Media Influence on Penalties for Amateurism Violations in College Football

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MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PENALTIES FOR AMATEURISM VIOLATIONS IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL

By

Charlotte L. Perpall

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Submitted to the Faculty of the University of Miami in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

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MEDIA INFLUENCE ON PENALTIES FOR AMATEURISM VIOLATIONS IN COLLEGE FOOTBALL

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Effects of the media on the outcomes of NCAA investigations were evaluated using content analysis techniques whereby news articles were mined for media classification, article tone and 14 different proposed penalties for athletic programs that were accused of violating the NCAA amateurism code. Three Division I institutions, all of which are historically prominent and known for probes into their football programs due to amateurism violations, were chosen for analysis; these include: Southern Methodist University, University of Miami and University of Southern California. It was predicted that media effects would exist, and agenda setting would be evident from journalists covering collegiate sports scandals. It was concluded that indeed, media effects stem from sports journalism, however the extent to which they exist needs to be further examined.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

“Public Relations,” as defined by the Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) “is a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics” (2012). Throughout my educational and professional experiences, I have observed that public relations strategies are rarely independently sufficient. The majority of successful public relations plans and strategic communication processes are reliant on both managing the media and realizing its influence on both an organization’s publics and on society as a whole. In this way, public relations and media relations are interdependent. Acknowledging that the media are a dominant factor in most successful corporate communication efforts, this paper will explore the role of media in sports organizations.

Sports, particularly amateur sports, are my passion. I have coached and mentored athletes and have been an athlete my whole life. I’ve worked for sports properties and organizations and have witnessed the pressures elite athletes face to become professionals. Despite a myriad of outside influences, a specific group of athletes resist those pressures. Athletes who compete at the intercollegiate level choose to maintain their amateur status and postpone or completely forgo lucrative sponsorship deals and the ability to compete on a national or international stage. Through their actions and decisions, this group of athletes embodies the fundamental principle of amateurism: playing for the love of the game. The passion and devotion to their sport demonstrated by these athletes helps maintain the integrity and spirit of college athletics. By extension, the sports industry as a whole benefits from the existence of collegiate athletics by
appealing viscerally to society, engaging the public emotionally and de-emphasizing the financially motivated business of sports at the professional level.

Athletes are taught at a young age to focus on the “team” and not their individual accomplishments. Some argue that this demonstrates a level of “respect” to the sport itself, providing a platform for the highest level of competition (Klosterman, 2012). This might seem counterintuitive, as it is commonly assumed that professional athletes play at the highest level of sport, pro athletes instead play for the results they get compensated for, not for the sport itself. Professional sports exist to provide entertainment to the public and athletes are essentially actors hired by teams to put on a show. Professional contracts are often written containing clauses where athletes can earn greater compensation for more “showy” and individualistic plays, i.e.: hitting a homerun, rather than simply getting on base, or securing a certain number of rebounds rather than playing defense. While this is a productive business model, it is contrary to the notion of amateurism and creates a disconnect between sport enthusiasts (those who have a vested interest in a sport itself) and professional entities (Whitlock, 2005).

As such, professionalism has no place in college athletics. It has been asserted that the construction of “super teams,” teams with college athletes who play in a professional manner (such as the University of Kentucky’s 2012 NCAA Division I Basketball championship team), cheapens the experience of intercollegiate athletics both for spectators and competing athletes (Klosterman, 2012). It also has the potential of damaging competitive balance within the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), the primary governing body of intercollegiate athletics, by allowing major power conferences and historically dominant programs to rise to the top, attracting “one-
and-done” players. This practice calls an institution’s integrity and character into question as such a framework undermines a university’s mission of providing higher education opportunities for student athletes.

The preservation of amateurism in college athletics is invaluable. Professionalism can corrupt the system by providing financial motives for play, as opposed to promoting play for the love of the game. Due to fundamental necessity, violations of any codes designed to preserve amateurism are intolerable and warrant sanctions. Since intercollegiate athletics provides a platform for competition, its participants (athletes and coaches) are the most publicly recognized group that employs amateur ideals. Furthermore, the actions and decisions made by student athletes and their coaches affect not only their own reputation and integrity and that of their teams, but also their university. This includes the athletic department, university administration, faculty, staff, alumni, donors and, most importantly, the student body. Student athletes and coaches can be viewed as public relations tools, used to build relationships between an organization (university) and its publics (students, faculty, alumni, donors, etc.) because their actions can have deep-seated emotional and personal effects on the publics’ experiences.

I attended Indiana University (IU) for four years in pursuit of my Bachelors degree and the University of Miami (UM) for graduate school. Unfortunately, during my tenure, both universities experienced corruption of amateur ideals. Although Indiana’s basketball recruiting scandal of 2008, which involved former coach Kelvin Sampson violating recruiting rules established to control fairness of competition in amateur

---

1 The term “one-and-done” refers to players who play one year of intercollegiate athletics (as required by professional leagues) then declare for the professional league draft. This is most common in college basketball, however exists in other sports as well.
athletics, has been closed and is in the past, the University of Miami’s investigation into the receipt of impermissible benefits by football team members is still unfolding. My experience as a student was directly affected by these cases and therefore I should have been kept informed of the ongoing investigations directly through university media outlets. In both cases however, official communications were sparse and it was necessary to sift through external media reports in order to obtain a comprehensive understanding of each series of events.

In gathering information from external sources, it seemed that news reports about the University of Miami violations were often biased, either persuading readers to feel compassion or disdain for the university’s athletic program by discounting the infractions or calling for sanctions. A majority of the articles suggested or proposed penalties for the program’s alleged actions well before the NCAA and institution were able to fully investigate and determine the program’s actual violations and assess appropriate punishment. One such article in CNN titled “The epidemic of college football scandals” highlighted a large number of past and present university football programs that violated the NCAA’s amateurism code and the potential sanctions that each university faced or could face. Upon reading this piece, I realized that media reports needed to be examined to determine whether they have an effect on the outcomes of NCAA investigations into athletic programs that violate the codes regulating amateurism. This thesis will explore media effects on the penalties incurred by rule-breaking Division I football programs.
Chapter 2: Literature Review

Sport, media and social influence are very broad but well researched subjects that garner a lot of scholastic attention. Academics have blended these topics in a variety of ways over time to provide unique insights on their cultural significance and prevalence. Ample research exists surrounding the topics of race and gender inequality in sports, sport’s place in society, the relevance and scope of sport journalism within the media spectrum, and media bias and influence over public perception. However a focus that is not greatly explored is media’s effects on the governing bodies and major institutions that oversee amateur sports. The contextual framework below is aimed at substantiating the value of such a study.

Sport Media Landscape

“The single most dominant influence on the way in which sport is experienced in American society is that of the mass media” (Lever & Wheeler, 1993, p. 125). As of 2004, sport coverage dominated almost 25 percent of newspaper story space (Funk & Pritchard, 2006). Because most people do the vast majority of their sports spectating via the media, the cultural experience of sports is hugely mediated (Jhally, 1989). As such, in order to make assumptions and predictions about sports media in today’s society, it is vital to understand the current day landscape.

The total economic value of the global sports industry in 2010 was identified in a PricewaterhouseCoopers report as $114 billion and is expected to grow to $133 billion by 2013, an annual growth rate of 3.8 percent (McCullagh, 2010). Furthermore, in a study by The Sports Business Daily in 2004, it was estimated that over 476 million spectators attended sporting events of all types during the 2003-2004 sports year, as 12.8 percent
increase from four years prior (Conrad, 2006). A 2005 study by the National Sporting Goods Association (NSGA), found that more than 50 percent of the U.S. population participates in some sport regularly, with far more participating occasionally (Edited by Humphreys & Howard, 2009). The continued growth of the sports industry, despite economic hardships, proves that it is one of the most inelastic trades in today’s society.

The growing base of fans who attend games, watch televised sports at home, at bars and follow news of their favorite players and teams on television, newspapers, magazines, online and with their mobile devices is remarkable (Billings, 2011).

As evidenced above, mediated sport represents a multi-billion dollar industry (Billings, 2011). This phenomenon, or as renowned sport communication scholar Lawrence Wenner puts it, “the cultural fusing of sport with communication” has brought about a “new genetic strain called MediaSport” (1998, p. xiii). At the root of this MediaSport concept, is Jhally’s (1989) deduction that from a financial, professional and collegiate point of view, sports are dependent upon media money for their survival and their present organizational structure.

Much of this fiscal dependency can be traced to the corporate landscape that has come to define the upper echelon of MediaSport (Wenner, 1998). Megamergers and acquisitions that create giant media/entertainment conglomerates are leading to the globalization of sport (Kemp, Law, & Harvey, 2002). This “sports media complex,” as it has come to be known, is a small number of corporations which own or lease a visual product from source to point of consumption by a globally expanding audience and tentatively holding their viewers or readers attention. Interdependencies between key groups that make up the global sports media complex (sports teams, marketing agencies
and transnational corporations) have placed sports teams in dependent positions, where they no longer have control over the nature and form in which their sport is televised, reported and covered (Kemp et al., 2002). Wenner (1998) further contends that commercial television and its institutionalized value system – profit seeking, sponsorship, expanded markets, commodification and competition – is without question a primary player in this MediaSport complex.

Currently a sports media oligopoly exists in the marketplace, providing participating outlets with the power to determine what becomes available to the public for consumption and how (Kemp et al., 2002). “The global ‘integrated marketing’ strategies of the Time-Warner Cable News Network-Sports Illustrated combine, the Disney-ABC-ESPN brands, and the Rupert Murdoch-News Corp. leveraging of the Fox television imprimatur through sport have only been the most recent sightings on the horizon” (Wenner, 1998, p. 4). This concentrated control of the news is different than having a command of other commodities in that it controls public information, an American right
(Bagdikian, 1980). Such control can be damaging to democratic standards, and thus it is important to recognize the conglomerates and their individual holdings for the purposes of obtaining “balanced” news from a variety of sources. The major holders are therefore succinctly identified below.

