingly unimportant country.

Cheddi Jagan’s life epitomizes Horatio Alger’s “rags to riches” theme. An East Indian born on the sugarcane estates, his parents saved money to send him to study in the United States to break the family’s cycle of poverty. As Stephen G. Rabe (2005) explained, with his family’s life savings of $500 he went to Howard University in 1936, received scholarships and went on to earn a degree in dentistry at Northwestern University, making ends meet with a series of low paying jobs (23-24). His American experience shaped his life and his political views. The economic depression in the United States combined with his observation of the poverty of black Americans encouraged him to take classes in history and political science while he studied dentistry (2005, 24). He met his future wife and political partner, a nursing student who was a member of the Young Communist League of Chicago at a political gathering for students (2005, 25). Janet Rosenberg Jagan came from a white middle class Jewish family in Chicago and moved to British Guiana with her husband.

The Jagans founded a multiracial party in 1950, the People’s Progressive Party (PPP) with Dr. Cheddi Jagan as the political leader and Forbes Burnham as the chairman. Burnham was born into a black professional class, where his father was the headmaster of a primary school. He won the Guiana Scholarship from the colonial government and went on to earn
a law degree in 1947 from the University of London (Rabe 2005, 22-23). Burnham was also politically active while abroad developing relationships with the British Labour Party and the British Communist Party. In the post-1945 period U.S. interest in British Guiana was minimal - the military base was deactivated after the war, the State Department closed its Consulate in Georgetown in 1953 and reported on Guiana from Trinidad and Tobago, American aluminum companies began sourcing bauxite from Jamaica and Surinam and American Cyanamid even closed its operations in Guiana in 1952 (Rabe 2005, 33-34). British Guiana however soon became a problem for the Anglo-American alliance in 1953. A revision of British Guiana’s constitution was intended to place the country on the path towards eventual self-governance and so the first general election was held in 1953 (Daly 1975, 299). The PPP swept to power owing much to its leadership by Dr. Jagan and Mr. Burnham, but also because of the goal of a socialist state and support from the trade union movement (Daly 1975, 299). The triumph however would turn out to be short-lived as the political leanings of Cheddi and Janet Jagan led to fears of a communist revolution in Britain’s only colony on the South American continent.

As documented by Rabe, the PPP’s victory shocked Prime Minister Winston Churchill and in May of 1953 he asked the Colonial Secretary whether Britain should accept the result and went on to say that “we ought to surely to get American support in doing all we can to break the Communist teeth in British Guiana” (2005, 39). The Colonial Office saw Janet Rosenberg Jagan as the true villain and she was described as “an exceptionally able, ruthless, and energetic woman” and “the dominating influence in the party” (Rabe 2005, 40). The Americans felt the same as CIA Director Allen Dulles stated “The leader of the
dominant party in the new government of British Guiana was an American-born Communist whose East Indian husband was the head of the People’s Progressive Party” (Rabe 2005, 45). The British made the decision to send warships and troops to British Guiana, the Governor on instructions from London suspended British Guiana’s constitution in October 1953 and re-took control of the colony. The PPP lasted only 133 days in office. The Eisenhower administration accepted the British government’s decision to overthrow Jagan’s government. The British and the Americans subsequently launched a campaign to destroy the People’s Progressive Party.

From 1953 to 1957 British Guiana was run by an interim government. In 1955 there was a split in the PPP and Burnham formed his own political party the People’s National Congress (PNC) in 1957. The colony’s politics was now racially divided: the majority of East Indians supported Dr. Jagan, a hero for the poor Indians, the sugar workers and rice farmers and the majority of Afro-Guyanese supported Burnham and so did the black trade unionists. According to Rabe (2005), colonial officers together with the British Trade Union Council (TUC) trained and financially supported black union leaders in British Guiana who opposed the PPP and this created the preconditions for racial confrontation in the country (51-52). While at first Forbes Burnham blamed the British for the racially divisive strategy of pitting blacks against East Indians, “by 1961 Burnham was issuing explicit racial appeals, warning blacks that Indians wanted to take their jobs and businesses” (Rabe 2005, 54). The British even found a way to jail Cheddi Jagan and later Janet Jagan by prohibiting political activities. In the 1957 elections, Jagan’s PPP party defeated Burnham’s PNC. The Jagans however exacerbated their situation by traveling to
Cuba to observe the Revolution in 1960, meeting with Cuban leaders, and looking for markets for the poor Indians to sell their rice (Rabe 2005, 70-71). This only confirmed the Americans’ fear that the Jagans were communists and Cheddi Jagan and British Guiana was then equated with Fidel Castro and Cuba.

After the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba, President Kennedy made British Guiana a foreign policy priority and his administration ordered CIA activities to “forestall a Communist takeover” in British Guiana (Rabe 2005, 82-83). With anti-Communist hysteria flying high, the Kennedy administration sought British support to remove Jagan and to delay British Guiana’s independence. According to Cary Fraser (2000), a meeting between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Foreign Secretary Earl of Home in 1962 set the stage for Anglo-American cooperation and Home accepted that “Britain must not leave behind another Castro situation in the hemisphere” (599). Both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations favored Forbes Burnham over Cheddi Jagan. As Rabe explained, Burnham had influential friends in the United States and the climate of the Civil Rights Movement led to black Americans, progressive Democrats and African American Democrats speaking on his behalf, in addition to which he had the support of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organization (AFL-CIO) (2005,115). Forbes Burnham was therefore in a strong position to negotiate American support:

Burnham asked the United States to bypass the government and provide economic assistance directly to the people. Burnham further asked for U.S. financial support and for weapons. The United States should also persuade the United Kingdom to establish an electoral system based on proportional representation. He threatened a civil war, with the PNC having “to fight to
defend itself,” if the new electoral system was not established. Burnham would eventually receive all he asked (Rabe 2005, 99-100).

The development of trade unions in British Guiana can be traced to 1919 when the British Guiana Labour Union (BGLU) registered as the first trade union. As Daly (1975) explained, the BGLU was a general union which catered mainly for the Negro workers but it also drew support from East Indian sugar estate workers (288). In the 1930s Guyana was no different to the rest of the British colonies with unemployment, low wages and economic hardships leading to labor unrest. It was during the 1930s that the trade union movement was consolidated. The Manpower Citizens’ Association (MPCA) which drew its strength from the sugarcane workers represented the first major attempt of organizing labor unions industrially and about twelve other small unions were registered during the 1930s (Daly 1975, 294). In the 1960s another trade union, the Guianese Agricultural Workers’ Union (GAWU) headed by Cheddi Jagan tried to get workers belonging to the MPCA to leave and to join the GAWU. In 1963 Jagan announced in a GAWU conference that he would push through a bill that would allow only two unions in British Guiana – the GAWU and the Guiana Public Service Workers’ Union, both controlled by the PPP party (Waters and Daniels 2005, 291). When the labor relations bill (which the PPP said was based on the Wagner Act of the United States) was introduced it caused uproar among the labor movements. The trade unions protested the bill as they feared they would be replaced with government-controlled unions and they voted for a general strike in 1963 (Waters and Daniels 2005, 293-295). In their article The World’s Longest General Strike: The AFL-CIO, the CIA, and British Guiana (2005), Waters and Daniels highlighted that U.S. labor
unions did not hide their hatred towards Jagan and the AFL-CIO funded the strike and the CIA funded the AFL-CIO’s funding of the strike (279). As the authors explained:

Shortly before launching the strike, Guianese labor leaders secretly met with AFL-CIO representatives. For the previous two years, the AFL-CIO was everywhere in British Guiana, with trade unionists regularly flying in and out of the colony. The American Institute for Free Labor Development (AIFLD), the AFL-CIO’s Latin American arm…trained a higher percentage of Guianese unionists than from any other country or colony in the hemisphere. [The] AFL-CIO ultimately spent over $800,000 on food relief in British Guiana [during the strike]. US unions paid for a daily radio program and funded the union’s newspaper. [The] intervention was called “Operation Flypast”, and it was a joint effort by the CIA and the AFL-CIO, or as British Foreign Office official [called] them, “the AFL/CIA”. [Only] in 1999 did the CIA acknowledge that it had been the “executive agent of policy” and the “action arm of covert operations” in British Guiana (296-303).

The strike basically crippled the country and Jagan turned to Cuba and the Soviet Union for food and fuel which aggravated the Americans even further. As the economic situation deteriorated violence broke out between the blacks and East Indians. Waters and Daniels documented that violence “began in Georgetown, the capital and opposition stronghold, where lone East Indians were set upon and beaten by black gangs” (2005, 299). Via a series of political machinations, Burnham with British and U.S. support was able to manipulate the election process changing it from a first-past-the-post system to proportional representation which gave him the upper hand. In his visit to Washington in 1962 Burnham told the State Department that under proportional representation, a coalition between the PNC and the United Force (UF) (which represented middle class commercial groups) would win a majority (Fraser 2000, 603). Leading up to the 1964 elections, riots broke out, this time with both Indians and blacks perpetrating violence against each other.
Prime Minister Cheddi Jagan could not control the violence. The police force was a majority Afro-Guyanese force and they ignored government orders and Burnham’s threats such as “if it comes to a showdown, the East Indians must remember that we could do more killing than they could” only added fuel to the fire (Rabe 2005,126). Historian Vere T. Daly (1975) recorded that in 1964 “176 persons were killed, 920 injured, 1,400 homes destroyed by fire, and about 15,000 persons forced to move their houses from one district to another in order to settle in communities where people of their own ethnic group predominated” (306-307). These statistics were significant in a country with a population of just over 600,000 in 1964. The result was a racially partitioned nation heading towards independence.

The election under the new system of proportional representation took place in December of 1964. Cheddi Jagan and the PPP won 45.8 per cent of the votes and 24 seats, Burnham and the PNC 40.5 per cent of the votes and 24 seats, and the UF 12.4 per cent of the votes and 7 seats (Daly 1975, 307). According to Daly (1975), the Governor called upon Jagan to form a government with a coalition with the PNC but Burnham refused and so the Governor asked Burnham to form a government and he formed a coalition with the UF (307). Forbes Burnham led the country towards independence on 26 May, 1966 and became the first Prime Minister. When the colony gained independence from the British in 1966, its name changed to Guyana. The PPP led by Dr. Cheddi Jagan would only return to power in 1992 when the first democratic elections was held since independence.
II. The Cold War and the Caribbean’s Socialist Experiment (1970s and 1980s)

Case Study 3: Jamaica

Jamaica’s transition from colonialism to independence was smooth and untroubled. According to Lewis (2004), “Colonialism for Jamaicans, ended not in a bang but a whimper” (190). Norman Washington Manley and Sir Alexander Bustamante led the national movement which culminated in universal adult suffrage being granted to Jamaicans for the first time in 1944. While both parties in 1961 were divided on a West Indian Federation, both Manley and Bustamante joined together at the Independence conference in London in 1962 and led a common front on the terms of the Independence Constitution (Lewis 2004, 188). Both leaders successfully and peacefully led to nation to independence on 6th August, 1962. The Jamaica Labor Party (JLP) won the 1962 elections and Sir Alexander Bustamante became Jamaica’s first Prime Minister.

Jamaica was an important political achievement in the British West Indies compared to the other colonies. Trinidad and Tobago was not free from racial tensions leading up to independence, and Guyana’s permanent crisis started with the collapse of a united Indian-African political party. This would not mean however that Jamaica would be free from conflict. While the Trinidadian and Guyanese cases were marked by race, the Jamaican case would be defined by class. As Lewis described the Jamaican scenario, “much of the ill feeling between white, brown, and black takes on a class rather than race forms. By comparison with, say, Trinidadian society, it has been a rigidly stratified structure” (2004, 191-196).
The strategy of economic development adopted in the Caribbean was very much influenced by the Caribbean Economist Sir Arthur Lewis. While blessed with natural resources, these small countries did not have the capital nor technology to develop their industries. The “industrialization by invitation” strategy was adopted by Jamaica since the 1950s since elites recognized the need to attract foreign investment to develop their resources. The Industrial Development Corporation was established in 1952 in Jamaica to attract overseas investment, and laws guaranteeing the special status and rights of the foreign investor were passed (Manley 1982, 33). Jamaica’s economy became highly dependent on foreign capital. Foreign interests owned:

100 per cent of the bauxite and alumina industry, more than half of the sugar industry and much more than half of the tourist industry…In spite of a well established two-party democratic system, the society was still firmly elitist and those elements of the economy which were in local hands were controlled by a tight oligarchy (Manley 1982, 40).

The PNP and Michael Manley

The People’s National Party (PNP) was formed by the Rhodes Scholar, WWI veteran and successful lawyer Norman Washington Manley. The PNP was a socialist organization and also a member of the Socialist International. While N.W. Manley was building a nation, his wife Edna Swithinbank Manley was at the same time carving a society out of art. Edna Manley, a sculptor, was considered the “mother of Jamaican art”. Norman and Edna had two sons Douglas and Michael. Michael Manley studied Economics at the London School of Economics and worked as a journalist and trade union negotiator on his return to
Jamaica. When N.W. Manley retired as leader of the PNP in 1969, his son Michael Manley was elected leader of the party. Affectionately known as “Joshua”, the charismatic Michael Manley won both the 1972 and 1976 general elections becoming Jamaica’s fourth Prime Minister. As described by Godfrey Smith (2016) *Michael Manley: The Biography*, “[Joshua] had successfully built a grand coalition of classes that included musicians, artists, intellectuals, Rastafarians, big capital, labour and the church. He was ready to lead Jamaica if that was the will of the people” (109). After losing the 1980 elections to the capitalist leaning JLP party led by Edward Seaga, Manley would return after nine years a changed man in terms of ideology, and would serve Jamaica for the third time as Prime Minister in 1989. Under his leadership during the 1970s, the PNP adopted a democratic socialist ideology and development model in 1974. His philosophical beliefs as Prime Minister were informed by his parents and he fought to break the class divisions and the structures in Jamaica which led to poverty and inequality. According to Smith (2016),

> A privileged upbringing by liberal parents and a broad exposure to music, art and theatre steered him away from any kind of narrow, Manichean outlook. His omnivorous, eclectic mind rejected the notion that he should become an ideological prisoner of any of the contending ‘isms’, except egalitarianism which he declared was the only imperative in his life (3).

Michael Manley outlined his vision of democratic socialism in his book *Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery* (1982). He was the only Caribbean leader comparable to Dr. Eric Williams in terms of publications. While Dr. Williams became an established scholar and wrote most of his work before politics, Manley wrote his books during his political career. The PNP sought a development path somewhere between the Puerto Rican and Cuban models, a “third path, a Jamaican way…capable of providing an economic base to our political independence and capable of some measure of social justice for the people” (38).
The strategy was committed to an economy more independent of foreign control, an egalitarian and democratic society and a move towards rediscovering Jamaica’s African heritage (39). While their plan was to increase state activity, there was a commitment to the preservation of a strong private sector (43). On the domestic front, some of his initiatives included: regaining control of the bauxite and alumina industry, offering free education for Jamaican citizens, affordable housing, paid maternity leave for women, and legal recognition for children born out of wedlock. On the international front, he pursued an aggressive foreign policy making Jamaica a leader for the Third World, developed strong and friendly relations with Cuba, supported and sympathized with independence struggles in Africa, and pioneered the New International Economic Order. His domestic and foreign initiatives however caused alarm for Jamaicans on the right during his first two terms in office. The Manleys were “as close to aristocracy as Jamaica could get” and so his socialist policies “struck fear in the capitalist heart of the middle class, which felt that one of their own had sold them out” (Smith 2016, 4).

Bauxite and Alumina Industry

The PNP government took several initiatives to gain some control and increase government revenues from the bauxite industry. These included negotiating with the North American multinationals for majority ownership; implementing a bauxite levy; and establishing an OPEC-type International Bauxite Association. The PNP government announced that it would:

…introduce a ‘new formula for revenue’ and reacquire all the lands now owned by the bauxite and alumina companies so that ‘control of the surface rights’ would pass from the companies to national hands. The Jamaica government would reacquire control of the bauxite ore and negotiate its
participation in the ownership of bauxite and alumina operations in Jamaica. Legislation would be introduced for the imposition of a production levy on bauxite with effect from January 1, 1974 (Smith 2016, 148).

The bauxite levy tied the level of local taxation to the actual market price of aluminum instead of calculating the tax based on a rate negotiated between the government and the companies. Manley ensured that he exercised careful diplomacy with the governments of Canada and the United States and the aluminum multinationals, assuring them that there would be no nationalization of the companies. He briefed Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, Henry Kissinger and the CEOs of the multinationals on his plans. His administration assured the American media that it was not a “communist-style takeover” (Smith 2016, 148). The aluminum multinationals reacted to the levy by going to the World Bank’s International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The dispute proceedings were eventually withdrawn by the firms in 1977. The International Bauxite Association was formed in Guinea in 1973 and formally came into existence in 1975 with headquarters in Jamaica. The multinationals agreed to sell 51 percent of their mining assets and lands to the Jamaican government. Perhaps it was a combination of the companies’ reliance on Jamaican bauxite and Manley’s careful diplomacy which did not lead to an official condemnation by the US government. There was however reaction by the companies which hurt the Jamaican economy. According to Payne (1988), the companies cut back their production which undermined government revenues, increased bauxite imports from Guinea while decreasing imports from Jamaica, increased the number of strikes such as an 81-day strike at Alcoa and 35-day strike at Alcan, and the companies conducted a US media campaign blaming the Manley government for the rising cost of
aluminum (53-54). All of these tactics led to significant decreases in bauxite production and government revenues.

Cuba and Angola

On December 8, 1972, the leaders of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, Guyana and Barbados simultaneously announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba. On 12 March, 1975, Jamaica established diplomatic relations with the USSR. Michael Manley developed close relations with Fidel Castro. Manley and Guyana’s Forbes Burnham flew with Fidel on his plane to a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) meeting in Algiers, Algeria in 1973. The plane ride led to much consternation in Jamaica from the right leaning opposition. In addition, several projects were carried out in Jamaica with Cuban technical assistance such as the building of dams. The PNP was committed to Third World solidarity and Manley saw foreign policy as an integral component of Jamaica’s economic development. He explained Jamaica’s foreign policy and in particular, Jamaica’s position regarding Cuba and Africa as follows:

Whilst making it clear that we were not part of any anti-US hate campaign, indeed that we wished to remain friendly, we placed ourselves firmly in the camp of the non-aligned and for the first time began to hammer out a foreign policy for the periphery. Our understanding of our own situation led us to the conclusion that ethics and self-interest combined to demand our support for the liberation movements of Southern Africa. Our strong opposition to any infringement upon the sovereignty of a small nation and its rights was to lead us to the most controversial single aspect of our foreign policy. This was our friendship with and consistent defense of Cuba. Many have thought that our Cuba policy was a quixotic mistake. Others interpreted it as implying secret communist purposes. Still others believed that I fell under the spell of Fidel Castro; that Jamaica became Moscow’s cat’s-paw through its relationship with Cuba. All of this, without exception, is poppycock (Manley 1982, 59-69).
Angola’s liberation struggle to gain independence from Portugal (1961-1974) attracted the attention of several foreign actors during the Cold War: Soviet Union, Cuba, United States, South Africa, and Rhodesia (Zimbabwe). The USSR and Cuba supported the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). The Soviets increased their aid to the MPLA and Cuba supplied soldiers and advisors. Under Nixon and Kissinger, the United States relaxed punitive measures against the white minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia, eased the arms embargo on South Africa and broke a United Nations boycott of Rhodesia (Combs 2012, 327). Nixon and subsequently Ford unwilling to trust third-world nationalism and Soviet influence decided to oppose the MPLA faction which was receiving support from the USSR and Cuba and support two other factions of the Angola guerillas with covert aid – the Front for National Liberation (FMNL) which was backed by China and the UNITA party which was backed by China and South Africa (Combs 2012, 327).

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger while holidaying in Jamaica requested a meeting with Prime Minister Manley. Kissinger was not happy about Cuban troops in Angola and asked Jamaica not to vote in favor of the Cuban intervention at the United Nations General Assembly. Smith (2016) explained that Kissinger made it clear that “US-Jamaica relations could accommodate an abstention but a vote in support of Cuba’s action would not be viewed with favor” (174). Kissinger also went on to mention he was aware of Jamaica’s US$100 million loan application with the State Department. Michael Manley viewed the UN vote as being tied to the loan (Smith 2016, 175). Manley advised Kissinger that he would inform the United States of its decision and in 1976 Jamaica decided to vote in favor
of Cuba. The loan subsequently did not materialize. While the issue for the West was Communism, for the Third World it was Apartheid. Smith (2016) documented that for Prime Minister Manley that was one of his most difficult decisions to back Fidel Castro in Angola, “a decision for which he was ‘punished for years’ but which he did not regret” (2016, 177).

**Destabilization**

After Manley’s meeting with Kissinger, a series of events between 1976 and 1980 led him to conclude that the CIA was trying to destabilize Jamaica. According to Smith (2016), in January of 1976 Manley had informed Kissinger of his plans to vote in Cuba’s favor and by February of 1976 CIA operatives doubled in Kingston and simultaneously vicious articles about Jamaica were written by James Reston (who had a close relationship with Kissinger) for the *New York Times* (179). Destabilization according to Manley “describes a situation where some source either inside or outside a country – or perhaps two sources working in concert, one outside and one inside – set out to create a situation of instability and panic by design” (1982, 138). These events included “unprecedented levels of violence, terrorism, organized public protest and a propaganda campaign locally and overseas” (Manley 1982, 223).

