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THE “MIAMI MODEL” OF POLICING PROTEST: NARRATIVES OF ORDER, RESISTANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

By
Denise Woodall

A THESIS

Submitted to the Faculty
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ORDER, RESISTANCE, AND SOCIAL CHANGE

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This research examines what has been referred to as the “Miami model” of protest policing with a focus on the strategies, social constructions, and harms associated with this type of response to dissent. The first aim of this study is to clarify the “Miami model,” which includes both the strategies employed and the meaning attached to these constructions. The second aim is to produce an exploratory inventory of social harms associated with the model and implications for social change. Content analysis, participant observation, and in-depth interviews with key police participants related to the Miami model case were analyzed using modified grounded theory methods. The data revealed the presence of a set of strategies that constitute a broadly applicable design of response to large protest events that could be referred to as a model. Furthermore, strong notions of national history and ideology are embodied in officer narratives associated with the model. The Miami model is, in a sense, a set of strategies and tactics constructed through reified stories which may be used in any part of the world to control dissent at large transnational events. Physical, mental, financial and civil liberty related social harms were found to be associated with this model. Officers reported a willingness to assist activists in connecting with the media and their targets for the purpose of de-escalating the crowds. Although working with officers may not be the desired path for
change, this process holds an important residual effect of interrupting the age old storyline that officers and activists, as two sides, must stand opposed. These findings add to our understanding of the Miami model, clarify its elements, social constructions and harms, as well as provide future directions for social change.
Dedication

This is dedicated to the post-market society that I dream of.
Acknowledgements

I’d just first like to honor myself for persevering through this Master’s thesis.

I must thank the presence of a spiritual force that propelled me through. I could very easily connect with spirit anywhere around the beautiful city of Miami. When the stress was eroding at my ability to create quality work; one stroll on the beach, one look at the blue sky, one breath of the cool breeze, or just watching a crane fly, re-centered me.

In recognition of Miriam Boeri, she is the greatest mentor to ever walk the earth, in my eyes. She has made this thesis possible. I consider myself a convict criminologist, and as such, subject to very rough beginnings in academia. She granted me my first opportunity to work in research with the vulnerable population that I had once been. Her belief in me carried me into graduate studies and her guidance as a committee member helped me to produce this methodologically rigorous piece of scholarly work. I owe my identity as a scholar largely to her, because graduate school would not have happened without her.

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My gratitude goes to Sandy Page, my spiritual advisor, for listening to me process through contemporary sociological theory, sometimes for hours. Our sporadic conversations on social problems and contemporary solutions helped me to work through the applicability of the theories here. Sandy should be listed right under spirit, because she saved my life.

I want to express my appreciation for my mother and father for their financial support and their patience. They have bore the brunt of the economic strain that graduate school brings for working class people. They have graciously picked up my pieces and helped keep me afloat so I could continue this work. This wouldn’t be possible without them.

I want to honor my beautiful daughter Ashley Woodall: A brilliant bright shining star, the apple of my eye, the love of my life. She encourages me and tells me, “You got this!” She has been without my full presence for two years during a time of her life that she has had to make huge decisions. But, she values education, she will teach her own classroom one day, and her sacrifice will never be forgotten.

I’d like to express my gratitude to Dr. Roger Dunham and Dr. Marvin Dawkins who took on the challenge of this ambitious project and helped me to ensure that it was rigorous and scientifically sound. I’d like to thank John Murphy who introduced me to contemporary social theory and a foundation of social research that I will continue to study and develop in my own work as a scholar-activist.
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Bold political statements by social justice activists are bringing the problems of increasing inequality to the human conscious, and point to the severe social harm associated with capitalism and globalization. These messages have been increasingly sweeping across the global terrain in recent years in the form of broad transnational social movements and far-reaching efforts of unity, such as the Occupy Wall Street movement. A brute paramilitarized force has been used to meet this united front. The social meaning of the clashes are being translated into the human psyche in a flurry of confusing imagery that society may be left struggling to understand. The policing of protest is taking on a new identity and this new approach is rumored to have been birthed in Miami at the 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) demonstrations, and is thought to have been diffusing globally ever since.

Various independent news sources such as Common Dreams, Salon magazine, Democracy Now, and Indymedia, as well as widely accessed blog and activist organization sites, like Toward Freedom and Solidarity, are all using the term “Miami-model” (Scahill 2003, Solidarity 2004, Indymedia 2004, Indymedia 2005, Toward Freedom 2008, Mychalejko 2008, Lennard 2011, Democracy Now 2012) The “model” references a wide ranging set of strategies associated with police brutality and various violations of human and constitutional rights. Any Google search of the term “Miami model” will yield multiple pages of results that reference a sort of emerging “style” birthed at the 2003 FTAA events in Miami. The term continues to be referred back to when describing current political demonstration events. Given this variety of viewpoints, the first aim of this research project will be to explain what the “Miami model” is. This
paper will apply academic methodological rigor to a definition of the “Miami model.”
The definition includes both the strategies police use before, during and following the event.

Although defining a model based on the strategies employed is a worthy goal, this
definition is incomplete without considering its social constructions. To account for this,
literature on narrative and postmodern theory will inform our understanding of the
construction of the model. Organizational theory from the postmodernist tradition is used
to clarify the ideas of “bureaucracy.” Bureaucracy is embedded in narratives and the
social complexity of organizations is deeply ingrained in our social world (Perrow 1972).
Utilization of this idea helps to reveal critical theoretical underpinnings of the
construction of policing protest. However, little more than passing references to
organizational complexity and bureaucracy, as related to the Miami model or protest
policing in general, is present in the academic literature. This look at the narratives and
figures of speech, or tropes, that officers use to justify the police response add to our
understanding of the model. In meeting the first research aim the model is comprised of
both the strategies related social constructions.

A social harm perspective was used to inform the second research aim. There is
little known published literature straightforwardly assessing the harm imposed on
individuals, movements, and the society, in general, as a result of this model. This study
adds to the growing body of literature on social harm by the assessment of injuries
associated with this emerging style of policing protest, that includes physical, mental,
financial, and civil liberty based harms.
The current study utilizes a case study and modified grounded theory approach to determine a set of characteristics that define the model that is an outgrowth of the Miami protests in 2003, and to understand various social constructions and pieces of the puzzle that have not been considered in regard to the sustenance of the model and its harms. Interviews with key police officers and associated individuals, analysis of various sources of information and direct observations will all be combined to answer the questions associated with aim one: What is the “Miami model” of policing? How do narratives, social organization, and meaning contribute to understanding the big picture? And research aim two: What are the social harms associated with this model and are there implications for social change?

The growing visibility of transnational social movements and their conflict with law enforcement, military, and intelligence forces make this research on the “Miami model” of policing very timely and of interest globally. Also, enhancing our understanding of society through the new lens of social harm provides very straightforward information unacknowledged currently in the knowledge base and also advances a new sociological perspective important to clearly identify the extent of social problems associated with this type of policing. In the following pages the appropriate literature will be reviewed, followed by a description of the methods, a report of the results, followed by meaningful discussion on the analysis, then implications for social change and directions for future research.
CHAPTER II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Previous Key Studies of the Miami Model

Several scholarly works largely informed this analysis of the incidents at the 2003 FTAA demonstrations in Miami. This study utilizes and builds upon the following work: First, John Gibson’s 2008 article, *A Model for Homeland Defense: The Policing of Alter Globalist Protests and the Contingency of Power Relations*, provides a very detailed account of activist perspectives from the events of 2003. The complexity of activist tactics and repressive police responses were the focus of Gibson’s study, largely from the perspective of activists. The current study uses that information in content analysis and adds to this research with police interviews. Another pivotal study was written by Alex Vitale in 2007. Vitale created a framework of the “Miami model.” However, he looked for the presence of the 2003 strategies in subsequent smaller protests primarily only in New York. This work contributes to his research by incorporating additional elements of the model into his definition focuses primarily on the use of the model at transnational protest events. Few have sought to bring them together to claim an actual scientifically rigorous definition of the model. Still, all of this data are likely to provide only part of the picture of what is involved in the Miami model.

There are some important additional concepts to consider in a formulation of the model that have been found very little in the literature. To begin with, the important work of Donatella della Porta and Herbert Reiter (1998)) earlier explorations of police “knowledge” and national history narratives contributes to some explanation of the clashes. The concept of police “knowledge” has been used to frame investigations into the meaning and constructions of police action; National history is important in this
conceptualization. A study conducted by Mattias Wahlstrom (2007) did incorporate views of police “knowledge” in Sweden. The current study looks into forms of US police force “knowledge” as revealed in narratives. Furthermore, the study of negotiations between summit organizers, civil society, police forces, demonstrators, the general public, and media have received little attention in the sociological academic literature. To address these angles, the work of Gary Prevost (2005) who wrote on the activists’ critique of the FTAA was used. Finally, of the primary pieces of scholarly work that investigate the Miami model which were closely utilized and built upon, is the work of Amory Starr and Luis Fernandez’s (2009). They looked into the intelligence and legal mechanisms in place that deploy control. They uncovered massive innovation in control tactics since Seattle 1999 and found that only a few repressive tactics actually ever make it into court and into the public eye. The studies listed here largely influenced the study and informed the content analysis, helped to define the model, assess social contractions associated with it, and they were also helpful in the development of the social harm inventory. The role of narrative analysis in the current research adds new dimensions to all of this scholarly work and this knowledge produced new innovative directions for social change.

*The Miami Model: What is it?*

Few studies have attempted to define the specific aspects of the tactics used in the “Miami model.” It is rumored to be an actual template for controlling dissent. Various independent media sources, websites, academic literature, and organization postings refer to this model and it is broadly associated with police brutality (Indymedia 2005). There is
a continued reference back to the model in such progressive perspective sites like *Toward Freedom*’s 2008 article that refers back to the “model” from Miami to describe what they see assembling in preparation for the Republican National Convention of 2008. This Miami “model” is also assumed to be implemented in other areas of the country. Since 2003, independent media source Common Dreams, likens the strategies to oppressive authoritarian regimes with little regard for civil liberties. Also activist organization sites like *Solidarity* (2004) calls the Miami model “a menace… symbolizing Homeland Security and free trade, in your face!” Lawsuits filed by Amnesty International, the AFL-CIO, and the ACLU in 2003 have shown up in blogs and press releases. The ACLU claimed to have received 134 complaints resulting in lawsuits. One particular article on the site citizenstrade.org, reported a statement by Naomi Archer, spokeswoman for South Floridians for Fair Trade and Global Justice. She says, “This ‘Miami model’ could be used elsewhere in the country and what happened here is inexcusable” (Citizens Trade 2005). More recently, in 2008 the Op-Ed News network questioned whether the Miami model was being exported to various events (Mychalejko 2008) and the documentary “The Miami Model” (Indymedia 2004) has been the centerpiece of activist events such as “Food Not Bombs: Dinner and the Miami Model” (Civic Media Center 2013). The promotional material called it a “template of military oppression.” In 2006, Upside-Down World posted an article from Z magazine regarding the Operational Plan (OP) for the FTAA event. The story maintains that the OP could not be obtained through any of the litigation or records requests procedures (Mychalejko 2006). There appears to be an OP that might outline the model, but it has not been possible to retrieve the outline, even through court order by the Citizens Investigative Panel (CIP 2006) that examined the
case. Police officials say it could jeopardize security operations nationally to release certain aspects of the operations, suggesting further link between the tactics used in Miami and the rest of the nation. Whether Miami set the standard is yet to be determined.

An article in the Guardian (2012) suggests that elements of the Miami model are going to be used to squash the uprising in the very recent Bahrain uprisings (Devereaux 2012). A prime example of this seeming permanency of the term “Miami model” and its continued reference to events as recent as Occupy may be found repeatedly. The origin of the “model” reference could be considered to lie in the language of government officials around the time of the event. A 2011 article in Salon, based on reporter Natasha Lennard’s coverage of the policing of the recent Occupy movement events, brings back the words of Miami-Dade State Attorney Kathy Fernandez Rundle, who, during the time of the FTAA demonstrations, said “this is a model … for the rest of the world to emulate in the future when these sort of events take place” (2011).

