Coercive Diplomacy in the 21st Century: A New Framework for the "Carrot and Stick"

Aida M. Perez
University of Miami, aidamp@aol.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations

Recommended Citation
https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/1557

This Open access is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Scholarly Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Open Access Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository. For more information, please contact repository.library@miami.edu.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE “CARROT AND STICK”

By
Aida M. Perez

A DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Faculty
of the University of Miami
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Coral Gables, Florida
December 2015
COERCIVE DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR THE “CARROT AND STICK”

Aida M. Perez

Approved:

Bruce Bagley, Ph.D.
Professor of International Studies

Roger Kanet, Ph.D.
Professor of Political Science

Ambler Moss, J.D.
Professor of International Studies

Dean of the Graduate School

Owen Kahn, Ph.D., J.D.
Senior Lecturer of International Studies
Coercive diplomacy has been utilized throughout history as a tool of foreign policy to present a peaceful alternative and means to curtail military intervention or escalation to warfare. It is a diplomatic method used by a country in which the application of economic sanctions or embargoes, as well as the use of force or military action, is threatened or hinted at in order to force another country to give in to a certain demand or not engage in a particular course of action. What has perplexed international theorists and policy makers is under what political circumstances or crisis conditions can coercive diplomacy be applied today as a viable tool of foreign policy. This study addresses specifically under what conditions can coercive diplomacy be successfully applied and what elements, if lacking could result in its failure. However, this study analyzes how this framework alone, without considering the operational code of the political leaders and the role of intelligence, is deficient in providing the decision makers with a more integrated and informed situational picture. The primary objective is to evaluate the usefulness of economic sanctions and embargoes as effective tools of coercive diplomacy in stemming the possible eruption of conflict or dissuade aggression in conjunction with assessing the political leader's operational code and the role of intelligence as a new three prong analytical framework.
## TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Recipe for Coercive Diplomacy: A Three Prong Analytical Framework</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 1: Coercive Diplomacy</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 2: Operational Code</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 3: Intelligence</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary of Analytical Framework &amp; Methodology</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature Review</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 1: Coercive Diplomacy: Checkmate vs. Stalemate</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 2: An Operational Code Defined</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prong 3: Intelligence</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case Study: Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section I: The Cuban Missile Crisis – A Short Summary</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section II: John Fitzgerald Kennedy: The Operational Code of the U.S. President</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK: His Family and His Roots</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK: Family, Early Life and Education</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK: A Veiled Medical History</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK: A Military Hero</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFK: Politics and the Presidency</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section III: Nikita Khrushchev: The Operational Code of a Russian Premier</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khrushchev: His Family and His Roots</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khrushchev: Early Life and Education</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khrushchev: Politics, War and the Communist Party</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section IV: Fidel Castro – The Unknown Variable</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section V: Kennedy, Khrushchev &amp; Castro – Operational Codes and Perceptions during the Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section VI: Intelligence</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section VII: Coercive Diplomacy – Stages and Strategies in the Cuban Missile Crisis</td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section VIII: The International Community</td>
<td>267</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section IX: Conclusions</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4 Case Study: Iraq: The Persian Gulf War – Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm .......................................................... 276
Section I: Iraq: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: A Short Summary......................................................................... 276
Section II: George Bush: The Operational Code of the U.S. President
.............................................................................................................. 287
    George Bush: His Family, Early Life and Education ........ 287
    George Bush: Education and Military Service ................. 289
    George Bush: Post War Life, Politics and the Presidency... 291
Section III: Saddam Hussein: The Operational Code of an Iraqi President
.............................................................................................................. 297
    Saddam Hussein: His Family and Early Life. ................. 297
    Saddam Hussein: Education and the Ba’ath Party........... 299
    Saddam Hussein: Politics and War ......................... 304
Section IV: Bush & Hussein - Operational Codes and Perceptions. 309
Section V: Intelligence ................................................................. 324
Section VI: Coercive Diplomacy - Strategies in the Gulf War ...... 339
Section VII: The International Community .......................... 352
Section VIII: Economic Sanctions as Tools of Coercive Diplomacy... 362
Section IX: The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions during the Gulf Crisis ................................................................. 367
Section X: Conclusions ................................................................. 373

5 The Three Prong Analytical Framework: Is it an Effective Recipe? 389
    The Cuban Missile Crisis ......................................................... 394
    The Persian Gulf War: Operational Desert Shield/Desert Storm ... 409
    Conclusions ................................................................. 416

Selected Works ............................................................................... 423
Chapter 1

The New Recipe for Coercive Diplomacy: A Three Prong Analytical Framework

As conceptualized and developed by Alexander George, coercive diplomacy has been utilized throughout history as a tool of foreign policy to present a peaceful alternative and means to curtail military intervention or escalation to warfare. This study will focus on the coercive diplomacy whose intent is to place a demand on an adversary and back it up with a credible threat of punishment for noncompliance with the expectation that it will persuade the opponent to change the adverse behavior and comply with the demand. However, this study analyzes how this framework alone, without considering the operational code of the political leaders and the role of intelligence, is deficient in providing the decision makers with a more integrated and informed situational picture. It is asserted in this study that the framework of coercive diplomacy alone without integrating an analysis of the leaders’ operational code and the role of intelligence is deficient in providing the decision makers with a more informed situational picture.

The individual policy maker has always been the focus of international relations and foreign policy analysis. In analyzing the body of work on operational codes, this study is looking at one of the most used concept relating to the nexus between international relations and individual belief systems.\(^1\) Leaders and their belief systems have been linked to their diplomatic approaches to foreign policy

choices. The study of the belief systems of the individual policymaker has evolved into an operational code analysis as an approach to foreign policy and international relations within the cognitivist theories in world politics. That being said, the operational code of an individual political leader should not be construed as the overarching element that decides the potential outcome of a crisis or conflict. Rather, it is a form of social constructivism and does not present a complete picture surrounding a political leader. It is introduced as one of three prongs in a new analytical framework that serves to explain what factors and elements should be considered when applying the strategy of coercive diplomacy and under what circumstances. It is not predictive in nature, but instead a tool that can be applied to better clarify the potential options to be employed by a leader and the possible reactions the opposing leader can manifest as part of coercive diplomacy during a crisis situation.

The original operational code paradigm was framed by Nathan Leites during the Cold War in analyzing the origins of political strategy in the Bolshevik ideology. Leites viewed these conceptions as manifestations of the Bolshevik character. Later Alexander George theorized a leader’s operational code as a political belief system infused with philosophical intrinsic beliefs that directed how the individual would react in a situation. George conceptualized that this

---


operational code within a leader is what theoretically will provide the analysis and context for a situation which will ultimately guide the leader as to what actions will be taken and what strategy will be formulated to achieve the political goals.

Conventional international relations theories, such as realism, neorealism and neoliberalism, traditionally rejected the impact of individuals and ideational variables on policy. These theories deny the importance on the leaders themselves throughout the political processes. Indeed, the engagement between Reagan and Gorbachev and the post-Cold War era underscored that international relations is ultimately about individuals and the manner in which those individuals politically interact. To consider political actors as shapeless entities and to deprive them of any consciousness is equivalent to denying the sociopsychological character of politics. Such an interpretation of international interactions is lacking and can only be improved by developing a better understanding of the agents of political action. This position was carried into the discipline of political science by the constructivists who maintained that international interactions cannot be adequately understood without examining the beliefs of the leaders themselves. It should be noted that interpretations are by their nature subjective. To construe that one can derive conclusive knowledge

\[\text{(5) Schafer and Walker, 127-129.}\]

\[\text{(6) Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,”}\]
\[\text{International Organization 41 (3): 335-370.}\]

\[\text{(7) Akan Malici, “Reagan and Gorbachev: Altercasting at the End of the Cold War,” in Mark}\]
\[\text{Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, eds., Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and}\]
\[\text{Applications of Operational Code Analysis (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 127-128.}\]
through subjective interpretations is elusive, and as a result not all explanations are equally valid.\(^8\)

This constructivist movement infused the study of international relations with ideational variables. Constructivists have argued that political actors are not to be considered passive agents who are merely responding to environment factors and variables as much as traditional international relations theory would have us believe. As an alternative, these political actors are viewed as selective agents that are proactively shaping their external environment. These actors process the information they are receiving from their political environment, form a strategy and derive alternatives for decisionmaking.\(^9\) Although such claims about shaping the external political environment inherently address “what politics is about,” there is still a gap in acknowledging the existence and impact of ideation, or the individual on politics. This is where the operational code analysis, as a form of social constructivism, can fill the theoretical gap by providing a tool kit which contributes to the study of ideational variables and that is increasingly identified as an impacting factor in international relations.\(^10\)

In this vein, decision makers must not only have an understanding of the diplomatic tools at their disposal, but theorists asserted that they must also have a correct image of the opponent, his intentions, behavioral style, and political

\(^8\) Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 85

\(^9\) Malici, 129.

\(^10\) Schafer and Walker, 7-8.
aspirations. An individual’s ethnicity and cultural background are included as key factors contributing to a policy maker’s operational code. This model suggests that non-economic factors may often be more important in determining whether economic sanctions can be effective, rather than solely analyzing the detrimental effect which can be imposed on the economy of the target state. In conducting the analysis within this three prong framework, I will also be addressing the internal domestic political and economic climate of the target state to determine the support for an external intervention, as well as the national security interests of both states and how the international community views the impending escalation. Although many theorists have alluded to some of these variables and factors in their research, few have considered how to comprehensively conceptualize them into one analytical framework.

Key factors impacting the application of coercive diplomacy are the operational code of the leaders involved, the quality of the intelligence they receive during the crisis, and the domestic political goal. The operational code of a leader is comprised of the cognitive and affective influences which can influence the decision making process as a result of their cultural background, education, economic status and life experiences. These factors together formulate the underlying beliefs and perceptions which guide a leader’s decision making process in a crisis. A leader’s instrumental beliefs influence the nature of

---

appropriate responses, while a leader’s philosophical beliefs aid in analyzing the political meaning of the situation.\textsuperscript{12}

My primary objective is to evaluate the usefulness of utilizing economic sanctions and embargoes as effective tools of coercive diplomacy in stemming the possible eruption of conflict or dissuade aggression in conjunction with assessing the political leader’s operational code and the role of intelligence as a new three prong analytical framework. It is suggested by examining these three variables as part of the analysis one can better assess the potential effectiveness of coercive diplomacy when certain political conditions exist in the operating environment. The analytical framework of this study will be organized into three prongs: the tools of coercive diplomacy applied to the crisis at hand, the influence of the leaders’ operational code in assessing the political situation, and the quality and infusion of intelligence during the diplomatic engagements. The analytical framework I have advanced draws upon the theories of coercive diplomacy and economic statecraft, but moreover embraces factors which are peripherally addressed in current literature but not incorporated into one analytical framework, namely, the impact of the policy maker’s operational code and the role of intelligence during a crisis situation.

The comparative methodology of the analysis is imbedded within the theories of coercive diplomacy contained within the writings of Alexander George, and upon the writings of Gary Clyde Hufbauer who focuses on the theoretical as well as the practical aspects of implementing economic sanctions.

George asserts that policy makers must individually tailor those strategies to suit the crisis at hand. Hufbauer argues that, unless sanctions are deployed in a calculated and internationally cohesive manner designed to cripple the target government, they will not be successful. This study will attempt to demonstrate that there are analytical gaps in the mainstream literature which lack the integration of two key elements. A central contention of this study is that based upon the factors identified in George's and Hufbauer's theoretical writings, the implementation of economic sanctions as a strategy of coercive diplomacy will not derive the same level of success unless the decision maker's operational code and the role of intelligence are factored into the analysis of the crisis as critical variables swaying the political environment. Specifically, central elements impacting the utilization of coercive diplomacy in a crisis are the operational code of the leaders involved, the quality and timeliness of the intelligence they receive during the crisis, and the domestic political goal. The aftermath of 9/11 has demonstrated that a leader’s operational code and the quality of intelligence are critical variables in determining what type of response or calculated measure is to be undertaken in a crisis.

Economic sanctions have been tools of diplomatic negotiations and engagement for centuries. As has been noted in recent times, the siege was the ultimate form of economic sanctions in ancient and medieval warfare. A siege from a traditional medieval sense is defined as a military blockade of a city, fortress, or stronghold with the intent of ultimately conquering the target through a direct assault or by eventual attrition of supplies and provisions. Historically,
sieges originally encompassed the intentional blocking of supporting troops or more importantly the blocking of access to provisions or supplies from reaching the target. Sanctions were originally utilized for waging an economic war during ongoing hostilities, but have been redefined in the modern era of international relations as a foreign policy measure of preventive diplomacy, implemented to initiate political and social change within the targeted country. Economic sanctions and embargoes are utilized as a last resort “carrot and stick” tool in an effort to prevent war. Coercive diplomacy, as applied through economic sanctions and embargoes as instruments of foreign policy, is best examined from a case study methodology. In assessing the viability of using sanctions as tools to curtail a conflict, the decision maker must look at both the cost and effectiveness in imposing the sanctions.

In analyzing the elements of coercive diplomacy, I also recognize that there are limits to its application. There are no clear lines of separation between the implementation of coercive diplomacy and the trigger point resulting in an escalation to a war. Rather, coercive diplomacy is a set of blurred lines which are drawn beginning with the initial application of some of its tools, such as the ultimatum, the gradual turning of the screw, and the try-and-see variant, to the ultimate trigger point resulting in the escalation to military engagement. This study acknowledges that there are difference limits in each case and the escalation or resolution of the crisis is contingent upon the specific circumstances of each case, the political leaders involved, and the level of international support.
Coercive diplomacy is an alternate means for economic diplomacy instead of resorting to military intervention in order to change the adverse behavior of a target state. This study will illustrate that there are limits to when coercive diplomacy can be applied with a reasonable expectation of achieving a positive outcome. In applying coercive diplomacy, it is recognized that there are upper limits or thresholds to its use before it deteriorates into a military clash. This study stresses that the critical consideration for political leaders to be aware of is managing the limits of coercive diplomacy once it is underway. This can be difficult for the leader to calculate if insight is not available through reliable intelligence or through a correct assessment of the opponent’s operational code and what they perceive may be at risk to them.

The analytical framework will include examining and comparing the implementation of economic sanctions or embargoes as the “carrot and stick” instrument of coercive diplomacy in the cases of Cuba and Iraq. This approach underscores the need to have force and diplomacy and not solely force or diplomacy. The application of the threat juxtaposed with the relief of diplomacy as an incentive facilitates the negotiations towards a mutually acceptable resolution. This analysis is qualitative in nature and utilizes components of existing frameworks of coercive diplomacy and economic statecraft in conjunction with the more subjective and political factors controlling the decision making process of a leader, namely the operational code and the role of intelligence. I have identified and included these factors as critical and necessary.

---

in my analytical framework in order to comprehensively assess the success or failure of the economic sanctions implemented in each of the three case studies. The cases of Cuba and Iraq were selected to demonstrate the diversity of the political arena at the time in the international community where economic statecraft had different levels of success and effectiveness in preventing the escalation of a conflict.

The use of only two cases in this study presents both advantageous and disadvantages. The Cuban and Iraqi cases have all three prongs of the analytical framework used in this study present, specifically the strategy of coercive diplomacy, the presence of political leaders with prominent and disparate operational codes, and the use of intelligence which was critical in the decision making process. These two cases also afford this study the opportunity to analyze to a degree of detail the mixture and degrees of successes, failures and intermediate results achieved in each instance. That being said, it would be worthwhile in the future to analyze additional cases to identify potential trends and patterns in the implementation of coercive diplomacy when considering the other two elements of this analytical framework.
Figure 1 - Three Prong Analytical Framework

Prong 1: Coercive Diplomacy

One of the most persistent issues that has plagued international theorists has been identifying what strategies a policymaker must undertake in order to avoid a crisis situation from escalating into a conflict. Crisis management, in essence, refers to the particular efforts to avoid the misperceptions and “miscalculations of an adversary’s responses to one’s moves that can bring forth inadvertent or accidental escalation.” The ultimate goal of crisis management is to achieve a strategy that will balance two principle objectives: (1) military preparations and threats of force; and (2) extensive diplomatic efforts. However, in order to achieve such a balance, it is necessary to consider factors outside the apparent issues impacting the crisis.

14 Figure 1 created by A.M. Perez to depict analytical framework and the overlapping nature of its three prongs: coercive diplomacy, operational code, and intelligence.

Once a crisis ensues, each of the adversaries feels compelled to take whatever action is necessary to protect its most vital economic and national security interests. However, Alexander George recognizes in his analysis of conflict management that each party to the controversy must avoid resorting to avenues that will escalate the momentum of the crisis; e.g. blackmail or secret military deployments. The spiraling effect in the conflict is what George identified as the policy dilemma of crisis management. George maintains that some type of strategy is necessary for ultimately managing or terminating the crisis without warfare erupting. A provisional theory of coercive diplomacy can involve a multi-faceted strategy that encompasses diplomatic, economic, and military approaches. It requires novel concepts of guarded diplomatic confrontations in war threatening situations, as well as military planning and operations. In a crisis situation, policy makers must formulate a strategy of some sort in order to manage and terminate the crisis without the eruption of violent conflict or warfare. Without having key information for situation awareness, a political leader’s miscalculations of an adversary’s responses can trigger an accidental or unintended escalation.

The implementation of coercive diplomacy is a gradual intensification of the tools as part of a strategy under taken by the coercer against the target state in order to reach the foreign policy goal. The leader does not operate independently, but rather functions under the pressures and constraints applied

---


17 George, “Provisional,” 22-27.
by both domestic constituency and foreign allies who may or may not be aligned with the same goals. As such, coercive diplomacy is a strategy that must be planned and carefully coordinated with key stakeholders to avoid an inadvertent miscommunication leading to an unwanted military encounter.

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that calls for employing economic tools such as sanctions or military threats in an effort to persuade an opponent to halt adverse behavior or undo an encroachment in which he is already engaged. It is a strategy that is sometimes employed by policymakers in the hope of securing a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute. Coercive diplomacy is best conceptualized as an element of foreign policy that encompasses other tools of diplomacy, such as economic sanctions, to create a setting that combines threats in conjunction with positive inducements to change adverse behavior. The general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one’s demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for noncompliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand.

Under these circumstances, the abstract theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure rationality on the part of the opponent. The theory assumes that the opponent has the ability to receive all relevant information, process and evaluate it correctly, make proper judgments as to the credibility and potency of the threat at hand, and see that it is in the best interest to accede to the demands

---


19 George, “Need”, 463-486.
being made. The abstract theory, therefore, does not take into consideration the possibility of misperception and miscalculation. It also does not recognize that an opponent’s rationality may be affected by psychological variables as well as by values, cultures, and traditions that may differ from those of the coercive state. In other words, the abstract theory does not consider a policymaker’s operational code, or the beliefs and underlying premises that can impact the decision making process of a leader. Decision makers are affected by their operational code, psychological undercurrents, political dynamics internal and external to the state, and organizational bureaucracy. In addition to these elements, add to this mix the significant disparities which may exist relating to the decision maker’s personal values, political culture, and perceptions of risk taking in the political arena to further their position.

Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic method used by a country in which the application of economic sanctions or embargoes, as well as the use of force or military action, is threatened or hinted at in order to force another country to give in to a certain demand or not engage in a particular course of action. The implementation of economic sanctions and/or embargoes is one of the “carrot and stick” instruments of coercive diplomacy. From Thucydides to Machiavelli to

---


22 George, “Need”, 463-486.
Hobbes, philosophers and students of diplomacy have preferred resorting to some type of coercion in order to persuade opponents into taking a different course of action or changing their behavior, rather than resorting to military intervention to modify unacceptable behavior. What has perplexed international theorists and policy makers is under what political circumstances or crisis conditions can coercive diplomacy be applied today as a viable tool of foreign policy. A second question concerns what conditions determine its likelihood of success. This is the dilemma that will be addressed in this study, specifically under what conditions can coercive diplomacy be successfully applied and what elements, if lacking could result in its failure.

Coercive diplomacy, whose objective is to dissuade or prevent an opponent from undertaking an unacceptable course of action, employs flexibility in the various styles which allow for discrete measures, tailored conditions, paced escalation of events, and if all peaceful avenues fail, the ultimate use of force. Coercive diplomacy theory has identified several critical variables which contribute to the success or failure of its application in specific historical instances. Some of these factors include: 1) the credibility of the coercer’s intent; 2) the balance of the motivation between the actor imposing the coercion vis-à-vis the perception by the target that action will be taken if it does not comply; 3) the target’s perception of the sense of urgency; 4) multilateral support by the international community as well as sufficient domestic backing; 5) the opponent’s fear that the confrontation will result in escalation if the behavior is not modified.

---

and, 6) ultimately establishing clear and precise terms in order to settle the crisis that prompted the implementation of coercive diplomacy.\(^{24}\)

Coercive diplomacy presents challenges when deciding what strategy to tailor for the particular situation. There are several essential questions that the decisionmaker must ponder when considering what facet of coercive diplomacy and what tools can be implemented:

1. What to demand of the adversary;

2. Whether, and how, to create a sense of urgency in the opponent’s mind to comply with the demand;

3. How to create and convey a threat of punishment for non-compliance with the demand that is sufficiently credible and potent enough in the adversary’s mind to persuade the adversary that compliance is more in its interest than facing the consequences of noncompliance;

4. How to create a credible sense of urgency; and

5. Whether to couple the threatened punishment with positive inducements, such as a “carrot”, to make it easier for the adversary to comply with the demand.\(^{25}\)

In considering these questions, it is evident that the more extensive the demand made upon the target state, the more difficult the task of coercive diplomacy will be because there will be a greater motivation on the part of the opponent to resist the demand.

In essence, coercive diplomacy as *a tool of crisis management* is like a chess game where the players are continually at odds with each other countering


the opponent's strategic and calculated moves in an effort to avoid a checkmate at all cost. The crisis cannot be viewed as a zero sum game. It is a strange game of chess where the players in an effort to save face with their opponent and their own state, while protecting their economic, military, and national security interests, seek to achieve a stalemate instead of a checkmate which could signify the outbreak of a full scale conflict. Crisis engagements envision that face saving gestures or political exit strategies can assist in securing essentials demands from an adversary without triggering an escalation to a full conflict.

Coercive diplomacy is at its core a peaceful strategy to exercise power as a measure of influence or control over political actors, events, or issues in an attempt to stem aggression or military engagement. Coercion implies a use of intimidation or force in order to gain compliance on the part of the adversary. This strategy however when used in the context of coercive diplomacy underscores the ultimate goal of achieving a 'peaceful' resolution to the conflict at hand without having to resort to military engagement. The four variables involved in the use of coercive diplomacy are: 1) the demand; 2) the means used for creating a sense of urgency; 3) the threatened punishment for noncompliance; and, 4) the possible use of incentives.
Coercive diplomacy is not a form of extortion or blackmail where an opponent pressures an adversary to relinquish actions, information, or other goods under the threat of violence or damage to their reputation. This is compared to deterrence which utilizes threats to discourage a rival or ‘political’ challenger from undertaking a course of action not yet instigated. Once again, contrary to achieving the ultimate objective of a game of chess which to render the opponent under an inescapable threat of capture, the goal of coercive diplomacy is to rather achieve a draw where neither player wins and each player is allowed to save face. A checkmate can trigger the aggressor into proceeding with other retaliatory actions against the winner if there is no escape route to achieve an appearance of ‘equality’, or stalemate, at the end of the engagement in order to save face with other peers.

---

26 Table 1 created by A.M. Perez based upon the writings of Alexander George to conceptualize and facilitate the analysis of the theoretical elements, coupled with the various types of coercive diplomacy being reviewed in this study.
Although coercive diplomacy is a peaceful diplomatic alternative to military intervention, theorists such as Robert Art have underscored that it is difficult to successfully implement this strategy because of four specific factors. These four factors stem from the inherent nature of coercive diplomacy and function throughout its implementation. As a result, the same factors that can make coercive diplomacy a success, can also make its use problematic and challenging to implement.

First, coercive diplomacy is a form of compellance and is inherently harder to execute than deterrence because it is inherently more difficult to get a target to change its behavior than it is to maintain it. Secondly, coercive diplomacy is a direct form of coercion and can be applied in a denial, punishment or risk approach. Theorists have argued that neither significant punishment nor

---

27 Figure 2, www.shutterstock.com, date of access: July 11, 2014.


significant denial is possible with coercive diplomacy because the limited use of force can only produce a limited form of punishment.\textsuperscript{30} From this perspective, what coercive diplomacy can readily communicate to the target state is the increasing likelihood that more punishment will be imposed if it fails to comply with the demand, which implies risk and at the same time, an indicator of the denial capabilities at the disposal of the coercer.

The third factor, which is difficult to assess, is determining the level of resolve of the two leaders before and during a crisis. Without having a mechanism, such as reliable intelligence, to determine the resolve of the opponent prior to the crisis, the coercer cannot know for certain whose resolve is stronger. The other facet of this element is that costs already made towards a situation should not be ignored. As a result initial resolves are likely to harden, not weaken under the impact of a coercive attempt, and, threats to use force are likely to lead to a demonstration of force.\textsuperscript{31} This quandary has been referred to as a game of chicken and can have an intrinsic drive toward an escalation of the crisis before there is a plausible resolution because neither party will compromise at the onset.\textsuperscript{32} There are three possible resolutions to a chicken game: one party acquiesces, both parties compromise, or neither party yields and war erupts. However, this study will explore how coercive diplomacy is not destined to fail under these circumstances provided that the two other prongs of the analytical

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{31} Art, 366.
\end{itemize}
framework are introduced into the equation: the leader’s operational code and the quality of the intelligence available to the decisionmaker.

The fourth factor that may render coercive diplomacy difficult encompasses the effects of a confrontation based upon the credibility of the coercer, and the power and capabilities available to the coercing leader.\textsuperscript{33} Political leaders are always influenced by how their actions will be recorded in history. A leader’s actions in the present will inadvertently set precedents for the future. In the same vein, the target state’s leader cannot ignore how his actions and reactions to political pressure, or coercion in this example, will affect his reputation and credibility both internally and externally whether regionally or internationally. What is noteworthy from a U.S. perspective in considering this factor is that a president’s commitments are not binding on future presidents in office unless congressionally or judicially formalized.

This study will examine specific cases against a theoretical backdrop of realism, liberalism and constructivism that will allow for the examination of a variety of conditions and not just power politics. The study highlights the types or variations of coercive diplomacy applied in the both cases: 1) the ultimatum; 2) the tacit ultimatum; 3) the “try and see” approach; 4) the gradual turning of the screw; or the “carrot and stick” approach.\textsuperscript{34} The analysis of each case encompasses applying the theory of coercive diplomacy intertwined with the political and personal elements comprising the leader’s operational code and

\textsuperscript{33} Art, 366.

\textsuperscript{34} See Table 1, “Elements & Types of Coercive Diplomacy,” 13.
ultimately reviewing those cases against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the political leaders to make informed decisions. What is unique in this analytical framework is not the actual application of the instruments of coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions or embargoes, but rather how the analysis is infused with what role intelligence plays in the crisis and the operational code of the leaders involved in the crisis which influences how they interpret and apply that information in their decision making process.

**Prong 2: Operational Code**

The other vital factor intertwined in the crisis management process and the approaches taken during the application of coercive diplomacy is the actual policymaker. Each individual’s particular life experiences can effect and influence foreign policy behavior and orientation during a crisis situation. Indeed, constructivists argue that substantial facets of international relations are socially constructed. The study of individuals and their role in international relations or foreign policy has drawn heavily from the disciplines of psychology and social psychology and has focused on how an individual’s life experiences influence the behavior and responses to a political situation. The analytical framework used in this study focuses on the influence that the individual and his own perceptions formed from life experiences can have on the crisis at hand.

---

An individual’s belief system and life experiences are what have been coined as an operational code.\textsuperscript{36} The analysis of the operational code in a political leader evolves from the early writings of Nathan Leites who structured a psycho-cultural model in order to study the Bolshevik operational code.\textsuperscript{37} What is noteworthy is that these early analyses entrenched the analytical framework in the combination of psychological and cultural sources that together created the operational code of the Soviet elite.

Although George acknowledges that underlying beliefs and values of a leader can impact the decision making process, he does not elevate them to an integral part of his analytical framework when discussing the role of a leader’s operational code.\textsuperscript{38} George departs from that sociological element emanating from the cultural values which can shape the perspective of a leader and argues that the operational code of the decision maker can be considered a different type of belief system.\textsuperscript{39} George moves off the Nathan Leites model and contends that a leader’s operational code can be viewed as a belief system that has filtered information received from external sources and the surrounding environment, and as such has influenced the individual’s preferences for different ends and means.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36} Viotti and Kauppi, \textit{International}, 235.


\textsuperscript{38} George, “Operational”, 51-53.


\textsuperscript{40} Schafer and Walker, 4.
This model is a variant of the traditional rational-actor paradigm of decision making and shifts the focus to the actions engaged in by a decision maker as emanating from the actor’s goals. Such a rationale, structured approach in reaching national policy decision now alludes to the premise that there is a level of uncertainty permeating the process and can be attributed to the variants in the leader’s operational code. From this perspective, then, the leader’s belief system turns into an apparatus that reflects unspecified societal influences which evolve into personality biases. In other words, beliefs and personality traits play a key role in an environment that is uncertain and when information is scarce or incomplete the leader will have difficulties in processing the information in such a way as to enhance the decision making process.\footnote{Ole Holsti, “Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy,” \textit{Journal of International Affairs} 21 (1967), 16-39.} Ole Holsti theorized that these belief systems are central to the leader and they remain constant over time and permeate political domains for the decision makers who hold them. Both George and Holsti, however, acknowledged that this typology does not exhaust the cognitive complexity of political leaders.\footnote{Jerrold M. Post, ed., \textit{The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein & Bill Clinton} (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2008), 215–245.}
In constructing a cohesive analysis of the leader's operational code, the psychological and sociological factors are integral catalysts of the decision making process and cannot be lightly dismissed. In expanding George's and Holsti's theoretical premise further, I would add that the underlying perceptions or preexisting beliefs of the leader serve as filters in interpreting the information which is being presented. Those filters include old information which was never put into context and is seeking some level of intelligibility, stereotypes, or other cognitive biases. A cognitive bias is a common tendency to acquire and process information by filtering through one's own personal experiences, likes, dislikes, stereotypes, and ethnic or social upbringing. It is these types of preexisting beliefs and cognitive biases that when confronted with potential threats to one's vested interests trigger certain responses which are intrinsically imbedded in the

---

Table 2 - Operational Code Factors

Table 2 created by A.M. Perez to conceptualize and facilitate the focus of the analysis and factors in a belief system which comprise the operational code of a leader.
aggregate of one’s operational code. The psychological factors include: 1) the personality and character of the leader; 2) the behavioral style; and, 3) any psychophysiological dynamics which may be at play behind the scenes. This nexus between the intelligence necessary to perform an informed risk assessment and how the operational code of the actual policy maker interprets that information is lacking in current literature and associated analytical models.

The political environment which is comprised of the historical, cultural and political context in which the leader is acting is of central importance and directly influences the outcome of a crisis. This is the external environment providing the setting in which the leader must operating and incorporate the information at hand and interpret it through their operational code perspective. Under these circumstances, leaders have a tendency of looking towards historical events in assessing current actions automatically. This is especially true when considering the role of history in rendering intelligence assessments. A major duty of an intelligence analyst is to make an assessment or forecast the developments in the field, country or theater of specialization. Many have argued that history itself cannot educate the present-day generation because history never exactly repeats itself. This is a negative viewpoint that has done little to enhance the analytical efforts of the intelligence analyst who must forecast economic trends, and anticipate political uprisings, coup d’états and occasionally predict the propensity of a country to enter into war when certain indicators are present. I would assert, nonetheless, that even though history does not exactly repeat

44 Schafer and Walker, Beliefs, 5-6.
itself, one can learn from the past in reaching a present day perspective or conclusion. The elements which go into this analytical formula include contexts and approaches developed by economics, social or political science, or other disciplines.

An understanding of the comparative history of civilizations, social and economic orders, political constructs of states, and societies will create the necessary awareness of the constancy of change. However, I would contend that the key factor which has eluded analysts is not so much the integration of the social, economic, political, and historical elements, but the notion that in order to have an integrated view of a situation, one must also incorporate an internal understanding of the political leaders involved, i.e. their operational codes. Decisions rendered in a political crisis are intertwined with perspectives regulated by life experiences and moral codes, rather than solely by direct cause and effect relationships arrived at through structured analytical formulas and methodologies.

**Prong 3: Intelligence**

The requirement for intelligence in protecting the national security interests of the United States or any country has always been acknowledged as a cornerstone safeguarding its political and economic standing in the international community. What is of utmost importance is the quality, usefulness

---

and role that the intelligence plays during the decision making process of political leaders in a crisis. Unless intelligence is relevant to the leaders and is disseminated in a timely, actionable manner, the effort to cultivate and produce it has been wasted. The application and exploitation of intelligence to provide a clearer situational awareness of the crisis at hand assumes that the political leaders will rely on objective and effective all source intelligence reporting and analysis from the subject matter experts in the Intelligence Community. This analysis will also address the gaps and misperceptions which are created when the interpretation and analysis of raw intelligence is left to inexperienced leaders. Further, when intelligence decisions are left in the hands of leaders with personal agendas beyond those articulated in the public eyes, there is a greater likelihood that intelligence can be manipulated to achieve those political ends. This was made apparent in the months leading to the Iraq War where it later became apparent that then Vice-President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Ronald Rumsfeld manipulated raw, if at best limited intelligence, to further covert operations without the proper Intelligence Community or Congressional oversight.

While engaging in this political chess game, it is the quality of the information and intelligence that it channeled to the political leader that will influence the next proverbial move in this diplomatic engagement. In order to

---


generate the necessary intelligence that is relevant to the crisis at hand, there needs to be an understanding of the requirements they have, the collection efforts they seek, and ultimately what political environment exists. An intelligence requirement describes any form of intelligence or information which needs to be collected in order to fill in a gap or assist a decision maker. The collection and evaluation of intelligence requirements are important elements of the intelligence cycle which will ultimately generate the intelligence or information necessary to fill an operational or strategic gap. Timely, relevant information and classified intelligence is what provides the insight and foundation to validate engaging in a particular course of action, or escalating the ‘carrot or stick’ to a new level when applying the tools of coercive diplomacy.

In order to approach this chess game in an informed and rational manner, the policymakers must have access to the necessary tactical, operational and strategic level intelligence to arrive at coherent strategies. The need for relevant and timely intelligence to alert policymakers of hostile actions by other states or non-state actors is self-evident.48 Intelligence is a factor which is inextricably intertwined with effective crisis management and engaging in diplomacy. The target’s perception of the sender’s capabilities in imposing the sanctions and the capabilities behind the threats need to be validated through independent channels in order to gauge the legitimacy of the proposed actions.49


is a key factor that provides the decision makers with an assessment of the political arena, military capabilities, and socio economic factors which could guide how the target state will react.

Intelligence is developed in several stages. The stages of the intelligence cycle include: the identification of requirements by decision makers, collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of the intelligence in a timely manner.

![Figure 3 – Stages of the Intelligence Cycle](image)

The stages of the intelligence cycle include the identification of Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) which are issued by decision makers. Once the PIRs are identified and drafted, the next stage is to focus on the collection methodologies. The Intelligence Community (IC) gathers intelligence through human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) or electronics intelligence (ELINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT) or geo-spatial intelligence (GEOINT), and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT). Most of these require clandestine means and various

---

50 Figure 3, source Central Intelligence Agency.
sources and methods to collect intelligence from controlled access areas in foreign venues. Once the collection plan is completed and the information is aggregated, then it must be processed and exploited. This processing phase involves sorting the raw intelligence and segregating it into areas of raw intelligence materials which can then be translated from a foreign language, interpreted from visual media and correlated with other intelligence mediums, analyzed into trends, patterns, or developed into indicators and warnings. Indicators and warnings refer to those pieces of gathered intelligence which once reviewed present a picture of the factors of risk and what would have to happen or most likely happen as a scenario of engagement unfolds. The analysis of the collated raw intelligence ultimately leads to the evaluation of the information, its relevance and most importantly its reliability. The reliability and credence given to the sources and methods used to collect the intelligence and the ultimately the quality of the analysis delineated in the finished intelligence product is what lends credence to how much weight a political leader places on that information. A critical element that underlies this is intelligence cycle is the actual dissemination of the intelligence and its timeliness. Intelligence is of no use to a policy maker engaged in a crisis unless that intelligence product that is made available with enough time to make an informed decision. The intelligence needs to be published and dissemination to key stakeholders.

The two facets which combine to depict the situation surrounding a political situation are the fusing of open source information and the more traditional clandestine intelligence. The first facet is information which is
collected from open, unclassified sources, available to the public large, and is comprised of government statistics, economic data and trends, histories, cultural facts, and outlooks or foreign populations, and academic research. Facts are collected from open sources to fuse with the intelligence collected through clandestine means and techniques to arrive at a more validated and factual assessment of a particular political situation or crisis. Intelligence collection efforts are surreptitious in nature and by its nature must be accumulated through various means in order to uncover ‘the reality’ of a political situation or identify the operational intent of an opponent or political adversary. Intelligence operations traditionally include the collection and analysis of sensitive information which is usually carefully guarded by foreign actors. However, more and more in recent times, valuable intelligence is increasingly gathered from open sources.

Further, the accuracy of the intelligence received by the leader influences the decision-making process. The crisis may be further complicated if the intelligence filtered by the policy maker’s operational code which will contribute to the policy maker’s willingness to diminish the pace of escalation in an effort to achieve a resolution. Another aspect of intelligence impacting the accuracy or relevancy is exactly what intelligence is presented to the decision maker, i.e. exploited and analyzed intelligence or raw information which has been collected and not vetted through subject matter experts in the area at issue. When raw intelligence is directly presented to the decision maker without proper context or analysis it is referred to as “stovepiping”. The term stovepiping correlates with the isolated vertical nature of a stovepipe pushing smoke up the conduit, to that of
raw intelligence being funneled up the chain of command directly to a political leader without adding context, resulting in unclear and clouded perceptions of a situation. The cases in this study present scenarios in stovepiping intelligence: 1) where the lack of context may be due to the specialized nature, or security requirements, of a particular intelligence collection methodology or technology which has limited focus and the data within is not easily shared; or 2) instead, the lack of context may come from a particular group, in the national policy structure, selectively presenting only that information that supports certain political conclusions.

Table 3 - Intelligence & Stovepiping

Stovepiping of raw intelligence data directly to decision makers bypassing proper vetting poses significant operational risks. This study will demonstrate

---

51 Table 3 created by A.M. Perez to conceptualize the relationship between the raw intelligence as it enters the intelligence cycle and how stovepiping can impact the quality of information.
that the dissemination of raw intelligence to decision makers without adhering to proper analysis and vetting protocols can only contribute to inaccurate assessments of political conditions, policymaker’s motivations, and ultimately a state’s capabilities or resolve in responding to economic sanctions and other strategies. This is especially significant when the intelligence is being applied in conjunction with tools such as the ultimatums, tacit ultimatums, try and see approaches, and the gradual turning of the screw to create pressure to change the unacceptable behavior. U.S. intelligence capabilities must be reoriented and collection requirements redefined to meet the operational demands created by the imposition of sanctions which range across the economic, military and political spectrums. Economic sanctions are quickly becoming the primary policy instrument of choice for the United States in the post-Cold War era to achieve foreign policy interests through peaceful means.

Summary of Analytical Framework

I will analyze two cases, Cuba and Iraq, from a historical perspective using a comparative methodology highlighting the development of the theory as it was applied to each case, under what political climate was it applied, and ultimately the results achieved in each case study. The time frames for analyzing these cases will be: the Cuban Missile Crisis for Cuba and Desert Storm/Desert Shield for Iraq. These cases have been selected because they present a hybrid of successes, failures and intermediate results. Facets of each case lend

---

themselves to applying the three prong analytical framework described for this study which overlays coercive diplomacy, the leader’s operational code, and intelligence to form an integrated analysis that will aid in underscoring the goal of this study: what conditions must exist in order to utilize coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool where the application of economic sanctions and embargoes will result in success or failure when juxtaposed against a leader’s operational code and the quality of intelligence available to the decision maker.

The two cases involve leaders with very pronounced operational codes that either through proactive or reactive actions demonstrated that the historical, cultural and political context in which the leader acts is of central importance. These cases will also be analyzed against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the policymakers during the crisis. In addition, the analysis will also address the operational code of the leaders involved in the negotiations which can result in achieving either a positive outcome, or adversely result in the crisis situation turning into military intervention. By incorporating the tools of coercive diplomacy applied in a crisis, the political leader’s operational code and the quality of the intelligence being infused and disseminated to the decision makers, this study asserts that a clearer picture of the factors surrounding a political situation can be conveyed to the decision makers.

---


Chapter 2

Literature Review

Prong 1 – Coercive Diplomacy: Checkmate vs. Stalemate

Coercive diplomacy has been considered as an attractive strategy to further foreign policy goals because it offers the target state an opportunity to achieve reasonable objectives in a crisis with less costs. Coercive diplomacy is a potential means to change unacceptable behavior with much less, if any, conflict or bloodshed, with fewer political and psychological outlays. It is a diplomatic method used by a country in which the application of economic sanctions or embargoes, as well as the use of force or military action, is threatened or hinted at in order to force another country to give in to a certain demand or not engage in a particular course of action. Often by using coercive diplomacy there is less of a risk of an escalation into a full scale conflict.

From Thucydides to Machiavelli to Hobbes, philosophers and students of diplomacy have preferred resorting to some type of coercion in order to persuade opponents into taking a different course of action or changing their behavior, rather than resorting to military intervention to modify unacceptable behavior. What has perplexed international theorists and policy makers is under what political circumstances or crisis conditions can coercive diplomacy be applied today as a viable tool of foreign policy. A second question concerns what conditions determine its likelihood of success. This is the dilemma that will be addressed in this study, specifically under what conditions can coercive
diplomacy be successfully applied and what elements, if lacking could result in its failure.

The analytical framework used in this study will integrate not only the actual application of instruments of coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions or embargoes, but also infuse the role of intelligence and the operational code of the leaders involved in the crisis. This analysis will examine specific cases against a theoretical backdrop of realism and liberalism that will allow for the examination of a variety of conditions and not just power politics. The three prong analytical framework will consist of analyzing each case by applying the theory of coercive diplomacy intertwined with the political and personal elements comprising the leader’s operational code and ultimately reviewing those cases against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the political leaders to make informed decisions. In addition, an analysis will be conducted of the economic sanctions and/or embargoes that were implemented as instruments of coercive diplomacy, such as the “carrot and stick”.