News Corp, the first power player in this oligopoly, exhibits horizontal integration in delivery platforms including print media, television and the Internet. Its holdings also include sports teams and venues such as Madison Square Garden and the Staples Center with two NHL teams and three NBA teams in the mix. It also has the largest allowed percent holdings in dominant European football clubs, including Chelsea, Manchester United and Manchester City, the entire British Rugby League and 50 percent ownership of the Australian National Rugby League. Furthermore it enjoys exclusive broadcasting rights for the Super Bowl, NHL games, the MLB World Series, World Cup of Cricket and English Premiership Football (Kemp et al., 2002).

Disney owns ESPN, Anaheim Sports, ABC Broadcasting and ESPN Internet group (includes NBA.com, NFL.com, NASCAR.com, EXPN.com, etc.) in addition to ESPN and all it’s spin offs. (ESPN 2, 3, EXPN, ESPN Classic, ESPN News, etc.)(Kemp et al., 2002)

AOL Time Warner, the third major proprietor, has Sports Illustrated and Turner Sports, which encompass TNT, TBS, Atlanta-based professional teams and venues (Kemp et al., 2002).

The final, but significantly lesser enterprise in this sport media oligopoly, is Viacom – CBSSports, a newer conglomerate that recently took over NCAA college basketball tournament rights. They also own sportsline.com (Kemp et al., 2002).
Having established that the relationships between the sports and the mass media industries are matters of mutual interests and dependencies among advertisers, media organizations, sport organizations and the public, it is important to examine the ways in which this affects sport consumption. The complexity of the aforementioned relationships have become so greatly integrated that it is virtually impossible to separate spectator sports from the media (Jhally, 1989; Wenner, 1998). With this realization, the big-business mentality has taken over, filling the sports media landscape with local, regional and national sports networks and online sites that compete for audience attention. This proliferation of sports and other entertainment options fragments the audience and makes sports more valuable than most other entertainment options (based strictly on audience share) (Billings, 2011). Furthermore, as Billings puts it “digital video recorders (DVRs), streaming video, interactive and online programming, social media, and mobile technologies have moved the audience from the back seat to the front seat” (2011, pp. 9-10). In other words, sports media today must attract its audience with cross-platform campaigns and unique content.

The multitude of options, competition for increasing developed content in the marketplace, and technologies of communication continue to intensify the media outreach of sports, it has also brought about an increasing commodification of everything associated with sports. “Commodification,” as Wenner (1998, p. 21) explains, “reduces the value of any act or object to only its monetary exchange value, ignoring historical, artistic, or relational added values.” This hence transforms the world of sports in the age of mass media from “nineteenth century amateur recreational participation to late twentieth century spectator-centered technology and business” (Wenner, 1998, p. 18).
Allure of Sport Scandals

While it is vital to understand the big picture of how sports media operate in today’s society, on a more micro-level it is important to distinguish what sports consumers’ value and how sports news caters to the demands of public interest. “Sports make up a sophisticated business, evolving over the last century into a dynamic economic juggernaut of high revenues, lucrative compensation, and high visibility,” notes Conrad (2006, p. xxi). He continues, “The sports industry is a multi-billion-dollar business that involves many unique and complicated issues – issues that often beg to be discussed and analyzed in an objective and systematic way.” At the core of it all is understanding how and why sports are newsworthy. While sports coverage used to simply convey scores, standings and star performances, the increased complexity of the sports landscape requires greater understanding of journalistic objectives and recognizable news determinants (Conrad, 2006; Julian, 1980).

While there are dozens of factors that generally constitute “newsworthy” material, a few recurring characteristics of the news specifically apply when identifying what types of complex sports issues get covered. The first indicator is cultural proximity, also known as nearness. “Readers need to identify with the society in which an event occurs” (Whitlam, 1998, p. 196). The closer to a locale an event is, the more newsworthy it is (Julian, 1980).

The second indicator is continuity. “Some stories take time to reach a conclusion and so will continue to run as the press examines each new stage and examines the consequences.” Often these stories begin as a rumor, proceed into interviews with those
allegedly involved and follow developments in the investigation through the end result (Whitlam, 1998, p. 197).

Prominence, fame or elite societal status is the third major determining factor in sports news. It is a commonly accepted fact that the public is generally interested in the lives and affairs of high-profile individuals (Julian, 1980). Tabloids generate millions of dollars covering celebrity gossip simply because it sells.

The final factor is that a story is structured on the basis of drama, conflict or negativity. Crises and scandals fall into this category being commonly described as disruptive, dangerous, predictable, public, escalating and pivotal (Guth & Marsh, 2005).

The most highly publicized sports stories in society today encompass all four of the news qualities discussed above; the most prevalent genre of is sports scandals. While there are hundreds of different kinds of sports scandals that garner media attention, including drug abuse or steroid usage by top athletes, athlete sex scandals, rape or marital issues, physical abuse, fights or general player misconduct, one of the most publicized and controversial topics in today’s sports media surrounds intercollegiate athletics. Most notably in the spotlight is the recent rash of NCAA violations particularly those pertaining to individual athletes who are accused of accepting extra benefits and play-for-pay schemes; ultimately those that breach one of the NCAA’s most controversial key principles: amateurism.

NCAA Division I collegiate football programs are seemingly the center of attention in these scandals with highly visible schools such as Ohio State University, University of Miami, Boise State University, and Auburn University making headlines as
investigations into their programs unfold. As such, it is valuable to explore how journalistic coverage of collegiate sport scandals effect violating universities.

Media coverage when scandals first surface is widespread and relentless, demanding immediate action by university officials. One newspaper article notes that “with the first hint of scandal, rumors multiply on message boards, media descends upon campus and administrations attempt to minimize damage by shifting into crisis management mode” ("With the first hint of scandal," 2006).

Students and university staff alike criticize the coverage and view it as intrusive and unwelcome. As such, the media have long been a scapegoat by athletic departments for negative reporting on collegiate sports scandals. In the wake of Southern Methodist University’s (SMU) string of violations in the 1980s, one disassociated booster said, “I blame the media for some of this. I think they’ve been unfair. I don’t know of another school that could get under the microscope like we have and survive. I hope we get our program back” (Cobbs, 1987).

At the core of every major scandal though, sports or otherwise, are rules that have been violated, whether these are rules of morality, governmental law or founding principles. The majority of Division I college sports scandals today stem from a violation of the founding principles of the NCAA.

One sports scholar compared this regular violation of NCAA regulations, especially those regarding an athlete’s receipt of improper benefits, to Prohibition in the 1920s. “Society’s response to Prohibition illustrates what happens when laws are passed without due regard for the mores… Violations of the law were so rampant that resources available to the first Prohibition commissioner proved to be ludicrously insufficient.”
“Like the Eighteenth Amendment,” he continues “the NCAA’s amateur code appears to be virtually unenforceable, and the corruption associated with college sport has become a national scandal” (Sack, 1988, pp. 1-2).

Role of Athletics in the University Setting

College sports have, over the past few decades, become a part of the entertainment industry, expanding the market, revenues and reach of collegiate athletics exponentially. Some even refer to the increasing hype as “edutainment” (Benford, 2007). But, as Putler & Wolfe point out “growing concern about the direction of college sport has coincided with its unprecedented popularity and appeal as indicated by attendance and media coverage” (1999, p. 302).

Dr. James Zumberge, former SMU and University of Southern California (USC) president, once said, "The athletic department is the window through which people view your school.” Others have referred to it as “the front porch” of an institution as it receives far more publicity than any other entity within a university (Putler & Wolfe, 1999). With such prominence however, come power, pressure and perils. The integrity and prestige of a university can be directly associated with the control and the reputation of an athletics program. “Intercollegiate athletics is at a crossroads where standards of higher education, big-time business costs and revenue, passionate fans and donors, and ethical practices of NCAA rules compliance collide.” In many instances, “the ideals from one facet may contradict the values of another” (Clark, 2010, p. 81).

What it really comes down to is competition and winning. Once the “win at all costs” motive is in place, it is impossible to reign in any sort of control over an athletic program, primarily that over the amateurism of highly esteemed college athletes. David
Lott, a former booster club board member at SMU who presided during the midst of the turmoil in the late 1980s made one point clear: “Quit talking about being less competitive. We live in a can-do city. We are part of a city, state and culture where football is an important part of life, and you are not going to change the role of sports in society” (McCartney, 1986).

**Governing Structure of the NCAA**

In order to fully understand the complex relationship between the media, college athletic programs, affiliated universities and their effect on both those directly associated (athletes, coaches, faculty) and indirectly associated (fans, alumni, donors) with these entities, it is imperative to understand the governing structure and role that the NCAA plays in monitoring and regulating its participants.

Organized to protect the amateur status of college athletes, sanction athletic events and otherwise regulate the behavior of member schools, it has been widely avowed that the National Collegiate Athletic Association operates as a cartel, dominating the intercollegiate athletics market (Depken & Wilson, 2006). Kahn (2007, p. 211) asserts:

“According to the proponents of the cartel theory of the NCAA, the organization has enforced collusive restrictions on payments for factors of production, including player compensation, recruiting expenses, and assistant coaches’ salaries; it has restricted output; and it has defeated potential rival groups. The NCAA can levy sanctions against athletic programs found in violation of its rules, sanctions which range from a temporary reduction in scholarships, to suspension of a program from postseason play, all the way up to the requirement that a school eliminate a certain team and, even measures that indirectly threaten the school’s academic accreditation. Today, restrictions on payments to players are probably the most important way in which the NCAA acts to restrict competition.”
While it can be argued that professional leagues also operate under a similar structure, the difference with collegiate athletics is that the NCAA rules place value on amateurism and competitive balance whereby direct payments to players are illegal (Frey, 1987). As such, firms (or in this case universities) cannot be differentiated based on the wealth of the organization, unlike in professional leagues. As Kahn (2007, p. 210) puts it, “the potential effects on fan demand of amateurism and competitive balance distinguish analyses of sports from those of other industries, where presumably consumers are not concerned about the contractual status of the industry’s workers or the relative status of the firms in the industry.” Therefore, competing teams within the NCAA are more directly comparable to each other than teams within any given professional league.