Some have discussed this model and multiple facets of it in the academic literature. As introduced, John Gibson (2008), Alex Vitale (2007), Mattie Wahlström (2007), and Amory Starr and Luis Fernandez (2009) have authored articles in peer reviewed journals referencing the Miami model. There is assumed to be either a model, a new style, or the term is just used loosely to explain a number of strategies by various connected justice agencies in repression. What has not been done, is a rigorous study of the model that includes contemporary theoretical considerations that address the strategies and social construction process of the model.
Policing

In order to understand the everyday processes of policing and their social organizational structure, a review of the relevant literature on policing from the criminal justice perspective, policing from a sociological perspective, and literature from military studies was reviewed. Only the most relevant work is discussed here. From a criminological perspective, Edward Maguire’s (2003) research on organizational structure in large police agencies is applicable to this work. Chains of command, he writes, connecting agencies, training, and tactics negotiated through bureaucratic pathways and types of differentiation of specializations (2003). Also, literature related to paramilitary organizational dynamics is described by Eric-Hans Kramer (2007) stemming from a research project of the Dutch Armed forces involved in United Nations peace operations under NATO and the United Nations. Kramer in Organizing Doubt writes that a goal of army unit training is reduce complexity that is, reducing the decisions a soldier must make in the field. They to handle a situations in the field through almost automated response, in other words they are trained to “not think.” Officers in this study clearly proclaimed when they respond to events such as the FTAA events, they are responding as a paramilitary unit, and military training is very similar to what officers are receiving and using when responding to large demonstrations. Based on this literature is it important to explore how police response forces are structurally designed to remove the agency of the officer and replace it with mechanical responses to complex situations. Sociological analysis of officers’ identity is important to understanding how various tactics are implemented upon various groups. Roger Dunham and Geoffrey Alpert (2010) describe that training and actions match officer perceptions and their perceived role in society.
These perceived roles are important for understanding how, with what force officers are carrying out control of demonstration events. This literature informs the exploration of how meaning is intertwined in police training and action.

Widening the scope of the aforementioned literature, in recent years, there has been a trend toward greater standardized of police strategies globally (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012). The diffusion of US involvement in policing “responsibilities” around the world has been growing since WWII (Nadelman, 2012) and particularly concentrating on growing transnational protest since the Seattle protest against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1999. The strategic repressive response to the FTAA demonstrations is thought, by some, to be an improvement from Seattle. Many of the latest tactics designed to disrupt social movements, include the use of non-lethal arms, challenging zones which separate the demonstrators from their targets, covert tactics such as the construction of databanks to identify troublemakers, and the use of anti-insurgents is just to name a few. All of these tactics may pose new challenges for social movements (della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006).

The study by Amory Starr and Luis Fernandez (2009) provides broad insight into the legal conditions that make the repression of alter-globalization movements possible. Their study pulls from the previous literature on transnational social movements and from participatory fieldwork. The authors’ participant observer perspective is from a rank and file affinity group associated with many actions since the Seattle 1999 protests. The FTAA protests in Miami 2003 were one of the actions under study. A number of findings from the Miami event are important to note regarding the legal actions surrounding Miami 2003. Starr and Fernandez point out that the Citizens Investigative Panel,
succumbing to political pressure, failed to investigate various claims. They also note how injured parties, involved in Miami and other events, become distanced from the case and their fellow plaintiffs, which leads to a lack of proper pressure on agents of social control; officers, agencies, and others, to initiate change. They note that a lack of media coverage of the legal filings also foster an environment for more of the same to occur in future events. Starr and Fernandez posit problems such as these as reasons why police oppression continues. Starr and Fernandez also place their findings in the broader scope of social control over alter-globalization movements as well, but suggest that this is an area for future research. The current research will utilize their perspectives and knowledge to build a specific definition of this model that includes these legal aspects of the model and being mindful of others.

Although general policing literature largely focuses on day-to-day police activity and gives less attention the rare transnational demonstration event, attention to their designated organization can tell us something about why police are compelled to respond to protest in certain manners based on their command policing structure (Nadelmann, 1993; and Macguire 2003). Authors Clark McPhail and John McCarrthy’s chapter Protest Mobilization, Protest Repression, and their Interaction in the edited volume Repression and Mobilization (2005) focuses on the interaction of challengers and agents of social control. The authors overview some of the research on officer and demonstrator interactions, this includes various types of gatherings. Relevant to the current study they suggest that how the police respond to demonstrators depends on a variety of conditions including perceived threat of demonstrators to authorities, perceived threat of authorities to demonstrators, and the nature of the event. The interaction of these conditions,
according to McPhail and McCarthy help to determine how repression and mobilization will be carried out, there is a reciprocal nature of interaction between activist and officers.

Of all of these works, the most relevant to the current research is John Gibson’s use of the FTAA Miami event of 2003 as a case to explain broad neo-liberal imperialism, securitization, matrices of power and disempowerment. Gibson reports the varieties of control methods used in 2003, this includes repressive tactics, jurisdictions involved, non-lethal weapons use, specific instances of protester and officer interactions, and many other experiences of activists to explore broad issues of power. His work flows from contemporary theory and situates how the events in Miami are characteristic of a shifting global security landscape. He notes specificities that can be directly placed into a definition of the Miami model, though this is not the aim of his research. There is still a gap in understanding in the general knowledge base that is a phenomenological analysis of those doing the policing. Gibson’s great detail of the event and his linking of what occurred in Miami to a broader, global, and historical perspective are important considerations when analyzing protest events, particularly with the goal of assessing social change. The current research uses Gibson’s work to add the global perspective to the definition of the model and the social harm inventory and builds upon his work by adding the officers and agents of social control perspectives.

*Political Process, “Knowledge” and Protest Control*

There are many major strands of theory in social movement literature that aim to describe how people mobilize. Sidney Tarrow in his book *Power in Movement* (2011) explains the schools of thought. However, probably most important for this particular
study are the work of Charles Tilly and author Doug McAdam who explain contention as it relates to a political process. The “Political Process Model” (McAdam (1999[1982], Tilly 1978) explains how social movement cycles over time are determined in part by the political opportunities around social movements. The important elements of the political era to consider are the opportunities for change and the threats attached to social movement involvement. This perspective has expanded into a broad area of study that has propelled our understanding of the rise and fall of contentious politics over time. This political process framework is an important lens through which to collect and analyze data on protest policing. The organization and behaviors of law enforcement institutions intertwine with the political times, players, and collective actions of social movements in such a way that have historically continued to affect social change.

Protest policing has been defined as:

The control of protest which requires a difficult balance between the protection of legal order and defense of individual freedom, and citizens’ rights to political participation. Protest policing operates as an indicator of the quality of democracy, its implementation may affect the evolution of protest, is affected by activist tactics (della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter 2006:3).

The nature of controlling protests during the past ten years has been changing. Early strategies involved “escalated force” which refers to the quick suppression of any uprising. Then,”negotiated management” styles that involved police-protester communication and negotiation characterized the 1970s through the 1980’s and into the 1990s. Today, protest policing is taking on a much more coercive style (della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006: Tarrow 2011). This style is marked by certain coercive, persuasive and intelligence tactics which are being diffused and shared globally. Very few authors are investigating the definition of the model and questioning whether this
model represents a standardization of tactics to control transnational protest (Gibson 2008). If capacities and standardization of police repression take on a life of their own, what does this mean for the opportunities for social movement building? Contentious politics and political opportunities theory suggests that movements will come when visions of opportunity are believed to be possible. To further develop protest policing theory, it is important to understand how oppressive modes of policing affect social change. There is heterogeneity among the findings with respect to officer repression of activist mobilization (Rasler 1996).

Tactical diffusion is an area of research that evaluates how movements share tactics. Tactics are socially created, situated historically and can be relationally constructed through interactions between police and movements (Soule 1997, Givan, Soule, and Roberts 2010). Tilly’s concept of the “repertoire of contention” involves what people do in conflict and what others expect them to do. Tarrow gives this example in Power in Movement (2011) to explain that a “sit in” protest in 18th century France would make less sense than an act of tarring and feathering would today. Tactics come into being through the cultural processes of social movement action. According to Donatella della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (2012) an under researched issue is the relationship between developments in repertoire and adjustments in strategies of repression (2011:54). Dissenters change up tactics to outwit repression and this is met with new “forces of order.”

Several authors have sought to understand these intricacies of order in policing protest specifically, but very few do. In regard to the Miami model, one of the few that do is a study published in 2007. Alex Vitale assess the “Miami model” against a new style of
protest controls. He does so without a solid definition of the model, using only two news articles for the basis of a definition. Although, the characteristics of the Miami model that Vitale suggests may be accurate, a scientifically rigorous definition would surely be helpful for further research that include some of the constructions of perception, knowledge, and organizational theory. Vitale’s findings suggest that this new style is not represented in connection with the Miami model. However, Vitale uses multiple events in New York as a basis for determining the presence of the new style. This assumption, as admitted by Vitale, is problematic because the model is used primarily at large protests only. Furthermore, several of the studies specifically focused on the Miami model lack interviews with officers. It is likely to be difficult to confirm the presence of a model without a global analysis of large protests over the past 10 years and even then, according to the work of della Porta on “knowledge” national history of the location of the summit may play into the policing of the event.

Understanding what happens within the connecting agencies and organizations associated with protest control are important as agencies continue to crush uprisings. It is also important to understand the breadth of reach of these tactics that are being diffused across borders into many parts of the world (Nadelman, 1983). Law enforcement and intelligence perspectives may lead to new repertoires of organizing, or force protesters into new ways of thinking about resistance all together. Years of social movement actions have been reduced to conflicts with officers distracting activists from the very issues that led them to organize in the first place. The perceptions of the officers have been scarcely examined for the presence of solidarity with the activists messaging and goals. The aforementioned areas of research not only inform this case study analysis, but are also
critical for its potential unique representation of some emerging presence in the spaces where established order meets dissent.

**Narratives**

Postmodernist perspectives view institutions as alive in the realm of praxis, or situated in human action. They exist not as a separate higher order, nor as a static ahistorical entity, but as a devised narrative that people are inspired to continue to reify. Institutions represent a “history of choices” this is mediated through multiple realities or collective praxis (Murphy 2013). The narrative of an institution or its’ biography, may be broken down into “petite narratives.” The petite narrative perspective might be preferred over the thought of larger grand narratives that suggest the old thought that institutions somehow exist autonomous to human action. In postmodern thought, it is more appropriate to view institutions as a series of petite narratives that form a “Genre.” It is then the “genre” that our shape social practices and convey relations of power” (Lyotard 1984). Furthermore, Herbert Marcuse’s *One Dimensional Man* (1964) is important to note for his contribution to postmodern thought. A particular aspect of his work is the expression of “the rationality of [advanced industrial civilization] irrationality” and his criticism of this rationality as it has come to justify mastery and domination (1964:8).

This approach is greatly informed by the writing of Catherine Kohler Riessman (1993). Her work is one of the most cited on narrative analysis. She explains that in qualitative work the event is studied, in a narrative analysis, the story they create about the event is the focus of examination. Researchers are interpreting interpretations. “Culture speaks itself,” she says (5:1993) and the terms people use are contingent upon
history. How officers interpret the policing of protest in regards to their role in order, their perceptions of resistance, and the social change process is evidenced in the stories they tell.

Aside from the broad theorizing of general society, few authors have applied these conceptions to policing, particularly from the field of sociology, even fewer have related these concepts to the policing of political events. Egon Bittner (1990) has applied an epistemological fluid outlook to policing. He takes a turn away from the conventional view of police being some necessary fact of life, and instead approached their existence as a collection of agreements that take shape in the space of practice and experience. He considers how professionalism is understood by the officers and how that reasoning intertwines with officer behavior and then how that behavior is viewed. He says, “What commends [elements of officers’ work] is not that they are right, but that they are based on reason, rather than on feeling and in this sense, professional” (173:1990). His contribution, if considered seriously, does not allow for a one-dimensional, definition of a policing model. The definition should reflect various elements of power, logic, history, meaning, and so forth, particularly as these elements of policing relate to the development of characters and the carrying out of narratives.

Fresh minds and the research of recent graduates contribute greatly to the theoretical development of this research. For example, Jonathan Wender (2004) is a former police officer who proposes to bring a “philosophical voice” to the issues of policing and criminology. In his Dissertation Policing as Poetry and subsequent book, Policing and the Poetics of Everyday Life, Wender describes how police find themselves working in a “bureaucratic paradox” (346: 2004). On the one hand officers must come
into contact with others via what they perceive as a role. The idea of the role though, as explained through much contemporary writing refers back to social theory of first principle and that, as criticized by Wender, is what hinders officers from real change. He claims the police officer role is what needs to be transcended for real amelioration of situations. The scholarly work engages literature in ways that build a case for police work as being the interplay of bureaucracy and officer praxis. He maintains that cops are not just “walking bureaucracy,” but suggests that there is interplay of personal values and interpretations at work. It is important to note that the examination of daily police work as narratives is a quite different job than the police work at transnational protest events. There is a very different type of engagement with the public (Bittner, 1990). Although, some postmodernist and phenomenological writing has been done about police in general, the narratives driving training and the carrying out of policing political events have been largely ignored.