Throughout history diplomacy has been viewed as an integral part of statecraft, foreign policy and a means towards resolving conflicts. Mainstream theorists have argued that the successful management of foreign policy incorporates the conscious integration of diplomatic tools and the use of force.\textsuperscript{55} The use of force, however, has also presented a cause for concern in that once force is released, the original purpose and justification for its application would be overshadowed by the actual use of the force. Indeed, Carl von Clausewitz the

military theorist who stressed the political and psychological aspects of war, noted that the violence of force at times eclipsed the diplomatic and economic bonds present before the onset of a conflict.\textsuperscript{56} As such, Clausewitz underscored that war was merely the continuation of political motivations through other means implying that war was a last resort when other political means had failed. A central contention of this study is that statesmanship therefore rests in the crafting of diplomatic means to offset or mitigate the need to resort to the use of force. A state will usually resort to persuasive diplomacy, or the gradual escalation to coercive means rather than the application or use of force.\textsuperscript{57}

The purpose of diplomatic negotiations is to ultimately gain the acquiescence of the opposing state in adjusting their political stance towards a position that can advance national interests and address national concerns.\textsuperscript{58} Diplomatic negotiations exist in many genres, but all variations ultimately strive to negotiate with the opposing state in order to gain political or economic leverage or advantage. Every diplomatic negotiation addresses issues at the forefront, as well as underlying concerns which can ultimately redefine political relationships between states. When negotiations are at an impasse, especially when there is a situation involving military engagements, states must resort to other means in order to deflect or minimize the potential escalation to an outright conflict. In light

\textsuperscript{56} Carl von Clausewitz, \textit{On War}, Michael Howard and Peter Paret, eds. and trans., with introductory essays by Peter Paret, Michael Howard, and Bernard Brodie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), Book One, Chapter 1, Section 26, 88.


\textsuperscript{58} Freeman, Arts, 88-89.
of the enormous destruction a military conflict can bring to each side, resorting to
the use of force because all other alternatives have been exhausted is usually
the justification for resorting to the use of military force.\(^{59}\)

In general, approaches to stemming an escalation of a crisis into a conflict
or attempting to resolve an existing conflict, can be sorted into four main strategy
categories\(^{60}\):

1) Contending: trying to impose one’s preferred solution on the other
party;

2) Yielding: lowering one’s own aspirations and settling for less than one
would have liked;

3) Problem solving: pursuing an alternative that satisfies the aspirations
of both sides; and,

4) Avoiding: not engaging in the conflict.

Most conflict situations are not resolved by solely utilizing one strategy, but rather
they call for a combination, or at times a calculated sequencing of the preceding
strategies to arrive at an acceptable resolution for the parties. This is especially
true in international and political negotiations that will most likely never arrive at a
win-lose situation, but rather an ultimate solution that is palatable to the parties
engaged in the crisis or conflict.

Two of these strategies, contending and problem solving, can be
implemented by executing numerous diverse tactics. Theorists have defined the
terms strategy and tactics in different manners. Specifically, tactics are distinct in

\(^{59}\) Brown, Causes, 13-18.

\(^{60}\) Pruitt, Dean G. and Sung Hee Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and
that they are the kinds of maneuvers by which strategies can be implemented.\textsuperscript{61}

Tactics have been considered the catalysts that help transform strategic political objectives into operational results. The other strategies, contending, yielding and problem solving are considered active in nature because they are focused on a reasonably consistent and clear effort to resolve a conflict. In analyzing the four categories, it can be reasoned that the two which can be most closely aligned with the strategy of coercive diplomacy are contending and yielding which for all purposes yielding resigns itself to accepting at least a partial defeat and contending involves the determination to win. This interpretation can be seen in the clash between George Bush and Saddam Hussein during the Iraq conflict where Bush indirectly acknowledged that at some level there must be a ‘partial defeat’ to avoid a full conflict escalation, yet Hussein was single-minded and determined to ‘win’ at any cost.

Coercive diplomacy is a diplomatic strategy to exercise power as a measure of influence or control over political actors, events, or issues in an attempt to stem aggression or military engagement. Coercive diplomacy as a tool of crisis management is a peculiar chess game where the political leaders are continually at odds with each other countering the opponent’s strategic and calculated moves in an effort to avoid a checkmate at all cost. In equating coercive diplomacy with a game of chess, the ultimate objective of a game of chess is to checkmate the opponent. However, just like all chess games do not have to culminate in checkmate, either one of the players may decide to resign which results in a win for the opponent. In a true chess match it is more common

\textsuperscript{61} Pruitt, \textit{Social}, 6-7.
for a game to be resigned than for it to end with a checkmate. Opponents can usually foresee a checkmate in advance and anticipate the strategies which will be undertaken by the opponent during the engagement. Chess games may also end in a draw or a tie which can translate into either a draw by mutual agreement or a stalemate because a checkmate is impossible which the situation at hand. Coercive diplomacy is a peculiar game of chess where the players in an effort to save face with their opponent and their own state, while protecting their economic, military, and national security interests, seek to achieve a stalemate instead of a checkmate which could signify the outbreak of a full scale conflict. The spirit of coercive diplomacy is best captured in the Chinese proverb, "A good player knows the right moment to resign."

Coercive diplomacy, whose objective is to dissuade or prevent an opponent from undertaking an unacceptable course of action, employs flexibility in the various styles which allow for discrete measures, tailored conditions, paced escalation of events, and if all peaceful avenues fail, the ultimate use of force. When implementing tools of coercive diplomacy, they must be credible in order to be effective. One adversary must believe that the opponent is capable of carrying out the threat and punishment, and most importantly intends to carry out with the promise of the threat if the opponent fails to comply. By the same token, the opponent must be convinced that the promise is credible enough to believe that the adversary will lift the proposed punishment if there is compliance with the request.

---

62 George and Simons, Limits, 10-11.
Coercive diplomacy theory has identified several critical variables which contribute to the success or failure of its application in specific historical instances. Some of these factors include: 1) the credibility of the coercer’s intent; 2) the balance of the motivation between the actor imposing the coercion vis-à-vis the perception by the target that action will be taken if it does not comply; 3) the target’s perception of the sense of urgency; 4) multilateral support by the international community as well as sufficient domestic backing; 5) the opponent’s fear that the confrontation will result in escalation if the behavior is not modified; and, 6) ultimately establishing clear and precise terms in order to settle the crisis that prompted the implementation of coercive diplomacy.\footnote{George, “Strategies,” 377-393.}

Other dynamics impacting the application of coercive diplomacy are the operational code of the leaders involved, the quality of the intelligence they receive during the crisis, and the domestic political goal. The operational code of a leader is comprised of the cognitive and affective influences which in turn affect the decision making process as a result of their cultural background, education, economic status and life experiences. These factors together formulate the underlying beliefs and perceptions which guide a leader’s decision making process in a crisis. A leader’s instrumental beliefs influence the nature of appropriate responses, while a leader’s philosophical beliefs aid in analyzing the political meaning of the situation.\footnote{Walker, “Evolution,” 403-418.}

Economic sanctions have been tools of diplomatic negotiations and engagement for centuries. Sanctions were originally utilized for waging an
economic war during ongoing hostilities, but have been redefined in the modern era of international relations as a foreign policy measure of preventive diplomacy, implemented to initiate political and social change within the targeted country. Economic sanctions and embargoes are utilized as a last resort “carrot and stick” tool in an effort to prevent war. Coercive diplomacy, as applied through economic sanctions and embargoes as instruments of foreign policy, is best examined from a case study methodology. In assessing the viability of using sanctions as tools to curtail a conflict, the decision maker must look at both the cost and effectiveness in imposing the sanctions.

I will analyze two cases, Cuba and Iraq from a historical perspective using a comparative methodology highlighting the development of the theory as it was applied to each case, under what political climate was it applied, and ultimately the results achieved in each case study. The time frames for analyzing these cases will be the Cuban Missile Crisis for Cuba and Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm for Iraq. These cases have been selected because they present a hybrid of successes, failures and intermediate results. Facets of each case lend themselves to applying the three prong analytical framework described for this study which overlays coercive diplomacy, the leader’s operational code, and intelligence to form an integrated analysis that will aid in underscoring the goal of this study: what conditions must exist in order to utilize coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool where the application of economic sanctions and embargoes will result in success or failure when juxtaposed against a
leader’s operational code and the quality of intelligence available to the decision maker.

The case studies evolve around two sets of decision makers whose operational code had a direct nexus with the development of the actions during the crisis. Each leader viewed the crisis through his own historical and cultural biases which guided how the leader acted during the crisis. These cases will also be analyzed against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the policymakers during the crisis. In addition, the analysis will also address the operational code of the leaders involved in the negotiations which can result in achieving either a positive outcome, or detrimentally impact the crisis situation and escalate it into war.65

Central to the concept of coercive diplomacy is the need to create in the opponent the expectation of being adversely hurt to such an extent that the target state will cease in continuing with the adverse behavior. The key to the application of coercive diplomacy is to migrate from the abstract conceptual model of a strategy, such as deterrence, crisis management or coercive diplomacy, into a viable operational framework. A workable framework will identify the key variables of the chosen strategy and the rationale which is usually associated with the successful use of those policy instruments.66 For example, if one first examines the precepts of deterrence, the logic underlying this strategy dictates that the threat in response to an action against a state’s

65 Richelson, U.S. Intelligence Community, 315-331.

interests should be sufficiently credible and compelling to persuade the opponent that the risks and political and/or economic costs of the course of action being contemplated outweighs the perceived gains. Deterrence theory in its abstract model, like coercive diplomacy, rests on the general assumption that the adversary is rational and has the ability to calculate and correctly analyze the potential benefits, costs, and risks associated with the situation at hand. 67

It can be argued that any political strategy can have its theoretical origins in an abstract model. However, abstract models will initially present an analytical framework for policymakers to examine a crisis and formulate which strategy can best be applied to the situation at hand with the highest probability of generating a successful outcome. Abstract models identify the framework and elements necessary to formulate a strategy for implementation. The abstract model alone will not specifically identify what actions a policymaker must undertake in order to bring the crisis to a resolution. Rather, the abstract model allows the leader to integrate the variables adjoining the crisis such as the political leaders involved as well as the potential political and economic risks to formulate the strategy. To achieve the formation of a sustainable strategy, the policymaker must tailor the abstract model and transition it into a specific strategy for the crisis at hand, taking into consideration the behavioral characteristics of the adversary. 68

In order for a policymaker to transition an abstract model into a specific strategy, such as coercive diplomacy, each of the critical components of

67 George, Bridging, 118.

68 George, Bridging, 118.
framework must be clearly identified. Alexander George has asserted throughout his writings that coercive diplomacy is a strategy that relies upon pressures and threats to persuade an adversary to stop or disengage a hostile action he has entered into causing the crisis. When attempting to migrate the abstract model of coercive diplomacy into a specific strategy for engaging the adversary, the political decisionmakers need to define four key elements, namely:

- What demand to make on the opponent and whether it is reasonable;
- Whether and how to create a sense of urgency for compliance with the demand;
- How to create and convey a threat of punishment for noncompliance that will be sufficiently credible and powerful to persuade the adversary that compliance is in his best interest; and,
- Whether to couple the threat with a positive inducement, i.e. “a carrot”, to make compliance easier for the adversary and, if so, what kind and how much of an inducement to convey.

George asserts that if the policymaker addresses each of the four key elements associated with a strategy of coercive diplomacy in an informed and rationale manner then the framework would be used to predict whether the strategy is likely to succeed or fail in the crisis at hand.

I would assert, however, that the utilization of the abstract model of coercive diplomacy and the development of the strategy alone as outlined by Alexander George and other theorists, will not render a truly viable framework for evaluating courses of action in a crisis without integrating the temperaments of the leaders, their operational codes, and the critical role that intelligence plays in the formulation of the strategy itself. The underlying hypothesis set forth in this
study, is that the three prong analytical framework which encompasses the strategy of coercive diplomacy, the operational code of the leader, and the infusion of intelligence, will provide the policymaker with the structure necessary to more fully analyze the crisis and render a more informed course of action to potentially stem a crisis from escalating into a full scale conflict. By incorporating and considering other factors such as the opposing leader’s personality traits, temperament, operational code, and the critical intelligence necessary to form a situational picture that is as accurate as possible, the policymaker will be better empowered to develop effective strategies to address the crisis at hand.

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that is sometimes applied by policymakers in the hope of securing a peaceful resolution of a serious dispute. Coercive diplomacy is best conceptualized as an element of foreign policy that encompasses other tools of diplomacy, such as economic sanctions, to create a setting that combines threats in conjunction with positive inducements to change adverse behavior.\textsuperscript{69} It should be noted that studies have identified several significant conditions, all psychological in nature, which are associated with the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy. Once again, the success of the strategy can often depend on creating several triggers in the opponent’s mind:

1) A sense of urgency for compliance with what is demanded;

2) A belief that asymmetry of motivation favors the coercing power; and,

3) A fear of unacceptable punishment if the demand is not accepted.\textsuperscript{70}

\textsuperscript{69} George, “Need,” 463-487.

\textsuperscript{70} George, \textit{Bridging}, 123-124.
Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that calls for using economic tools such as sanctions or military threats in an effort to persuade an opponent to halt adverse behavior or undo an encroachment in which he is already engaged. The theory of coercive diplomacy assumes pure rationality on the part of the opponent and assumes that the opponent will be a rational actor in the crisis. The underlying assumption of the theory is that the opponent will have the means of receiving all the pertinent information and will evaluate it appropriately in order to make the proper assessment to the credibility of the threat, and conclude that it is in the best interest to accede to the demands being made. The abstract theory, therefore, does not take into consideration the possibility of misperception and miscalculation. It also does not recognize that an opponent’s rationality may be affected by psychological variables as well as by values, cultures, and traditions that may differ from those of the coercive state. In other words, the abstract theory does not consider a policymaker’s operational code, or the beliefs and underlying premises that can affect the decision making process of a leader. Decision makers are affected by their operational code, psychological undercurrents, political dynamics internal and external to the state, and organizational bureaucracy. In addition to these elements, add to this mix the significant disparities which may exist relating to the decision maker’s personal

---

71 George, Presidential, 246-248.
72 George, Forceful, 4.
values, political culture, and perceptions of risk taking in the political arena to further their position.\textsuperscript{74}

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy that cannot rest solely on coercive threats. Some critics approach coercive diplomacy as solely a stick approach and make no provision for the carrot incentives. Their theory of coercive diplomacy envisions that one offers an opponent only face-saving gestures on trivial or peripheral matters and they overlook the possibility that coercive diplomacy in any given situation may be facilitated by genuine concessions to the opponent as part of a quid pro quo that secures one’s essential demands.\textsuperscript{75} Coercive diplomacy, therefore, must be distinguished from pure coercion because the former encompasses bargaining, negotiations, threats and incentives, as well as compromise. Coercive diplomacy also needs to be distinguished from deterrence, a strategy that also employs threats to dissuade an adversary from undertaking a damaging action in the future. Another misconception is that coercive diplomacy is a magic bullet that will resolve all problems in a crisis and ultimately lead to a lower cost avenue than the alternative of a costly military intervention.\textsuperscript{76}

The strategy of coercive diplomacy may require that at some point in the crisis a sense of urgency be created for the opponent’s compliance. The character of this strategy is to create urgency, induce a heightened state of

\textsuperscript{74} George, “Need”, 463-487.

\textsuperscript{75} George, \textit{Limits}, 16-20.

pressure and anxiety that will direct the focus on the part of the political leaders and actors to the crisis. Political actors and leaders engaged in the conflict are surrounded by psychological factors such as fear, isolation, and anger and in extreme cases a sense of desperation which can at times incite or aggravate the very behavior that you want to change.\textsuperscript{77} The time sensitive pressure intended by coercive diplomacy may not be handled in the same manner or approached with the same response by decision makers. In order to avoid unintended escalations of a conflict, or premature responses, the pace of the engagement at times must be decelerated. However, the practice of deliberately slowing up the pace and spacing of military actions, which crisis management requires, may be difficult to reconcile with the need to generate the sense of urgency for compliance.

Coercive diplomacy is a strategy for attempting to prevent international conflicts from turning violent or preventing diplomatic confrontations from escalating into full scale wars.\textsuperscript{78} It refers particularly to a state’s efforts to avoid the kinds of misperceptions of the adversary’s intentions and capabilities, as well as to the miscalculations of an adversary’s responses to one’s moves that can be misconstrued and accelerate into a conflict.\textsuperscript{79}

In order to gain an appreciation of the motivations behind crisis management and the ramifications it produces, it is necessary at least briefly to address its underlying premise. The basis paradox of crisis management is that


\textsuperscript{78} Brown, \textit{Causes}, 13-18.

“confrontations between adversaries can be easily managed and terminated if either side is willing to back away from a confrontation and accept damage to its interests.” In other words, the underlying assumption is that a crisis escalate if one side backs down and accepts a certain degree of loss to its strategic position. If such a situation does not present itself, or if either one of the adversaries considers that any compromise would be inexcusably detrimental to their economic or national security interests, a crisis or conflict will eventually ensue. Indeed, throughout recent history there have been examples of both, successful conflict management strategies (the Cuban Missile Crisis under the Kennedy administration), and detrimental confrontations which culminated in an embarrassing retreat (the Carter administration’s retreat from the mini-crisis over the discovery of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba).

Economic sanctions or embargoes have been key incentives or deterrents which have been used to curtail aggressive behavior and bring about a peaceful resolution to a serious dispute or crisis. Economic sanctions take a variety of forms, ranging from a mere refusal to renew trade agreements to a total export and import embargo against the target state. The objectives to be achieved by the imposition of economic sanctions and embargoes are ultimately the maintaining or restoring of international peace and security. When applied as tools of coercive diplomacy, they serve as targeted political trade restrictions aimed at changing what is perceived as adverse behavior in the international

---

80 George, “Provisional,” 22-27.

community by the target country. These political trade tools are usually implemented by the United Nations (UN), but have also been imposed unilaterally by states against political adversaries. In general, the principal aim of all UN sanctions and embargoes, as articulated and empowered under the UN Charter, is to implement decisions reached by the UN Security Council is to conserve or reinstate international peace and security. The role of the United Nations as it related to the cases in this study and imposition of the sanctions and embargoes will be addressed in a subsequent chapter.

The study of economic sanctions requires an introduction into what economists have labeled the ‘donkey psychology’ of economic diplomacy.\(^{82}\) There is an assumption that just like a donkey, countries can be induced or coerced to move in particular right direction by means of a carrot and stick, in other words, by positive and negative economic sanctions. However, the donkey psychology also points out that sanctions can be counterproductive if the donkey beater pulls a donkey by the tail and in turn the animal runs in the opposite direction. In the case of Saddam Hussein, Iraq sat on Kuwait and refused to move. The encroachments implemented by Hussein into Kuwait had gone far beyond what could have been perceived as simple military deployment exercises. The underlying concern was whether Hussein would carry out the long time threat of annexing Kuwait, which would have presented an unprecedented

attack of one Arab state against another. The challenge for the United States was to implement sanctions that would coerce Saddam Hussein into removing his troops from Kuwait without lashing out even more.

Negative sanctions are the best known economic instruments of coercive diplomacy. A negative sanction functions as a direct punishment or disincentive. There are three distinct types of negative sanctions that can be implemented as a tool of coercive diplomacy: boycotts, embargoes and capital sanctions.

- A boycott restricts the demand for certain products or commodities from the target country.
- An embargo restricts the exports of certain types of commodities, if not all, to the target economy. An embargo may be partial in nature, restricting only specific products and technology items.
- Capital or financial sanctions restrict or suspend lending and investments in the form of loans, credits, and grants to the target economy.

Positive sanctions are conducted under the umbrella or domain of silent diplomacy. Many types of positive sanctions belong to day-to-day practices and are hardly ever distinct enough from the flow of international interactions to stand out in comparison to the more highly publicized negative sanctions. Positive sanctions can include economic aid or military cooperation. Many theorists view multilateral sanctions as being the most effective form of coercive diplomacy in attempting to alter the target state’s behavior. Over the past decades, international sanctions have featured prominently in economic statecraft and

---

practice as a means to achieve political goals in a peaceful manner. As a result, international sanctions have received considerable attention and study in the news media, public debate, and in scholarly writing. However, how economic sanctions are defined and applied in the international arena has created much debate.

Coercive diplomacy, or compellance as some theorists call it, utilizes the threats of force to persuade an opponent to modify certain behavior or undo an action which has been taken. Coercive diplomacy is different from deterrence in that the strategy of deterrence attempts to dissuade or convince an opponent from not entering or engaging into a particular course of actions. Therefore, coercive diplomacy is also a different tool of diplomacy because it seeks to change an action that has already been undertaken, yet resorts to persuasion through other political tools such as sanctions and embargoes, rather than confronting the opponent with full military force. As such, it can be argued that coercive diplomacy provides the opponent with the possibility of ceasing the abhorrent behavior or encroachment before the adversary resort to the use of military force. Coercive diplomacy is a true avenue for the peaceful diplomatic resolution of a crisis which would potentially result in a full scale military conflict if other opportunities are not presented.

In spite of the potential offered by the use of coercive diplomacy, some theorists are skeptical and have attempted to attribute four aspects of coercive

---

diplomacy which can make its successful application a challenge.\textsuperscript{85} The first challenge is that coercive diplomacy is a method of compellance and is often considered more difficult to implement than deterrence.\textsuperscript{86} By nature, theorists have asserted that it is more difficult to have a target change its behavior than to maintain its current pattern of behavior.\textsuperscript{87} Actions to compel a demonstrative change in the behavior of the intended target decrees that the political environment perceives the actual change in conduct and in addition attributes the change to the actions taken by the aggressor. In contrast, threats intended to deter behavior are easier and more palatable for the target state to appear to have ignored or in turn to acquiesce without suffering a significant loss of face in the eyes of the international community. The target state can claim plausible deniability in deterrent situations by sustaining the premise that it had no intention of modifying its behavior, or it can choose to simple ignore the deterrent threats and not change its behavior. Compellance, the other hand, carries with it the cost of potentially losing face in the international community and suffering political humiliation and credibility. If a loss of face occurs, the target state may escalate their retaliation to demonstrate they are worthy and viable opponents on the political stage.


\textsuperscript{86} Thomas C. Shelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 69-86.

\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
The second challenge is that coercive diplomacy is in its purest sense a form of coercion which can be applied in the form of a punishment, denial, or a risk aversion. In this aspect, strategies of when applied denial seek to change or modify an adversary’s behavior by hampering or thwarting its military strategy. The focus of this approach is directly at the opponent’s military apparatus with the intent of undermining and diminishing their overall effectiveness in executing their strategies of campaigns, effectively seeking to stalemate the forces rather than achieve an outright military victory, or checkmate, over them. Actions to impose punishments directly impact the target state’s population and their quality of life. These punishments are usually meted in the form of sanctions or embargoes. The target state may modify its adverse behavior, but not because its’ military strategies have been hampered, but rather the cost to its population poses too great a risk.

The third factor identified by theorists as posing a challenge in the application of coercive diplomacy is the ability to estimate the resolve of the target state in continuing to engage in the adverse behavior or actions. Prior to implementing any of the tools of coercive diplomacy, the state applying the coercive diplomacy cannot determine with any assurance the level of resolve the opponent possesses in continuing to engage in the behavior that created the crisis in the first place. Like a game of chess, coercive diplomacy is a political game of moves and countermoves where each player attempts to ascertain their

---

88 Pape, 18-19.

opponent’s strategy and resolve during the course of the game. However, unlike a true game of chess, the intent of coercive diplomacy is to achieve a stalemate and stem the possibility of further aggression by either side. Each effort using coercive diplomacy reveals the level of determination of each of the adversaries in achieving their political goals. Even if the coercing state has the ability to accurately estimate the level of determination of the opponent’s resolve prior to engaging in coercive diplomacy, there is no guarantee that the level of tenacity will remain the same once the crisis and engagement proceeds. However, even the most skeptical theorists acknowledge that coercive diplomacy is not destined to fail, but rather that the odds are not necessarily in its favor when the crisis at hand can potential harden the initial resolve of the parties.90

The fourth and final element of concern is that coercive diplomacy presents difficulties because the target state must assess the effects of an escalated confrontation not solely on its credibility stakes, but also on its power stakes.91 The stakes surrounding power are embodied in capabilities, whereas the stakes involving credibility are directly at the political leader’s reputation. This is especially significant from a strategic perspective where failed engagements today can resulted in significantly damaged political reputations and creditability in the future. Therefore, a strategy of coercive diplomacy must also be looked at through a strategic lens to take the necessary steps to not only mitigate or stem aggressive behavior today, will take steps that will seek to weaken the position of

90 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 366.
91 Art, “Coercive Diplomacy,” 366, citing the distinction made by theorist Barry Posen.
the adversary in the future. Because military conflicts are costly for all participants, states generally have a significant incentive to find alternative and peaceful resolutions to the crisis at hand so that they do not incur the burden and destruction associated with a war.\textsuperscript{92}

In order to approach this chess game in an informed and rational manner, the policymakers must have access to the necessary tactical, operational and strategic level intelligence to arrive at coherent strategies. The need for relevant and timely intelligence to alert policymakers of hostile actions by other states or non-state actors is self-evident.\textsuperscript{93} Intelligence is a key element found throughout a crisis and is inherent in effective crisis management and diplomacy. The target’s perception of the sender’s capabilities in imposing the sanctions and the capabilities behind the threats need to be validated through independent channels in order to gauge the legitimacy of the proposed actions.\textsuperscript{94} Intelligence is a key factor that provides the decision makers with an assessment of the political arena, military capabilities, and socio economic factors and how the target state will react if those areas are debilitated.

This nexus between the intelligence necessary to perform an informed risk assessment and the operational code of the actual policy maker is lacking in current literature and associated analytical models. The application of coercive diplomacy under existing frameworks presents challenges if one does not


\textsuperscript{94} Li and Drury, “Threatening Sanctions,” 378-394.
incorporate the leader, his/her operational code, the quality of intelligence being disseminated to the policymakers to integrate in to the decision making process. Therefore, the three prong analytical framework proposed in this study serves to mitigate the level of uncertainty and the risks potentially associated historically with a strategy of coercive diplomacy.

**Prong 2 – An Operational Code Defined**

In constructing an integrated analytical framework I would assert that a leader’ operational code is an integral factor in presenting a more informed situational assessment of a crisis at hand. The new analytical framework being adapted in this study would be deficient in providing the decision makers with a more informed picture of the circumstances impacting the political situation if the operational code of the leader was not considered. Previous research and studies have attempted to outline what an operational code in a leader is and what elements comprise it. What theorists have failed to accomplish is taking an integrated approach in analyzing an operational code. An integrated analysis as defined in this study should encompass not only the external political factors facing a leader, but also the internal composition of the leader himself. The actual policy maker drives the tone and tenor of how a crisis is approached.

The operational code analysis cannot be made without considering the theoretical perspectives set forth by social constructivists. They argue that international relations structures are “socially constructed” and that these “structures” serve to shape the political actor’s identities and interests, rather
than just their behavior.\textsuperscript{95} The constructivist theory challenges the original premise of the mainstream realist and neorealist theories. Where neorealists view systemic structures as comprised of solely of material capabilities, social constructivists maintain that they are also made of social relationships which themselves encompass three key elements: shared knowledge, material resources, and practices. The social construction of international politics is achieved through “a process of interaction between agents (individuals, states, non-actors) and the structures of their broader environment.”\textsuperscript{96} Basically, it is interpreted as a process of mutual constitution between agents and structures, with the agents being the political leaders.

This study builds upon the initial work of Alexander George and asserts that the life experiences of a political leader are ingrained within their personality and as such will influence the orientation of actions undertaken during a crisis, what tools of coercive diplomacy are applied and how intelligence is ultimately interpreted. In examining a political leader’s operational code and without delving too deeply into psychological analytical theories, it must be recognized however that there are intrinsic factors which are woven in the fabric of a political leader’s personality. As such it is critical to emphasize that those factors are not static, but rather are dynamic throughout an individual’s life.\textsuperscript{97} In examining a crisis situation, it is asserted that a political leader’s life experiences, upbringing and


\textsuperscript{96} Wendt, 417.

\textsuperscript{97} Post, Leaders, 21.
psychological factors are factors that can and do manipulate the decision making process. In scrutinizing what tools of coercive diplomacy are chosen and applied, it is the political leader and his political inner circle that directly influence what course of action is taken.

An individual’s belief system which is comprised of psychological and sociological factors, as well as life experiences are what theorists have come to label as an operational code.98 The most extensive discussion of a political leader’s operational code and how it can affect a situation was set forth by Nathan Leites in his seminal work The Operational Code of the Politburo in 1967 and most recently resurrected by the RAND Corporation as part of its program of research for the United States Air Force.99 Leites was a Russian immigrant who became an expert on his native land by examining the motivations and intentions of Soviet leaders for the U.S. government. Leites forged new ground by applying the principles of psychoanalysis to the study of political figures. The thrust of Leites’ study was to assess the political strategy of Bolshevism, basing it on the writings of Lenin and Stalin. What is noteworthy is that these early analyses entrenched the analytical framework in the combination of psychological and cultural sources that together created the operational code of the Soviet elite.

The initial part of Leites’ analysis stems from the roles that political actors on the world scene are “forced into their parts through the pressure of historical

---

98 Post, Leaders, 21.

99 Leites, Operational, 1-12.
developments. It is through past practice and political expectations to fulfill the party’s agenda that a leader may be coerced into taking a course of action in order to sustain the will of the party, even though those actions may be directly contradictory to their own perspectives or beliefs. Although Leites peripherally alludes to the individual and his actions, the analysis is restricted to the individual operating within the constraint of the Politburo. The political leader is not allowed within that political environment to assert his own actions. The analysis of an ‘operational code’ is restricted not to the elements which make up the individual leader, but rather a description of what political framework the Politburo has deemed acceptable for effective political action to further the agency of the Bolsheviks. Indeed, Bolsheviks ingrained their perceptions of their opponents, the capitalists, as innately hostile and as such would react to their political opponents in the West with that underlying assumption. As such, Leites research although innovative for the time period, presents an analytical gap which this study intends to address. The analytical gap presented is that a leader’s cultural and psychological characteristics do regulate how a decision maker reacts during a crisis and what courses of action are undertaken.

Alexander George addresses the philosophical content and instrumental beliefs of an operational code years later. Once again the analysis is from the perspective of how external factors constrain and guide the decision making process of the Communist leaders, and not from the internal factors which can

---

100 Leites, Operational, 1-12.

react to the external catalysts in the political environment. George reviews the basic issues surrounding the nature of political action and politics and how those have been attributed to what he sees as a misnomer, in other works, the term “operational code.” He acknowledges that in referring to those personal beliefs or attributes of a leader, perhaps the literature would best be served by referring to them as “approaches to political calculation” instead.\(^\text{102}\)

George concedes in discussing the effect of a political leader’s operational code on a crisis that the underlying beliefs and personal values of a leader can impact the decision making process if given the opportunity. He does not, however, incorporate it to as critical element of his analysis.\(^\text{103}\) George instead postulates that the operational code of the decision maker can be considered a different type of belief system which is not correlated with the sociological elements emanating from the cultural values which can shape the perspective of a leader.\(^\text{104}\) George’s analysis departs Leites model and concludes that the leader’s operational code is a belief system compromised of informational inputs from external sources and the social environment.\(^\text{105}\) The processing of these inputs and their assimilation by the leader is subject to the individual’s preferences for different approaches during crises. Indeed George underscores his perspective by stating that a leader’s “belief system about politics is part of


\(^{105}\) Schafer and Walker, Beliefs, 7.
the cognitive and affective portion of the ego structure of personality; as such it
serves as an adaptive function for coping with reality.\textsuperscript{106}

The operational code analytical paradigm was first established by Leites and then further interpreted by George. The analysis was constructed upon the following assumptions:

- Decision makers vary significantly in choice biases, beliefs, opinions, and personality traits;
- These characteristics help to formulate the decision maker’s range of objectives and shape the analysis of alternatives by the decision maker; and,
- Insofar as possible, a policy-maker’s choices are selected which are consistent with these principles and constitute the boundaries of rational behavior for the decision maker.\textsuperscript{107}

The exploration set forth by George recognizes that a leader’s underlying values and beliefs can interject themselves and influence the decision making process in a crisis. It should be noted, however, that in spite of this acknowledgement, George does not raise the values and beliefs of a leader as key factors in his analytical framework when discussing the role of a leader’s operational code.\textsuperscript{108}

This lack of association between the operational code as a whole and an individual’s value system and upbringing presents a deficiency in being able to associate key indicators which would assist in the decision making process for a leader. This is especially significant in how conservative or aggressive an

\textsuperscript{107} Walker, “Evolution,” 403-418.
approach is taken by a political leader when intelligence is lacking or unclear regarding a crisis. This absence of correlation is particularly problematic where a crisis involves not only political beliefs, but also religious and moral perspectives. The manner in which an individual assimilates information is directly affected by what life experiences have been internalized. These are the filters which must be considered as part of the analytical framework addressing the operational code.

Stephen Walker in revisiting the paradigm of an “operational code” set forth in early writings by Leites and George adapts their analysis and recognizes them as a synthesis of the cognitive and affective influences upon political leaders and decision makers. Indeed, he reviews the original questions structured by George which were designed to address the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in the Bolshevik ideology originally studies by Leites. George redefined the operational code analysis set forth by Leites and excluded the psychoanalytical factors to an extent and focused principally on the cognitive aspects in an attempt to decrease the complexity involved in the initial framework. The expectation was that the new structure could potentially enhance the analysis of the decision making process.109

The questions outlined by George fall into two specific categories: philosophical and instrumental. A leader’s instrumental beliefs influence the nature of appropriate responses, while a leader’s philosophical beliefs aid in analyzing the political meaning of the situation. These questions have evolved 109

---

into the basis of standardized operational code analysis. George further delineated the breadth and scope of these two categories of questions by defining the “philosophical belief questions” as those which serve as the “diagnostic” tool which can assess and guide the political leader’s view of the political environment at hand.\textsuperscript{110} The “instrumental belief questions”, on the other hand, are described as the “prescriptive or choice” piece of the equation which can guide the political leader’s ranges regarding the courses of action or strategies are employed in addressing the crisis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Philosophical Belief Questions</th>
<th>Instrumental Belief Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>What is the “essential” nature of political life?</td>
<td>1.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Is the political universe one of harmony or conflict?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is the fundamental character of one’s political opponent?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one’s fundamental political values and aspirations?</td>
<td>2.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Can one be optimistic or must one be pessimistic on this score and in what respects the one and/or the other?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>Is the political future predictable?</td>
<td>3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>In what sense and to what extent?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development?</td>
<td>4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>What is one’s role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?</td>
<td>5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{111} Table 4 created by A.M. Perez based upon the writings of Alexander George to facilitate the analysis of the philosophical beliefs and instrumental belief questions which impact a leaders’ operational code.
I would suggest that the application of these questions, for example, first to the political leader’s philosophical beliefs can aid in assessing the conditions which are present on the political chessboard for the crisis at hand. Then the application of the questions addressing the individual’s instrumental beliefs can influence or indicate the next strategic move or course of action to be undertaken in furthering the political engagement without leading it into a checkmate scenario which could escalate it into a military confrontation.\textsuperscript{112}

These questions come for the most part from an external perspective and do not necessarily integrate the individual’s personal biases or outlook. The analysis of the operational code in a political leader as presented by Leites was structured as psycho-cultural model in order to study the Bolshevik operational code.\textsuperscript{113} However, the operational code of a leader, in its purest sense, should be comprised of the cognitive and affective influences which can permeate the decision making process as a result of their cultural background, education, economic status and life experiences. Although not specifically delineated and outlined by Leites or George, I would attempt to fill a gap in the analysis and advance the literature relating to the framework of what comprises an ‘operational code’ by explicitly identifying the factors which I believe together embrace the operational code of political leader. These are the psychological and sociological variables which when fused comprise an operational code. The first facet to address is the psychological factors and they encompass:

\textsuperscript{112} Walker, “Evolution”, pp. 405-406.

\textsuperscript{113} Leites, \textit{Operational}, 1-12.
The personality and character of the individual or leader
The behavioral style of the individual
The psychophysiological dynamics at play

The second facet to analyze is the sociological factors. These factors include:

- Cultural influences
- Traditions stemming from cultural origins and upbringing
- Sociopolitical dynamics which may facilitate or constrain actions
- Familial environment
- Religious affiliation
- Values and moral code

The mixture of these factors overlay to form a more distinct picture of how a political leader may engage in a crisis situation when confronting an opponent.

The analytical framework being applied in this study integrates not only the application of the potential instruments of coercive diplomacy, but also the role of intelligence and how the operational code of the leaders involved in the crisis react and apply that information into the decision making process. Indeed, the leader’s political perspective infused with intelligence and his operational code will determine what the next move will be in this very volatile game of chess.
In analyzing the cases against the three prong analytical framework, *the role of the actual policymaker will directly influence the tools of coercive diplomacy applied and how the intelligence is interpreted for the crisis at hand*. Foreign policy behavior and orientation during a crisis situation is dominated by each political decision maker’s particular life experiences.\textsuperscript{115}

From this perspective, the traditional structured approach in reaching national policy decisions now alludes to the premise that there is a level of uncertainty permeating the process and can be attributed to the variants in the leader’s operational code. This model is a variation of the tradition rational-actor paradigm of decision making and shifts the focus to the actions engaged in by a decision maker as emanating from the actor’s objectives. The leader’s belief system turns into an apparatus that reflects unspecified societal influences which evolve into personality biases. This study contends that beliefs and personality traits play a key role in an environment that is uncertain. As such, when information is scarce or the intelligence picture is incomplete the leader will have

\textsuperscript{114} Figure 4 source [www.shutterstock.com](http://www.shutterstock.com).

\textsuperscript{115} Viotti and Kauppi, *International*, 235-236.
difficulties in processing the information in such a way as to enhance the decision making process.\textsuperscript{116}

Along this vein, further research has identified a number of key circumstances where the characteristics and personality of a leader are likely to affect engagement and behavior in the international political arena, most significantly in crisis situations involving two opponents.\textsuperscript{117} The thought process of this analysis addresses the problem explored by theorists, namely the question of "when" a leader’s personality is most likely to affect political behavior is applied from the perspective of "under what political circumstances," referring to the political context in which the leader is operating.\textsuperscript{118} This type of inquiry, however, pays minimal if any attention to personal variability which is impacted by the individual’s operational code, in other words the psychological and sociological factors. The key circumstances identified by Hermann where a political leader’s characteristics may affect foreign policy are:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Post, \textit{Leaders}, 7-21.
\end{itemize}
In proportion to the general interest of the head of state in foreign policy.

When the means of assuming power are dramatic.

When the head of state is charismatic.

When the head of state has great authority over foreign policy.

When the foreign policy organization of the state is less developed and differentiated.

In a crisis.

When the external national situation is perceived to be ambiguous, the information-processing systems of the head of state play a key role.

The cognitive styles and beliefs of the head of state will affect foreign policy in relation to the degree of training in foreign affairs.

**Table 5 – Philosophical Belief and Instrumental Belief Questions**

Ole Holsti theorized that these belief systems are central to the leader and they remain constant over time and permeate political domains for the decision makers who hold them. Holsti contended that his operational code typology consisted of independent belief systems which are distinct sets of beliefs held by individual political leaders which are themselves internally consistent, interdependent and at times resistant to change. Both George and Holsti, however, acknowledged that this typology does not exhaust the cognitive complexity of political leaders. In constructing a cohesive analysis of the

---

119 Table 5 created by A.M. Perez based upon the writings of Margaret Hermann to outline the key circumstances she identified where a political leader’s characteristics may affect foreign policy.


leader’s operational code, the psychological and sociological factors are integral catalysts of the decision making process and cannot be lightly dismissed.

In expanding George’s and Holsti’s theoretical premise further, I would add that the underlying perceptions or preexisting beliefs of the leader serve as filters in interpreting the information which is being presented. These beliefs or perceptions have not been integrated fully into existing operational code analyses and as such create a gap in being able to fully comprehend actions taken or potentially to be executed by leaders during crisis situations. Those filters include old information which was never put into context and is seeking some level of intelligibility, stereotypes, or other cognitive biases.

![Figure 5 - Cognitive Bias](source www.globoforce.com)

A cognitive bias is a common tendency to acquire and process information by filtering through one’s own personal experiences, likes, dislikes, stereotypes, and ethnic or social upbringing. It is these types of preexisting beliefs and cognitive biases that when confronted with potential threats to one’s vested

---

122 Figure 5 source www.globoforce.com.
interests trigger certain responses which are intrinsically imbedded in the aggregate of one’s operational code. The key psychological factors that have a direct bearing on the political leader include: 1) the personality and character of the leader; 2) the behavioral style; and, 3) any psychophysiological dynamics which may be at play behind the scenes. This nexus between the intelligence necessary to perform an informed risk assessment and how the operational code of the actual policy maker interprets that information is lacking in current literature and associated analytical models.

The study of an operational code cannot occur in a vacuum. It must also take into consideration an understanding of the comparative history of civilizations, social and economic orders, political constructs of states, and societies will create the necessary awareness of the constancy of change. It would be virtually impossible to conduct an analysis of an operational code encompassing each and every factor previously listed. However, it would be more realistic to highlight and delve further into those factors which have a direct nexus and impact on the leader or the crisis at hand, such as religious beliefs, regional historical conflicts, and previous military engagements. Gaining a more in depth comprehension of these factors alone does not satisfy having a total awareness of a political situation. I would stress that the key factor which has eluded theorists and analysts is the notion that in order to have an integrated view of a situation, one must also incorporate an internal understanding of the

---

123 Schafer and Walker, Beliefs, 5.

124 Peake, “History’s Role.”
political leaders involved, i.e. their operational codes. Decisions rendered in a political crisis are intertwined with perspectives effected by life experiences, religious beliefs and moral codes, rather than solely by direct cause and effect relationships arrived at through structured analytical formulas and methodologies. This analytical perspective has been lacking in the body of literature research and published to addressing the operational code of a leader.

In applying the three prong analytical framework outlined in this study, the operational code of the decision maker or political leader can directly influence how intelligence is perceived, interpreted and applied to the crisis at hand. In addition, the elements of the operational code instilled in the political leader can serve as filter in interpreting intelligence surrounding the political engagement. This further controls how and when, as well as what actions will be undertaken by a leader vis-à-vis the opponent in a political crisis. It is human nature to filter and interpret the information being received from external sources through one’s own life experiences and knowledge. However, without considering the impact that an individual’s personality and sociological make-up can have on a crisis and how those elements can directly permeate the analysis of the political conditions, a decision maker will be hampered in properly gaging the intentions of the opponent, the crisis may be further complicated if the intelligence filtered by the policy maker’s operational code which will contribute to the policy maker’s willingness to diminish the pace of escalation in an effort to achieve a resolution.

The cases in this study, Cuba and Iraq, are being analyzed in an historical perspective, and have been selected because they present a hybrid of
successes, failures and intermediate results. Facets of each case lend themselves to applying the three prong analytical framework described for this study which overlays coercive diplomacy, the leader’s operational code, and intelligence to form an integrated analysis that will aid in underscoring the goal of this study: what conditions must exist in order to utilize coercive diplomacy as a foreign policy tool where the application of economic sanctions and embargoes will result in success or failure when juxtaposed against a leader’s operational code and the quality of intelligence available to the decision maker. As part of the three prong analytical framework, these cases will also be scrutinized against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the policymakers during the crisis. The study will also address how the operational code of the leaders involved in the negotiations can result in achieving either a positive outcome, or could detrimentally impact the crisis situation and inadvertently spiral it into a military engagement.\textsuperscript{125}

**Prong 3 – Intelligence**

The final prong of the analytical framework being applied in this study is intelligence which I set forth as an integral factor throughout the analysis of the crisis. During a crisis, intelligence plays a critical role in providing greater clarity and precision in sifting through the plethora of information facing the political leader during the decision making process as to what actions to take or not to take in order to prevent an escalation. Intelligence, in the traditional sense, refers to issues of national security which today encompasses foreign policy

concerns, national defense and numerous facets of homeland security. These components have risen to a significant degree of importance in addressing national security concerns both internationally and domestically since the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001 on U.S. soil. Juxtaposed with these elements comprising intelligence are the policies, actions, and economic and military capabilities of other nation states and other non-state actors such as terrorist organizations and international organizations (both governmental and non-governmental).