The Ideal of Amateurism

Although the NCAA was founded in 1906 with the purpose of protecting young people from the dangerous and exploitive athletic practices of the time, it was not until 1953 that the institution was reformed to current day standards and began keeping record of its investigations into universities that violate its code of conduct ("History of the NCAA," 2011). The NCAA handbook is a 434-page manuscript that covers a multitude of regulations surrounding the management of collegiate athletics including recruiting guidelines, academic standards and safety procedures. The handbook has long been criticized for being too complex. NCAA president Mark Emmert himself supports the

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2 While salary caps in professional leagues seek to promote level competition, this has proven to not be the case in recent years with players offering to take salary cuts from team budgets to build “super teams,” as with the Dwayne Wade, LeBron James and Chris Bosh trio of the Miami Heat. Endorsement contracts often provide professional athletes with a greater income than their team contract, thus salary caps arguably have a diminished effect on providing a level playing field.
need for streamlining the rules handbook and disposing of outdated rules, calling for “some serious editing.” Emmert asserted that he and his presidential group would “love to probably throw the rulebook out and start all over again, but that’s actually impractical.” It has been indicated though, that upcoming rules changes will focus on more major infractions like paying players and less on the minor ones like bumping into recruits at an all-star game (Bennett, 2011). This is seemingly in accordance with the fact that, aside from a slew of minor recruiting violations, the most severely violated rule since 1953 is the principle of amateurism, a foundational pillar in the NCAA system.

In its most basic form, “amateur” is defined by Merriam-Webster’s dictionary as “one who engages in a pursuit, study, science or sport as a pastime rather than as a profession.” In theory, intercollegiate athletics should be pure and based solely on an individual’s passion for a sport; however in practice, this ideal gets muddled amidst dozens of other rules, outside influences and everyday decisions that college athletes face. The NCAA’s definition of the term is a bit more intricate asserting that: “Student-athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and social benefits to be derived. Student participation in intercollegiate athletics is an avocation, and student-athletes should be protected from exploitation by professional and commercial enterprises” (2011-12 NCAA Division I Manual, 2011).

NCAA Bylaw 12.1 states that a student-athlete becomes eligible once their amateur status is certified. It also states that certification can be revoked on the premise that an individual does of any of the following: (a) uses his or her athletics skill for pay in any form in that sport; (b) accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received
following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation; (c) signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received; (d) receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or participation; (e) competes on any professional athletics team, even if no pay or remuneration for expenses were received; (f) after initial full-time enrollment, enters into a professional draft; (g) enters into an agreement with an agent ("2011-12 NCAA Division I Manual," 2011).

Currently there are 120 Division I FBS member schools, and there are 360 major infraction cases on file in the NCAA database pertaining just to those universities ("NCAA 2009 Membership Report," 2010). While not every school has violated an association policy, nearly all have, and many have more than one infraction; specifically in an analysis by Insider Higher Ed, 53 of the 120 Division I institutions broke major NCAA rules in the past decade (2001-2010), 11 institutions had two or more infractions cases, totaling 65 investigations in the 2000s. These numbers have remained relatively constant over the past three decades, with 57 of the 106 Division I-A schools punished for association violations in the 1980s and 64 infraction cases filed in the 1990s (Lederman, 2011). As found on the NCAA’s Legislative Services Database for the Internet (LSDBi), in 2011 alone, the NCAA sanctioned 14 different Division I FBS universities, and nearly half of those programs were in identified as receiving extra benefits. Furthermore that same year, at least 12 prominent Division I FBS football programs were accused of or under investigation for the receipt of impermissible
benefits, which can also be seen as a form of payment for student-athletes, thus putting the schools in potential violation of the NCAA’s amateurism code.

The rampant violations have led to arguments that college sports should no longer be classified as amateur, however instead identified as “quasi-professional athletics” (Boxill, 2003; Brody, 1979; Davies, 2012). While the NCAA has long fought to regulate the amateurism of its athletes, violations became exacerbated over the past 30 years, since the N.C.A.A. V. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma (468 U.S. 85 [1984]) Supreme Court case which ended NCAA’s cartel on the broadcasting rights of college football games (Kahn, 2007). With this decision, universities were left to find networks to broadcast home games. While this could have easily thrown member schools into chaos, ESPN, a 24-hour per day sports network that launched only a few years prior, sought immediately to fill its airtime. In turn, major networks became unsettled by the new competition and thus began the current practice of broadcast bidding (Thelin, 2011). There is no question that the revenue gains for universities from such bidding wars are lucrative. In 2010 the NCAA signed a 14-year $10.8 billion contract with CBS and Turner Sports to air March Madness, the Division I men’s basketball tournament, and beginning January of 2011, college football’s Bowl Championship Series (BCS) agreed to a four-year $500 million deal with ESPN (Ford, 2011).

Furthermore, based on a 2010 report on Revenues and Expenses of NCAA Division I Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, two revenue sources account for more than 50 percent of total generated revenues for Division I FBS, formerly Division I-A, university athletic departments; these are: ticket sales and alumni and booster contributions, accounting for 30 percent and 25 percent of generated revenues
respectively. Moreover, football is the largest grossing collegiate sport constituting up to $87.5 million in generated revenue for some universities. The next most profitable sport is men’s basketball whereby the largest generated revenue by any university is nearly $25.5 million, less than one third of that earned by football (Fulks, 2010). On top of all that there are additional revenue generating contracts that provide funds to individual conferences, such as the Southeastern Conference’s (SEC) $2.2 billion contract with ESPN and the Big Ten Network’s distributions of more than $6 million to each conference school for the past two seasons. This excludes the more than $174 million distributed in 2011 by the BCS to the teams that played in its five bowls. Conferences receiving the most money, $27.2 million each were the Big Ten, Pac-10 and SEC (Moore, 2011).

With the amount of money invested in college sports, it is easy to see how athletic departments are in a constant battle to manage its big-business assets, while trying to comply with NCAA regulations. In a NPR “Talk of the Nation” interview with Charles Robinson, Yahoo! Sports journalist who broke the most recent University of Miami (UM) story about a football booster providing illegal benefits to players, Robinson identified college football as “a professional sport that is sold as amateur sport… it’s packaged professionally. It’s sold for billions of dollars to networks and endorsements.” Robinson continues to explain why athletes take extra benefits and violate their amateur status: “Because of college football’s existence as a commodity, because of singular athletes, their existence as a commodity, because of coaches being a commodity that is sellable, there will always be an inherent risk of impropriety… It is inherent to the sport itself. As long as it [college athletics] is packaged professionally, and it is sold
professionally, there will always be individuals – whether it’s agents, whether it’s institutions, whether it’s boosters – who will treat players as commodities and thusly want to provide for them.”

While the idea of a student-athlete works well in nonrevenue-producing sports such as soccer, crew and gymnastics, issues with amateurism arise when athletes play for revenue-producing teams that generate millions of dollars per season. Much of the controversy surrounding the amateur ideal has existed for decades and is due to the morality surrounding the subject matter. One hypothesis suggests that athletes from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are less likely to recognize the moral legitimacy of the NCAA’s amateur code. Athletes from less affluent backgrounds may view amateurism as a luxury they cannot afford (Sack, 1988). Athletic scholarships in the past have covered only room, board, tuition and fees. They did not cover travel to and from school and other expenses incurred by an average college student. The NCAA is currently debating legislation that would allow top Division I conferences to offer a minimal stipend (up to $2,000) to students in addition to their scholarship (Yanda, 2012). This however, still will not cover much more than an athlete’s gas or meals during days when team facilities are not open.

In the grander scheme, it is important to understand the role that money and corruption play not only within a university, but also in the media and under the public eye. In a 1989 Harris poll, 77 percent of the respondents agreed that athletic scandals and the pursuit of money undermine the role of the university as a model of integrity and athletics (Putler & Wolfe, 1999).
Violations of NCAA rules and regulations is evidently a growing problem (Putler & Wolfe, 1999). Public perception is that athletic programs, particularly Division I FBS programs, tend to be deviant and out of control.

*Power of the Media (Media Influence)*

It is important to remember that popular forms of media culture can be highly influential in structuring ideas in the public’s mind. Whether these pertain to concepts of race and ethnicity or popular culture, opinions and attitudes can be influenced by the media (De Leeuw, Knoppers, & Van Sterkenburg, 2010). Research regarding public perceptions of newspaper content alone shows that 69 percent of people believe that newspapers “understand the issues that are important to a local community,” “conduct more careful research,” provide “better explanations,” “have different points of view on controversial issues,” and have “higher standards for accuracy” than television programs do (Hoffman & Wallach, 2007). Recognizing that the public has somewhat of a blind faith in print-based journalism, it becomes imperative to identify potential sources of subjectivity by the media.

Media bias is a long established and substantiated concept. First put forth as a communication technology theory in the 1950s by Canadian economic historian H.M. Innis, research and assumptions of the basic principle have evolved to take on multiple meanings and expanded to include a variety of characteristic tendencies (McQuail, 2005). Within the scope of representation bias, or impartiality found in print media, there are two generally accepted types of media bias: ideology and spin. Ideology is the goal of media outlets to sway public opinion, whereas spin is the attempt to produce a story that the public considers memorable (Hoffman & Wallach, 2007). While these biases are not
mutually exclusive, the notion of ideological partisanship is more relevant when identifying media effects on public perception.