Clifford D. Shearing and Richard V. Ericson (1991) invoke a semantic analysis of police work. Their theoretical concepts of the use of “tropes” in the action of police work provides a very useful approach to unveiling police narratives by bringing their elements to the forefront. They suggest that officers’ actions are guided by these narratives, comprised of many tropes. To be sure, these tropes, or narratives, are not principles on an ontological plane of their own, but are constructs that have developed over time, through action, they are continually reified. Though there may be certain peculiarities to these that are unique to individual officers, there are guiding suggestions for conduct. As Shearing and Ericson put it “an officer is told not how to act, but rather the sensibility out of which they ought to act” (495:1991). Applying these ideas to the current study calls for
attention to what the sensibility is from which an officer acts. The requirements of officers in crowd control formation are very different than their job in day to day policing and will require slightly different analysis. The invocation of tropes are used by officers to justify behavior, whether in thoughtful action found on beats or in community policing, or in the more bureaucratic militaristic action of “following orders” tropes embody ideology. Tropes are likely to still be invoked by the officers to justify the oppression of social movements. If social change is to be had, it is not useful to make arguments which do not challenge these ideas. Therefore, a definition of the model calls for a list of these driving ideas, particularly if a research goal is eventual social change. These tropes represent hollow assumptions, figures of speech, that may get glossed over and not thought of much at all, but fuel the clashes between activists and officers. This research brings some of these into the light.

The present research pulls sensitizing concepts from the aforementioned literature, broadly in search of petite narratives, described by Lyotard and Murphy. The analysis also includes attention to the role of reasoning and bureaucracy in interviewing, seeking how these drive police action, as described by Bittner. The paradoxes officers find themselves in are also explored as suggested in the work of Wender. Shearing and Enderson’s which provides a simple analysis of the repeated figures of speech invoked by officers are reported and included in the research aim of defining the model, and for potential spaces for social change.

The current research follows a form from a dissertation by Gullermina Sofia Seri (2005) who draws heavily from a postmodern perspective of narratives to explain police work. This research however, places very little emphasis on the United States and very
little in the work of policing protest or of the type of work that requires officers to shift to a paramilitary, and more bureaucratic formation.

Also, this work considers activist narratives, particularly those that imply provocation and violence (Wahlstrom 2011). The tropes and elements of their narrative are considered. The current study reports common tropes among officers. The common themes expressed by officers can be tied to larger constructions or grander narratives that explain how officers ‘ways of seeing’ are guided and exist. The constructive action and reification of narratives are examined for the ways in which they stand in oppositional space to the tropes of activists. The analysis of these themes reveal where the most prevalent points of contention lie. These points may be the spaces where the greatest change is possible. Tropes, expressed as praxis in action, contribute to a more sociologically relevant definition of the Miami model, one that includes social constructions so commonly referred to in our theoretical literature. So, this research is not simply regurgitating a laundry list of tactics and strategies, but explaining deep and long nurtured narratives that continue to drive how protest is controlled.

**Social Harm**

An important task of this research is to bring the dynamics associated with the “Miami model” of policing into the realm of criminological theory. There are a number of criminology theories that could be used to explain certain aspects of the policing of protest. However there is an emerging movement to shift our thinking to one of harm, as opposed to thinking only about the breaking of stated rules, when assessing these events criminologically. One important and basic next step in the development of crime theory
is to begin a database that itemizes the harms inflicted by the state (Rothe, Ross, Mullins, Friedrichs, Michalowski, Barak, Kauzlarich, and Kramer 2009). In an effort to advance the social harm perspective, the harms imposed by the state in regard to protest policing are assessed. As chains of command, organization, training, messaging, and expectations of officers are unraveled, harm is likely to exist. Most importantly, the social harms imposed by all actors and processes, including those of activists, are addressed. Crime has been criticized as merely a social construction with no ontological reality (Hillyard and Tombs 2004). For example, scholars have argued that “the problematic situations that may be labeled as crimes occur in different kinds of situations and for different reasons” (Hillyard, Pantazis, Tombs and Gordon 2004:11). The defeat theory suggests that the “most dangerous of anti-social behaviors” are not reflected in criminal justice policy (2004:12). Crime, thus, excludes many harms. Because the concept is so broad, it is problematic to define social harm. The term should embrace a far-reaching variety of situations that affect people across their life course.

There can be physical harms, due to lack of food, blocked access to adequate shelter, exposures to environmental pollutants, death or torture. There can be social economic harm including poverty, fraudulent mortgage practices, price gauging, public service policies, unemployment, or cultural injustices that may affect groups or individuals access to any number of resources, resulting in broad social harm. These are a few examples, although what constitutes harm might be best defined by those who are harmed, and less by what is pre-ordained by the state. Thus, harm may not have any more ontological reality than crime, but the advantage of using a social harm perspective is in its power to paint the picture of what is most likely to affect people during their life
course. These harms are more likely to include states of affairs, and ongoing conditions that often, from a criminological perspective, go unacknowledged.

Also, the study of harm permits a much wider investigation into who may be responsible for harms. There is less focus on an individual, or single criminal act and more focus on uncovering the broad social webs of harm. Further, a social harm perspective elicits much more useful policy responses for harm reduction than criminological theories. Paddy Hillyard and Steve Tombs cited Carol Smart in Beyond Criminology (2004) who proposes, “the thing that criminology cannot do is deconstruct crime” (2004:12).

While social harms are being itemized, it is important to keep in mind the potential positives generated from conflict. Some authors suggest that oppression has progressive impacts on movements. For example, della Porta, Peterson, and Reiter (2006) propose that in some cases oppression may have positive impacts on movement formation. Also, David A. Snow, Louis A. Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson (1980) suggest that grievances are the foundation for collective identities, which become more defined in the presence of perceived enemies. This idea was elaborated in Doug McAdam’s work Freedom Summer, illustrating how conflict can propel social change. Based on this literature, harm is divided along lines of individual harms which may or may not equate to social harms. The social harm determinations of the “Miami model” are made by relying heavily upon the budding social harm literature that has been authored across many substantive areas of criminology. The previous work on social harm grappled with individual harms versus social harms and this will have to be
considered by the reader, the current research is only a beginning attempt at defining and acknowledging various harms associated with the Miami model.

Organizational Theory, Bureaucracy, and Social Change

Max Weber (1947) describes increasing rationality related to an increasing implementation of bureaucracy. There still exists at the core of Weber, a dualistic view of reality that suggests there is some reality that stands outside of human creation (Perrow 1979). This view is limiting. Perrow suggests that, “organizations must be continually reproduced and recreated through the actions of concrete individuals” (1979:247). A deeper look, Perrow suggests, examinations of daily life might explain how actions come to be carried out through reification of processes and adherence to procedures under assumptions that seem to be removed from class or power. This research suggestion provides useful insight into how police “workers,” through bureaucracy, carry out the suppression of civil liberties, physical violence, and violation of human rights that are iconic of demonstration events historically. These images and historical referents continue to transform in a place of shared meaning and interpretations, by officers, activists, public, media, and targets of dissent. These meanings have been reified for as long as the force of police has been used to squash dissent. Examining the language, meanings, and narratives of the police and activists in these situations is useful in capturing how the violence is occurring on various levels between these forces that have been, over time, continuously pitted against each other. David Farmer (1995) reminds us that in a postmodern assessment of an arrangement like the police, it is important to consider things from a global perspective. Also interesting in his work is the suggested
contributions that a postmodern perspective can have in regard to social change. He maintains “there is no miracle prescription or magic bullet” that will bring about change (1995:3). Change, he says, will be slow and accomplished by attending to the language of bureaucracy, and opening up to reflexive language. Change needs to take place, a kind of total root and branch transformation, but it is not likely to all be yanked up all at one time. Attending to the powerful contribution of narratives that have risen to be accepted as reality (Murphy 1982) we may find appropriate immediate avenues for social change through unveiling the bureaucracies as narratives, and seeking ways to change the language. Redekop and Par’e (2010) take a more conservative path to social change, but bring up potential research paths to consider as we attempts to change the dialogue, not to make a kindler gentler demonstration, but to change the storyline. In this, it is important to understand the intent of demonstrators and the message framing by the media. A look into how the demonstrators want to be perceived and the problems they experience in the way of media messaging and news framing is valuable in the current research. Erving Goffman’s 1977 work on the effects of framing is also relevant in this analysis, particularly in determining future directions and harm reduction as demonstrators seek meaningful interactions and access to the public. Also, another way to envision change may be, as Redekop and Par’e suggest, is to be attentive to key persons that are continuously left out of the equation those being the targets of the activists, like the media, the public, and in the case of FTAA, the summit ministers. These entities are often who demonstrators seek to speak to, how demonstrators get to reach them and if this is a consideration of the Miami model is important to note in the current research.
CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY

As proposed by Bruce Lawrence Berg (2004), a qualitative case study approach was employed that utilized modified grounded theory methods in data collection and analysis (Charmaz 2006; Birks and Mills 2007; Cresswell 2012) with a human rights agenda (Denzin and Giardina 2010). Case study methodology involves systematic gathering of information about something, in this case the Miami model, that permits the researcher to understand its’ operations and functions. Data gathering measures, in this case study analysis, are drawn from the guidelines of modified grounded theory which suggests that there should be data gathering, coding, analysis, writing and then engagement with the literature following the initial data collection and analysis through the constant comparison method. The methodology allows theoretical sensitization to concepts during the research and allows for systematic arrangements or relationships to be examined and reported among categories. What assisted the researcher in generating conceptual categories is the act of memo writing throughout the constant comparison method. These memos help determine how the researcher should raise codes based on their explanatory power. Raising codes brings the data closer to theoretical categories useful for explaining the phenomena. More data collection occurs in tandem with more focused coding and memo writing to refine the categories and theoretical sampling was necessary in order to get clarification on the developing foundation. Memo sorting, engagement with the relevant literature, and writing the draft were all part of the analytic process as well. The revision process helped to make the modified grounded theory identifiable and accessible.
It is important to note at this point how the narrative portion of the results was analyzed. Grounded theorist Kathy Charmaz (2006) suggests in *Constructing Grounded Theory*, one is able to articulate the dominant literature, but remain “theoretical agnostics” when data collection and analysis begins. Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggest that the initial collection of data is based on general sociological perspective, but subsequent data gathering and analysis depends on what the data reveal. In efforts to search for meaning of the coded categories, the literature on narratives and policing as poetry was engaged as suggested (Charmaz 2006, Glaser and Strauss 1967).

The researcher became sensitized to the theories of narrative and figures of speech that embody meaning. The theoretical concept of “tropes” in this research sensitized further data collection and analysis. The researcher both examined, through axial coding, those already coded categories, seeking for those very similar, almost parroted figures of speech commonly expressed in the officer interviews; and conducted more interviews with officers who were on the front line with the most exposure to the activists. An article written by Ian Dey (2007), published in The Sage Handbook of Grounded Theory, edited by Antony Bryant and Kathy Charmaz, explains that humans make sense and structure experience through narratives. Narrative enquiry can play a critical role in grounded theory. There are various culturally available genres through which storytelling is enacted and “tropes bear a close comparison with modes of categorization” (2007:185). Tropes in the case of this study are taken from the Latin word *tropos*, which means "to turn or twist,"

An example of how these methods were used to obtain the results was finding the trope “good demonstrators and bad demonstrators.” Scanning the material for relevant
material as suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998) was conducted in conjunction with data collection and analysis. Messages like “there are mom and pop demonstrators and then you know there’s trouble when someone comes at you wearing a mask.” Phrases that officers used to describe demonstrators were coded, like “agitators” or “troublemakers.” Then, other codes were created to capture where officers described other activists as “good law abiding citizens” or those who are just “trying to express their first amendment rights.” The researcher noticed that these codes were emerging, in tandem, together. So the code was raised to “good demonstrators and bad demonstrators.” Later, memos and axial coding, looking for relationships between codes, revealed that officers were making a distinction between the two types of demonstrators primarily when a question was asked of them to explain why some social harm had occurred. This was also verified through activist messages in the content. Activist claimed that officers’ justified the brutality by pinning blame on “bad demonstrators.” It was also alluded to in the observation field notes that there was some way of police “knowing” when events would require heavy police presence to handle the bad demonstrators.