Intelligence has always played a critical role in providing information to protect the national security interests of a state. This perception is also held by other states and political actors in the international community who use intelligence to safeguard its political, military and economic standing. I would assert that whether from a U.S. or foreign state perspective, the role that intelligence will place during the decision making process of political leaders in a crisis situation is contingent upon the quality and reliability of the information. Contextually, intelligence collection efforts must be focused and analyzed in a timely manner so as to enable the policymaker to render the information actionable and relevant to the crisis or the effort to cultivate and produce it has been wasted.¹²⁶

The review of the literature surrounding intelligence will focus on four critical areas: 1) intelligence, its context and role; 2) the stages and process of the intelligence cycle; 3) the quality and reliability of intelligence; and, 4) the consumption and interpretation of intelligence. To assist in the analysis of the

role intelligence played in the three highlighted case studies and in the application of the three prong analytical framework, the concepts surrounding intelligence will be assessed using the basic model outlined by Mark Lowenthal, however I will be integrating another element to fill the gap which exists in the analysis, namely the context and role intelligence plays in a crisis:  

#### Table 6 - Context & Role of Intelligence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Context &amp; Role of Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence: Its Context and Role</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Traditional role of intelligence as part of national security and military engagement but now encompasses economic concerns, as well as other non-state actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence: Its Stages and Process</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Intelligence can be thought of as the means by which certain types of information are required and requested, collected, analyzed, and disseminated, and as the way in which certain types of covert action are conceived and conducted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence: Product &amp; Dissemination</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Intelligence can be thought of as the product of these processes, that is, as the analyses and intelligence operations themselves.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intelligence: Organization &amp; Consumer</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Intelligence can be thought of as the units that carry out its various functions and bring the stages of the intelligence cycle to fruition so that customers can assess and apply the information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Intelligence traditionally has been perceived as information used to plan and coordinate military engagements, conduct threat assessments focusing on weapons capabilities, troop abilities and skillsets for deployments as well as creating situational awareness in times of conflict. However, intelligence is not only information to be collected and applied for military engagements, but

---


128 Table 6 created by A.M. Perez based upon the model outlined by Mark Lowenthal to facilitate the analysis intelligence and its role and context in a crisis.
moreover to elucidate political, economic, social, environmental, health and ultimately cultural areas of concern. It is this interpretation of intelligence that will be integrated into this study. This construct aligns most cogently with that application of coercive diplomacy and the operational code of the leaders, and as such is most relevant to the analytical framework of this study. Much has been written about intelligence in general, about how it’s collected, analyzed and disseminated, and conclusions have been drawn about the ‘successes’ and ‘failures’ of intelligence operations and the information itself. However, the preponderance of these studies has focused the analyses on the events giving rise to the collection of the information and the external variable impacting the conflict itself and to some extent the leaders engaged in the altercation.

The contribution of this study is that other studies have not drawn a direct nexus between the leader consuming and interpreting the intelligence to engage the opponent in the political crisis, the link to operational code of the leaders themselves, and ultimately analyzing in light of those two factors whether the tools of coercive diplomacy will be appropriate for the crisis at hand. Foreign policy actions and strategic measures undertaken during a crisis situation are directly guided by each political decision maker’s particular life experiences. The policy maker and his or her operational code will directly influence, first, how the intelligence is interpreted, and secondly, how the intelligence is used to discern which tools of coercive diplomacy, if any, can successfully be applied.\textsuperscript{129} Intelligence and its application cannot be considered in a vacuum apart from a

\textsuperscript{129} Viotti and Kauppi, \textit{International}, 236-237.
key element, the leader’s operational code, which directly impacts how the information will be construed and ultimately used during the decision making process in a crisis. Moreover, the historical interconnectedness of intelligence, policy, and political dynamics now present in the government arena pose unique challenges that render the management of these relationships more difficult when attempting to analyze all the potential factors impacting a crisis and in determining whether the tools coercive diplomacy can in some manner be successful be applied.

The rapid-paced global information environment of today exhibits closer relationships between policy makers, political leaders, and intelligence professionals.\(^{130}\) It is as a result of these more direct connections that a question arises as to whether or not the commingling and overlapping of what have historically been very clear roles and functions between intelligence, policy makers and leaders, may potentially lead to an erosion of objectivity that should exist in the production of intelligence. This particular topic has not been directly addressed in recent literature. The research has, however, addressed the connection between intelligence managers, the intelligence analysts and their customers.\(^{131}\) This premise has been outlined in terms of whether or not a “firewall” should be established between these roles so as not to taint the integrity of quality of the intelligence being provided.\(^{132}\) One side of the argument


\(^{131}\) Clark, 334-337.

\(^{132}\) Clark, 334-335.
asserts that intelligence should be organizationally situated close to senior leadership where decision making occurs. The argument against that structure is that intelligence will then be used as a direct advocate for policy itself, rather than an objective contributor of information to key stakeholders to render a decision. As a result, intelligence, in its purest sense, will lose the ability to render and provide objective information to assist during the decision making process.

The role of intelligence and the direct access the intelligence analysts conducting the research have to the political leaders may erode the level of objectivity of the information and product being generated. This is especially significant if weighed against the operational code of the political leaders. The Cuba and Iraq cases will demonstrate how having access to the raw intelligence for interpretation by the political leader, versus having the availability of the intelligence analyst to clarify the findings or the basis for the final intelligence product can significantly impact the outcome of a crisis which could have been deescalated through coercive diplomacy instead of military engagement.

Timely, relevant information and classified intelligence is what provides the insight and foundation to validate engaging in a particular course of action, or escalating the ‘carrot or stick’ to a new level of engagement when applying the tools of coercive diplomacy. This study examines three specific cases against the types or variations of coercive diplomacy applied in each one: 1) the ultimatum; 2) the tacit ultimatum; 3) the “try and see” approach; 4) the gradual turning of the screw; or the “carrot and stick” approach. What is unique in this analytical framework is how the analysis is infused with what role intelligence plays in the
crisis and the operational code of the leaders involved in the crisis which directly
or indirectly influences how they interpret and apply that information in their
decision making process. The analysis of each case encompasses applying the
theory of coercive diplomacy intertwined with the political and personal elements
comprising the leader’s operational code and ultimately reviewing those cases
against the backdrop of the intelligence available to the political leaders to make
informed decisions.

To gain a better understanding of the role intelligence plays during a crisis,
it must be defined and explained so as decipher the impact it can have during the
potential implementation of coercive diplomacy. Intelligence is the information
that has been gathered in response to the operational needs of policy makers
and has been collected, analyzed, produced into a finished product and most
importantly disseminated to the key stakeholders. What needs to underscored
is that intelligence is a subgroup of the broader category of the overarching class
of “information”. The sum of intelligence itself and the intelligence cycle which is
the process by which it is first identified, cultivated, and then analyzed is in direct
response to the needs of political leaders and policy makers. As such a key fact
to remember is that although intelligence is information, not all information is
defined or characterized as intelligence. The level of detail of the analysis and
the level of reliability assessed to the intelligence influences the ultimate goal
which is to generate a relevant and objective product for the decision maker.

---

133 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 57-70.
Intelligence is the aggregate outcome of the process whereby information is gained through specific methods and sources for government use.\textsuperscript{134} Intelligence is developed through defined stages and very specific functions. The intelligence process itself refers to various steps and stages to provide an intelligence product to the policymaker that initially generated the requirement for information. The focus and ultimate goal of intelligence and its analysts is to apply objective, in-depth analysis infused with technical expertise to exploit all source information resulting in a product which adds value to the policy maker’s interests in protecting or advancing national security interests.\textsuperscript{135} The intelligence cycle encompasses the:

- Planning, direction and identification of the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs);
- Collection;
- Analysis and processing;
- Production;
- Dissemination and integration; and,
- Feedback and evaluation as to how the intelligence impacted the mission requirements.

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{134} Roger A. George and James B. Bruce, eds., \textit{Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations} (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 1-7.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{135} James B. Bruce and Roger Z. George, “Intelligence Analysis – The Emergence of a Discipline,” in \textit{Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations} (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 1-7.}
A high-level summary of each of the steps in the intelligence cycle will facilitate the flow of the analysis for each of the cases in this study. The identification of intelligence requirements means defining those areas of concern where it is not only anticipated, but expected, that intelligence can fill operational or situational gaps. That intelligence is ultimately expected to be relevant once inserted into the decision making process. The collection cultivates and produces information through various and methods, not 'intelligence'. That raw information must undergo the processing and ultimate exploitation before it has been sifted through enough to be considered ‘intelligence’. Underlying the completion of these initial stages of the intelligence cycle is the understanding that the information has no value in its raw state unless it is evaluated by an intelligence analyst. It is the analytical skillset imparted by an intelligence officer that will turn

---


137 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 57-70.
raw information into intelligence. The analysis and production sections of the intelligence cycle enable the intelligence to be turned into products that are responsive to the policy maker’s informational needs. What at times is sorely missing from this cycle is the need for feedback on the quality and relevance of the intelligence product from the consumer to the intelligence analyst. Theorists have described that the failure to provide feedback on intelligence “is analogous to the policy makers’ inability or refusal to help define requirements.”

The Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIRs) or Requests for Information (RFIs) are information requirements linked with an upcoming high-level decision that will affect a domestic or foreign policy, or impact an ongoing political engagement. I would contend that it is this initial step in the intelligence cycle that forms the foundation of the ultimate quality of information ultimately presented to the decision maker for assessment and action. The substance and quality of the information which is collected is directly correlated with how well the initial PIR was drafted. PIRs are necessary for intelligence to fill a gap in the policy maker’s knowledge and understanding of the crisis at hand. The scope of the PIR usually will change in response to the information needs of the leader engaged in a political crisis. In attempting to render informed decisions, the policy maker will process information based upon his or her own preferences or personal style, i.e. operational code. Once again, the ultimate form and substance of the information will significantly depend upon how the policymaker requested or crafted the intelligence requirements, the manner in which the information gathering

---

138 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 67.
questions were framed, and the questions that were asked of the intelligence collector.\textsuperscript{139}

The individual style and preferences that a policymaker embraces relating to how information is cultivated, retrieved, and ultimately used will directly guide how the intelligence is developed and disseminated. An interesting model developed by Lorne Teitelbaum looks at three different categories of policymakers and how they seek out and filter information.\textsuperscript{140} The model complements the second and third prong of my analytical framework, the operational code of a leader and the quality of the intelligence being imported into the crises. Teitelbaum breaks down the three different strains of policymakers into three types: Type I, Type II, and Type III. Teitelbaum asserts that it is possible to describe how some decisionmakers will search for and filter information depending on what their ‘type” is.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POLICYMAKER/DECISIONMAKER TYPES: METHODS FOR SEEKING AND VETTING INFORMATION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type I</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type II</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type III</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{139} Lorne Teitelbaum, A Dissertation: The Impact of the Information Revolution on the Policymakers’ Use of Intelligence Analysis, (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2005), 18-21.

\textsuperscript{140} Teitelbaum, Impact, 19-21.

\textsuperscript{141} Table 7 created by A.M. Perez based upon the model described by Lorne Teitelbaum in A Dissertation: The Impact of the Information Revolution on the Policymakers’ Use of Intelligence Analysis, but modified for the analytical framework of this study.
Type I decisionmakers place selective filters on incoming intelligence to preclude information overload after having triggered mechanism to seek and retrieve information from as many sources as possible. Type II decisionmakers is most susceptible to the influences of their operational code. This type of leader will make tactical and strategic decisions in a compartmentalized manner by receiving the incoming intelligence but placing significant filters on the incoming information, paying no attention to most of it, and ultimately basing their operational decisions on their instinct and past life experiences, rather than the new information being provided. Type III decisionmakers will immerse themselves in the weeds of the data and the analysis attempting to gather as much information as possible prior to making what they perceive to be “an informed” decision.

The three types of policymakers have their unique methodologies for gathering, assessing and processing intelligence. This model accounts for the different styles of vetting and socializing of the intelligence, and also lends itself to the inclusion of the second prong of the analytical framework in this study – the leader’s operation code. Because of the decisionmakers operational code, the manner in which information is reviewed, the validation and reliability attributed to the sources and collection methods, it is asserted that the operational code of a political leader is directly related to the manner in which the intelligence is filtered and processed before taking action.
Once the PIRs are identified and drafted, the next stage is to focus on the collection methodologies. Intelligence is gathered through various open or closed sources and methods such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, communications intelligence or electronics intelligence, imagery intelligence, geospatial intelligence, or measurement and signatures intelligence. The two facets which combine to decipher and present a clearer situational awareness of the conflict at hand fuses open source information and the more traditional clandestine intelligence. The first facet is information which is collected from open, unclassified sources, available to the public large, and is comprised of government statistics, economic data and trends, histories, cultural facts, and outlooks or foreign populations, and academic research. Facts are collected from open sources to fuse with the intelligence collected through clandestine means and techniques to arrive at a more validated and factual assessment of a particular political situation or crisis. Intelligence collection efforts are surreptitious in nature and by its nature must be accumulated through various means in order to uncover ‘the reality’ of a political situation or identify the operational intent of an opponent or political adversary. Intelligence operations traditionally include the collection and analysis of sensitive information which is usually carefully guarded by foreign actors. However, more and more in recent times, valuable intelligence is increasingly gathered from open sources.

In order to understand the role that intelligence played in the case studies, it is necessary to understand the various genres of collection methods.\(^{142}\)

\(^{142}\) Clark, 89-126.
- **Open Source**: Information of potential intelligence value that is available to the general public.

- **Human Intelligence (HUMINT)**: Intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.

- **Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)**: Intelligence derived from deliberate electronic transmission, to include communications intelligence, electronics intelligence, and foreign instrumentation signals intelligence.

- **Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)**: Intelligence derived from the exploitation of collection by visual photography, infrared sensors, lasers, electro-optics, and radar sensors, such as synthetic aperture radar, where images of objects are produced.

- **Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT)**: Intelligence derived from the analysis of imagery and geospatial information that describes, assesses and visually depicts physical features and geographically referenced activities on the earth. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery intelligence and geospatial information.

- **Communications (COMINT) or Electronics Intelligence (ELINT)**: COMINT is a sub-category of signals intelligence that engages in dealing with messages or voice information derived from the interception of foreign communications. It is also described as technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the originally intended recipients.

- **Measurements and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)**: Scientific and technical intelligence obtained by quantitative and qualitative analysis of data (metric, angle, spatial, wavelength, time dependence, modulation, plasma, and hydro magnetic) derived from specific technical sensors.

After the raw intelligence is collected, it is then processed and exploited. This processing phase involves sorting the raw intelligence and segregating it into areas of raw information materials which can then be interpreted and interrelated with other intelligence mediums, analyzed into trends, patterns, or developed into indicators and warnings. The indicators and warnings are key
pieces of intelligence that serve as the bases for risk analysis and assessments in determining what effects might result from certain courses of action being undertaken by a leader in a crisis. The analysis of the collated raw intelligence ultimately leads to the assessment of the information, its relevance and most importantly its reliability. The reliability and credence given to the sources and methods used to collect the intelligence and the ultimately the quality of the analysis delineated in the finished intelligence product is what lends credence to how much weight a political leader places on that information.

A critical aspect of the intelligence cycle is the actual dissemination of the intelligence and its timeliness. Intelligence is of no use to a policy maker engaged in a crisis unless that intelligence product that is made available with enough time to make an informed decision. The intelligence needs to be drafted coherently, adding value, and formed into a finished intelligence that is then disseminated to key stakeholders in a timely manner. Intelligence is irrelevant and stale for a tactical or operational engagement if it is not distributed to the key stakeholders promptly. This brings us to a question which has been addressed in the literature to some extent, but still fails to correlate its significance vis-à-vis the policy maker receiving and applying that intelligence to the crisis at hand, namely, what steps can be taken to reduce the uncertainty and reliability of the information. Producing an integrated intelligence product implies not only that the information must be as accurate as possible, but also:

- That it clearly specifies what is firmly known and not known about an issue;
- That the quality and quantity of the existing information;
- How the intelligence was obtained and through what medium;
- What assumptions have been applied in analyzing the intelligence and what alternative perspectives have been considered; and,
- What level of confidence do the intelligence analysts demonstrate in the information itself, as well as how sound are their analytical abilities and judgments in making conclusions about the information.  

This last point is of significance in the context of the analytical framework of this study. The intelligence products being generated prompt the posing and answering of questions at key points during the analysis to fill possible gaps, as well as when the information is being presented to leadership.

As previously pointed out, coercive diplomacy is like a strategic game of chess. This chess game should be approached in an informed and rational manner by both adversaries; however that is usually not the case as will be revealed in the case studies. The engage in calculated, methodical chess game, the policymakers must have access to high quality and objective intelligence assessments in order to arrive at coherent strategies. The need for relevant and timely intelligence to alert policymakers of hostile actions by other states or non-state actors is self-evident.  

Intelligence is the principle factor which enables political leaders with the informational basis for assessing the political arena, military capabilities, and socio economic factors of the opponent and in turn, can assist in projecting how the target state will react. The target’s perception of the

---


144 George, "The Role of Intelligence," 395-412.
sender’s capabilities in imposing the sanctions and the capabilities behind the threats need to be validated through independent channels in order to gauge the legitimacy of the proposed actions.\textsuperscript{145}

The intelligence product is generated in direct response to a collection requirement. Once the information is collected, exploited and analyzed, the original individual levying the collection requirement may not be the only stakeholder who would need access to the information to ensure a greater degree of granularity and quality is assessed. For the leader to able to assess a political crisis, the information must be provided in a timely manner. As will be noted in the case studies, it is critical for information to be disseminated the appropriate leaders and stakeholders. I would argue that extreme compartmentalizing and stovepiping of intelligence not only hampers, but may very well skew the context, analysis, reliability and ultimately the interpretation of the information.

The interpretation and application of intelligence to a crisis assumes that the political leader will rely on an objective product generated by the Intelligence Community in direct response to the requirements levied by the decisionmaker. This objectivity in assessing intelligence is a factor correlates with the second prong of the analytical framework of this study – the operational code of the political leader. Indeed, the intelligence community has adapted it’s historically traditional methodologies in the field to now consistently incorporate elements from other disciplines and fields in order to present the situational picture having the clearest information.

\textsuperscript{145} Li and Drury, “Threatening Sanctions,” 378-394.
For example, the Intelligence Community is again regarding socio-economic factors, cognitive psychological factors, and other fields related to analytic thinking, in addition to the more obvious transnational issues as critical to the analysis of raw intelligence. Indeed, it is the case for the intelligence analyst, as it is for the political leader that when assessing intelligence, individuals have a tendency to process information through the filters of one’s biases, socio-economic perceptions, personal experiences, and ethnic or religious upbringing. The correlation between the quality of the intelligence

---

146 For Figure 7 source: Visual Guide to Cognitive Biases, http://www.cruxcatalyst.com/2012/06/06/visual-guide-to-cognitive-biases/.


148 Schafer and Walker, Beliefs, 4-5.
produced by the analysts and how the information is interpreted by the political leader as a result of the operational code is deficient in current analytical models for the application of tools or coercive diplomacy during a crisis situation. In the case of the intelligence analyst, it can be argued that intelligence is in fact a profession of cognition.\textsuperscript{149} An intelligence analyst must absorb and process information through the cognitive biases embedded within his professional experiences and analytical toolkit. An analyst in executing the intelligence tradecraft must make every effort to detach from these preconceptions, or cognitive disassociations, so that the finished intelligence product is impartial and unbiased. A political leader, however, is not bound by the same professional standards or requirements. As the cases in this study will demonstrate, political leaders are more often than not, directly influenced by their operational codes which serve to at times justify their political actions.

The decisionmaker filters the information in a crisis through his political, life and personal experiences, biases and cultural perspectives. In reviewing the quality and objectivity of the intelligence, we must also address the personal opinions and biases of the analyst exploiting the intelligence in order to generate the most objective product.\textsuperscript{150} The intelligence analyst, who assesses foreign events, must set aside personal opinions and biases in order to commence the analysis from a neutral point. Comparisons have been drawn regarding the


\textsuperscript{150} Clark, 335-339.
objectivity of intelligence analysis in a government setting, as compared to a business intelligence analyst. Whereas in private industry recommendations are expected from business intelligence analysts who derive their conclusions from their technical and operational experience in the industry, a government intelligence analyst would be committing career suicide if they were placed in a position to make recommendations to a decision maker.  

A valid question to consider is whether the expertise brought to the table by a government intelligence analyst should have the same role as the operational experience lends to the recommendations made by a business analyst. In the study at hand, even though a government intelligence analyst may have the in-depth experience and historical perspective of similar political entanglements, the correlation of what course of action should be taken for the crisis at hand, considering similar historical events, rests with the political leader and the inner circle of advisors. The problem with this paradigm is absent having savvy political advisors to consider all scenarios and historical contexts for applying the intelligence, a fragmented or stovepiped interpretation may be rendered. 

Assuming that the political leader will rely on the objective analysis of the all source intelligence reporting generated by the subject matter experts within the Intelligence Community, there should be a greater degree of reliability or credibility in the information when applying it to the crisis at hand. Alexander George asserted that political leaders will seek the intelligence and sources of information  

---

information that will present them with the best opportunity to render quality political decisions."\(^{152}\) The question which is always at hand in determining the impact which intelligence could have had in a political situation is whether the political leader would have undertaken different course of action or would have made a different decision regarding the opponent with or without a specific piece of intelligence.\(^{153}\)

Intelligence presents a significant challenge when there is incomplete information to offer a better picture and assessment of the situation at hand. A key guiding principle of intelligence professionals is that because of their individual reasoning process which can be impacted by their life experiences, they should think about how they make analytical judgments and reach conclusions, and not just about the judgments and conclusions themselves.\(^{154}\) This study will address the misperceptions and information gaps and which are created when political leaders attempt to control the flow of raw intelligence and circumvent the analytical processes imbedded within the ranks of intelligence professionals. The raw intelligence without the proper vetting and analysis can render a political strategy for engagement inoperable. When engaging in the application of coercive diplomacy which can be appropriately described as a political chess game, the quality, reliability and accuracy of the intelligence being provided to the leaders proves crucial in determining the next move on the

\(^{152}\) George, *Presidential*, 2.


international chessboard. Faulty or incomplete information can lead to
detrimental actions which may culminate in the escalation of a crisis resulting in
military engagement when a stand–off was the original goal. In order to generate
the necessary intelligence that is relevant to the crisis at hand, there needs to be
an understanding of the requirements they have, the collection efforts they seek,
and ultimately what political environment exists.

Another aspect of intelligence impacting the accuracy or relevancy is
exactly what intelligence is presented to the decision maker, i.e. exploited and
analyzed intelligence or raw information which has been collected and not vetted
through subject matter experts in the area at issue. When raw intelligence is
directly presented to the decision maker without proper context or analysis it is
referred to as ‘stovepiping’. Stovepiping is a term which correlates the isolated
vertical nature of a stovepipe pushing smoke up the conduit, to that of raw
intelligence being funneled up the chain of command directly to a political leader
without adding context, resulting in unclear and clouded perceptions of a
situation. The cases in this study present scenarios in stovepiping intelligence
where the lack of context may be due to the specialized nature, or security
requirements, of a particular intelligence collection methodology which has
limited focus and the data within is not easily shared. Another possibility is the
intelligence may the lack context or direction from a particular group in the
national policy structure, selectively presenting only that information that supports
certain political conclusions.
Stovepiping of raw intelligence data directly to decisionmakers bypassing proper vetting poses risks presents significant gaps and lends itself to skewed interpretations of the information. This study will demonstrate that the dissemination of raw intelligence to decisionmakers without adhering to proper analysis and vetting protocols can only contribute to inaccurate assessments of political conditions, policymaker’s motivations, and ultimately a state’s capabilities or resolve in responding to economic sanctions and other strategies. This is especially significant when the intelligence is being applied in conjunction with the tools of coercive diplomacy such as the ultimatums, tacit ultimatums, try and see approaches, and the gradual turning of the screw to create pressure to change the unacceptable behavior. U.S. intelligence capabilities must be reoriented and collection requirements redefined to meet the operational demands created by the imposition of economic sanctions as tools to further foreign policy interests.\textsuperscript{155}

Further, the accuracy of the intelligence ultimately received by the leader influences the decision-making process. The operational code of the political leader will directly control in what manner they cultivate the intelligence, how they apply the information, and the level of credibility that it placed on the intelligence apparatus. The information will be further impacted during the assessment due to the policy maker’s operational code which will contribute not only to how the intelligence is viewed, but also how the intelligence is used. The accuracy of the intelligence is contingent upon two dynamics which ultimately work together to

\textsuperscript{155} Haass, 1-9.
develop the information critical for providing situational and directional awareness to the political situation. First, the extent to which political leader guided the agenda for the collection of intelligence and what types of sources were used; i.e. HUMINT, SIGINT, COMINT, GEOINT, etc. and then how that raw intelligence was analyzed. The second dynamic at play is Secondly, the stakeholder’s characteristics and the basic world view that is held. A study conducted by the RAND Institute incorporating how stakeholder analysis, contributes significantly to creating a framework for assessing irregular warfare.\textsuperscript{156} The RAND study describes the elements of the operational code of a leader without specifically naming it as such.

“At the highest level, these characteristics include the stakeholder’s basic worldview, historical or cultural narrative, motivations, and views on key issues in contention; the importance of salience of the conflict or issue in dispute to the stakeholder; aims, objectives, preferred outcomes, and strategy; and moral, discipline, and internal cohesion or factionalization. They also include general and specific attitudes and beliefs related to the underlying conflict, as well as historical, cultural, religious, and linguistic characteristics, economic circumstances, and other factors.”\textsuperscript{157}

Once again, the study alludes to an ‘operational code’ by discussing the various perceptions and embedded biases entrenched within the psychological personal of a leader. The framework in this study does not skirt this, but instead places it as one of the key prongs in the analysis in determining whether coercive diplomacy will work if certain conditions are present in the political arena.

\textsuperscript{156} Eric V. Larson, Derek Eaton, Brian Nichiporuk and Thomas S. Szayna, \textit{Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis} (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2008), 22-28.

\textsuperscript{157} Larson, \textit{Assessing}, 26.
Chapter 3

Case Study: Cuban Missile Crisis

The Prelude to the Cuban Missile Crisis – October, 1962

“Acting on our own by ourselves, we cannot establish justice throughout the world. We cannot ensure its domestic tranquility, or provide for its common defense, or promote its general welfare, or secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity. But joined with other free nations, we can do all this and more … We can mount a deterrent powerful enough to deter any aggression, and ultimately we can help achieve a world of law and free choice, banishing the world of war and coercion.”

John Fitzgerald Kennedy
July 4, 1962

Section I: The Cuban Missile Crisis – A Short Summary

Since the dawning of the atomic age in 1945, no event has more seriously imperiled the continued existence of civilization as we know it, than the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cold War era presented a battle ground and insistent rivalry between the two distinct blocs of contending states that emerged in the aftermath of World War II. The Cold War presented an era that lacked large scale wars between the states, and the two superpowers never directly engaged in full-scale armed combat. It was a confrontation and tests of wills and ideologies between the Communist bloc led by the Soviet Union and the non-Communist states led by the United States and Great Britain. However, the Cold War the United States


and Soviet Union did each arm themselves heavily in preparation of a possible all-out nuclear world war. It was this Cold War rivalry that almost brought the United States and the Soviet Union to the brink of thermonuclear war in October 1962.

For a period of thirteen days in October 1962, the world lived on the brink of thermonuclear war and the end of civilization as we know it. Earlier that year, Khrushchev had begun secretly deploying a nuclear strike force on the island of Cuba just 90 miles from the United States. Soviet military specialists along with the technical hardware had systematically been deployed to Cuba to form a military stronghold in Latin America that would facilitate the expansion of Communism in the region. These missiles had nuclear strike capabilities and could potentially reach most major strategic U.S. cities in less than five minutes.

In October 1962, the United States had confirmed that the Soviet Union had placed forty medium range missiles with a range of 1200 mile strike capacity. The missiles, many of which were already on launch pads, were armed with one-megaton warheads – nearly fifty times more destructive that the atomic bomb deployed at Hiroshima – and were situated only ninety miles from the Florida coast.\textsuperscript{160} The Soviet deployment of medium-range ballistic missiles into Cuba during the late spring and through the fall of 1962 triggered the most potentially volatile and dangerous crisis of the Cold War. JFK asserted that the positioning of the nuclear strike capable missiles just 90 miles from the United States would not be tolerated and insisted on the Soviet Union removing them.  

refused and saw it as a natural expansion of the Communist ideology in the region. This crisis which could foreseeably escalate to a full scale war, which was unwanted by either side, was eventually resolved peacefully through the careful utilization of coercive diplomacy in managing a crisis by both Kennedy and Khrushchev.  

Following the Bays of Pigs fiasco, tensions between Cuban and the United States reached a new high. Kennedy had isolated Cuba diplomatically because it was apparent that Cuba was the center of a network of subversive activities throughout Latin America. In December of 1961, Fidel Castro had announced that he was “a type of Marxist-Leninist,” and that he would follow their ideologies until he died. The following month the Organization of American States, at America’s urging, expelled Cuba from its membership. The United States had already placed an embargo on exports to Cuba as codified under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and as implemented in conjunction with the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) legislation enacted by Congress. The only exceptions to the embargo were medicines and certain types of foodstuffs. For all intents and purposes, a curtain had been dropped on the island of Cuba. It should be noted, however, that Castro’s government had expropriated American property during 1960 and 1961 so the embargo was in

---


162 Winks, 89-91.
effect implemented as a result of Cuba’s hostile acts as well as Castro’s recent ideological declarations.

Castro claimed that he feared military action from the United States and invoked the assistance of the Soviet Union. Castro was drawn into the Communist sphere of influence because once having attained power, he needed an ideological framework to keep himself in power, and communism provided this platform. The Soviet Union sought to expand its sphere of influence and Cuba provided the perfect venue for the Latin American corridor. On October 10, 1962 U.S. reconnaissance planes took films of Cuba that revealed roads striking through tall wooded areas in remote places. An order was issued to photograph Cuba, field by field if necessary, in order to properly assess the situation. For four important days a hurricane kept U.S. reconnaissance planes on the ground, but on Sunday, October 14, Navy fighter pilots were deployed to Cuba on an intelligence gathering mission. The photographs they brought back demonstrated that Cuba had become, in effect, a missile. While there were no missiles or missile-related equipment actually seen at the site, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) photograph analysts and interpreters were certain that the Soviets were building an intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM) site based on the pattern of construction and the excavation found there. Indeed, when one of the photograph interpreters “was shown the photos of the sites in

---

163 Abram N. Shulsky, Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence (New York: Brassey’s, 1993), 57.
Cuba, he opened one of his books and there was a photograph of an identical IRBM site in Russia.”

The Soviet defector Oleg Penkovsky was a United Kingdom–United States defector who remained in place in an extremely critical and key position in the Soviet government. Penkovsky was a well-respected colonel with the GRU, the Soviet military intelligence, during the late 1950s and early 1960s. He skillfully exploited the access to material afforded him as a colonel in the GRU and was not only able to provide information about what the Soviets had learned about the West, but more importantly also about the real capabilities of the Soviet military. Penkovsky had informed the United States and the United Kingdom of the Soviet Union's placement of missiles in Cuba. It was Penkovsky that had previously delivered some photographic evidence and testimony which assisted the U.S. intelligence photo analysts in identifying what they were looking at in the photographs taken by the U-2 reconnaissance planes.

On October 22, President Kennedy wisely rejected an air strike and announced a naval blockade to turn back any Soviet ships that might be carrying nuclear warheads or other materials for the Cuban based missiles. Although the naval blockade could prevent additional missiles and equipment from reaching Cuba, it obviously could not remove the missiles that had already arrived and were being made operational. Kennedy demonstrated a keen understanding of Khrushchev’s position and misperceptions he had pertaining to himself as a

---

164 Shulsky, 57.

leader. Both he and Khrushchev exercised exemplary caution and restraint in dealing with each other during the course of the crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis spanned a total of six days, during which time Moscow backed down and agreed to crate its missiles in Cuba and return them to the Western Bloc in return for a promise from the United States not to invade Cuba.

For a stressful 13 days in October 1962, the fate of the world hung in the balance. JFK's response to the crisis was remarkably restrained in spite of all the anti-Communist rhetoric that had been pronounced by JFK and his brother Bobby.

“...The Communist empire...which knows only one party and one belief...suppresses free debate, and free elections, and free newspapers, and free books and free trade unions – and ... builds a wall to keep truth a stranger and its own citizens prisoners.”

Khrushchev pressured the Soviet team on the ground in Cuba to complete the construction of the missile sites. In spite of the aggressive determination demonstrated by the Soviets, JFK refused to be forced into a hasty decision. JFK conducted the crisis negotiations deliberately with extreme discipline and delicacy. JFK cautiously balanced cold determination with pragmatic statesmanship. JFK stood his ground diplomatically by not forcing the hand of an impulsive and resolute opponent into a rash response, but neither would he allow the placement of missiles in Cuba which posed a critical threat to U.S. national security.

166 Stacey Bredhoff, JFK and the Cuban Missile Crisis: To the Brink (Washington, D.C.: Foundation for the National Archives, 2012), 1.

A proper evaluation of Kennedy’s success in coercing the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba must not only address the President’s threats to Khrushchev, but also his willingness to give the Soviet leader a substantial quid pro quo. Kennedy eventually offered not only a conditional pledge not to invade Cuba, but he also gave Khrushchev a private assurance that the Jupitar missiles the United States had stationed in Turkey pointing towards the Soviet Union would be removed soon. The U.S. Jupitar missiles in Turkey numbered fewer than the number of missiles the Soviet Union deployed in Cuba. Further, they were constructed with archaic technology used in the first generation missiles. President Kennedy had previously ordered that these missiles be disassembled and removed months prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, but the order had never been executed by the Department of Defense. Therefore, the value of Kennedy’s concession in removing the missiles from Turkey lay not in reducing the military threat to the Soviet Union, but in the political significance of offering them as a secret payment for the removal of the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Hence, the removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey provided the critical quid pro quo to facilitate the de-escalation of the conflict. On October 28, 1962, virtually on the brink of war and events taking on a life of their own, Khrushchev suddenly yielded and announced that the Soviet missile sites in Cuba would be dismantled immediately. The elements of the Cuban Missile Crisis allow for an in-depth analysis applying the three prong analytical framework of this study, specifically the application of the leaders operational code, the quality of intelligence, and the use of coercive diplomacy. The peaceful resolution of the
crisis is considered to be one of JFK’s greatest political and diplomatic achievements.

Section II: John Fitzgerald Kennedy
The Operational Code of the U.S. President

John Fitzgerald Kennedy is a controversial figure in the history of the United States. Kennedy is considered by many either as one of the most admired and beloved presidents of recent times, or as a much debated political figure who may have been overrated as a leader during his presidency. In spite of the many opinions rendered about Kennedy and his presidency, he is still ranked as the President with the highest retrospective job approval rating, averaging an 83% approval rating even though his term in office was plagued with multiple foreign policy and domestic political issues.\textsuperscript{168} In order to gain an understanding of the man, the political figure, and his actions as the President, one must assess the times in which he lived. Events during his presidency included the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, the Civil Right Movement, the Space Race, the early stages of the Vietnam War and the most critical, the Cuban Missile Crisis. It was during his thousand days in office as President that he and Premier Khrushchev made their most significant contribution to the international community, preventing an escalation to a potential nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis. This crisis brought the world closer to the launching of a nuclear engagement and war than at any other point in military history.

\textsuperscript{168} Gallup, “Presidential Job Approval Ratings While in Office vs. Retrospective Job Approval Ratings,” \url{http://www.gallup.com/poll/124922/Presidential-Approval-Center.aspx}, date of access: September 5, 2013.
How a political leader assimilates and analyzes all the domestic and foreign variables in a political crisis gets to the focus of this facet of the study: the leaders operational code. In order to provide insight into whether coercive diplomacy will be effective in a crisis situation, one must look at how the political leader will act or respond when faced with certain types of situations. This study contends that the analysis must account for the leader’s cognitive and affective influences which are formed through their cultural background, education, economic status and life experiences. These factors together formulate the operational code which guides a political leader’s decision making process in a crisis. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was quoted as saying that, “[t]he convictions that leaders have formed before reaching high office are the intellectual capital they will consume as long as they continue in office.”

Kissinger was referring to a leader’s operational code. In order to appreciate the nuances and factors intervening and surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis, one needs to delve into the life experiences which formed John F. Kennedy, his family, cultural upbringing, education, social and economic standing, as well as his personal and professional expectations, successes and failures.

Kennedy overcame many hurdles, obstacles and misperceptions on the road to the White House. The operational code as one of the prongs of the analytical framework in this study allows the political actors to gain greater insight into the man and his persona in the political arena, his actions serving as a head of state, and how his decision making was impacted by the era in which he lived.

---

and also by his family. Kennedy was an individual constantly challenged by his family’s expectations, his poor health, and his own personal beliefs and aspirations during politically tumultuous times. Kennedy’s family was driven by the devastating famine that had detrimentally impacted Ireland in the 1840s and resulted in JFKs grandparents fleeing the hardships of Ireland to the United States in search of a better life. JFKs grandparents settled in Boston, Massachusetts where they settled in a community that was overtly entrenched with anti-Irish Catholic sentiments. Just as most immigrants aspired to when coming to the United States, JFKs grandparents traveled to the new world to better their economic situation. Their efforts paved the way for the Kennedy family’s success in both business and politics.

JFK’s father, Joseph Kennedy, was the family catalyst that would achieve great financial wealth and high political offices. John F. Kennedy lived in a chaotic period in American history intertwined with the height of the Cold War, the expansion of Communism, civil rights and the potential for nuclear war. This political backdrop, coupled with the influence of the Kennedy family on JFK throughout his upbringing, along with the infusion of his own operational code will serve to provide more insight into the decision making process during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Indeed, the compartmentalization and control centric environment in which JFK was raised is why he called for a collegial environment for the decision making process in the White House, and how ultimately this framework facilitated the flow of intelligence to facilitate a better informed decision making process.
John F. Kennedy was born into a life of privilege. Kennedy was the second son born to Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. (1888 – 1969) a prominent government official and businessman and his wife Rose Fitzgerald, the eldest child of John “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald, a prominent Boston political figure who had served for three terms as a member of Congress and was the city’s mayor. Kennedy was born on May 29, 1917 while the family resided at 83 Beals Street in Brookline, Massachusetts. Kennedy’s ancestry from both sides of his family was Irish. His great-grandparents who had worked on farms had all emigrated from Ireland to Massachusetts in the 1840s to escape the Irish famine.

Joe Kennedy, however, was not a first generation immigrant, nor was his father, P.J. Kennedy. Joseph Patrick Kennedy, Sr., JFK’s father, was born in Boston and the eldest son of Patrick Joseph “P.J.” Kennedy and Mary Augusta Hickey. Joe Kennedy’s privileged situation had no connection with the modest and humble circumstances of his grandfather or with Ireland’s potato famine that had initially prompted so many Irish to migrate to America. Instead, he was born into a highly sectarian society where the Boston upper echelons of society excluded the Irish Catholics who were considered inferior to the Protestant upper class. Although immigrants in general faced adversity and some level of discrimination when they came to America, as he progressed up the social echelons in Boston, Joe Kennedy would cite his Irish heritage with much pride when it suited his purposes, but in the same vein he would demean the Irish at
public functions, such as the St. Patrick’s Day Dinner sponsored by the Irish Clover Club, where he said that too many Irish did not have the “family tradition adequate to win the respect and confidence of their Puritan neighbors.” In order to have relevance in the marginalizing Boston society, P.J. Kennedy, John Fitzgerald Kennedy’s grandfather, and numerous other Irish relatives became extremely proactive in the Democratic Party to have a voice in local politics.

As a result of his involvement in politics, P.J. gained influence in Boston and established successful saloons along with lucrative business investments that enabled him to provide his family with a very comfortable home and living. P.J. Kennedy served five terms as a Massachusetts state representative and then was elected to the Massachusetts Senate. His career progressed by becoming city wire commissioner for three terms, who was responsible for electrifying the city of Boston. P.J. had not only become very wealthy, but also very powerful politically. He was wise in his investments and his initial speculation into the Suffolk Coal Company paved the way for him to conquer the most untouchable territory of the Boston Brahmins, the banking industry. His founding of several financial institutions laid the groundwork for his son, Joseph, to eventually acquire his first job at a bank. The political career of P.J. was not free from corruption. He was able to continue getting reelected to key political positions through the support of a political machine imbedded in Boston’s Democratic Party and entrenched in political favors. Indeed, P.J. Kennedy, although cultivating the image of a quiet man, was known to his inner circle as a

---

man who had a vicious side with a ruthless temperament. P.J. Kennedy has been called an old-time politician who can be compared to Robin Hood.

“He was a Robin Hood type. Take care of the poor, give them Christmas baskets, take care of everybody, while at the same time he robbed everybody blind for their influence.... P.J. was very entrepreneurial. He made money on contracts. They didn’t have all these laws on ethics. He had a lot of contracts to give out on construction. He could do all types of favors and add on extras. He electrified Boston and robbed the city blind.”

This is the example P.J. Kennedy set for his son Joseph throughout his life. Joseph, however, would eventually want much more than money, he yearned and lusted for influence and power.

Joseph “Joe” Kennedy, Sr. was able to attend private schools and got to know some of the children of Boston high society that had initially ostracized his parents. With both of his parents being high achievers, they were determined that their son would be on equal footing with the Protestants that dominated Boston society. It was decided that he should attend the Boston Latin School, instead of Catholic school, where he would be surrounded by the children of the Boston society who had tried to impede their social progress. Joe Kennedy attended the Boston Latin School where even though he was a below average student, he was extremely popular among his classmates, eventually playing on the school’s

---

171 Kessler, 8-9.
172 Kane Simonian, a former executive director of the Boston Redevelopment Authority, as cited in Ronald Kessler’s, The Sins of the Father: Joseph P. Kennedy and the Dynasty He Founded, 11.
varsity baseball team and getting elected as class president. He was charismatic and had a booming, authoritative voice that led people to believe he knew what he was talking about, even if he didn’t.