How much of Jamaica’s instability was attributed to U.S. meddling is still debatable. US officials have denied the charge and to my knowledge the U.S. government has not published any information on funds used for covert action in Jamaica. Compared to the case of British Guiana, U.S. intervention to destabilize the Cheddi Jagan government was
publicly acknowledged. It was not unreasonable, however, for Prime Minister Manley to
draw parallels based on U.S. action in Chile during the 1960s and 1970s. Salvador Allende
had committed himself to making Chile a socialist state and the United States had
committed itself to preventing Soviet influence in the Americas. With Lyndon Johnson’s
approval, the CIA channeled $3 million to Allende’s rival Eduardo Frei in the 1964
elections and when that didn’t work Nixon was willing to spend up to $10 million to ensure
that Allende did not gain power (Combs 2012, 325). The CIA spent nearly $4 million
backing Chile’s opposition parties and $1.5 million in support of El Mercurio, its
propaganda machine (Manley 1982, 225). On September 11, 1973, the Chilean military
overthrew Allende and General Augusto Pinochet assumed power in 1974. Allende was
either killed or committed suicide and General Pinochet ruled as a bloody dictator thanks
to a CIA-backed military coup.

Political violence and gang warfare began in Jamaica in the 1960s between supporters of
the PNP and JLP, and politicians of both parties sponsored the warfare as they fought for
control of the ghetto areas (Payne 1988, 21). But by 1976 violence had reached terrifying
levels in Jamaica. Rex Nettleford (2006) described the murder rate leading up to the 1980s
as “unprecedented” and Jamaica’s violence and crime “earned it a reputation as something
of a killing field” (216). Payne (1988) addressed the destabilization question in Jamaica
and concluded that a destabilization campaign was waged against the Manley government.
He stated, “A ‘smoking gun’ was never found, but the weight of the evidence makes it
likely that the CIA was at work, in league with the JLP, the Daily Gleaner, and opposition
businessmen and trade unionists, to undermine the elected government in Jamaica” (1988,
An ex-CIA agent Philip Agee who had worked in Latin America for twelve years and was in Jamaica in 1976, named eleven US embassy personnel working for the CIA. He also identified all the typical methods of CIA destabilization being deployed in Jamaica (Payne 1988, 55). One of those tactics included CIA inspired articles in the American press to destroy the reputation of the country, many times reporting inaccuracies and distortions. During 1976, a series of negative and distorted articles about Jamaica appeared in Christian Science Monitor, the Washington Post, Time and Newsweek (Payne 1988, 56). Regarding the destabilization charge, Manley (1982) concluded:

Looking back at the events of 1976, I have no doubt that the CIA was active in Jamaica that year and was working through its own agents to destabilize us. They deny it to this day, but I prefer the judgements of the heads of the Jamaica security forces at the time. Police, army and special branch concurred that the CIA was actively behind the events. My commonsense left me with no option but to agree (140).

Towards Neoliberalism

During the 1970s and early 1980s developing countries including Jamaica faced three international shocks: an increase in the price of oil; a decline in their terms of trade; and interest rate increase on foreign debt. Facing budget and current account deficits, governments relied heavily on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Financial assistance was linked to the implementation of neoliberal reforms or structural adjustment programs. In the 1970s Jamaica experienced an increase in the price of oil, a decline in the price of sugar, a decline in bauxite and alumina production, and a significant decrease in tourist arrivals from the United States. According to Smith (2016), the violence and negative portrayal of Jamaica in US media made many hoteliers leave taking with them large amounts capital and the government was forced to take over
a number of hotels (210). Under the Manley administration Jamaica’s national debt increased, inflation was high, foreign reserves declined and a significant chunk of the middle class left for North America. Statistics according to Patrick E. Bryan (2009) indicated that between 1972 and 1980, 125,350 Jamaicans left for the United States and 55,000 left for Canada, many being businessmen who took their capital with them (197). The economic downtown, balance of payments deficits and the loss of domestic and foreign capital led the PNP to turn to the IMF.

A collapsing economy, increasing criminality, continued migration, capital flight and communist hysteria paved the way for Edward Seaga, leader of the opposition. Seaga made the distinction between Manley’s democratic socialism and the JLP’s capitalist model. The JLP positioned itself as a pro-US and anti-Communist party. Edward Seaga won the 1980 elections and served as Jamaica’s fifth Prime Minister until 1989. United States relations with Jamaica improved as Seaga was genuinely anti-Communist and committed to the market economy. He asked Cuba to withdraw their Ambassador in 1980 understanding that the United States viewed the Caribbean in Cold War terms (Bryan 2009, 216). According to Patrick E. Bryan (2009),

Seaga was able to manipulate Reagan’s Cold War geopolitical concerns to maximize US aid to trade with and investment in Jamaica. He had so impressed Ronald Reagan with his Cold War rhetoric that Seaga was the first head of government to be received by the United States president following the latter’s inauguration in January 1981. Seaga and Reagan agreed that every effort should be made to forestall the development of any further socialist states in the Caribbean (215-216).
During Seaga’s administration, USAID doubled its funding to Jamaica between 1980-81 and by 1982 Jamaica was the largest per capita recipient of World Bank loans (Bryan 2009, 219). Jamaica also cooperated with the United States in fighting the drug trade. The implementation of IMF and World Bank’s neoliberal policies did not improve Jamaica’s economic situation. The tourism industry however did recover during these years replacing the bauxite industry as the most important earner of foreign exchange (Henke 2000, 75). However, the “JLP’s policies of devaluation and demand reduction, through wage restrictions and fiscal cutbacks, brought to Jamaica the familiar pattern of social hardships experienced by scores of countries under IMF and World Bank supervision” (Henke 2000, 77).

So, beginning in 1980 Jamaica’s socialist experiment ended and the era of neoliberalism was ushered in. Michael Manley would win the 1989 elections and would adopt a very different ideology after nine years of reflection. He had put in considerable effort to improve relations with the United States and the U.S. press began writing favorably about him. According to Smith (2016), the Chicago Tribune in 1984 wrote a piece entitled ‘US to Greet Former Opponent’ and an analyst for the Heritage Foundation said that Manley had “moderated considerably since he was Prime Minister” (323). The U.S. government was willing to do business with a de-radicalized Manley. After he won the election in 1989, he traveled to Washington to meet President Bush, indicated that his economic strategy would be similar to Seaga’s and stated that his government wanted “the best possible relations with the US” (Smith 2016, 339).
Concluding Remarks

The 1950s and 1960s are emblematic of the transfer of imperial power from Britain to the United States as the British began its imperial disengagement with its West Indian colonies. The Anglo-American rapprochement which began in 1895 with the British Guiana-Venezuela boundary dispute continued well into the decolonization era. In the two cases presented, the British did not let American pressure force them into meddling in the political processes in Trinidad and Tobago, and so the twin-island state was able to peacefully transition to independence as a united rather than divided nation. In the case of Guyana, Britain co-operated and collaborated with the Americans by funding a strike to bring down the Cheddi Jagan government and aided and abetted Burnham’s political manipulations of the electoral process. Had it not been for the interventions of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, Forbes Burnham would not have led his nation to independence and the Guyanese people would not have been the victims of political violence. For Britain, Cold War demands and keeping an amicable relationship with the United States trumped a democratic and peaceful decolonization process in British Guiana.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the United States continued to view the region in geopolitical terms and policies towards Caribbean countries were determined by the Caribbean’s relationship with Fidel Castro and Cuba. Michael Manley’s democratic socialist experiment and his friendship with Cuba led to Communist hysteria both within Jamaica and in the United States. The Jamaican government was convinced that the United States did launch a destabilization campaign in 1976 and Michael Manley even kept a “Destabilization Diary” of events which he believed were linked to efforts to undermine his government. The
United States also did not hesitate to launch a military intervention in Grenada 1983, although some Caribbean leaders did call on the United States to intervene, and so it was not viewed as a unilateral intervention.

It is ironic that both Dr. Cheddi Jagan and Michael Manley died on the same day, 6th March 1997, two Caribbean leaders who loved their tiny nations and searched for ways to liberate their people from poverty and inequality through socialist experiments. They both experienced the overwhelming power of the United States, Jagan more so than Manley, as both Davids faced Goliath in their struggles to govern their nations. Dr. Eric Williams was able to win a small battle by regaining control of the Chaguaramas base but he was not a Communist and his party was not by any means socialist, it made all the difference in Britain’s non-interference in Trinidad’s politics. British Guiana and Cheddi Jagan suffered the most from American interference as Jagan tried to be Communist and American ally one and at the same time. Michael Manley learned his lesson after he lost the 1980 election, changed his ideology and approach to the United States. Unlike Cheddi Jagan, Michael Manley was not an “ideological prisoner”. These three cases, Trinidad and Tobago, British Guiana and Jamaica all illustrate that while small, the United States did pay attention to the Caribbean countries during post-WWII era until the end of the Cold War. While U.S. interest was principally in the area of security and preventing Soviet influence in the region, U.S. multinationals and their investments in the bauxite and alumina industries in particular also kept North America engaged in the Anglophone Caribbean.
CHAPTER 4

The United States and the Caribbean: From 1990s to 2000s

With the ending of the Cold War, the threat of rival extra-hemispheric states like the Soviet Union no longer occupied America’s security agenda. The 1990s witnessed a shift to transnational issues like international drug trafficking and illegal immigration. As Andreas and Nadelmann in *Policing the Globe* (2006) pointed out, the “quest for new agendas and objectives to fill the vacuum left by the disintegration of the Soviet Union” resulted in “drug trafficking, traditionally a criminal justice matter [being] formally elevated to the national security directive” (236). The end of the Cold War led to a paradigm shift in the national security agenda and was formalized “in 1995 [when] President Clinton issued Presidential Decision Directive 42, which officially defined transnational crime as a national security threat” (158). As the authors highlighted, drug enforcement and criminal justice objectives replaced anticommunism as “the principal moral imperative of U.S. foreign policy” (157). It was also a period of “geo-economics” where increased attention to economic concerns like free trade and regional integration became foreign policy priorities for the United States (Smith, 2013). Scholars in the field of international relations, international political economy and criminal justice began to bridge the gap in the literature on international crime control and the impact of transnational actors on global politics. For example, Susan Strange (1996) in *The Retreat of the State* began to address the question of how transnational organized crime posed a threat to state power in the 1990s and beyond. Moises Naim (2006) in *Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers and Copycats are*
*Hijacking the Global Economy* addressed the issue of how illicit commerce was changing the world by transforming economies, reshaping politics, and capturing governments.

By the 1990s, the Anglophone Caribbean states ended their flirtations with socialism and followed the neoliberal model of structural adjustment, privatization and trade liberalization. As Bryan (1997) pointed out, the English-speaking Caribbean was doing everything right and these countries in particular were “exemplary in their practice of democracy and political stability” (101). Globalization however posed both a challenge and an opportunity for the Caribbean, as these small and vulnerable economies struggled to compete internationally, and drug trafficking and its accompanying corruption and criminality posed a threat to the stability of the region. The impact of the end of the Cold War on U.S.–Caribbean relations was also addressed by several academics and policymakers. The literature on this topic echoed one theme – the United States abandoned and neglected its hemispheric neighbors in the post-Cold War era. Robert A. Pastor (2001) described this historical fluctuation of attention as a “whirlpool” where the United States is sucked into a crisis in the Caribbean Basin and as soon as the crisis is over resources shift away from the region only to be pulled back again with the next crisis.

The tragic events of September 11, 2001 led to a return of geopolitics with international terrorism rising to the top of United States security agenda. Resources were directed to more strategic areas in Central and South Asia, and the Middle East. In the post-9/11 era the prevailing sentiment among scholars regarding United States relationship with the Caribbean did not change from the post-Cold War period – the region was neglected and
abandoned, now even more so since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Beruff and Cordero (2005) have noted that “The Caribbean has clearly been bumped farther down the U.S. national security agenda as the new antiterrorism campaign has been superimposed on the antidrug campaign that previously prevailed in the region” (305). According to Peter H. Smith (2013),

One of the most conspicuous features of U.S. diplomacy toward Latin America during the post-9/11 era was inattention. Initially a champion of inter-American harmony, George W. Bush turned his back on the region once the war on terror was begun. Latin America was simply not important – or dangerous – enough to attract the interest of the White House (289).

Richard Bernal (2013) has argued that the English-Speaking Caribbean has been unimportant to the United States simply by counting how many times the Caribbean was mentioned by Presidents and Secretaries of State rather than examining policies and data. These pessimistic accounts however do not reflect actual changes in U.S. foreign policy towards the Caribbean region in the twenty-first century. These small countries did not receive as much attention nor assistance compared to other regions which are of greater geostrategic importance to the United States. Neither is it realistically expected that the United States would pay as much attention to its small neighbors as it would to a region such as the Middle East. The Caribbean however has re-gained some level of visibility and reappeared on the radar of U.S. policymakers over the last fifteen years. Initial data has revealed that at least in the areas of security and energy during the period (2001-2016), the United States has been paying attention and America’s “backyard” is no longer completely abandoned. This research seeks to answer the question why the United States has renewed its attention to the Caribbean and to fill the gap in the current literature on
U.S.-Caribbean relations in the twenty-first century. While the past relationship between the United States and the Caribbean was accurately depicted as “benign neglect” during the 1990s, the current narrative is overblown for the twenty-first century.

This chapter will review the literature on the two main foreign policy priorities of the United States during the 1990s - drug trafficking and trade policy, and it will discuss how the Caribbean was incorporated into America’s foreign policy agenda. It will examine America’s neglect after the Cold War and how U.S. policy towards the Caribbean has been moving towards strategic engagement.

1. Drug Trafficking

International drug control can best be understood from realist theoretical lens. The United States with its overwhelming power and influence has shaped the international agenda and was able to “coerce and co-opt others” in following U.S. interests and priorities (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, 9). No other country has dedicated so much diplomatic and financial resources to pursuing its international crime control agenda (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, 106). Foreign governments have signed multilateral treaties, bilateral treaties and even changed their domestic laws to meet U.S. demands. Treaties designed for narcotics control have been accompanied by efforts to criminalize financial activities related to drug trafficking (money laundering) and to control chemicals used to process narcotic drugs (precursor chemical control). All these initiatives have been U.S.-driven. Andreas and Nadelmann have described the phenomenon as the “Americanization” of criminal justice
systems in countries across the world with “less powerful and especially less developed
countries [playing] a more secondary and reactive role” (2006, 10). According to Bagley
and Tokatlian (2007), U.S. led supply-side strategies:

flowed directly from the core assumptions and internal logic of “realist”
alyses of the international system – and of the U.S. role within it. From
this perspective, the United States not only had the right, but also the duty,
to use its dominant leadership position and superior power capabilities to
persuade or compel subordinate states to cooperate on issues such as the
war on drugs (221-222).

Bruce Bagley in his article Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major
Trends in the Twenty-First Century further underscored the importance of power and the
dominant role of the United States in the development of regional and international drug
control policies:

Reflecting the hegemonic influence of the United States over international
drug policy during the post-World War II period, the United Nations (UN)
Office on Drugs and Crime and the Organization of American States (OAS)
have both faithfully reproduced the U.S. prohibitionist regime at the
multilateral level. In practice, the UN-OAS-U.S. unwavering prohibitionist
strategy long dominated international discourse on drug control and
prevented individual countries from experimenting with alternative
approaches, or forced them to ignore or defy their UN treaty obligations
regarding narcotics control (2012, 12-13).

Historical Development of International Drug Control

The development of an international drug control regime began way before the Cold War
and can be traced as far back as 1906. As documented by David Musto (1999) in The
American Disease: Origins of Narcotics Control, when America acquired the Philippines
she also inherited an opium problem and Bishop Brent’s “contact with the Philippine opium
problem made [him] an international leader in the anti-opium movement” (25-26). The
State Department subsequently appointed Dr. Hamilton Wright to take charge of a meeting
to be scheduled in Shanghai in 1909 which became known as the Shanghai Opium Commission. Given that the meeting in Shanghai was a commission and not a conference, Wright pushed for the International Conference on Opium which was held in 1911 at The Hague. The Hague Convention was signed by twelve countries in 1912 and each signatory was required to enact domestic legislation controlling narcotic drugs (Chawla 2004, 230). The Convention however “placed the major burden of narcotic control on domestic legislation, and the apparent failure of this approach led in ten years to the Geneva Opium Conference, which shifted the locus of control to international restraints” (Musto 1999, 52).

The Harrison bill was passed and signed by the President in 1914 and the Harrison Act became effective in 1915. This according to Musto allowed the United States to redeem its international pledges with a federal law bringing some control to the traffic in opiates and cocaine (1999, 61). In the 1920s, America again tried to regain international leadership in narcotic control with Republican representative Stephen G. Porter taking charge of narcotic matters. According to Musto, “Porter became obsessed with the idea that the production of raw opium and coca leaves must be controlled before any other aspect of narcotic traffic was undertaken” (1999, 197-198). He then worked towards establishing a separate agency “to enforce the Harrison Act and represent the nation in foreign conferences” (Musto 1999, 206). The Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) was created in 1930 and the agency was presided over by the famous “drug czar” Harry J. Anslinger from 1930-62. According to Andreas and Nadelmann, “Anslinger began his tenure by stressing the international dimension of the narcotics traffic. He became a leading figure in the
international conferences and agencies concerned with narcotics, as well as the leading U.S. diplomat on drug control issues” (2006, 124).

The term “war on drugs” was coined by President Richard Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign and subsequently the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was created in 1973 under his administration (Isacson 2005, 19). Andreas and Nadelmann further explained that “Having declared a war on drugs, the Nixon administration focused substantial attention and resources on the foreign sources of heroin, cocaine, and most of the marijuana consumed in the United States” (2006, 127). The U.S. war on drugs continued under the Reagan administration with the President signing into law the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 which according to Bagley represented “the most comprehensive effort in modern history to lower domestic demand for illegal drugs and to reduce the flow of narcotics from the Third World into the United States” (1988, 164).

Current Multilateral Drug Control System

The modern multilateral system has evolved since 1961 with the scope of coverage widening over time as more layers are added to the area of drug control. There are three main United Nations International Drug Control Conventions each building on each other:

a) Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol;

b) Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971; and

a) **Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961 as amended by the 1972 Protocol**

The Preamble to the 1961 Single Convention reflects both constructivist and liberal ideas respectively, with drugs being constructed as socially evil requiring mutually beneficial international co-operation among states to control its supply:

*Recognizing* that addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a *serious evil* for the individual and is fraught with social and economic danger to mankind,

*Understanding* that such universal action calls for *international co-operation* guided by the same principles and aimed at common objectives,

*Desiring* to conclude a generally acceptable *international convention* replacing existing treaties on narcotic drugs, limiting such drugs to medical and scientific use, and providing for continuous international co-operation and control for the achievement of such aims and objectives.

As stated in Article 44 *Termination of previous international treaties*, the provisions of the Convention are to terminate and replace provisions of previous treaties including *inter alia*:

- the 1912 Hague International Opium Convention;
- the 1925 Geneva International Opium Convention;
- the 1931 Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking in the Far East etc.

The Commission on Narcotic Drugs of the Economic and Social Council and the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB) were the main organs entrusted with the responsibility of international drug control (Article 5). Some of the *supply-side mechanisms* in the 1961 Convention included articles specifically dealing with controls in the cultivation and production of opium, poppy straw, coca bush, coca leaves and cannabis.
The substances under control however in the treaty are not limited to these. Article 2 specifies that drugs listed in Schedules I and II are subject to measures of control.

b) Convention on Psychotropic Substances of 1971

The 1971 Convention extends control from narcotic drugs and its raw materials to psychotropic substances. This treaty however is mainly concerned with global health and finding a balance between medical use and substance abuse. The Preamble to the Convention outlines these objectives:

Being concerned with the health and welfare of mankind,

Noting with concern the public health and social problems resulting from the abuse of certain psychotropic substances,

Considering that rigorous measures are necessary to restrict the use of such substances to legitimate purposes,

Believing that effective measures against abuse of such substances require coordination and universal action.

According to Article 2 Scope of control of substances paragraph 4, The World Health Organization (WHO) is charged with the responsibility of determining whether “there is sufficient evidence that the substance is being or is likely to be abused so as to constitute a public health and social problem warranting the placing of the substances under international control.” The Convention also calls for research on amphetamine drugs.

c) United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988
The main purpose of the 1988 Convention is to address illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances with an international dimension, calling for international co-operation and viewing the problem in its entirety. This treaty introduced precursor chemical control and also aspects of money laundering. The Preamble stated clearly:

*Recognizing* the links between illicit traffic and other related organized criminal activities which undermine the legitimate economies and threaten the stability, security and sovereignty of States,

*Aware* that illicit traffic generates large financial profits and wealth enabling transnational criminal organizations to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, legitimate commerce and financial business, and society at all its levels,

*Considering* that measures are necessary to monitor certain substances, including precursors, chemicals and solvents, which are used in the manufacture of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, the ready availability of which has led to an increase in the clandestine manufacture of such drugs and substances,

*Desiring* to conclude a comprehensive, effective and operative international convention that is directed specifically against illicit traffic and that considers the various aspects of the problem as a whole, in particular those aspects not envisaged in the existing treaties in the field of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances.

*The Caribbean and the “War on Drugs”*

Given its geographic location, the Caribbean countries are transit centers for cocaine originating from the Andean region (Colombia, Peru, Bolivia) heading towards the United
States or Europe. Ivelaw Griffith (1998) has used the term “geonarcotics” to describe the drug trafficking phenomenon in the Caribbean. The term captures the dynamics of four factors – drugs, geography, power and politics, with geography being the most important. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Medellin and Cali cartels used the Caribbean as a smuggling route to the United States. In the 1980s, due to the U.S. government’s South Florida Task Force headed by then Vice President George H.W. Bush, American law enforcement and military operations were able to shut down the Caribbean route (Bagley 2012, 6). U.S. efforts however were not successful in permanently stopping trafficking in the Caribbean. Drug consumption, drug-related crime and violence, corruption and arms trafficking have all accompanied the passage of illegal drugs through the region in the 1990s and into the twenty-first century. At a 1995 CARICOM Summit, drug trafficking was identified by regional leaders as the main security threat facing the Caribbean (Beruff and Cordero 2005, 311).