The same way that bidding wars corrupt amateur athletics, capitalism threatens the free press (Harris, 2006). Mass media conglomerates dominate what the majority of people in the United States see about the world beyond their personal experience, and their motives are mostly based on stock market performance and investors’ standards (Bagdikian, 2005). In effort to maintain a democratic system and serve public interest, ethical standards in journalism today seek to achieve balance in reporting; providing the public with multiple views of the truth through relative objectivity (Singer, 2010). In theory, the notion of neutral and informative reporting of events is simple; however when a journalist is covering events that involve conflict and are open to alternative interpretations and evaluations, it is virtually impossible to adhere to such standards (McQuail, 2005). In effort to combat the inherent problems associated with objectivity, critics have developed three current and widely discussed alternatives: existential journalism, standpoint epistemology and public journalism. These approaches can be used to clarify and improve the objective approach, however should not be used in place of it (Ryan, 2001).

The nature of existential journalism is extremely personal, requiring its practitioner to be independent, creative, passionate, committed, responsible and, moreover, subjective (Ryan, 2001). As Stoker (1995, pp. 10-11) states, “existential journalism focuses on the journalist as an autonomous moral agent who can choose to promote the overall welfare and freedom of others,” rather than relegating them to a “subservient, spectator role in serving public interest.” Journalists who follow this
practice do not worry about the commercial impact of their work but about whether they have behaved ethically and have promoted freedom and welfare (Ryan, 2001).

Essentially, existential journalists “thrust themselves into the social maelstrom, seeking to harmonize their own self-interest with the wider public interest of society” (Merrill, 1989, p. 149).

Standpoint epistemology seeks to destabilize hegemonic discourse in journalism (Hekman, 1997). Its purpose is to highlight the perspectives of marginalized groups that are affected by events and issues so that there is more balance in journalistic coverage between the oppressed and the socially dominant “insiders.” Essentially this contests objectivity by noting that journalism “is at best a second- or third-order reconstruction of an event that happened to other people, which brings the validity of the account – its objectivity, or realism – into question” (Durham, 1998, p. 130).

The last alternative to pure journalistic objectivity is public journalism. This “begins with a consideration of what will improve the public life, rather than what will make a good story, and it implies a commitment to solving community problems beyond the publication of one story or series” (Voakes, 1999, p. 759).

While each of these alternative approaches to journalism creatively addresses the major issues in news objectivity today, they all also depend on whose definition of freedom, public good or approved marginalized group holds sway. “Audiences want to know what individuals on important sides of issues are thinking, but balance is not achieved by a journalist who approaches a story from a particular standpoint” (Ryan, 2001, p. 15).
Despite heightened efforts to converge these theories and endorse a compounded definition of objectivity, encouraging journalists to acknowledge their own biases, accept that absolute objectivity is seldom achieved, and agree to recognize and give weight to the views of the marginalized and oppressed groups affected by reports, implementation of such objective ideals is an ongoing problem (Ryan, 2001). Because standards for responsible journalism have declined, due mostly to the constantly increasing demand for profit, the nature of the majority of news topics in today’s society remains a product of impassable subjectivity.

As such, it is impracticable to expect that sport media, identified above as the discussion and analysis of unique and complicated sport-related issues, would be anything but marginally biased (Conrad, 2006). Social constructionism’s critical theory that the media reproduce a selective and biased view of reality is the foundation for this assertion, which will be discussed in more detail below (McQuail, 2005). Geographic location, or proximity to an event, can affect sports coverage on a local news level; and producer or editor preferences can affect coverage on a national level, such as on ESPN or in Sports Illustrated. Tone of the reportage toward a subject, sheer volume of coverage and the variety of media outlets that propagate a sports story can also all be viewed as influencers in sports journalism; all of which ultimately affect the public’s consumption and perception of reality.

With the understanding that subjectivity in sports media is unavoidable, it is important to study how individuals and institutions are affected by media bias. Ideological bias, as discussed above, pertains to the influence of the media over public opinion. While it is widely understood that the media does not expressly control what
people do, “it does shape and influence public opinion by providing much of the information people think about” (Funk & Pritchard, 2006, p. 613). Due to the nature of the sports industry however, public opinion in or regarding sport is rarely at a broad consensus and more often is divided. As such, public opinion does not weigh heavily in any decisions that seek to resolve problems or matters open for interpretation and evaluation. The same is true in politics. Prominent lobbyists, members of Congress, Senators and White House officials make our nation’s political decisions the same way that league agents, team presidents and governing body officials make sporting decisions, with undetermined regard for public opinion (Page, 1994). Therefore, it is imperative to understand whether media affects decision-makers in the same way it does the general public.

The objective of this study is to examine whether sports media coverage is powerful enough to seemingly influence governing institutions and its decision-makers. This will be achieved by gauging whether ideas put forth by the media are comparable to decisions made by both the chief governing body of collegiate athletics (NCAA) and the institutional leaders presiding over universities with dominant sports programs. The research question developed to evaluate this objective asks: “Does type and amount of media coverage of collegiate sport scandals prior to a program’s sanctioning have any relation to the final penalties imposed upon those institutions?”

More specifically, the goal of this thesis is to identify whether a relationship exists between media-proposed penalties and the actual NCAA and self-prescribed penalties carried out by three Division I football programs that have undergone NCAA
investigations due to violation of the NCAA’s amateurism code and receipt of extra benefits.

Ultimately this research will determine whether media influence the outcomes and results of NCAA investigations. This study seeks to investigate the role of media publicity surrounding an NCAA investigation in the sanctioning decisions made by both university administration and NCAA leadership.
Chapter 3: Theoretical Implications

The theoretical basis for this research is drawn from the media-society concept of social constructionism. Social constructionism broadly defined is an abstract term for the influential tendency of the media (McQuail, 2005, p. 465). Ideas such as critical theory, agenda setting and framing fall under the domain of social constructionism and all play a role in understanding media effects in society, which can be applied more specifically to the sports world.

Media effects are generally understood as “the consequences of what the mass media do, whether intended or not” (McQuail, 2005). There are two dimensions of media effects: intentionality and time. The focus of this research primarily pertains to the planned and short-term effects (which are often synonymous with ‘bias’), such as those contextualized through journalistic framing, as well as the unplanned and long-term effects (often viewed as ‘ideologies’), such as those that trigger event outcomes.

Gerbner’s cultivation theory is one that pertains to the unplanned and long-term effects of the media. Referring specifically to the long-term formation of perceptions and beliefs about the world as a result of exposure to the media, Gerbner (1969) examined how “the mass production and rapid distribution of messages across previous barriers of time, space, and social grouping bring about systematic variations in public message content whose full significance rests in the cultivation of collective consciousness about elements of existence.” This notion can be applied to the sports world as collective perceptions about industry functions, such as those that pertain to ideals of amateurism, may be due to the cultivation of norms.
Agenda setting is a broad and well-established notion, first put forth in 1972 by McCombs and Shaw. Since the field of communication has changed vastly over the past 30 years, this theory has taken on a variety of meanings, however its underpinnings remain intact. At its most basic definition, agenda setting asserts that the news not only tells us what to think about, but also tells us how to think about it (McCombs, 1992; McCombs & Shaw, 1993). McCombs & Shaw expand further by stating that “central to the news agenda and its daily set of objects – issues, personalities, events, etc. – are the perspectives that journalists and, subsequently, members of the public employ to think about each object” (1993, p. 62). These “journalistic perspectives” can also be identified as “newsworthy qualities,” which can be framed in a variety of ways (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). A specific set of newsworthy qualities (as defined in the literature review above) determines the types of sports stories that get media exposure; this selection process by the media can thus alter the publics’ perception of the sports industry through the coverage it receives.

The concept of framing “refers to the way in which news content is typically shaped and contextualized by journalists within some familiar frame of reference and according to some latent structure of meaning” (McQuail, 2005, p. 555). News is made up of “fragments of factual information and observation that are bound together and given meaning by a particular frame, angle of vision or perspective” (McQuail, 2005, p. 101). There is substantial evidence supporting that the way an object on an agenda is framed can have measurable behavioral consequences. For example, the attributes of an issue emphasized through news coverage can directly influence the direction of public opinion (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Framing in sports media, particularly that found in
the coverage college football scandals, inevitably exists, shaping public perceptions. While framing may not be directly related to a decision-maker’s frame of reference, it should be understood media power affects the everyday lives of every media consumer. Thus, media frames inescapably play a role in influencing institutional leaders’ views in the short-term.

Agenda setting also incorporates ideas of social consensus. In covering issues and events the media choose to highlight certain aspects of reality providing either pluralistic media messages, which provide a range of confrontational views on issues and offering audiences awareness of the presence of controversy and alternative viewpoints, or monopolistic messages, which emphasize the orthodoxy of thoughts (Shen, Guo, & Wang, 2011). Based on these messages, the public develops opinion diversity, the distribution of public opinion along a continuum ranging from homogeneity to heterogeneity. While there are a variety of roles that perceived opinion diversity play in the social influence process, the most relevant to this study is that “majority opinion can exert normative influence on individuals’ public behaviors. Out of fear of social sanctions, individuals are likely to adjust their own behavior toward the majority position” (Shen et al., 2011, p. 424). Thus the agenda setting role of the media promotes social consensus on what the agenda is by providing an agenda that everyone, to a considerable degree, can share, creating a sense of community (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). Noelle-Neumann’s (1984) spiral of silence theory also comes into play here stating that as one majority view dominates the public scene, other views disappear from public awareness because its adherents become silent. This theory is based on an individual’s fear of rejection in a social environment, better understood as a fear of
isolation. While pro-social behavior and general consensus can be positive, it also poses a threat to individual freedom of thought and thus ensures support of popular decisions, stifling creativity and endangering freedom of speech.

Another notion developed to explain specific media effects is the persuasive press inference theory. The theory states, “when individuals are exposed to slanted media coverage, they tend to expect a public opinion that is consistent with the direction of the media slant” (Shen et al., 2011, p. 426). Once one audience believes that the bias coverage they were exposed to is truly representative of reality, others become exposed to the same partial coverage. This is consistent with the third-person effect and presumed media influence hypothesis, that people will expect that others are influenced by the media slant, despite whether or not this is the actually the case (Shen et al., 2011).