Joe went on to attend Harvard College, just as his cousins had done before him. There he continued to focus on his political aspirations by becoming a social leader on campus and diligently working and maneuvering to gain acceptance into the prestigious Hasty Pudding Club, the oldest collegial social club in America. Members of this exclusive club must undergo a vetting process comprised of a series of gatherings, lunches, ad cocktail parties, referred to as the “punch process”, where members have the opportunity to scrutinize potential future initiates. Former members of the Hasty Pudding Club include five former U.S. Presidents: John Adams, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and John F. Kennedy. Even though Joe Kennedy also played on the baseball team and joined the Delta Epsilon International fraternity, he was still blackballed from the elite men only Porcellian Club. This club is considered one of Harvard’s most exclusive societies often compared to Princeton’s Ivy League, Yale’s Skull and Bones, Dartmouth’s Sphinx, and England’s Cambridge’s Pitt Club and university of Oxford’s Gridiron Club. The Club had the unwritten canon or urban legend that if a member does not earn their first million by the age of 40,

---


then the club will give it to them. Joe Kennedy had aspired to make acceptance into this elite club mark of his approval into Boston Brahmin society. Instead he ultimately realized that he was ostracized from this inner circle and that none of the Catholics he knew at Harvard had been selected either.

Indeed it was Joseph Kennedy’s staunch Irish Catholicism that forged his determination towards the next steps in achieving his goals. He married Rose Elizabeth Fitzgerald who was the eldest daughter of John Francis “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald and Mary Josephine “Josie” Harmon. Honey Fitz had been his father’s P.J.’s rival on the Boston political scene. The marriage of Joe Kennedy and Rose Fitzgerald produced nine children: Joseph Patrick “Joe” Kennedy Jr., John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Rose Marie “Rosemary” Kennedy, Kathleen Agnes “Kick” Kennedy, Eunice May Kennedy, Patricia Helen “Pat” Kennedy, Robert Francis “Bobby” Kennedy, Jean Ann Kennedy, and Edward Moore “Ted” Kennedy (see chart below).

---


176 Maier, 72.

177 Kessler, “Prologue.”
Joe Kennedy, although a bountiful provider for his family, was also known for his extra marital dalliances through his marriage. Joe’s affairs ranged from a highly publicized affair with actress Gloria Swanson to a long time affair with his Hyannis Port secretary, Janet Des Rosiers, who was described as well-sculpted and green-eyed beauty who was his mistress for over nine years. Indeed, affairs had plagued Joe Kennedy and would also cast a shadow throughout JFK’s political career.

---

178 Kessler, Figure 8 contained in “Prologue.”
179 Kessler, 2 and 247.
180 Kessler, 2.
After graduating from Harvard, P.J. got his son a job as a state bank examiner where he first ventured into learning about financial and banking affairs. In later years, mentions by business associates were made that Joe Kennedy learned how to steal from banks because he had learned that the epicenter for financial success was to learn the business from the inside. What Joe had not learned at Harvard, he quickly grasped through his foray in to the financial industry itself. Joseph Kennedy embarked on a business career in finance, using his personal, academic and political connections to make a large fortune as a stock broker and commodity investor and by venturing into the real estate market as well as a variety of other industries.

Political clout always served the Kennedy family well. With World War I already underway, the government had already announced plans to draft young men in the event that the United States entered into the war. The message was stern with a warning issued on August 4th, 1917, that resisters against the draft would be executed. Joe Kennedy had no intention of being drafted to fight in the war even though most of his friends from Harvard had already volunteered to serve.\footnote{Kessler, 32.} Joe used an old connection to facilitate his being drafted to serve in the war. Guy Currier was a well-connected Boston lawyer dabbled in the arts, architecture, and business ventures. Currier had the reputation of helping others who were starting out in their careers as a sense of obligation to assist others as he himself had been helped when he first started.\footnote{Kessler, 31.} Indeed, it was Currier who
was who was working as a lobbyists for the Bethlehem Ship-Building Corporation at Fore River in Quincy, Massachusetts that brokered a position for Joe even though he knew nothing about ship building. By leveraging the political clout that Joe’s father, Mayor Fitzgerald had, Currier highlighted that the Mayor would be appreciative if they would hire his son-in-law. As a result, Joe was hired as an assistant general manager and developed a personal friendship with Franklin D. Roosevelt who was the then Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Towards the end of summer in 1933, sufficient states had ratified the amendment repealing Prohibition ensuring that the sales of liquor would now be legal in the United States. During Prohibition, Joe had entrenched himself in politicking the Washington apparatus by procuring permits to import significantly large quantities of Dewar’s Scotch whiskey and Haig & Haig Scotch whiskey (later known as Haig’s Pinch), to be sold as medicine for various ailments.\textsuperscript{183} The whisky imports were stockpiled in warehouses across the northeast United States so when Prohibition ended Joe would have a large quantity of high-quality liquor to immediately make available to a welcoming public. When Prohibition ended in 1933, Kennedy amassed an even larger fortune by traveling to Scotland with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s son, James Roosevelt to secure the distribution rights for Scotch whiskey in the United States. Somerset Importers, Joe’s company, became the exclusive agent in the United States for the distribution of Dewar’s Scotch whiskey and Gordon’s Gin. As a means to the legitimization of this business line, Kennedy also purchased the importation rights for spirits from

\textsuperscript{183} Kessler, 104-105.
a Canadian firm in Canada, Schenley Industries. He expanded his business holdings by purchasing the largest office building in the country, Chicago’s Merchandise Mart, which allowed him to establish and important political and commercial operating base in that city, which in turn fostered an alliance with the Irish-American political leadership there. This business engagement would later serve to cultivate political support in the Midwest for his son’s, JFK, political aspirations to the White House.

With his business ventures succeeding and growing, Joseph and Rose Kennedy maintained several homes in the Boston area, the suburbs of New York, Hyannis Port, Massachusetts, and Palm Beach, Florida. The success of Joe Kennedy and the fortune he massed was always cast with dark cloud because of the tactics he used in his business practices as well as his alleged links to underground figures. Although his fortune stemmed from commodities and stock market investments, as well as savvy ventures in the real estate market and other industries such as liquor, he never built a business from the ground up. He was known for his uncanny timing as both a buyer and seller of his investments which usually rendered a very profitable return on his investment. Indeed, money would become the lubricant of the political machine in post war America and Joe Kennedy was very much aware of this reality.

Joe’s father, P.J. had been a strict disciplinarian throughout his life. A cold relationship had existed between father and son to the point where Joe never

---


185 Maier, 201-203.
displayed any warmth or affection towards his father. Even though Joe publicly spoke of highly respecting his father, he never attended his funeral, claiming business affairs in Hollywood with the movie star Gloria Swanson precluded him from being present. Joe had made huge profits from refinancing and reorganizing multiple Hollywood movie studios, ultimately merging several acquisitions into Radio-Keith-Orpheum (RKO) studies. These dealing led to his involvement on the Hollywood scene. The relationship with his mother, on the other hand, was extremely warm and affectionate. Father and son outwardly were physical opposites. P.J. looked and acted like a ruffian, whereas Joe had a more refined and intellectual appearance. More often than not he had a broad smile which seemed to be painted on his face and was at times infectious. However, Joe like his father P.J., both shared the volatile Irish temper which they used to coerce, and employ to get what they wanted. A confidant said that:

“When Joe talked with you, he didn’t converse with you. He intimidated you. Joe would always put people on the defensive. He would come in and say something or ask a question so you had to justify yourself.”

Joe Kennedy was proud of his aggressive demeanor and how he had used his outwardly appealing façade to coercing people, business associates, politicians, and even his family into seeing his way. He especially enjoyed demonstrating his powerful and threatening character to his own children. Joe had sent his son

---

186 Kessler, 13-14.
187 Kessler, 13.
Teddy Kennedy a photograph of himself when he was about seven years old. Joe made it a point to write in the note attached to the photograph that what he would like for Teddy to observe were his piercing eyes, the very set jaws, and his clenched left fist noting sarcastically and proudly that maybe all of that meant something.\textsuperscript{188} Joseph Kennedy’s role as a patriarch and architect of today’s most powerful political dynasty was a methodical and calculated path filled with intimidation, bullying, political connections and financial influence.

Indeed, this gets to the heart of how the background of any individual affects the manner in which decisions are made later in life. The Kennedy household from, P.J. and cascading down to Joe was one of strict discipline intertwined with an insatiable drive for power and success in terms of political notoriety and financial realization. However, this behavior does not negate the influence their Irish heritage had on their lives and their sense of family. In spite of this drive for achievement, the Kennedy’s sense of belonging to something greater than themselves was defined by the dedication to their family unit and their overcoming the prejudices they had faced because of their Irish roots and Catholic beliefs. P.J. Kennedy was known as a strict disciplinarian who at times bullied and kept his family at bay in order to rise above the limitations Boston society placed on them. The lack of a warm relationship between Joe and his father P.J. as a result of his terse nature was a known fact, even to the point of Joe not attending his father’s funeral. Psychologists have asserted that bullies often exhibit the same type of behavior which they themselves experienced. Many have argued that Joe Kennedy in turn drove his family in the same manner

\textsuperscript{188} Kessler, 14.
as his father in order to fulfill their family dream of acceptance into the mainstream circles of society, having open political power, financial solidarity and respect among his peers.

**JFK: Family, Early Life and Education**

It was Joe Kennedy’s ambition for acceptance into society, and his business and political achievements that drove Joseph P. Kennedy to establish what many have come to know as American royalty, a political dynasty that would produce the first Catholic president, three senators, three congressmen, ambassadors, an attorney general, and senior government officials. Joe Kennedy guided his sons’ political and personal destinies. Although Joe Kennedy spent much time apart from his family, he saw his children as extensions of himself and the personal goals that he himself wanted to achieve. Joe Kennedy would vicariously relish those achievements through his children. Operating behind the scenes, and sometimes at the forefront of the political arena, Joe Kennedy furnished the monetary support and critical connections both internal and external to the government to enhance their political aspirations.

It was this lifetime of political and personal orchestration and manipulation of fate that molded JFK’s operational code. It was the exposure to Joe Kennedy’s hard-nosed drive for power, his personal relationship with Pope Pius XII, and the family tradition of navigating a cultural divide between the Irish roots and humble beginnings to the precarious acceptance into Boston Brahmin society and politics.

---

that shaped JFK. However, JFK was also driven by the loyalty to family which
was instilled by his mother Rose Kennedy. Indeed, JFK was also shaped by the
gentle and shy nature of his mother, infused with a deep curiosity and
remarkable courage which would serve and the cornerstone for his life.\textsuperscript{190} This
upbringing forms the integral foundation of JFK’s operational code which
becomes ingrained within their personality and will influence the compass of
decision making. How JFK reacted to his upbringing is what ultimately impacted
how he would deal with critical political events throughout his presidency.
Jacqueline Kennedy reflected on the life of her husband stating that “history
made him, this lonely, sick boy. His mother never loved him. History made Jack,
this little boy reading history.”\textsuperscript{191} John Fitzgerald Kennedy was born into an
American dynasty that afforded him a privileged childhood. Along with privilege
however, came the expectation that he would remain strong to achieve his
father’s goals in spite of much adversity.

JFK was born in Brookline, Massachusetts on May 29, 1917 at the home
located at 83 Beals Street. He was the second son born to Joe Kennedy, Sr. and
Rose Fitzgerald. The Kennedy family lived at the Brookline address for ten years
where he attended the Edward Devotion School, Noble and Greenough Lower
School, and then the Dexter School through the 4\textsuperscript{th} grade.\textsuperscript{192} It was then that the
Kennedy family moved to 5040 Independence Avenue in Riverdale, Bronx, New

\textsuperscript{190} Giglio, 3.

\textsuperscript{191} Theodore H. White, notes scribbled by White during an interview with Jacqueline
Kennedy, November 29, 1963, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{192} “John F. Kennedy: Miscellaneous Biographical Information,” John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library & Museum, Boston, Massachusetts.
York City in 1927. A couple of years later the family moved to 294 Pondville Road, in Bronxville, New York, where JFK became of member of the Scout Troop. Unlike popular belief, JFK spent his early childhood in New York City. He spent summer breaks with his family at their home in Hyannisport, Massachusetts, and then Christmas and Easter holidays would be spent with his family at their winter home in Palm Beach, Florida. For the remainder of his primary school education, from the 5th through the 7th grade, JFK attended a private school for boys, the Riverdale Country School. Then in September 1930, JFK who was 13 years old attended the Canterbury School in New Milford, Connecticut for 8th grade. However, in late April 1931, JFK had to withdraw from Canterbury because he required an emergency appendectomy and recuperated at home. This episode would mark the first of many impacting the poor health of JFK throughout his life. JFK suffered throughout most of his childhood and life with chronic health issues.

During JFK’s childhood, he was effected not only by his ill health, but also by his mother’s immersion in her religion to help her cope not only with her children’s illnesses, but also with her husband Joe’s engrossment in business affairs and his decadent social life. Through her deep belief in Catholicism, Rose found an avenue to cope with her challenges as a mother caring for Rosemary who suffered from mental retardation, and her son Jack whose health was fragile from birth. The primary physician who cared for the Kennedy children,

---


194 Maier, 75-76.
Dr. L. Emmet Holt, frowned upon all signs of affection by parents upon their children because he was wary of contagious diseases. Rose, who had been raised with a life of self-sacrifice and self-denial in the Sacred Heart Convents where she had been educated, found validation in her cold and distant demeanor towards her children. Through this combination of religious and medical forces, did Rose embrace motherhood “as an emotionally reserved parent who would love her children, but as she was told, in the distant manner that all good mothers should demonstrate.”

It was after the birth of their fourth child, Kathleen, that JFK became deathly ill with scarlet fever. Joe Kennedy came to the realization that his marriage was in trouble due to his dalliances and his wife’s decision to distance herself from him was already a concern in his life, but the possibility of losing his second son Jack was more of a burden that he could bear. The cold, hard-nosed businessman, Joe Kennedy, was now seen going to church during the middle of the day to pray that God might spare his son Jack. This was a time when historians feel that Joe became most human in appreciating how delicate life could truly be considering he always thought himself invincible after having achieved such a high degree of political power.

John Kennedy later went to the Choate School, a private boarding school in Connecticut for during his high school years. JFK’s older brother had been attending Choate for two years when JFK enrolled and he had already made his mark as an exceptional student and formidable athlete. JFK struggled with the frustration of living in his brother’s shadow for most of his life and his father’s

---

195 Maier, 76-77.
molding of his brother to be the next jewel in the Kennedy family crown. John F. 
Kennedy was faced with a lonely life at boarding school where he was constantly 
being compared to his older brother, Joe, and constantly battled medical 
problems which could not be successfully treated. In time the headmaster of 
Choate, the boarding school JFK attended in Wallingford, Connecticut realized 
that Jack Kennedy was just the opposite of his brother.

JFK very quickly set on his own path of making his mark at Choate but 
one that gained him the reputation of being a troublemaker. He quickly changed 
from being a lonely and often vulnerable boy in the shadow of his older brother, 
to a rebellious ringleader known for outrageous shenanigans. The headmaster 
of Choate, George St. John, considered JFK and his band of troublemakers with 
a bad attitude and labeled them as bad apples and “muckers.” The Choate 
School antics led to JFK and his group of merry men becoming part of the 
“Muckers Club” which included his roommate and friend Kirk LeMoyne “Lem” 
Billings, who would be part of his political life for many years to follow. Lem 
Billings also had an older brother whose shadow he lived in while at Choate. It 
was this common element that drew both JFK and Billings together during their 
years at Choate.

The “mucker” label which he hung on the Kennedy-Billings gang took on 
several connotations. The first being someone who takes important matters too 
lightly, or who mucks about to no particular purpose. In this instance, he viewed 
the Kennedy-Billings gang as a group of students who mocked the time honored 

---

traditions of Choate School and its standards of decency, sportsmanship, cleanliness, politeness and most importantly respect for the leadership at Choate. The second meaning of a “mucker” is one that would have been very familiar to an Irish Catholic boy from Boston. In Boston, the term “mucker” was one who deals in muck, or mud, to a derogatory term applied to Irish-Americans who worked shoveling horse manure from the city streets during the age of horse-drawn carriages.\textsuperscript{197} This term “mucker” was applied in a disparaging manner to the immigrant Irish. JFK, who was proud of his Irish Catholic heritage, took the nickname thrust upon them by the headmaster as a personal insult and prompted JFK and his roommate, Lem Billings who were already known as Choate’s Public Enemies Number One and Two, to bring to life the offensive nickname. JFK, Lem Billings and their band of followers filled the dining hall that had been prepared for an important school dance with manure. This act of rebellion prompted the headmaster to propose the students’ expulsion from the exclusive school. Joe Kennedy, Sr. intervened and the students were not expelled.\textsuperscript{198}

The many acts of rebellion JFK committed during his stay at Choate only served to fuel a sense of defiance and strength in JFK that would define him throughout his political career. During his time at Choate, JFK was impacted by health problems which ultimately resulted in his hospitalization at the Yale – New Haven Hospital in 1934. He eventually graduated from Choate in June 1935 and in spite of his reckless antics, his classmates voted JFK the student most likely to

\textsuperscript{197} Matthews, 20.

\textsuperscript{198} Matthews, 21-22.
succeed which he ultimately did. Immediately after graduation, Joe had arranged for JFK to follow in the path of his brother, Joe, Jr. and was to study at the London School of Economics. Once again, his health dominated his plans and he was forced to return to the United States in 1935 where for a short time he was enrolled at Princeton University. Again he took ill and was hospitalized in Boston for gastric ailments. After his release JFK traveled south and convalesced at the family’s winter home in Palm Beach. Later in the spring of 1936, JFK went with his older brother to the Jay Six Cattle Ranch outside Benson, Arizona where he worked as a ranch hand herding cattle on the 40,000 acre ranch.

JFK continued his education after his health became more stable. He enrolled at Harvard College in September of 1936. He tried to integrate himself on campus by trying out for several sports teams, football, and golf and eventually earned a spot on the university’s varsity swimming team. It was during these college years that JFK was first exposed to the political arena. Joe Kennedy was serving as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s U.S. Ambassador to the Court of St. James, at the U.S. Embassy in London and sailed with JFK and brother, Joe Jr. to England in June 1938. This exposure to international relations in Europe instilled a deep curiosity in JFK. As a result, JFK prepared for his senior honors thesis at Harvard by touring Europe in 1939, visiting the Soviet Union, the Balkans, the Middle East, Czechoslovakia and Germany before returning to London on September 1, 1939, the day Germany invaded Poland.

The Kennedy family was in the House of Commons for speeches endorsing the United Kingdom’s declaration of war on Germany. JFK witnessed
firsthand the anxiety and tribulations the impact the declaration of war had on England would have on a nation. JFK was then sent by his father, the Ambassador, as his representative to assist with the arrangements for American survivors of the SS Athenia, when on September 3rd it became the first British ship that Nazi Germany sank in the Second World War. The sinking was condemned as a war crime and 128 civilian passengers and crew were killed, 28 of which were Americans.¹⁹⁹ This was the first political mission JFK undertook at the young age of 22.²⁰⁰

**JFK: A Veiled Medical History**

What is apparent in the literature on John Kennedy is that for all of his apparent vitality as an adult, it was his extraordinary force of will that enabled him to endure a lifetime plagued by health and back problems.²⁰¹ Indeed, JFK was a man who surpassed poor health throughout his life to become a war hero, congressman, senator, and ultimately the President of the United States. Since childhood, JFK was held captive to medical procedures, tests and lengthy hospitalizations trying to diagnose what was wrong with him.²⁰² In fact, due to his many maladies medical specialists were unable to determine the causes of his illnesses as a child and young adult.

---


²⁰⁰ Dallek, 54.

²⁰¹ Matthews, 25-27.

²⁰² Matthews, 18.
JFK was the youngest man ever elected to be president of the United States. Throughout his political career and the campaign trail leading to his election as president, JFK was always portrayed as the epitome of youth, vitality and vigor. In reality, the opposite was in fact the case. For all the apparent vitality that JFK exhibited as an adult, projecting an image of sheer will and determination, in reality he was plagued by lifelong crippling pains in back and his stomach. By learning to cope with his severe health conditions, JFK learned early in his youth how to separate his life into guarded compartments, most notably his private health impacted existence, and his ‘public’ persona which later would cultivate the charisma and sense of self-assurance for which is known. His self-confidence triggered his risk-taking tendencies which in turn nurtured his innate leadership and political ability.

Details of JFK’s true medical condition were not publicly disclosed during his lifetime.\textsuperscript{203} JFK had the most complex medical history of anyone serving as president.\textsuperscript{204} Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Ted Sorenson, American historians and advisors to JFK during his presidency, were both able to intimately chronicle from a personal vantage point the significant health issues that impacted JFK not only personally, but also his political career. As a child JFK suffered through illnesses ranging from scarlet fever and diphtheria to acute appendicitis and a chronic

\textsuperscript{203} Dallek, 475-476.

stomach trouble. In addition JFK’s left leg was three-quarters of an inch shorter than his right.

As an adult, JFK’s health was hampered by severe diseases. During his first term in Congress, he was diagnosed at 30 with a rare endocrine disorder, Addison’s disease. This was after having undergone an unsuccessful spinal operation to help alleviate the pressure and chronic lower back pain. The severe medical history continued in 1951 when JFK while on an official Congressional trip to Asia nearly died from a bout with hepatitis. Later in 1966, the White House physician revealed that when JFK was a senator he had also suffered from hypothyroidism. The presence of Addison’s disease and hypothyroidism, both endocrine diseases, have lead medical experts to raise the possibility that JFK may have actually suffered from autoimmune polyendocrine syndrome which detrimentally impacts the autoimmune system and can have secondary symptoms.

The therapies prescribed to JFK in order to deal with these diseases have been attributed to his mood swings especially during high stress periods in his political career. JFK’s conditions, ranging from his severe chronic back pain to his endocrine diseases, prompted his physicians to prescribe different courses of treatment which historians have argued could potentially have had diplomatic repercussions, even though there have been no direct examples of impaired judgment as a result his medications. In spite of his many medical ailments and

---


conditions, including his severe chronic back problems, JFK conveyed an image of good health, stamina and vigor that masked the true state of his health to the public. Later his brother, Robert Kennedy, noted that those who knew JFK intimately throughout his life would become aware of his painful episodes and suffering when his demeanor would change reflecting a pale face and a sharp tongue in expressing himself which was unusual for the usually charismatic Jack Kennedy. In spite of his many ailments, JFK loved life too much to complain and he would attempt to display his charm and joyful nature, carefully guarding whatever pain he was feeling.

JFK: A Military Hero

JFK was a reflection of his times. For JFK it was bringing his two distinct worlds into one sphere of influence. Although his childhood had been overcast with bedridden periods of illness, he escaped his reality by voraciously reading and living vicariously through the pages of the books. The other JFK was the charming son of Ambassador Joe Kennedy who felt at ease in the political arena. He felt drawn to public service, especially to the military because he could prove to himself that he was as good as his older brother Joseph Kennedy, Jr. who was training to be a Navy pilot. Being raised in an elite family, he and his older brother both sought to demonstrate their resolve for public service in such times of


208 Schlesinger, 97.
uncertainty.\textsuperscript{209} In spite of his desire to serve in the military along with his brother and friends, being accepted into the military also proved a challenge for JFK.

JFK's medical ailments followed him into military service. He first attempted to join the Army but was medical disqualified due to his severe lower back problems. He had attempted to join the Navy also but was also rejected because of health reasons. JFK was determined to serve in the military so he went on an intensive exercise regime to help him overcome the bad back problems that have prevented him from passing his medical examinations. His family physician placed him on an exercise program focusing on strength, balance and coordination through weight training and cardio/respiratory endurance. After having strengthened his physical condition, JFK was able to pass the physical examination on the second try. However, in spite of having passed, he also had to use the influence of the then Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence who had previously been a naval captain serving at the Naval Attaché at the London Embassy while his father Joe had been Ambassador.\textsuperscript{210}

JFK was appointed an Ensign in the U.S. Naval Reserve in October 1941 and was immediately assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI).

JFK’s assignment to the ONI staff would be key in developing the skillsets he applied during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During his tenure at ONI, JFK learned the critical skills involved with intelligence gathering and analysis. JFK delved into

\textsuperscript{209} Mathews, 41-43.

the world of intelligence by preparing intelligence bulletins, threat assessments, and briefing information for the Secretary of the Navy and other senior leadership both internal to the Navy, as well as cross disciplinary briefings to other branches of the military. He was later assigned to the ONI field office in the Sixth Naval District in Charleston, South Carolina. JFK then attended the Naval Reserve Officers Training School at Northwestern University in Chicago, Illinois and subsequently went to the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron Training Center in Rhode Island. JFK was quickly promoted to the rank of Lieutenant, Junior Grade. His received his first leadership assignment as the Commanding Officer of a motor torpedo boat.

In 1943, during World War II, Kennedy was the commanding officer of patrol torpedo (PT) boat 109 patrolling the waters and conducting night operations in the Pacific Theater near the Solomon Islands to interdict the heavy Japanese traffic attempting to resupply the Japanese garrisons. While on patrol in August JFK of 1943 the Japanese destroyer Amagiri inadvertently cut PT 109 in half killing two of the crewmen and severely injuring others, including JFK who was thrown into the cockpit on his back. In spite of his injuries, JFK lead the 10 survivors and swam to a small island almost three miles away from the wreck site. JFK, despite the severe reinjuring to his back during the collision, towed a severely burned crewman through the water for all three miles with the strap of his life jacket in his teeth until they reached a deserted island. Kennedy and a friend of his, Ensign George H.R. Ross, who had joined the crew of the PT 109 the night before the crash when his own ship had been damaged, towed the

---

211 “Lieutenant John F. Kennedy,” Department of the Navy.
wounded man and led the surviving crewmembers to the first deserted island, and then to a second island from where they were all eventually rescued. JFK was awarded the Navy and Marine Corps medal for his heroic actions in the rescue of the crew of PT109, as well as the Purple Heart Medal for the injuries he sustained in the accident on August 1, 1943. JFK served on active duty until October 1944 and finally retired from the U.S. Naval reserve on physical disability in March 1945. By serving in the military, JFK proved to himself that he was able to survive on a level playing field. He rose to the challenge of the Navy, faced death and adversity and survived. The confidence that emanated from his years in the military stayed with him throughout his political career and gave him the sense of perseverance.

**JFK: Politics and the Presidency**

After leaving the military in 1945, Joe Kennedy used his connections and arranged a position for JFK with William Randolph Hearst a special correspondent for Hearst Newspapers. This position and the accessibility to international political events it facilitated kept JFK in the public eye and the possibility of a career in journalism. One of his first assignments was as a correspondent covering the Potsdam Conference and other related events in Europe. Although JFK enjoyed the excitement of journalism, he was drawn to public service as a product of the age in which he lived and the experiences to which he had been exposed. As a child, JFK was raised in a political family.

---

212 Dallek, 104.
driven into public service as a means into being accepted into Boston society. JFK quickly learned that the means to effect change was through political power.

JFK possessed the attributes and drive for public service that had been driven into him since childhood. Joe Kennedy had served as Ambassador to England and had exposed JFK to the international political arena during the first stages of World War II. The experiences JFK was exposed to before, during and after the war drove JFK into public service.\textsuperscript{213} Most significantly it was the personal experiences that most affected JFK, such as the death of his older brother, Joe Jr., and his brother in law.\textsuperscript{214} Joe Jr. had been shaped for public service by Joe Sr. and when he was killed in action in August of 1944 while detached to Operation Aphrodite shifted the family responsibility of entering into public service to JFK.\textsuperscript{215} This was not the only personal tragedy that JFK suffered. JFK’s brother in law, William “Billy” Cavendish, the Marquees of Hartington married his sister Kathleen in 1944. Kathleen, who decided to join the war effort again in 1943, had rejoined the Red Cross in London providing food, supplies and accommodations for officers. Just four short weeks after their marriage in London, Billy, Lord Harrington, a member of the British army was called to serve. He was killed in combat just four months after their wedding.\textsuperscript{216}


\textsuperscript{214} Schlesinger, 87.

\textsuperscript{215} Dallek, 118.

Kennedy was moved by his personal beliefs and wanted to dedicate himself to public service in a manner that would help a world in which so many people had died. His drive was not so much to save the world from itself, but rather prevent it from deteriorating any further. The path into public office for JFK was facilitated by his father. JFK’s first foray into the political arena was as a congressman in 1946 for the 11th Congressional District in Massachusetts. Joe Kennedy had convinced the incumbent congressman, James Michael Corley, to step down as U. S. Representative and become mayor of Boston. Joe Kennedy was effective at the political chess game, vacating one seat to be filled by another and repositioning the first politician into another strategic post. JFK ran successfully and served as a congressman defeating his opponent by a wide margin.

In 1948, however, JFK experienced the loss of another sibling. It was during his first congressional term that he learned of the death of his sister, Kathleen Kennedy Cavendish, Lady Harrington. After the death of her husband Billy Cavendish in combat, Kathleen remained in England returning to the Red Cross as a volunteer for a short time in the fall of 1944. After the war ended she returned to visit her family in the United States, but decided to return to London and live there permanently. Four years later in 1948 she died in a plane crash in France. JFK became more determined in all aspects of his life after his sister’s death. As a result of the many illnesses he had suffered throughout his life, he had become indifferent about being able to control his life. After having

undergone back surgery on two occasions along with the many health issues he suffered, JFK may have envisioned himself as living on borrowed time. After Kathleen’s death, a newfound ambition and drive fueled his political aspirations. He now aspired to achieve a much higher goal in his political career.\(^{218}\) In 1948, JFK went on to win the election again for U.S. Representative serving as a congressman for six years.

In 1952, JFK defeated the incumbent Republican Henry Cabot Lodge for one of the U.S. Senate seats from Massachusetts. JFK received significant support from his father and his network of political and business connections. Joe Kennedy knew that becoming a U.S. Senator was a direct path to the White House, an aspiration he was going to achieve for the Kennedy family name. It was during this election that rumors circulated that Joe Kennedy had infused the political election with so much money, that there was no way JFK could have lost the election for U.S. Senator.\(^{219}\) Joe Kennedy mobilized the Kennedy clan and got them entrenched into senatorial campaign for JFK. Joe Kennedy drew upon familial connections such as Bobby’s new father in law, a wealthy businessman from Connecticut, to raise critical funding for the campaign as well as using his own religious and business influences to secure his son’s election to the U.S. Senate.\(^{220}\) Joe Kennedy even procured the direct support of the White House when very prominently publicized photographs were taken of then President

\(^{218}\) Dallek, 154-155.


\(^{220}\) Maier, 244-245.
Harry S. Truman walking with JFK in the Boston Public Garden in October 1952 during the Kennedy Senate Campaign.\textsuperscript{221}

Indeed, political and monetary support was just one facet of Joe Kennedy’s approach to political success. He very much believed that the integration and unity of the family was the only means for a family to survive against adversity and the challenges life presents. Joe Kennedy highlighted during JFK’s political career that “…if you have your family with you, you have a head start on others who must rely on making friends.” This level of familial support emanating from Joe Kennedy provided the reassurance that the Kennedy clan needed to forge ahead in the political arena.

As JFK’s political path became clearer, he also focused on his personal life. The following year, he married Jacqueline Lee Bouvier. Jackie had first met JFK when she started her first job in the fall of 1951 as the "Inquiring Camera Girl" for the Washington Times-Herald newspaper.\textsuperscript{222} As a roving reporter, she took pictures of people she encountered around the city, asked questions on the issues of the day and wrote a newspaper column. Among those she interviewed for her column was Richard M. Nixon. Jackie also covered the first inauguration of Dwight D. Eisenhower and the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II. It was during this time that Jackie met John F. Kennedy, who was a congressman and soon to be elected a Senator from Massachusetts. They married in September 1953 at


St. Mary’s Church in Newport, Rhode Island. After their honeymoon in Mexico, the Kennedys returned to Washington D.C. JFK had found in Jackie a true partner with whom he shared a deep appreciation of politics, current events, and a mutual love of life.

Early on in their marriage, then Senator JFK, continued to suffer crippling pain in his back stemming from his football and wartime injuries and underwent two spinal operations. JFK had suffered from low back pain almost constantly. However a specific cause was never identified and a surgical cure not achieved, even after lumbosacral and left sacroiliac fusion surgery. Few were aware in 1954 of a post-operative coma and septicemia JFK suffered, during which he received last rites of the church. While recovering from surgery, Mrs. Kennedy encouraged him to write a book about several U.S. senators who had risked their careers to fight for the things they believed in. The book, called Profiles in Courage, was awarded the Pulitzer Prize for biography in 1957.

Kennedy was focused on rising to the next echelon of political power. He was next nominated for Vice President at the 1956 Democratic National Convention on a ticket with Democratic presidential nominee Adlai Stevenson. He lost, however the Democratic National Convention gave the Senator critical national exposure and paved the way for him run for the White House. JFK set his sights on the next test he would have to pass, the successful announcement

---


that he was running for President. In January 1960, JFK announced his candidacy for President. He did not lose confidence after having lost the nomination for Vice President at the Democratic National Convention. Instead he used the optimistic outlook and refocused his energy on his next goal – the presidency.

The road to the White House was not a smooth one for JFK especially when the issue of Catholicism was raised during the campaign. This was especially significant in West Virginia which was a key state that turned the tide of JFK’s campaign. West Virginia was a predominantly conservative Protestant state comprised for the most part of mine workers or a population connected with grass roots coal mining. JFK visited a coal mine in West Virginia where most of the constituency were conservative, Protestant and leery of a Catholic candidate. In spite of these obstacles, JFK was victorious in West Virginia and demonstrated he had the necessary appeal to cut across the diverse groups in the United States. JFK’s drive and focus during this campaign underscored his belief that the only qualification necessary for obtaining the most powerful job in the world was desiring it.\textsuperscript{225}

However, JFK grew into a true presidential candidate when he presented what would be a sample of his charismatic personality as president. JFK conveyed his acceptance speech at the Democratic National Convention with a sense of purpose and vision that had not been seen in recent years in other candidates. JFK delivered his famous “New Frontier” speech saying that:

\cite{225} Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 14.
“Today some would say that those struggles are all over – that all horizons have been explored – that all battles have been won – that there is no longer an American frontier… But I tell you that the New Frontier is here, whether we seek it or not. Beyond that frontier are unchartered areas of science and space, unsolved problems of peace and war, unconquered pockets of ignorance and prejudice, unanswered questions of poverty and surplus.

“For the harsh facts of the matter are that we stand on this frontier at a turning point in history. We must prove all over again whether this nation – or any national so conceived – can long endure; whether our society – with its freedom of choice, its breadth of opportunity, its range of alternative – can compete with the single-minded advance of the Communist system.”

With that speech, JFK underscored his interest and focus in foreign policy and the impact it could have on the United States, especially originating from the spread of Communism.

Indeed, the threat of Communism loomed over the presidential campaign between JFK and Nixon. JFK wanted to underscore that he had the wherewithal to engage in international relations and deal with the challenges being set forth by Communism. During the presidential campaign, JFK attacked Nixon by reminding campaign audiences that he “wasn’t the Vice President that had presided over the Communization of Cuba.” He further criticized Nixon by asking him that “if you can’t stand up to Castro, how can you be expected to stand up to Khrushchev?”

The zeal with which JFK presented himself during this exchange showed audiences that would take a more proactive approach in dealing with ideological challenges to the American way of life. Once again, the

---

226 Matthews, Jack Kennedy, 282-283.

227 Michael Grow, U.S. Presidents and Latin American Interventions: Pursuing Regime Change in the Cold War (Kansas City: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 47-49.
self-assuredness, charisma and confidence JFK exhibited during the campaign underscored to the American people that he would be able to fulfill the duties as President of the United States.

Historical writers have noted that underneath this mantle of self-confidence, however, there was a man who doubted his ability to have succeeded in politics without the happenstance factors which had impacted his life. JFK was always reflecting on his life as a series of accidents that had shaped his path in life, namely his father's father, the death of his brother Joe, Jr. and the close election that had edged out Nixon in the presidential race. If any of these “accidents” had not occurred, he probably would have never been elected president.\(^{228}\) Kennedy's extreme manner of approaching life with insatiable pleasure was always at odds with his deep rooted sense of pessimism always pondering the possibility of failing in life or being subjected to more tragedy.\(^{229}\) It was this attitude towards life and his behavior that would initially impact Khrushchev’s perception of JFK and guide how he would engage with him.

The 1960 Presidential campaign had focused not only on the Soviet threat and he spread of Communism, but the threat posed by the arms race and space race. The image of the United States as the superpower of the west was critical to JFK during his campaign. He wanted to underscore that although the U.S. was still the force to be contended with in the Cold War, it was at risk of losing its power and prestige if the Soviet threat was not put in check. The arms race and


\(^{229}\) Beschloss, 9.
the space race fueled the Cold War rivalry to new levels. The Soviet Union had always alleged their technological superiority.

JFK was sworn in as the 35th President of the United States on January 2, 1961. His election as the President inaugurated many ‘firsts’ in the history of the United States. JFK not only was the first Catholic and New Englander elected into the office, but he was also the first Senator nominated by the Democratic Party in over a hundred years and ultimately the first president elected from the Senate. Upon assuming his duties as President, JFK was confronted not only with public misperceptions surrounding his level of political experience and but also his lack of exposure to the international arena.

JFK also dealt with controversies surrounding his personal life. JFK early in his presidency was vulnerable to the shadows of his past which were comparable to the indiscretions committed by his father Joe Kennedy. Like his father, JFK, was exposed to allegations of political corruption and of extra-marital affairs. In spite of these concerns, JFK lived his life as if there would be no tomorrow. LeMoyne Billing, JFK’s longtime friend from the Choate School, was quoted as saying that after Kennedy experienced the loss of his sister Kathleen and had been living with his own fear of dying from Addison’s disease he felt that “there was no sense in planning ahead anymore. The only thing that made sense … was to live for the moment, treating each day as if it were his last, demanding of life constant intensity, adventure, and pleasure.” Even after he was serving


\[231\] Beschloss, 10. Note: JFK made similar comments to friends such as Priscilla Johnson Mc Millan, Ted Reardon, and Charles Spalding (Harvard friend).
as President, JFK was ingrained with a “tomorrow-we-die streak” which was manifested by his promiscuity with women and indifference to physical risk.\footnote{Beschloss, 10.}

It was the fear of appearing weak or hampered by personal challenges that drove JFK to constantly display an air of confidence that prompted a lack of fear in taking risks. He was also coping with his physical frailties which he never exposed publically. Accounts of Kennedy’s life reveal a consistent theme that JFK would always seek to present himself in the best possible light, no matter what personal tragedy he was suffering or what physical pain he was enduring. Indeed, JFK saw it as a sign of weakness to reveal to anyone how much pain he was enduring.\footnote{Sorensen, Kennedy, 97.} Indeed, Norman Mailer who had covered the Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles in 1960 observed that JFK appeared to have “the wisdom of a man who senses death within him and gambles that he can cure it by risking his life.”\footnote{Richard D. Mahoney, The Kennedy Brothers: The Rise and Fall of Jack and Bobby (New York: Arcade Publishing, 2011), 61-62.} Even if JFK exhibited an outward buoyancy, it was a façade that he maintained to cover a life which had been impacted by the deaths of his siblings and fellow soldiers, serving as a constant reminder of his own mortality.\footnote{Beschloss, 10.} It can be argued that it was this underlying fear of failure that later prompted JFK to attempt to bring the Cuban Missile Crisis to a peaceful resolution by collaborating with Khrushchev.
In an attempt to dispel these perceived weaknesses, JFK took a major risk and optimistically delivered a forceful inaugural address that set the roadmap for his administration, one that would have direct bearing on domestic policy as well as the foreign relations of the United States. JFK wanted to break away from previous administrations and optimistically embark on a new era for the country. His inaugural speech set the tone for Americans as well as those abroad in a thought-provoking call to arms. First he called spoke to the need for all Americans to be active citizens in this nation and challenged them by saying, “Ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.” In doing so he went beyond the borders of the United States and set the course for his administration by calling upon the nations of the world and asking them to fight together against what he viewed as the “common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease, and war itself.” His desire for greater international cooperation was further emphasized by calling out across borders and stating “whether [you] are citizens of America or citizens of the world, ask of us here the same high standards of strength and sacrifice which we ask of you.”

Kennedy wanted to portray a President that was self-assured and fearless. JFK believed that his rise to such a high office was principally the result of family interventions and accidental circumstances of fate. As such, he always

---

237 Ibid.
238 Ibid.
felt a looming fear of failure. To compensate for this anxiety, JFK would strive for perfection which was a trait that he learned from his father. Joe Kennedy contributed largely to the confidence displayed by JFK as well as his engaging character. His image always presented a meticulously dressed man that hid any signs of weakness, including not wearing eyeglasses in the public or in the presence of photographers. His drive for perfection most notable even extended to his public speeches and engagements prompting several Senators to comment that JFK was the only man who spoke in precise paragraphs without having a written text.  

JFK received his first intelligence briefing in November 1960 by CIA Director Allen Dulles and his Deputy for Operations, Richard Bissell. This initial briefed created great trepidation not only with JFK, but also with his father Joe Kennedy fearing what derogatory information may be presented at that briefing by Dulles. Joe Kennedy was keenly aware that his son’s presidential campaign had raised questions about his own reserve about Nazism while he was ambassador to England. In addition, if the voting public in America learned of the wartime romance that JFK had with suspected Nazi spy, Inga Arvad Fejos, credibility would be added to the suspicions raised by Jewish groups that he had inherited his father’s diffidence about the Nazi movement.

Dulles tasked CIA psychologists to conduct an in-depth assessment of Kennedy’s personality that was comprised of intelligence files dating to the

---

240 Beschloss, 102-103.
1930s, which also included information from British intelligence services
surveillance of Joseph Kennedy’s London Embassy, as well as his son’s wartime
service in the Navy.\textsuperscript{241} The psychological study was fused with additional
intelligence provided by J. Edgar Hoover, the Director of the F.B.I., which was
contained in the President’s FBI files. The FBI maintained information in addition
to the intelligence maintained in the CIA files that related to the 1942 affair JFK
had while he served in Naval Intelligence with a suspected Nazi spy, Inga Arvad
Fejos.\textsuperscript{242} This situation weighed heavily on both JFK and his father Joe Kennedy
who knew that information of this nature which was comprised of transcriptions of
telephone and hotel room conversations could potentially destroy JFK’s political
career. From Joe’s perspective, he would do anything to remove anything or
anyone that posed a threat to JFK’s political future and Inga Arvad Fejos was just
that.

Although they were adversaries, Joe Kennedy and J. Edgar Hoover were
two men that constantly used their connections and each other to further their
objectives. “Joe constantly praised Hoover as the finest public servant in the
land, while Hoover helped Joe with information about his enemies.”\textsuperscript{243} It was
Hoover himself that after hearing the conversations of the hotel room he had
ordered bugged where JFK and Arvad has spent the night, Hoover told Joe
Kennedy the very next morning that JFK was in trouble and he should get him

\textsuperscript{241} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{242} Beschloss, 103.
\textsuperscript{243} Kessler, 262-263.
out of Washington, D.C. immediately. In order to ensure that JFK would not continue the affair with Arvad, he used his influence to get him transferred to the South Pacific. Joe Kennedy contacted his friend, James V. Forrestal, then Undersecretary of the Navy, to facilitate the reassignment. Eventually the FBI closed its investigation against Arvad because there was nothing that directly implicated her in spying, but the alleged associations with Hitler and members of the Nazi party would have been enough to destroy JFK’s political aspirations. Once again, Joe Kennedy intervened to safeguard his son’s political career.