As shown in Table 2, the English-speaking Caribbean countries have made international commitments regarding narcotics and crime control. On a multilateral level, the four countries in this study (The Bahamas, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago) have all ratified the 1961 United Nations Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs. To date, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana have already ratified the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances while The Bahamas and Jamaica have only acceded. The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have all ratified the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances while Guyana has only acceded to the Convention. The 2000 UN Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime has been ratified by The Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago while the 2005 UN Convention Against Corruption has only been ratified by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago.

The Anglophone Caribbean countries have also cooperated bilaterally with the United States in its counter-narcotics efforts. According to Bagley, Latin American and Caribbean countries do not have much of a choice as those which do not “fully cooperate” with the “war on drugs” are sanctioned by the United States via its “certification” process (2012, 13). If countries do not fulfill their international treaty obligations and do not adhere to U.S. counter-narcotics measures they will be placed on a list and punished via the withdrawal of foreign assistance. According to the State Department’s website⁵:

The Narcotics Certification Process was ended as a result of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, 2002-2003, signed into law on September 30, 2002. Henceforth, the President must submit a consolidated report identifying all major illicit drug producing and drug-transit countries (the Majors list) and designating those countries that have "failed demonstrably" during the previous 12 months to make substantial efforts to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the counternarcotics measures specified in U.S. law. If a country is determined to have “failed demonstrably” and is absent a Presidential waiver, foreign assistance other than humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance is suspended and the United States is required to vote against funding by six multilateral development banks to that country.

As shown in Table 2, during the 1990s, Caribbean states signed maritime and air counter-narcotics bilateral agreements with the United States. These “Ship Rider” agreements allow U.S. vessels to engage in search and seizure activities provided Caribbean officials are on board. Anthony Bryan (1997) pointed out that while Caribbean leaders do not

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⁵ https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/rpt/c11766.htm
dispute the urgency of controlling trafficking in illegal drugs, they do resent U.S. pressure and the manner in which the United States goes about its drug war, being obsessed with narcotics control and having little regard for other serious economic concerns of the Caribbean. Trinidad and Tobago and The Bahamas signed these agreements in 1996 and Jamaica in 1998. Guyana signed an agreement in 2001. These agreements are part and parcel of the international drug control regime as it builds on the 1988 UN Convention. This is clearly stated in the Preamble of the Agreement Concerning Co-operation in Suppressing Illicit Maritime and Air Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances in the Caribbean Area:

Bearing in mind the complex nature of the problem of illicit maritime drug traffic in the Caribbean area;

Desiring to increase their co-operation to the fullest extent in the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances by sea in accordance with international law of the sea, respecting freedom of navigation and overflight;

Recognising that the Parties to this Agreement are also Parties to the 1988 United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter, "the 1988 Convention");

Having regard to the urgent need for international co-operation in suppressing illicit traffic by sea, which is recognised in the 1988 Convention;

Recalling that the 1988 Convention requires Parties to consider entering into bilateral or regional agreements or arrangements to carry out, or enhance the effectiveness of the provisions of Article 17 of that Convention.

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Source: Department of State website: https://www.state.gov/s/l/2005/87198.htm
The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) has also expanded its presence abroad and throughout the Caribbean. The Caribbean Field Division\textsuperscript{7} headquarters is located in San Juan and has oversight over several countries including Guyana. There are seven DEA country offices in the Caribbean including in Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. The Miami Field Division has oversight over The Bahamas. Additionally, the United States signed Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) and Extradition Treaties with Caribbean countries in the 1990s. According to the State Department\textsuperscript{8}, MLATs “allow generally for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal and related matters [and in] money laundering cases, they can be extremely useful [to obtain] banking and other financial records”. Only Guyana among the four case studies has not signed a MLAT with the United States. MLATs with Jamaica, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago entered into force in 1989, 1990, and 1999 respectively. Extradition Treaties with the United States entered into force with Jamaica, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago in 1991, 1994 and 1999 respectively. The 1931 Guyana-U.K.-U.S. Extradition Treaty is still in force.

The Caribbean has also complied with international efforts to counter money laundering and more recently to criminalize terrorist financing and financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Anglophone Caribbean states are members of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), a twenty-five-member

\textsuperscript{7} https://www.dea.gov/divisions/international/caribbean.shtml

\textsuperscript{8} Source: Department of State website: https://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/vol2/184110.htm
intergovernmental organization among Caribbean Basin countries⁹ which complies with the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) formed by the G-7 in 1989. The FATF “operates on the basis of informal agreements and mutual evaluation of members rather than binding multilateral treaties” (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, 51-53). Countries which do not implement the “40 recommendations” and the added “8 Special Recommendations” on terrorist financing are sanctioned and a “high profile campaign of naming and shaming noncooperative states” was formalized in 2000 (Andreas and Nadelmann 2006, 51-53). Caribbean countries have been working to implement and comply with the recommendations of the FATF to prevent money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

Table 2: Multilateral and Bilateral Treaties

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Treaties</th>
<th>The Bahamas</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>Trinidad &amp; Tobago</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Multilateral</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Bilateral with US</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs)</td>
<td>Entered into force 1990</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>Entered into force 1989</td>
<td>Entered into force 1999</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and State Department
2. *International Trade Policy*

Trade policy in the United States has historically been one of the most contentious political issues, even up until the 2016 presidential elections. The United States moved from an isolationist and protectionist policy towards an internationalist and free trade policy after World War II. Protectionist measures however have always been built into any trade agreement whether at the multilateral, bilateral or regional levels to ensure American economic interests are not harmed. Trade policy in the United States is also formulated taking into consideration broader security and political concerns. According to John M. Rothgeb (2001) in *U.S. Trade Policy: Balancing Economic Dreams and Political Realities*, the following factors have determined the development and implementation of U.S. trade policy over the years:

a) The strategic environment the United States confronts in the international arena;

b) The competitive environment the United States faces in the international arena;

c) The ideas policymakers and influential citizens have about role of trade policy;

d) The beliefs of special interest groups about how trade regulations affect them;

e) The institutional rivalries among elements of the U.S. government (3).

From an international relations theory perspective, realists would take a nationalist stance doubting whether international commerce and cooperation would limit conflicts, also viewing competition from foreign goods as a threat to American businesses and will therefore call for protectionist measures to limit foreign trade. Liberals would see free trade as a means to prevent conflict which would provide mutually beneficial gains if countries produced and exported those goods for which they had a comparative advantage.
By the 1990s, liberals were able to push ahead with a free trade agenda but were still limited by competing protectionist voices which curtailed the United States ability to pursue its goal of hemispheric free trade.

Cold War Trade

In the period after World War II (1948-1995), the United States promoted trade liberalization by participating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) rounds of negotiations to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers on goods and services. The GATT was a provisional agreement with Contracting Parties until the creation of an international organization - the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 when Contracting Parties became member states. From 1948 to 1994, trade liberalization via negotiating rounds were conducted under the auspices of the GATT. The original intention was to create an International Trade Organization (ITO) in 1948 to accompany the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) to handle the trade side of the post-war international economic order. While the United States exercised leadership, and was one of the driving forces behind the creation of the ITO, it failed because the United States did not seek ratification from Congress of the ITO Charter which was negotiated in Havana in 1948. Some of the explanations for the withdrawal of the ITO Charter from United States Congress included: membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) taking precedence, business leaders viewing the Charter as flawed, Republicans hostile towards an initiative spearheaded by Democrats, and the Korean War (Rothgeb 2001, 76-77). The withdrawal of U.S. support resulted in the delay for decades of the establishment of an international organization, the WTO.
During the Cold War years, liberals were able to use national security objectives and anticommunist justifications to push for a free trade agenda. They argued that trade among non-communist countries would promote economic security in a Western-led economic order. According to Rothgeb, “Congress passed legislation giving the president the authority to restrict trade in order to prevent communist countries from importing strategically important goods from the West” (2001, 83). In the 1970s during the Tokyo Round of negotiations, developed countries provided developing countries “Special and Differential Treatment” with provisions in the GATT agreements which allowed more favorable treatment to developing countries, in other words, a derogation from the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of non-discrimination. The legal basis for preferential trade arrangements for developing countries was provided by the “Decision on Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries” better known as the “Enabling Clause” which was adopted in 1979 under the GATT. The Enabling Clause provided the legal basis for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) where developed countries were able to offer developing countries low tariffs or zero duties on selected goods originating from the developing world. Unilateral trade preferences were part of strategy of development assistance to promote export-led growth in the developing world. Caribbean countries were able to take advantage of the GSP offered by developed countries including the United States GSP regime. The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 brought the results of the Tokyo Round into U.S. law. Some of the changes the law made included *inter alia* denying GSP privileges to communist
countries and to countries which did not cooperate with the United States in the “war on drugs” (Rothgeb 2001, 137-138). U.S. security interest was tied to preferential trade.

During the 1980s, the United States developed unilateral preferential trading schemes other than the GSP which were tailored to specific geographic regions. The first trade preference program designed for the Caribbean was the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) which was launched by President Ronald Reagan in 1982. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Caribbean during the 1980s received a lot of attention from the United States because of fears that communism would spread in the hemisphere, and many Caribbean countries experienced economic crises due to deteriorating terms of trade (price of exports as a ratio of price of imports) for Caribbean products. The strategic environment was therefore a significant consideration for the United States as the economic and political stability of the region was important to U.S. security interests. As J.F. Hornbeck (2011) in *U.S. Trade Policy and the Caribbean: From Trade Preferences to Free Trade Agreements* explained:

> The impetus to create a Caribbean trade preference program arose from concern over the region’s economic collapse and political radicalization that materialized in the early 1980s. Proximity, vulnerability, and instability have long made the Caribbean Basin a particular strategic interest of the United States…In light of this reasoning, President Reagan and the U.S. Congress initially considered a comprehensive response to the Caribbean Basin’s troubles. Trade preferences would emerge as the primary economic component of a scaled back alternative (CRS 2011, 4).

The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA) was signed into law in 1983 and the trade preference scheme went into effect in 1984. Due to resistance from textile and labor industries, the arrangement only gave modest duty-free access for ten per cent of Caribbean exports (Hornbeck CRS 2011, 4). Twenty-four countries were designated as
beneficiary countries\textsuperscript{10} from the Caribbean and Central America, a region designated by the United States as the Caribbean Basin. These countries were eligible for duty-free or reduced tariff access for specific products if they met certain conditions. For example, designation as a beneficiary could be denied or suspended if the country was a Communist country and if it did not sign an extradition treaty with the United States (Hornbeck 2011, 4). These types of conditions clearly demonstrate that U.S. security interests weighed heavily in the design of the CBI preference program. The competitive environment as well as special interest groups determined which products were “import sensitive” to the United States and these were excluded from duty-free or reduced tariff rates. Some of the products excluded from preferential market access included those which were important export products from the Caribbean Basin region such as textiles and apparel products and petroleum products. Caribbean goods were also subjected to a resumption of tariffs if import quantities were able to hurt U.S. producers, so called “safeguard measures” for American industries were built into the arrangement (Hornbeck 2011, 5).

By 1990 concerns were raised about the effectiveness of the CBERA program since export products which would have boosted the economies in the Caribbean were excluded from the 1983 CBERA legislation. While attempts were made to include some of these products in a new bill, textiles and apparel products were again not included. Another legislation, “CBI II” or the Caribbean Basin Economic Expansion Act of 1990 was passed instead

\textsuperscript{10} CBI Beneficiary Countries include: Trinidad and Tobago, The Bahamas, Jamaica, Guyana, St. Kitts & Nevis, Barbados, St. Lucia, Antigua & Barbuda, Grenada, Dominica, Montserrat, British Virgin Islands, Netherland Antilles, Aruba, Haiti, Dominican Republic, Panama, Belize, Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua.
which extended tariff preferences to only a few new goods and it made permanent the existing CBI preferences for beneficiary countries (Hornbeck 2011, 6).

Post-Cold War Trade – 1990s and Beyond

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 allowed Americans to focus their energy on economic matters which arose during the Cold War years. Since the 1980s the United States wanted increased market access for not just their goods but also their services. American businesses were also concerned about issues such as intellectual property rights violations, protection of foreign-related investment and agricultural trade. This led President Reagan to call for a new GATT round of negotiations in 1985 which resulted in the Uruguay Round of negotiations that lasted from 1986-1994. When President Bill Clinton came into office, he made economic and trade issues a priority and he inherited the task of completing the Uruguay Round of negotiations. It was during the Uruguay Round that the United States supported the creation of an international organization to handle trade. The WTO was established in 1995 with a Dispute Settlement Mechanism in place for trade disputes. The United States would avail itself of the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanisms in the future to the detriment of banana producing countries in the Caribbean. The other main achievements of the Uruguay Round included the establishment of a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and the establishment of the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.

The precursor to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the 1988 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement was spearheaded by Canada as a means to solve the
economic recession in North America. Negotiations for NAFTA began in 1990 when Mexican president Carlos Salinas de Gotari asked President George H.W. Bush to eliminate trade barriers between the United States and Mexico (Rothgeb 2001, 202). When President Clinton came into office he also had to secure congressional approval for NAFTA. Labor and environmental groups opposed NAFTA and Clinton negotiated side agreements on the environment and labor standards. When NAFTA took effect in 1994, the “NAFTA parity” issue arose for Caribbean countries. Mexican products received duty-free or significantly lower tariffs under NAFTA compared to CBI, putting the Caribbean Basin countries in a relatively disadvantageous position. Mexico had a significant advantage in textiles and apparel in particular, and this posed a threat to the economies of CBI countries. The Caribbean Basin countries then began to lobby for “NAFTA parity” or trade preferences equal to Mexico. Given the import sensitive nature of textiles and apparel, it took many years and only in 2000 did Congress pass the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) which gave textiles and apparel NAFTA-equivalent treatment (Hornbeck 2011, 7). The CBTPA also gave NAFTA tariff treatment to more goods including petroleum products. The eligibility criteria for CBTPA included those under CBERA plus meeting trade obligations under the WTO and eventually moving towards a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the United States (Hornbeck 2011, 7).

The Anglophone Caribbean countries have not moved towards negotiating any FTA with the United States. The Central American countries (Honduras, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, Nicaragua) plus the Dominican Republic which were all CBI beneficiary countries have already signed a FTA with the United States - the CAFTA-DR Agreement.
which began to be implemented in 2006. When fully implemented it would provide almost full free trade between the US and these countries and it is anticipated to create the same form of CAFTA-DR parity issue as it did with NAFTA (Hornbeck 2011, 8). The CBI program in its entirety (CBERA, CBI II, and CBTPA) however only benefited a few of the twenty-four countries. The top exporters from the Caribbean Basin were the Central American countries and Trinidad and Tobago. Trinidad and Tobago was the number one exporter from the period 2000-2008 because of its mineral fuel exports and preferential market access under CBTPA. According to the Congressional Research Service report, in 2008, 81% of U.S. imports originated in only the top three CBI countries – Trinidad and Tobago, Honduras and Dominican Republic (Hornbeck 2011, 15).

An effort was also made to unite thirty-four economies in the Americas (with the exception of Cuba) into a single free trade area – the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). This hemispheric initiative was launched in Miami in 1994 by President Bill Clinton with the objective of concluding the agreement by 2005. This goal was too ambitious and the FTAA never materialized. According to Estevadeordal and Suominen in their article *Economic Integration in the Americas* (2011):

The FTAA negotiations were troubled. Although NAFTA illustrated the possibilities for economic integration between industrial and developing economies, there were protectionist pressures and growing tensions in the hemisphere. Negotiating positions over agricultural subsidies and antidumping between countries of the Northern hemisphere and the Southern hemisphere stalled discussions. The talks collapsed in 2003 in the face of divergent interests and seemingly irreconcilable bargaining positions between the main economies of the region: Brazil and the US (89).
3. From Neglect to Engagement

There has been reason to argue that the United States did in fact neglect the Caribbean during the 1990s. One indicator was a significant reduction in foreign aid from the 1980s to the 1990s. According to Bernal (2000), “Aid from the US to Jamaica declined from US$116m in 1984 to US$32 million in 1994, a fall of 72 per cent. Over the same period US aid to Barbados declined by 98 percent, to Grenada by 99 per cent and to Trinidad and Tobago by 99 percent” (2000, 308). Palmer (2006) in his book *U.S. Relations with Latin America during the Clinton Years* examined the question why the United States did not do more in Latin America during the Clinton administration period (1993-2001). Palmer (2006) has argued that there were contextual and structural constraints within which U.S. policy towards Latin America operated during these years. Clinton was elected because of his domestic rather than foreign policy agenda and he lacked the foreign policy experience of his predecessor George H.W. Bush (1989-1993). Top U.S. officials accorded a low priority for Latin America and most of President Clinton’s principal advisors like his Secretaries of State had little knowledge or concern for Latin America (2006, 42). According to Palmer,

President Clinton’s brief trip to Mexico, Costa Rica, and Barbados in May 1997 was long on rhetoric but short on substance. A commitment to “build a better future” or to promise “no mass deportations of illegal immigrants to the Caribbean” hardly qualify as solid policy initiatives (2006, 42).

The United States also developed a bad reputation in Latin America and the Caribbean because of historically empty rhetoric and disappointing past initiatives, the failed FTAA being a main example. Abraham F. Lowenthal in his 2011 article *The Obama Administration and the Americas* has highlighted that “One new U.S. administration after
another in recent decades has announced a new policy for the Americas, usually with considerable fanfare. Often, however, these initiatives have come to naught, or little more” (15). While the prevailing sentiment is one of discouraging past outcomes, Lowenthal has noted that U.S. officials have recognized that “hemisphere-wide summits and broad regional initiatives are less likely to be effective than efforts that bring together smaller groups of variable compositions, with comparable or complementary concerns” (2011, 7).

[The Obama] administration developed “policies tailored to specific issues in four high-priority target regions:

1. The closest neighbors of the United States in Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean
2. Brazil, the region’s largest and most powerful country
3. The diverse and troubled nations of the Andean ridge, each posing a different challenge
4. Cuba, long a neuralgic issue for the United States, where changes in U.S. policy are overdue” (2011, 8-9).

On April 14, 2016, the United States Government officially prioritized its policies with the Caribbean by introducing a bill\[11\] in the House of Representatives (H.R. 4939). The *U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016* was passed in the House on 13 June 2016, was unanimously passed in the Senate on 10 December 2016, was signed by President Obama and became public law on 16 December 2016. Eliot L. Engel, Ranking Member

on the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, in support of his bill, the *U.S.-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 (H.R.4939)*, on June 13, 2016\(^\text{12}\) stated “We spend a great deal of time focusing on challenges and opportunities in faraway places. But it’s important that we never lose sight of our interests closer to home. Indeed, we should be working to strengthen our ties with countries in the Caribbean.” Georges A. Fauriol in his article *Engaging the Caribbean: From Relations to Actual Strategy* (2016)\(^\text{13}\) has attributed this renewed attention and activity to a recognition of the lack of a “Caribbean policy” and further explains that:

> Despite the relatively small scale of some of its components, the Caribbean ranks high in several individual U.S. political, security, and financial policy interests as the region comes under pressure from an expanding set of global forces. Admittedly, all of this has a long way to go to trigger results for the Caribbean, but there is momentum. And an eventual revival of the Congressional Friends of the Caribbean caucus would be a reminder of an earlier era when the region resonated with the top echelon of U.S. foreign policymaking (Fauriol, 2016).

Fauriol (2016) stated that the passing of the Act “by a 386 to 6 margin...was a noteworthy achievement” given “a sharply divided political environment.” He further noted that “Much of what H.R. 4936 calls attention to actually exists in some form in existing policies and programs”. In the new *United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016* Congress declared that:

> it is the policy of the United States to increase engagement [emphasis added] with the governments of the Caribbean region, the Caribbean diaspora community in the United


\(^{13}\)https://www.csis.org/analysis/engaging-caribbean-relations-actual-strategy
States, and the private sector and civil society in both the United States and the Caribbean in a concerted effort to –

1) Enhance diplomatic relations between the United States and the Caribbean region;
2) Increase economic cooperation between the United States and the Caribbean region;
3) Support regional economic, political, and security integration efforts in the Caribbean region;
4) Encourage sustainable economic development and increased regional economic diversification and global competitiveness;
5) Reduce levels of crime and violence, curb the trafficking of illicit drugs, strengthen the rule of law, and improve citizen security;
6) Improve energy security by increasing access to diverse, reliable, affordable, and sustainable power;
7) Advance cooperation on democracy and human rights in the Caribbean region and at multilateral fora and;
8) Continue support for public health advances and cooperation on health concerns and threats to the Caribbean region (H.R. 4939, 2)

Concluding Remarks

This chapter has reviewed the literature on U.S.-Caribbean relations from the 1990s to the beginning of the twenty-first century. The literature revealed a general consensus that the United States at the end of the Cold War essentially paid little attention to Latin America and the Caribbean but two issues were of main concern – drug trafficking and international trade. With the Communist threat disappearing, the U.S. then channeled its resources to the “war on drugs” via multilateral, bilateral and regional initiatives. The U.S. was also more concerned with domestic economic issues and free trade via multilateral, bilateral and regional trade agreements. This chapter has highlighted that while the Caribbean received less attention with reductions in foreign aid during the 1990s, it did receive attention from the United States in terms of signing on to agreements to cooperate in international criminal control, a summary of which is provided in Table 2. The Caribbean
also benefited from several unilateral preferential trading arrangements with the United States (GSP, CBERA, CBI II, and CBTPA) which began in the 1980s and was updated in 1990 and 2000. Not all countries benefited from these arrangements and Trinidad and Tobago was the main beneficiary with its petroleum products and petrochemical exports.