So, the tropes that officers communicate represent their version of what happened. Theoretical sampling of several officers who were on the front lines was conducted to investigate if this was really experienced by the officers who were in the most direct contact with the demonstrators. It was clear, that even these outer-perimeter officers decided that there were “good demonstrators and bad” and it was those few who ruined it for everyone else. What officers were saying, in many of the cases, was troublesome for two reasons: One, these phrases did not clearly explain the video and testimony out of the content analysis and two, sometimes the activists were aware of these justifications as
evidenced in their testimony, blogs, and independent media articles. In the case of the “good demonstrators and bad demonstrators” example, the documentary *the Miami Model*, showed many instances where large forces of police in riot gear were pushing back on entire crowds when some individuals were trapped and some trampled. There was one part of the video where an officer was swearing at an activist then obscenely gestured the camera. There was also a scene where a woman standing holding a sign was fired upon with rubber bullets, not provoking at all. She was even wearing a suit and looked like what could be defined as a “good demonstrator.” These data from the content analysis raised a question about what the officers were saying. So, in effort to try and understand how to make sense of this, literature on narrative analysis was explored.

The idea of “tropes” was found to be helpful in making sense of the categories. What was particularly interesting about these tropes, or twists, is that they seemed to be highly charged with national sentiment or ideology about how social change should be occurring. For example, if this study was on uprisings in Bahrain or Egypt, officer responses might be quite different. In some countries there is no history of protected rights to assemble, even if in ideology only. Officers, in the case of this event in the United States, expressed that holding a sign and being obedient to the police is democracy and what a “good demonstrator” would do. One officer even exclaimed that “FTAA demonstrations would not happen in Cuba.” But those activists who are not satisfied with being obedient, or even those who were in the wrong place at the wrong time, were labeled “bad demonstrators” and not participating in democracy correctly and therefore not subject to protection. The “good demonstrators and bad demonstrators” trope was invoked to justify harmful behavior.
Since actors are engaged in events and experience them in terms of unfolding stories, it is important to note that narrative accounts are not merely literary devices, but also constitute experience (Czarniawska 2004). The categories of tropes created in this study are not a part of a narrative analysis methodology, but sensitize the researcher to these ideas using the method of modified grounded theory to inform the research aim of defining how the Miami model is socially constructed. The work of Catherine Kohler Riessman (1993) is one of the most cited on narrative analysis. She explains that in qualitative work the event is studied, in a narrative analysis, the story they create about the event is the focus of examination. Researchers are interpreting interpretations. “Culture speaks itself,” she says (5:1993) and the terms people use are contingent upon history. How officers interpret the policing of protest in regards to their role in order, their perceptions of resistance, and the social change process is evidenced in the stories they tell. The theories of culture embedded in narratives informed the project overall, but a full narrative analysis is needed in future research. According to Ian Dey (2007), grounded theory is valuable in the analysis of narratives as embodying experience.

The use of modified grounded theory in a "holistic analysis" seems appropriate (Creswell, 2007:100). Combining this case study framework and a modified grounded theory approach is justified by Melanie Birks and Jane Mills (2011). Further coding and comparison of categories, guided by the theoretical foundation of narrative analysis

In order to achieve the aims of this research, three methods of data collection were used: 1) in-depth interviews and 2) content analysis and 3) field observations. The data collected is triangulated to achieve a comprehensive understanding of the Miami Model’s policing organizational structure, including processes used by police on the
ground, the model’s characteristics of new styles of protest control, and the harms related
to this model of policing protests. The following data collection section outlines how
each data source informs the research aims.
CHAPTER IV. DATA COLLECTION

In-Depth Interviews

A total of 8 in-depth interviews with key participants were conducted. These included five officers who were involved with the 2003 FTAA event and one who continues to assist with ongoing lawsuits. Two of those who participated in FTAA were in leadership roles and three were on the ground outer-perimeter officers and hotel security. Also, one external trainer and one attorney involved with oversight panels were interviewed for this study. The Institutional Review Board at the University of Miami has approved for the interviews to be conducted without any law enforcement agency permission. Verbal informed consent, however, was required (See Appendix C). Using a snowball sampling method, contacts were pursued through connected agencies. All but one of the participants was directly involved in the FTAA protests of 2003. The one not included, however, provided offsite, non-violence training to at least one officer present. The specific research questions for officers, agency representatives, and related parties are listed in Appendix A. Each participant was interviewed or contacted two times. The first interview was approximately one hour long. Second contacts were very short, often sharing information via telephone, or contacted with one additional question.

Repeating fragments and recurring themes that were present in the language of officers were coded. They were considered parts of narratives (Shearing and Ericson 1991, Seri 2005). The actions of the involved parties under study are
considered to be part of a social constructed legal and historical context that are communicated through narrative. These are included in clarification of the model.

**Content Analysis**

The content analysis was included to add to the comprehensive understanding of the model. The content analysis provided the perspectives of other parties other than the officers, as well as to fill in gaps, corroborate police interviews, and get more information about the model in general. The content analyses focus is on targeting the characteristics of the 2003 protests and narratives provided by activists in the media and their organizations. Also, the content is utilized during late stage analysis and for theoretical sampling purposes.

The data sources for content analysis included items from four available categories: 1) Four articles from the published academic literature, 2) Ten published independent media news stories, 3) Three legal filings, two civilian oversight reports and testimony transcripts, and various non-governmental reports, and 4) Various blogs and organization press releases, feature stories, mission statements, and celebrated literature of activist groups. Specifically the selection of the content is justified as follows:

**Academic Literature**

The academic literature analyzed and contributing to the aims of this research includes works from John Gibson (2008), Armory Starr and Luis Fernandez 2009, Alex Vitale (2007), and Mattias Wahlstrom (2007).
**Independent Media**

The first internet search on outlets listed in the proposal was for the term “Miami Model.” This search yielded 10 articles which were then entered into NVivo either in the form of text or audio/video. One round of initial open coding was completed, and then another search was conducted, continuing through the necessary theoretical sampling until the raised categories reached saturation. Furthermore, while some of the articles were direct reports, other information was pulled from comments on the articles. These comments were entered into the section “Blogs, Organizational information, and Opinion pieces” which are quite useful in the analysis of dialogue and narrative.

**Legal Filings**

The most informative pieces of what information was available were pulled from this category. This includes A Civilian Review Panel Investigation, which was conducted in at least two jurisdictions immediately following the 2003 event, one in Miami-Dade county and another in the city of Miami. These boards are appointed by the community; the report for the Miami-Dade area gave much more information and even transcripts of multiple hearings held where activist, media, officers, and other community members gave testimony on a range of accusations of civil rights violations. This testimony was considered data under this legal filings section. Also, Amnesty International released a report on the legal filings by their organization, made available on their website, and the National Lawyers Guild reports on the filings of individual demonstrators. This seemed sufficient and as the
categories became saturated during analysis. This occurred until no further content was needed in order to explain the emerging themes.

**Documentary, Direct Accounts and Forums**

The Documentary the “Miami Model” contributed in ways that added video of officers in action that were in contradiction to the interview data, particularly in the way of professionalism testimony and officer inappropriate behavior. This added greatly to a category of contradictions between activist viewpoints and officers. Direct accounts might include statements put out by attending organizations. Also forums provided insight into the contradictory narratives of activists and officers. One case of a lengthy debate between multiple officers and activist on a public forum is analyzed. Also, in late analysis it became clear that theoretical sampling needed to be conducted to analyze a specific group that was continuously considered separate from the others, by many officers and various activists. The group considered is oppositional type anarchists. To further understand this group, *The Anarchist Tension* (Bonanno 1996) was entered into NVivo and included in the examination of narratives. This was important to be comprehensive and considerate of all forms of political action, particularly when considering paths of inclusive social change.

**Field Observations**

Field observations at two planned protest demonstrations were conducted, but did little to inform the research as it was discovered through the collection and
analysis process that Miami model tactics are only implemented for massive large
scale events with the presence of various political ministers and leaders, and funded
by particular sources. One observation consisted of a two-day internationally
focused mass demonstration and another was a local afternoon demonstration near
the location of the original 2003 event. The specific observations are listed in
Appendix B.

All interviews and field notes were recorded then transcribed and quality
controlled, all audio was deleted after quality control of the transcript. All data was
coded in NVivo

The compiled list of strategies from all sources is reported in Table 1. Then, tropes that emerged from officer interviews which embody meaning and
attribute to the social construction of the model are reported in Table 2. The results
of the social harm inventory, pulled from all sources, is reported in Table 3, and the
officer field force configuration as described in interviews and resemble, in some
ways, what was viewed in content analysis is illustrated in Figure 1.
CHAPTER V. FINDINGS

*Defining the Model – Strategies and Narratives*

The data revealed the presence of a set of strategies that constitute a broadly applicable design of response to large protest events, these strategies that occurred before, during, and after this large transnational protest event could be referred to as a model. Furthermore, strong notions of national history and ideology are embodied in officer narratives that help explain the emergence and the use of the model. Historical influences and ideology motivate officer to tell stories that justify their actions within the model. Therefore, the model can be considered to be comprised of both physical strategies and social constructions. First, the physical components, strategies, and procedural details of the model are reported in Table 1. Then, the narrative tropes that officers are associating with this type of response to protest are listed in Table 2. The strategies and important findings associated with them are reported, followed by the narrative elements which provide a vision of a social construction of the model, in a very fluid way historically and considering the particular place and time.

*Strategies*

A number of physical components, strategies and procedures seem to define the model. For the sake of clarity, the model is broken down into three categories: Those that occur prior to the event, those that take place during the event, and those
that follow. The strategies in Table 1 make up the sum of all strategies reported or observed in the officer interviews, content analysis, and observations. See Table 1.

*Preparation for the event*

A key strategy used in this model is surveillance. This is one issue officers were largely unable to elaborate on. Most of this data was gathered from the content analysis. Officers did admit that determining and the planning of the police response largely relied on intelligence information. Surveillance of activists prior to the event includes ongoing surveillance of social media and various communication channels, such as email and blogs. Informants are embedded in certain organizations. Provocateurs are used, according to activists, though officers may deny their presence. Activists maintain that individuals are placed with the purpose of encouraging activists to use illegal tactics. Intelligence agencies, based on information not obtained in this study, target particular organizations in an ongoing fashion. Many of these actions are justified by various bills such as the Patriot Act and the more recent Domestic Terrorism Act which allow for the officer breaches of privacy acts in the name of national defense. Homeland Security and other federal level interior securitization entities are involved in the model.

Also prior to the event are a variety of officer activist interactions that include arrests, questioning, intimidation, and searches. Preventative arrests are used, according to activists, to frighten or intimidate, however officials claim the arrests are made with the purpose of national security. Detectives will threaten lengthy jail sentences for the purpose of pressuring activists to turn informant. The arrests
officers make, according to activists are based on fragmented or questionable evidence and the charges are vague, such as “conspiracy” or “obstruction.”

Types of gear and number of troops were decisions made in the planning stages. Number of officers, types of munitions, fencing, and determining zones where activists will and will not be allowed were no secret. Prior to the 2003 FTAA event, media covered what the city of Miami was doing in preparation for the event, police officials did not hesitate reporting that there would be many jurisdictions of officers called out, certain munitions used, etc. For example, the use of rubber bullets was approved because of the windiness of the area of Miami just off the bay, officers felt that rubber bullets were more precise. These types of considerations all take place in preparation. The elements of planning are divided across different teams. These include Logistics, Financial, Training, Intelligence, and Legal. There may be more, but this was all the information obtained from the officers in the scope of this study.

Negotiation took place prior to the event between various entities. A number of key characteristics of these negotiations took place in 2003 and seem to be a common practice. The negotiations called by particular officials involved with crafting particular aspects of the operational plan. The negotiation in the case of 2003 included fewer than 10 representatives from a contingency of thousands of protesters, many people felt that the negotiations were exclusive. The terms of negotiation mostly concerned logistics and were more instructional than negotiated. The officials were very rigid in allowing activists access to targets such as FTAA
ministers, media, and the general public. For example, decisions were made to keep activists several blocks away from the hotel, media were embedded with officers and trained with them rather than with activists; general public traffic through Miami was re-routed and nearby offices and businesses were encouraged to close. This virtually isolated the activists. Also, “negotiated” logistics were not guaranteed by officers. Representatives from various groups were instructed that areas were not guaranteed to be accessible to the activists, if officers felt at any time that they needed to partition them off. This would occur during the event, which is discussed in the next section.