JFK followed his father’s lead in cultivating a working relationship with both Hoover, the Director of the FBI, and Dulles, the Director of the CIA. Joe Kennedy maintained a friendly association with Hoover and Dulles so that when JFK announced his candidacy he had cordial acquaintances in key government posts to safeguard the Kennedy dirty laundry. Once JFK was elected he was aware that as a sitting President he could exert some pressure on both men if they tried to leak any embarrassing secrets. However, for JFK, keeping Hoover as Director of the FBI translated into ensuring that the information relating to Inga Fejos was protected from public disclosure. This détente type of relationship was a key factor for the administration as intelligence reports were flowing into the White House describing the changing Soviet influence in Cuba and the potential for Cuba to become an imminent threat to the United States. JFK was a President that used his personal diplomatic skills, savvy political tactics and charming personality to achieve his goals. He was successful throughout his
political career by relying on these traits and they proved instrumental during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

**Section III: Nikita Khrushchev - The Operational Code of a Russian Premier**

Nikita Khrushchev brought a new flavor to the Soviet Union during a period of the Cold War that was surrounded by dramatic and pivotal twists of power while he was in office. Political power was highly centralized in the communist party and Khrushchev was responsible for retooling of the Stalin tyranny that had been entrenched in the Soviet Union since Joseph Stalin came to power. Although Khrushchev was a man that came from a peasant background, and although he had very little formal education, he rose through the ranks of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union during the regime of Joseph Stalin. Khrushchev was a colorful political figure that shaped the after emerging victorious in the power struggle that was triggered by Joseph Stalin. Khrushchev conspired and positioned himself to succeed Stalin as the Soviet leader after his death in 1953. He was a political figure that was immersed in controversy and contradictions. Stalin’s political dealings with the West were deep rooted in an environment of distrust and isolationism. The cold and aloof political environment which had been entrenched under Joseph Stalin was slowly reshaped under Khrushchev.

---

244 Bredhoff, 2.
Nikita Khrushchev was the catalyst that was responsible for several reforms that put a new face on the Communist Party. Although he relied on many of the same aggressive schemes to preserve his power, he was still able to seize the opportunity effect some change in the brutal Stalin regime. Khrushchev was responsible for the partial de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union. He also set a new pace for engagement in international politics, especially with the United States which was also reflected in the comparatively liberal reforms in various areas of domestic policy. Khrushchev was also a trailblazer in the support he gave at the inception of the Soviet space program which greatly helped advanced its progress. In implementing these reforms both domestically and especially internationally, Cuba presented to Khrushchev an opportunity to gain traction in Latin America to establish a strategic footing for Marxism-Leninism. Cuba’s strategic geographic location just south of the United States was the first step to strengthening the credibility if the Communist movement not only in the Americas, but also on a world wide scale. Even though Khrushchev’s political strategies failed to achieve the major goals he sought of innovating the Soviet Union and expanding Communism throughout Latin America, it can be argued that his strategy did pressure the West into limited agreements with the USSR.

---

245 Bredhoff, 2.

246 John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 206-211.
Khrushchev: His Family and His Roots

Nikita Khrushchev was born to a Russian peasant family on April 15, 1894. He was born in the Russian village of Kalinovka, in what is presently Russia’s Kursk Oblast situated close to border between Russia and Ukraine. His parents, Sergei Khrushchev and Ksenia Khrushcheva were both of poor peasant families who had worked in the fields. His godparents, who attended his christening in the village’s Archangel Church, were also poor peasants who strove to survive each day. Sergei and Ksenia had two children, Nikita and Irina, who was two years his junior. Khrushchev’s father, Sergei, advanced himself from a field laborer by working in several different trades in the Donbas area located in the far eastern area of Ukraine. Because the economic conditions were so severe, Sergei would leave his family in Kalinovka and venture to other areas, such as Donbas, to make enough money to support his family.  

Wages for laborers were much higher in the Donbas region of the Ukraine than in Russia’s Kursk region. He worked as a railway man, a miner, and eventually as a laborer in a brick factory. Khrushchev lived in Kalinovka until 1908 when his father moved the family to the mining town of Yuzovka in Eastern Ukraine. Yuzovka was at the heart of one of the most industrialized areas of the Russian Empire. However, Yuzovka was an industrialized are of Russia that was made so by a foreign built and foreign owned apparatus. As such, it was an area that promoted the gathering of the criminal elements and the dredges of the

---


248 Tompson, 30.
mining industry resulting in labor conditions that were brutal. Factory owners exploited the workers with minimal pay and the levying of fines for poor performance or unacceptable behavior at work. This environment instilled a culture of bribery, corruption and abuse. Miners were seen as socially ostracized because of the nature of their work and were treated with much disrespect.

Khrushchev who was only fourteen at the time had already established the desire to overcome the backwardness of the city, the mistreatment of its workers, and the dismal living conditions in which he was being raised. A key aspect of Khrushchev’s operational code is shaped by the poverty, misery and abuse of the workers he experienced throughout his children. It can be argued that these experiences triggered a willingness and overt desire in Khrushchev to help remedy and ameliorate the human condition that he had seen so detrimentally impacted in his childhood. Later in his political career, one of the major reforms Khrushchev focused on economic development and reform. He attempted to use his political power to remedy social injustices.

Khrushchev’s father first worked as a common laborer on the railroad tying railroad ties, leveling embankments, driving stakes, and digging drainage ditches. When the seasonal job on the railroad ended, he then worked in a brick factory. He learned to mix the clay for form the bricks and then lay them until he gained enough experience to work in the kiln, the chamber containing the ovens that hardened the bricks. This work was also seasonal and then Khrushchev’s father

\[^{249}\text{Tompson, 6.}\]
was forced to look for more work to support his family.\textsuperscript{250} Indeed, it was his life during these years in the mining town of Yuzovka that Khrushchev most remembers about his early childhood. Khrushchev described his father as a miner and not so much as a peasant.

The acquisition of land and horses were a primary focus of Khrushchev’s father, but that dream never came true. The key symbols of having a stable financial situation and gaining a certain level of social standing in the village was owning land and having horses. Nearly half of the village households owned at least one horse, but the poorest household owned neither land, nor a horse. This was Khrushchev’s family situation. It did not matter how many hours his father labored in the mines, not did it matter how much his mother struggled in the public washrooms because they were never able to achieve a respectable social standing. These hard years growing up as miner’s son in Kalinovka formed Khrushchev’s perspective as a leader of a workers’ state even though there were many aspects about life in this town that he chose to forget.\textsuperscript{251}

Khrushchev’s mother was a strong influence in his life. She was viewed as a determined and strong will woman who battled throughout her life.\textsuperscript{252} She harbored a contempt for Sergei Khrushchev and blamed him for the financial failures in their family. Her indifference towards her husband cultivated a cold relationship between Nikita and his father which grew most distant as he grew

\textsuperscript{250} Taubman, 23.
\textsuperscript{251} Taubman, 18.
\textsuperscript{252} Taubman, 24.
older. He was a favorite of his mother and Nikita grew to rely on his mother’s strength to survive in this difficult society. The irrelevance that Nikita Khrushchev became apparent in the formative years of his life because he would not consider his father’s advice. Sergei never shared a close father-son relationship with Nikita and had little significance in his son’s life thanks to the contempt his mother displayed towards him. In spite of this cold relationship, Sergei always wanted his son to succeed in life and his grandparents also fostered this supportive atmosphere. This level of support heightened Khrushchev’s motivation and ambition to grow beyond his family’s social standing. In addition, he always had the emotional support of his mother Ksenia who cherished her son and referred to him as “my son, the tsar” and later stated that she knew that “someday he would become a great man.”

Khrushchev: Education and Early Life

Nikita Sergeyevich Khrushchev’s early life was always a source of pride for him despite the financial challenges and lack of social standing. Indeed, throughout his public life, he never relinquished his association with his humble beginnings. He spent his boyhood in poverty, helping his family by working as a shepherd and later as a miner. Education was not a priority in the lives of Russian peasants because the true focus was fulfilling the basic needs for the family unit to survive. In 1881 only 46 out of the 922 adults living in the area of

---

[253 Taubman, 25.]

[254 Taubman, 21-22.]
Kalinovka were literate. Parents took their sons out of school to help their families plow the fields and work to help support the family. Schools in the area came in two varieties, schools run by zemstvos, local government agencies formed during the Great Reforms of the 1860s, and Orthodox Church parochial schools.\textsuperscript{255} Khrushchev attended both types of schools for a total of about two years.

As a result of the support given by Khrushchev’s father and grandparents, Nikita studied under teacher from the village who inspired him, Lydia Mikhailovna Shevchenko. She was the role model that inspired little Nikita to continue with his studies and go beyond the constraints of the village to the city where he could grow intellectually.\textsuperscript{256} Shevchenko, who was known to be an atheist and nonconformist in school, first introduced Khrushchev to the books and literature that were banned by the government. She introduced Khrushchev to the world of knowledge and education beyond the myopic views which were held by the villagers.

When Khrushchev was a little over fourteen years old, he had already worked in several jobs in the area. His parents found him a job as a metal fitter’s apprentice and when he completed the apprenticeship the teenage Khrushchev was eventually hired by a factory.\textsuperscript{257} He was invigorated by the skillsets she had developed during his apprenticeship and later when he was working at the

\textsuperscript{255} Taubman, 22.

\textsuperscript{256} Taubman, 24.

\textsuperscript{257} Tompson, 6-7.
factory. Khrushchev exhibited a positive attitude in his work and with his co-workers:

“... A fitter is to metals what a carpenter is to wood ... A lathe operator makes only single parts, while a fitter assembles all the parts and breathes life into the whole machine so that it begins to work.”

This perspective indicated that Khrushchev had an underlying spirit fit into a team that would work together to ‘breathe life into the whole machine.’ Khrushchev was content to be part of the workers’ team and he felt himself becoming an adult that was now legitimizing his image as a worker in the shops. This was part especially significant to Khrushchev because he saw himself as working in the clean shops, while his father Sergei had been a worker in the dirty mines.

Khrushchev pursued his hunger for knowledge and learning. He began reading the Bolshevik newspapers Pravda and Zveda. He fed his hunger for learning by reading extensively and then discussing political issues of the day with his coworkers. His zeal and passion for political dialogs made him popular among his co-workers and highly visible at the company. Khrushchev shared in his memoirs that his colleagues at work considered him a good public speaker and found him to be a courageous man advocating on behalf of the workers and their issues. Khrushchev recalled that:

“... the workers said I spoke well, and therefore they chose me as their spokesman before the owner when they wanted to obtain some improvement or benefit. They often sent me with ultimatums because they said I had the courage to stand up to the owner.”

---


259 Talbott, 7.

260 Talbott, 8.
What is significant to note is that Khrushchev was only fifteen years old at the time.

Khrushchev continued to develop himself politically eventually becoming an activist. He was fired from that job when he openly collected money for the displaced families of the victims of the Lena Goldfields Massacre. The Lena Gold Fields Massacre refers to the shooting of striking goldfield workers by soldiers of the Imperial Russian Army on April 17, 1912 in northeast Siberia near the Lena River. The incident took place at the goldfields of the Lena Gold Mining Joint Stock Company about 28 miles northeast of the town of Bodaybo in northern Irkutsk. The venture produced large profits for its British and Russian shareholders. Working conditions were harsh with miners having to work fifteen to sixteen hours a day. For every thousand workers, there were more than 700 accidents, along with meager salaries and scarce supplies which the workers were forced use their coupons at the mine store. All this led a spontaneous strike, which was also prompted by the distribution of rotten meat at one of the company supply stores. The strikers were met by soldiers, who began shooting at the crowd resulting in hundreds of dead and wounded.

Thousands of employees and their family members abandoned the goldfields and were displaced. Khrushchev was so moved by the level of injustice and cruelty against these workers and their families that he began collecting money and supplies for them. The chief of the provincial gendarmerie

---

261 Taubman, 37-38.
had received reports that Khrushchev was among those that had been collecting donations for the families who had lost their loved ones during the shootings of the striking field workers.\textsuperscript{262}

Khrushchev was later hired by a mine in nearby Rutchenkovo to mend underground equipment.\textsuperscript{263} While working at the mine, he began organizing and holding public readings of \textit{Pravda}, which was the Soviet political newspaper that began publication in 1912 and emerged as a leading newspaper of the Soviet Union after the October Revolution. The newspaper was an organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union between 1912 and 1991.\textsuperscript{264} Khrushchev stated later in his political career that he had considered immigrating to the United States during this period in his life because there were more opportunities and better wages for its workers, but he ultimately stayed and become entrenched in Soviet politics.\textsuperscript{265} Khrushchev had to leave the factory shop that he had come to consider a family because he had collected donations for the families of the killed strikers.

Khrushchev continue to develop his skills as a metal worker over the next couple of years. In 1914 when World War I erupted, because Khrushchev was a skilled metal worker he was exempt from conscription in the military. The war increased the workload for the mines and Khrushchev was employed by a central

\textsuperscript{262} Taubman, 9.
\textsuperscript{263} Taubman, 37-38.
\textsuperscript{264} Tompson, 8.
\textsuperscript{265} Peter Carlson, \textit{K Blows Top: A Cold War Comic Interlude, Starring Nikita Khrushchev, America's Most Unlikely Tourist} (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 141.
workshop that provided metal services to ten mines in the surrounding area. The centralized access to these mines facilitated Khrushchev mounting organized strikes against the mine owners demanding higher pay for the mine workers, better working conditions, and advocating for an end to the war.266

While working at the central workshop he spent time with a co-worker who was a member of the working class intelligentsia and who shared Khrushchev’s political views, Ivan Pisarev. Pisarev was an elevator operator at the Rutchenkovo mine and opened his family to Khrushchev. During 1914 he married his daughter, Yefrosinia Pisaraeva. They had a daughter, Julia in 1915 and later a son, Leonid, in 1917.

The years of injustice and the mounting pressures from World War I slowly eroded the stronghold of Tsar Nicholas II had been politically growing weak. He ultimately abdicated his throne in 1917 bringing the 304 year reign of the Romanov dynasty to an end. The newly established Russian Provisional Government in Petrograd (St. Petersburg) had little if any influences over the activities in Ukraine. The rapidly changing environment prompted Khrushchev to become more involved in political activity. Khrushchev was supported by the mine workers on whose behalf he had so fervently advocated and was elected to the Soviet Council in Rutchenkovo and was later elevated to Chairman in May of that year.267 These grass roots beginnings in Ukraine enabled Khrushchev to being having a following among the workers with whom he had labored over the

266 Tompson, 8-9.
267 Taubman, 37-38.
years. His new post enabled him to focus on establishing connections and networking with key figures in the Bolshevik movement. As a result he met the Bolshevik organizer and his future patron, Lazar M. Kaganovich. Both men quickly established a strong rapport and affinity. Khrushchev quickly established the ability to connect with people and project a genuine and sincere empathy towards them and their issues.

The Russian Provisional Government did not last long. On October 7, 1917 the Bolsheviks, also known as the Red Army, launched an attack on the provisional government. The well-known October Revolution under the direction of the Bolsheviks seized control of Petrograd (St. Petersburg) and occupied most of the offices, cities and villages by October 26. Civil war broke out following the inception of the Bolshevik regime and it was a conflict between the Bolsheviks (Red Army), and the White Army who were a coalition of dissidents. In spite of the Bolsheviks having to battle armies from Ukraine, The Baltic States, the Caucasus and some rival nationalistic groups, the Bolsheviks rallied the workers and peasants to defend the country from foreign invaders.

In 1918 Khrushchev fled to Kalinovka and joined the Bolshevik party after the Bolsheviks settled a separate peace with the Central Powers. His political timing enabled him to be mobilized into the Red Army as a political commissar in the Ninth Kuban Army. The post of political commissar had been recently established as the Bolsheviks relied more on the military recruits rather than on the untrained worker activists. The political commissar was charged with the

\[^{268}\text{Taubman, 48-49, and Taubman et al., Nikita Khrushchev (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), 11.}\]
training and indoctrination of the recruits in the doctrines of Bolshevism, and in promoting the troops for battle readiness in the event of another military engagement. Khrushchev was first assigned as a political commissar to a construction platoon and rose to become commissar to a construction battalion. His skills and contributions to the Red Army were well noticed. He was sent from the front lines to a two month political course to further enhance his skills and capabilities. Khrushchev serving as commissar came under fire many times yet his memories of the events would focus more on his troops and their cultural awkwardness rather than with the combat engagement.

The civil war ended in 1922 and the Bolsheviks victory marked the birth of the USSR. Khrushchev was demobilized and reassigned as commissar to a labor brigade in the Donbas. Once again Khrushchev and his troops lived in poor conditions. The wars had brought widespread famine and devastation, as well as hunger and disease. Many deaths resulted from the diseases caused by the war, one of which was Khrushchev’s wife who died of typhus in Kalinovka while Khrushchev served in the Red Army.

Khrushchev returned to civilian life after the end of the civil war. Through the contacts he had established over recent years, he was assigned as assistant director for political affairs for the Rutchenkovo mine in the Donbas region where he had previously worked. He helped to resume the full production at the mine by involving himself in the functionalities of the mine operations even restarting

---

269 Taubman, 50.

270 Taubman, 50.
machines by reinstalling key parts that had been removed by the pre-Soviet mine owners. He was so successful at reestablishing the operations at the Rutchenkovo to serve the Donbas region that he was offered the directorship of the nearby Pastukhov mine.

Khrushchev, however, has other aspirations. He refused the offer to oversee the Pastukhov mine and instead sought to be assigned to the newly established technical college in Yuzovka. Khrushchev had only been able to obtain four years of formal schooling. He sought to advance his formal education and applied to the training program, rabfak, which was attached to the tekhnikum. The rabfak was designed to bring undereducated students to the high school level which was a prerequisite for entry into the tekhnikum. While he was enrolled in the rabfak, Khrushchev continued to advance his work at the Rutchenkovo mine. Khrushchev continued to try and fulfill his dream of obtaining a formal education.

Even though he had been described as a poor student, Khrushchev continued to advance the Communist Party. Shortly after he was admitted to rabfak, Khrushchev was appointed party secretary of the entire tekhnikum and also became a member of the bureau which was the governing council of the party committee for the town of Yuzovka. Khrushchev’s appointment was not of a high rank because he was not a full time party official, however it enabled him to continue advancing his standing in the political arena and an opportunity for a Party career. The most important skillsets he gained during his enrollment at the

271 Taubman, 55.
rabfak was the knowledge and understanding of how important and powerful it is to be an eloquent, impromptu speaker and a composed, tranquil debater. Khrushchev recognized that the same passion which had brought him too this point in the Party was not going to help him move forward. Instead, he acknowledged that he had to learn not to be overtaken by his emotions which would overpower his speech and this was critical at a time when Khrushchev was a newcomer to the Party. Khrushchev was a quick study in human nature and recognized that in order to be assimilated and accepted into the Party his language would have to mirror the vision and goals of the Party. Even though Khrushchev was a poor student in the classroom, he excelled at adapting his tone, demeanor and personality to the expectations of the Communist Party which enabled him to advance.

Migrating through the Bolshevik party politics after the civil war became hazardous to its members. A political party which had its roots in the worker population of the Soviet Union and had grown from the open strikes of discontent that forged the civil war to take hold was now subject to oppression. Members of the Party could speak openly and debate their political ideals freely without fear of reprisal or even execution. Ultimate decisions were achieved through a majority vote after much open discourse and debate. The Bolshevik Party of 1922, however, was one where members had to speak and debate differently if they did not want to get into serious trouble. Khrushchev had detected that the

Party had become austere, rigid and treacherous. If Khrushchev wanted to advance his political career he had to adapt to the new tone and tenor of the Party. This environment was what helped to shape Khrushchev’s political image and he had to mold himself to fit into the new Party vision and image.273

Khrushchev met and married his second wife, Marusia, but they soon separated. Marusia, who was ten years younger than Khrushchev, had a child from a previous relationship. Khrushchev’s mother and many of his friends viewed Marusia as an opportunist. Even though their marriage ended quickly, Khrushchev helped Marusia in later years when her daughter was suffering from a terminal illness.

Soon after separating from Marusia, Khrushchev met Nina Petrovna Kukharchuk who was a well-educated Party organizer and daughter of prosperous peasants.274 Khrushchev and Nina lived together as common law husband and wife the rest of his life, eventually registering their marriage in 1965. The two had three children together: a daughter Rada who was born in 1929; a son Sergei who was born in 1935; and another daughter Elena who was born in 1937.

Khrushchev felt a deep sense of guilt for having left Marusia so quickly after their marriage. Khrushchev had experienced becoming a father for a short time and it affected him deeply. So much so that when he later had children of his own with Nina, he would become a strict father setting rules and expectations

274 Taubman, 58-59.
for them to achieve in their lives. For Khrushchev it was critical for his children to lead industrious and fruitful lives. He especially focused on his children’s’ education and wanted them to take advantage of all the opportunities he did not have as a child. Khrushchev, like JFK, set high standards for his family and wanted to be a role model for his family and children unlike his father had been for him. Khrushchev was always driven to better himself and he always strived for perfection. To demonstrate a frailty to Khrushchev would be analogous with being a failure in his mind.

Khrushchev: Politics, War and the Communist Party

Khrushchev used his connections and friends from his past and in 1925 Lazar Kaganovich became Party head in Ukraine, who quickly took Khrushchev under his patronage. Khrushchev was appointed second in command of the Stalino party apparatus in late 1926. After a brief nine months, his superior was ousted from his position and Khrushchev was transferred to the capital of Ukraine as the head of the Organizational Department of the Ukrainian Party’s Central Committee. Then later in 1928, Khrushchev was transferred to Kiev, where he served at second in command of the Part organization there.

Khrushchev continued to feel inadequate as he rose through the political ranks because he did not have a formal education. In 1929, Khrushchev once again was assisted by his patron Kaganovich and followed him to Moscow where he was now serving in the Kremlin and was a close associate of Stalin. Upon

275 Taubman, 66.
276 Taubman, 68.
arriving in Moscow, Khrushchev once again sought to further his education and he enrolled in the Stalin Industrial Academy. He never completed his studies there, but his political career in the Party flourished in Moscow. When the academy's Party cell elected several rightists to an upcoming Party conference, the newspaper Pravda openly criticized the cell. Khrushchev was very shrewd and used the power struggle that ensued to arrange for the delegates to be withdrawn, and afterward skillfully purged the cell of the rightists resulting in him becoming Party secretary of the school.

Khrushchev continued to advance and rise in the ranks of the Party. First he became the Party leader for the Bauman district, which was the site of the Stalin Industrial Academy, before accepting the same position in the Krasnopresnensky district which was Moscow’s largest and most important district. By 1932, Khrushchev continued to follow in the footsteps of mentor Kaganovich, becoming second in command under him of the Moscow Party organization; and, later in 1934 he became the Party leader for the city and a member of the Party’s Central Committee.

Kaganovich supported Khrushchev as he was slowly introduced into the Politburo and its substantial political landmines with Stalin at the helm. Khrushchev came to a Moscow where a German writer who visited the city in the summer of 1934 described it as a city where:

---

277 Taubman, 68.
278 Tompson, 31-32.
279 Tompson, 31-32.
280 Taubman, 73-78.
“The streets had been excavated; there were long, muddy tranches floored with dirty planks; heaps of soil everywhere. The whole city was in a mess, and heavily loaded trucks were busy shifting the accumulated debris… In every quarter of the city the earth shook with the ringing of hammers, the banging, bumping and screeching of single-bucket excavators, concrete mixers and machines that turned out mortar. Thousands of men worked day and night with almost fanatical diligence.”

This was Moscow in the aftermath of the Party assuming power of which Khrushchev was introduced to and assigned to take charge of its critical public functions.

As part of his new post Khrushchev was required to brief the Politburo on the Moscow state of affairs. His lack of skills in formal briefings became apparent when he make his first presentation to the Politburo and Stalin where he clearly appeared nervous. Stalin who wanted to gain the favor of Moscow’s working class was deeply troubled by the hunger that was present in the city in 1932. It was Stalin who wanted to demonstrate his concern for the working classes welfare and suggested that raising rabbits would be a good solution to feed the masses. Khrushchev, who was eager to impress Stalin and win his trust, immediately set out to implement his idea of raising rabbits. Almost every factory, plant and workshops throughout Moscow started raising rabbits to stock its own kitchen to support the initiative. Along with the distribution of rabbits, ration cards were given to the population to make sure everyone got a proper share of what was available. However, even though some factories supported the cause by

---

281 Taubman, 90.

282 Taubman, 90-91.
contributing rabbits to feed the masses, many factory directors did not agree with the approach and did not supply rabbits.

Kaganovich assigned Khrushchev to investigative and report to the Politburo the status of the problem and what actions were being taken to rectify the situation. Khrushchev recalls in his memoirs that “the assignment worried him and he went as far as to that that he was really frightened by the prospect of delivering a speech to [our] most prestigious body; Stalin would be judging [my] report.” As anticipated by Khrushchev, his briefing to the Politburo and Stalin did not go well. Even though Khrushchev pursued his early strategy to preach was the Party, and now his bosses, wanted to hear wasn’t completely off the mark. Khrushchev briefed a positive perspective on how he had successfully streamlined the ration card system and quashed a significant portion of the thievery in the city, but Stalin who knew the environment in Moscow was too keenly aware that it was too good to be true and that there was still much corruption to be addressed. Indeed, after Khrushchev concluded his briefing, Stalin exchanged some jokes among the Politburo at his expense citing that in spite of his euphemistic outlook “there are still many thieves left, very many – don’t think you have caught them all.” Khrushchev acknowledged that Stalin was correct and was astounded at the insightful analysis that Stalin has shared, especially since he hardly left the confines of the Kremlin.

Khrushchev was a man that was lacking in formal education and cultural awareness. He had survived throughout his life and in his political career by

283 Taubman, 91.

284 Taubman, 91.
relying on his intuition, improvisation, bold passion for the Party and ultimately his natural gifts to adapt to difficult situations. Khrushchev worked towards establishing his bon fides not only as a loyal Party member but also as technical professional that would continue to advance and better the Soviet Union’s critical infrastructure. Just as he had achieved success at the mines and operations at Rutchenkovo, Khrushchev wanted to take on a more high profile project that would truly establish him in the eyes of the Party. The new socialist party had to showcase high profile projects such as the new Moscow Metro and the Moscow- Volga canal to demonstrate that the Party’s installation was for the good of the new Soviet Union.

While serving as the head of the Moscow city organization, Khrushchev was also appointed to serve as the superintendent of the construction of the Moscow Metro, with Kaganovich in charge of the overall project which was a highly expensive public enterprise. The Moscow Metro had an anticipated opening day set for November 7, 1934 which was the anniversary of the revolution. The metro project was a highly anticipated transportation conduit for Moscow and Khrushchev took considerable risks throughout the construction in order to meet expectations. He once again became personally involved in each stage of the constructions has he had done in the operations at Rutchenkovo and spent much of his time in the excavated tunnels where the tracks were being laid for the trains. Khrushchev tried to apply the experience he had gained in the Yuzovka mines and saw the closed tunnel construction as a key benefit in this
project, but he lacked the engineer expertise to make an informed assessment of the risks associated with this type of underground construction.

The project presented many unanticipated challenges and in spite of his engineering ignorance with a project of this magnitude, Khrushchev took extensive risks to complete the job. Terrible accidents occurred as a result of Khrushchev and the Moscow Mayor driving the more than seventy thousand workers mercilessly, demanding that they long continuous hours without rest. Most significantly, Khrushchev ignored the engineer’s warnings that the tunnels that were being excavated and buildings above would collapse if safeguards were not implemented. Terrible accidents occurred including tunnels that were flooded drowning workmen, and underground fires which impacted not only the tunnels but the structures above. When the predictable accidents occurred, they were portrayed as heroic sacrifices in furtherance of a great cause.

The Moscow Metro did not open until May 1, 1935, but in spite of the delays and accidents experienced during construction, Khrushchev was awarded the coveted Order of Lenin for his role in the construction. Khrushchev shared the credit and glory with his mentor, Kaganovich, after whom the Metro was named. Khrushchev was also honored when a Moscow factory that made precision electrical devices was given his name and it was then that he added the Moscow Province first secretaryship to his city portfolio. Later that year

---

285 Taubman, 94-95.

286 Tompson, 45-46.
Khrushchev was selected as Party leader for Moscow oblast, a province with a population of 11 million.\textsuperscript{287}

Khrushchev was invited to participate in more meetings where Stalin was present. The two slowly developed and built a good relationship. Khrushchev admired the dictator and treasured the informal meetings with him as well as the invitations to spend time at Stalin’s dacha, while Stalin developed an affection for his young subordinate.\textsuperscript{288} Indeed, Khrushchev slowly overcame the sense of insecurity and uncertainty that he experienced when he first came to Moscow in 1932 and began to develop a sense of power and authority as he rose in the Party ranks under the mentorship of Stalin and Kaganovich. Khrushchev had developed the sense of certainty in his public and political dealings in spite of his internal insecurities surrounding his upbringing and lack of social aptitude.

Khrushchev’s sense of power and authority is captured in a 1935 newsreel footage:

“One sequence shows him inspecting a new Moscow River bridge leading to the Kiev Metro station. Khrushchev arrives in a big black limousine with a suite of functionaries. Wearing a long, dark, well-tailored overcoat and a workman’s cap, he waves at the assembled workers, gins broadly, and then shakes hands all around... Everyone in the picture has a cigarette hanging from his fingers or lips – except for the self-denying Khrushchev. He walks resolutely across the bridge, barking out orders left and right, and then gets in to his black limousine and drive off, followed by several other black cars... Before he departs, the camera zooms into his eyes. They are piercingly bright and penetrating, fully concentrated on the task at hand.”\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{287} Taubman, 73.

\textsuperscript{288} Taubman, 105-106.

\textsuperscript{289} Taubman, 95.
Indeed, although it can be argued that Khrushchev displayed an unimpressive outer figure, there was no denying that the burning intensity of his eyes and controlled demeanor that conveyed his resolve.

Stalin appointed Khrushchev as head of the Communist Party in Ukraine in 1937 and he assumed the post in its capital, Kiev, in 1938. Khrushchev was sent to Ukraine which had been the site of the extensive purges which included the murder of several professors whom Khrushchev greatly respected. After Khrushchev assumed his post, the number of arrests, including within the Party itself, greatly increased.\textsuperscript{290} Almost all the government officials and Red Army were replaced and all but one member of the Ukrainian Politburo Organizational Bureau and Secretariat were arrested. During the few months after Khrushchev’s arrival in Kiev, almost every official that was arrested received the death penalty. Allegations arose that innocent people had been entangled unjustly in the purge and Khrushchev in 1939 addressed the Fourteenth Ukrainian Party Congress stating “Comrades, we must unmask and relentlessly destroy all enemies of the people. But we must not allow a single honest Bolshevik to be harmed. We must conduct a struggle against slanderers.”\textsuperscript{291}

Khrushchev, like JFK, also served in the war against Germany. When The Germans invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Khrushchev was still serving at his post in Kiev, Ukraine. Stalin appointed Khrushchev a political commissar, and he served on several fronts as an intermediary between the local military commanders and the political Party rulers in Moscow. Stalin knew he could rely

\textsuperscript{290} Taubman, 116-118.

\textsuperscript{291} Taubman, 118.
on Khrushchev to keep the commanders on the front line with Moscow’s orders, while the commanders on the front lines viewed Khrushchev as a means to indirectly influence Stalin. As the German forces advanced, Khrushchev worked with the military in an attempt to defend and save the city. Stalin had dictated that under no circumstances was the city to be abandoned and as a result the Red Army was soon surrounded by German forces. Khrushchev had appealed to Stalin to allow the Soviet forces to be redeployed and not to evacuate them from Kiev. Stalin refused to allow the troops to withdraw and as result many troops were taken prisoner or killed in battle and triggered many Red Army setbacks. This caused Khrushchev to lose faith in Stalin, his mentor.

Again in 1942 while Khrushchev was on the Southwest Front, he had proposed a massive counteroffensive in the Kharkov area. Stalin approved only part of the plan and 640,000 Red Army soldiers would still become involved in the offensive. The Germans had good intelligence on the Soviet’s military strategies and they had deduced that the Soviets were likely to attack at Kharkov and they set a trap. Once again, the Soviet offensive initially appeared as if it was going to be successful, but within a mere five days the German forces had infiltrated the Soviet flanks and the Red Army troops were in danger of being cut off from further support. Stalin refused to halt the offensive and the Red Army divisions were soon encircled by the German troops. Over 267,000 Soviet troops were lost, including more than 200,000 men that were captured and as a result Stalin held Khrushchev responsible.

292 Taubman, 163.
Khrushchev endured the suspense of what his destiny would be after the defeat. Even though the two met several times for dinner the conversation would be interspersed with veiled threats as they discuss practical tactics to defend the Donbas. Much to Khrushchev’s relief after the anticipation of being made the scapegoat, Stalin recalled him to Moscow. He had hinted at arresting and possibly executing Khrushchev, but he allowed the commissar to return to front lines of battle by sending him to Stalingrad. Khrushchev reached the Stalingrad front lines in 1942 shortly after the start of the battle for the city. Khrushchev’s role at the front lines now was not as prominent as it had been. He remained in Stalingrad for much of the battle, only visiting Moscow on occasion, and was nearly killed on an occasion.

Like JFK, Khrushchev’s personal life was laden with tragedy. Soon after Stalingrad, Khrushchev was confronted with the death of his son. Leonid, who was a fighter pilot, was allegedly shot down and killed in action in March 1943. Leonid’s fate has been the subject of considerable speculation. An account described that he was shot down and captured by the Germans later collaborating with them, and upon being recaptured by the Soviets, it is alleged that Stalin ordered him shot despite Khrushchev pleading for his life. The circumstances of Leonid Khrushchev’s fate has been the topic of considerable

\[293\] Taubman, 164-168.

\[294\] Taubman, 157-158.
conjecture, especially since it is believed that his supposed killing is the reason why Khrushchev later denounced Stalin in the Secret Speech.\textsuperscript{295}

Khrushchev later served in other fronts during the war. He was at the front overseeing the troops at the Battle of Kursk which successfully turned back the last major German offensive on Soviet soil.\textsuperscript{296} He went on to accompany the Soviet troops as they drove out the Germans from the shattered city of Kiev in November 1943. Khrushchev became more and more involved in the reconstruction of the battle ridden Ukraine as the Soviet forces were successful in driving the Nazi forces back to Germany. Khrushchev’s efforts during the war led to his appointment as Premier of the Ukrainian SST in addition to his earlier post, which was a unique and rare instance in which the Ukrainian part and civil leader posts were held by the same person.

Khrushchev returned the Ukraine in late 1943 only to find a war torn region full of devastation, disease and hunger. Despite his efforts to rebuild the region, as of 1945 the Ukrainian industry had only returned to a quarter of what it had been prior to the war. The harvest had significantly diminished detrimentally impacting the ability to sustain basic needs for the in the area. In an effort to increase agricultural production in the region, the collective farms were empowered by the Party to expel residents who were not contributing sufficiently to the common good. The leaders of the collective farms used this reason as an

\textsuperscript{295} Taubman, 157-158. The Secret Speech was delivered by Khrushchev to a closed session of the Congress limited to the Soviet delegates and not for press publication. During the four hour session, Khrushchev destroyed Stalin’s reputation and while the speech did not fundamentally change Soviet society, it had wide effects.

\textsuperscript{296} Taubman, 171-172.
excuse to expel and rid themselves of their political enemies, invalids from the war, and the elderly who could not work on the farms. Over 12,000 people were exiled to the eastern parts of the Soviet Union. Khrushchev who viewed this policy as very effective for the common good recommended adopting this strategy to Stalin to implement in other parts of the Soviet Union.297 There was significant resistance from the armed partisans which slowed the process. These partisans were gradually defeated but 600,000 Ukrainians were ultimately arrested between 1944 and 1952, with one-third executed for charges of treason and the remainder were either imprisoned or exiled to the east.298

The agricultural production and drought impacted the Ukraine and Western Russia from 1944 – 1946. In spite of the agricultural challenges, the collective and state farms were still obligated to contribute over 52% of their harvest and agricultural production to the government.299 The focus of the Soviet government was not internally focused to support its people, but rather it was directed at collecting as much grain as possible in order to supple communist allies in Eastern Europe. Khrushchev had set the production quotas at a very high level which in turn lead Stalin to presume that an unrealistic high quantity of grain was going to be cultivated from Ukraine. Even though food supplies were rationed, non-agricultural rural workers throughout the Soviet Union were not given any ration cards.

297 Tompson, 86.
298 Taubman, 195.
299 Tompson, 91.
Khrushchev now realizing that the situation was deteriorating further, appealed to Stalin on numerous occasion for aid but instead of finding a receptive leader, he encountered anger and resistance on the part of Stalin. Khrushchev resolved to address Stalin in person since his many letters fell on deaf ears. After a personal appeal by Khrushchev to Stalin, the Soviet leader finally provided Ukraine with limited food aid and financial support to set up free soup kitchen to feed the destitute. 300 Stalin now regarded Khrushchev as a weak leader with a damaged political standing in his view and in February 1947 he sent Khrushchev’s original mentor Kaganovich to Ukraine to assist Khrushchev. 301 Soon after Kaganovich’s arrival in Ukraine, he was made the party leader of the Ukrainian Central Committee and retained Khrushchev as premier. Khrushchev fell seriously ill with pneumonia shortly after Kaganovich arrived in Kiev, Ukraine. Kaganovich was recalled to Moscow in late 1947 and Khrushchev who had recovered from his long illness was restored to the First Secretaryship, but later resigned.

Khrushchev spent the next few years from 1947 to 1949 working with the industry and implementing policies that stimulated collectivization while discouraging privatization of farms and agricultural operations. Khrushchev’s efforts led to the creation of agro-towns which encouraged agricultural workers to live in larger towns that would offer them municipal services such as utilities and public libraries which were not available in the small villages near the farms. He

300 Taubman, 201-202.

301 Tompson, 92.
officially completed one agro-town which he dedicated to Stalin just before returning to Moscow in 1949.\(^{302}\) It was during his final years in the Ukraine focusing on the agricultural operations and the relationships with the larger towns that Khrushchev gained an in-depth understanding and appreciation for the devastation that the war had caused. Khrushchev who had lived through poor childhood felt a strong affiliation and understanding of the Ukrainians affected by the post war destruction. Khrushchev shared a deep connection and affinity with the people and as a leader in the Party he more than anyone else had a better insight into the reality of the people’s situation and attitude in the regions better that other leaders did.\(^{303}\)

Khrushchev resolved to continue his pursuit to rise in the Party. Stalin transferred Khrushchev back to Moscow in 1949 because he wanted to have reliable and trustworthy counselors in the Kremlin. Khrushchev was appointed as a Central Committee secretary. Upon his return to the Kremlin, Khrushchev was received by a prolonged standing ovation and chant at the Sixteenth Party Congress, “Glory to Comrade Khrushchev who went through battles together with our people, he is leading our land to happiness.”\(^{304}\) The aging Stalin most likely recalled Khrushchev to Moscow to create a balance between the two rival

---

\(^{302}\) Tompson, 96-97.


\(^{304}\) Khrushchev and Benson, 202.
contenders seeking to succeed Stalin as Chairman of the Party, Georgy Malenkov and security chief Lavrentiy Beria.\footnote{Taubman, 210.}

Josef Stalin suffered a massive stroke and died on March 5, 1953. Malenkov assumed power as the new Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Beria, Kaganovich, N.A. Bulganin and Molotov became First Vice-Chairman. Khrushchev was elected by the Central Committee as First Secretary of the Party. In what evolved as a political struggle and chess game for power, Khrushchev skillfully created alliances and maneuvered his way into eliminating political opponents. Malenkov and Khrushchev forged an alliance against Beria who they feared was mounting a military coup. As a result, Beria was arrested at a Presidium meeting and was later tried and subsequently executed with his five closet associates. The elimination of Beria enabled Khrushchev to advance significantly within the Party.\footnote{Khrushchev and Benson, 35.}

Malenkov had political aspirations of his own and envisioned a reorganization of the government. Khrushchev in turn mounted his own strategy to eliminate Malenkov. In spite of the intellectual advantage and cultural sophistication inherent in Malenkov, he was viewed as dull and incapable on taking on the tasks at hand within the Party. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was regarded as a capable forward-looking leader that was down to earth and prepared to take on any challenge.\footnote{A. R. Medvedev and Z. A. Medvedev, Khrushchev, the Years in Power (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 4-13.} Khrushchev turned against Malenkov and
steadily won the support among the Party officials who then took seats on the Central Committee. In 1954 Khrushchev was elevated in the Party and replaced Malenkov in the seat of honor at Presidium meetings. Malenkov was accused during a session of a Central Committee meeting of committing political atrocities. With Malenkov removed from power within the Party, the game board was cleared of all opposing pieces and Khrushchev had checkmated his opponents. Nikita Khrushchev had finally reached the summit of Soviet power and had emerged as the most powerful figure in the Soviet Union.

Khrushchev learned to adapt to what it meant to be part of the Communist Party. Party figures had to be assimilate themselves into the collective Party voice and image. As such, no individual Party official could exhibit an individual persona or demonstrate what their personality entailed because it would be perceived as showmanship by the fellow Party members. Khrushchev learned to suppress his real personality which had been described as that of an ebullient peasant.\textsuperscript{308} In order to survive the political arena Khrushchev had to contain his individual personality and individuality for the good of his advancement in the Party. It can be argued that it was not until Khrushchev became Chairman of the Party that he allowed glimpses of this real personality to come to the surface. It was this level of discipline that allowed Khrushchev to compensate for his perceived gaps in educational and cultural awareness that enabled him to achieve higher political echelons than anyone anticipated.\textsuperscript{309}

\textsuperscript{308} Aloczi-Horvath, \textit{Khrushchev: The Making of a Dictator}

\textsuperscript{309} Taubman, 86.
Personality sketches of Khrushchev indicated that he was extremely conscious of his humble origins. This was a theme that was reflected throughout his political discourses in the form of folk stories and parables, all echoing back to him and who he was. Khrushchev explained on numerous occasions “that no matter how humble a man’s beginning, he achieves the stature of the office to which he is elected.”  

Another element in Khrushchev’s life that directly influenced his internal drive and ability to develop beyond the limitations he had been faced with early on in life was that of his mother. Khrushchev’s relationship with his father was non-existent to the point where after 1938 when Sergei passed away, he did not even visit his father’s grave. Communists have the reputation of being militantly unsentimental and cold using their political work as too important to be distracted by insignificant things as visiting the graves of the dead. However, in spite of the Party’s critical work, Khrushchev somehow always found time in his busy schedule to frequently visit his mother’s grave in Kiev.

Sigmund Freud highlighted the significance of the mother’s role in forming the psychological shape of an individual. Freud wrote in 1952 that “a man who has been the indisputable favorite of his mother, keeps for like the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success that often induces real success.”

As noted earlier, although Khrushchev’s mother was indifferent to her husband, her

---

310 Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

311 Taubman, 25.

son was clearly a favorite in her eyes. Other psychology and personality theorists assert that the pursuit of political power is often spurred by a mother who was married “beneath” her potential and is determined to “vindicate” herself through “the vicarious triumphs of her children.” On the other hand, a man who has viewed his father as a letdown or disappointment knows all too well what it means to be a failure to himself and his family. This perceived failure can be considered the origins for a wife to despise her husband, much like what Khrushchev experienced in the relationship between his father and mother. It can be argued that as a result of that relationship, Khrushchev felt the need to demonstrate that he could exceed his father’s achievements in life. However, theorists have also stressed that it is possible for such individuals to risk inducing the feelings of guilt at achieving a level of success that the father did not. In that aspect, Khrushchev’s dream of power and glory and his ambivalence toward both were legacies of his childhood.