Considerable research has been done on the role of the media in the outcome of significant societal events. Audiences absorb the attributes of news – the frames and slants in the way news is presented – and thus, the mass media have considerable power to tell us how to think about topics, with implications for social policy (Shaw, McCombs, Weaver, & Hamm, 1999). Mass media rarely initiates change independently, however they do provide the means through which other influential actors and interests can comingle and contend (McQuail, 2005). As McQuail states, “the primary objective of influence may be not the general media public itself but other specific organized interest groups, elites, influential minorities, and so on” (2005, p. 528). This notion can be applied to sports media the same way it has been to general news media. Perhaps the objective of sports media is not always to shape public opinion, but instead to influence the attitudes of institutional leaders. It must be understood, however, that these leaders
are part of society and generate opinions and make decisions in much of the same way that the general public do. Thus, theories such as Noelle-Neumann’s spiral of silence and the press-inference theory affect the attitudes and decisions of institutional leaders, guiding them to choose what is popular and prevailing in the eyes of the majority of sports consumers. Moreover, the media can be identified as an information source that shapes public opinion through short-term agenda setting and framing and cultivates norms in collegiate sports in the long-term, ultimately guiding the decisions of the NCAA rules committee and the administrative staff of universities under NCAA investigation.
Chapter 4: Data and Methodology

The objective of this study is to evaluate whether the type and amount of media coverage of collegiate sport scandals prior to a program’s sanctioning have any effect on the final penalties imposed upon those institutions. More specifically, the goal is to identify whether a difference exists between media-proposed penalties and the actual NCAA and self-prescribed penalties carried out by dominant Division I football programs that have undergone NCAA investigations due to the violation of the NCAA’s amateurism code and receipt of extra benefits.3

Case Selection

The researcher selected three well-established, private institutions with substantial revenue generating athletic departments. Each institution is located within the immediate proximity of a major metropolitan area, with a local population falling within the top ten of all major metropolitan areas in the U.S. (Population Estimates: Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 2011). Furthermore, each institution

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4 Due to the privacy allowances regarding publications of internal documents, typical student body size and overall institutional structure of private vs. public universities, it is necessary to compare private institutions separate from public. Substantial revenue figures were qualified on the basis of student body size (full time undergraduate students), not-allocated revenues (funds generated primarily from athletic boosters) and total athletic department revenue as of 2010, as reported by the Office of Postsecondary Education of the Department of Education. The database consists of athletics data that are submitted annually as required by the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act (EADA). Data per university is as follows: SMU: Student body: 5,924; Not-allocated revenues: $8,157,290; Total Revenue: $37,471,381; UM: Student body: 9,402; Not-allocated revenues: $18,854,392; Total Revenue: $60,325,003; USC: Student body: 16,563; Not-allocated revenues: $38,606,976; Total Revenue: $75,707,273.
had to have a dominant, winning Division I college football program during the time leading up to or during the NCAA investigation (see footnote 3).

Each institution’s football program also to violate of the following NCAA articles (2011-12 NCAA Division I Manual, 2011):

I. **12.1.2 – Amateur Status:** “An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual: (a) uses his or her athletics skill (directly or indirectly for pay in any form in that sport; (b) accepts a promise of pay even if such pay is to be received following completion of intercollegiate athletics participation. (c) signs a contract or commitment of any kind to play professional athletics, regardless of its legal enforceability or any consideration received, expect as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.5.1; (d) receives, directly or indirectly, a salary, reimbursement of expenses or any other form of financial assistance from a professional sports organization based on athletics skill or participation, except as permitted by NCAA rules and regulations; (e) competes on any professional athletics team per Bylaw 12.02.4, even if no pay or remuneration for expenses was received, except as permitted in Bylaw 12.2.3.2.1; (f) after initial full-time collegiate enrollment, enters into a professional draft; (g) enters into an agreement with an agent.

II. **16.02.3 – Extra Benefit:** “An extra benefit is a special arrangement by an institutional employee or a representative of the institution’s athletics interests to provide a student-athlete or the student-athlete’s relative or friend a benefit not expressly authorized by NCAA legislation. Receipt of a benefit by student-athletes or their relatives or friends is not a violation of NCAA legislation if it is demonstrated that the same benefit is generally available to the institution’s students or their relative or friends or to a particular segment of the student body (e.g., international students, minority students) determined on a basis unrelated to athletics ability.”

The final criterion in selecting a university’s program was timing of the case. Since sports media have constantly evolved over the past 30 years, no specific time frame would provide better results than another when measuring media effects. Consequently, I chose to select violating programs from three different decades, examining media effects in three separate instances over time. This provides a more comprehensive understanding of whether media coverage of Division I football scandals and the institutional penalty structure has been consistent over time.
With this extensive list of criteria in place, the following programs and time frames were selected:

1. **Southern Methodist University**, October 1986 – February 1987


3. **University of Southern California**, April 2006 – June 2010

*Case Briefs*

**Southern Methodist University**

In October 1986, an NCAA enforcement representative interviewed a former football team member from SMU and reported possible major violations of NCAA legislation. Shortly thereafter a television sportscaster and film crew interviewed the university’s former athletic director, former head football coach and other former athletic department staff concerning possible cash payments to athletes. This case rapidly expanded, whereby it was found that during the period of September 1985 through December 1986, numerous student-athletes received monthly payments ranging from $50 to $725 from a “slush fund” generated by outside representatives of the university’s athletic interests. In all, 13 football team members were involved, with illegal financial handouts totaling approximately $61,000 over the 15-month period. Furthermore, the university was already under five-year probation due to major recruiting violations, of which were sanctioned in 1985, establishing them as a “major repeat violator,” a classification for universities that have more than one major NCAA violation within a five-year period following any indictment of a major infraction (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1987).
On February 25, 1987, the NCAA charged SMU with the following penalties: (a) Probation – until September 1, 1990; (b) “Death Penalty” – the university was prohibited in participating in any football games or scrimmages with outside competition in 1987, and during the 1988 season, the university was limited to no more than seven games or scrimmages against outside competition, with no “home” games permitted; (c) Postseason competition – was prohibited in the 1988 season; (d) Practice limitations – during 1987 practice was limited to conditioning programs, no football equipment other than helmets and shoes were used, no instruction including walk through plays or film watching was permitted; (e) Coaching limitations – limited to one head football coach and five full-time assistants until August 1, 1989 (universities are typically allowed nine assistant coaches); (f) Grants-in-Aid limitations – no football scholarships available to any athlete in the 1987-88 academic year, no more than 15 scholarship athletes permitted in 1988-89 academic year; (g) Recruiting limitations – no football coaching staff member was permitted to participate in any off-campus recruiting activities until August 1, 1988, further limitations existed on paid recruiting visits until 1990; (h) Disassociation – between the university’s athletic program and boosters who provided illegal financial contributions. While the university suggested self-imposed sanctions prior to the NCAA’s ruling, the NCAA found their suggested penalties to be insufficient and thus either rejected their suggested penalties completely or altered them to be more severe (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1987).

University of Miami

On June 13, 1991, university representatives informed the NCAA enforcement staff as well as Federal agencies that the university discovered that an athletics
department staff member assisted student-athletes in fraudulently obtaining Pell Grant funds, possibly in violation of NCAA legislation. A three-year investigation was immediately launched by Federal authorities, during which, in the fall of 1993, the athletics department staff member pled guilty to obtaining approximately $220,000 in Pell Grant funds through fraud, false statement and forgery. Media reports following the investigation sparked allegations of “pay-for-play” issues, involving performance awards from pools of cash amassed by football student-athletes. Further reports alleged that a potential NFL draftee and university football student-athlete failed several drug tests at the university (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1995).

Self-imposed penalties, or those proposed by the University of Miami, adopted by the NCAA include: (a) Financial aid reduction – by seven initial awards and by five total financial aid awards in football during the 1995-96 academic year. The NCAA Committee on Infractions also imposed the following penalties: (a) Public reprimand and censure; (b) Probation – three years; (c) Postseason ban – for the 1995 season; (d) Financial aid reduction – initial aid awards were reduced by 13 scholarships in the 1996-97 academic year and 11 scholarships in the 1997-98 academic year, total financial aid awards were reduced by five during each of the 1996-97 and 1997-98 academic years; (e) Develop a comprehensive athletics compliance education program; (f) Recertification; (g) Show-cause penalty – regarding the former athletics department staff member for seven years (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 1995).

University of Southern California

This case is exceedingly complex and extensive, however NCAA investigations began in April of 2006 due to a tip provided to the NCAA Agent Gambling and
Amateurism (AGA) staff suggesting that a prominent, elite-level USC student-athlete might have received impermissible benefits while playing football for the institution (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 2010). Upon further investigation it was found that this particular athlete and his family were alleged to have accepted financial benefits worth more than $100,000 from marketing agents. Benefits included airfare, limousine transportation, clothing, a car, weekly cash payments and housing arrangements for the athlete’s family. Furthermore it was revealed that these benefits were provided by an agency seeking to sign the athlete following his college eligibility; this clearly violates the “no-contact” rule in place regarding athlete and agent communication, established to protect the athlete’s amateur status (Robinson & Cole, 2006).

During the midst of the investigation into the aforementioned student-athlete, a second case arose whereby a dominant former men’s basketball player was alleged to have had contact with an agency intermediary, violating recruiting legislation. This athlete also allegedly received cash, electronic devices, transportation and meals. Due to overlap, the complex nature of the investigations and the assertion that there was a lack of institutional control, the NCAA Public Infractions Report for USC includes charges and penalties for both athletes and programs, however clearly identifies which penalties are associated with which program. Furthermore, it vital to recognize that USC is classified as a “repeat violator,” this being the university’s sixth major infraction case, the last of which pertained to the football and women’s swimming programs and was published in June 2011 (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 2010).