Various fundraising activities to fund the model take place leading up to the event. The FTAA entity footed some of the bill. Other sources include federal and state requests, but also officials garner support from local businesses. In the name of law and order and selling police presence as a means to defend local property, business owners are solicited, eg. the Miami Herald was a contributor.

_During the event_

A massive police presence and widespread arrests took place. Arrest teams attached to response platoons in a paramilitaristic formation are important components of the Miami model. See Figure 1 regarding the Field Force formation used in the model. Officers are placed on an outer perimeter with the primary function of moving as ordered by Sergeants located on an inner perimeter who are in communication with Commanders. Each unit, or platoon, consist of officers, several sergeants and a commander who are interconnected with other platoons, combined to make up the field force formation.
The media embedding campaign is also very unique to the Miami model. Media are trained and placed with officers in a design which mimics warzone coverage. The media are escorted by officers and briefed on the happenings on the ground, from the officer perspective. Media were not embedded with activists, and were discouraged from doing so by officers. Media personnel were not promised protection if they chose not to be embedded. Further aggravating the situation of informing the public was a campaign of material destruction by officers. Many activists and media journalists claim there recorded material was seized or destroyed by officers.

The barricades of event spaces and zones are a key means of controlling the protests in the model. Planned blockades preventing activists from accessing event spaces either on foot or by vehicle is a common practice and even blockading activists from reaching each other is a tactic used to reduce the power of the crowd. Also, access to permitted events was denied in the name of security, officers may invoke reasons of security at any time to prevent the enactment of first amendment and permitted rights to assemble. Also, it should be noted that there may have been a denial of entrance or various control methods used at the borders according to some academic literature, but this was not clear from other sources. This tactic should be considered a possible strategy of the model, though not entirely verified by this research.

Officers are used in various ways. The largest contingent of officers in this model was those in ant-riot gear. This gear was used to protect officers from attack, but they also were used to prevent officers from being identified and to intimidate. Some officers were wearing everyday officer uniforms, particularly those who are assigned to “scout and recon,” who were out and around the crowd, watching, questioning, or searching
activist. Then, the embedded and provocateurs officers in plain clothes were used in the action of the event. Scouts and re-con that were in officer attire were also in and around the crowd.

Following the event

Important actions taking place after the event are connected to the model. In the case of Miami, the records of the event were specially classified based on issues of public safety. Of particular concern is the model operational plan. That plan would be most useful as a definition of the model; however that document has special protections. Future research may investigate the protection of these records. Public relations campaigns are devised legal cases which could serve as an ongoing research project in and of themselves. Activists’ legal observers filed and presented evidence in courts. Civilian review boards were created. The Miami model plan has a legal team charged with handling legal issues of the event from planning through the following years of litigation. Also, various external, judicial, and community entities to address damages became involved.

This list of strategies is not exhaustive, but includes most of the descriptions that emerged from the data. There was not the capability in the current study to do an exhaustive list of strategies used at previous or subsequent transnational protests that would have aided in fully isolating the Miami “model.” However, these are the primary strategies experienced by activists, found in legal filings, observed in academic research, covered by independent news media, and revealed by various officers and officials. The listed strategies generally make up what is being referred
to as a Miami model. The term, based on the data collected, signifies that these strategies are becoming basic elements of policing transnational protest events.

**Additional Characteristics of the Model**

**Significance of planning stage**

It was made clear by officer interviews that the planning stage is a key to the model. What makes the Miami model transpire is determined mostly by what occurs in the planning stage. Roland states,

> Pre-emptive gathering of data and analyzing intelligence determines whether or not a future event meets a threshold for us to establish a steering committee and engage in the Miami plan. It’s changed over the years, with the use of computers and the ability to send information and communicate digitally you know there’s certain different sophistications and vulnerabilities that these groups engage in, you know passing information back and forth, it's just another way to gather that same old intelligence and information about what may be occurring. Officers are trained on what to expect, so when they go out there, they know what might be coming, Intelligence is evaluated, you know validated or vetted and then we design response capabilities based on the information that we interpret, so if we think that there’s going to be a very specific threat at this level, then we design a response to address that threat. (Roland)

**Social organization**

The Miami model is shrouded in elusiveness, but has a history associated with previous riots in Miami, and is now associated with National Response Platoons (RP). The RPs are trained in standardized tactics designed to handle riots or other events calling for crowd control, Roland describes,

> We have 48 law enforcement agencies all trained with a Response Platoon concept, so in this region, everybody’s trained the same. What’s referred to as the Miami model, just expands on the needs of that mobilization effort. It addresses things like feeding people, how we’re moving people, what kind of transportation elements are we going to use,
how we are going to communicate. So the Miami model is an all-inclusive response effort way beyond just the response platoon capability. So we’ve been using this Miami mobile field force for quite some time, but recently the office of domestic preparedness decided that there needed to be a national plan, an opportunity to use this same kind of response capabilities nationally. So if somebody had to respond to another jurisdiction or to another location and stand up crowd control or respond to civil unrest, there would be a plan that would work across borders. So law enforcement entities got together, in like a think tank, and redesigned the Miami mobile field force into what we use now the Response Platoon (RP). What happened was this Miami mobile field force, was adopted by agencies around the country and modified to meet the needs of their community, so now they have the opportunity to take all of those modifications to find what really works best and include that into this national response platoon plan. (Roland)

The question I asked about what specifically the Miami model was diverted a bit. The RP was explained by Roland instead. He did suggest that the Miami model goes well beyond the RP tactics. Also, how strategies were employed in the street, based on the interviews and content, were quite dynamic. It is unknown, due to the sealing of records, protected by a Florida Supreme court order, how many violations of civil rights were planned ahead of time, or were made more likely due to elements of preparation, those are protected. Even efforts to obtain information on the “model” to allow investigators to determine if portions of the model were designed with rights infringements embedded were not allowed through court of law, even when filed by the National Lawyers Guild. A Superior Court judge allowed the model to be released, law enforcement attorneys sought protection of the plan in the higher Supreme Court and those protections were granted. Currently, these records are unattainable to the public. Roland’s description is helpful to understand the creation and changes of the model. The Response Platoon can be found in the Incident Command system (Incident Command System Overview, 2012).
There are extensive training manuals, one for officers and another for commanders. I was unable to review the books in their entirety since only a brief glance at the books was allowed during interviews. However it was clear that, very seeming aspect of this event was covered in the training manual. Notably, a hefty section on the first amendment was included in the training manuals. Although little data came out of these books in this study, it is important to note that they exist, but they are protected. The books were used to train officers and then officers carried out enactments of scenarios at the end of their training. See Figure 1.

*Lawsuits*

Understandably, there are still pending lawsuits to this day. One officer admits the police response was “incredible, it was absolutely crazy” (Frank). He continues:

The city has paid some, but as far as our police officers getting hit with punitive damages, our lawsuits had been violating peoples’ rights, mostly suing majors of police, like John Timoney, the main administrators, none of them have been hit with punitive damages. The city has settled some, mostly to save money. It’s so expensive to defend multiple cases, it’s cheaper to settle out. (Frank)

So far this officers response was very much in-line with what was discovered in the legal filings content analysis. The organizations have been able to claim victory; however the complete terms of settlements are unknown. It is also important to note that the budget for FTAA response was approximately 8 million dollars (Frank, Indymedia 2004). Paid for by Federal Emergency Management Response, the FTAA or related entities, The Miami Herald gave money, as did other private interests” (Frank, Indymedia 2004).
The officers will justify their actions that violated civil rights through a variety of rules set in place that determine their action. These are what officers refer to as rules of engagement.

The rules of engagement what actions we take depending on what the protesters do and its always a reaction to what the protesters do. I developed them the first rule of engagement is Omni-presence its standing there looking good looking like you know what you’re doing and you know that presence alone to deter people that’s how we start out and then depending on what happen with the protesters it can escalate from anywhere from omnipresence to deadly force depending on if anybody’s got a gun.” (Mitchell)

The rules of engagement for officers that are put in place to reduce officer doubt on the ground and are designed to subvert these lawsuits. The rules of engagement are also viewed as superior to human decision making ability. These rules bring so-called rationality and sensibility to various types of police engagement with activists on the ground, even justifying violence. It is important to note that, through very seemingly concrete, “rules and regulations” (Ross) removed a senses of personal responsibility from the officers on the ground. The seemingly concrete organization and training reported by one officer might be challenged by another officer.

*Not so organized*

The general response was, at times, not so organized even though the model gives the illusion of a united fro, Arthur explains,

Arthur: It was a Hollywood police officer who fired a concussion grenade which is real loud, it scared me to death, it makes a loud noise, it sounds like bomb, and that scared me to death and they [the demonstrators] took off running, they retreat. Denise: you didn’t have ear protection gear? Arthur: No, we had a lot of agencies that came down to help us, but we
didn’t know that they was gonna fire this thing off… that thing scared me to death. They fired off between the buildings downtown, it sounded like they blew up a building. But it commanded respect and they moved back. (Arthur)

Officers were not informed about actions taking place and the confusion was dangerous. Although the rules and training seemed so formalized, Author’s experience suggests the formality does not as much for creating an organized response as they boast. This so-called organized response will be an excuse for responding to dissent in a seemingly unfeeling way, guided by the illusion of rationale that the model provides.

**Inconsistencies**

Not surprisingly the various responses that officers recollected were quite different than those of the activists. Although this may be expected, further investigation into how and possibly why these differences exist and how they further serve to prevent fundamental social change is needed and important. To name a few, the officers largely denied the presence of provocateurs, discrepancies in configuration, primarily the omission of information, such as the use of scouts. Officers largely maintained that they would have to be acted upon first to respond with physical force against demonstrators. Activists have maintained that they were in attendance in peace and did not provoke officers, and were denied civil liberties. Given the discrepancies, it would be unfair to provide a definition of a model with such varying accounts of the event. Further examination into meaning and narratives should prove useful for understanding these discrepancies and ultimately
lead to a more descriptive and fluid version of the model along the lines of the
storylines and their themes associated with the meaning of the Miami model.

*The Strategies of the Miami Model and New Style of Protest Control*

The results here suggest that there are a number of strategies and tactics
particular to a Miami model that take place prior to, during and after the event.
There are also particular characteristics emerging around beefed up intelligence,
more involved legal issues, stark inconsistencies between officer and activist. The
web is cluttered with description of the brutality of the Miami model. And other
than whispers of an operational plan, an official release of what the model is has
not been obtained, without a higher court order than what has already been filed
according to ACLU and Amnesty International. The model can be thought to
consist of the sum of the elements of the Miami Field Force Tactics created in the
1980s, the additions to those tactics in the form of RPs, and strategies particular to
the place, time, and event. The additional considerations regarding meaning and
narrative construction from the modified grounded theory and social harm analysis
should also be considered parts of the model addressed in the Narrative section.

*New style - Protest control*

A new style of Protest Control is said to be emerging (della Porta, Peterson,
and Reiter 2006). To examine this, assessments of how aspects of the former style
of negotiated management might be being used or distorted. Though variously
defined, a key characteristic of negotiated management is negotiation before and during an event, particularly in meaningful ways for activists. For example, if someone throws a rock, that might be allowed to slide, but not so under the Miami model. In contrast, the Miami model design, in general, is about more control and less negotiation. The attorney who had facilitated the negotiation with certain activists; primarily labor unions, and established groups, could not be reached. So, Roland speaks about the negotiation process,

If there were more than 5 or 6 people in the room, nothing would ever get accomplished so it was very limited in that respect that only those interested parties and probably the legal representations of the AFL-CIO and other legal representation of other groups that wanted to participate in the demonstration. I wasn’t there, but I would assume it was maybe 6 maybe 8 at the max. (Roland)

Also, negotiation was more like instructions:

There were lines in the sand that were drawn and we’re not gonna go past this point even in the negotiation process, because there’s certain things that we can’t give up, but there were efforts to negotiate components of what we were going to allow, what we were going to tolerate, and what we were going to hold the demonstrators responsible for. (Roland)

These pre-event negotiations were very rigid, and were not inclusive of the needs of many of the activists. The negotiations were very much on the terms of the police and can therefore hardly be credited for managing the interactions and the crowd at the event. Many of these “promises were broken” (City of Miami civilian Investigative Panel Report on the Free Trade Area of the Americas summit 2006).