Khrushchev understood and valued his humble beginnings, never losing sight or an appreciation of who he was. A personality sketch prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961 indicated that:

“When Stalin died in 1953, Khrushchev was largely an unknown quantity outside the Soviet union, seemingly a lesser-ranking figure … In the year that ensued he edged his way more and more onto the public stage but the picture he presented to foreign observers was not impressive -- from all appearances he [Khrushchev] was an impetuous, obtuse, rough-talking man, with something of the buffoon and a good deal of the tosspot in him….

---

313 Taubman, Khrushchev, citing Harold Dwight Lasswell, 26. Lasswell was credited with being the founder of the field of political psychology and was the man who intersected the concepts of psychology and political science.

314 Taubman, 26.
Before long, however, events would show that there was a great deal more to Khrushchev than the appearance suggested and that behind the exterior lay a shrewd native intelligence, an agile mind, drive, ambition, and ruthlessness.\textsuperscript{315}

Khrushchev demonstrated over time that behind his rough exterior, there was a man that possessed a shrewd natural intelligence with an agile mind, and a focused drive filled with ambition and if necessary ruthlessness.

Under Stalin, Khrushchev had very limited opportunities to manifest his resourcefulness and audacity. His peers most likely did not estimate the potential Khrushchev possessed in spite of his peasant origins. However, contemporaries in the Soviet bureaucracy were also keenly aware that anyone posing a threat to Stalin would have quickly been subjected to his ruthless wrath. Indeed, underneath the man with the humble beginnings was a savvy politician with a good sense of political timing and showmanship, as well as a gambler's instinct.\textsuperscript{316}

**Section IV: Fidel Castro - The Unknown Variable**

Fidel Castro was the illegitimate son of a wealthy sugar planter. Unlike Lenin, Mao and other known revolutionaries, Fidel Castro was not born of the working class. His orphaned father, Ángel Castro y Argiz, had migrated to Cuba from Galicia in Northwest Spain when he was thirteen years old to live with an

\textsuperscript{315} “Khrushchev – A Personality Sketch,” prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts, 2-3.

\textsuperscript{316} “Khrushchev – A Personality Sketch,” 2-3.
uncle in the Mayari region of Cuba. This region was saturated with the presence of the United States more than in any other part of the island due in part to the United Fruit Company which had helped the CIA in 1954 to oust the leftist Guatemalan government of President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman after he threatened the expropriation of the company’s holdings in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{317} Angel Castro struggled to establish himself in Cuba. He laid railroad track for the United Fruit railway, rented some of the company’s land interests, and sold merchandise from farm to farm in that area of the island. He saved the profits he accumulated from his peddling and sales enabling him to purchase a farm in the province of Oriente.

Castro was born out of wedlock at his father's sugar plantation on August 13, 1926. He had become successful plantation owner growing sugar cane at Las Manacas farm in Birán, Oriente Province. His first marriage deteriorated when his wife became ill and bedridden. After the breakdown of his first marriage due to his wife’s illness, he took his household servant, Lina Ruz González, as his mistress. Angel Castro and Lina Ruz had seven children, some which were born out of wedlock and were not legally recognized until Angel Castro’s first wife died and they married.\textsuperscript{318} Among the initial illegitimate children was Fidel Castro. The stigma of being born illegitimate and the son of a servant, even though his parents eventually married, was an element that weighed heavily on Castro throughout his life.

\textsuperscript{317} Beschloss, 92.

Aged 6, Castro was sent to live with his teacher in Santiago de Cuba, before being baptized into the Roman Catholic Church aged 8. Being baptized enabled Castro to attend the La Salle boarding school in Santiago, where he regularly misbehaved, and so was sent to the privately funded, Jesuit-run Dolores School in Santiago.\footnote{Fidel Castro and Ignacio Ramonet (Interviewer), \textit{My Life: A Spoken Autobiography} (New York: Scribner, 2009), 59-60.} In 1945 he transferred to the more prestigious Jesuit-run El Colegio de Belén in Havana which was the leading school of the Cuban high society establishment. Although Castro took an interest in history, geography and debating at Belén, he did not excel academically, instead devoting much of his time to playing sports and excelling at baseball.\footnote{Leycester Coltman, \textit{The Real Fidel Castro} (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003), 23-27.} Even while attending this privileged school, Castro developed a deep seeded hatred against society people and their expectations. The day to day society life he was born into only inflamed his nascent socialist political views. Later while Castro began studying law at the University of Havana, he became engaged in student activism on campus because he viewed himself as being politically uninformed.

From a young age, Castro was enthralled by the political spirit of great revolutionaries such a Jose Marti, the champion of Cuban independence. He grew up hearing the impassioned stories of Marti who had been betrayed, ambushed and killed nearby his father’s farm in 1895 in pursuit of Cuban independence. From a young age, Castro was described as an excitable, devious, and defiant young man who openly accused his father of abusing his
sugarcane workers with false promises of social advancement and he attempted to organize the workers against his own father, but was unsuccessful.\textsuperscript{321} Fidel saw himself growing up in shame because he was a citizen of Cuba, a country that he perceived to in reality be an American-dominated pseudo-republic. Castro’s deep rooted disdain for his father’s willingness to serve under the political oppression of the United States later manifested itself when after he began his political career, he set the fields of the family farm on fire.\textsuperscript{322}

Castro had a deep passion and strong opinions about anti-imperialism, specifically opposing U.S. intervention in the Caribbean and Latin America. In 1947, Castro joined the socialist Party of the Cuban People, founded by veteran politician Eduardo Chibás. A charismatic figure, Chibás advocated social justice, honest government, and political freedom, while his party exposed corruption and demanded reform. Though Chibás lost the election, Castro remained committed to working on his behalf. Student violence escalated after Grau employed gang leaders as police officers, and Castro soon received a death threat urging him to leave the university. Castro refused and instead began carrying a gun and surrounding himself with armed friends.\textsuperscript{323} The university served as a platform for Castro to set forth his political ideals about Cuba. It was while studying law at the University of Havana that Castro adopted leftist anti-imperialist politics. Later Castro proclaimed himself to be "a Socialist, a Marxist, and a Leninist".\textsuperscript{324}

\textsuperscript{321} Beschloss, 92.
\textsuperscript{322} Beschloss, 92.
\textsuperscript{323} Coltman, 23–24, 37–38, and 46.
\textsuperscript{324} Castro and Ramonet, 157.
After participating in rebellions against right-wing governments in the Dominican Republic and Colombia, Castro planned to overthrow Cuban President Fulgencio Batista's military junta, launching a failed attack on the Moncada Barracks in 1953. After a year's imprisonment, he traveled to Mexico where he formed a revolutionary group with Che Guevara and his brother Raúl Castro, referred to as the 26th of July Movement. Returning to Cuba, Castro led the Movement in a guerrilla war against Batista's forces from the Sierra Maestra. As anti-Batista sentiment grew, Castro took a leading role in the Cuban Revolution. He led a rebel army that ultimately ousted the president in 1959, and brought his own assumption of military and political power. Alarmed by his friendly relations with the Soviet Union, the United States government unsuccessfully attempted to remove him, by assassination, economic blockade and counter-revolution, including the Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961. Countering these threats, Castro actively sought the economic support and military protection of the Soviet Union, openly aligning Cuba with its policies, and eventually becoming a Soviet Ally in the Cold War. Castro formed an economic and military alliance with the Soviets and allowed them to place nuclear weapons on the island, sparking the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962.

Cuba had been within the sphere of influence of the United States since the Spanish American War of 1898. The United States had always been involved in the politics of Cuba since it was a country geographically located only 90 miles away and any instability could pose a military threat. Fulgencio Batista, who had

\[325\] Gaddis, 206-211.
been supported by the United States, had been voted out of office in the mid and late 1940s, but returned to power in 1952. Indeed, Fulgencio Batista returned to power in 1952 by staging a military coup with the quiet support of the Truman Administration. Cuba had always been viewed by the United States as a key component in the stability of Latin America against the spread of communism. Truman immediately recognized Batista’s regime to add legitimacy to the coup.

To further underscore the importance of America’s backyard, the Truman administration’s final national security document which was left for future administrations, was known as NSC-141 and Top Secret. This document summarized U.S. postwar objectives and applied the earlier NSC-68 to Latin America:

“\textit{In Latin America we seek first and foremost an orderly political and economic development which will make the Latin American nations resistant to the internal growth of communism and to Soviet political warfare…Secondly we seek hemisphere solidarity in support of our world policy and the cooperation of the Latin American nations in safeguarding the hemisphere through individual and collective defense measures against external aggression and internal subversion.}” \textsuperscript{326}

The document underscored the national commitment which at the time to counter the spread of Soviet influence. Truman left NSC-141 as an instrument for Eisenhower to implement as U.S. foreign policy in dealing with the Soviet Union.

The document outlines strategies to deal more directly with the Soviet atomic threat:

“The defense of the United States against the growing Soviet atomic threat involves both passive and active defense measures. For some years to come, the deterrent power of the United States

will reside largely in its ability to deliver an atomic attack of tremendous force upon the Soviet Union. The power of our striking forces is now substantial and is improving. For the foreseeable future, the willingness of the United States to employ atomic weapons in the event of general war is essential to the success of our strategic plans. The willingness of the United States, however, to initiate an atomic attack in the event that the Soviet rulers take certain actions which we would regard as a casus belli will be significantly affected by the casualties and destruction which the Soviet system could inflict in retaliation.”

Batista had been America’s protégé and had thrived under the support and protection of the United States. Fidel Castro, however, only saw Batista as a puppet of the United States and wanted to expose him as such. Batista had been America’s protégé and had thrived under the support and protection of the United States. Fidel Castro, however, only saw Batista as a puppet of the United States and wanted to expose him as such. Castro cultivated the support of the Cuban people by appealing to their lack of economic resources and promising a higher standard of living across the social classes. Castro overthrew Batista in January 1959 and eventually established a socialist government in Cuba. Castro feared a U.S.-backed coup in light of the support Batista had received from the United States. Castro consolidated his political power by the control he had of the military. With both political and military power in his own hands, Castro postponed the free elections and reforms as he had promised by the revolution, suppressed any political dissent, effectively marginalized other resistance fighters and imprisoned or executed anyone who posed a threat to his regime.

327 NSC-141.


329 Background Notes: Cuba,” U.S. Department of State, last updated November 7, 2011, http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/cuba/191090.htm (date of access: August 1, 2014), and Bredhoff, 4.
Fearing that Cuba would not be able to fend off a U.S. invasion, in 1959 Castro’s regime spent over $120 million on Soviet, French, and Belgian weaponry and by early 1960 had doubled the size of Cuba’s armed forces. Castro eventually declared Cuba a socialist state on April 16, 1961 and pursued close relations with the Soviet Union. He worked to advance the political goals of the Soviet Union by funding and backing violent subversive activities and participating in foreign interventions that supported Soviet political ideologies and priorities. To sustain the new Cuba, Castro executed an estimated 3,200 Cubans between 1959 and 1962 who he perceived posed a threat to his regime. Hundreds of thousands fled the island to avoid persecution or incarceration as Castro’s revolution became more radical. When Castro, who had sold himself as a democratic reformer during his revolution, announced his allegiance to Marxist-Leninism, the Soviet Union had gained an ally only ninety miles from the coast of their Cold War enemy – the United States.

The Soviet threat had long been looming over the United States on many fronts. Not only was there the threat of atomic superiority, but there was also the scientific space race where the Soviet Union had already launched the satellite Sputnik into orbit ahead of the United States. The launching of Sputnik sent a dreadful shiver down the spines of Americans who had been long convinced of the United States’ enduring edge against the Soviet threat. Relations with the

---

331 “Background Notes: Cuba,” 4.
332 Matthews, 239.
333 Matthews, 238-239.
Soviet Union existed on many levels which included a military alliance and economic support, as well as the educational and scientific collaborations. Castro and his ideologies presented a formidable threat and Cuba was now of utmost concern to the United States and Latin America. The alliance between the Soviet Union and Cuba was a tacit indication that the United States had failed to maintain pace with the expanding Soviet threat in Latin America.

The threat from Cuba emanated not only from the political and military alliance with the Soviet Union, but also from the uncertainty and volatile nature of its leader, Fidel Castro. Psychological studies conducted by the CIA shortly after he assumed power and right before the Cuban Missile Crisis described Castro as a leader of superior intellect with insatiable narcissistic and exhibitionist needs.334 “The outstanding neurotic elements in his personality are his hunger for power and his need for the recognition and adulation of the masses.”335 An element that would play a role in the crisis was Castro’s primary focus to maintain power and control. Castro has been described as a mirror-hungry leader who seeks to elicit a continuing flow of admiration from his people and in turn he is able to convey a sense of strength, grandeur and omnipotence.336 These facets of Castro’s personality are the basis of his charismatic appeal and power. It was

---


335 “Psychiatric Personality Study of Fidel Castro.

336 Post, Leaders, 201-202. Profile of Fidel Castro was published in Problems of Post Communism (Spring 1995) under the title “Aging Revolutionary in an Aging Revolution: A Political Psychology Profile of Fidel Castro.”
argued during the crisis deliberations that Castro would probably destroy both
himself and the Cuban people to preserve and maintain his position of power
even if it meant going to the brink of war.

Psychological analysts have argued that there are two kinds of
charismatic leaders, the reparative and the destructive. A reparative charismatic
leader heals his own psychological insecurities and wounds as he heals those of
his society, while a destructive charismatic leader unifies his people towards a
common goal by blaming an outside enemy. Fidel Castro has been set forth as
an example of a destructive charismatic leader. From his early kindling of a fire to
fuel a revolution against Batista, Castro has always portrayed the United States
as the external enemy, blaming the U.S. for Cuba’s economic and social
problems. Destructive charismatic leadership is also associated with a
particularly dangerous kind of narcissistic personality which is malignant
narcissism. An analysis of Castro indicates that he is a prime example of a
malignant narcissist. Indeed, “so insatiable is his drive for glory that he will go to
any lengths to achieve it, and he demonstrates remarkable perseverance when
many other leaders would have given up. Failure is unthinkable.”

337 Post, Leaders, 201-202.
338 Post, Leaders, 202.
Section V: Kennedy, Khrushchev & Castro –
Operational Codes and Perceptions during the Crisis

JFK had come to the presidency believing that the Cold War should be modified, and that a mutually acceptable form of coexistence with the Soviet Union could be worked out through negotiation and serious exploration of each other’s interests. In 1959 President Eisenhower expressed this same sentiment to Khrushchev: “You know, we really should come to some sort of an agreement in order to stop this fruitless, really wasteful rivalry.” The Cuban Missile Crisis attacked the very foundation of his optimistic world of coexistence with the Soviet Union. What is ironic is that at the same time Khrushchev had also expressed his wish to strive for a peaceful coexistence with the United States claiming that for many years he had made many honest attempts to come to an agreement about trusting and establishing good faith relations with America. From JFK’s perspective, he came to the realization that Khrushchev also felt the same sentiments and that both sides had a sincere desire for legitimate negotiations to discontinue the Cold War.

The Cuban Missile Crisis revived many ghosts in JFK’s recent political career, namely the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. JFK needed to establish his credibility and power as the leader of the other pole in the Cold War bipolar world. “He knew that, were he humiliated a second time in Cuba, he would lose

---


340 Talbott, 174.
all hopes for a stable world peace." JFK knew that he would need to rectify and eliminate all the factors that led to the dismal results in the Bay of Pigs invasion. JFK did not want to fail yet again when he approached Khrushchev to negotiate during the crisis and wanted to present himself as a true leader and diplomat, less he be judged again as inept.

The operational codes of JFK and Khrushchev were key factors in bringing the Cuban Missile Crisis to a peaceful resolution. Kennedy and Khrushchev were political adversaries during an era that presented unique political challenges and engagements in foreign policy. Both Kennedy and Khrushchev displayed a keen awareness of the requirements for managing a crisis and coercive diplomacy. They regulated their behavior in accordance with those diplomatic precepts during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Theorists have hypothesized that war and the aggressive resolution of crises would be associated with high levels of power motivation and low levels of affiliation between the leaders of the conflict. Crises which are peacefully resolved, on the other hand, reflected a high level of affiliation between the leaders involved in the conflict. The peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated that as the power struggles diminished during the crisis, the affiliation between the leaders went up resulting in a quasi-rapprochement enabling fruitful negotiations. For both leaders, it was a shared experience of "being poised

---

341 George, Limits, 94.


343 Winter, 165.
on opposite edges of an abyss, with imperfect means of communication or of understanding the act and purposes of the other, and with the weapons by which each demonstrated resolve but which promised not victory but mutual suicide if they came to be used.”

JFK and Khrushchev both focused on people and tried to relate to all echelons of society with a keen sense of empathy and understanding. They comprehended that political activities and engagements were built upon recognizing the importance of the individuals involved in the process, their roles and their ultimate goals. They saw the individuals as an extension of the state and by relating to them one would gain greater insight into the motivations and intents in negotiations. They each sought to establish personal relationship behind the public diplomatic persona as a means to gain trust and understanding of each other’s political situations in their country. JFK had a unique ability to empathize and relate to everyone, which enabled him to naturally understand the others perspective. JFK’s down to earth personality and ability to place himself in another’s shoes provided him with key insights that others lacked.

Khrushchev possessed a simplistic and compassionate personality because of his own life experiences. Khrushchev who came from very humble peasant beginnings experienced the hardships of hunger, extreme and arduous labor, as well as financial hardship. He was able to relate to poor peasants and understand their plight because he had walked down the same path in life.

---

Khrushchev related to everyone on a very basic level of survival because he had experienced extreme hardship in his own life and understood what had to be done to survive. Even though JFK did not experience financial hardship or hunger in his life, he was constantly exposed to physical pain which limited his capacity to fully enjoy the joys of life. JFK and Khrushchev suffered different types of pain, physical and financial, each hampering the ability to enjoy life. Khrushchev was able to relate to JFK as their political relationship progressed because of the shared a compassionate and considerate ability to be empathetic to the plights of others.

JFK and Khrushchev also shared a propensity for taking risks. JFK’s risk taking attitude came from the realization of his own mortality and how fragile life could be. His personal life experiences with his own brother and sister, as well as his fellow servicemen repeatedly reminded JFK of his own mortality. As such, JFK did not feel a need to plan ahead choosing to live for moment which at times created a chaotic existence. Khrushchev, on the other hand, was known for being an individual with great political turmoil as well as personal chaos and disorder. Khrushchev “sometimes acted before thinking and rarely thought in terms of conceptions or generalizations. He had enormous intuition, spontaneous reactions, and often proved unpredictable for outsiders.” JFK and Khrushchev shared common characteristics in their personality which may


\[\text{\textsuperscript{346}} \] V.M. Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1997), 177.
have elicited the connection to each other which facilitated a level of collaboration and understanding of each other’s position during the crisis.

In order to analyze the process of coercive diplomacy in managing a crisis, one must look not only to the overt military and political motivations, but also to the internal composition and operational codes affecting each individual leader. An operational code draws upon the policymaker's background, educational and political experiences, and psychological make-up to gauge what type of strategies a leader will undertake in a crisis situation. In further analyzing the psychological impacts on the crisis at hand, theorists have addressed how stress can impair the normal decision making process and in turn create analytical problems which can indirectly escalate the confrontational situation into a full scale conflict. In the Cuban Missile Crisis, both heads of state performed significantly well in spite of the exorbitant amount of stress that was generated as a result of the pressure from their political and military advisors, as well as the critical public opinion.

JFK felt more at ease with the conflictual aspects of politics and policy making that his predecessor. Indeed, his Irish culture permeated every facet of his presidency and set a tone in the White House that allowed for a collegial environment during the deliberative process of the crisis. JFK was known for his quizzical wit, the eruptions of boisterous humor, the appreciation for politics, the love of language, the romantic sense of history, the admiration for physical daring, the toughness in negotiation, the joy in living, and the ironic view of life as
both a comedy and as a tragedy because of his life experiences.\textsuperscript{347} His sense of efficacious included confidence in his ability to manage and shape the interpersonal relations of those around him in a constructive fashion, and his cognitive style led him to participate much more actively and directly in the policy making process. It was precisely those personality characteristics contributed to forging a collegial style of policy making based on teamwork and shared responsibility among a cadre of talented advisors.\textsuperscript{348} JFK recognized the value of the give and take and the devil’s advocate approach among his advisors, and encouraged it. He learned the pitfalls of having inefficient communication channels which could be previously attributed to the isolation between the agency heads and advisors.

JFK managed the White House outside the established protocols and procedures historically expected in the office. Especially after the Bay of Pigs fiasco, JFK protected himself from traditional bureaucratic politics by restructuring the roles of the advisors and agency heads and broadening their participation in the deliberative facet of the policy making process.\textsuperscript{349} Unlike his predecessors who held structured National Security Council meetings, JFK preferred to conduct one-on-one meetings with his senior leadership and advisors. JFK was of the opinion that if critical national security matters were to be deliberated, decisions would not be possible if a wider group of officials was present. JFK’s easy going personality and down to earth personality enabled

\textsuperscript{347} Schlesinger, 78.

\textsuperscript{348} George, Presidential, 157.

\textsuperscript{349} George, Presidential, 157.
him to quickly establish a rapport with his team and other leaders, including political opponents.\textsuperscript{350} Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, found JFK really fun to work and an individual who possessed strong executive leadership weapons: a personality enriched by immense charm, intellectual integrity, and a sense of humor that forged his men into a Shakespeare band of brothers.\textsuperscript{351} The successful development of a collegial-team model of policy making supports the hypothesis that it worked because of JFK’s personality, past political experiences, and value system, i.e. operational code. It demonstrates, for the most part, that in order to properly analyze a crisis situation, a correlation needs to be made between the communication tools utilized by the policymaker and the influence his personality had on the decision making process. The possibility for the fruitful restructuring of advisory roles was strikingly demonstrated by JFK during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The lessons JFK and his close advisors had drawn from his inept management of the policy making group in the Bay of Pigs case were quickly put to use in restructuring a different approach to crisis decision making when they were confronted by Khrushchev’s deployments of the missiles into Cuba. The Cuban Missile Crisis prompted necessary critical evaluations that would need to be integrated from political, diplomatic, military and intelligence standpoints. Out of this crisis was born the ExComm, the Executive Committee of the National Security Council. JFK created a special ad hoc group of advisors from different

\textsuperscript{350} Sorensen, Kennedy, 11.

branches of government to deliberate the implications of the missile deployment for U.S. national security interests and to develop, and evaluate alternative courses of action to implement during a crisis. The inept leadership that had been displayed by JFK and his advisors during the Bay of Pigs decision making process were replaced by more sophisticated set of techniques for policy making decisions in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Even though the collegial model advocated a team approach towards policy making, JFK made it clear that ultimate authority lay with him and that the Presidency would be a podium for vigorous leadership.

The image JFK projected to the international community was just as critical as the image being displayed by Khrushchev. The image of the opponent played an important role in both the onset of the Cuban Missile Crisis and ultimately its resolution. It can be argued that for JFK the fear of failure again in light of the Bay of Pigs debacle may have been a catalyst for him to work with Khrushchev instead of challenging outright during the crisis. JFK perceived that the international community would be judging him if he did not negotiate well with Khrushchev. The Vienna Summit only highlighted to JFK that Khrushchev did not see him as a worthy opponent, but rather as a little boy who was in over his head. JFK’s fear of another failure in the political arena most likely contributed to him being more amenable to collaborating with Khrushchev in finding a

---

352 George, Presidential, 211-212.

353 Winks, 93.

354 C. Willis, Jack Kennedy – The Illustrated Life of a President (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2009), 129.
resolution to the crisis that would not end in war. JFK ideally sought peace co-
existence with the Soviet Union to avoid another altercation. Ultimately JFK
sought world peace and his motivation to achieve it most likely compelled him to
be more flexible and open-minded in dealing with Khrushchev and his chaotic
and unpredictable political and military moves. This level of tactical cautiousness
was especially seen during the Cuban Missile Crisis when JFK slowed down the
pace by authorizing the blockage and quarantine of Cuba, instead of immediately
resorting to a military engagement.

The perceptions JFK and Khrushchev had of each other further
contributed to the ultimate chess game that the Cuban Missile Crisis would
become. On one side of the chess board was Khrushchev who regarded JFK as
a young, inexperienced and weak leader who could be pushed around. At the
Vienna Summit, Khrushchev thought that he could bully JFK into achieving
movement towards the goals he had been pursuing since the late 1950s. JFK’s
attempts to discuss the situation in Berlin and the nuclear ban treaty fell on
Khrushchev’s deaf ears. What is significant is that Khrushchev noted that
although JFK was relatively inexperienced, the sincere disappointment he
expressed in Vienna at Khrushchev’s intransigence demonstrated that JFK was a
sensible man who cared about U.S.-Soviet relations. Later, as a result of this
experience, Khrushchev also viewed JFK as a rational person who would not risk
entering into a war to remove the Soviet missiles out of Cuba. Indeed, it was
Khrushchev’s perception of JFK which fueled an underestimation of the risks of
his missile deployment. Khrushchev’s character analysis was also formed from a belief that JFK was a moderate-liberal who might have a less belligerent view of the Soviet Union with a commitment to domestic reforms and civil rights, unlike Eisenhower. Khrushchev initially feared that JFK was like his father Joe Kennedy, the former Ambassador to Great Britain, who had stringent anti-communist sentiments.

On the other side of the chessboard was JFK who had sufficient insight into Khrushchev’s operational code to determine that he was man that was potentially capable of realizing his mistakes and withdrawing the missiles in Cuba if persuaded to do so. JFK’s perception of Khrushchev’s operational code played a key role in his choice of political strategy, namely applying coercive diplomacy rather than resorting to military engagement. In light of the brazen deployment of missile into Cuba, a consideration JFK took in to account was whether the Soviet leaders were committed to the point of no return that removal of this military stronghold was not an option. The ultimate question Kennedy pondered in this strategic board game was whether Khrushchev was capable of a diplomatic retreat in front of the international community. Since Khrushchev’s appearance on the political scene in 1953, he was quickly distinguished from his predecessor Josef Stalin in his open manner and desire to advance the Soviet’s Union’s political footprint internationally.

---

355 Post, Leaders, ix – x.

Some theorists suggest that Khrushchev’s motivations included a complex emotional dimension that arose from his frustration at the exposure by the United States of Soviet strategic inferiority at the collapse of his Berlin policy, the resentment of the U.S. deployment of Jupiter missiles in Turkey, and his increasing concern over mounting foreign policy problems. Khrushchev and his closest advisors were under considerable political and psychological pressure to reintegrate the powerful image of the Soviet Union. Knowledge by the international community that the real missile gap favored the United States instead of the Soviet Union, restored Western self-confidence and altered the world political climate. By the end of 1961, it could be argued that the Soviet foreign policy had lost its forward momentum and Khrushchev was encountering disappointments on many fronts.

In 1962 while on vacation in the Crimea, Khrushchev had pondered the fact that the U.S. had installed operational missiles in Turkey across the Black Sea which could reach the Soviet Union in a few minutes. Soviet missiles would need at least 30 minutes to reach the U.S. in the event of a crisis. After returning to Moscow, Khrushchev suggested deploying missiles in Cuba as a balance for the missiles the U.S. had deployed in Turkey. The Soviet Union had reluctantly learned to live with the deployment of U.S. weapons in Turkey, Italy,

---


and Britain and the potential deployment of missiles in Cuba would give the U.S. a taste of their one medicine in their back yard.\textsuperscript{360}

Khrushchev and his advisors believed that in deploying the missiles in Cuba there would also be a way to solidify Soviet-Cuban relations. Even though historians and theorists have not been able to clearly identify Khrushchev’s motivations for installing the missiles in Cuba, there are generally two schools of thought. Some theorists hold that my placing the missiles in Cuba, Khrushchev was in fact furthering his grand strategy of expanding the Soviet sphere of influence, and in turn appeasing criticisms at home. The other line of reasoning, attributes the response not so much as to pursue Cold War initiatives, but instead as a “generalized, strategic response to a whole set of problems, military, economic, and political” facing Soviet leaders in 1962.\textsuperscript{361}

Part of the impetus for placing the missiles in Cuba can be linked to the Berlin crisis the previous year. Khrushchev had lessened the pressure against the Unites States in Berlin the previous year when it became generally known by the international community that the Soviet Missile claims had been generally inflated. Indeed, it can be argued that it was Khrushchev’s fear that the United States still possessed overwhelming superiority in intercontinental missile technologies and capabilities that prompted the Soviets to deploy the missiles in Cuba. Theorists argued that the deployment of missiles in Cuba might well appear to redress the balance by extending the Soviet Union’s strategic reach in

\textsuperscript{360} Stern, \textit{Week the World Stood Still}, 19.

\textsuperscript{361} George, \textit{Deterrence}, 460-461.
Latin America, reviving a margin of insurance against a United States strategic response to a Soviet probe in Berlin. It can be argued that from the Soviet perspective, there should be no objection to the Soviet Union aligning itself with another Communist regime, and as such there was no reason why it should be regarded as an illegitimate penetration into the U.S. sphere of influence.

What further aggravated JFK’s view of Cuba was how he perceived the current government under the control of Fidel Castro. He saw Castro as both a political and religious opponent challenging the very core of his Catholic views. To the Kennedys and the Catholic Church hierarchy, Cuba’s acceptance of Castro seemed unholy. The Cuban exiles in Florida maintained their strong faith in the Catholic Church, but the rest of the Cuban nationals were imprisoned by a Communist tyrant. A CIA official claimed to have overheard JFK compare his dilemma with Castro to the question posed by Henry II about Thomas à Becket: “Who will free me from this turbulent priest?” The CIA had proposed several controversial plans after the Bay of Pigs to assassinate Castro. The plans ranged from precise methods such as poisoning to guerilla methods such as explosions. JFK as a matter of general policy had issued orders prohibiting American involvement in the assassination of foreign leaders. The impetus had stemmed from the CIA involvement in providing weapons to the rebels who killed Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.

---

363 Brown, Faces, 165.
364 Maier, 381-382.
Robert “Bobby” Kennedy held a different view. Bobby Kennedy who was tough minded and at times an arrogant official had little sympathy for Cuba’s attempt to exert its own independence over its neighbor to the north. Bobby viewed communism as far too serious a threat and he wanted action to take place against the Cuban dictator. Allen Dulles, who had been the first civilian Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had been receiving much criticism following the Bay of Pigs incident in 1962. Bobby who had been dissatisfied with Dulles advocated to have him replaced with a new Director, John McCone, who shared the Kennedy’s adamant view of Communism. McCone was deeply influenced by his Catholic views and also shared a hardline world view against Communism and Castro. However, even McCone did not condone assassinations. In August 1962, McCone learned about a plot to assassinate Castro and he made it clear to those at the meeting that he would not tolerate such a murderous conspiracy and that such actions should never be discussed or condoned by American officials. McCone who had converted to Catholicism had a deep understanding of the Church’s doctrine concluded that he could get excommunicated for such abhorrent acts against God. He tried to separate himself from such conspiracies by going as far as asserting that even the mention of an assassination should be expunged from the official meeting record.

---

365 Maier, 381.
366 Ibid.
Bobby Kennedy, although JFK’s aides tried to minimize his involvement in the Castro assassination plot, was in fact deeply engaged in the conversations. Evidence was later presented years later by the 1975 Senate Select Committee investigating U. S. intelligence activities which revealed that Bobby Kennedy was behind those operations in conjunction with the CIA. A key CIA operative involved in the plans, Richard Helms, testified before the Senate Select Committee stating that he dealt with Bobby Kennedy almost every day.

“A small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. This, and this alone, divides us. As long as it is true, nothing is possible. Once this barrier is removed, everything is possible.”

Even after the Cuban Missile Crisis ended, Bobby Kennedy still viewed Castro as a dictator who deprived the people of their autonomy.

What is significant to note in the Cuban Missile Crisis is that the only time JFK and Khrushchev formally met face-to-face was at a summit meeting held in Vienna, Austria from June 3-4, 1961. However, JFK soon found out after the Vienna Summit that Khrushchev would not be won over so convinced. On the heels of a successful trip to Paris where JFK and Jackie were honored at a grand ball in the Versailles Hall of Mirrors that was worthy of Louis XIV, JFK arrived in

---

Vienna to a completely different atmosphere full of tension. Khrushchev and JFK almost immediately went directly into eleven hours of meetings, working meals and a walk through the woods with their interpreters. Over those two days philosophical discussions were held about war and foreign policy concerns ranging from China to Southeast Asia and to the Middle East. The meetings were tough and contentious and covered a range of concerns and issues, both ideological and strategic in nature. JFK was taken by surprise by Khrushchev’s combative posture which became even more intensified when neither side yielded a point during their discussions. Khrushchev was so forceful that at the end of the Summit he left JFK with an ultimatum that signaled a new crisis over the future of Berlin which had been divided between the East and West powers after World War II. The official memorandum capturing the conversation between JFK and Khrushchev on June 4 best captures the tone and tenor of their first encounter:

“At the Vienna Summit, Khrushchev persisted in the Soviet Union’s longtime effort to drive the United States and all the western powers from West Berlin. Khrushchev announced his intention to cut off western access to Berlin and threatened war if the United States or its allies tried to stop him. The President stood his ground, affirming U.S. national interests in Berlin, and concluded the meeting saying, ‘It’s going to be a cold winter.’”

Due to Khrushchev’s intransigence at the Summit, JFK as a precautionary measure authorized that the launch sites for the Jupiter missiles in Turkey

---


369 Official Memorandum of Conversation between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev at the Soviet Embassy in Vienna, Austria, June 4, 1961, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts.
become fully operational in the event the Soviets exerted a use of force in Berlin or other venues in Europe. It was during this Vienna Summit meeting that Khrushchev had assured JFK that there would be no Soviet encroachments into the U.S. sphere of influence. This is especially significant because later when Khrushchev himself orchestrated the deployment of missiles in Cuba, he was in effect still asking JFK to accept his assurance that the Soviet missile arsenal in Cuba would only be used to deter an American attack. Khrushchev wanted to balance the show of force and apparent symmetry with the deployment of missiles in Turkey: the United States had missiles pointed at the United States in their backyard, specifically Cuba. The psychological, military, and political implications further hastened the crisis and eventual confrontation between Khrushchev and Kennedy. From a Soviet perspective, the consensus is held that if the United States by chance discovered the deployment of their missiles in Cuba, the initial U.S. response would probably be a hesitant one, and would most certainly be manifested in political and diplomatic terms rather than resorting to military

---

370 George, Limits, 93.

371 Beschloss, 150.
means. Khrushchev accepted low risks initially in the crisis with the expectation that is a conflict arose with the United States it would come only at a later point in the crisis and the Kremlin could probably manipulate the situation to control its overall risks. Khrushchev sought to protect himself with his colleagues and his critics by taking a harder line towards the United States. The slapstick incompetence and weakness displayed at the Bay of Pigs seen too great an opportunity for Khrushchev not to exploit.\textsuperscript{372} In essence, Kennedy had not stood his test in the eyes of the Soviet government.

In considering the balance of interests between U.S. – Soviet interactions, the Cuban Missile Crisis can be cited as an example of how Khrushchev reappraised their interests in Cuba, pulled them apart, and redefined them in order to save face. After the Soviet leadership had realized their tactical error, they now made it clear to the United States that the “sole” purpose of stationing Soviet missiles in Cuba was not to pose a threat to U.S. security but to defend the Cuban revolution.\textsuperscript{373} Khrushchev and his advisors felt more at ease with their declaration of intent after JFK had explicitly confirmed that the United States did not intend to intervene in internal Cuban affairs.

The grave error that prompted this entire situation was in Khrushchev’s perception of JFK. Khrushchev viewed Kennedy as weak, inexperienced, and irresolute. His assessment was predicated upon Kennedy’s handling of the Bay of Pigs fiasco and his performance in Vienna in 1961. The last thing that

\textsuperscript{372} Beschloss, 150.

Khrushchev or the Kremlin expected was to receive a stern and formidable response from JFK. Indeed this misperception of their opponent could only strengthen their belief that the missile deployment could not possible entail excessive risk. However, when JFK learned that Khrushchev had been placing missiles in Cuba while at the same time systematically deceiving him with false assurances, he realized that Khrushchev had made a dangerous miscalculation and that the only way to get the missiles out of Cuba without war or major appeasement was to impress Khrushchev, as never before, with his determination.\(^{374}\)

In spite of their cultural, political and generational differences, JFK and Khrushchev shared many similar life experiences which assisted them in establishing a unique rapport in spite of the Cold War dividing them. The war had impacted both JFK and Khrushchev in the same manner. It is critical to understand that their operational codes were controlled by similar experiences which ultimately stayed embedded within their moral fiber. They both feared war because it had led to a loss of life, disaster to a country and its people, and ultimately poverty. JFK had been touched by personal tragedy during the war and the many lives that he had seen lost around the world left a mark on him. The war had also traumatized Khrushchev. His own son, Leonid, was killed in action soon after the battle of Stalingrad even though there is a controversy surrounding his death. Khrushchev’s personal observation of the tragedies brought on by war and the aftermath in trying to rebuild a war torn society

\(^{374}\) George, Deterrence, 465-466.
triggered in Khrushchev an innate tendency towards violence. In his memoirs, Khrushchev asserted that:

"Kennedy feared war and he seemed determined to do something, to take concrete steps. He knew that war brings impoverishment to a country and disaster to a people, and that a war with the Soviet Union wouldn’t be a stroll in the woods – it would be a horrible, bloody war. Kennedy understood all this and was not afraid to call things by their own names."  

It was this common understanding of what war was and the impact that it had on a people and their country that drove both Kennedy and Khrushchev to take such cautious and reserved steps as the Cuban Missile Crisis escalate to the brink of war.

In fact, this common fear of war was a key catalyst in the relationship that the USSR wanted to establish with the United States. Khrushchev was afraid of war and the death and destruction it brought. He also knew that his country shared the same fear. With JFK having the same fear, Khrushchev knew they shared a common ground between their countries. This mutual fear of war aided both JFK and Khrushchev in feeling empathy towards each other and their country. Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, highlighted this critical factor which but for its existence the Cuban Missile Crisis would have had a totally different outcome.

Khrushchev was quoted by his son Sergei as saying:

---

375 Talbott, 491.

376 Talbott, 492.

“We differed from Kennedy in every respect. He defended his capitalist belief, his world, and we defended ours, our concept of justice. We had one thing in common: Both he and I did everything we could to preserve peace on earth.”

This shared fear of a war and yearning for world peace formed the basis for the rapport between these two world leaders.

Both JFK and Khrushchev had initially relied upon their political and intelligence sources to assess each other’s resolve in a crisis. Since Khrushchev’s appearance on the political scene in 1953, he was quickly differentiated from his predecessor Josef Stalin in his open manner and desire to advance the Soviet’s Union’s political footprint internationally.

JFK had recognized the threat posed by Cuba as early as his presidential debates against Nixon. He knew that there was a significant threat only ninety miles off the southern tip of Florida that could impact the stability of Latin America and the United States. JFK gave a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio on the night before the second presidential debate with Nixon where he attacked what he called “the most glaring failure of American policy today … a disaster that threatens the security of the whole Western Hemisphere … a Communist menace that has been permitted to arise under our very noses.” JFK was alerting the audience of the dangers posed by Fidel Castro and his brother Raul which had been experienced first hand by two recent U.S. ambassadors to Cuba.

By looking at the operational codes of each leader, their internal composition and motivations behind their military and political decisions, one can

---

378 S. Khrushchev, “How My Father.”

379 Matthews, 305-306.
best assess whether coercive diplomacy can be successfully applied. Another facet of the operational code which can impact the decision making process is stress. Alexander George addresses the significance of how stress can impair the normal decision making process and in turn create analytical problems which can indirectly escalate the confrontational situation into a conflict or worse, military engagement. Both JFK and Khrushchev performed significantly well during the Cuban Missile Crisis in spite of the exorbitant amount of stress that was generated from their political advisors, foreign partners, and critical public opinion.

Section VI: Intelligence

Intelligence played a critical role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Cuban Missile Crisis impressed both JFK and Khrushchev with the critical importance of having timely, reliable, and accurate channels of communication and for dissemination of intelligence available to political leaders in order to manage a crisis situation. Both leaders recognized that coercive diplomacy often operated on two levels of communication: words and actions. The actions taken or not taken during the crisis can reinforce verbal threats and make them more credible or can dilute and weaken the effect of even strong verbal threats.\(^{380}\) JFK and Khrushchev had in recent history experienced intelligence failures in their countries and as such were hesitant to make abrupt and hasty moves. Both JFK and Khrushchev were cautious in their communications and in conveying any

\(^{380}\) George, Forceful, 9.
signals that could be misperceived by the opponent. In addition, the quality of intelligence and analysis the leaders received from their circle of advisors and intelligence agencies, enabled them to make rational, informed decisions during the crisis, thus diminishing the possibilities of misperceptions.

The Bay of Pigs provided valuable lessons for JFK, especially in how he dealt with intelligence reporting. One of the powerful lessons was implemented as one of his first presidential acts as he commented to Arthur Schlesinger, Special Assistant to the President:

“I probably made a mistake in keeping Allen Dulles on…. It’s not that Dulles is not a man of great ability. He is. But I have never worked with him and therefore I can’t estimate his meaning when he tells me things. We will have to do something about the CIA. I must have someone there with whom I can be in complete and intimate contact – someone from whom I know I will be getting the exact pitch… It’s a helluva way to learn things, but I have learned one thing from this business – that is, that we will have to deal with the CIA.”

Allen Dulles, Director of the CIA, had been receiving much criticism following the Bay of Pigs incident in 1962. Bobby Kennedy had been promoting having him replaced with John McCone who shared the Kennedy’s adamant view of Communism. JFK forced the resignation of Allen Dulles and some of his staff. John McCone replaced Dulles on November 29, 1961.
For JFK, having reliable intelligence to identify the missile bases in Cuba was critical to having informed situational awareness of the actual threat posed by the Soviet Union. The reassurance of having a CIA that could collect, properly analyze and report accurate intelligence identifying the missile sites provided him with a solid basis to proceed cautiously and deliberately in his dealing with Khrushchev. The Cuban Missile Crisis, where intelligence proved to be a necessary ingredient in the successful culmination of the crisis, was solely lacking in the escapade that occurred during the Bay of Pigs invasion. History and past errors subconsciously dictated JFK to proceed conservatively against Khrushchev and allow diplomacy an opportunity to resolve the crisis peacefully. In order to avoid the pitfalls of the lack of communication experienced during the Bay of Pigs operation, JFK restructured his cabinet heads and policy advisors into a collegial model of policy making.

Just as JFK was seeing Cuba as a strategic location in Latin America, so too did Khrushchev. During the Eisenhower administration, the KGB which was the main security agency for the Soviet Union from 1954 until its break-up in 1991, was aggressively collecting intelligence on U.S. efforts in Latin America. The KGB predicted that there would be more U.S. covert action but assured the Kremlin that Eisenhower was not likely to launch military attack on Cuba.\textsuperscript{382} Unbeknownst to the KGB in spite of all their intelligence collection efforts, President Eisenhower was concerned at the direction which Castro’s government was taking, and in March 1960, Eisenhower allocated $4.4 million to the CIA in

order to plan the overthrow of Castro. The program’s purpose was to “bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the interest of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the United States.”