The literature on U.S.-Caribbean relations post-9/11 made the same argument that the U.S. abandoned the Caribbean even more so in the twenty-first century. These pessimistic assessments however are overblown and do not reflect the changing sentiment and bipartisan support at the legislative and executive levels of the U.S. government which has recognized a need to re-engage its closest neighbors and allies. This culminated in the United States-Caribbean Strategic Engagement Act of 2016 which was passed with overwhelming support in both the House and Senate and was signed into law on 16 December 2016. The literature on U.S.-Caribbean relations in the twenty-first century needs to be updated to reflect the actual situation and the move towards strategic engagement. This dissertation will fill that gap by examining how and why the United States has increased its engagement with the Caribbean in the twenty-first century.
CHAPTER 5

Methodology

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section I will be a justification for the selection of cases. Section II will explain the dependent variable engagement. Section III will lay out the theoretical framework, hypotheses and independent variables. Section IV will explain the mixed methods approach that will be used in this study. This methodology is intended answer the following research questions:

Main Question:

- Why has the United States increased engagement with the Caribbean in the twenty-first century?

Other Research Questions:

- How has the United States increased its engagement with the Caribbean?
- Which areas have received U.S. attention? Which areas have not?
- What explains the variation in engagement among the case studies?
- Is the United States helping or hurting the Caribbean countries?
- Should the United States engage more or less with its Caribbean neighbors?

SECTION 1: Case Study Justification

George and Bennett have defined a case as “an instance of a class of events [which] refers here to a phenomenon of scientific interest” (2005, 17). The Anglophone Caribbean, a region often overshadowed by hotspot countries such as Haiti and Cuba and neglected in
the literature on Latin America and the Caribbean, will be the focus of this research. The case of the English-speaking Caribbean represents an instance of a region targeted for increased engagement as part of a broader twenty-first century U.S. foreign policy strategy. Cases were selected which vary on the dependent variable “engagement” and which vary in case characteristics. The population of cases from which countries were selected included twelve English-speaking members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). Four CARICOM states with more developed economies were selected: The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. Given the diversity and lack of homogeneity among states in the Caribbean, the results of the findings of these cases will be context specific to each country, and hence not generalizable to rest of the Caribbean. Four steps were taken to select cases studies: determining the level of engagement, assessing the security situation, determining the levels of economic interdependence, and variation in case characteristics.

1. Determining preliminary levels of engagement
One of the indicators of U.S. engagement that will be used is bilateral U.S. foreign assistance. Statistics were compiled for the period 2001-2014 of total U.S. aid to the English-speaking Caribbean from USAID’s online interactive database. Cases were picked based on variation in the levels of engagement - countries which received high, medium and low levels of U.S. foreign assistance. As shown in the Chart below, there was variation in the levels of bilateral foreign assistance among the four cases. Jamaica received the highest level of foreign aid ($416,298,742) followed by Guyana

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14 Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Trinidad and Tobago
($239,900,437) over the time period 2001 to 2014. The Bahamas received medium level of aid ($108,512,374) and Trinidad and Tobago received low levels of assistance ($15,364,313).

2. Assessing the security situation

Three metrics were used to assess the levels of violence, crime and drug trafficking: homicide rates, robbery and drug seizures. This data was obtained from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) online statistical database. I compiled data which was available for the Anglophone Caribbean and I presented the data graphically using Microsoft Excel.
i) **Homicides**

Charts were done for countries where data was available. As shown in figure 2, between the period 2000-2010 with the exception of Grenada, the homicide rate per 100,000 increased for all the islands, with some countries experiencing an escalation such as St. Kitts and Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica. Out of the nine countries surveyed, in 2010 seven registered homicide rates above 20 with the highest rates occurring in Jamaica (52.8), St. Kitts and Nevis (40.1), Trinidad and Tobago (35.6), The Bahamas (26.1) and St. Lucia (24.8).

![Figure 2: Intentional Homicide Rate per 100,000 (2000 & 2010)](https://data.unodc.org/)

Source: Compiled from UNODC Database [https://data.unodc.org/](https://data.unodc.org/)

ii) **Robbery**

Regarding crime, robberies at a national level are also at an extremely high level. As shown in Figure 3, in 2010 Trinidad and Tobago had the highest robbery rate per 100,000 of 385.7. Barbados, St. Kitts and Nevis, Jamaica and the Bahamas also recorded rates between 93.1 to 174.2.
iii) **Drug Trafficking**

Data was gathered to compare drug seizures in 2001 to 2013. In 2001, Jamaica registered the highest level of cocaine-type seizures (2950.91 kg), followed by The Bahamas (1469 kg), and Trinidad and Tobago (821.88 kg). In 2013, Trinidad and Tobago had the highest level of cocaine-type seizures (2351.48 kg), followed by Jamaica (1234.3 kg) and The Bahamas (1010 kg). Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas over the period 2001-2013 recorded the highest levels of cocaine-type seizures indicating that these countries are the main transit countries for cocaine-type drugs in the English-speaking Caribbean.
3. Determining the levels of *economic interdependence*.

Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas are the three most important trading partners with the United States. The Bahamas and Jamaica have trade deficits with the U.S. (imports exceeding exports). Trinidad and Tobago continues to register trade surpluses (exports exceeding imports) with the U.S. due exports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and petrochemicals like methanol. The United States is also the main investor in the region having the largest share of FDI stock in 2012 in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas. Also in the cases of these three islands, the majority of tourists came from the United States (most recent data available was 2008). Given the proximity and reliance on maritime trade with the United States, there are fairly high levels of shipping connectivity for Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas. High levels of container port throughput indicate their high levels of integration in the global trading network and with the United States.
I gathered data on trade flows, tourist flows, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Data was obtained from online statistical databases available on the website of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UN Comtrade online database, and the website of the Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO). All data was then analyzed and presented graphically to assess which countries had the highest levels of economic interdependence with the United States in terms of trade, investment, and tourism. Data was organized graphically to visually display:

a. The countries with the highest levels of trade (imports and exports) with the United States;

b. The top trading countries (Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and The Bahamas) trade with the United States compared to other developed countries (Canada and the United Kingdom);

c. The levels of FDI from the U.S. to FDI from other countries in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and The Bahamas;

d. Tourist arrivals from the U.S. compared to tourist arrivals from other countries in Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and The Bahamas.

A: International Trade

a) Anglophone Caribbean Trade with the United States

As shown in Figure 6, over the twenty-year period 1995-2014 Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica, and The Bahamas were the main importers of goods from the United States. All three countries witnessed a continuous rise in imports over 20 years trading significantly more than the smaller islands of the Eastern Caribbean.
As shown in Figure 7, Trinidad and Tobago had the highest levels of exports to the United States with an upward trend over 20 years. This is principally due to exports of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and petrochemicals such as methanol of which Trinidad and Tobago is a major world exporter. The rest of the English-speaking Caribbean export substantially lower levels to the United States.
b) **Anglophone Trade with Developed Countries**

The three most important trading partners with the United States are therefore Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas. Comparisons of these countries’ trade with the United States to Canada and the United Kingdom revealed that in terms of both exports and imports, the United States remains the main trading partner with the Caribbean. As demonstrated, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas export levels to the United States in 2014 far exceeded those of Canada and the U.K. In 2014, in the case of imports the story was the same, these countries import the most from the United States, trading minimally with other developed countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom. The United States in terms of trade remains a significant player in the Anglophone Caribbean.

Source: Compiled from data obtained from UNCTAD [http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html](http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html)
Figure 8
Trinidad & Tobago Exports to Developed Countries (2014)
- Exports to Canada
- Exports to United States
- Exports to United Kingdom

Figure 9
Jamaica Exports to Developed Countries (2014)
- Exports to Canada
- Exports to United States
- Exports to United Kingdom

Figure 10
The Bahamas Exports to Developed Countries (2014)
- Exports to Canada
- Exports to United States
- Exports to United Kingdom

Source: Compiled from Data Obtained from UNCTAD [http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html](http://unctadstat.unctad.org/EN/Index.html)
B: Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)

Not only is the United States the main trading partner in the Caribbean, but is also the main investor in the region. For the biggest economies, Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The
Bahamas, the United States had the largest share of FDI stock in 2012 in these islands. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago FDI stock is more diversified in part due to oil, gas and petrochemical firms from Canada and the UK. The U.S. however still has the largest share of FDI stock around 51% while Canada has around 25% followed by the UK with 13%.

Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database, based on data reported by Host Countries.

In the case of Jamaica as shown in Figure 15, the United States has the majority of investment in that country, 88% of the FDI stock in Jamaica in 2012 was American. China had about 12% of FDI stock in Jamaica in 2012.

Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database, based on data reported by Host Countries.
In the case of The Bahamas, FDI stock was more diversified. The United States still however has the bulk of FDI stock in The Bahamas, about 63% followed by Brazil of around 31%.

Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database, based on data reported by Host Countries.

Comparing FDI stock from the United States in the Caribbean over the period 2001 to 2012, Figure 17 shows that there has been a continuous increase in U.S. FDI stock in The Bahamas and that the U.S. has invested the most in The Bahamas compared to Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica.

Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database, based on data reported by Host Countries.
C: Tourism

In the cases of Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas, the majority of tourists came from the United States. The most recent year for which data was available was 2008. In the case of The Bahamas, 81% of the tourist arrivals were from the United States. In Jamaica, 65% of all the tourists were Americans and in Trinidad and Tobago 43% of the tourists were from the United States. Tourism is of more significance to The Bahamas and Jamaica than Trinidad and Tobago hence the higher levels of tourist arrivals from the U.S. in those two countries.
4. Cases were selected which vary in case characteristics. Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and The Bahamas are all island states while Guyana is a part of mainland South America. Guyana has the largest land area while Trinidad and Tobago has the smallest. Of the four, Jamaica has the largest population while The Bahamas has the smallest. Trinidad and Tobago and The Bahamas are among the wealthier countries of the Caribbean with GDP per capita registering just over US$20,000 in 2014, while Jamaica and Guyana are among the poorer countries with GDP per capita around US$5,000 and US$4,000 respectively in 2014. In terms of the size of the economy, Trinidad and Tobago has the biggest economy with a GDP of US$ 28.9 billion while Guyana has the smallest with a GDP of US$ 3.1 billion in 2014. Trinidad and Tobago is not a member of PetroCaribe while The Bahamas, Jamaica and Guyana are members.
Table 3: Variation in Case Characteristics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Trinidad and Tobago</th>
<th>Jamaica</th>
<th>The Bahamas</th>
<th>Guyana</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Type of Government</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Presidential Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land Area km²</td>
<td>5,128</td>
<td>10,991</td>
<td>13,939</td>
<td>214,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>1.3 million</td>
<td>2,673,800</td>
<td>323,000</td>
<td>760,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP SUS Billions (2014)</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Resource Endowments</td>
<td>Crude oil, natural gas, asphalt</td>
<td>Aluminum, bauxite</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Precious metals-gold</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Member of PetroCaribe</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: World Bank, CRNM

Cases not selected

The countries of the Eastern Caribbean – Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the Grenadines were not selected as case studies. With the exception of Barbados, the rest of the Eastern Caribbean are designated as Less Developed Countries (LDCs) within CARICOM. Their levels of economic interdependence with the United States are very low. LDC states are usually treated as a group of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)\(^\text{15}\) for purposes of foreign assistance and in terms of analysis given the small size of those states. Their inclusion will make the study too broad in scope. This paper focuses on individual states rather than a group of states. While Belize is a member of CARICOM, the United States provides funding to Belize through its regional initiatives for Central America and so it was also not included in this study.

\(^{15}\) Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and St. Lucia are all members of the OECS.
**Limitations of Cases**

Given the lack of homogeneity among all the Caribbean countries, the results will not be generalizable to the entire Anglophone region. Each Caribbean country varies in size, wealth, population and resources. The findings of the cases will be context specific to each country. The findings are not comparable nor replicable. The sample of countries illustrate the more prominent states and those which have the most economic linkages and pose the greatest security threats to the United States.

**SECTION 2: Dependent Variable - Engagement**

Matthew Wallin in his article *Engagement: What does it mean for Public Diplomacy?* (2013)\(^{16}\) noted that the term “engagement” has been used recently in diplomatic circles but there seems to be no clear definition of what exactly it means. He wrote:

> In recent years, diplomatic circles have been relying on the term “engagement” to describe various communication and public diplomacy activities with foreign publics. The term is used almost universally in government, the military, academia, corporations and think tanks to describe a range of practices designed to influence or persuade foreign audiences. But missing from the discourse about engagement and its attractiveness as a term is a substantial discussion of exactly what it means.

President Obama however provided a very broad definition of “engagement” in his 2010 National Security Strategy. The document defined *engagement* as “the active participation of the United States in relationships beyond our borders” (2010, 11). A review of various National Security Strategies over the period 1999 to 2015 have revealed that “engagement” has been a recurrent theme from President Clinton to President Obama. The national

security strategy of the United States at the beginning of the twenty-first century as set forth by President Clinton entitled *A National Security Strategy for a New Century* (1999) stated:

Our strategy is founded on continued U.S. engagement and leadership abroad. We must be prepared and willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors, to provide global leadership, and to remain a reliable security partner for the community of nations that share our interests. Our engagement therefore must be selective, focusing on the threats and opportunities most relevant to our interests and applying our resources where we can make the greatest difference (1999, 3).

This research will define its dependent variable engagement as *the active participation of the United States in the Caribbean bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally*. Engagement has often been narrowly viewed by the Caribbean solely as the provision of foreign assistance by the United States. I will broaden that definition to include not only foreign aid, but also legislative changes, regional and multilateral initiatives and high-level diplomacy. When combined, these different forms of interaction give a clearer picture of the willingness and ability of the United States to increase its engagement with the Caribbean in the twenty-first century.

1. *Levels of U.S. foreign assistance*

The data is taken from USAID’s interactive online database *Foreign Aid Explorer*\(^\text{17}\) which provides statistics on official U.S. foreign aid across countries and sectors. I use aid obligations rather than aid disbursements since obligations provide a more accurate picture of intended aid allocation by the United States in a given year. There are many reasons

\(^{17}\) https://explorer.usaid.gov/
preventing aid from actually being disbursed. The sum of aid obligations in current US dollars were used and so the totals do not take inflation into account. Foreign assistance data was available from the period 1952 to 2016 and so the data was divided into three time-periods to allow for comparisons – Cold War, Post-Cold War and the post 9/11 periods.

2. Legislative changes

This study will examine all bills and amendments related to the Caribbean which have been passed in Congress during the period 2001 to 2016.

3. Regional and Multilateral Initiatives

This research will also look at regional and multilateral initiatives involving the Caribbean and the United States during the period 2001 to 2016.

4. Diplomacy by Senior U.S. leadership

I will also take into account visits and meetings between senior leadership in the United States and the Caribbean between 2001 and 2016.

SECTION 3: Theory, Hypotheses and Independent Variables

According to the United States National Security Strategy (1999) entitled *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, “Our strategy [of engagement] has three core objectives: enhancing American security; bolstering our economic prosperity; and promoting democracy and human rights” (1999, 3). The mission of USAID, the lead U.S. government agency in charge of foreign assistance programs18 is to “directly enhance American-and global-security and prosperity” and according to the organization’s mission

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18 https://www.usaid.gov/who-we-are/mission-vision-values
Accessed October 17, 2017
statement, “The United States is safer and stronger when fewer people face destitution, when our trading partners are flourishing, when nations around the world can withstand crisis, and when societies are freer, more democratic, and more inclusive…”

Broadly speaking, the three main international relations paradigms (realism, liberalism and constructivism) can provide explanations for U.S. engagement emanating from security concerns, economic interdependence and ideology respectively. From a realist theoretical perspective, United States foreign policy towards the Caribbean is driven by power and U.S. security interest. The assumptions which realists ascribe to include: states are the most important actors in international politics, states are rational and unitary actors, and matters of security override all other issue areas (Sterling-Folker 2006, 15). Policy is determined by the anarchic structure of the international system. A policy of engagement can be explained with the reasoning that no governing authority in the international system can provide security to the United States and thus any form of foreign policy of engagement is for the purpose of “self-help”. The United States will increase engagement in the Caribbean because security threats affect American national interests.

From a liberal theoretical perspective, economic interdependence between the United States and the Caribbean will lead to increased U.S. engagement. The subject of engagement can be viewed as cooperation, a main focus of liberal scholarship. Liberal scholars view economic issues as having great potential for cooperation since it is characterized by relatively high levels of interdependence among states (Sterling-Folker 2006, 57). Within the liberal paradigm, the assumptions which liberals ascribe to which
are similar to realism include: states are rational actors and they operate under conditions of anarchy (Moravcsik 2010). Among the differing strands of liberal theory, commercial liberalism presents an opportunity to generate hypotheses as international trade falls within the liberal tradition as means of promoting cooperation and peace.

While realist and liberal theories focus on power and interest or ‘material’ factors, the constructivist paradigm focuses on ideas. According to Jackson and Sorensen (2013), the “core ideational element upon which constructivists focus is intersubjective beliefs (and ideas, conceptions, and assumptions) that are widely shared among people” (213). From constructivist theory, one explanation which can be derived for U.S. engagement can be intersubjective beliefs. In this case, political beliefs fall into either a liberal or conservative ideological camp. Previous studies on foreign assistance have taken into account the role of ideology in foreign aid allocations. Milner and Tingley (2011) in their article Who Supports Global Engagement? The Sources of Preferences in American Foreign Economic Policy have explained that:

In American politics, a liberal-conservative ideological spectrum is often used to describe political beliefs. This traditional left-to-right ideological scale may help explain views toward foreign aid and trade. The liberal-conservative political spectrum identifies liberals as being more supportive of government intervention in the economy, especially to deal with redistribution to the poor. The conservative position is associated with beliefs about the importance of individual effort and the market as a means of wealth generation and distribution. Given these beliefs, one would expect individuals holding liberal values to support aid…; those holding conservative values should…oppose aid as a form of government intervention to redistribute wealth globally (47-48).
From the above international relations theories, I derived several hypotheses to explain U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. I will try to ascertain whether U.S. engagement was caused by U.S. security interests, U.S. economic interests, political ideology, or development needs in the Caribbean. I will define U.S. security interest as drug trafficking; U.S. economic interest as international trade; political ideology as the liberal/conservative ideological spectrum; and development needs as the income levels of Caribbean states. Indicators to measure the independent variables were selected based on the availability of data.

- **Hypothesis 1: U.S. Security Interests (Realism)**

  \[ H_1: \text{In a comparison of countries, those experiencing higher levels of drug trafficking will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than those experiencing lower levels of drug trafficking.} \]

Drug trafficking is one of the main security concerns for the United States in the Caribbean region. The Caribbean states given their geographical location are transit centers for illegal drugs leaving South America (cocaine in particular) and heading to the United States. I will therefore use the volume of cocaine seizures in kilograms as reported by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as an indicator of the level of drug trafficking in the Caribbean. This data is publicly available on the website of UNODC\(^\text{19}\). While levels of cocaine trafficked through the region may actually be higher than seizures data, it is the best indicator to ascertain trafficking levels.

\(^{19}\)
\[ \text{https://data.unodc.org/?lf=1&lng=en} \]
Hypothesis 2: U.S. Economic Interest (Liberalism)

**H2:** In a comparison of countries, those having a trade deficit with the United States will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than countries with a trade surplus with the United States.

Previous studies have used trade flows as an indicator of commercial interests and as one of the determinants of foreign aid. Berthelemy (2006) and Fleck and Kilby (2010) have used donor exports to recipient countries in their research on aid allocation. According to Berthelemy, “A donor’s foreign assistance policy based on its self-interest will typically be biased toward countries that tend naturally to have more trade with it” (2006, 183). I will use U.S. trade balance (exports minus imports) to each of the Caribbean countries as a measure of U.S. economic interest. Cases where the U.S. has a trade surplus, i.e., where U.S. exports exceed U.S. imports, would indicate that the U.S. has a greater economic interest in those countries. Cases where the United States has a trade deficit, i.e., where U.S. imports exceed U.S. exports would indicate that the U.S. has less economic interest in those countries. Trade flows as measured by value (in U.S. dollars) will be obtained from the United Nations online international trade statistical database UN Comtrade.

Hypothesis 3: Political Ideology – Liberal/Conservative (Constructivism)

**H3:** Liberal administrations will more likely give higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance to the Caribbean than Conservative administrations.

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20 [https://comtrade.un.org/](https://comtrade.un.org/)
I will use a dummy variable to capture liberal/conservative ideology. All the years when a Democratic administration was in charge will assume the value of 1, and the years when a Republican administration was in charge will assume the value of 0.

➢ Hypothesis 4: Development Needs – Income levels

\textbf{H4:} In a comparison of countries, those with lower levels of income will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than those with higher levels of income.

The literature on foreign aid has divided the determinants of foreign assistance into two broad categories: donors’ interests and recipients’ need. According to Milner and Tingley, “Almost all U.S. aid is given to low-and middle-income countries…” (2010, 207). According to Berthelemy, “The most straightforward indicator of beneficiary needs is income per capita…If aid is to be allocated based on recipient needs, the poorer countries should receive more and the richer countries should receive less” (2006, 184). I will use GDP per capita as my development needs indicator found on the World Bank’s online database\(^2\).

\textit{SECTION 4: A Mixed Methods Approach}

This research will adopt a mixed methods approach combining both qualitative and quantitative techniques. Qualitative techniques will include a discourse analysis of primary sources, a document analysis of secondary sources, and elite interviews. Quantitative

\(^2\) https://data.worldbank.org/
techniques will include trend analysis of the dependent and independent variables with descriptive statistics, correlations and a panel regression with fixed effects.