An important aspect of the negotiated management style is for some leniency of the officers to allow small infractions. Small infractions were taken very seriously and actually seen as the catalyst for potential escalation of violence, Ross explains,
It wasn’t... horseplay, it wasn’t playin’ in the playground, it was serious business, they cannot get any idea that they can breach a particular area. Ever notice how one person does something and the rest follows? It could be a situation like that, you could have one person or a group of people who take the initiative to do something and then before you know it you have a whole gang of people following the leader, so they want to avoid that. So therefore it had to be serious business, we had to show that we meant business. (Ross)

These aspects of policing the event deviated from a negotiated management style.

It appears based on the strategies employed that this resembles a new style of protest control. Although, based on the research, uncertainty remains concerning the issue of whether this is a model being applied, in its entirety, elsewhere, but it can be determined that certainly many parts of this model are designed for the purpose of being able to be used anywhere. It can be used to bring all forces from all over the country, if needed. Also, it is unknown if is here to stay. The strategies that occur before, during, and after the event make up the model. More characteristics include that it is intelligence driven, accompanied by lawsuits, rift with inconsistencies between activists and officers, and it fits into a new style of protest control.

Sociologically, political constructions, meaning, national history, experiences, fears, and ideology should be considered in any clarification of the model. A definition of the model without this type of contribution would be incomplete. The following section includes constructive elements that enrich our understanding of the meaning officers attribute to their work, and will be useful in creating new ideas around social change.
Narratives Associated with the Model

A number of figures of speech that embody sociologically relevant concepts were found to be associated with the model. Fragmentary stories of narratives set “truth” and organize courses of action. Having one definition of the model that holds for everyone is not feasible. This research aims to uncover “patterns of continuity” and disruption (Lyotard 1984). This concept was applied here in the analysis of various “tropes” invoked to guide thinking and ways of acting. These tropes are elements of narratives. They are creative guides for action that have been constructed historically through praxis (Seri 2005, Shearing and Ericson 1991). A number of themes are outlined in Table 2. These can be considered figures of speech embodying beliefs about the control of dissent that are driving the model. The story lines reveal the rationalizations of the officers directly interviewed. The activist experiences are addressed, particularly where they may greatly conflict with officers. The following are “tropes” or themes weaved together into storylines. See Table 2.

Although narrative analysis often calls for attention to the order of these tropes, in this case, they seemed to be invoked at any time to ward off responsibility. However, a much more in-depth narrative analysis focused study design would be in order for a richer explanation of the officer narratives. In this case, the tropes are important to point out since they seem to be attached to and justify the use of the militant tactics seen in the model.
Negotiation – justifies it all

The officer continually fell back on the negotiation process, as the justifier of all that was done. Every officer interviewed, viewed the negotiation process as positive and it was the catch all “they were warned,” “they had a chance to speak,” “we worked with them.” The negotiation process was extremely limited, see previous section. Ivan rather idealistically says, “I know the department representatives met with all the groups that they could and tried to work a solution that everyone was generally happy with. So that’s the goal. “(Ivan). When challenged about other people’s rights, to symbolically resist, or to include those who weren’t invited to the negotiation, officers simply responded that they do the “best that they can.” The negotiation, in all its limitations, is a hurtful process when so many are not heard, the ground rules seem to be laid out before anyone walks in a room, and it then justifies various civil rights violations of the officers.

Protect and Serve – that’s my job

Officers parroted often their duties; this includes largely protection and service. They repeated these terms often and used to justify most of the behavior and how they see themselves serving society. Ross says, “We were there to serve and protect and preserve lives, we were also there to preserve property. So it can be a huge task, but I think it was a very successful task.” (Ross) The officers see that the surrounding area needs to be controlled, but also that the ministers have a right to meeting, they serve them too.
I don’t think we impeded them, we just did what our job was as required as a law enforcement officer, to protect property and life, I don’t think we impede their process, if its done in a peaceful and organized manner... in this situation we’re there to protect life and property and ensure that the conference goes on. (Mitchel)

Mitchel’s quote represents many of the sentiments of the responding officers. Here the vision of “protection” is distorted. They see themselves as protecting those who have rights to have a conference, with less thought that the conference’s continuation is likely to lead to mass harms and violence across the Americas. The term “protect life and property” does not reach beyond a one-dimensional thought of us and them. The rights of demonstrators are protected through the negotiation process, as explained in previous section, but were more like instructions, than true negotiations. That thought goes by the wayside, as officers justify the “protection” of life and property. Rights conflict sometimes, there is a balance, officers claim, to protect rights when not interfering with the rights of others. Further the other harms associated with the munitions use, mass arrests, and other civil rights violations are reduced to below the value of protection of property in this trope.

*Two sides – us and them*

Officers continuously expressed that there were two sides. Forgetting that there is an entity the free Trade Area of the Americas, which was actually the focus for most of the protesters, with the exception of those specifically there for police resistance tactics. The officers continued rhetoric that suggested there were only “us and them” This tends to pit the police against the protesters.

It’s a balance, they have the right to have their event, they have the right to have their meetings in peace, the other group wants to be as close as
possible, they want to be heard, so there’s a balance. You have to work the balance, if they’re too close they can’t defend the location and keep it safe and secure and give this side [FTAA] their rights. And you can’t put the other people too far away, they feel unheard. So we do the best job of balancing that we can. (Ivan)

I wasn’t on that perimeter, but I’ve been around since 1982, the feelings are kind of mixed, depending on the overall picture, because your primary function is to serve and protect citizens within the city of Miami and citizens period, at the same time we have a function to maintain their rights. It is unfortunate at times when you have two forces meeting head on, someone’s bound to be violated. (Ross)

The hope for breaking down barriers came through in attempting a counter narrative, calling for the inclusion of the “targets,” FTAA ministers, media, public, in the thoughts of which all is included in a demonstration, such as FTAA. There is much more to these situations than only two-sides. This issue is addressed when discussing implications for social change.

There are good demonstrators and bad demonstrators

Most officers maintained that there would be no unrest if the “bad demonstrators” or the “troublemakers” were not out there.

It’s always the demonstrators that start the police action, remember they’re given dispersal orders, things are done properly dispersal orders are given, everything is fine. It’s when they attempt to breach either the perimeter, which they did here when they tried to take the fence down, which I knew they would and we had tactics that were set up and its stopped it immediately then they tried to breach the police lines, they tried to cause chaos and we knew they would, if they wouldn’t do any of that, we would just stand there. (Mitchell)

There is a repeating theme that there are good demonstrators and bad. One officer even said “you know if its mom and dad just out there versus someone with
a mask over there face hiding their identity that is trouble” (Ivan). It seems that the few, who are likely types of insurrectionary anarchist who are used to blame for escalated force. Even the non-violent direct action type demonstrators, those who refuse dispersal orders, typically, then wait to be arrested, were not thought of as hostile, or of the troublemaker class. “If you want to be arrested, I’ll arrest you, I don’t have any problem with that, its when someone is coming at you with a brick, that’s when we need to respond and secure the area.” (Frank)

*Maintain order – de-escalate*

Officers typically saw themselves as de-escalators to situations. They do not view the use of munitions, or pushing with large sticks as provoking the crowd.

“So your always striving to de-escalate the situation when you can, remember there’s two sides going on, so you have one side that’s trying to deescalate or escalate, then another side that’s responding to that, say the people want to deescalate another that wants to escalate there’s two opposing things going on, so its not one dimensional.”

All officers denied the use or knowledge of provocateurs in the crowd that are used to instigate harsh police response. They referred only to the certain “type” of demonstrator that instigated violence, causing the police to have to “command respect.” Ross explains how tactics play out on the ground, “It’s not intentional but you have to stop the immediate threat because the idea is to be proactive and
preventative to avoid becoming reactive and defensive so the idea is to be ahead of the game if you will their action, even if it means to be taking the initiative.” (Ross)

*I don’t think – I follow orders*

A hallmark of the RP configuration, is that officers on the “line” do not think. Unlike daily police work requiring ongoing decision making, judgments, and behavior choices. The officers’ job changes dramatically at an event like FTAA. They might be bound by bureaucracy and guidelines in their daily work, but this is taken to a more extreme, militant, level, of obeying orders, and “maintaining the line.” One officer even bragged how officers were so dedicated to not breaking this line, “they urinated on themselves, when they could not get a break. Ross explains, “I don’t make decisions, I follow orders.” Others added, “our job is to reinforce the perimeter, we do not act individually.” It is important then to note, that many of the officers are simply following orders, their meaning is how they justify, to themselves, the nature of their work, particularly as their job relates to democratic functioning.

*First amendment – the cover up*

The First amendment and its attached meaning were invoked repeatedly throughout all the officer interviews. In one breath an officer would likely say that people have the right to be out and demonstrating, then in the next breath explaining why people had to be pushed back or fired upon with munitions. The response was almost schizophrenic in how one could completely feel that people are expressing their right, at the same time they are having civil rights violated.
We don’t go out to violate anyone’s rights, we can’t. It’s not our job, cause we enjoy the same rights as police officers, so therefore we can’t trample on their rights you know because we have free speech, this is the United States of America. (Arthur)

*Neutrality – the conundrum*

Officers were no fools about what it means to work for a political entity. They understand how people view officers as appendages of these entities. Officers, however, may, not always, see themselves as a valuable neutral force. One that is a manager of conflict, a peacekeeper, one that is not political.

The only people who don’t have a message are the police. We’re just there to make sure that order is maintained you know personally you can go talk to every officer there and they’re gonna have a different opinion on … on the topic, and some people actually sympathize with the protesters, but you can’t. You have a role in society and you have to do that role. They are hired to do their job; I could care less about what their political opinions are. (Mitchell)

Ross repeats something similar, when asked does he see himself as defending a destructive force, by protecting it he responds,

I see what you’re saying and where you’re going, but that’s not the way it is, because we can’t take any sides, anything that’s like a political side, there has to be a neutral position. Whether they [protesters] have a personal agenda or alternative motive and these people [FTAA] are against that, our job is to not say hay maybe we could become mediators and bring them together. Our job is to function. In such a fashion where it doesn’t give a perception that we are on one or the other side. Now probably through the lens of the news media it appears that we were more on their side because of the force between the two over here [the protesters], but to the best of my understanding and my belief our stance was straight down the middle. Even if they became violent, we are sworn to deal with them in appropriate manner you know so there’s no sides. (Ross)

Roland added his perception of officers who felt aligned with protesters, and explained how the police are supposed to function, for the good of society.
Officers see themselves as protecting their own rights as well as those of society.

Roland was asked, if he felt aligned with any of the issues of the demonstrators, he responded,

"That’s a very very interesting point, I’m almost glad that you brought it up, the truth is that we are also human beings, police officers are taken from the same human race that everyone else is taken from. Complications arise when the truth... (pause) sometimes happens to be that we don’t have the ability to have a philosophical position on an issue, our job is very specific, our job is to keep the peace, our job during FTAA was to maintain the peace for the citizens for Miami, and the community that we serve. We may have a personal belief that globalization of corporations is a bad thing, but we’re not entitled to bring that philosophical position to the job, it is almost like biased, like racial bias or gender bias, you can’t have a position like that as a police officer because you’re supposed to be that non-biased neutral entity so regardless of what your personal philosophical position might be on McDonalds or The Gap or any other global corporation, when we’re here on this job, our job is to keep the peace for the community that we serve. (Roland)

The trope here begins to touch on the potential for affiliation of officers with the demonstrators. I began to see the connection conundrum officers are in and conversely, the conundrum the, protesters are in. The following section looks at tropes for grounds for potential affiliation with the tropes of the activists.