In hearing the KGB’s assessment of Eisenhower’s administration, Khrushchev chose a public forum to reassure the Cubans that their country’s security was of vital importance and interest to the Soviet Union. Khrushchev declared the Soviet Union would defend Cuba if necessary with nuclear weapons. He affirmed that:

“It should be borne in mind that the United States is now not at such an unattainable distance from the Soviet Union as formerly. Figuratively speaking, if need be, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with their rocket fire should the aggressive forces in the Pentagon dare to start intervention against Cuba. And the Pentagon could be well advised not to forget that, as shown at the latest tests, we have rockets which can land precisely in a preset square target 13,000 kilometers away. That, if you want, is a warning to those who would like to solve international problems by force and not by reason.”

As early as January 1961, Khrushchev had seen the Cuban Revolution as the expansion of communism beyond the European theater. Indeed, Khrushchev

---

383 “A Program of Covert Action against the Castro Regime,” approved by President Eisenhower at a meeting in the White House on March 17, 1960, White House, Office of Staff Sec. International Series, Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.

384 Fursenko and Naftali, *Khrushchev’s Cold War*, 305-306.
referenced the Cuban Revolution as an indication “of the triumph of socialist and communism on a world scale” and pledges support for "wars of national liberation" throughout the world.  

Following JFK’s election in 1960, the CIA informed JFK of the invasion plan set into motion under Eisenhower and JFK gave his consent to proceed with the operation based upon the intelligence at hand. This program was ultimately code named Operation Mongoose. The thrust of the plan included the utilization of Cuban exiles who were training as guerillas in Guatemala and they would participate in a large scale invasion of Cuba. JFK, based upon the intelligence received from Dulles, had wanted the plan to succeed without divulging the role of the United States in backing and organizing the exiles for the invasion. As history has shown, these expectations not only proved unrealistic, but disastrous for the Kennedy administration. On April 17, 1961, Brigade 2506 which was comprised of a 1,400 man invasion force of anti-Castro Cuban exiles, landed at the Bay of Pigs beach on the south coast of Cuba. Castro has been alerted to the attack and Cuba’s armed forces overwhelmed Brigade 2506. The Cuban exile invasion force was crumpled within two days and more than 100 men were killed, and nearly 1,100 were taken prisoner, tortured and held in Cuba for more than two years.

In spite of the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, Operation Mongoose was not shelved. Instead, the program budge was increased from $4.4 million to $50

---

million with operational resources amounting to approximately 400 intelligence officers and agents engaged in a variety of covert operations under the direction of the Attorney General, which included attempts on Castro’s life.\(^{386}\) The budgetary increase was a result of the program assessment conducted by Brigadier General Lansdale for review by a committee of the National Security Council known as the Special Group Augmented (SGA). The program review for Operation Mongoose and transmittal memo for Brigadier General Lansdale highlighted that “any inference that this plan exists could place the President of the United States in a most damaging position” and underscores maintaining a control on the access to the information contained in the report.\(^{387}\) The document called for increase intelligence collection efforts to provide a better ground truth of Soviet activities on the island of Cuba. Even though the plan clearly states that the “the United States will help the people of Cuba overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace,” the SGA decided to reduce the scale of the plan set forth in Brigadier General Lansdale’s operational review.\(^{388}\)

In the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Soviet and American participants in the crisis met at a conference and exchanged information about the events leading to the crisis itself which provided insight into their


\(^{387}\) Program Review for Operation Mongoose and Transmittal Memo from Brigadier General Lansdale, dated February 20, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, Boston, Massachusetts.

\(^{388}\) Program Review for Operation Mongoose.
motivations.\textsuperscript{389} We learned that the Soviets wanted to equalize the strategic imbalance by placing offensive missiles in Cuba, proximately positioned just 90 miles off the United States. This strategy was a calculated move comparable to the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union being fenced off by Western missiles. But the Soviet Strategic Rocket forces did not deviate from their usual standard operating procedures which rendered them vulnerable to detection. The Soviets employed the same protocols in Cuba for constructing missile bases that they had used in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Instead of applying additional safeguards to maintain the secrecy of their operations, did not employ camouflage, the missile bases were clearly visible to air traffic. As a result, the U-2 overflights easily captured the configurations and specifications of the missile bases under construction which had the same configuration in overhead photography as those in the Warsaw Pact.

In the spring of 1962, Khrushchev wanted to counter the growing lead in technological advancements and placements of strategic missiles by the United States against the Soviet Union in Turkey by deploying Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles on the island of Cuba, just 90 miles away from the U.S. Specifically, the Soviets decided to place nuclear equipped SS-4 and SS-5 ballistic missiles in Cuba to counter the increasing edge in ballistic missiles aimed at the Soviet Union. The operational deployment was to be concealed from U.S. intelligence agencies by concocting an elaborate program that combined human intelligence (HUMINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), open source press and technical reporting, as well as the critical diplomatic deception.\textsuperscript{389}

\textsuperscript{389} Post, Leaders, 15.
In May 1962 Khrushchev presented a plan to the Presidium to secretly deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba, a proposal that was quickly approved. The Soviet plan is eventually code named Operation Anadyr which was the site of a strategic air base in Siberia near the Siberian river from which Soviet bombers could reach the United States. The name was intended to mislead Soviets as well as foreigners about the ultimate destination of the equipment. After Khrushchev had decided to establish a base and deploy missiles in Cuba, the planning of Operation Anadyr was contained within the Soviet military planning apparatus under the General Staff’s Chief Operations Directorate. As part of the façade, Soviet troops, as well as Cuban troops who had been invited to participate in the exercise, were solely informed that they would be assisting in an exercise in Siberia.

The thrust of the plan was to build a powerful Soviet military base 90 miles from the U.S. coast. The Soviet Union would dispatch forty nuclear range missiles consisting of both intermediate range and medium range missiles which if deployed could strike U.S. strategic missile base in the Midwest and Washington, D.C. Khrushchev was reacting in part to the Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles which the United States had installed in Turkey during

---

390 Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 191.
391 Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 191.
393 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 439-440.
April 1962. Khrushchev also perceived that after the Bay of Pigs debacle, JFK would lack the confidence to confront the Soviet Union. Once the missiles were in Cuba, JFK would accept that the missiles had entered Cuba without their knowledge and would not seek to challenge the Soviet Union and potentially live through another failed political engagement.

The Soviet Union proposed the plan to place the missiles in Cuba to Castro on May 30, 1962 which he quickly accepted. Castro, from his perspective, was reacting to the possibility of the United States again attempting to invade Cuba like had been attempted during the Bay of Pigs. It was not unreasonable for Castro to seek protection from the Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs. Castro was committed to the plan but sought to make the deployment public in order to avert an aggressive reaction from the U.S. He had hoped that through a public proclamation or an open alliance with the Soviet Union for conventional military aid would result in a deterrence against U.S. aggression towards Cuba. Castro did not request, nor did he seek to have nuclear missile deployed to Cuba. This was part of Khrushchev’s plan, not Castro’s.

In an effort to sway Khrushchev’s position, sent the Minister for Industry, Che Guevara and the head of the Cuban militia on a delegation to Moscow to introduce Castro’s proposed revisions into the draft treaty Khrushchev had approved. Khrushchev insisted on executing Operation Anadyr in secret despite Castro’s urging to make the deployments a public announcement to underscore
the forged military relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba. In his memoirs Khrushchev recalled that when he can Castro talked about the problem of the missiles, they had a very heated argument, but ultimately Castro was pressured into agreeing with Khrushchev. Both Khrushchev and Castro felt that the United States needed to be confronted with more than just mere words and in their minds the deployment of the missiles in Cuba was the logical answer. Castro reluctantly accepted the nuclear missiles in Cuba, but later declared not in order to ensure our own defense, but primarily to strengthen socialism on the international plane. The Soviet deployment of missile in Cuba occurred rapidly over the next few months.

Operation Anadyr combined critical elements of Soviet intelligence sources and methods, with calculated steps to mask and operationalize their deployment of missiles in Cuba. The use of HUMINT, IMINT and the exploitation of diplomatic channels to implement Operation Anadyr proved initially fruitful for the Soviet Union. Some of the tactical steps taken to conceal the Soviet’s true strategic military plan included several carefully planned activities.

- Soviet military units designated for the Cuban assignment were told that they were being deployed to a cold region. They were outfitted with skis, felt boots, fleece line parkas, and other winter survival equipment.

---

394 Bredhoff, 17.
395 Talbott, 511.
Soviet officer and technical specialists traveled to Cuba under the cover of being agricultural specialists, machine operators, and irrigation specialists.

Missiles were shipped to Cuba from eight (8) different Soviet ports to hide the magnitude of the deployment and the missiles were loaded onto the vessels under the protection of the cover of darkness.

The actual crates containing the missiles and launch pads were shielded from infrared photography with metal sheets which would preclude the wavelengths from penetrating the crates to capture its contents.

Conventional tractors, harvesters, automobiles and other agricultural equipment were loaded on the top decks of the vessels to convey the impression that the ships were transporting only agrarian tools.

The cargo vessels entered false declarations when departing the ports in the Black Sea and the Bosporus. Cargo records were altered and export declarations declared tonnage well below what was being transported. The ultimate destinations for the cargo were often listed as Conakry, Guinea.

The Soviet Union coordinated with Castro in Cuba to ensure that anything that resembled agricultural equipment was unloaded in the daytime. Any type of weaponry was only unloaded at night and was moved directly to the missile bases situated along the roads at night to prevent detection by U.S. intelligence assets.

Radio Moscow regularly broadcast reports that the Soviet Union was supplying Cuba with wheat, machine tools, and agricultural equipment, as well as fertilizer to enhance the agrarian capabilities.

From a U.S. intelligence perspective, the month of September brought to light how significant the Soviet threat was becoming. Throughout the summer of 1962 the CIA detected Soviet military shipments to Cuba. On September 4, 1962 JFK issues a statement warning the Soviet Union that “the gravest issues would arise” if they were to deploy weapons “with significant offensive capability.”\textsuperscript{397} As

\textsuperscript{397} Fursenko and Naftali, \textit{One Hell of a Gamble}, 205-206.
a precaution, JFK calls up 150,000 reservists for one year of active duty in the
event the need for an immediate U.S. military response should arise. 398

What is significant is that in spite of the public warning from the United
States, the Soviet Union repeatedly denies the deployment of offensive weapons
into Cuba. 399 The Soviet Union continually denies the deployment of offensive
weapons into Cuba. The spokesmen for the Soviet Union maintained a steady
flow of denials and disinformation throughout September. Indeed, on 4
September Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin met with Attorney General Robert
Kennedy and stated that he had received instructions from Khrushchev to assure
the President that there would be no surface-to-surface missiles or offensive
weapons placed in Cuba. 400 Dobrynin also added that the Attorney General
could assure his brother that the Soviet military buildup was not of any
significance. 401

Later on September 6, Theodore Sorenson, special counsel to President
Kennedy, met with Dobrynin, who reiterated his assurances that Soviet military
assistance to Cuba was strictly defensive in nature and did not represent a threat
to American security. The following day, Dobrynin assured US Ambassador to

398 Dallek, 539.
399 Hansen, “Soviet Deception.”
400 Hansen, “Soviet Deception.”
401 Dino A. Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: Random House, 1991), p. 191. Note: The author was a key figure at the National
Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in 1962. The NPIC functions have since been
absorbed into the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), and was formerly a component
of the CIA Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T). NPIC produced imagery interpretation
reports, briefing boards, videotapes for national-level consumers, and provided support for the
military. NPIC employed some 1,200 image interpreters and archivists.
the United Nations Adlai Stevenson that the USSR was supplying only defensive weapons to Cuba. Then to underscore the message, on September 11 the Soviet Union’s news agency, TASS, announced that the USSR neither needed nor intended to introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba, again attempting to mask the true nature of the Soviet shipments into Cuba.\textsuperscript{402}

In spite of Soviet reassurances, JFK requested intelligence sources to collect data that would either validate Soviet assertions, or most likely confirm the belief that the Soviets were in fact deploying missiles into Cuba. With the input of the CIA, and specifically the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC), the U.S. detected more state of the art technologically advanced surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) in Cuba. As a result, after September 10 JFK instructed the military to limit the amount of time U-2 reconnaissance planes would spend over Cuba to diminish the potential risk of one being shot down during an overpass.

Many intelligence failures occur because the analysts were either more rational than the leaders whose decisions they predicted, or simply because they were not looking at all the forces that were in play. The manner in which the intelligence estimate was generated and analyzed assessing the deployment of missile in Cuba by the Soviets illustrates the problem described as “philosophical predisposition” which means a situation in which expectations fail to apply to the

\textsuperscript{402} James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, with the assistance of Davis Lewis, \textit{Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse} (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), 8. Note: This source draws extensively on input from key Soviet and American officials who were involved in the crisis.
facts of the case at hand. The Soviets had never deployed nuclear weapons outside their immediate control before 1962, and U.S. intelligence analysts incorrectly assumed that they would therefore not deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba. Raw intelligence and other supporting information was discounted if it contradicted the assumption that the Soviets would not now deploy missiles out of their control in Cuba.

The counterintelligence technique of deception through outright erroneous information or intentional disinformation thrives on this tendency to ignore evidence that would disprove an existing assumption made in an intelligence threat assessment. What propounds this inconsistency is that once an intelligence agency analyzes information to generate a firm estimate, it will have the tendency in future estimates or threat briefs to outright ignore or explain away contradictory information. Denial and deception in intelligence can be used to manipulate information against one opponent can get the other to make a wrong initial estimate. This is especially true in the intelligence estimate generated in the Cuban Missile Crisis where it was a denial of what potentially the Soviet could implement. The intentional ignoring of intelligence that presents a different outcome than what is being sought is not the case in the Cuban Missile Crisis but rather an example of defective analysis that was ultimately corrected to produce successful outcomes.

---


404 Clark, 142.

405 Clark, 142.
John McCone, the new Director of the CIA who replaced John Dulles, was a key figure in the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (EXCOMM) during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. McCone left Washington, D.C. on August 23 to marry Theiline McGee Pigott, the widow of a rich Seattle industrialist and an old family friend. During his honeymoon cruise to Europe and his three-week stay on Cap Ferrat on the French Riviera, he received daily briefing telegrams. The intelligence in the daily briefings deepened his apprehension about the situation in Cuba and the underlying motives of the Soviets. On September 7, 10, 13 and 20 he responded with telegrams expressing his mounting concern. But, again, he did not direct that the "honeymoon telegrams" be passed along to the President. They were treated as "in-house" messages and were not circulated outside the CIA.

During McCone's absence, the Board of National Estimates was asked to assess the possibility that the Soviets would station offensive missiles in Cuba. And on September 19, 1962 a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 83-3-62 was published concluding that it was unlikely that nuclear missiles would be placed on the island.406 The tasking for this estimate was undertaken when intelligence reporting from Cuba began to indicate a significant increase in the number and quantity of military supplies to Cuba. The SNIE conceded that the Russians might be tempted to introduce the missiles for psychological reasons, particularly to impress the Latin Americans and Cuba presented a geographically

strategic venue.\textsuperscript{407} It also alluded to the possibility that the Soviets might wish to strengthen their position in Cuba as a prelude in the event a move would be made against Berlin by the West. However, the drafters of the SNIE assumed the Soviets knew that the placement of missiles in Cuba would probably provoke some type of U.S. military intervention. Nevertheless, the Estimate stated that it was highly unlikely that offensive missiles would be sent in, because the Soviets would be deterred by their awareness of the violent reaction which such a move would provoke on the part of the United States. The chief Kremlinologists in the State Department, Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen and Llewellyn E. (Tommy) Thompson, Jr., both former ambassadors to Moscow, concurred with the NIE.\textsuperscript{408}

As part of Operation Anadyr, the Soviets actually leaked accurate information about the deployment of the missiles to Cuba which proved to be a brilliant strategic move. The Soviets channeled accurate details of their deployment through counterrevolutionary Cuban organizations in the United States. The CIA which was entrenched in their assessment did not give any credibility to the information because they originated with groups did not assess as reliable sources of intelligence. Along the same vein, the CIA also discounted and dismissed the stream of reports from Cubans, tourists and foreign diplomats in Cuba who in hindsight were providing accurate reliable information on the Soviet maneuvers.\textsuperscript{409}

\textsuperscript{407} Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{408} Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{409} Hansen, “Soviet Deception.”
McCone who held an inherent mistrust of the Soviets and was skeptical as to their intentions, disagreed with the analysis of the NIE. Later in presenting testimony before the Senate Preparedness Subcommittee on March 12, 1963, McCone stated that he had reported this view within CIA channels on August 10. He couldn't understand why these surface-to-air missile sites were there because they were useless for protecting the island against invasion. In his opinion, the purpose of the missiles was to shield the island against observation from aerial reconnaissance. McCone conceded, however, that his view, was based on "intuition" without "hard intelligence." And although as Director of Central Intelligence he could have ordered that his view be made the official view and reported to Kennedy, he did not do so.

Throughout the month of September, Soviet diplomats in Washington, D.C. repeatedly gave assurances to senior U.S. officials, including JFK and Cabinet members, that they had no intentions of deploying military weaponry in Cuba.\(^410\) Then on September 20, 1962 in what has come to be known and the Honeymoon Telegram, McCone insisted that the CIA remain imaginative when it came to Soviet weapons policy towards Cuba. The telegram was so named because McCone sent it while on his honeymoon accompanied not only by his bride, Theiline McGee Pigott but also by a CIA cipher team. McCone's suspicions of the inaccuracy of this assessment proved to be correct, as it was later found out the Soviet Union had followed up its conventional military buildup with the installation of MRBMs (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles) and IRBMs

\(^{410}\) Hansen, "Soviet Deception."
(Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles), sparking off the crisis in October when they were later spotted by CIA's Lockheed U-2 surveillance flights. His background in engineering and business may also have been a factor. Knowing the difficulty and expense that the Soviets would have incurred installing a SAM umbrella to include areas of no tactical significance, McCone could have reasoned that the consensus view at the time (that the military reinforcement of Cuba was merely intended to make it a harder target for the US to attack) was unlikely.411

Operation Anadyr had some gaps that ultimately led to the confirmation by U.S. Intelligence agencies to the discovery of the San Cristobal missile site in October and the start of the Cuban Missile Crisis. First, the Soviets used the freighter Poltava to transport the missiles. Some U.S. intelligence experts speculated that the ship might be carrying ballistic missiles because the Soviets historically had used large-hatch ships comparable to the Poltava to deliver such missiles.412 Then, once deployed, the missile units were not properly concealed from aerial reconnaissance and intelligence overflights. The vessels, the positions of the cargo, and the specifications formulated unique characteristic imagery signatures that the Soviets neglected to change.413 This lack of attention to detail, no matter how elaborate Operation Anadyr was plotted, led to the U.S.


412 Hansen, “Soviet Deception.”

413 Clark, 173.
Intelligence agencies’ discovery of the missile site at San Cristobal, Cuba in October.

The next few days in October would trigger an escalation between the United States and the Soviet Union which led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. On one side of the chess board Khrushchev believes that he has outsmarted the young and naïve JFK by masking the cargo shipments to Cuba and then denying the true nature of the Soviet intentions. In order to properly conceal the missiles that would be transported to Cuba, the Soviets began changing their maritime transit practices in June and July. The Soviet Union began to charter Western flagged vessels to transport their general cargo to Cuba, reserving its own freighters for carrying military cargo. Technical support specialists and operational personnel that would be assigned to the missile project on the ground in Cuba traveled under the covers of being machine operators, irrigation specialists and agricultural specialists. These missile technology experts were intermingled with the genuine machine operators, irrigation and agricultural specialists and were instructed by Operation Anadyr officials to consult the true specialists traveling with them to gain some basic knowledge of the jobs they were allegedly going to be performing when they arrived in Cuba.

The first nuclear warheads arrived in Cuba on October 4, 1962. In spite of the missile’s physical presence in Cuba, the Soviet Union continued to deny the presence of any offensive weapons on the island. Starting on October 9, JFK

---

414 Brugioni, 92.
415 Gribkov and Smith, 56.
ordered an increase in the surveillance flights over Cuba in an effort to obtain visual evidence of Soviet nuclear site on the island. As a result of the intensified aerial photographic reconnaissance flights, the first documented evidence of the presence of Soviet missiles in Cuba was captured on October 14 after more than 900 images had been captured. The morning of October 14, 1962 Major Richard Heyser began the crossing of Cuba in his U-2 reconnaissance plane. He flew almost due north-on a course some 60 miles to the west of Havana and passed over the northerly beaches six minutes later. In that brief timespan he took 928 pictures, which covered a swath 75 miles wide and the resolution of his best shots was as precise as a matter of three feet. The imagery intelligence (IMINT) of the MRBM Field Launch site, San Cristobal NO 2, captured on October 14, 1962 was evaluated by intelligence analysts at the NPIC on October 15, who concluded that the photographs provided conclusive evidence of Soviet missile site construction in Cuba.

The intelligence brief was provided to JFK on October 16, 1962 who then learned of the imminent threat to the national security of the U.S. and of the Soviet Union’s ongoing deception. As a supplemental analysis, the CIA reported that based upon the IMINT and human intelligence (HUMINT) they had been collecting, some of the Soviet missiles were already operational and were likely armed with nuclear warheads with the launch capability of reaching strategic

---


417 Imagery Intelligence: MRBM Field Launch Site, San Cristobal No. 2, 14 October 1962 (Detail), Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files, Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
targeting in the U.S.\textsuperscript{418} After being presented with the IMINT and specific photographic evidence of the missile sites in Cuba, JFK immediately assembled a group of senior advisors to assist him in formulating a response.

Later on October 22, 1962 by National Security Action Memorandum 196, JFK formally established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, better known as the “Ex Comm.”\textsuperscript{419} This advisory core group formed the senior leadership which deliberated and formulated a U.S. response to the Soviet Union’s actions during the Cuban Missile Crisis and began deliberations at the first instance when the missiles were discovered in Cuba. What is significant about the Ex Comm is that JFK placed intelligence at the forefront of the discussions and integrated the most recent intelligence throughout their deliberations. Most Ex Comm meetings began with an intelligence update delivered by McCone, the Director of the CIA.\textsuperscript{420} Intelligence was objectively assessed and weighed against the delicate situation that the crisis brought.

In the correlating the impact of the leader’s operational code and how he interprets intelligence, the Cuban Missile Crisis provides a good example not only of JFK’s perspectives, but also of his advisory team – the Ex Comm. McCone provided a briefing on October 18 where he reported that intelligence and photo


\textsuperscript{419}“National Security Action Memorandum 196, dated October 22, 1962,” Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files, Cuba, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{420}Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
analysts found the evidence to confirm the construction for intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Cuba (IRBMs). The range of these IRBMs expanded to nearly 2,200 miles and now these missiles based in Cuba would pose a threat to all parts of the United States except for the Pacific Northwest coast.\footnote{Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, ed.,} The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002), 76. In analyzing transcripts of the Ex Comm discussions surrounding a possible strike against Cuba and the Soviets, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara remembered that JFK opposed launching a surprise military strike, in part, because it was “contrary to our traditions and ideals, and an act of brutality for which the world would never forgive us.”\footnote{Bredhoff, 31.}

The synergy of collecting, collating and analyzing all-source intelligence was especially demonstrated in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The concept of all source intelligence is the fusion of multiple collection sources to overlay and fill gaps which may exist if information were solely gathered from one source. Specifically, it could mean the collection of human intelligence (HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), communications intelligence (COMINT) and open source intelligence (OSINT) to analyze and formulate an integrated situational picture. Intelligence based upon as many collection sources as possible to compensate for the information gaps in each generates a product that profits from the strength of all the collection methodologies, i.e. all source intelligence.\footnote{Lowenthal, Intelligence, 74-75.}
The Cuban Missile Crisis presents an example of integrated collection synergy where all source intelligence was collated and analyzed to present leaders with enhanced situational awareness to enable better policy decisions. Even though CIA analysts failed to recognize that Khrushchev was willing to deploy missiles to Cuba as a means of balancing the strategic military capability against the U.S., the intelligence community did in fact exploit multiple sources and methods of intelligence collection that lead to the positive identification of the missiles in San Cristobal, Cuba. HUMINT was provided by a source with data that targeted the U-2 flights over a trapezoid-shaped area encircled by four towns in western Cuba. Anti-Castro Cubans on the island provided reliable evidence that missiles were being deployed in San Cristobal.\textsuperscript{424} The U-2 overflights then captured the critical photographic imagery and naval assets provided the coordinates of the Soviet vessels transporting the missiles to the almost finished sites in San Cristobal. These sources of information captured only a facet of the picture in Cuba and the Soviet encroachment into the Americas.

The ultimate source of human intelligence was Soviet Red Army Colonel Oleg Penkovsky, codenamed “Hero”, who was spying for both the U.S. and Great Britain, had provided the Soviet standard operating procedures and technical specification manuals for the missiles who were being deployed to Cuba. These manuals deciphered the not-so-subtle images of the Soviet missiles.

\textsuperscript{424} Lowenthal, \textit{Intelligence}, 74-75.
Star of David’ because of its resemblance to that religious symbol. To the untrained eye it looked like an odd road interchange, but trained U.S. photo interpreters recognized it as a pattern they had seen before – in Soviet missile fields. ⁴²⁵

Indeed, without being able to properly examine and explain the framework contained in the image capturing the missile sites, and without having photographs of Soviet missile fields to compare, intelligence analysts would have been ridiculed and accused of reading into what amounted to crossed lines in a field. It was Penkovsky who provided the U.S. with reliable and authoritative tactical and operational level intelligence regarding the missile specifications and the status of Soviet strategic forces which validated the overwhelming U.S. superiority over Soviet forces. This valuable asset was arrested in Moscow on the morning of October 22 by the KGB. Penkovsky was recruited by British intelligence in April 1961 and had systematically been passing critical KGB and Soviet military secrets, most significantly that Soviet missile technology was far less advanced than that of the U.S. ⁴²⁶ But for the intelligence provided by the spy Penkovsky, the U.S. would not have had the insight to validate the deployment of the missiles.

The spying activities of Penkovsky created severe vulnerabilities for the Soviet Union. The Soviet intelligence apparatus was not as factually accurate as that of the U.S. which lead to gross miscalculations on the part of Khrushchev as the crisis unfolded. Khrushchev had assumed that the U.S. would tolerate the presence of the missile sites in Cuba and once fully operational the U.S. would

⁴²⁵ Lowenthal, Intelligence, 90.
⁴²⁶ Thompson, 256.
not take any action against either Cuba or the Soviet Union. JFK’s October 22 address to the nation in response to the uncovering of the missile sites in Cuba made it clear that the U.S. was taking precautionary steps in the event of heightened threats to safeguard U.S. national security interests against the spread of Communism in the Western Hemisphere. This forceful but conservative speech alarmed the Soviets, especially Khrushchev who had miscalculated JFK’s objectives.

The Soviet Union quickly decided to seek a means out of the situation they had created. The most appropriate means would be through diplomatic means. In the interim, Khrushchev had received exaggerated intelligence reports from the KGB concluding that the U.S. was on the verge of an imminent invasion of Cuba. The major source of Soviet intelligence stemmed from Soviet assets on the ground at the missile sites and Castro himself. Castro viewed the U.S. reconnaissance flights as a precursor to what he believed to be the planning stages for an all-out invasion into Cuba. After hearing JFK’s October 22 address to the nation, he was completely convinced the a U.S. attack on Cuba was imminent and that it would result in a nuclear war between the Soviet Union and the United States where Cuba would be the collateral damage and would be annihilated. Castro determined to protect his island, urged Khrushchev in a message he wrote on October 26 not to wait until the U.S. took action, but rather requested that he launch a pre-emptive strike against the United States. Castro
viewed himself as an integral part of this crisis and sought to demonstrate Cuba’s resolve in supporting him and the Soviet Union.427

Khrushchev, on the other hand viewed Castro as a loose cannon that could potentially aggravate an already volatile situation. As a result, Khrushchev drafted his famous “knot of war” offering to remove the missiles from the sites in Cuba in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. The Soviet intelligence assessment instead of presenting all the options the U.S. was considering, only cited the most extreme reaction the U.S. could take response to their placement of the missiles in Cuba. Just as the CIA has published the NIE miscalculating Soviet actions and intentions, so too had Soviet intelligence analysts generated a product that prompted Khrushchev to take immediate action to prevent what he saw as the onset of a potential nuclear war.

Due to the delay in communicating secure messages through diplomatic channels, Khrushchev was still apprehensive that the message would not reach JFK quickly. This is a key turning point in the crisis because Khrushchev never personally believed that a man like JFK would resort to military force in such a volatile and dangerous situation which would change the world for generations to come. The Soviet leader’s son, Sergei Khrushchev later stated that: “Father decided to try to change horses in midstream … now it was all logical: the [U.S.] base in Turkey in exchange for the [Soviet] base in Cuba.”428 Khrushchev dictated another letter where he introduced a quid pro quo demanding the

427 Blight, Allyn, and Welch, 251-252 and 481-482.

428 Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, 596.
removal of the U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey. In order to ensure that the message carried quickly to JFK, he ordered that the letter be read over the air waves by Radio Moscow and it was broadcast as the Ex Comm was deliberating his initial proposal. 429

The missiles crisis was a U.S. intelligence success even though it commenced as a mistaken assessment of the situation. The collection of intelligence from several sources allowed for the missile sites to be discovered before they were completed and fully operational. Most importantly, the HUMINT that was collected gave the decision maker, President Kennedy, the firm assessment of Soviet strategic and conventional force capabilities which resulted in strengthening his ability to make difficult, yet informed decisions in the crisis. A by-product of this intelligence success was a step towards restoring the Intelligence Community’s credibility as to its operational capability in the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs intelligence failure. 430

Section VII: Coercive Diplomacy – Stages and Strategies in the Cuban Missile Crisis

A challenge faced by policymakers in the early stages of a potential conflict is what strategies are available to avert a crisis from developing unto an undesirable engagement. Conflict management strives to balance extensive diplomatic efforts with the threats of force and military preparations. Other factors can impact the ability of a decisionmaker to achieve such a delicate during an

429 Bredhoff, 70.
430 Lowenthal, Intelligence, 2.
ongoing crisis. Military capabilities, for example, must meet several special political-military requirements in order to constitute usable options in controlled crisis situations.

More than any preceding crisis, the Cuban Missile Crisis forced leading members of the Kennedy administration to determine what their general doctrine of controlled, flexible response meant in terms of a specific design for formulating usable options for the President in exerting U.S. foreign policy objectives. There are seven criteria that are identified as key factors utilized by JFK and his team of advisors in comparing and evaluating possible military options.

“1. Maintain top-level civilian control of military options… 2. Create pauses in the tempo of military actions… 3. Coordinate diplomatic and military moves… 4. Confine military moves to those that constitute clear demonstrations of one’s resolve and are appropriate to limit one’s limited crisis objectives… 5. Avoid military moves that give the opponent the impression that one is about to resort to large-scale warfare and, therefore, force him to consider preemption… 6. Choose diplomatic-military options that signal a desire to negotiate rather than to seek a military solution… 7. Select diplomatic-military options that leave the opponent a way out of the crisis that is compatible with his fundamental interests.”

Of utmost importance for crisis management is top level civilian control over the timing and selection of military actions. It has been argued that in order to properly grasp and tailor the momentum of crisis management, the leader must be intricately involved in the authorization of each military option. The unfolding sequence of the military and political-diplomatic actions must be closely


432 George, Limits, 9-11.
coordinated and must provide clear and appropriate demonstration of the leader’s resolve and of his crisis objectives. The momentum of military movements may have to be deliberately slowed down in order to provide enough time for the two sides to exchange diplomatic signals and communications. Military options must be programmed in such a way that they permit significant pauses in the momentum of military operations so that the opponent may reflect upon the signals and proposals addressed to him. In this vein, the opponent must be given the opportunity to ponder the situation at hand without being subjected to too many signals from the opposition.

To this end, the leader and his advisors must control and eliminate actions and statements which might give confusing signals regarding his demands and offers. These safeguards reduce the possibility of misperceptions during the crisis which can inevitable lead to misunderstandings and unwanted escalations culminating in a full scale war. Whatever military moves are undertaken must be carefully coordinated with political-diplomatic actions and communications. The military options need for crisis management must not confront the opponent with an urgent requirement to escalate the conflict himself, but instead must use military options that will be militarily effective in accomplishing their specific tactical objective while at the same time affording the opponent a way out to save face.

The two political requirements for crisis management are: (1) the limitation of objectives pursued in the crisis, and (2) the limitation of the means employed on behalf of those objectives. International political views and internal political
pressures, as well as the leader’s operational code and perceptions of the opponent have underscored that the more ambitious the goals pursued at the expense of the adversary, the more intensely the adversary will be to resist any type of compromise or quid pro quo. The Cuban Missile Crisis is a classic case highlighting a limitation of objectives and means where JFK limited both by confining his objective to the removal of the missiles and rejecting a military confrontation through the use of a naval blockade.

The task of implementing coercive diplomacy can be relatively easy or quite formidable, depending on what one demands of the opponent and how strongly he is motivated not to do what is asked of him. The policy maker must, therefore, find a combination of a carrot and stick approach that will suffice to overcome the opponent’s disinclination to yield. In other words, the demands made of the opponent must be less unattractive to him than the threatened consequences if he does not acquiesce. Further, if the threatened consequences are not strong enough for this purpose, then concessions must be offered to the opponent as well so that the combination of negative and positive inducements directed towards him will outweigh the attractiveness of what is demanded. Both JFK and Khrushchev displayed a keen awareness of the requirements of coercive diplomacy and regulated their behavior in accordance with them during the Cuban Missile Crisis. For both leaders, it was a shared experience “of being

---

433 George, “Provisional,” 24.
434 George, Limits, 135.
435 George, Limits, 135-136.
poised on opposite edges of an abyss, with imperfect means of communication or of understanding the act and purposes of the other, and with the weapons by which each demonstrated resolve but which promised not victory but mutual suicide if they came to be used.\footnote{Farley, 233.}

Exemplary coercive diplomacy, crisis management techniques, savvy utilization of critical intelligence, and conservative personal behavior was exhibited by both JFK and Khrushchev in the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Kennedy, utilizing the lessons of recent history and experience with the Bay of Pigs as his framework, rejected pressure from his advisors to use military force in the form of an airstrike at the onset to remove the Soviet missiles once they were identified through intelligence. Instead, JFK selected a more visible, yet nonviolent naval blockade of soviet ships carrying arms headed for Cuba as a signal of resolve.\footnote{Brown, \textit{Causes}, 194-195.} The Ex Comm supported the blockade as a strong but limited military action which still afforded the opportunity for diplomatic channels to resolve the crisis. On October 23, JFK signed a Quarantine Proclamation authorizing the naval quarantine of Cuba which declared that the quarantine line would consist of a 500 mile radius from the eastern tip of Cuba.\footnote{Quarantine Proclamation: Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba, signed October 23, 1962, by President John F. Kennedy, General Records of the U.S. Government Archives, Washington, D.C., 1-4.} The language was carefully crafted because the term ‘blockade’ was regarded under international law as an act of war, whereas a ‘quarantine’ was interpreted in a...
less aggressive manner. Further, JFK from what insight he had gained into Khrushchev’s personal beliefs about war, did not believe that the Soviet Union would be so easily provoked into launching an attack against the U.S. by a mere blockade.

Extensive research was conducted by legal experts from both the Department of State and Department of Justice who concluded that the use of a blockade could be implemented and a declaration of war could be avoided as long as another legal justification was found. Based upon the Rio Treaty for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, JFK obtained the legal justification for the blockade through a resolution by a two-thirds vote from the members of the Organization of American States (OAS). The validation of an international organization provided the U.S. with the legitimacy needed to undertake the implementation of the blockade. JFK supported the more conservative approach to addressing the conflict, but the matter needed to be discussed by his senior advisors, the group that would ultimately become the Ex Comm. After extensive review of the impact the blockade and air strike would have in attempting to remove the missiles from Cuba, the Ex Comm supported the less aggressive blockade. The blockade proved more desirable especially since the U.S. had gained international support through the OAS under the hemispheric defense provisions of the Rio Treaty. The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, better known as the Rio Treaty, was ratified after the Inter-American Conference

---

439 Bredhoff, 44.

on Problems of War and Peace which convened in Mexico City in 1947 and recommended “a treaty to prevent and repel threats and acts of aggression against any of the countries of America.”

In drafting the document authorizing the blockade or ‘quarantine’, the language of the proclamation was intended to address the immediate threat of the missiles in Cuba, as well as the intolerance by the U.S. of the Sino-Soviet threat.

“Whereas the peace of the world and the security of the United States and of all American States are endangered by reason of the establishment of the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles with a potential range covering most of North and South America....[w]hereas by a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress of the United States ... it was declared that the United States is determined to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending, by force or by the threat of force, its aggressive or subversive activities to any part of the hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering the security of the United States... Therefore, I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America... in accordance with the resolutions of the United States Congress and of the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics, and to defend the security of the United States hereby proclaim that the forces under my command are ordered ... to interdict ....the delivery of offensive weapons and associated materiel [sic] to Cuba.”

As in a precisely calculated game of chess, JFK deliberately slowed down the pace of the crisis activity, so as to give his opponent sufficient time to recalculate his risks. Both leaders concentrated on finding a formula to resolve

---


442 Widmer, 168-173; signed Quarantine Proclamation 3504, 1-4.
the crisis without humiliation or the opponent losing face. Such conservative and calculated moves in this particular political game of chess resulted in the Cuban Missile Crisis ending in a stalemate: “… a quid pro quo of the Soviet removal of their offensive strategic weapons from Cuba in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade the island and a secret assurance that the United States would remove its anti-Soviet missiles based in Turkey.”

JFK felt that he must find a way to impress Khrushchev with his determination so that Khrushchev would believe him if and when it became necessary to press harder to secure removal of the missiles. JFK chose the blockade option as the vehicle by which he would demonstrate his resolve and rid himself of the image of a weak American leader in the eyes of Khrushchev. Even though the blockade was seen by many as a relatively weak strategy for persuading the opponent to undo or reverse what he had already done, which was to remove the missiles from Cuba, it was a much stronger coercive strategy for persuading Khrushchev to stop sending more missile to Cuba. To achieve his objectives, JFK had to implement the blockade with careful consideration to the requirements for managing a crisis so that the blockage measures themselves would not escalate the situation and erupt in violent conflict or war. By the same token, JFK made his intentions precisely clear to Khrushchev what the Soviets would have to do in order to settle the crisis and to assure the

---

443 Brown, Causes, 195.
444 George, Limits, 88.
Soviets that the United States would not use military force at that stage of the confrontation.

In the end, JFK’s image of Khrushchev was decisive. JFK saw the Soviet Chairman as a rational, intelligent man, who if given sufficient time and shown determination, would alter his position. JFK saw that Khrushchev was rational and thus capable of retreating and that an effort should be made to induce him to do so. By the same token, JFK was acutely aware of the danger of backing his opponent into a corner without leaving him an open line of retreat. In light of such an insight, JFK chose to implement an approach of coercive diplomacy instead of opting immediately for the quick and decisive military strategy represented by a possible air strike in Cuba. JFK utilized the strategy of coercive diplomacy even though he realized that its possible success could be jeopardized because a naval blockade, or any other public demand for the removal of the missiles from Cuba, would challenge Khrushchev’s power and prestige. JFK correctly recognized that any diplomatic action by the United States that did not directly involve Khrushchev and his authority as the ultimate decision maker would basically be ineffectual. The key element in implementing coercive diplomacy in the Cuban Missile Crisis was that JFK was prepared to facilitate a retreat for Khrushchev, not merely by cooperating in face-saving gestures, but also by making a meaningful contribution of his own to a quid pro quo that would secure the removal of the missiles from Cuba.

---

445 George, Limits, 88.
From the inception of the crisis to until its conclusion, Castro was a variable that could have easily disrupted the conservative steps being taken by both JFK and Khrushchev. After having agreed to proceed with Operation Anadyr, Castro urged Khrushchev to militarily support Cuba by threatening a nuclear attack against the United States should they choose to attack the island. Khrushchev left Castro out of any negotiations throughout the crisis because he viewed him as an unpredictable element in the crisis. Most importantly, Castro was omitted from the final negotiations in which Khrushchev agreed to remove the missiles in Cuba for the commitment from JFK that the United States would not invade Cuba and the secret understanding that the U.S. would also remove the missiles located in Turkey and Italy pointed at the Soviet Union. When Castro heard over the radio, and not personally from Khrushchev, that he had negotiated a resolution of the crisis with the United States without consulting him or informing the Cuban Government, he was enraged.446

Castro viewed Khrushchev’s actions as nothing less than the Soviet Union’s betrayal of the Cuban Revolution.447 Further, Castro interpreted these actions as a personal betrayal by Khrushchev who he saw as solely safeguarding his interests in the Soviet Union and leaving Cuba unprotected against the Yankee imperialists to Cuba’s north who had already attempted to invade then at the Bay of Pigs. Castro was so affected by this outcome that he was furious and

446 Blight, 214-225.
447 Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War, 490.
soon became ill. In response, Castro proposed a five point plan where he demanded that: 1) the U.S. immediately end its embargo against Cuba; 2) the U.S. withdraw its military assets and presence from the Guantanamo Bay Base; 3) the U.S. cease and desist from providing surreptitious and overt support to Cuban dissidents; 4) the U.S. should stop violating Cuban air space and cease from conducting overflights of their island; and 5) that the U.S. stop intruding and violating Cuban territorial waters. Since Castro felt betrayed by the Soviet Union, he turned for support to the United Nations (UN). The U.S. ignored the demands presented by Cuba to the Secretary-General of the UN, U Thant, and as a result Castro refused to allow the U.N. access to conduct the weapons inspections in Cuba. What is ironic in this situation is that the practical effect of the agreement between JFK and Khrushchev essentially strengthened Castro’s defensive position in Cuba because he indirectly obtained a guarantee that the U.S. would not invade Cuba. Cuba would be protected from invasion.

In spite of the successful outcome, the Cuban Missile Crisis has invoked mixed reactions from critics. One view chides JFK for taking the United States to the brink of a possible military confrontation unnecessarily because the missiles in Cuba did not actually reverse the strategic balance of power in Russia’s favor. The other view concurs with the administration’s judgment that the missiles were an actual threat to U.S. national security and they had to be removed. However, even some of the critics holding this opinion believed that JFK could have

---

448 Bourne, 239, and Quirk, 443-444.
persuaded Khrushchev to remove the missiles through quiet diplomacy, without escalating the crisis to such a dangerous point.\textsuperscript{450} Such criticisms have blinded critics to the credit which can be attributed to JFK. Most critics have failed to recognize that JFK withstood pressure to resort to military action, and more importantly for having refused to step up demands on Khrushchev once the latter began to retreat.