**Qualitative Techniques**

*Discourse Analysis of Primary Sources*

To understand and explain U.S. policy in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century, I will examine official government discourse on the Caribbean during the period 2000 to 2016. Congressional hearings are publicly available documents and they provide a rich source of primary data to map specific discourses. Hearings provide testimony and data about various topics, documenting past and future changes in policy and legislation. According to the Congressional Research Service (2017), Congressional committee hearings gather information for use by the various committees which are often used to shape legislation and the decision to hold a hearing indicates the subject is worthy of the committee’s time and attention. I will be using the database *ProQuest Congressional* to source Congressional committee hearings and accompanying testimony transcripts and submitted statements from the following committees:

- Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives – Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
- Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives – Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere
- Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate – Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs
• Caucus on International Narcotics Control of the Senate

• Committee on the Judiciary - Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight

**Document Analysis of Secondary Sources**

The analysis of text will complement the analysis of talk. U.S. government publications are available online and are also a rich source of secondary data. Congressional publications will also be obtained from the database *ProQuest Congressional* and will include Congressional Research Service Reports (CRS), committee reports, GAO reports, House and Senate documents and reports, laws and bills. Other U.S. government publications will also be reviewed such as reports by the State Department and USAID. This will be complemented by reports in the news on U.S.-Caribbean relations.

**I. Interviews of Elite Public Officials**

Elite interviews will be another data collection method which will complement data compiled from both primary and secondary sources of publicly available information. Public officials and experts in the field of foreign and security policy with relevant experience in the Caribbean and the United States was the criteria used to determine which individuals to select for interviews. I expect to interview a total of three public officials during the period September 2017 to January 2018. I will be the only person conducting the interviews. In-depth interviewing will be used via a few open-ended questions which can lead to a discussion about policies, initiatives and all forms of engagement between the United States and the Caribbean. Interview questions will be formulated based on knowledge already gained from the literature review and preliminary data.
Given that the data being collected is not about the subjects themselves but about the policies and programs they know about or which they have been involved in, there is no risk to public officials who can decide for themselves what information they wish to share. I submitted this research study for approval from the University of Miami’s Human Subjects Research Office. I received an exemption on September 1, 2017 for this study. The Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed my submission (IRB ID: 20170779) and determined that this study was not research involving human subjects as defined by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations, and therefore IRB review and approval was not required. Public officials to be interviewed will include:

- Trinidad and Tobago’s Ambassador to Washington D.C., His Excellency Brigadier General (Retired) Anthony W.J. Phillips-Spencer;
- Guyana’s Ambassador to Washington D.C., His Excellency Dr. Riyad Insanally;
- Former Minister of National Security for Trinidad and Tobago, Captain Gary Griffith.

**Quantitative Techniques**

I will be using both descriptive and inferential statistics to test my hypotheses. I have a combination of both interval-level variables (values that give the exact quantity of the characteristic) and nominal-level variables (a numeric code to represent a characteristic). I will be analyzing the trends of all the variables over time using both SPSS and Stata to generate descriptive statistics. I will be doing a correlation analysis of the interval-level...
variables and a panel regression analysis of the dependent variable and two independent variables using Stata. This is summarized in the table below.

Table 4: Summary of Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Measurement</th>
<th>Type of Variable</th>
<th>Quantitative Technique</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dependent</td>
<td>U.S. Engagement – Foreign Aid</td>
<td>U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations in Current $US</td>
<td>Interval-level</td>
<td>○ Correlation ○ Trend Analysis ○ Regression</td>
<td>USAID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>U.S. Security Interests</td>
<td>Cocaine Seizures in kg</td>
<td>Interval-level</td>
<td>○ Correlation</td>
<td>UNODC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>U.S. Economic Interests</td>
<td>U.S. Trade Balance = U.S. Exports – U.S. Imports to each country in $US</td>
<td>Interval-level</td>
<td>○ Correlation ○ Regression</td>
<td>UN Comtrade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Recipients Income Levels</td>
<td>GDP in Current $US</td>
<td>Interval-level</td>
<td>○ Correlation ○ Regression</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Democratic Admin = 1 Republican Admin = 0</td>
<td>Nominal-level</td>
<td>○ Descriptive Statistics</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. **Trend Analysis with Descriptive Statistics**

Given that I am working with time series data, I will be considering the effect of time on both my dependent variable and my independent variables. This will be done using both Stata and SPSS. I would be investigating whether the dependent and independent variables follow a trend over time for each of the four cases.

2. **Correlation Analysis**

I will be doing a correlation analysis to describe the relationship between the dependent and independent variables. I will be using Stata to generate a Pearson’s correlation coefficient, $r$, to determine the strength and direction of association between the variables.
I will be doing a Pearson’s correlation of the following interval-level variables: U.S. aid (measured in $US), drug seizures (measured in kg), GDP (measured in $US), trade balance (measured in $US) and years. Correlations for each variable will be done separately for each of the four countries (The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Guyana) over the time period 1985-2015. The purpose of the correlation analysis is to get an idea of the overall relationship between the variables.

3. Regression Analysis

Given that causation cannot be assessed based on a correlation coefficient, I will be doing a regression analysis since the regression coefficient shows the amount of change in the dependent variable that is associated with a one-unit change in the independent variable. I will be using a panel data set to do a regression with a fixed effects model. I will be estimating the size of the effect of two independent variables on the dependent variable. My dependent variable \( Y = \) U.S. Foreign Aid, using the sum of aid obligations for each fiscal year during the period 1985-2015 to each of the four countries. The independent variables \( X_1 = \) GDP and \( X_2 = \) Trade Balance. I will be using the statistical software Stata to do the regression analysis.

Panel Data Set

I will be using panel data also known as “longitudinal” or “cross-sectional time-series” data to construct a data set which allows for observing the behavior of entities (states) across time. The advantage of using a panel data set is that it combines two dimensions: a cross-sectional dimension \( n \) and a time series dimension \( t \). As explained by Kahane (2008), “With cross-sectional data, time is held fixed and we consider variation across
space (e.g. across states) to identify the effects of X variable on Y variable” (103). With time-series data, the space is fixed (like one state) and time is allowed to change. Panel data sets are richer since “they contain variation across both time and space to help identify the effects of various X variables on some Y variable” (Kahane 2008, 104). In this study, the entities or cross-sectional dimension will be countries (The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana) so \( n = 4 \). My time period \( t \) will be 1985 to 2015. The result is a “stacking” of data for four countries from the period 1985-2015 on each other. My data set is attached to the end of this chapter. The main advantage of using a panel data set is a larger number of observations as it provides multiple observations on each country in the sample. According to Kahane, pooling data provides several advantages:

First, larger data sets generally produce better estimates of population parameters. Second, with a greater number of observations, we have the ability to estimate richer models containing more X variables without the fear of depleting our degrees of freedom. Third, pooling cross sections over time allows for variation in our Y and X variables across both time and space, which may better identify the effects of the X variables on Y (2008, 110).

According to Torres-Reyna (2007), another advantage of using panel data is that it accounts for individual heterogeneity, that is, it allows for control of variables which cannot be observed or measured, or variables that change over time but not across entities. One of the disadvantages involved in panel data sets is data collection issues such as coverage. Torres-Reyna (2007). Data sets can be “balanced”, i.e., all countries have data for all years. If one country does not have data for one or some of the years then the data is “unbalanced”. Ideally a balanced data set is the goal, if data is missing however for some of the years, a statistical model can still be run.
Regression with Panel Data - Fixed Effects

With panel data analysis, one can use a fixed-effects model or a random-effects model. A fixed-effects model was chosen instead of a random effects model for this regression. A fixed-effects model is used when analyzing the impact of variables that vary over time and it “controls for all time-invariant differences between the [countries], so the estimated coefficients of the fixed-effects models cannot be biased because of omitted time-invariant characteristics” (Torres-Reyna 2007). These time-invariant characteristics may be things such as culture, political systems, religion etc. It is designed to study the causes of changes within entities, in this case, within countries. The fixed-effects model explores “the relationship between predictor and outcome variables within an entity” understanding that each country “has its own individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables” (Torres-Reyna, 2007). As pointed out by Torres-Reyna, the main assumptions of the fixed-effects model are the following:

a) Something within the entity/country may impact or bias the predictor or outcome variables and so there is need to control for this. The fixed-effects model removes the time-invariant characteristics in order to assess the net effect of the predictors on the outcome variable.

b) The time-invariant characteristics are unique to each entity/country and should not be correlated with other characteristics. Given that each country is different, the country’s error term and the constant which captures the individual characteristics should not be correlated with the others.
On the other hand, with a random-effects model, “the variation across entities is assumed to be random and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model” and if there is reason to believe that differences across entities have some influence on the dependent variable, then a random effects model should be used (Torres-Reyna, 2007). In a random-effects model however, individual characteristics that may or may not influence the predictor variables need to be specified. A disadvantage of this model as pointed out by Torres-Reyna is that some variables may not be available which would result in “omitted variable bias” in the model. One advantage of this model is that it allows the generalization of the inferences beyond the sample.

In my analysis, I chose a fixed-effects model since each of the four countries vary in time-invariant characteristics such as natural resource endowments, geography, demography etc. The heterogeneous nature of the case studies makes it impossible to allow a generalization of the inferences to the rest of the Anglophone Caribbean. The fixed-effects model therefore controls for the variation within case characteristics allowing for estimates of the independent variables on the dependent variable. Time-invariant characteristics such as natural resource endowments will not play a role as explanatory variables in this quantitative analysis.
This chapter presents the results of a qualitative review of both primary and secondary sources by looking at both the “talk and text” of U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. I have reviewed various U.S. government publications by several agencies and official government discourse on the Caribbean to ascertain which areas have received U.S. attention and why. This chapter is divided into three sections. Part one will discuss the global and regional context of U.S. foreign assistance in order to place Caribbean engagement within a broader framework. Part two will look at five areas of U.S. engagement in the Caribbean which I have identified for the twenty-first century. Part three is an analysis of Congressional hearings on the Caribbean between the period 2000 to 2016 to understand some of the reasons for this renewed attention.

I. U.S. Foreign Assistance: Global and Regional Context

United States engagement in the Caribbean can only be understood when placed within the global context of U.S. foreign assistance. Since the Caribbean is usually grouped into the category of Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. engagement must also be placed within the regional context of the Americas. Trends in U.S. assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean generally mirror the trends of U.S. engagement globally – for example, a decline in aid globally is accompanied by a fall in aid to Latin America and the Caribbean.
U.S. foreign assistance trends also reflect specific foreign policy events and presidential initiatives, and have largely been driven by American security concerns. According to the Congressional Research Service (2016), there have been three main rationales for foreign assistance during the past 70 years: national security, commercial interests, and humanitarian concerns. American engagement globally as measured by levels of U.S. foreign aid has displayed certain clear trends since the end of World War II. During the Cold War, U.S. foreign aid levels increased globally, and so did aid to the Caribbean in an effort to prevent Communist infiltration in the region. The end of the Cold War and the 1990s led to a global decline in U.S. foreign aid.

The twenty-first century witnessed a transformation in U.S. foreign assistance under the George W. Bush administration in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Foreign aid became an important element to achieve U.S. national security objectives. Globally, U.S. aid increased and displayed a continuous upward trend. According to CRS data, in 2001, global U.S. foreign assistance totaled around $20 billion. Continuing on an upward trajectory, by 2012, U.S. foreign aid more than doubled, totaling around $50 billion. After the terrorist attacks in 2001, President Bush in his 2002 National Security Strategy gave development an equal footing with defense and diplomacy as the three pillars of national security. The international context for American engagement abroad was shaped principally by the global war on terrorism, sustained war efforts in the Middle East and Asia, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Africa. In particular, funding for health escalated. The rationale for foreign assistance in mitigating global ills was explained
clearly by President George W. Bush in a recent article he wrote about his health initiatives in the Washington Post dated April 7, 2017\textsuperscript{22},

It is clear that the generosity of the American people has had a huge impact — one that reflects the view that all lives are precious, and to whom much is given, much is required. This lifesaving work also has a practical purpose for Americans. Societies mired in disease breed hopelessness and despair, leaving people ripe for recruitment by extremists. When we confront suffering — when we save lives — we breathe hope into devastated populations, strengthen and stabilize society, and make our country and the world safer.

According to USAID’s 2009 Report \textit{Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance over the Past Decade}, some notable transformations in twenty-first century U.S. foreign aid include: a change in the way foreign aid is delivered; an increase in the number of U.S. agencies involved in foreign aid activities; an increased role of private actors in foreign assistance such as foundations, corporations, and private and voluntary organizations; an expansion of presidential initiatives; and development as a key component of national security. New entities were created such as the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator within the State Department. Additionally, the Department of Defense, the Treasury, the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Agriculture played an expanded role in foreign assistance activities.

As shown in the chart of the global distribution of U.S. foreign aid, in 2005 the region Near East (which comprises the Middle East and North Africa) received the bulk of assistance, around 48 per cent of total U.S. aid. Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, South and Central Asia also became significant recipients of U.S. aid, principally due to terrorism activities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Africa also emerged as a significant recipient of U.S. aid mainly because of funding for HIV/AIDS, receiving around 32 per cent of total U.S. aid by 2015. Latin America and the Caribbean as a region received comparatively lower levels of funding, receiving around 9 per cent of total U.S. assistance in 2005 and around 6 per cent in 2015.

Figure 21

![Global Distribution of U.S. Foreign Aid](chart)

Source: Congressional Research Service

The table below shows the top ten recipients of U.S. foreign aid for 2005 and 2015. Countries which are of geostrategic interests (Israel, Iraq, Egypt, Afghanistan, Pakistan,  

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and Jordan) received the bulk of U.S. aid. As shown below, Israel and Egypt remain the
two largest recipients of U.S. foreign assistance. By 2015, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and
Jordan reached the top ten list and so did countries in Africa, namely Sudan and Ethiopia.
For 2005, only one Caribbean country, Haiti was in the top ten. In 2015, one Latin
American country Colombia, was the 7th largest recipient of U.S. aid, mostly for counter-
narcotics programs. Broadly speaking, two main security concerns – terrorism and drug
trafficking, and one development concern – the HIV/AIDS epidemic, drove the rationale
for the bulk of the foreign assistance programs.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Top Recipients of US Foreign Assistance in US$ millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Israel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>Ukraine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>Palau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>India</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Congressional Research Service 2016

In Latin America and the Caribbean, the United States focused its energies on drug
trafficking and related terrorism activities, with a particular emphasis on the Andean
region. The largest recipients of U.S. aid were the Andean countries (Colombia, Bolivia
and Peru) through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the source countries for most of the
world’s cocaine. Colombia was the largest recipient of U.S. aid in the region because of
the $1.3 billion package “Plan Colombia”. Funding for counter-narcotics and security
programs in the Americas continued with packages for Mexico, the “Merida Initiative”; for Central America, the Central American Regional Security Initiative (CARSI); and for the Caribbean, the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). From 2000 to 2011, U.S. aid to Latin America generally increased, but then there was a decline from 2011 to 2014. According to a CRS Report *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean: Recent Trends and FY2016 Appropriations*, the fall in aid was due to several factors which included: reductions in the overall U.S. foreign assistance budget, the 2008 global financial crisis, the need to reduce budget deficits, and changes in Latin America and the Caribbean which allowed the U.S. government to concentrate its resources on fewer countries and sectors (2016, 3).

**II. Five Areas of Twenty-first Century U.S. Engagement in the Caribbean**

U.S. assistance in the Caribbean reflects elements of global and regional trends with presidential initiatives also playing an important role in new engagement activities. This renewed attention to the Caribbean however began even before the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The *Caribbean Regional Assistance Act of 2001* was introduced in the House of Representatives on February 7, 2001. The purpose of the Bill (H.R. 502) was to amend the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 by adding *Chapter 13 – Assistance for the Caribbean Region*. The amendment was made due to concerns by Congress of the “deterioration in economic, social, and political conditions in small countries of the Caribbean [which was] leading to increased crime…and illegal immigration to the United States”; narcotics
trafficking, drug interdiction, money laundering, and HIV/AIDS amongst other issues. The purpose of Chapter 13 is “to provide assistance for the countries of the Caribbean region to promote broad-based, sustainable, and successful economic development and growth that emphasizes small economy diversification, technical training, trade enhancement, judicial reform, environmental management and other related goals” (H.R. 502, 6). At the Summit of the Americas held in April 2001, President George W. Bush launched the “Third Border Initiative” in order to deepen cooperation with the Caribbean, recognizing that the Caribbean was often America’s overlooked “third border” and that these nations were important partners in security, trade, health, regional democracy, and education. President Bush stated:

We are also committed to deepening our cooperation throughout the hemisphere in fighting the spread of HIV/AIDS, responding to natural disasters, and making sure the benefits of globalization are felt in even the smallest economies. These goals are at the heart of the "Third Border" initiative we have launched with the countries of the Caribbean (21 April, 2001).24

According to the CRS report Caribbean-U.S. Relations: Issues in the 110th Congress (2007), in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the Third Border Initiative was expanded to include matters which affected U.S. homeland security such as border security, modernization of Caribbean airports and immigration controls. The tragic events of 9/11 not only drew American attention to the Middle East and Asia, but it also brought heightened attention to securing United States’ borders with the Caribbean.

24 http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=78817
U.S. engagement in the Caribbean in the twenty-first century reflected the global and regional trends of U.S. foreign assistance and presidential initiatives. Based on data collected and a review of U.S. foreign assistance activities, I have placed United States engagement activities in the Caribbean into five categories: development, humanitarian, health, energy and security. This section examines these five areas.

**Development: Millennium Challenge Account**

In 2002, President George W. Bush announced a plan to increase development aid by 50 percent over the following three years, resulting in an annual increase of $5 billion by 2006. The funds would go into a Millennium Challenge Account (MCA), which was signed into law in 2004 (P.L. 104-199, Section 602), and Congress authorized the establishment of the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), an independent government corporation to implement the MCA (USAID 2009, 3). President Bush called for “a new compact for global development, defined by new accountability for both rich and poor nations alike. Greater contributions from developed nations must be linked to greater responsibility from developing nations.” According to a CRS Report *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean*, the MCA initiative differs from traditional USAID programs in three areas:

First, funding is linked to performance and results. Second, the conceptualization of development projects rests with the countries themselves and their national development strategies, with the United States playing an advisory role. Third, MCA funds are intended to center exclusively on development goals without regard for other U.S. foreign policy and geostrategic objectives (2006, 21).

Countries receiving aid would have to meet the eligibility criteria in three categories: governing justly, investing in people, and promoting economic freedom. Countries with certain ranges of per capita income levels will be chosen (below $1,435 and between $1,435 and $2,975). Sixteen indicators would also be used to assess countries performance and eligibility for aid. U.S. assistance will be given to countries which have demonstrated a commitment to governing justly, investing in the health and education of their people, and working towards sound economic policies which promote enterprise and growth. According to White House archives, the following performance indicators will be used to assess countries eligible for development aid:

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a) **Governing Justly**
   i. Civil liberties
   ii. Political rights
   iii. Voice and accountability
   iv. Government effectiveness
   v. Rule of law
   vi. Control of corruption  

b) **Investing in People**
   i. Public primary education spending as a percent of GDP
   ii. Primary education completion rate
   iii. Public expenditures on health as a percent of GDP
   iv. Immunization rates: DPT and Measles  
Sources of indicators: World Bank, National Sources.

c) **Promoting Economic Freedom**
   i. Country credit rating
   ii. Inflation
   iii. 3-year budget deficit
   iv. Trade policy
   v. Regulatory quality
   vi. Days to start a business  

Guyana was selected by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) in 2004, and in 2007 the Government of Guyana submitted a proposal for assistance which was approved by the MCC. The objective of the assistance program for Guyana is “to improve Guyana’s fiscal management and business investment climate”. The program expects the following results: increased revenue generation; strengthened expenditure planning and controls; improved fiduciary oversight by parliament; and reduced costs and days to start a business.
USAID contributed around $7 million while the Government of Guyana contributed around $4 million\textsuperscript{27}.

**Health Diplomacy**

In 2003, President George W. Bush made a historic commitment to the global fight against HIV/AIDS and announced the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), one of the largest international health initiatives to fight a single disease. With bipartisan support, later in 2003, $15 billion was authorized to the initial 5-year program. In 2008, President Bush signed legislation to reauthorize PEPFAR (the Tom Lantos and Henry H. Hyde Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008) with an additional $48 billion over the next five years to combat HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria\textsuperscript{28}. PEPFAR funding continued under the Obama administration’s Global Health Initiative which was introduced in 2009. The agencies involved in implementing PEPFAR include: USAID, Department of State, Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), Department of Labor, Department of Defense, Department of Commerce, and the Peace Corps. PEPFAR’s activities are aimed at prevention, treatment, and care. According to USAID, the targets which were written into the legislation included:

- Preventing 12 million new HIV/AIDS infections
- Caring for 12 million people living with HIV/AIDS
- Training 140,000 health care professionals and
- Treating 4.5 million patients with TB and diagnosing 90,000 multi-drug resistant cases (2009, 14)

\textsuperscript{27} Information on Guyana and the MCC was obtained from the document “Development Assistance Grant Agreement No.- 504-008 for the Millennium Challenge Account Threshold Program for Guyana”, August 23, 2007.

\textsuperscript{28} Source: USAID Report August 17, 2009.
The United States also works through multilateral organizations to fight HIV/AIDS and is the largest contributor to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. According to USAID, PEPFAR “focuses its efforts on 15 heavily impacted countries in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean: Botswana, Cote de ’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Guyana, Haiti, Kenya, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Vietnam and Zambia” (2007, 4). Guyana and Haiti are the two Caribbean nations among the list of fifteen countries. According to a CRS Report (2006), the inclusion of Guyana and Haiti in PEPFAR led to an overall increase in US assistance to the Caribbean, at least $18 million for fiscal year 2004, and at least $53 million for 2005. Additionally, the report highlighted that for fiscal year 2006, the administration requested $21.4 million for Guyana and $47 million for Haiti from the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative account.