Due to the nature of this case, penalties are extensive. Institutional impositions are denoted with an asterisk. Penalties include: (a) Public reprimand and censure; (b)
Probation – four years, ending June 9, 2014; (c) Postseason ban – for both basketball and football, basketball ending its 2009-10 season with the last regularly scheduled game*, football being ineligible for any postseason competition or bowl game for the 2010 and 2011 seasons; (d) Vacation of records – including all wins associated with the football team during the time when aforementioned athlete competed while ineligible, all basketball wins in which the second athlete competed during 2007-08 season*; (e) Grants-in-aid limitations – limited to 15 initial grants-in-aid and 75 total grants in football for each of the 2011-12, 2012-13 and 2013-14 academic years as well as limit of 12 grants-in-aid in men’s basketball for 2009-10 and 2010-11 academic years*; (f) Coaching reductions – by one for off-campus recruiting purposes in basketball*; (g) Recruiting limitations – decreased total number of recruiting days in men’s basketball by 20 days for the 2010-11 academic year*; (h) Fines imposed – for football student-athlete’s amateurism violations*, and earnings from conference distributions and championships to be returned*; (i) Disassociation – of both student athletes and men’s basketball coach*; (j) Extraneous limitations – prohibiting all non-institutional personnel from traveling on football and men’s basketball team charters, attending football and men’s basketball team practices, attending or participating in any way with either sport’s camps including donating funds, and having sidelines and locker room access before, during and after games*; (k) Show-cause penalty – one year for coaches involved (NCAA Committee on Infractions, 2010).

Data Selection

After identifying the cases, the researcher established the type of medium to be examined. Newspaper articles transcribed into an electronic version as well as online
articles and electronic magazine archives were selected as the data source for this study. Print media was selected instead of televised reports due to the availability of sources and time frame selection. ESPN, today’s leading sports network launched in 1979 was not awarded its first cable contract until the fall of 1987 (ESPN, 2010). Thus, the no ESPN network coverage was available during any part of the SMU investigation. Furthermore, sports websites gained prevalence in the mid-1990s, with the launch of ESPN.com, one of the first online sports-focused websites, on April 1, 1995. Thus, the only consistent form of sport-media reporting over the past 30 years and throughout each investigation was in print. Due to archive availability, only newspaper reports appearing in the Access World News database were analyzed for this study.

In order to narrow the population, data for this study were gathered from three types of print media: regional, national sports-focused and national news media.

Regional media are defined as articles that were published within the same state that the violating institution exists. Regional media is not identified as a “national” media and have a daily print circulation of at least 150,000. Articles were either published online or were found through the Access World News database of online newspaper archives. The following regional media outlets were identified for each university based on the aforementioned criteria: SMU: Dallas Morning News, Fort Worth Star Telegram and Houston Chronicle; UM: Miami Herald, Orlando Sentinel, South Florida Sun Sentinel, St. Petersburg Times and Tampa Tribune; USC: Orange

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5 Time frames were established for each case by examining all articles found between the month wherein each investigation was launched, ending in the date that the official NCAA infractions report was published. Time frames for each case are as follows: SMU: October 1986 – February 25, 1987; UM: June 1991 – December 1, 1995; USC: April 2006 – June 10, 2010.
County Register, Sacramento Bee, San Diego Union-Tribune, San Francisco Chronicle and San Jose Mercury News.

National sports-focused media are defined as the top sports media outlets available during the time of all three investigations. These are identified as the news entities that comprise the sport media oligopoly (as previously discussed in the literature review). Due to the timing of this study, only articles from ESPN and Sports Illustrated (SI) were taken into consideration. CBSSports, FOXSports and The Sporting News were excluded due to date limitations of online archives. Furthermore, due to the changing media scene, SI is the only national sports-focused media source available for the entirety of the SMU and UM investigations because ESPN archives do not date before 1994.

The final category, national news media, represents the top six newspapers in the nation in 1987, 1995 and 2010 (the three years in which the NCAA case findings were released for the examined cases) with a daily print circulation of at least 550,000. These sources include: The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, New York Times, LA Times, New York Daily News and the Washington Post. All articles were either published online or found through online newspaper archives.

Data Collection

After identifying the data needed, the Access World News online database was used to identify available article archives. Search terms used to identify affiliated articles included mention of the identified university’s name as well as the words “investigation” or “NCAA.” Searches were further narrowed by limiting the dates of publication from the month in which each NCAA investigation began through the day that the final NCAA

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6 While each of these sources existed during the time period of one or more of the examined cases, each website’s online archives only host articles from 2011 and after.
findings were published and released. Dates are delineated in the “Case Selection” section above.

Testing Reliability

One of three undergraduate student assistants or the author of this study coded each media source for tone and total count of media-proposed penalties. Prior to coding, intercoder-reliability was tested on three different cases (data sets), one from each case. Reliability numbers were generated using ReCal, an online reliability calculator developed by Deen Freelon, Assistant Professor at American University School of Communication. ReCal is an online utility that computes intercoder reliability coefficients for different types of data (Freelon, 2011). Because interval data is used in this study, the ReCal OIR generates an output of Krippendorff’s alpha for each case tested. The first case tested was a regional media article that pertained to SMU. It returned a coefficient of 0.971. The second case tested was a national sports-focused media article pertaining to UM. It returned a coefficient of 0.93. The final case was a national news article relating to USC. It returned a coefficient of 1.0, also known as achieving a perfect 100 percent accuracy. As stated by Krippendorff (2004), the minimum acceptable alpha for a study should be ≥0.80, pending on the sample size. Due to the fact that the sample size of this study is relatively small, 231 articles in total, I required a minimum acceptable level of ≥0.90, which was achieved in each of the reliability tests.

Units of Analysis

University Affiliation
The first unit identified within each variable was which university the article was associated with. Options include: Southern Methodist University, University of Miami and University of Southern California.

**Media Type**

Media type was coded next, allowing each coder to identify the source of the data. Possible media types for selection include: regional media, national sports-focused media or national news media.

**Tone**

Subjective assessment is used to determine if the content of an article is either favorable or unfavorable toward the subject of the article, i.e. the violating university’s athletic program (Stacks & Michaelson, 2010). This is to identify whether journalistic media bias exists. Tone is assessed through coder selection of one of the following codes: positive - favors penalizing the university for its actions, negative - does not favor penalizing the university for its actions (discounts penalties), or neutral - no bias, no mention of institution or if positive and negative arguments are seemingly equal.

**Media-Proposed Penalties**

The final 14 units of analysis are all media-proposed penalties, or 14 penalties that could have been received by each violating institution on the basis of the NCAA penalty structure. The NCAA penalty schedule is similar to the legal penalties imposed in general society: more egregious violations carry increased severities in penalties, whereas minor offenses receive rather trivial punishments (Depken & Wilson, 2006). As such, based on a selection of typical penalties for violating institutions as provided by the NCAA, 14
potential penalties were selected. They are identified as media-proposed penalties in this study because with each penalty is associated a count of the number of times a variable suggests a particular penalty; thus, they will only have a value greater than zero associated with the unit if the media mentioned that penalty within the article. The following are a list of the 14 media-proposed penalties: 1) probation; 2) regular season competition and/or scrimmage suspension/reduction/prohibition and/or reference to the “death penalty”; 3) ineligibility for postseason competition (aka: postseason ban); 4) practice limitations; 5) coaching limitations/staff reductions; 6) recruiting limitations; 7) grants-in-aid limitation/financial aid and/or scholarship reduction; 8) disassociation; 9) public reprimand and censure; 10) recertification; 11) vacation/forfeiture of record(s)/win(s)/title(s); 12) fines; 13) extraneous limitations; 14) show-cause penalty.

As mentioned above, each of these 14 units will have a count value as the input. For example, if the “death penalty” is mentioned four times in an article, that unit’s input value will be “4.” If a penalty is not mentioned at all, the input value will be “0.” A complete codebook can be found in Appendix I.

Hypotheses

Three hypotheses were developed in accordance with the overarching thesis in an attempt to understand whether media effects can be assumed. Each hypothesis is grounded in a different media concept. The first originated from the universal premise that specialized media should have the most expert knowledge in their field of specialization. Due to the nature of this study, the national sports-focused media is identified as the expert media source. Hence, in order to evaluate whether the specialized
media in the data set were truly the most accurate source in predicting the penalties administered to each university, the following hypothesis was developed:

\[ H_1 - \text{National sports media will most accurately predict actual penalties, compared to national news media and regional media.} \]

The second hypothesis acknowledges media bias on the basis of favoritism toward local and community interests. This falls under the newsworthy quality of “cultural proximity” as discussed above. Because each chosen university is physically located within the immediate proximity of a major metropolitan area (SMU – Dallas, UM – Miami and USC – Los Angeles), it is important to examine coverage of each university by popular regional media sources. Studies prove that local media can have strong influence over community opinion, and as such, it is vital to identify the scope of bias in provincial outlets (Christen & Huberty, 2007; Maxson, Hennigan, & Sloane, 2002; Rennie, 2006). Furthermore, due to an outlet’s need to appeal to its intended audience, regional media outlets must take into account the interests of its more localized publics. With large numbers of each city’s populations being graduates from each of these highly prestigious, private institutions, a large portion of local media consumers will have a vested interest in the well being of the selected universities\(^7\). With this said, the second hypothesis is:

\[ H_2 - \text{Regional media will have a more favorable tone toward a university investigation than national news or national sports-focused media.} \]

---

\(^7\) According to each university’s website, alumni numbers in surrounding areas are as follows: Approximately 40,000 SMU alumni reside in the Dallas-Fort Worth area (Southern Methodist University); more than 39,000 UM alumni reside in Miami-Dade county (University of Miami, 2012); and USC only provides data for the number of alumni living in the state of California, not by surrounding city or provincial county, but the website states that nearly 175,000 USC alumni live in California (University of Southern California, 2011).
In other words, the attitudes portrayed in each article by regional media journalists will lean toward not penalizing a university for its actions. The tone will be classified as “negative,” discounting penalties toward the university.