We might agree with what they are doing

Officers have the potential to be educated and learn from the activists. Arthur explains his experience,

"To be honest with you, when they first started talking about it, I didn’t know too much about what they were protesting about. I found out after the fact, I told somebody I should have been on the other side. (Arthur)

Arthur, Frank, Ross, and Roland all, in some fashion or to some extent, agreed with the demonstrators messages. Alluding to officer solidarity."
Who takes care of us - who we serve

You have to respect people and don’t forget whose taking care of you, its society in general that foots your bill I mean we pay taxes too, but they’re the one that makes sure we taken care of, so can’t turn around and disrespect the person that’s taking care of you. (Arthur)

We are workers too

Officers expressed their working conditions, and they seem like the conditions of many workers. One officer explained how officers slept in the trunk of their car because of the long shifts that they were expected to work. Mitchell explains the conditions in the gear, “we stand in line for long periods of time, when you’re out there and you’re suited up for a very long period of time. you start to get a fog sometime.” (Mitchell) Frank explained that he has to show up to this FTAA event response. He says,

We’ll get fired, we’ll get arrested, it is almost like oppression from the get go. You can’t say, I’m not gonna show up for this, you’ll get terminated. Especially at those times, I mean it is all about the public and the safety of the public. So if you don’t show up, they’re gonna be knocking on your door to find out where you are at. They actually have squads of people, supervisors that go out, if you called out sick, they’re gonna show up at your house to see if you’re home. (Frank)

The officers here are experiencing many of the hardships of workers. These responses may serve in capacity to counter the argument of many activists in regard to excluding police from the working class, and placing them in the position of political oppressors. This is in no effort to argue the case one way or the other, but the officer’s conditions and their responses indicate working class solidarity.
Tropes – extremists

Some of the officers did articulate extreme views that might be viewed as in opposition to activist’s beliefs about their role in policing protest. For example, a representative government represents all is an idea that was alluded to by Mitchell and articulated directly by Ivan who says,

Ivan: we have a representative government. We have representatives, it may be a group of various nations or whatever, but we have our representatives in government that facilitate those meetings, so if you’re unhappy with that process, you can elect others, that’s the way our government works. DW: what if you, let’s say for example, have a state, like Florida, that disenfranchises people for life, you have entire communities who can’t vote. Ivan: Well you need to be a law abiding citizen. Then you’d be able to vote. (Ivan)

Tropes- self-care

In no way is self-care a bad thing, I found it interesting the officers who broke away from the stance of being pillars of the community, entirely interested in their best interest at all times. Arthur states, and we had a laugh, “During that incident… I just saw my role; first and foremost take care of myself: then take care of other people, and then the last thing is property, its property.” (Arthur)

The officers expressed parroted phrases that shroud many aspects of what the act of doing their job involves. They can hide behind many of the glorified visions of protecting and serving and maintaining order. They can make believe that they uphold the first amendment in the same breath as instigate a civil violation. But they also exhume many elements of humanity, particularly fitting within the working class. They work hard, they endure though conditions for low pay, and they believe that they are doing
something good. Many don’t understand the complex issues of world trade nor how those policies are supposed to affect them. These tropes may also represent what the general public believes as well that reify and justify policing in this manner.

Now that the organization and strategies have been addressed and some of the meaning associated with the social construction of these interactions have been reported. Now, what are the harms associated with all of this? The following section is an exploratory attempt at applying a social harm perspective and reports the discovered implications for change.

**Social Harm**

The social harm inventory (See Table 3) is an attempt to begin the conversation of social harms that result from the process of policing protests and the handling of political dissent in the way it is handled with a strategy like the Miami model. Drawing from the idea that another world is possible, then a host of arrangements would be possible to handle political dissent. It may look nothing like what has been constructed today. As discussed in earlier sections, there are various parties not considered in the rhetoric of the policing of protest in the age of the Miami model. These primary parties constitute the ministers of the FTAA and the general public. These two entities are important targets for political messaging by demonstrators. These are largely left out of the discussion as protests are reduced to the clashing between officers and activists. The social harm inventory, as expressed in the social harm perspective agenda, is to provide a new story line twist designed
to inform and contribute to the sociological knowledge base about many of the unseen harms and forces that get left out of conventional viewpoints and positivistic research. The inventory therefore includes thoughts on harms not only to officers and activist, but also to those targets yet to be included in the picture, the broader social public and the FTAA ministers. The harm perspective assumes that if political dissenters wish to reform the FTAA agenda in various ways that are human rights related, then it would be assumed that the proper political functioning would be able to carve out of the FTAA those destructive forces opposed by dissenters and create a more civil, human rights focused agenda for world trade. Given this assumption, the harms associated with the lack of that political functioning are considered as well as the harms on broad society based on the Free Trade Area of the Americas, Civil Society Resource (2002) obtained online. The items presented in Table 3 are merely a first attempt to coalesce the harms of an event like the Free Trade Area of the Americas, particularly to the conference held in Miami around this important re-vamping of response to democratic political dissent.

*Social Change*

*Officers’ counter-narrative – bridging activist targets*

Officers expressed a willingness to participate in social change efforts by bridging activists with their targets. Those targets often include the media, the public, often both. And they also seek to be heard by the organizations they oppose
for the purpose of public safety. The officers’ assistance in this way has the power to interrupt the old storyline that officers will stand in opposition to activist.

Participant officers thought that it would increase public safety if demonstrators were given a clear channel to the people they seek to address, the FTAA ministers and the general public. They agreed that public hearings and press conferences would be wise, and in the interest of public safety, if people were given a chance to speak and to be heard. If they were heard and felt like they had a say, perhaps the public would not react so violently. The officers, particularly those involved with the police union the Fraternal Order of Police, were very interested in attempting to appeal to future political visitors to encourage them to hold more broad public hearings for the purpose of controlling the anger in dissent. The potential for an act like this by law enforcement holds the potential to introduce a counter narrative. The enactment of a behavior, seeking a public hearing for activists, supplies an anomaly to the dominant narrative. This anomaly is the sounds of officer alignment with activist interest. A counter narrative such as officers seeking public hearings, even press conferences for activists in the interest of public safety has the potential to reduce the idealized polarization of demonstrators versus police. This can action also has the power to wrangle the real targets back into the picture, these being the ministers of the FTAA and the corporate media. Frank says, “We can request hearings of the event organizers, sure it can be considered an issue of public safety.” So changing the narratives is important implication for social change.
**Education**

Another suggestion toward meaningful social change is the education of officers. Frank provided ideas for this pathway to change, “the more educated an officer is, the less likely he is to be charged with infractions.” Frank explained that there is a mentality that if “you can’t be anything better…then be a cop.” The job itself should be considered a greater responsibility, requiring more education and training of officers, he says. Although, the implications for fundamental capitalist change here are not clear, the advancement of officer education and exposure to knowledge particularly related to sociology and the humanities must surely improve the situation.

**Considerations for All Tactics in Social Change Implication**

What should be considered in implications for social change is the protection of all the tactics of dissenters, even those of the insurrectionary anarchist. An important piece was referred to in order to understand anarchism of this kind, although they really choose not to be defined. *The Anarchist Tension* a reading from Alfredo M. Bonanno, is a keystone in anarchist thought. He states, “[Insurrectionist anarchists] “seek to create consequences for power”” It cannot be contained, because what defines their tactics are undefinable. Sometimes it is our most radical that could bring about the most meaningful social change. A powerful change would be a push toward post –market, ridding and gutting of the narratives that are most alienating. These insurrectional anarchists suggest permanent conflict, remaining in conflict, not having relations with organization even trade union,
facing problems as they come and not creating a core group. These are abstract guidelines, and much of their behavior is symbolic. They are driven, by the nature of their beliefs to not cooperate. This paper may not attempt to make a moral judgment on what anarchists should do, but this research does pose opportunities for resistance, and forms of remaining in conflict, however through linguistics. Bonanno continues, “Power realizes itself in space, The physical space of social reality, it is under the control of power, we carry the value of insurrection with us, we individuate behaviors, to create the conditions that people who have pain will destroy.” Anarchists of this sort “oppose themselves to the presence of power.” In the current research’s attempt at providing avenues for social change, it is important to consider and protect the most radical elements of forces for social change. They should not be ostracized or minimized in contention, but encouraged to find creative solutions to the problem of violence, working through the moment by moment symbolism that is life, in a way that they advocate.

The Role of Police and Activist in Social Change

Finally, one particular interview summed up many of the problems presented to demonstrators and offices in these political dissent situations. An external trainer to officers, and the public, was interviewed. He provided an array of arguments for the reasons we have the problems with clashes between dissent and officers, And then also provides his thoughts for social change in the Kingsian non-violence tradition. His comment are shared here, although not all direct implications for change, many ideas regarding what is not likely to bring about change. For example
regarding the insurrectionary tactics of some anarchists he responds, “You throw a Molotov cocktail, they bring the national guard, and it is futile to fight the symptom in this way.” (Cameron) He suggests that activists need to focus on “people issues and should enact entire strategies aimed at the issue.

It is a whole strategy, a philosophy, [the civil rights movement] was not people just getting upset singing, that’s not going to get to the basic problem. Officers are there to protect a civilized society and maintain peace and order, their opinion is, “I’m not here to get hurt you know I’m not here to take your issue, I may have prejudiced against you because of how you look or how you dress it all comes in a police-mans’ mind when he or she is protecting an area doing their job, their prejudiced in their head because they’re human beings, you can’t fight superior power, the police are superior power and if you beat one police officer, they bring in another 20, if you beat that 20, they bring the national guard, you beat the national guard…they bring in the US army. Every riot I’ve seen in the United States that they declare martial law, the troops come in, the riot is over in 4 days. Those troops are superior power, guns and boots, that’s to establish order and they’re very effective in superior force. Your power doesn’t lie in fighting the police, and when you see police brutality, that’s a symptom, not a cause. (Cameron)

Cameron saw the police brutality as a symptom of the social problem and invites demonstrators to address those issues. The people involved in the civil rights movement, Cameron claims, was to make appeals to “people of good will.” But people, he said, must understand the issues.

A new world is possible. When we consider what we have now is socially constructed through the stories we tell, then if we change the stories, we change our world. Though the process to getting there may be slow and incremental, it can come through the transformation of our narratives.
CHAPTER VI. CONCLUSION

The findings here suggest that a set of strategies and characteristics do exist that constitute a broadly applicable design of response to large protest events; these could be referred to as a “model.” And given the nature of its beginnings in, the “Miami model” could be fairly accurate. Furthermore, strong beliefs that drive this model are embodied in officer narratives. These beliefs help explain the emergence of the model and continue to drive and justify its use. The Miami model is then, in a sense, a set of strategies and tactics constructed through reified stories which may be used in any part of the world to control activist efforts of demonstrating at large transnational events. The Miami model then, is not simply an operational plan, but it is constructed through communicative action in historical context. The adoption of Sheering and Ericson’s (1991) notions of tropes in police work have been particularly useful in this study to understand how narratives are constructed with various components that guide officers, and perhaps broader societal, “ways of seeing” (495). These tropes contribute to a narrative of order and resistance and social change, to be fully interpreted by the reader here.

The elements of the Miami model are associated with particular social harms, acute and chronic physical harms, economic, mental harms were noted as well as harms associated with the infringements of civil liberties. These may affect individuals, groups, or the broader society. This analysis opens doors as an example of methodology that can be applied to various social arrangements. For the purpose of this study, the totality of harms may begin to be assessed and brought to the
forefront. The analysis here is merely an introductory attempt to inventory harms associated with the 2003 FTAA event in Miami in a broad sense. This is an attempt within the specific area under study, to grow and develop the social harm perspective for future research.

This study has implications for social change. Activists often seek to make a message in order to increase awareness of their topics and to pressure their targets. It appeared in the interviews that there is the potential for activists to successfully access the media and other targets with the aid of officers. The motivation for this assistance, in the eyes of the officers, is in the interest of public safety. Officers believe that if the activists had access to clear channels of communication to the public and to the entities they oppose, that would alleviate some of the threat to officers. Though being granted public hearings and press conferences facilitated by officers is valuable practically, there lies a great benefit for social change symbolically. This co-operation of sorts between officer and activists has the power to inject counter narratives into old storylines, important for social change. The philosophy of non-violence advocates focusing not so much on the police, but on the other entities of interest. Police and violence, are merely symptoms of the problems. The social change implications of this study involve convincing officers that it is in their best interest to connect activists, media, and the general public to de-compress a marginalized activist community and what comes as a result is interruption of a story line, and seeing that police, usually thought of as an extension of power, and to serve as a reminder that officers are working class and should be working to better the society who made them. This suggestion to enlist
officers in bridging activists with their targets, considers the important radical elements of movements also. These implications are very inclusive given the importance placed on symbolic change; they coincide with a variety of activist tactics and have the officers ready to use their pressure to help meet activist demands, and increasing solidarity.