**Humanitarian Assistance: Food Aid, Disaster Relief and Reconstruction**

*Food for Peace: P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid*

The P.L. 480 Title II Food Aid account, (also known as Food for Peace) is funded through the annual Agriculture Appropriations bill. It provides funds for USAID to respond to the food assistance needs of countries for emergency situations and is intended for particularly vulnerable populations coping with or recovering from natural or man-made disasters. The program is administered mostly by U.S. private voluntary organizations and through the United Nations World Food Program. According to a CRS Report, for fiscal year 2005, “the United States allocated an estimated $108 million for P.L 480 in Latin America, and the administration requested $113 million in assistance for fiscal year 2006 (2006, 26).
Additionally, food aid funding has been linked to funding for HIV/AIDS to address the food and nutrition needs of people living with HIV. According to USAID’s *HIV and Food Security Conceptual Framework* (2007), there can be collaboration between PEPFAR and Food for Peace Program (FFP):

> By continuing to draw upon the technical expertise and resources of both FFP and PEPFAR, the goals of meeting the nutrition, food and food security needs of individuals, households and communities affected by HIV, while strengthening HIV prevention, care, support and treatment, will be better achieved (2007, 1).

**Disaster Relief and Reconstruction**

The United States has consistently provided assistance to the Caribbean in times of natural disasters. USAID’s Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance and Office for Food for Peace in conjunction with the Department of Defense has historically provided humanitarian disaster assistance in the Caribbean. Regarding hurricane disaster assistance, according to a CRS Report *U.S. Foreign Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean*, “Congress appropriated $100 million in October 2004 in emergency assistance for Caribbean nations (P.L. 108-324), with $42 million for Grenada, $38 million for Haiti, $18 million for Jamaica, and $2 million for other countries affected by the storms” (2006, 13). The United States Southern Command has played an important role in providing hurricane disaster relief to the Caribbean. In 2017, in the aftermath of hurricanes Irma and Maria, USAID and the Department of Defense provided nearly $22 million to the affected Caribbean nations which included: Antigua & Barbuda, The Bahamas, Dominica, St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Martin.
Energy Diplomacy

Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA)

At the Fifth Summit of the Americas which was held in 2009 in Port of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, President Barack Obama launched the Energy and Climate Partnership of the Americas (ECPA). According to the U.S. Department of State29, President Obama’s vision is to bring “countries across the Western Hemisphere together to facilitate the acceleration of clean energy development and deployment, advance energy security, and reduce energy poverty by sharing best practices, encouraging investment, and cooperating on technology research, development and deployment.” ECPA is shaped by the following pillars30: energy efficiency, renewable energy, cleaner and more efficient use of fossil fuels, energy infrastructure, energy poverty, regional energy integration, and energy research and innovation.

Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI)

Vice President Joe Biden announced the launching of the Caribbean Energy Security Initiative (CESI) during his visit to Trinidad and Tobago in June 2014. This was part of a two-pronged energy diplomacy initiative with one program for the Caribbean and one for Central America. The Caribbean Energy Security Summit was held in Washington D.C. on 26 January 2015 with Caribbean Heads of Government to advance energy cooperation under CESI. The outcome of the Summit was a joint statement where twenty-six governments, together with the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Secretariat,


Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), European Union (EU), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA), Organization of American States (OAS), and the World Bank recognized that “increased energy efficiency and more diversified, and clean energy sources can lead to improved energy security, increasing self-sufficiency, economic growth, and climate resilience as well as reducing greenhouse gas emissions”). The objective of the CESI is to attract investment in energy technologies in the region. According to the State Department there are three main pillars of CESI:

a) **Governance**: United States is providing technical assistance to governments in the Caribbean to set up the legal, regulatory and policy frameworks to reduce electricity costs in the region.

b) **Finance**: United States in conjunction with the U.S. Oversees Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), the U.S. Trade and Development Agency and USAID through the Clean Energy Finance Facility for the Caribbean and Central America (CEFF-CCA) are funding renewable energy projects in the Caribbean. OPIC has financed over $120 million in energy projects and has additional $70 million in the pipeline. The CEFF-CCA is proving up to $20 million in grant funding.

c) **Donor Coordination**: United States provides technical assistance to the CARICOM Secretariat for a platform to coordinate energy projects in the region. The platform called the Caribbean Sustainable Energy Roadmap and Strategy (C-SERMS) will track and meet sustainable energy goals and projects in CARICOM.

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The multilateral development banks, in particular the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) has been a big partner and financier of energy projects in the Caribbean, specifically around $33 million for projects in Jamaica, $3 million in The Bahamas and $60 million in Trinidad and Tobago.

Security Engagement

The United States engages bilaterally, regionally and multilaterally via various security assistance programs which involve the Caribbean. Some of these include: the long-standing cooperation program Operation Bahamas Turks and Caicos (OPBAT), Third Border Initiative, Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and Tradewinds.

- Third Border Initiative

Funding for the Third Border Initiative which was launched under the George W. Bush administration amounted to $8.9 million in fiscal year 2005, almost $3 million in fiscal year 2006 and a request of $3 million for fiscal year 2007 (CRS Report 2007, 27). This initiative provided funding for education, health, natural disasters, border security, law enforcement cooperation, anti-money laundering, professional development of police and prosecutors, and anti-corruption training and assistance throughout the Caribbean. Additionally, in 2007 the United States helped Caribbean nations with security in preparation for the Cricket World Cup games.

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- **Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI)**

At the Fifth Summit of the Americas held in Trinidad and Tobago in 2009, President Obama reiterated the need for greater security cooperation and announced the launching of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). A Congressional Service Report (CSR) prepared by Mark P. Sullivan explained that the CBSI was established “In anticipation of a potential “balloon effect” of drug trafficking shifting to the Caribbean region” (2016, 12). According to the Government Accountability Office (GAO), “The United States developed CBSI to complement the Merida Initiative and the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI) by mitigating potential criminal spillover resulting from successful reductions in drug trafficking and transnational crime in Mexico and Central America” (2013, 4). The CBSI focuses on three priority areas:

a) **Substantially reducing illicit trafficking;**

b) **Increasing public safety and security;**

c) **Promoting social justice.**

The United States has committed $437 million in funding since 2010\(^{34}\). Five Foreign Assistance Accounts have funded CBSI:

- International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
- Economic Support Fund (ESF)
- Development Assistance (DA)

- Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, De-mining, and Related programs (NADR)
- Foreign Military Financing (FMF)

Table 6: Caribbean Basin Security Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accounts for CBSI Funding</th>
<th>Description of funding used in CBSI</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INCLE</td>
<td>• Border control enhancement</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Police training and information sharing</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Criminal justice capacity building</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Drug demand reduction &amp; counter-narcotics</td>
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<td>ESF &amp; DA</td>
<td>• Education improvement</td>
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<td>• Workforce development</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Juvenile justice reform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Community-based law enforcement and judiciary programs</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Anticorruption efforts</td>
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<tr>
<td>NADR</td>
<td>• Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) &amp; Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Antitrafficking programs and training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• WMD identification workshops</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Firearms destruction and stockpile management</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Cargo targeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMF</td>
<td>• Maritime security capacity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Securing maritime borders</td>
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</table>

- **Tradewinds**

Tradewinds is an annual training exercise conducted by U.S. Southern Command with Caribbean Basin partner countries. It supports the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative and Southern Command’s “theater security engagement goal of building partner nation
capacity at the tactical and operational levels. In 2016, the training exercise took place of the coasts of Grenada and Jamaica but involved several Caribbean countries. According to U.S. Southern Command, the training exercises focused on multinational security operations, illicit trafficking, humanitarian assistance and disaster response operations.

III. Reasons for U.S. Engagement – Government Discourse

A review of Congressional testimonies during the period 2000-2016 from various Committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate have gleaned several reasons for interest and engagement in the Caribbean. After reading through the transcripts, I identified six reasons for paying attention to the Caribbean. These include: drug trafficking and the return of the Caribbean connection; rising insecurity, drug related violence and crime; economic interdependence and security; Venezuela’s oil diplomacy and Cuba’s Caribbean engagement; past neglect; and the ISIS terrorist threat emanating from the Caribbean. The following provides a summary of official government discourse.

a) Drug Trafficking and the Return of the Caribbean Connection. In 2000, Senator Strom Thurmond in his testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Oversight stated:

Today, the entire Caribbean is becoming an increasingly attractive avenue for trafficking and is the second major conduit for contraband. Interagency studies and intelligence sources indicate that detected smuggling attempts in the Caribbean are up…and it is estimated that 33 percent of the total cocaine smuggled into the United States last year came through the Caribbean. Clearly, the increased use of the Caribbean as a pipeline for drugs bound for the United States represents a disturbing trend and a serious threat to our Nation (Senate 2000, 1-2).

In 2000, Michael S. Vigil representing the Caribbean Field Division of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) also testified before the Subcommittee and informed the members that:

[F]ive years into the Southwest Border Initiative, drug trafficking is once again increasing in and through the Caribbean-South Florida corridor. The primary method for smuggling large quantities of cocaine through the Caribbean to the United States is via maritime ships. Go-fast boats, small launches with powerful motor; bulk cargo freighters; and containerized cargo vessels are the most common conveyances for moving large quantities of cocaine through the region. The Caribbean Corridor poses several impediments for a successful law enforcement strategy. First, the traffickers’ use of sophisticated compartments in freighters make inspections very time consuming and laborious. Second, the volume and variety of commercial cargo flowing through the Caribbean further exacerbates inspection and interdiction efforts. (Senate 2000, 10-16)

In 2012 the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control reported:

The Caucus is very concerned with the potential shift of drug trafficking patterns back to the Caribbean as a result of increased interdiction efforts in Mexico and Central America. Violence in the Caribbean has already risen in recent years and a further shift would likely bring with it more violence (Senate 2012, 9-23).

b) Rising Insecurity, Drug-related Violence and Crime. In 2007, Congress discussed with concern the findings of the UNODC and the World Bank in their Report entitled *Crime, Violence, and Development: Trends, Costs, and Policy Options in the Caribbean* (H.R. 865). Congress made particular note that the Caribbean region had the highest murder and assault rates in the world; kidnappings in Trinidad and Tobago doubled between 1999 and 2005; and that crime cost the Jamaican economy 3.7 percent of its GDP in 2001 (H.R. 865). These facts led the House to welcome the recommendations contained in the report and to urge:
the United States Government to increase counter-narcotics assistance to Caribbean region; to increase coordination on policy development and implementation with Caribbean governments to help combat crime and violence in the region; [and] to work with Caribbean governments to mitigate the negative effects of United States deportation policy (H.R. 865, 5).

In 2012 the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control reported:

While drug trafficking through the Caribbean has not yet returned to the levels of the 1980s, drug-related violence continues to rise. In 2010, Jamaica had the fourth highest murder rate in the world with 52 homicides per 100,000 people. In 2010, The Bahamas had its highest recorded murder rate, 28 per 100,000. Only seven miles from the Venezuelan coast, Trinidad and Tobago has experienced a significant rise in crime due to drug trafficking culminating in the imposition of an almost four month curfew in 2011. This is a very serious situation which demands U.S. attention [emphasis added] (9-23).

c) **Economic Interdependence and Security.** The impact of 9/11 and the recognition of the importance strong economic linkages between the United States and the Caribbean and the need to maintain open trade with secure borders. Both Dan Burton and Jerry Weller in their testimonies before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Committee on International Relations explained:

What is perhaps less well known is the fact that the Caribbean is the tenth largest trading partner of the United States, and an important destination for tourism and business. Since 2001, there has been a newfound awareness of the importance of striking the right balance between opening markets and protecting our borders. The Caribbean region constitutes America’s third border, and one which is critically important in both economic and security terms. There are numerous threats to security in the Caribbean, from organized crime, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, infectious disease outbreaks, and natural disasters. All of these threats either directly or indirectly constitute challenges to our security here in the United States. The Caribbean countries lack resources to adequately maintain and guarantee security of their own waters. There are opportunities to strengthen intra-Caribbean commerce and trade with the United States. Our neighbors in the Caribbean should continue taking steps to upgrade security
at airports and tighten security on ships and cargos destined for United States ports (U.S. House 2005, 1-3).

The Caribbean, our third border, is a region that is often neglected in the headlines, as well as the attention of this Congress. Trinidad and Tobago is an important energy supplier to the United States. I think that two-thirds of the liquefied natural gas that we import to the United States comes from Trinidad and Tobago. CARICOM and its members, are important allies. The Caribbean is an important region in the world and for the United States (House 2005, 28-29).

d) Venezuela’s oil diplomacy and Cuba’s Caribbean engagement. In 2005, Dan Fisk, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State stated:

The Caribbean remains a high priority for this Administration. This is particularly important at a time when countries such as Cuba and Venezuela are promoting an alternative and regressive vision for the region’s future. Most recently, Hugo Chavez launched Petrocaribe. Petrocaribe undermines the position of private sector companies in the region and advances his “Bolivarian alternative” trade and economic agenda. Despite Cuban and Venezuelan attempts to drive a wedge between the US and its Caribbean partners, Caribbean countries have not been lured by failed statist ideologies. Mindful of the many ties that bind our country to the region – its proximity, the volume of trade we engage in, the large numbers of Americans of Caribbean descent, the massive flow of tourists between the U.S. and the Caribbean – we are their willing partner in the effort to revitalize their economies, strengthen their democracies, provide opportunity to their citizens and enhance their security (U.S. House 2005, 20-21).

e) Past Neglect. A recognition that the Caribbean in the past did not receive sufficient attention by the United States Congress. In a hearing before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere Barbara Lee expressed this concern:

Often times I wonder why the Caribbean is often overlooked and forgotten, in terms of our focus as it relates to United States foreign policy. Sometimes I wonder if it is because much of the English-speaking Caribbean boasts of some of the strongest democracies, and so maybe they are often taken for granted. Often times the Caribbean is often overshadowed by political hotspots I must say, like Cuba, Haiti, Colombia, and Mexico. [W]e have
many allies. We have friends here in America who are of Caribbean descent, and who want our country to engage more in a positive way with their families and friends in the Caribbean. And so I am glad that we are having this hearing today. We need to really put the Caribbean on the front burner, in terms of this Subcommittee (House 2005, 7-8).

f) **ISIS Terrorist Threat.** Caribbean nationals leaving for Syria and returning from the Islamic State could pose a threat to the United States. This concern was expressed by Gen. John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command. According to 2015 news reports:\textsuperscript{36}

The war in Syria has attracted roughly 100 foreign fighters from the Caribbean who could easily make their way to the United States, said the top U.S. military commander for the southern hemisphere. With little ability to track and monitor foreign fighters when they return, it would be relatively easy for those fighters to “walk” north to the U.S. border along the same networks used to traffic drugs and humans, according to Gen. John Kelly, commander of U.S. Southern Command.

\textsuperscript{36} http://www.defenseone.com/threats/2015/03/us-military-concerned-isis-fighters-returning-caribbean-could-reach-Border/107421/
CHAPTER 7
Results: Section II

Trend Analysis of U.S. Foreign Assistance to the Caribbean

I. The Cold War to Post 9/11 Era

Foreign aid data was available from 1956 to 2016 from USAID’s online database *Foreign Aid Explorer*. I divided the data into three time-periods: Cold War (1956–1991); Post-Cold War (1992-2001); and Post-9/11 (2002-2016). I then totaled aid going to the four case studies – Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana. While the time-periods vary in number of years, the graph below reflects the general global trend of U.S. foreign assistance since the end of World War II. Aid to the Caribbean was highest during the Cold War. During the post-Cold War era aid declined dramatically to the Caribbean, as was the case of U.S. aid to the rest of the world. In the post-9/11 era, aid to the Caribbean increased and was higher than the post-Cold War period.

Figure 22

![Bar graph showing total U.S. aid to Bahamas, Jamaica, T&T, & Guyana (1956-2016)](image)

Source: Compiled from USAID’s Online Database
The graphs below show the trends of U.S. foreign assistance in millions of US dollars to each of the four case studies over the 30-year period 1985-2015. As demonstrated, each country displays a different trend. Historically, Jamaica received the most aid from the United States while Trinidad and Tobago received the least over thirty years. In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, aid levels remained almost the same over thirty years. With Jamaica, aid was highest during the Cold War years. While assistance to Jamaica declined during the 1990s, it was still comparatively higher than aid going to The Bahamas, Guyana, and Trinidad and Tobago during that period. U.S. assistance to Jamaica began to increase again between 2000 and 2015 even though aid levels were comparatively lower than the 1990s. In the case of The Bahamas, aid levels during the 1980s and 1990s remained almost consistent but aid increased during the period 2000-2015. U.S. aid to Guyana showed an upward trend during the 1990s and increasing from the 1990s to the 2000s.
II. Twenty-first Century U.S. Foreign Aid to the Caribbean

The United States engagement among the Caribbean nations has varied by countries and by sectors in the areas of development, security, energy, health and humanitarian relief. This section examines the four case studies to determine which areas have received U.S. attention over the twenty-first century during the time period 2001 – 2015. As shown in the chart below, among the four case studies, Jamaica received the most U.S. foreign aid over the period 2001-2015, followed by Guyana, the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago. The following section will explore in detail the trends for each of the case studies.
The Bahamas

US assistance to the Bahamas was comparatively low among the four cases but was higher than aid given to Trinidad and Tobago. Three broad trends can be observed for the Bahamas over the 15-year period: aid flows were fairly constant between 2001 and 2004 averaging around $7 million; between 2005 and 2008, aid increased significantly from around $4 million in 2005 to around $20 million in 2008; between 2008 to 2015 aid declined dramatically from $20 million to $3 million. The majority of aid to the Bahamas was military, while some aid was classified as economic. The United States and the Bahamas have a long-standing history of counter-narcotics cooperation under Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT). The United States also signed a comprehensive maritime agreement with the Bahamas in 2004 which continues cooperation in counter-narcotics and migrant interdiction.
In 2001, the sectors which received funding included social infrastructure, government, conflict peace and security with two U.S. agencies providing support: Department of Defense and the Department of State. The activities which received funding included counter-narcotics, foreign military financing, and international military education and training. In 2008 when aid was at its highest, of the $20 million of total aid more than half was allocated to counter-narcotics ($13 million) and around $6 million was targeted at the use and handling of nuclear materials. The U.S. Department of Defense, Department of
Energy and Department of State were the main agencies involved in the Bahamas in 2008. By 2015, conflict, peace and security received the bulk of funding with a variety of activities which included counter-narcotics and law enforcement, Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training, international nuclear materials protection, anti-terrorism training, and international passenger interdiction training. The main U.S. agencies involved in 2015 included the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Energy, Department of Justice and Department of Homeland Security.

Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database
Jamaica

Of the four case studies, Jamaica has received the most foreign assistance from the United States over the 15-year period. Three broad trends can be observed: a spike in aid from around $29 million in 2001 to $64 million in 2005; a general fall in aid from 2005 to around $24 million in 2008; and a gradual rise in aid from 2008 to 2015 with assistance totaling around $38 million. The majority of aid was economic for the entire period 2001 to 2015. Economic aid accounted for around 94 per cent of total aid while military aid accounted for around 6 per cent. By 2015, economic aid continued to account for the majority of assistance, around 87 percent. It is to be noted however that military assistance almost doubled from 6 per cent in 2001 to 13 per cent in 2015.
As shown in the charts below foreign assistance to Jamaica was distributed among a variety of sectors from 2001 to 2015. Food aid received the most funding around 27 per cent of total aid. Funds were also allocated to activities targeted at improving literacy among Jamaican youth, improving quality of natural resource areas, improving reproductive health, improving citizen security and the Peace Corps. In 2005 when aid was at its highest,
the main sectors receiving funds included food aid and reconstruction relief in the aftermath of hurricane Ivan, each sector receiving around $18 million each. Other activities in 2005 which received funding included Peace Corps, increasing literacy among Jamaican youth, international narcotics and law enforcement, and improving citizen security. In 2015 most of the aid was allocated to the environment and energy sectors each receiving around $10 million and $7 million respectively. The main activities included global nuclear material threat reduction, adapting to climate change and climate economic analysis, Caribbean clean energy, counter-narcotics program, and HIV/AIDS assistance. The United States Department of Agriculture, Department of State, Department of Defense, Department of Energy and US AID were the key agencies working with Jamaica over the period 2001 to 2015.

Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database
Over a fifteen-year period, there were two broad trends in US bilateral aid to Guyana. Firstly, there was a continuous increase in US foreign assistance from approximately $17 million in 2001 to $33 million in 2008. Secondly, foreign aid declined from about $33 million in 2008 to around $7 million in 2015.
As shown in the chart below, over the entire period, most of the aid was economic while a small percentage was military aid. In 2001, 97 per cent of the foreign aid was economic and 3 per cent was military. In 2015, most of the aid continued to be economic in nature, around 90 per cent with 10 per cent being allocated to military assistance.
As shown in the chart below, in 2001 the majority of foreign assistance (around 60 per cent) went into food aid. Of the total $17 million assigned to Guyana, around $10 million was allocated to food security assistance, with the United States Department of Agriculture contributing around $7.8 million. Other sectors which received funding included business and government which received around $2 million each for activities geared towards improving climate for private investment and more responsive and participatory governance and the rule of law. Less was allocated for population policies and reproductive health, agriculture and security.

![Figure 36: Guyana Top Sectors of US Aid 2001](image)

Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database

From 2001 to 2008, U.S. foreign assistance almost doubled to Guyana. From 2003 to 2008 most of the aid went to the population and reproductive health sectors. In 2008 when aid was at its highest, around $23 million (out of a total of about $34 million) was allocated to HIV/AIDS assistance. Guyana benefited heavily from the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) which was launched under President Bush in 2003. PEPFAR funding was also complimented by funding from the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of State. In 2008 around $5 million went to the government sector in activities such as legislative functions and rule of law, around $1.5 million in enabling a business environment and smaller amounts were allocated for trade policy and security.