The third hypothesis pertains to the idea of newsworthiness. While, as discussed above, there are many different philosophies on what makes news worthy, one predominant notion is that news with a high “shock value” is of greater interest to the public than predictable and lackluster news (Julian, 1980). Because of this, it is expected that news outlets will predict the most severe, or harshest, consequences when discussing possible outcomes for a university’s athletic sanctions. Therefore, the third hypothesis postulates:

\[ H_3 - \text{The harshest penalties actually received by each university will be those that are most proposed (most repeated) by the media.} \]

The harshest penalties are identified as follows:

- **SMU**: Regular season competition and/or scrimmage suspension/reduction/prohibition, including references to the ‘death penalty’
- **UM**: Grant-in-aid limitations, financial aid and/or scholarship reduction
- **USC**: Vacation/forfeiture of record(s)/win(s)/title(s)
Chapter 5: Findings

Hypothesis 1:

H₁ - National sports media will most accurately predict actual penalties, compared to national news media and regional media.

In order to evaluate this hypothesis it is necessary to compare sample means of each data set. Based on the T-Tests shown in Figure 1.1, it is found that sample means differ considerably with a significance >.001. Thus, it is proven that the accuracy of penalty predictions differs based on the type of media. A one-way ANOVA test is then run to identify which media source most accurately predicts penalties. As shown in the means plot, Figure 1.2, it is found that regional media sources are the most accurate predictors of penalties followed by national news media, then national sports-focused media, hence rejecting this hypothesis.

Although these findings are not consistent with the expectations of the hypothesis, they are not surprising. As previously discussed, the notion of cultural proximity could actually change the hypothesis to suggest that regional media is the “specialized” media source instead of sports-focused media due to the regularity in which regional journalists cover university matters. Such proximity would make regional journalists more knowledgeable about a
university’s affairs, and hence conceivably suggest that they should most accurately predict penalties than any other source. As shown in the chart above, this is the case.

One major factor that could have contributed to the severe differences in sample means is the small sample size of sports-focused media articles compared to the much larger samples in the regional and national news media sets. Due to the changing sports media landscape, the collective sample size for sports media articles is only 24, compared to a cumulative 89 regional media articles and 118 national news media articles. As such, the opportunity for sports media to predict penalties accurately is significantly less than other media types. Nonetheless, this study finds that specialized media, or in this case sports-focused media, are no more accurate or reliable in predicting the outcomes of NCAA investigations than other types of media, disproving the notion that “expert knowledge” provides any additional insights when discussing collegiate sport scandal cases.

*Hypothesis 2:*

**H**₂ - Regional media will have a more favorable tone toward a university investigation than national news or national sports-focused media.

This hypothesis is tested by running crosstabs on the media type and tone variables. As shown in Figure 2.1, 90 percent of all articles coded are deemed to have a “neutral” tone; 5.6 percent of articles have a “positive” tone, or that which seemingly is biased to favor penalizing a university for its actions; and a mere 4.3 percent
of articles have a “negative” tone, one that discounted penalties, suggesting the source does not favor penalizing a university for its actions. This crosstab data also shows that of all three media sources, regional media has the highest counts and percentages of biases in published articles with 79.8 percent of the articles examined found to have a neutral tone and the remaining 20.2 percent to be biased. While regional media has the most biased publications, there is an even split between partial perspectives, nine articles have a “positive” tone and nine have a “negative” tone.

When looking specifically at the 4.3 percent of articles with a negative tone, the asserted hypothesis holds true, finding that 90 percent or nine of the 10 articles identified to have a negative tone were classified as regional media, with a mere 10 percent of sports-focused and
no national news media discounting penalties towards a university. While examining the negative tone of 4.3 percent of all articles may seem insignificant, this data does demonstrate that the overwhelming majority of articles that do stand by university athletic interests and assert that the programs should not be punished for their actions are regionally based, and thus may be written by those with vested interests in the programs. This therefore demonstrates that the notion of cultural proximity and media bias on the basis of favoritism toward local and community interests exists in coverage of collegiate sports scandals.

**Hypothesis 3:**

H₃ – The harshest penalties actually received by each university will be those that are most proposed (most repeated) by the media.

Descriptive statistics on each penalty variable as well as crosstabs comparing the counts of each penalty to the university association variable were run to provide information on which penalties are proposed the most frequently for each investigation. For clarification regarding media-proposed penalty number assignment, reference Appendix II.

Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the total number of times a specific penalty is mentioned throughout all the data examined. Based the data, the most proposed penalty overall is that of “regular season competition or scrimmage suspension, reduction or prohibition or the ‘death penalty,’” suggested a total of 160 times. The second most proposed penalty is “ineligibility for postseason competition” with 74 mentions, followed by “grants-in-aid limitations, financial aid or scholarship reduction” with 52 mentions and “vacation of record(s), win(s), or title(s) 48 mentions. Of the other ten penalties evaluated, “public
reprimand and censure” is mentioned 28 times, “disassociation” and “probation” were mentioned 15 and 14 times, respectively, “recruiting limitations” were mentioned 12 times, “coaching limitations or staff reductions,” “extraneous limitations,” “fines” and “show cause penalty” were all mentioned six or fewer times and “recertification” and “practice limitations” had zero mentions. Based strictly on the cumulative number of mentions found in these descriptive statistics, it is evident that the most newsworthy penalties, or those with the highest “shock value,” receive extraordinarily more mentions in news articles than those that have a lesser effect on the public perception of each university. Upon further examination, the crosstabs displayed in Figures 3.3 – 3.6 identify which of the proposed penalties is most pertinent to each violating university.

As defined previously, each violating institution has one penalty that is widely considered to be the most severe, or most harsh, penalty each university received via their institutional and NCAA sanctions. In the case of SMU this is the death penalty, or the suspension of regular season competition. As shown in Figures 3.3 and 3.7, only nine (or 12.9 percent) of the 70 articles related to SMU did not mention this penalty, meaning that 87.1 percent of all articles mentioned the penalty at least once, with the maximum number of mentions in one article being nine. In the comparison of this crosstab table to that of every other penalty, it is found that suspension of regular season competition/death penalty far exceeds the total number of times any penalty is mentioned in the case of SMU. The penalty that is mentioned second most often is limitations of grants-in-aid, financial aid and scholarship reduction with a mere 22.9 percent of all SMU articles suggesting this penalty. Therefore, in the case of SMU, the H₃ holds true.
The harshest penalty prescribed to the University of Miami is a severe reduction in scholarships, financial aid and grants-in-aid. Per Figure 3.4, this penalty is proposed in 25.8 percent of all UM articles, or 17 out of 66 times. Upon looking further into which penalties were most proposed by UM articles, it is found that this case has more variety in the number of media proposed penalties than SMU. While the SMU case has a single clearly defined penalty that nearly all media articles propose, in UM’s case the suggested penalties are a bit farther reaching. The overall most proposed penalty in the UM case, as shown in Figure 3.8, is “ineligibility for postseason competition.” This is proposed in 24 out of 66 articles, or in 36.4 percent of UM articles, with eight being the highest count of mentions in each of two articles (see Figure 3.5). Again, this percentage is not significantly higher than that of the financial aid penalty, however it does disprove the associated hypothesis. Further insights on penalties associated with UM include: that the “death penalty” and “public reprimand and censure” are both mentioned in 12.1 percent of all UM articles and probation is mentioned in 7.6 percent.

The vacation or forfeiture of record(s), wins(s) or title(s) is established as the most severe penalty assigned to USC athletic program by the institution and the NCAA. This penalty is proposed in 34 out of 95 coded articles pertaining to the USC case, a 35.8 percent proposition rate (see Figures 3.6 & 3.9). Per comparisons to other crosstab results, this is the media’s most proposed penalty pertaining to the USC case. The runner-up with mentions in 12 articles is the proposed penalty of “ineligibility for postseason competition,” closely followed by 11 articles proposing financial aid, scholarship or grants-in-aid reduction. These represent only 12.6 percent and 11.6 percent of inclusion in all USC articles, respectively. Based on the data above, it can be
asserted that the H₃ holds true for media proposed penalties regarding the University of Southern California.

Thus, based on the rule of majority, in two out of the three cases examined, the harshest penalties are the most proposed by the media; therefore hypothesis₃ is accepted, and the notion that high “shock value” news draws greater audience attention is valid.
Chapter 6: Conclusion

On the whole, it is determined that media effects exist in the coverage of collegiate sports scandals, with the newsworthy qualities of cultural proximity and high shock value proving to be tied to the actions of decision makers.

The results of this study show that there are no expert media sources when it comes to coverage of NCAA investigations and sanctions on rule-breaking university athletic programs. All levels of the media – regional, sports-focused and national news media – are equally predictive of sanctions resulting from collegiate sports scandals. While all media sources are proven to have some level of accuracy in predicting the penalties imposed on violating programs, a larger sample size of articles must be collected to increase statistical significance. Alternative cases must be examined for greater reliability in order to determine whether one media source can accurately predict outcomes more accurately than any other source.

It can, however, be asserted that regional media sources are more likely to provide biased perspectives (weighing heavily in both directions) based on the tone of articles about a NCAA investigation than sports-focused or national news media sources. Thus, regional media should not be a public’s only source when seeking comprehensive information about a case. It is also vital for information seekers to recognize the newsworthiness of a scandal, or its reasons for coverage, as these factors contribute to the way in which people consume news. Based on the agenda setting theory, by reporting collegiate sports scandals regarding amateurism, the media are not only telling consumers what to think about, but through the proposition of severe penalties, it is also telling them how to think about punishing violators. Hence, whether the intention of journalists is to
shape public perception regarding the punishment of violating programs or not, media
effects are in place.

Limitations in addition to sample size include availability of specifically
identified regional media sources and archive availability of sports-focused media
sources. These specifically include the inability to gain access to publication archives
from CBSSports, FOXSports and The Sporting News. The constant creation of new sports
media outlets and channels also makes it difficult to compare scandals over a period of
time because of the rapidly evolving sports media scene. Furthermore, the uniqueness of
allegations and distinctness of case findings of sports scandals involving amateurism
make each investigation by the NCAA inhomogeneous and hence incomparable.