**Limitations and Future Research**

This study only brushed the surface of the massive ‘leviathan’ that is global policing. More research needs to be conducted along the way that investigates the interaction between local, state, federal, intelligence and global policing agencies, as well as officers’ socialization, their interactions, beliefs and values of how they fit into this particular system. The perspective of activists, media, and the public would be valuable as well. The information from the interviews, observations, and content analysis serve only as building blocks to the development of the social harm perspective, and will be mostly informative regarding the Miami model’s policing processes, from which further study can be conducted. The study is limited to one event only, but it is the site considered to be the genesis of the model. The stark homogeneity of race among transnational activists that are interested in the issues of global trade in the US is an important area for future research. The protected operational plan would be important to retrieve and analyze form a sociological perspective. It is particularly important to note what actions of officer violence was intentional and which acts were due to other unforeseen problems during the event. The narratives of activists, the general
public, and most definitely the narratives of those in power are important to
document in order to see the development of social arrangements and potential
areas for change. Investigation into understanding how this narrative continues to
inspire people to engage in the narrative is important. Understanding this form of
police work as a poignant and powerful force in the face of activists and social
change deserves much further investigation. Future research should focus on points
in the narratives of involved parties where change is most likely to occur. In other
words, what parts of the narratives are keeping officers and activists locked into a
hopeless state of unresolved conflict? Also the hazy narratives and tropes that are
likely to reproduce more damaging dogmas or stationary, fixed, and rigid
judgments should be examined. This work should open doors to new ways of
understanding the symbolic talk of officers, so that they may be countered, and
political opposition may be more effective.
REFERENCES


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APPENDICES

Appendix A - Interview Guide

Regarding Miami,

Questions for national, or international leaders and/or on the ground officers’ information

How long have you been on the force? What is your job?

What is important about policing protest? What do you believe your role is? In society? What is most important about your job and this activity?

Regarding Critical Issues in Policing

Have you experienced demonstrations? Tell me about them.

Do you receive training, how often, what does it consist of? May I attend or see what you learn can you demonstrate? How is this useful?

What material items do you use? How/when are they used? Are you comfortable with that?

Do you all work with people who are activists? Or have insider information that helps you prepare or be aware if there might be danger to you?

What is your take on what their issue is? why their demonstrating? Do you ever really feel like you agree with what they’re doing?

How do arrests take place? Do you know their outcome? What usually the charge?

Do you get information or help from other agencies? Monitor people? Is this helpful?

What is usually the charge, like what are these people usually doing that gets them arrested?

Regarding the “Miami model” specifically

What is the “Miami model” of policing, is there an actual “model” of this somewhere? How do you think it is defined? Does this require working with others? How well does this model, or list of any particular techniques associated with it, work “on the ground”? applied lately? (ex Occupy)

Were you around during the FTAA in 2003? Do you know Chief Timoney? What do you think about him and the model?
What type of work is being done to share this model with other countries? Who might be able to talk to me about that? For that participant: Tell me about the sharing of training methods? How do you think this helps society?

Who conducts the training? For trainer: tell me about the training, do you get ideas from other places?

Are there any interactions with military or intelligence agencies that assist? How does that work?

Is this helpful?

Are there other states that you know have experienced high volume of “problem” demonstrations? Do you go there? Who works with transferring officers?

Who works with the media? For media contact: how does coverage of these events happen?

Do you brief them? What do you think about this type of reporting? Do you get help with talking with them?

*The questions above are the general guidelines. Not all questions will be asked of each interviewee, but some will be pulled that are appropriate for the specific type of officer or official I am interviewing.

**Potential Questions**

Gibson (2008) article – I might find use to explore officers’ beliefs about reported incidents only from this article: What they think about these incidents:

What do you think (personally, your fellow officers think) about the following demonstrator experiences?

- city denied permits to demonstrators
- changing directives which created confusion among protesters opening doors for arrests.
- artwork being destroyed prior to the event.
• Rubber bullet shots and teargas exposure.
• public service campaigns that asked people to report possible threats, did this help?
• Use of containing tactics to keep demonstrators from each other and the targets of the protest?
• codifying dimensions and materials of protest objects (ex. barring glass bottles, pieces of wood or gas masks) Fair?
• use of informants and embedded officers.
• detain or stop charter buses in the area?
• Deterrence of participation in the event due to fear of behaviors (such as described)
• Have you ever thought about participating yourself in any action?
Appendix B - Field Observation

*Occupy Miami 1 Year Anniversary | There’s A Debt Strike Going On*
Public Event · By Occupy Miami

Join us at the Torch of Friendship as we commemorate the ONE YEAR ANNIVERSARY of Occupy Miami!

*SOA Watch Close the School of the Americas !*

*Columbus , GA - Annual event*

*Observation Guide*

Observational Protocol for November 17th and 18th Public Action

This Field Observation is of a Public Event that anyone would have access to witnessing

Descriptive Notes: Time, place, movement from place to place. Number of police, number of activists, media presence, audience presence.

Question: How do officers police transnational protest and what elements of the “Miami model” are incorporated in this setting?

Note layout and placement of officers, numbers of activists and number of officers. Draw a map.

Dress, appearance, gear and modes of transportation of officers vs. dress, appearance, gear and modes of transportation of activists.

Note interactions witnessed between officers and activists. Interactions between officers and officers. Between activists and activists.

Reflective Notes:
Appendix C

University of Miami
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY
Protest Policing: The Miami Model

The following information describes the research study in which you are being asked to participate. Please read the information carefully. At the end, you will be asked to agree to participate and completion of the interview is considered your consent.

My name is Denise Woodall and I am involved in a research study called Protest Policing: The “Miami model “with Roger Dunham, and Ruth Reitan at the University of Miami. You are being asked to participate in this study. You are eligible to participate because you are a police officer, official, associate, or representative of a justice system involved in protest policing in some capacity currently, formerly, or training for policing of protest.

PURPOSE OF STUDY:

We are asking you to take part in this research study because we are trying to learn more about the social organization, diffusion, and processes of policing protest events. We are interested in understanding how the law enforcement system operates to deal with protest generally. In addition we are also focusing on what is being referred to as the “Miami model,” the “name” or “label” originating from the 2003 FTAA demonstrations in Miami. We are interested in what information you have to contribute to these policy issues as well as your perceptions and viewpoints regarding formal policing procedures.

PROCEDURES:

- You will be asked a series of open-ended questions and your responses will guide the discussion. You will be asked about protest policing and the organization of policing protests. This study will also investigate formal processes and their connection with other agencies, along with your perceptions and opinions regarding these policies and procedures.

- This interview will be audio-taped. Any photographs taken will be of your gear or physical materials only, not of your face or identifiable details. You will be informed if and when these photos will be taken.

- You may be asked to participate in a second interview for clarification or follow-up.

- The first interview is expected to last one hour. Any subsequent interview would take approximately thirty minutes.
RISKS AND/OR DISCOMFORTS:

Please note that your statements will not be attached to your name. In efforts to describe processes within the organization, some positions may be identifiable in regard to their function or other sociologically important characteristics. Should they occur, unanticipated risks or problems should be reported to the research team.

You may skip any question you do not wish to answer, and if you feel uncomfortable being audiotaped, you can request that taping be terminated at any time. You also have the right to review recorded material or have it edited. Permission has not been obtained by the Miami-Dade Police Department or its connected agencies to conduct this research. Your participation in this research is your decision as an individual officer involved in the activities under study.

BENEFITS:

You may not benefit directly from participating in this research study. However, you will furnish insight into what you do as an officer and how you try to balance protection of democratic rights with maintenance of public order. Your knowledge is important and valuable.

CONFIDENTIALITY:

Efforts will be made to keep your identity confidential by assigning you a pseudonym. A pseudonym will be used for reporting. A temporary pseudonym key will be kept in a locked file in the Sociology lab on the University of Miami’s campus. This key will be kept during data collection only so that you may be contacted for clarification or for a second interview. The recorded interview material will be deleted immediately upon text transcription.

This textual data will be password protected in the same Sociology lab space. Once the data is collected, this pseudonym key will be destroyed and only the de-identified text transcripts will be kept. Although your interview responses are confidential, it is important that you discuss only what you are comfortable having published even though it will not be linked back to your identity. The uses for this study include the attaining academic knowledge. The results of this study may be published and used in subsequent analysis. When the project is finished and results are reported, no individual will be identified in any way. You also have the right to back out of the interview at any time.

By agreeing to this consent, you authorize the investigators(s) and his/her/their staff to access information as deemed necessary for purposes of this study.

COMPENSATION:

You will not be paid for participating in this research study.
RIGHT TO DECLINE OR WITHDRAW:

Your participation in this study is voluntary. You are free to refuse to participate in the study or withdraw your consent at any time during the study. The investigator reserves the right to remove you without your consent at such time that they feel it is in the best interest for you.

Do you have any questions regarding the consent at this time?

CONTACT INFORMATION:

If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Roger Dunham or Denise Woodall at The University of Miami’s Sociology Department 5202 University Drive, Merrick Bldg, Room 120 Coral Gables, FL 33146 Ph: (305) 284-6762 or (678) 887-6336. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research participant, contact the University of Miami, Human Subject Research Office at (305)243-3195.

PARTICIPANT AGREEMENT

By participating in the study at this time you are agreeing to the terms of this consent. Your participation indicates that you have had the chance to ask any questions you have and that they have been answered for you. You are entitled to a copy of this form. Do you agree to go forward with the interview at this time?
### Table 1 - The Miami Model Organization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preparation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Use of intelligence (both ongoing and particular to the event) methods of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveillance of activists (Invoking protection from privacy acts on grounds of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>domestic terrorism)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Surveillance through social media and other communication channels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Embedding informants and provocateurs in organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Targeting particular organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction between officers and activists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Frighten and intimidate, arrests and threats of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Threat of jail time used to turn activist to informants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Activists taken into custody for purpose of questioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Arrests based on fragmented or questionable evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Invoking vague charges like conspiracy or obstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determinants specific to location, type of event, and intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>· Determine the type of activists attending and the responding gear,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>technology, incarceration teams, monition response, and (possibly</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
invoking a Miami model.)

- The analysis of environment Munitions use may be interfered with by weather, nearby property, wind, water. Partitioning potential, officer placement given the area diagnostics.

- Where to place enforcement and scouts

  o Training

  - Response Platoon formation training approximately 35 officers per RP

  - Developed from Miami Field Force tactics (some elements will vary by location)

  - Formulation of operational plan connecting various agencies

  o Negotiation

  - Excludes many organizations

  - Logistics focused

  - Lacks arrangement of meaningful access to targets

  - Not guaranteed by officers

  o Control at the borders

  o Financial support gathered from local business, federal, and other private
and public interests

- Media campaign
  - Fear and misinformation
  - Preparation for embedding media

### During the Event

- Mass arrests
- Paramilitaristic formation
- Media embedding campaign
  - Destruction of recorded material by officers
  - No protection for media not embedded
- Massive police presence
  - Use of Force direct use of weapon upon the bodies of protesters in the form of mass movement of forces pushing back into crowds of protesters, munitions firing into crowds
  - Arrest teams dragging bodies, long holds in mass transit to local holding, tight use of zip ties, fist, arms, elbows, shoes gauged into those being detained.
- Barricades
- Blocking from event spaces
- Blocking activists from each other
- Roadblocks at various locations

- Ant-riot gear
- Unidentifiable officers
- Use of “scouts and recon”
- Use of provocateurs

### Following event

- Classification of public records
- Public relations damage control
- Ongoing legal cases
- Involvement of various oversight: Internal, external, judicial, community
Table 2 – Narratives Associated with the Model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tropes</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation – justifies it all</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Serve – that’s my job</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two sides – us and them</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Good demonstrators and bad demonstrators</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintain order – de-escalate</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I don’t think – I follow orders</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First amendment – the cover up</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutrality – the conundrum</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who takes care of us – who we serve</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>We are workers too</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropes – Extremists</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tropes- Self-Care</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Harm</td>
<td>Content analysis, interviews, and observations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acute</td>
<td>Activists: Munitions shots and exposure, trampled, cuts bruises. Officers: various items thrown from demonstrators (urine, paint, marbles, ball bearings, rocks) scrapes and bruises. Heat exhaustion. FTAA ministers: none designated. General Public: cuts bruises. Broad social: illness due to exposure and work related injuries with reduced oversight as these policies relate to World Trade Organization policies in effect which talks did not change.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Activists: Fees Fines, bonds, detainment and release costs; property destruction and loss; medical costs; permit costs and travel cost related to unattainable events. Officers: lost hours in additional jobs, additional childcare or home care.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>FTAA Ministers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Costs</td>
<td>spending for police protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fees</td>
<td>Activists: bond fees, legal fees, fines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fines</td>
<td>Officers: lost days spent on legal issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental</td>
<td>Activists: demoralization, fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Liberties</td>
<td>Activists: lack of access to first amendment rights, police brutality, unlawful arrests,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Officers: made to work in violation of human work hours and conditions, fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>FTAA ministers: none specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>General Public: reduction of rights to protest, to assemble and to privacy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 1 – Officer Reported Field Force Configuration