By 2015, U.S. assistance declined significantly. Over 50 per cent of aid however continued to be allocated to HIV/AIDS reduction with the Department of HHS being a lead agency. While the total aid declined, the share of funds allocated to conflict, peace
and security increased from around $268,000 in 2008 to $735,000 in 2015 with the Department of Defense providing Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). It is also to be noted that the U.S. Peace Corps was a constant presence in Guyana over the 15-year period.

**Trinidad and Tobago**

Trinidad and Tobago received the least amount of foreign assistance compared to the other Anglophone countries over the 15-year period. One main reason for such low levels of aid has to do with the United States position regarding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its powers to prosecute Americans. The United States has actively opposed the ICC while Trinidad and Tobago was instrumental in establishing the Court. The American Service-Members’ Protection Act of 2003 seeks to protect members of the Armed Forces from international criminal prosecution. According to Sec 2007 (a) of the Act, military assistance is prohibited to the government of a country that is party to the ICC. The President however may waive the prohibition of military assistance if the country has entered into an agreement with the United States pursuant to Article 98 of the Rome Statute which prevents the ICC from proceeding against U.S. personnel present in such country.

Starting in 2002, the United States started negotiating these “Article 98 Agreements” or Bilateral Impunity Agreements where countries agree not to surrender Americans to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Countries which did not sign agreements were subjected to a cut-
off of Foreign Military Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Excess Defense Articles funding. Trinidad and Tobago did not sign an Article 98 Agreement with the United States. The Caribbean, but in particular Trinidad and Tobago’s role was critical to the establishment of an International Criminal Court. In 1998, Trinidad and Tobago’s Prime Minister Arthur N.R. Robinson submitted to the United Nations General Assembly an agenda item for the establishment of an ICC. This eventually led to the adoption of a resolution calling for the creation of an International Criminal Court. By 2006, ICC-related sanctions began to have a negative impact on U.S. relations with Latin America and the Caribbean and America’s goals of security cooperation in the region. Support within Congress for prohibition of military assistance began to diminish. In 2006 the American Services Protection Act was modified to end the ban on International Military Education and Training (IMET) but restrictions on Foreign Military Financing remained in place.

As shown in the chart below, assistance fluctuated between 2001 and 2006, but there was a general increase from around $150,000 in 2006 to $1.4 million in 2015. Based on US AID’s classification, for most of the years, military aid exceeded economic aid. In 2002 and 2003 almost all aid was military and from 2010 to 2015 military aid exceeded economic aid.

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37 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/13/anr-robinson
38 https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL33337.html
As shown in the charts below, in 2001 aid was targeted to the government and civil society, conflict, peace, security and social infrastructure. The main activities in 2001 included international narcotics and law enforcement, Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and International Military Education and Training (IMET). The United States Department of State, Department of Defense and Department of Navy were the main agencies working in
Trinidad and Tobago. The most aid that Trinidad and Tobago received was around $2.5 million in 2004, and the U.S. agencies involved included the Department of Homeland Security, Department of State, Department of Labor, Department of Interior and Department of Defense. The top activities included trade policy technical assistance, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement and HIV/AIDS activities. In 2007, assistance spiked again to around $1.6 million of which $1.3 million was allocated to anti-terrorism assistance targeted to the government and civil society. By 2010, around 65 percent of assistance was allocated to conflict, peace and security with the top three activities being Foreign Military Financing, Anti-Terrorism Assistance and International Military Education and Training. In 2010, about 12 percent was dedicated to the energy sector in activities involving reduction of the global nuclear materials threat. In 2015, the main US agencies providing assistance included the Department of Defense, the Department of State, Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security. The top activities included Anti-Terrorism Training, International Military Education and Training, Global Nuclear Material Threat Reduction, International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and International Passenger Operations.
Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database

Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database

Source: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer Database
CHAPTER 8
Results: Section III
Quantitative Analysis

This chapter presents the results of the quantitative techniques (correlations, panel regression with fixed effects, and descriptive statistics) used to test the four hypotheses. Correlations were done for the variables U.S. aid, year, GDP, trade balance and drug seizures. The panel regression was done with the variables U.S. aid, GDP and trade balance. Descriptive statistics were used to analyze the variable political ideology.

Correlation Analysis
The Stata correlations output produces two values: the \( p \)-value or the level of statistical significance and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient \( r \). The interpretation for both values is as follows:

a) The \( p \)-value or probability value is used to test whether the relationship between the variables is statistically significant. The null hypothesis states that there is no relationship between the independent and dependent variables. If the \( p \)-value is less than 0.05 then the null hypothesis can be rejected, if the \( p \)-value is greater than 0.05 then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected.

b) The Pearson’s correlation coefficient \( r \) describes the relationship between the two variables and shows the direction and strength of the association. Pearson’s \( r \) has a value that falls between -1 and +1. If \( r \) is positive then there is a positive correlation between the two variables. If \( r \) is negative then there is a negative correlation between the two variables. The strength of association is measured by
c) the coefficient’s value $r$ and shows how well the independent variable works in explaining the dependent variable. As a guide, the following will be used to interpret the strength of association:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Coefficient Value</th>
<th>Strength of Association</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$0.1 &lt; r &lt; 0.3$</td>
<td>Small correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$0.3 &lt; r &lt; 0.5$</td>
<td>Medium correlation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r &gt; 0.5$</td>
<td>Strong correlation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results**

The results in the table below show the correlations output between U.S. aid and the following variables: year, drug seizures, GDP, and trade balance. The analysis will first examine whether the test is statistically significant and will then look at the relationship between the variables for each of the four countries.

1. **The Bahamas**

There is a statistically significant relationship between U.S. aid and year because the p-value of the correlation coefficient is 0.0048. The correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and year is 0.4933. There is a positive relationship between these two variables with a medium strength correlation. Higher levels of U.S. aid are associated with years, that is, over time there are increases in U.S. aid to The Bahamas. This is consistent with the trend analysis which showed increasing US aid to The Bahamas over the time period (1985-2015). There is also a statistically significant relationship between U.S. aid and GDP because the p-value of the correlation coefficient is 0.0006. The correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and GDP is 0.5788. There is a positive relationship between these two variables with a strong correlation. Higher values of U.S. aid are related to higher values of GDP. The p-value
for U.S. aid and drug seizures was 0.1211 and the p-value for U.S. aid and trade balance was 0.2113. Since these values are greater than 0.05, there is no statistically significant relationship between U.S. aid and drug seizures or U.S. aid and trade balance for The Bahamas.

2. Jamaica

There is a statistically significant relationship between US aid and year, US aid and GDP, and US aid and trade balance with the p-values of all three correlation coefficients registering 0.0000. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and year is -0.8244 indicating a negative but strong correlation. Over time, less aid goes to Jamaica. This is consistent with the trend analysis which showed an overall decline in aid to Jamaica over the 30-year period 1985-2015. The correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and GDP is -0.8105 indicating a negative but strong correlation. As GDP increases, U.S. aid decreases. The correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and trade balance is -0.6982 indicating a negative but also strong correlation. An increase in U.S. trade deficit decreases U.S. aid. There is a statistically insignificant relationship between US aid and drug seizures since the p-value is 0.4192.

3. Trinidad and Tobago

In the case of Trinidad and Tobago, none of the correlations were statistically significant since the p-values for all the correlation coefficients were greater than 0.05.

4. Guyana

In the case of Guyana, the only statistically significant correlation was US aid and drug seizures with a p-value of 0.0129. All other correlations were statistically insignificant
with p-values greater than 0.05. The correlation coefficient for U.S. aid and drug seizures is 0.4639 indicating a positive and moderate strength correlation. For Guyana, U.S. aid is associated with an increase in drug seizures.

Summary

The heterogenous nature of the four cases are reflected in the varied results of the correlations by country. This is expected since foreign aid levels were significantly different for each case as was shown in the trend analysis in the previous chapter. The purpose of the correlation analysis was to get an idea of the overall relationship between the variables to determine their strength and direction. Given that correlation does not imply causation, I would now turn to the regression analysis.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATA CORRELATIONS OUTPUT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Values</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Aid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drug Seizures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade Balance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p-value</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pearson’s r</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Regression Analysis

The panel regression permits the observation of the four states across time. The fixed effects model controls for time-invariant characteristics between the countries, therefore taking the heterogenous nature of the cases into account. The regression analysis will be done with only two independent variables GDP and trade balance since these are two interval-level variables with consistent data. Before the regression, I did an analysis of the two independent variables to determine if these variables followed a trend over time in each of the cases. The results for these are presented then the results for the panel regression will follow.

Independent Variable X1: Income levels of Caribbean States (GDP)

The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the four Caribbean states was available from the World Bank from the period 1960 to 2016. As shown the in the chart below, total GDP in Current US$ for all four countries showed an upward trend, increasing over the last six decades. By 2015, Trinidad and Tobago’s GDP was around $23 billion, Jamaica around $14 billion, The Bahamas around $US 8 billion, and Guyana around $US 3 billion.

The chart below shows U.S. trade balance (U.S. exports minus U.S. imports) with each of the four case studies over the 25-year period 1991 to 2016 (years data was available on the database UN Comtrade). Of the four countries, Trinidad and Tobago is United States most significant trading partner while Guyana is the least important by looking at the value of trade between the countries measured in US dollars. The United States has maintained a trade deficit with Trinidad and Tobago, meaning the U.S. has imported more goods than it has exported over the last twenty-five years. United States trade deficit with Trinidad and Tobago over the 20-year period 1991-2011 increased by almost $US 6 billion. This is due to U.S. imports of liquefied natural gas and petrochemicals such as ammonia, urea and
methanol from Trinidad and Tobago. The United States has maintained trade surpluses with The Bahamas and Jamaica over the 25-year period, with the U.S. exporting more to these countries. U.S. trade surplus with The Bahamas and Jamaica increased over the period with the trade flows showing the same pattern for both countries. Between 1991 and 2015, U.S. trade surplus with both The Bahamas and Jamaica increased by over a $US 1 billion, indicating that these countries have continued to import more from the United States from the 1990s to the 2000s.

Figure 45

Panel Regression with Fixed Effects

My panel data set was constructed based on the availability of data. The results of the panel data analysis with fixed effects are shown below.
PANEL DATA ANALYSIS WITH FIXED EFFECTS

STATATA

. xtreg US Foreign Aid (y) GDP (x1) Net Trade (x2), fe

Fixed-effects (within) regression
Group variable: country_id

Number of obs = 100
Number of groups = 4

R-sq:
within = 0.1431  min = 25
between = 0.2612  avg = 25
overall = 0.0006  max = 25

corr (u_i, Xb) = -0.5766
F(2, 94) = 7.85
Prob > F = 0.0007

| US Foreign Aid (y) | Coef.  | Std. Err. | t     | P>|t|   | [95% Conf. Interval] |
|--------------------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|---------------------|
| GDP (x1)           | -0.0005883 | 0.0001528 | -3.85 | 0.000 | -0.0008917 to 0.0002849 |
| Trade Balance (x2) | -0.0014987 | 0.0005062 | -2.96 | 0.004 | -0.0025038 to 0.0004936 |
| _cons              | 9.401838  | 1.297419  | 7.25  | 0.000 | 6.825782 to 11.97789  |

sigma_u = 6.3897314
sigma_e = 5.8870822
rho = 0.54087445

F test that all u_i=0: F(3, 94) = 16.41
Prob > F = 0.0000

The general equation for the fixed effects model is the following:

\[ Y_{it} = \beta_1 X_{it} + \beta_2 X_{it} + \alpha_i + u_{it} \]

Where

- Y is the Dependent Variable = U.S. Foreign Aid
- \( i = \) country, \( t = \) time
- \( \beta_1 \) is the coefficient for the Independent Variable \( X_1 = \) GDP
- \( \beta_2 \) is the coefficient for the Independent Variable \( X_2 = \) Trade Balance
- \( \alpha_i \) is the unknown intercept for each country
- \( u_{it} \) is the error term

The equation for the fixed effects model is the following:

\[
U.S. \text{Foreign Aid}_{it} = -0.0005883 \times (GDP_{it}) + -0.0014987 \times (\text{Trade Balance}_{it}) + 9.40_i + -0.5766_{it}
\]

**Interpretation**

1. **F test of significance**

The F test of significance tests the hypothesis that all the coefficients to the Independent Variables are equal to zero. *It tests the statistical significance of the regression as a whole.* If the number for the Prob > F is less than 0.05 then we can reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal to zero. In this model, the F statistic = 0.0007. Since 0.0007 is less than 0.05, I can be confident that the coefficients in the model are different from zero and that the model as a whole has something to say about the behavior of the dependent variable \( Y \).

2. **Two-tailed p-values test**

The two-tailed p-values test the hypothesis that *each coefficient* is different from zero. To reject the null hypothesis, the P > | t | values have to be lower than 0.05. In this model, the p-value for the coefficient for \( X_1 \) (GDP) is 0.000 and the p-value for the coefficient for \( X_2 \) (Trade Balance) is 0.004. Since both p-values are less than 0.05, I can reject the null hypothesis that each coefficient is equal to zero. In this model, the two independent variables have a significant influence on the dependent variable \( Y \).
3. **t-statistic**

The t-values test the hypothesis that each coefficient is different from zero. The larger the t-value, the more likely it is that the estimated coefficient is statistically significant and the more likely the null hypothesis can be rejected. For a 95% confidence level or a 5% significant level, the t-value has to be higher than 1.96. In this model, all three t-values are greater than 1.96. The Independent Variables therefore have a significant influence on the dependent variable.

4. **Fraction of variance due to differences across panels**

The value $\rho$ is known as the intra-class correlation and represents the fraction of variance due to differences across panels. In this model, the value for $\rho$ is 0.54087445. This means that 54% of the variance is due to differences across the panels.

5. **Coefficients of the independent variables**

The regression coefficients indicate how much $Y$ changes when $X$ changes by one unit. Multiplying the coefficients by 100 gives the estimated percentage change in US foreign aid for a one unit change in $X_1$ and $X_2$. Interpretations can be made based on the equation:

$$U.S. \text{ Foreign Aid}_{it} = -0.0005883 (GDP_{it}) + -0.0014987 (\text{Trade Balance}_{it}) + 9.40i + -0.5766_{it}$$

*Independent Variable X1 – Income levels or GDP*

If aid is given based on development needs, as countries become wealthier, aid levels should decline. I would expect a negative relationship between GDP and U.S. foreign aid. The regression coefficient for GDP is -0.0005883. The negative sign shows that an increase in GDP will result in a decrease in U.S. aid. Multiplying the coefficient by 100
and rounding off the decimal gives 0.06. GDP in US$ millions was used for the regression. Thus, if GDP increases by US$ 1 million, then U.S. aid is expected to decline by 0.06%.

*Independent Variable X₂ - Trade Balance*

A trade surplus with the Caribbean would indicate that the US has a greater economic interest in the Caribbean and should be more willing to increase foreign aid. A trade deficit would indicate that the US has less economic interest and would be less willing to increase foreign aid. I would expect a negative relationship between trade balance and US aid. The regression coefficient for trade balance is -0.0014987. The negative sign shows that a trade deficit would lead to a decrease in foreign aid. Multiplying the coefficient by 100 and rounding off the decimal gives 0.15. Trade flows is US$ millions was used for the regression. Thus, if the US trade deficit increases by US$ 1 million, then US aid is expected to decline by 0.15%.

*Limitations*

Given that trade data was only available from 1991, data is missing from 1985 to 1990 for the variable trade balance. This data set should have produced 120 observations (4 countries x 30 years), but given that some years did not have data, the data set produced 100 observations (4 countries x 25 years). While the data set is unbalanced, it was still possible to run a regression with the statistical software *Stata* with 100 observations. Since U.S. aid and drug seizures were statistically insignificant for three out the four cases, then it was not a strong indicator and was not used in the regression. A quantitative analysis was not done to test the variable “security interests”.
Descriptive Statistics

Independent Variable X3: Political Ideology

Political ideology was measured as a nominal-level variable, that is, a Democratic administration was coded as 1 and a Republican administration was coded as 0 for each year. Given that this was not an interval-level variable, it was not included in the correlation nor regression analysis. Instead, descriptive statistics were generated using Stata over the time period 1985-2015 to determine on average if Democratic or Republican administrations allocated more or less aid. The table below shows the sum of U.S. foreign assistance to The Bahamas, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana over the period 1985 – 2015 taking political ideology into account. Aid allocations were split into categories divided by political party and time period:


Over a 30-year period, Republicans allocated almost double the amount of foreign assistance to the Caribbean than Democrats. Total foreign aid given by Republican administrations averaged around $9.23 million compared to $4.85 million by Democratic administrations during the period 1985 to 2015. In the pre-9/11 period (1985 – 2000), foreign aid to these countries by Republican administrations averaged around $14.63 million compared to $6.34 million allocated by Democratic administrations. In the post-
9/11 (2001-2015) era however, both Republican and Democrats allocated the same amount of foreign aid to these four Caribbean countries, an average of around $3 million.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Republican, 1985-2015</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>9.23</td>
<td>17.65</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Democrat, 1985-2015</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.85</td>
<td>6.85</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>14.63</td>
<td>23.73</td>
<td>0.039</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>6.34</td>
<td>8.87</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.82</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Aid in $US Millions</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>3.09</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 9
Results: Section IV
Mixed Methods Analysis

This dissertation sought to answer the main research question, why has the United States increased engagement with the Caribbean in the twenty-first century? Both qualitative and quantitative techniques were used to answer the research question based on the following theoretically derived explanations:

- **U.S. Security Interests (Realism)**
- **U.S. Economic Interests (Liberalism)**
- **Political Ideology – Liberal/Conservative (Constructivism)**
- **Development Needs – Income levels**

This research has combined both qualitative and quantitative techniques to test my hypotheses. The following is an analysis which combines both the qualitative and quantitative results.

1. **U.S. Security Interests (Realism)**

   **H1:** In a comparison of countries, those experiencing higher levels of drug trafficking will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than those experiencing lower levels of drug trafficking.

   Measuring security interests for a quantitative analysis such as a regression proved difficult. Levels of drug trafficking measured by cocaine seizures was the best proxy to use; however, the data was available but not consistent for all the years for each of the case studies and correlations with drug seizures and U.S. aid were insignificant. I also recognize
that drug trafficking is not the only security concern in the Caribbean but consistent data for all the cases of other security issues was difficult to find for the purposes of a quantitative analysis. This hypothesis was best tested using qualitative techniques such a review of Congressional testimonies and U.S. government documents and by examining the types of security assistance that was provided to the Caribbean.

From the qualitative analysis, drug trafficking through the Caribbean was and continues to be a main concern for the United States and was a main reason for increased U.S. engagement. Not only the drug trafficking but also the accompanying crime and violence in the Caribbean is a major concern to American policymakers. The escalating murder rates in the islands was a major issue. This was highlighted in several Congressional testimonies. Additionally, one of the three goals of the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI) is to “substantially reducing drug trafficking” and one of the accounts used to fund the CBSI is the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account. In the cases of the Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago, counter-narcotics cooperation was one of the top engagement activities between the United States and these two countries which have had some of the highest levels of cocaine seizures over the last fifteen years. In the case of the Bahamas, counter-narcotics cooperation has continued under Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) into the twenty-first century. Three of the case studies, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas all experienced high levels of drug trafficking, yet Trinidad and Tobago and the Bahamas received lower levels of total U.S. aid. Security was therefore one but not the only reason that the United States increased engagement with Caribbean nations.
Drug trafficking is also not the only security concern for the United States. While this hypothesis was narrowly defined, the qualitative analysis revealed other security issues which have caused the United States to pay the Caribbean attention. In the aftermath of 9/11, protecting the U.S. border became a top priority and so border security became a focus of U.S. engagement with the region. Anti-terrorism training in the Caribbean especially in Trinidad and Tobago also became a priority for the U.S. government. Trinidad and Tobago has also been high on the radar of the United States due to around 100 nationals leaving to fight for ISIS in recent years. Drug trafficking, border security and terrorism have been the main security concerns for the United States in the Caribbean in twenty-first century and this has led to continued engagement with the Caribbean.

2. **U.S. Economic Interest (Liberalism)**

**H2:** In a comparison of countries, those having a trade deficit with the United States will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than countries with a trade surplus with the United States.

A trade deficit would indicate that the U.S. has less economic interest and would be less willing to increase foreign aid. As shown in the previous chapters, Trinidad and Tobago was the only country with which the United States had a deepening trade deficit and Trinidad and Tobago was the country which received the lowest levels of U.S. foreign assistance among the four case studies. A trade deficit was not the only reason Trinidad and Tobago received less aid, there were other factors mentioned in previous chapters such as the International Criminal Court and Article 98 Agreements. From the regression results
however, the regression coefficient for trade balance was negative, showing that a trade
deficit would lead to a decline in U.S. aid. The United States views the Caribbean region
as an important trading partner. This was underscored from the qualitative review of
Congressional testimonies. Dan Burton and Jerry Weller in their testimonies before the
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere of the House Committee on International
Relations both stated “What is perhaps less well known is the fact that the Caribbean is the
tenth largest trading partner of the United States, and an important destination for tourism
and business. There are opportunities to strengthen intra-Caribbean commerce and trade
with the United States. CARICOM and its members, are important allies” (U.S. House,
2005). Economic interest in the Caribbean is an important consideration by the United
States in deciding whether to increase engagement with the region. Countries with which
the United States had a trade surplus did receive higher levels of aid, and Trinidad and
Tobago which had a trade deficit with the United States received lower levels of aid.

3. Political Ideology – Liberal/Conservative (Constructivism)

**H3:** Liberal administrations will more likely give higher levels of U.S.
foreign assistance to the Caribbean than Conservative administrations.