Despite making every effort to identify cases with a similar proceedings and
penalty allegations, as demonstrated through the selection of the SMU, UM and USC
investigations, there ultimately are inherent differences in the case chronicles, accounts,
details and decisions made surrounding each program. These differences cannot be
stabilized or made constant, and as such, media effects on each case will be inevitably
different.

Additional research regarding media effects on the decisions of institutional
leaders (such as athletic directors, university deans or boards of trustees) should be
performed to substantiate the theories and findings of this thesis. It is also recommended
that future studies examine the agenda setting roles of the media across a variety of sports
platforms, including professional athletics, recreational sports and within corporate
institutions that heavily sponsor individual athletes, teams and events. Media effects
surrounding other sports scandals can also be studied, such as those involving drug abuse
or steroid usage by top athletes, athlete sex scandals, rape or marital issues, physical abuse, fights or player misconduct using the same framework put forth by this study. Furthermore, examining framing by sports media on the basis of the sports-media complex will provide a new perspective on biases from specific media sources, or the standpoints of each power player in the sports-media oligopoly.
Chapter 7: Appendices
APPENDIX I
Codebook

Article Number:
Enter handwritten number on top right hand corner of article page. Each article is assigned a unique number.

University Association:
0. Southern Methodist University (SMU)
1. University of Miami (UM)
2. University of Southern California (USC)

Media Type:
1. **Regional Media**\(^1\) (published within the same state that the violating institution exists, is not identified as a “national” media and has a daily print circulation of at least 150,000. Articles were either published online or were found through online newspaper archives.)
2. **National Sports-Focused Media** (Top Sports Media outlets: ESPN, *Sports Illustrated*)
3. **National News Media** (Top 6 newspapers in the nation in 1987, 1995 and 2010 with a daily print circulation of at least 550,000. These include: *The Wall Street Journal, USA Today, New York Times, LA Times, New York Daily News* and the *Washington Post*. Articles were either published online or were found through online newspaper archives.)

Actual Article Date:
Insert in MM/DD/YYYY format

Tone:
1. Positive – favors penalizing the University for its actions
2. Negative – does not favor penalizing the University for its actions (discounts penalties)
3. Neutral (or if positive + negative arguments are seemingly equal)

---
\(^1\) **Regional Media for SMU**: Fort Worth Star Telegram, Houston Chronicle, Dallas Morning News
**Regional Media for UM**: Orlando Sentinel, Tampa Tribune, Miami Herald, South Florida Sun Sentinel, St. Petersburg Times
**Regional Media for USC**: San Jose Mercury News, Sacramento Bee, San Diego Union-Tribune, Orange County Register, San Francisco Chronicle
When coding the following, please note that:

A media-proposed penalty (MPP) is one that provides suggestions for future reprimand. Do not count discussions or accounts of self-sanctions or prior NCAA sanctions/penalties as media-proposed penalties. Bottom line: if it already happened, then it doesn’t count.

Media-Proposed Penalty 1: Probation
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Included twice
3. Included three times
4. Included four times
5. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 2: Regular season competition and/or scrimmage suspension/reduction/prohibition (would also include references to the “death penalty”)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 3: Ineligibility for postseason competition (aka: postseason ban)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 4: Practice limitations
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 5: Coaching limitations/staff reductions
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 6: Recruiting limitations
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

---

2 Do not count “probation” if it was mentioned in the context of the school being under probation in the past or during the time of investigation. Only count if the media proposes it as a penalty for the violations in question.
Media-Proposed Penalty 7: Grants-in-Aid limitations/ financial aid and/or scholarship reduction
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 8: Disassociation (this includes the proposed dismissal/resignation of coaching staff/personnel, the dismissal/non-recognition of past or present student-athletes and/or discontinued association with any sponsor/booster/outside representative associated with the violation)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 9: Public reprimand and censure (defined as anything referring to future public denouncement of the school or program. Denouncement will primarily come from the media or a governing institution – ie. the NCAA, however may not be explicitly stated as such.)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 10: Recertification (wherein the University president must reaffirm that all current athletic policies and practices conform to all requirements of NCAA regulations)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 11: Vacation of record(s)/win(s)/title(s)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 12: Fines (whether they be for the institution or for individual student-athletes)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.

Media-Proposed Penalty 13: Extraneous limitations (these would include things such as: non-institutional personnel being unable to travel on team charters, attend practices or camps, have sidelines and locker room access, etc.)
0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.
Media-Proposed Penalty 14: Show-cause penalty (this is a penalty given to a coach or university athletics representative that has severely violated rules – traditionally recruiting infractions. It is the harshest penalty that a coach/administrator with a university can receive. This penalty typically amounts to a complete ban from working at the college level during the duration of the penalty for the involved party.)

0. Not included in article
1. Included once
2. Etc.
APPENDIX II
List of Media-Proposed Penalties

MPP1: Probation
MPP2: Regular season competition/scrimage suspension/reduction/prohibition; death penalty
MPP3: Ineligibility for postseason competition
MPP4: Practice limitations
MPP5: Coaching limitations/ staff reductions
MPP6: Recruiting limitations
MPP7: Grants-in-aid limitations/ financial aid/scholarship reduction
MPP8: Disassociation
MPP9: Public reprimand and censure
MPP10: Recertification
MPP11: Vacation of record(s)/win(s)/title(s)
MPP12: Fines
MPP13: Extraneous limitations
MPP14: Show-cause penalty
## T-Test

### Group Statistics

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<th>Std. Deviation</th>
<th>Std. Error Mean</th>
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### Independent Samples Test

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<th>df</th>
<th>Sig.</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>Std. Error Difference</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval for the Difference</th>
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<td>111</td>
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## T-Test

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**Figure 1.2**

**Oneway**

ANOVA

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**Means Plots**

![Graph showing mean of % of penalties accurately predicted across different media types]
Figure 2.1

**Crosstabs**

### Case Processing Summary

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<td>Percent</td>
<td>N</td>
<td>Percent</td>
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<td>Percent</td>
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### MediaType * Tone Crosstabulation

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<td>10.1%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>38.5%</td>
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<td>3.6%</td>
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### Descriptives

#### Descriptive Statistics

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Figure 3.2

Total count of penalty suggestions
Figure 3.3

Regular season competition/scrimmage suspension/reduction/prohibition; death penalty * SMU/UM/USC Crosstabulation

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<tr>
<th>Regular season competition/scrimmage suspension/reduction/prohibition; death penalty</th>
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<th>UM</th>
<th>USC</th>
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## Figure 3.4

Grants-in-aid limitations/financial aid/scholarship reduction \( \times \) SMU/UM/USC Crosstabulation

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### Ineligibility for postseason competition * SMU/UM/USC Crosstabulation

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<th>UM</th>
<th>USC</th>
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<td>18.2%</td>
<td>35.9%</td>
<td>80.5%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

| **1** Count                             | 9   | 14 | 11  | 34    |
| % within Ineligibility for postseason competition | 26.5% | 41.2% | 32.4% | 100.0% |
| % within SMU/UM/USC                      | 12.9% | 21.2% | 11.6% | 14.7% |
| % of Total                              | 3.9%  | 6.1%  | 4.8%  | 14.7% |

| **2** Count                             | 0   | 4  | 1   | 5     |
| % within Ineligibility for postseason competition | 0.0%  | 80.0% | 20.0% | 100.0% |
| % within SMU/UM/USC                      | 0.0%  | 6.1%  | 1.1%  | 2.2%  |
| % of Total                              | 0.0%  | 1.7%  | 0.4%  | 2.2%  |

| **3** Count                             | 0   | 3  | 0   | 3     |
| % within Ineligibility for postseason competition | 0.0%  | 100.0% | 0.0%  | 100.0% |
| % within SMU/UM/USC                      | 0.0%  | 4.5%  | 0.0%  | 1.3%  |
| % of Total                              | 0.0%  | 1.3%  | 0.0%  | 1.3%  |

| **5** Count                             | 0   | 1  | 0   | 1     |
| % within Ineligibility for postseason competition | 0.0%  | 100.0% | 0.0%  | 100.0% |
| % within SMU/UM/USC                      | 0.0%  | 1.5%  | 0.0%  | 0.4%  |
| % of Total                              | 0.0%  | 0.4%  | 0.0%  | 0.4%  |

| **8** Count                             | 0   | 2  | 0   | 2     |
| % within Ineligibility for postseason competition | 0.0%  | 100.0% | 0.0%  | 100.0% |
| % within SMU/UM/USC                      | 0.0%  | 3.0%  | 0.0%  | 0.9%  |
| % of Total                              | 0.0%  | 0.9%  | 0.0%  | 0.9%  |

**Total**

<table>
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<th>% within SMU/UM/USC</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
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<td>231</td>
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<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
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<td>Vacation of record(s)/win(s)/tie(s)</td>
<td>SMU</td>
<td>UM</td>
<td>USC</td>
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<td>95</td>
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<td>30.3%</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
<td>41.1%</td>
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Number of penalty mentions - SMU

- MPP14: 0
- MPP13: 1
- MPP12: 1
- MPP11: 0
- MPP10: 0
- MPP9: 9
- MPP8: 7
- MPP7: 16
- MPP6: 8
- MPP5: 6
- MPP4: 0
- MPP3: 9
- MPP2: 61
- MPP1: 0
Figure 3.8

Number of penalty mentions - UM

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<th>MPP9</th>
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0  10  20  30  40  50  60
Figure 3.9

Number of penalty mentions - USC

- MPP14: 1
- MPP13: 1
- MPP12: 4
- MPP11: 34
- MPP10: 0
- MPP9: 0
- MPP8: 3
- MPP7: 11
- MPP6: 4
- MPP5: 0
- MPP4: 0
- MPP3: 12
- MPP2: 2
- MPP1: 5
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