The statistics gathered on U.S. foreign aid to the four Caribbean countries have shown that
conservative administrations allocated more foreign aid to the Caribbean than liberal
administrations in the pre-9/11 period, that is from 1985-2000. In the post-9/11 period
(2001-2015), both conservative and liberal administrations allocated on average the same
amount of U.S. foreign assistance. For the twenty-first century, political ideology was not
a cause for increased U.S. engagement. From the qualitative research, the results for U.S.
engagement in the twenty-first century revealed that there was much continuity in programs and initiatives from the Bush to the Obama administrations.

In the area of health for example, the Obama administration continued funding for HIV/AIDS programs in the Caribbean which began under President George W. Bush. Cooperation in security also continued from the Third Border Initiative under the Bush administration to the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative under the Obama administration. Under Obama’s liberal administration, there was more diplomatic engagement in the Caribbean by high level officials such as visits by Vice President Joe Biden to Trinidad and Tobago in 2014 and President Obama’s visit to Trinidad and Tobago in 2009 and then to Jamaica in 2015. But in terms of foreign aid allocations, roughly the same amount of money went to the Caribbean under both conservative and liberal administrations, indicating much continuity and consistency in United States engagement policy with the Caribbean which was not affected by political ideology.

4. Development Needs – Income levels

**H4:** In a comparison of countries, those with lower levels of income will be more likely to receive higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than those with higher levels of income.

Among the four case studies, The Bahamas and Trinidad and Tobago are the wealthier nations due to higher levels of income with GDP per capita around US$ 22,217 and $US 21,317 respectively in 2014. Jamaica and Guyana are the poorer countries which had GDP per capita around US$ 5,119 and US$ 4,028 respectively in 2014. As shown in the graph
below, Jamaica and Guyana both received higher levels of U.S. foreign assistance than Trinidad and Tobago and The Bahamas from the Cold War to the post-9/11 period. The results from the regression analysis also showed a negative relationship between U.S. aid and GDP, with the regression coefficient for GDP being negative, meaning an increase in GDP will lead to a decrease in U.S. aid.

![Figure 46](image)

**Source**: Compiled from Foreign Aid Explorer

From the qualitative results discussed in the previous chapters, development became a core component of twenty-first century U.S. engagement with the Caribbean and became one of the pillars of the Bush administration’s national security strategy. In particular, aid allocations falling under the umbrella of the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA) were determined by *inter alia* countries’ incomes levels. Guyana, one of the poorer countries in the Caribbean benefited from MCA funding. Development needs as measured by income levels was a cause for increased engagement in the Caribbean.
Theoretical explanations

The reasons for increased U.S. engagement in the Caribbean can be explained through realist theoretical lens. United States foreign policy in the Caribbean was driven by U.S. security interests since transnational threats in the Caribbean such as drug trafficking and terrorism are problems which reach the U.S. border. Therefore, security issues in the Caribbean region affect U.S. national interests. Development was also a main reason for U.S. engagement, but development was viewed from a national security perspective in the context of a post-9/11 era and was also linked to terrorism. As George W. Bush stated in April 2017, “Societies mired in disease breed hopelessness and despair, leaving people ripe for recruitment by extremists” and so development funding for HIV/AIDS was also linked to security. Liberal theory also proved useful in explaining U.S. engagement in the Caribbean. Commercial linkages between the United States and the Caribbean was recognized as an important consideration in increasing engagement, especially the fact that the Caribbean is an important trading partner with the United States. Constructivist theory was not as helpful as political ideology did not make a difference in foreign policy decisions regarding the Caribbean, two terms of a Republican administration followed by two terms of a Democratic administration led to much continuity in policies and programs.
CONCLUSION

From the mid-nineteenth to around mid-twentieth century, American interests in the British colonies were driven mainly by economic and security concerns. Asphalt and oil reserves in Trinidad, aluminum and bauxite in British Guiana and Jamaica all drew profit-seeking American entrepreneurs and multinationals to the Caribbean. During World War II, the British colonies became vital assets as locations for American military bases, the most important one being located in Trinidad and Tobago. With the ending of the Second World War, Great Britain began its imperial disengagement with its colonies, passing the hegemonic baton to the United States. Close attention was paid to the independence movements in the British Caribbean as the United States feared the emergence of another Fidel Castro in the region. The U.S. did not hesitate to use its power and resources to meddle in the decolonization process in British Guiana, funding covert operations to undermine the Cheddi Jagan government. Jamaica’s socialist experiment and its close relationship with Fidel Castro under Michael Manley also kept the United States engaged in the region. With the ending of the Cold War, the rationale of preventing Communist infiltration in the region was no longer relevant and the U.S. began focusing its attention on transnational threats such as drug trafficking. The Caribbean became a transit route for cocaine leaving the Andean region in South America and heading towards North America. While foreign aid flows declined significantly during the post-Cold War era, there was still active engagement with the Caribbean in terms of counter-narcotics cooperation with the United States. History has shown that U.S. security interest has been a constant rationale for engagement in the Caribbean. From the military bases during WWII, to preventing
Soviet influence in the region during the Cold War, to addressing transnational threats in the post-Cold War era, security in one form or another has been the overall driver of U.S. engagement in the region.

In this research I argue that the twenty-first century witnessed a renewal of U.S. activity in the Caribbean. I sought to investigate what were the reasons behind this increased engagement. While security continues to be the main reason for cooperation, what distinguishes the twenty-first century is how the U.S. perceives and responds to new and emerging threats. Security from a U.S. perspective has evolved and is now a multidimensional concept encompassing traditional as well as non-traditional security issues. With the disappearance of Soviet-based threats, the state now needed to be secured from transnational threats such as drug trafficking in the post-Cold War era. In the post 9/11 era, the securitization of transnational threats was intensified, with not only drug trafficking but also terrorism and accompanying issues like terrorist financing and money laundering rising to the top of the U.S. agenda. The terrorist attacks in the United States deepened the need for global cooperation against the threat of terrorism. Intuitively, one would think that the anti-terrorism campaign and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would consume all of the United States resources overseas and that Americans would pay no interest to small places like the Caribbean. The war on terror instead had the opposite effect - it led to increased funding for regional security initiatives in the Caribbean. Continued drug trafficking through the Caribbean and the accompanying crime and violence also led to increased funding for counter-narcotics and citizen security programs.
The more recent phenomenon of Caribbean nationals leaving to fight for the Islamic State in Syria and the Levante (ISIS) also led to increased anti-terrorism training in the region.

I showed that the United States was involved in five areas of engagement in the Caribbean: security, health, energy, development and humanitarian. The twenty-first century saw health issues rising to the top of the global agenda with the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, Ebola, zika etc. in developing countries, principally in Africa but also in Latin America and the Caribbean. The United States responded to these health issues increasingly using the jargon of security, with diseases being framed as a national security threat. Health security is therefore one of the non-traditional dimensions within the security agenda. Countries mired in diseases are viewed as breeding grounds for criminal networks and terrorists. The human security element has been a new feature with funding for preventing and fighting infectious diseases becoming a big part of twenty-first century U.S. global engagement. Funding for development was also linked to a human security dimension since food aid was an important element of development assistance in the Caribbean. Another non-traditional security issue which gained importance in the twenty-first century was the environment and energy. President Obama brought environmental and energy security to the forefront of his foreign policy agenda with funding for renewable energy projects in the Caribbean. Rising energy costs in Latin America and the Caribbean and the heavy reliance on fossil fuels led to energy security initiatives being developed with the Caribbean. Across the ideological spectrum from Republican to Democratic administrations, there was general consensus that rising insecurity, violence and crime and the spread of infectious diseases in the Caribbean will
only cause problems for the United States as these problems will eventually manifest itself at the U.S. border. It is in the interest of the United States to ensure a stable, safe and prosperous Caribbean. Increased funding for health, development and energy therefore were all tied to a broader U.S. national security strategy.

To understand why there has been a mismatch between perception and reality about twenty-first century U.S.-Caribbean foreign relations and a misrepresentation in the current literature, it is worth discussing some of the reasons for this misperception. Firstly, scholars made premature judgements based on U.S. behavior during the post-Cold War era, making the same argument for the post-9/11 era without examining data and policies. In all fairness to the skeptics, history has shown much fanfare, empty rhetoric and failed initiatives in Latin America and the Caribbean in the past. Two examples of hemispheric initiatives which have left disappointing memories include the Alliance for Progress and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). However, as Abraham Lowenthal noted, U.S. officials have recognized that “hemisphere-wide summits and broad regional initiatives are less likely to be effective than efforts that bring together smaller groups of variable composition, with comparable or complementary concerns” (2011, 7). Comparatively, Latin America and the Caribbean as a region received lower levels of foreign aid compared to other regions. However, it is inaccurate to conclude that the Caribbean dropped off the U.S. radar since 9/11 and was unimportant to the United States. The evidence presented in the previous chapters has shown that there was more engagement with the Caribbean in the 2000s than in the 1990s – foreign aid levels
increased, legislation was passed, initiatives were launched and senior public officials continued diplomatic efforts in the region.

This study is important for the field of international relations since theoretically derived explanations for actions in a region often overlooked in the literature on U.S. foreign policy were used to generate hypotheses. Realist international relations theory was applicable since U.S. national security interests were a driving force for increased U.S. engagement. Liberal theory was also useful since U.S. economic interests also explained U.S. engagement. Constructivist theory was less helpful since political ideology did not affect policy. There were other explanations as well which could not fit squarely within an international relations paradigm. For example, Caribbean countries development needs also played a role in the allocation of U.S. aid. Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates wrote in his memoirs, “Political scientists, historians, and reporters are often completely unaware of events or experiences unseen by the public eye that influence important decisions” (2014, 307). While I have identified some explanations, there may be other reasons for U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean which were beyond my accessibility.

The future of this research will go in the following direction. It will broaden the scope of countries to include the other members of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). CARICOM states other than the More Developed Countries have also been actively engaged with the United States. The United States is involved with the smaller states in the Eastern Caribbean such as Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis,
and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The inclusion of these islands would give a better picture of the totality of U.S.-Anglophone Caribbean relations. Future research will also include education and cultural exchange, one area which did not register in foreign aid flows. Personally, being a recipient of a Fulbright award and having participated in various State Department programs, I know first-hand that the United States has consistently provided funding for education and cultural exchange yearly, and there are many international exchange programs which Caribbean nationals have benefited from over the years.

To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study of U.S. foreign policy in the Caribbean from the period 2001 to 2016, that is from the Bush to the Obama administrations. This dissertation fills the void on the Anglophone Caribbean and also adds to the literature on the allocations of U.S. foreign assistance, focusing on aid in small places like the Caribbean. One of the strengths of this research project is the collection of foreign aid statistics to understand in detail the sectors targeted and U.S. agencies involved in various activities in individual countries in the Caribbean. I highlighted that levels of engagement varied among each of the case studies, reflecting the heterogenous nature of the Caribbean nations. This information can be useful for Caribbean policymakers as a comparison and lesson to address future cooperation with the United States. It also increases awareness that much more is happening than expected and it brings a healthy dollop of optimism in an often negatively painted picture of U.S.-Caribbean relations.
EPILOGUE

The Impact of the Trump Administration on U.S.-Caribbean Relations

This research has focused on American engagement with the Caribbean up until the end of the Obama administration. On January 20, 2017, Donald J. Trump became the 45th President of the United States. His election and his “America First” agenda led to a significant shift in the role that the United States has traditionally played as a global leader. President Trump’s rhetoric both during and after the campaign continues to cause much uncertainty in the international community about America’s leadership and its engagement with the rest of the world. The President’s ideology cannot be placed within the typical Conservative camp, neither have academics outlined a Trump doctrine which would provide some basis for understanding the impact his administration will have on U.S. foreign relations. However, some insights can be gleaned on the future of U.S.-Caribbean relations based on the following: the budget proposal for fiscal year 2019 which was released in February of 2018, the President’s State of the Union address in January 2018, his National Security Strategy which was released in December of 2017, some of the policy actions which have taken place over the past year, articles and news reports. While recognizing that social media has become a tool the President has chosen to use frequently, I will not be analyzing Presidential tweets to gauge United States’ foreign policy direction.

As this research has pointed out, there was much consistency in U.S. foreign assistance to the Caribbean from the Bush to the Obama administrations. There is a lot of uncertainty and reason for concern regarding the future of U.S. foreign aid to the Caribbean. Several authors have argued that the Trump administration’s budget will negatively impact U.S.
foreign aid to the developing world. In an article\textsuperscript{39} published in February of 2018 \textit{Is the New Budget Deal Good for Foreign Aid? Is it good for Developing Countries? Probably Not}, Scott Morris stated that “the overall shift in the US fiscal position, driven primarily by last year’s tax cuts and furthered by this spending agreement, suggests that developing countries will be net losers by orders of magnitude that swamp the entire US foreign assistance budget.” Adam Isacson in his May 2017 commentary\textsuperscript{40} \textit{Trump’s 2018 Foreign Aid Budget Would Deal a Devastating Blow to Latin America} argued that:

The Trump administration’s 2018 budget request to Congress would slash assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean by 35 percent from 2016 levels. Economic and humanitarian assistance programs would drop by an incredible 37 percent from 2016 to 2018. Military, law enforcement, and “hard side” counter-drug programs would drop by 30 percent.

So, what does the 2019 Budget portend for the future of U.S. aid to the Caribbean? The document has made very clear in the chapter \textit{Department of State and Other International Programs} that the United States position regarding foreign assistance is to “promote developing countries’ self-reliance and ultimately end their need for aid” (2019 Budget, 82). It goes on to explain that the Budget “supports new efforts to track countries’ development progress from fragility through self-reliance to lasting prosperity” and it also puts an emphasis on “aid approaches that bring in private capital and innovation, foster fair and reciprocal trading relationships, and empower reform-minded governments and people who share the same goals to develop their own capabilities and resources” (2019 Budget, 82). The budget has also revealed a significant decrease in funding for the Department of

\textsuperscript{39} \url{https://www.cgdev.org/blog/new-budget-deal-good-foreign-aid-maybe-it-good-developing-countries-probably-not} Accessed April 15, 2018
State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), two key agencies involved in foreign assistance activities in the Caribbean. It stated:

The Budget requests $25.8 billion in base funding for the Department of State and USAID, a $9 billion or 26-percent decrease from the 2017 enacted level. The Budget also requests $1.4 billion for Department of Treasury international programs, a 20-percent reduction from the 2017 enacted level (2019 Budget, 79).

This research has shown that U.S. foreign assistance targets multiple sectors and that there are various U.S. agencies involved in foreign aid activities. A report by USAID Trends in U.S. Foreign Assistance over the Past Decade highlighted that one of the distinguishing features of twenty-first century U.S. foreign aid is the manner in which funds are programmed and administered, in particular an increased role of the Department of Defense (DOD) in traditional development activities and an expanded role of the Treasury Department in providing foreign assistance (2009, 1-3). While there are significant budget cuts to the State Department, USAID, and the Treasury Department, one silver lining is the increase in the Department of Defense’s budget which may indicate a continuation of security related funding to the Caribbean channeled via the DOD. As Adam Isacson (2017) pointed out,

Even as it slashes diplomacy and foreign aid, the Trump administration is proposing to increase the Defense Department budget by a further 9 percent. With this additional spending power, the Defense Department is likely to employ its programs, like its Counter-Drug and Counter-Organized Crime spending authority, to make up for cuts in State Department-run military aid programs.

Health however was one of the few areas which will continue to receive funding and which the Caribbean will continue to be a beneficiary. The Budget supports the continuation of funding for the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), the Global Fund
to fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and Neglected Tropical Diseases. Funding for health was however viewed from a national security perspective. The funding is part of a “Global Health Security Agenda” where “containing the spread of deadly diseases overseas is a vital U.S. national security interest” (2019 Budget, 82).

Another source of guidance regarding the direction of American foreign policy is the National Security Strategy (NSS) of December 2017. The Budget supports the objectives of the NSS and therefore both documents need to be analyzed together in order to ascertain future policies and direction. One of the pillars of the NSS is to “Promote American Prosperity” and trade is at the core of the message “economic security is national security.” The strategies outlined included: addressing the U.S. trade deficit, adopting new trade and investment agreements and modernizing existing ones, expanding U.S. trade and investment opportunities and increasing the market base for US goods and services (NSS 2017, 17-20). The Budget also addresses trade policy to achieve trade that is “fair and reciprocal” by “re-negotiating outdated agreements and pursuing opportunities for new trade deals” (2019 Budget, 81). This will have implications for the Caribbean which has benefited from preferential trading arrangements such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The Trump administration will not be interested in continuing trade preferences and so the Caribbean will have to prepare itself for losing preferential access for its exports to the United States. The Caribbean should start to prepare for future negotiations of reciprocal trade agreements. While the United States has an overall trade surplus with the Caribbean, the U.S. trade deficit with Trinidad and Tobago could raise concerns for the Trump administration.
Energy was also an important part of the National Security Strategy under the pillar of promoting American prosperity with the objective “embrace energy dominance” – meaning positioning United States as a leading producer, consumer and innovator in the energy system (NSS 2017, 22). Some of the priority actions outlined include:

a) Reduce barriers – limiting regulatory burdens that encumber energy production.
b) Promote exports – The United States will promote exports of our energy resources, technologies, and services, which helps our allies and partners diversify their energy sources and brings economic gains back home. We will expand our export capacity through continued support of private sector development of coastal terminals, allowing increased market access and a greater competitive edge for U.S. industries (NSS 2017, 23).

The Caribbean will continue to be of strategic economic interest to the United States because of energy investment and trade in the region. Nearly half of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock in the energy-dominant economy of Trinidad and Tobago is American and the bulk of trade between the United States and Trinidad and Tobago is in energy products. In 2008, ExxonMobil began oil and gas explorations in Guyana and in 2015 the first oil well was drilled. The multinational is now firmly established in Guyana with seven oil discoveries being made since 2015 and oil production is expected by 202041. The United States will continue to support American multinationals involved in all aspects of the energy industry abroad.

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One factor which can negatively affect the Caribbean is the President's threats to link foreign assistance to support for the United States policies as measured by how countries vote in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). This was triggered by the United States decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. According to news reports “the UNGA overwhelmingly rejected the Trump administration’s decision to recognize the disputed city of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. By a 128-9 vote, the representatives of the member countries gathered at UN headquarters in New York City ignored US objections and approved a nonbinding resolution calling on countries to avoid moving their embassies to Jerusalem.” The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) was divided on this matter. According to news reports:

Among the CARICOM states that were among the 128 countries that voted in favour of the resolution were Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, St Vincent and the Grenadines and Suriname. Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were among the 35 countries that abstained during the vote.

The response by the United States to the votes in the UN General Assembly on the resolution was strong and was articulated by President Trump in his State of the Union address on January 30, 2018:

Last month, I also took an action endorsed unanimously by the Senate just months before: I recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Shortly afterwards, dozens of countries voted in the United Nations General Assembly against America’s sovereign right to make this recognition. American taxpayers generously send those same countries billions of dollars in aid every year. That is why, tonight, I am asking the

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Linking foreign aid to countries’ voting patterns is actually not a new idea. Since the 1980s during the Reagan administration, the State Department began tracking how individual countries vote in the U.N. and calculates an index of voting coincidence with the United States every year. The *Voting Practices in the United Nations* report is sent yearly to Congress. The Heritage Foundation has regularly written on this subject. In one of their issue briefs by Brett D. Schaefer and Anthony B. Kim dated February 25, 2013\(^\text{45}\), they stated that “the vast majority of recipients of U.S. foreign assistance routinely oppose U.S. diplomatic initiatives and vote against the U.S.” The Heritage Foundation has been an advocate for linking U.N. voting to eligibility for U.S. development assistance for a long time. While in the past, aid seems not to have been affected with U.N. votes, the future of foreign assistance will be tied to support for U.S. initiatives.

In summary, the Trump administration will change the direction of U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean. Significant budget cuts in foreign aid will trickle down to the Caribbean. The new administration’s approach to developing countries is to wean them off foreign assistance. With the exception of health, funding for all other areas are predicted to decline, but hopefully there should be some level of continued security cooperation via the Department of Defense. As long as there is motive for profits, multinationals will continue the extraction of natural resources in the Caribbean.

Accessed April 17, 2018
The Caribbean should also prepare itself to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. If U.S. aid is tied to UN votes in the future, Caribbean countries will have to decide whether to stand with or against the United States on controversial international issues and weigh the consequences of even further cuts of foreign assistance, which are already at comparatively low levels. The election of the first black American President of the United States brought a lot of excitement to the Caribbean. President Obama’s interaction with Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State starting from the Fifth Summit of the Americas where he stated in Port of Spain in 2009 that “There is no senior partner and junior partner in our relations; there is simply engagement based on mutual respect and common interests and shared value” gave hope of a renewed commitment of engagement towards Latin America and the Caribbean. Not only will budget cuts under the Trump administration reverse the progress made towards increased cooperation between the U.S. and the Caribbean, but news reports\footnote{https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/trump-referred-haiti-african-countries-shithole-nations-n836946 Accessed April 17, 2018.} that President Trump referred to countries in Africa and Haiti as ‘shithole countries’ and his recent decision to prioritize the war in Syria and to skip the Eight Summit of the Americas which was held in Lima, Peru on 13 and 14 of April, 2018, has only demonstrated to his Latin American and Caribbean counterparts that the hemisphere will not be a priority for this administration. The Caribbean therefore has to prepare itself for an era of disengagement with the United States.
REFERENCES


Congressional Research Service. Report for Congress. 2007. Article 98 Agreements and Sanctions on U.S. Foreign Aid to Latin America (March 22), by Clare M. Ribando.


### APPENDIX

#### PANEL DATASET

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Country Bahamas</th>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>U.S. Foreign Aid in Current $US</th>
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<th>Cocaine Seizures in Kg</th>
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