In applying the strategy of coercive diplomacy, JFK also had to engage in careful crisis management. JFK proceeded with the expectation that Khrushchev would also act cautiously so that they could together end the confrontation before it escalated to a full conflict. JFK wisely limited his objectives and adhered to relevant crisis management principles. He specifically limited his objective to the removal of the missiles, while rejecting advice from his political team that he utilize the crisis as a means to get rid of Castro or at least eliminate the Soviet influence in Cuba.\textsuperscript{451} JFK realized that to pursue these more ambitious goals would have resulted in a greatly increased soviet motivation to reject plausible solutions to the crisis, thus making coercive diplomacy much more difficult and increasing the likelihood of military engagement. JFK, in addition to limiting his objective, limited the means he employed. The blockade option appealed to him because it enabled him to initiate a showdown with Khrushchev without the immediate danger of resorting to force, and most critically, it provided him with more time to try to persuade the Soviet leader to remove the missile voluntarily.

\textsuperscript{450} George, \textit{Limits}, 130.

\textsuperscript{451} George, \textit{Forceful}, 32.
In addition, it forded JFK the opportunity to correct Khrushchev’s misjudgments and misperceptions of his capabilities as a leader. It could be argued that the blockade also served a tactical objective that was essentially psychological in nature and provided Khrushchev with a window of opportunity in which to back down without losing face in front of his comrades.

JFK in applying the strategy of coercive diplomacy also adhered to the important principles of crisis management. He maintained informed presidential-level control over the movements of military forces which slowed down the momentum of the crisis to enable both sides to consider their policy options and to give time for diplomatic communications. In addition, JFK attempted to coordinate military and political actions to ensure clear and consistent signaling to avoid the dangers of misunderstandings or misperceptions. Specifically, he accompanied his firm demand for removal of the missiles and his management of the naval blockade with a clear indication of his goal towards a peaceful resolution of the crisis. What was most significant about JFK’s strategy was that he avoided boxing Khrushchev into a corner which might in turn make him desperate enough to escalate the crisis in the hope of avoiding a humiliating defeat.

It can also be reasoned that JFK’s exercise of restraint during the Cuban Missile Crisis culminated in a critical stepping stone towards détente, serious arms control negotiations and agreements, as well as refining U.S. – Soviet coexistence in that Cold War bipolar world. After the Cuban Missile Crisis, a

---

452 George, Forceful, 33
détente, followed shortly thereafter and the foreign policy objectives that had dangerously exacerbated the earlier conflict of interests were reexamined.\footnote{George, Limits, 130.} Indeed, within the ear after the crisis, both JFK and Khrushchev had cooperated in bringing about a partial test ban treaty. Therefore JFK not only obtained the removal of the missiles, but he also achieved an important modification of the offensive thrust of Khrushchev’s policies towards the United States and the West. This success also extended to an important prolonged respite in the dangerous clash over unresolved European issues. For example, the Soviet government did not resume pressure against West Berlin.

In analyzing the use of coercive diplomacy in the Cuban Missile Crisis, it is critical to note that its effective application is extremely difficult when one possesses overall military superiority and economic advantages as well. One has to acknowledge that there are practical difficulties in applying the theory of coercive diplomacy because there is no black and white formula to ensure its successful outcome. Over simplification of the tools of coercive diplomacy can lead to inadequate and incomplete analyses of crisis situations such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. Alexander George argues that:

“The on the side of theory, neither those who participated in the administration’s handling of the crisis nor those who wrote about it subsequently distinguished clearly between the try-and-see and the ultimatum variants of the strategy, so evident in the evolution of Kennedy’s handling of the crisis. They directed attention, rather, to questions such as the respective merits of rapid, large-step

\footnote{George, Limits, 130.}
escalation against a more gradual piecemeal increase in pressure.454

Indeed, this has been a controversial issue among United States policymakers during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and it has continued to created controversy in foreign policy as was seen in the case of the Vietnam War.

Even though theorists have argued over the significance of gradual versus rapid escalation, the more fundamental issue lies in the distinction between the try-and-see approach and the ultimatum variants of coercive diplomacy. As was previously described, the rapid, large-step as well as the gradual, piecemeal types of escalation can be utilized without specifying a time limit within which to comply or without a credible threat of punishment. By the same token, a gradual, piecemeal type of diplomatic approach can be transformed or can evolve into an ultimatum without actually engaging in a rapid, large-step escalation, as was the case in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Therefore, the strategy of coercive diplomacy cannot be adequately analyzed without addressing all the factors which impacted the policymaker’s decision making process, such as the operational code of the leaders involved and the quality of intelligence received throughout the crisis. In attempting to identify the basis for JFK’s success in one component or another of the United Stated military posture, a much more significant point about the crisis was obscured: how difficult it had been for JFK to utilized his combined strategic and local superiority in order to find a way of imposing U.S. foreign policy objectives on Khrushchev without going to war.

---

454 George, Limits, 131.
The question which arises is exactly what did the Cuban Missile Crisis reveal about the potential concerns with utilizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy. First, a responsible leader will restrain from the risks of giving an ultimatum, even when strongly motivated to do so, to an opponent who is also strongly motivated and possesses formidable military capabilities.\footnote{George, \textit{Limits}, 133.} A leader must consider whether an ultimatum threat will be credible and whether the recipient will regard it as a tactical bluff or an actual threat of impending action if the other leader does not comply with the demand. Another byproduct of this scenario is whether the ultimatum itself will provoke the recipient into sizing the initiative himself as a justification to engage in a major escalation of the conflict.

One important dilemma revealed by the Cuban Missile Crisis was that prudent crisis management generally tends to conflict with the requirements for a strong implementation of coercive diplomacy. As a result, the decision maker may be forced to dilute the context and impact of coercive diplomacy, as JFK did during the first stages of the crisis. However, it was also crisis management considerations which pushed JFK into issuing an ultimatum against Khrushchev. Crisis management considerations dominated JFK’s handling of the crisis in the first three and a half days. Only several unusual developments in the situation forced the President to finally “summon the nerve and determination to convert the try-and-see approach he had been following into an ultimatum”.\footnote{George, \textit{Limits}, 134.}

Specifically, it was the fact that work on the missile sites was bringing them to the point of operational readiness, which would have drastically altered the
bargaining positions in favor of Khrushchev, and the fact that a U-2 reconnaissance plane was shot down over Cuba, which increased the pressure on JFK to retaliate. Although the theory of coercive diplomacy may emphasize the general advantages of the ultimatum over the try-and-see approach, it is in reality not easy to adopt in practice the ultimatum prong of the strategy. Further, even though each approach may have advantages under difficult conditions, it is critical that the decision makers be flexible and precise in their timing when executing their actions.

Timing is the second critical factor in utilizing the strategy of coercive diplomacy and it directly impacts the difficulty of achieving optimum timing of negotiations. JFK’s grave task was to delay serious bargaining until he had succeeded in impressing Khrushchev with his determination. If he had entered negotiations prematurely, JFK would have been at a serious bargaining disadvantage. In the Cuban Missile Crisis case, JFK was successful in delaying the bargaining until he had forced Khrushchev to back down over the blockade and had accumulated other important bargaining assets. JFK was able to achieve his goal without having to pay a high price in terms of international reactions in delaying these negotiations. The factor of the international community was not as pressing in the Cuban case as it would be today, inasmuch as the Cold War produced a bipolar world with each superpower having its own sphere of influence and each with nuclear capabilities – a critical political hammer that is possessed by more than two states today.
The third factor is argued to be closed related to the need for a sense of urgency and the difficulty of timing is the problem of impressing an opponent with the strength of your motivation and degree of determination before subjecting him to the strong form of coercive diplomacy.\textsuperscript{457} The Cuban Missile Crisis represents an instance in which a relatively small and carefully applied amount of force, \textit{the blockade}, when it was combined with the threat of additional force, \textit{the ultimatum}, was sufficient to secure the foreign policy objective without a major escalation or prolongation of the conflict. The strategy of coercive diplomacy succeeded in part due to the implementation of the blockade and the United States Navy’s detection and harassment of the Soviet submarines which demonstrated to Khrushchev the resolve of JFK’s determination. The blockade and the actions of the U.S. Navy, together with the ongoing U.S. military fortification, solidified the credibility of the subsequent threats JFK made in conjunction with his ultimatum to Khrushchev.

A fourth problem associated with the utilization of coercive diplomacy involves the need to formulate the content and scope of the \textit{carrot} and \textit{stick} so that they are commensurate with the magnitude of the demand made on the opponent.\textsuperscript{458} The final stages of the crisis negotiations were critical because the world was watching and it was on the edge of a nuclear war. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, JFK was able to formulate a combined \textit{carrot} and \textit{stick} approach that neutralized Khrushchev’s initially strong motivation not to yield to the

\textsuperscript{457} George, \textit{Limits}, 135.

\textsuperscript{458} George, \textit{Limits}, 135.
demand that the missiles be removed from Cuba. Indeed, Khrushchev actually
helped JFK by initiating the quid pro quo himself in the form of removing the U.S.
Jupiter missiles based in Turkey. In a memorandum dated October 30, 1962,
drafted for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy, he
described the discussion points from his October 27 meeting with Ambassador
Dobrynin.

“He then asked be about Khrushchev’s other proposal
dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that
there could be no quid pro quo – no deal of this kind could be
made... If some time elapsed... I mentioned 4 or 5 months – I said
I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily.”

The statements and letters exchanged by JFK and Khrushchev during the
Missile Crisis underscored the theory that as the power struggles go down in a
crisis situation, the affiliation levels between the leaders go up enabling
communication channels to open and facilitate the negotiations. In other
situations or cases, the opponent who is the target of the coercive diplomacy
may not be so cooperative in helping to formulate a reasonable quid pro quo.
Under those circumstances the United States may have difficulty in formulating a
carrot and stick inducement to do what is demanded of him before the U.S. threat
of military force is escalated to a point where decision makers are faced with the
decision to act or back away from their demands.

The most critical and final stages of the negotiations between JFK and
Khrushchev occurred on the open airwave via a broadcast by Khrushchev

459 Memorandum for the Secretary of State from the Attorney General, describing his
October 27 meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, October 30, 1962, p. 3, John F. Kennedy
Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
because it was the fastest and most direct means of communication to deliver a clear message to JFK. Khrushchev’s message to JFK was broadcast by Radio Moscow, October 28, 1962:

“The Soviet government has ordered the dismantling of vases and the dispatch of equipment to the USSR…. I wish to again state that the Soviet government has offered Cuba only defensive weapons. I appreciate your assurance that the United States will not invade Cuba. Hence we have ordered our officers to stop building bases, dismantle the equipment, and send it back home. This can be done under U.N. supervision.”

JFK has authorized Attorney General Bobby Kennedy to convey a willingness on the part of the United States to remove the Jupitar missiles located in Turkey, if the matter was raised by the Russian Ambassador Dobrynin. However, that portion of the agreement would have to remain secret. JFK instructed Bobby Kennedy to warn Dobrynin that any disclosure of the proposed secret agreement would render it null and void. Indeed, out of concern for maintaining secrecy surrounding this proposed agreement, the sentence referring to the lapsed time of 4 – 5 months was crossed out on the final draft.

With the events escalating during the crisis, Khrushchev was anxious to end the crisis as soon as possible, especially after having met with his advisors that morning outside Moscow. Khrushchev had begun drafting a letter to JFK informing him that the missile sites in Cuba would be removed. United States.

---

460 Bundy McGeorge, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1991), 444.

461 Portion of Khrushchev’s message to the President, broadcast by Radio Moscow, October 28, 1962, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
When Khrushchev learned that the United States had made the secret offer to remove its Jupitar missiles from Turkey, he readily agreed to keep that part of the agreement secret.\textsuperscript{462} To end the crisis as soon as possible and avoid and miscommunications or delays, Khrushchev had couriers rush his message to JFK rushed to the Moscow radio station, where it was broadcast around the world at approximately 4:00 p.m., 9:00 a.m. in Washington, D.C.\textsuperscript{463}

The dismantling of the missile sites in Cuba began that day, October 28, 1962 at 5:00 p.m. that afternoon bringing the crisis to an end. JFK in turn sent a telegram to Khrushchev on October 28, 1962 at 5:03 p.m. JFK had first learned of the Soviet Union’s decision to remove the missiles from Cuba when Khrushchev’s message was broadcast on the American airwaves. When JFK met with the Ex Comm later that morning, he warned his circle of advisors that great strides had been made in the Cold War and warned his team against any appearance of gloating or claiming victory.\textsuperscript{464} The message JFK wanted to send to the Soviet Union and the American people was that he welcomed Khrushchev’s latest message as “an important contribution to peace,” and focused on stressing the importance of both countries working together towards disarmament.

“Mr. Chairman, both of our countries have unfinished business tasks and I know that your people as well as those of the United States can ask for nothing better than to pursue them free from the fear of war. Modern science and technology have given


\textsuperscript{463} Fursenko and Naftali, 287.

\textsuperscript{464} Sorensen, Kennedy, 717.
us the possibility of making labor fruitful beyond anything that could have been dreamed of a few decades ago...as we step back from danger...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth, and in outer space, and to the great effort for a nuclear test ban.\textsuperscript{465}

This situation suggests a fifth problem of utilizing coercive diplomacy. One not only has a problem with the precise timing of the negotiations, but moreover the timing of the \textit{carrot} and \textit{stick} may be critical.\textsuperscript{466} An otherwise reasonable and workable quid pro quo may be offered too late, after one’s military operations have hardened the opponent’s determination and made it more difficult for him to accept what is demanded of him. What is significant to note is that each leader took conservative and quid pro quo calculated approaches towards ensuring each opponent received a carrot to motivate them. Khrushchev’s famous “know of war” letter dated October 26 proposed a deal in which the Soviet Union would agree to dismantle the Cuban missile sites in San Cristobal if the United States would in turn agree to pledge not to invade Cuba and lift the quarantine.\textsuperscript{467}

Upon receiving the correspondence, the Ex Comm did not have the opportunity to respond when a difference proposal came in over the newswire whereby Khrushchev announced that the day prior he had communicated to President Kennedy that he would withdraw the missiles from Cuba if the U.S.

\textsuperscript{465} Telegram of President Kennedy’s message to Premier Khrushchev, October 28, 1962, received by the State Department and released to the press at 5:03 p.m., p. 3, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

\textsuperscript{466} George, \textit{Limits}, 136.

\textsuperscript{467} “Letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy, dated October 26, 1962,” Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
agreed to withdraw its missiles from Turkey. JFK after deliberating with the Ex Comm drafted a response to Khrushchev’s October 26 letter where he inherently agreed to the proposal concerning the Soviet removal of the missiles from Cuba, but did not openly address the added requirement of the U.S. removing the missiles from Turkey.

“You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba... We, on our part, would agree ...to remove the quarantine measures now in effect and ... to give assurances against an invasion of Cuba... the first ingredient, let me emphasize, is the cessation of work on the missile sites in Cuba.”

As history has shown, JFK’s timing was just right: neither too little, nor too late. In the end, JFK offered the Soviet Union a calculated blend of Khrushchev’s October 26 and October 27 proposals:

- The Soviet commitment to remove the Soviet missiles in Cuba.
- An American pledge to not invade Cuba.
- A willingness to later discuss NATO-related issues of concern.
- A secret commitment to withdraw the Jupitar missiles from Turkey

The intelligence analysis afforded JFK the ability to have verified information in order to make an informed decision as to the true operating environment in Cuba and the Soviet Union. Judging by the results, JFK dealt with the problems of coercive diplomacy skillfully and adeptly, but there was no guarantee nor could it be predicted that he would do so. The results of the Cuban Missile Crisis could have easily been different. It should be noted that this

---

particular case favored skillful implementation because underlying conditions existed.

Finally, it must be noted that each leader’s operational code, as well as the images and perceptions JFK and Khrushchev held of each other played a critical role in the inception and resolution of the crisis.

“Just as Khrushchev’s *defective* image of Kennedy – as a young, inexperienced leader who could be pushed around and who was too weak or too ‘rational’ to risk war to get the missiles out – played a role in his decision to deploy the missiles, so did Kennedy’s *correct* image of Khrushchev as a rational, intelligent man who would retreat if given sufficient time and shown resolution play a critical role in the president’s choice of the strategy of coercive diplomacy and his determination to give it a chance to succeed.”

JFK, acting on Khrushchev’s assurances that all nuclear weapons had been removed, lifted the Cuban blockade on November 20, 1962. JFK proceeded on the assumption that Khrushchev and the Soviets had acted in good faith and in fact had removed the missiles from Cuba and had ceased further operations to deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba. In reality, the Soviets had not fulfilled their commitment under the agreement with the U.S. Recently unearthed Soviet classified documents have revealed that while Khrushchev dismantled the medium- and intermediate-range missiles known to the Kennedy administration, he in fact left approximately 100 tactical nuclear weapons on the island of Cuba. The U.S. was unaware of this deception for decades.

---

469 George, *Forceful*, 37.

470 Sergio Mikoyan (author) and Svetlana Svanranskaya (editor), *The Soviet Cuban Missile Crisis: Castro, Mikoyan, Kennedy, Khrushchev, and the Missiles of November* (Cold War International History Project), (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). The book is based on the secret transcripts of Anastas Mikoyan, the number two Soviet leader who undertook high-level covert diplomatic negotiations in the aftermath of the Missiles of October. The unveiling of Mikoyan’s operational transcripts reveal that that withdrawal of the missiles from Cuba did not in fact occur until November 1962.
Khrushchev was still concerned about a possible invasion of Cuba and left the missiles on the island for possible use in repelling invading forces. On the world stage, the Soviet Union and the U.S. had ended the Cuban Missile Crisis. However, the Soviets maintained several tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba which were not known to the U.S. nor were they included in the Soviet pledge to remove them along with the strategic missiles. The Presidium had wanted to keep the tactical weapons on Cuba as a precaution against possible future U.S. attacks. Khrushchev had intended to train the Cubans and transfer the missiles to them, as long as they kept their presence a secret.\footnote{Anastas Mikoyan, who was negotiating the resolution of the Soviet-Cuban Missile crisis with the Cuban leadership, came to the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to keep a full-scale Soviet military base in Cuba. Mikoyan proposed to the Soviet Presidium to gradually transfer all the remaining weapons to the Cuban armed forces after a period of training by Soviet military specialists--"the Cuban personnel with the assistance of our specialists will gradually start to operate all Soviet weapons remaining in Cuba."\footnote{Telegram from Mikoyan to CC CPSU and Gromyko's response," 8-9, November 1962. National Security Archive. George Washington University, Washington, D.C.}} Anastas Mikoyan, who was negotiating the resolution of the Soviet-Cuban Missile crisis with the Cuban leadership, came to the conclusion that it would be inadvisable to keep a full-scale Soviet military base in Cuba. Mikoyan proposed to the Soviet Presidium to gradually transfer all the remaining weapons to the Cuban armed forces after a period of training by Soviet military specialists--"the Cuban personnel with the assistance of our specialists will gradually start to operate all Soviet weapons remaining in Cuba."\footnote{Telegram from Mikoyan to CC CPSU," National Security Archive. George Washington University, Washington, D.C.} However, there were substantial Soviet concerns about whether Castro, who was a volatile individual and exhibited erratic behavior, could be trusted with the weapons.

The impetus for considering to leave the weapons in Cuba stemmed from the Presidium and Khrushchev who were making an attempt to repair the
damaged relationship with Castro who felt bitterly sold out by the Soviet concessions to the U.S. The original Soviet plan presented to the Presidium on May 24, 1962 and finally approved on June 10 for Operation Anadyr, provided for the deployment of the R-12 and R-14 missiles, and also included a Soviet Group of Forces of 80 land-based cruise missiles to be deployed in Cuba with the range of 111 miles.\(^{473}\) In September, Khrushchev decided to strengthen the Group of Soviet forces in Cuba and augment the nuclear portion of the deployment with additional 12 tactical dual-use Luna launchers with 12 nuclear warheads for them, and 6 nuclear bombs for specially fitted bombers.\(^{474}\)

The use of the strategic missiles could only be executed upon direct order from Moscow, however there has been considerable debate as to whether the commanders of the tactical weapons units had authority to launch their own nuclear weapons.\(^ {475}\) The Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky had drafted a memorandum authorizing the local commanders in Cuba to make a decision whether to use tactical nuclear weapons which were in their immediate control in the event of a U.S. attack on Cuba. This pre-delegation authority, as outlined in the draft document, was contingent upon the local commanders not being able


to establish direct contact with Moscow. It is unknown whether the memorandum was in fact signed by Khrushchev, but there is no indication of such a signed document.\footnote{Draft Memorandum from R. Malinovsky and M. Zakharov,\textsuperscript{476} National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.} What was confirmed in related unclassified Soviet documents was that many of the local commanders stated they had received pre-delegation instructions orally from Moscow.

The Soviet Presidium was extremely concerned about an unauthorized use of tactical weapons and a cable was sent on October 27 forbidding Soviet military use of tactical nuclear weapons without a direct order from Moscow.\footnote{Telegram from Malinovsky to Pliyev,\textsuperscript{477} 27 October 1962. National Security Archive, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.} This concern on the part of the central leadership gives indirect support to the understanding that local commanders were instructed in the spirit of the September 8 memorandum that in the event of a U.S. attack on Cuba, they had the authority to use tactical nuclear weapons. Now Khrushchev wanted to make it very clear that under no condition were tactical nuclear weapons to be used, especially since the Soviets were extremely concerned about Castro’s reaction.

Throughout the Missile Crisis, Castro was defiant that he had not been involved in the negotiations with Khrushchev and JFK since the missiles were on his island. Castro had attempted to convince Khrushchev that the U.S. would continue their efforts to attack Cuba and he saw the weapons as a preventative measure against the U.S. Castro was very vocal and boisterous with Khrushchev about being the only nuclear power in Latin America. The Soviet’s concerns
regarding Castro’s intentions regarding the missiles quickly heightened their
apprehension about keeping the tactical weapons within Castro’s reach. Mikoyan
during his negotiations with senior level Cuban officials quickly realized that the
Cubans romanticized and professed their willingness to die beautifully. This
underscored their anxiety that if Castro gained control over the local Soviet
commanders who managed the weapons, the results would be disastrous. The
Soviets, at Khrushchev’s insistence and consultation with the Presidium, finally
removed the last of the nuclear warheads from Cuba on December 1, 1962.

Indeed, later in October 1964, Khrushchev was removed from power. His
misjudgments and mishandling of the crisis over the Cuban missile sites were
cited by the Soviets among the principal reasons for removing him from office.\(^{478}\)
Khrushchev’s actions were subjected to much scrutiny and was made to feel as
if he had made those tactical decisions in isolation without involving the Kremlin.
In particular, Khrushchev in his last political speech to the Presidium was made
to defend his actions and defend the measures he took:

“\begin{quote}
You accuse me of pulling out our missiles. What do you
mean, that we should have started a war over them? How can you
accuse me of undertaking some sort of Cuban adventure when we
made all decisions relating to Cuba together?\end{quote}^{479}\]

Khrushchev never believed in further escalating the Caribbean Crisis as it was
known in the Soviet Union to the brink of nuclear war so demonstrate that the
Soviet Union could expand its political ideology. Indeed, this was the last political

\(^{478}\) Fursenko and Naftali, 353-354.

\(^{479}\) Sergei Khrushchev, translated by William Taubman, \textit{Khrushchev on Khrushchev}
speech he made before his political contemporaries before he was removed from his position and forced into retirement.

Section VIII: The International Community

The U.S. engaged the involved several international organizations in preparing for and in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis. In addition, Cuba had been reaching out to the UN to express its concern to the UN General Assembly. “If we are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we do not wish to employ.”

Options that were considered as a means to resolve the conflict were sanctioned and supported by regional organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS). In considering the blockade as a viable option, JFK engaged legal experts at both the State Department and the Department of Justice to discern what actions could be taken pursuant to the Rio Treaty for the Defense of the Western Hemisphere. A position paper was drafted by the U.S. Navy that outlined the difference between what JFK termed as a “quarantine” of offensive weapons versus a total blockade of all materials. The paper asserted that the intent of the ‘quarantine’ was not the same as a traditional blockade which under international law would be interpreted as an act of war. The quarantine was to take place in international waters and based upon the

---

480 Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos addressing the United Nations General Assembly on October 7, 1962.
provisions of the Rio Treaty for the defense of the Western Hemisphere, the U.S. was able to obtain a legal justification and approval for military action via a resolution supported by a two thirds vote from the members of the OAS. Naval and air support was garnered from several members of the OAS including Argentina, the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago.

JFK mobilized U.S. Ambassadors around the world to brief the heads of state of the United Kingdom, Germany, Canada and France on the intelligence cultivated and reported by U.S. intelligence agencies and the proposed action response by the U.S. All heads of state were supportive of the proposed U.S. actions in the Cuban Missile Crisis to implement a blockade. Numerous diplomatic communiques were transmitted by the heads of state to JFK to demonstrate their support of the U.S. in implementing the blockade against the Soviet Union.\footnote{Multiple diplomatic cables, telegrams and communiques were reviewed from Great Britain, France, Germany, and Canada as well as other countries articulating their support of the U.S. action to execute a blockade around Cuba. Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.}

On October 25, 1962 the U.S. requested an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council. This is the famous meeting where U.S. Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson confronted Soviet Ambassador to the UN Valerian Zorin and questioned him about the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. In spite of the intelligence overflight images taken by U.S. assets over Cuba clearly demonstrating the presence of Soviet missiles at the San Cristobal
site, Ambassador Zorin refused to confirm, not deny, he outright refused to answer the allegations being presented before him.

The Cuban Missile Crisis formally ended on October 28, 1962 when JFK and the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant came to an agreement with Khrushchev. The terms which had been negotiated between JFK and Khrushchev were the ones ultimately implemented under the auspices of the United Nations. The Soviets agreed to dismantle the missiles sites and offensive weapons in Cuba which would be subject to UN on-site inspections for verification, in exchange for the United States publicly declaring and agreeing never to invade Cuba. There was also a secret agreement to the resolution of the crisis. The U.S. would agree to dismantle the Jupiter missiles deployed in both Turkey and Italy.

Section IX: Conclusions

The Kennedy Administration had clearly contributed to the polarization of relations with Cuba and found itself in a precarious situation due the earlier Bay of Pigs invasion. In addition, there were covert plots against Castro and plans to attempt another invasion of Cuba. It can be argued that the situation in which the Kennedy administration found itself clearly contribution to the provocation and confrontation between the Soviet Union, Cuba and the United States the Cuban Missile Crisis. Many theorists have depicted JFK as an uncompromising

---

cold warrior more enamored with military than with diplomatic means and striving to win, never abandoning his commitment to defeating the Soviet Union. In addition, others have construed JFK’s reaction to the crisis as a leader who preferred to suspend diplomacy and respond with public confrontation.

However, JFK did not choose confrontation or military engagement over diplomacy, but rather he consistently led the ExComm away from military action. This can be observed throughout the hundreds of documents generated during the crisis, and the actual recordings of the ExComm sessions during the thirteen days of the Crisis. JFK who was a product of the Cold War and rose above his own Cold War policies and methodically steered the discussions at the ExComm meetings from what could have led to nuclear war to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

Underlying the negotiations of the Cuban Missile Crisis was JFK’s and Khrushchev’s desire for a thawing of the Cold War so that countries would not again find themselves on the brink of mutual destruction. They both had a deep love of their children and did not want them to be subjected to the destruction of war. This love of family which was imbedded in both JFK and Khrushchev promoted additional unwillingness on their part to entertain the option of entering in to a nuclear war. JFK’s and Khrushchev’s operational codes forged an association between them that shaped foreign policy beliefs through their eyes

---

483 Stern, Week the World Stood Still, 23.
484 Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files and ExComm Files and Recordings, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.
and expectations and resulted in future implications leading to the first steps towards nuclear de-escalation.

The Soviet deceptions to mask the delivery of the ballistic missiles to Cuba proved unsuccessful despite the careful planning, and elaborate phases of execution. The plan initially enabled the Soviets to further their goals because they had a keen understanding of U.S. intelligence capabilities and subjective analytical limitations. From a U.S. intelligence perspective, the CIA and NPIC accurate assessment that the missiles in Cuba were not yet operational provided JFK with the ability to slow the pace of the crisis and evaluate all the options available to both him and Khrushchev to bring the crisis to the end. Even though the events that triggered the crisis occurred in rapid fire succession, the confirmation of the deployment and operational status of the missiles themselves provided for a decision making environment in which JFK and the Ex Comm employed restraint and good judgment.

JFK’s purpose in the crisis was told fold. First, his intention was to stop further deliveries of Soviet missiles to Cuba by establishing the naval quarantine; and second, to effect the removal of the missiles already positioned in Cuba through diplomacy. JFK’s negotiating credo throughout the crisis was adopted from a British military strategist whose book he had reviewed in 1960:

“Keep strong, if possible. In any case, keep cool. Have unlimited patience. Never corner an opponent and always assist him to save his face. Put yourself in his shoes – so as to see things through his eyes. Avoid self-righteousness like the devil – nothing is so self-blinding.”

---

The credo in effect outlines the framework of coercive diplomacy that JFK used in collaborating with Khrushchev to bring the crisis to an end.

The Cuban Missile Crisis has been regarded as one of the turning points in recent history because it facilitated a transition from the era of the acute Cold War to a less dangerous coexistence within the international system. It brought to a head long standing dissatisfactions maintained by both the United States and the Soviet Union with the Cold War world. The engagement during the Cuban Missile Crisis strengthened the determination of the United States and Soviet Union to move away from its worst aspects towards better alternatives. The example of the Cuban Missile Crisis serves to demonstrate how integrated intelligence, whether correctly analyzed or not, has the most effect in a crisis when it is appropriately combined with other aspects and facets of national security. Specifically, the key elements that will impact a crisis using the framework for this study are: 1) the leaders themselves involved in the crisis, their operational codes and how they allow the crisis to evolve interpreting the actions and intent of their opponents; 2) how the intelligence is collected, analyzed and ultimately consumed by the leaders, as well as how the intelligence is applied to crisis to identify what non-military options are available to prevent and escalation; and 3) what type of national and international political power is exerted, using the most effective tools of diplomacy to prevent an intensification to military engagement. Coercive diplomacy was effective in this crisis because all the special conditions necessary for a successful resolution were present.
Another element that can be argued was critical to the successful resolution of the crisis was the Ex Comm. The Ex Comm has been seen as a paradigm of organizational effectiveness. A common portrayal of the Ex Comm is that it was a sounding board and breeding ground for candid and objective evaluations of the crisis.

“The Executive Committee was important in helping plumb the reality of the situation … The men chosen were calm, rational, and frank … [T]he Committee was the scene of intellectual conflict … and not emotional quarreling arising from interpersonal friction … [The Ex Comm] permitted … the freedom essential for effective dissuasion … and made the best use of available time … [T]he information and skills brought to bear to the task were additive. Both in scope and in depth, the President and his advisors had a decisive edge over the President alone.”

However, declassified documents and transcripts of Ex Comm meeting recordings reflect that the Ex Comm meetings although at times volatile due to the strain and pressure of the crisis, still generated the deliberative conversations necessary to assess the events unfolding throughout the crisis and the intelligence feeding the current situational picture.487

Once the crisis was over, JFK and Khrushchev moved quickly to bring about a détente in their relations. Above all, both leaders realized that in order to avoid a nuclear holocaust, they would need to cooperate more effectively and communicate in order to prevent their ideological and political disagreements from escalating into war. Indeed, shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1963, JFK and Khrushchev agreed to establish what is commonly referred to as the

486 Thomas Halper, Foreign Policy Crisis (Columbus, OH: Charles E. Merrill, 1971), 189-193.  
“hotline” linking Washington, D.C. and Moscow. For the first time since the inception of the Cold War era, the United States and Soviet Union realized that they would have to go beyond the cursory relaxations of tensions and would have to reach substantive accommodations and resolutions of at least some of their disagreements. Indeed, less than one year after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Having experienced being so close to the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban Missile Crisis, both JFK and Khrushchev were proactive in seeking to reduce tensions between the two states in the months that followed. The treaty was signed on August 5, 1963 and “no other single accomplishment in the White House ever gave [JFK] greater satisfaction.”

JFK after having stared down the possibility of a nuclear abyss and viewing the cataclysmic horrors that the world could have faced is the Cuban Missile Crisis negotiations had failed, dedicated himself to genuinely promoting world peace. In what many have considered one of his most eloquent speeches of his political career, JFK delivered an address at American University in 1963 where he abandoned the Cold War rhetoric of his early years. In the speech, JFK lamented the huge expenditures for weapons proliferation and instead appealed for arms control. In addition, he called for a conciliation and mutual understanding with the Soviet Union. In addressing the students at American University, JFK reminded Americans of certain timeless truths:

“...let us not blind ourselves to our difference – but let us also direct attention to our common interests and to the means by which those

488 Sorensen, Kennedy, 740.
differences can be resolved… For, in the final analysis, our most basis common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children’s future. And we are all mortal.”

JFK was an optimist when it came to seeing the potential of what the future could bring regarding U.S.-Soviet relations. In light of the recent discovery regarding the existence of the tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba after the “conclusion” of the Missiles of October, it may have been wise for JFK to have taken the perspective of future President Ronald Reagan. Reagan adopted as a signature phrase, “trust, but verify,” regarding U.S.-Soviet relations. Reagan would repeatedly use the phrase in discussions with Gorbachev and especially during the signing of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in December 1987 to emphasize the extensive verification procedures that would enable both the Soviet Union and the United States to monitor compliance with the treaty. Indeed, JFK would have been better served by trusting and then verifying the Soviets assertions with imagery intelligence which first alerted the U.S. to the existence of the missile sites in Cuba.

---

489 Valois, 64-66.

Chapter 4

Case Study: Iraq: The Persian Gulf Crisis – Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

The United States: The Response to the Invasion of Kuwait by Iraq –

August 1, 1990

“The United States strongly condemns the Iraqi military invasion of Kuwait and calls for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces … We deplore this blatant use of military aggression and violation of the U.N. Charter.”

George Herbert Walker Bush
President of the United States of America
August 1, 1990

Section I: Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm – A Short Summary

The Persian Gulf War was the culmination of multilateral efforts after the Gulf Crisis ensued which attempted to coerce Iraq into withdrawing its military troops from the illegal occupation of Kuwait. The Gulf Crisis is known by many names including the Persian Gulf War, the First Gulf War, the First Iraq War or the Iraq War and of course Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm which were the U.S. operational names for the initial buildup of U.S. and Saudi Arabian forces and ultimately military strikes against Iraq. Operation Desert Shield encompassed the operations from August 2, 1990 to January 17, 1991, leading up to the military buildup of multilateral troops comprised of U.S. and

---

491 President George Bush, White House Press Release, 1 August 1990.
Saudi Arabian forces. Operation Desert Storm was the U.S. name of the air and land conflict which spanned the time period from January 17, 1991 to April 11, 1991. The combat phase of Operation Desert Storm from January 17, 1991 to February 28, 1991 was the military engagement phase of the Gulf Crisis where combat forces waged war under the umbrella of coalition forces comprised of 34 states, led by the United States against Iraq directly in response to Iraq’s invasion and annexation of the sovereign state of Kuwait.

Saddam’s encroachment into Kuwait was not a simple act of aggression. Iraq’s military forces were well equipped as a result of massive military aid that the United States had directly, and later indirectly, provided to Saddam during the Iran-Iraq War. The level of armaments, munitions, and technologies transferred to or purchased by Saddam, ultimately gave Iraq the fourth largest army in the world.492

The political situation prior to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was not the primary focus of the United States even though the region represented a strategic significance. At the time, the attention was directed at the developing situation in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. From a U.S. perspective the region was the main topic of focus of National Security Review 10 (NSD-10) – U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf which resulted in Presidential Decision 26 (NSD-26), U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf which had been classified at the time. Both of these documents generally sustained the Reagan administration’s policy

---

toward Iraq. The essence of NSD-26 outlined that the existence of normal diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Iraq would serve the long term interests of our country and would also encourage stability in not only the Persian Gulf region, but most importantly in the Middle East.

The historical Iraq-Kuwait clash arises from land and oil disputes. Iraq asserted ancient claims to the Kuwait as part of its rightful territory. Kuwait had originally been part of the Basra province under the Ottoman Empire. The al-Sabah family which was the Ottoman Empire’s ruling dynasty had entered into a protectorate agreement with the United Kingdom in 1899 that assigned it the responsibility for Kuwait’s foreign affairs. The United Kingdom ultimately drew the borders between Iraq and Kuwait in 1922 which rendered Iraq essentially landlocked. As a result Kuwait rejected Iraqi attempts to secure further provisions in the area.

Saddam’s and Iraq’s interest in Kuwait was borne not so much out of the legal rights to a geographic area or boundary, but more so out of the reality that Kuwait, as small as it was, had amassed enormous reserves of wealth, a large natural harbor to facilitate trade and approximately 120 miles of prime Gulf coastline. Iraq’s grievances with Kuwait and the UAE became more apparent in

---


the spring of 1990. Saddam’s protests were all connected to financial, territorial, and oil-related disputes. Indeed, Saddam’s early campaign in the summer of 1990 was focused on Kuwait’s wealth as well as the other Gulf States that he viewed as being more economically stable than Iraq. Saddam resented his Arab brothers, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, for not forgiving their loans to Iraq. Saddam viewed Iraq as having protected the region from Iran with rivers of blood and saw Kuwait and Saudi Arabia and not contributing their share to ‘Iraq’s heroic struggle.”

Further, Saddam required large sums of money to not only rebuild war torn Iraq in the aftermath of the eight year war with Iran, but also to pursue his military ambitions and he had no desire to repay Iraq’s loans to his Arab neighbors.

The seeds that sprouted into the Gulf Crisis stemmed from oil production and drilling in the region. Iraq accused Kuwait of exceeding its Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas for oil production which Iraq alleged caused a slump in the oil price per barrel. The OPEC target price for oil production was as $18 a barrel, but both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were consistently overproducing oil which bring about a drop in per barrel price to $10 and indirectly resulted in Iraq losing an estimated $7 billion. Although other Arab countries such as Jordon along with Iraq, struggled to contain the overproduction of oil in the region, they met with little success. Eventually

---

496 Freedman and Karsh, p. 45.
Saddam came to describe the situation as economic warfare because it was directly detrimentally impacting its economic stability and infrastructure.\textsuperscript{499}

As early as 1989 Iraq had complained that Kuwait was aggravating their economic situation by slant drilling across the border into Iraq’s Rumaila oil field.\textsuperscript{500} Iraq raised the complaint again in early July 1990 asserting the Kuwait was not respecting their quota and Saddam openly threatened to take military action. Intelligence cultivated by the CIA indicated that Iraq had in fact moved 30,000 troops and positioned them along the Iraq-Kuwaiti border. As a result, the United Stated had placed their naval fleet located in the Persian Gulf on alert. What is significant is that Saddam had sensed that a conspiracy against Iraq was developing in the region, and in fact Kuwait had begun talks with Iran and Syria, Iraq’s rival, had arranged a visit to Egypt to engage in similar discussions.\textsuperscript{501} Iraq’s Secretary of Defense used its intelligence apparatus to confirm that Syria was in fact planned a strike against Iraq in the coming days. Saddam directed funding towards intelligence resources and was able to ultimately prevent the impending air strike by Syria.

These series of events only served to reinvigorate Saddam’s protestations against the Arab League that their actions were costing Iraq over $1 billion a year and that Kuwait was still slant drilling and encroaching into the Rumaila oil field, hence into Iraqi sovereign territory. Another element which fueled Saddam’s

\textsuperscript{499} Simons, 341.


\textsuperscript{501} Simons, 343.
anger was that Iraq was still expected to repay loans made by the United Arab
Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait to Iraq, when he viewed those ‘loans’ as mere
assistance from one Arab brother to another and repayment should not be
anticipated.\textsuperscript{502}

Saddam’s threat of military force against Kuwait and the UAE became
more determined when he publically announced that:

“… the policies of some Arab rulers are American … they are inspired by
America to undermine Arab interests and security… O God almighty, be
witness that we have warned them… If words fail to protect Iraqis,
something effective must be done to return things to their natural course
and to return usurped rights to their owners.”\textsuperscript{503}

President Saddam Hussein proclaimed the oil production policies being executed
by the UAE and Kuwait were in fact the direct result of American influence in the
region who sought to cheapen the oil and harm other Arab nations to serve its
own economic interests.

Saddam’s threats did not fall on deaf ears in the region. Arab nations
believed that Saddam would in fact follow up on his threats if the UAE and
Kuwait continued to violate the OPEC quotas and overproduce oil. In spite of the
historical financial support that the UAE and Kuwait had provided to Iraq during
the eight year Iran-Iraq War, they perceived that Saddam was not making empty
threats. In an effort to stem aggression by Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq plead
their case before OPEC to pressure Kuwait and the UAE into restricting their

\textsuperscript{502} Simons, 343.

\textsuperscript{503} Youseff M. Ibrahim, “Iraq Threatens Emirates And Kuwait on Oil Glut,” New York Times 18 July
level of oil production which was exceeding the quota. The meeting resulted in a
direct impact of oil barrel prices rising by more than $1.50 a barrel.

The spike in oil prices was not enough, however, to appease or satisfy
President Saddam Hussein. A meeting was convened by Saddam with April
Glaspie, the U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad on July 25, 1990, when he
summoned her to his office in the last high-level contact between the two
governments before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2. 504 Saddam’s intent
was to convey a direct message to President George Bush. His message
underscored how he felt Iraq had been persecuted not only by the United States,
but also by Arab brothers. Saddam attacked U.S. policy regarding the UAE and
Kuwait:

“… [W]hen planned and deliberate policy forces the price of oil down
without good commercial reason, then that means another war against
Iraq. Because military war kills people by bleeding them, and economic
war kills their humanity by depriving them of their chance to have a good
standard of living. As you [the United States] know[s], we gave rivers of
blood in a war that lasted eight years, but we did not lose our humanity.
Iraqis have a right to live proudly. We do not accept that anyone could
injure Iraqi pride or the Iraqi right to have high standards of living…”505

Saddam continued to focus on his perceptions of American involvement in
the region and how he perceived how the American media had started campaign
against him which had influenced their relations which had already been
damaged by the Iran-Iraq War:

504 “The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador,” in The Iraq War Reader:
History, Documents, Opinions, Micah L. Sifrey and Christopher Cerf, editors (New York: Simon & Shuster -

“So what can it mean when America says it will not protect its friends? It can only mean prejudice against Iraq. This stance plus maneuvers and statements which have been made has encouraged the UAE and Kuwait to disregard Iraqi rights … If you use pressure, we will deploy pressure and force. We know that you can harm us although we do not threaten you. But we too can harm you. Everyone can cause harm according to their ability and their size. We cannot come all the way to you in the United States, but individual Arabs may reach you… We do not place America among the enemies. We place it where we want or friends to be and we try to be friends. But repeated statements last year make it apparent that America did not regard us as friends.”  

At dawn on August 2, 1990, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein sent his army into the small neighboring state of Kuwait. Hussein wanted to incorporate Kuwait into a territory of Iraq. The illegal act stemmed from Iraq’s accusation that Kuwait was pumping and selling valuable oil from the fields of Rumaila without Iraq’s consent.

The Iraqi invasion and annexation of Kuwait posed an immediate and real threat to the neighboring state Saudi Arabia which was another major exported of oil to the international community. If Saudi Arabia fell to Iraq, then Saddam would virtually control approximately one-fifth of the world’s oil supply. Kuwait was a major supplier of oil to the United States. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq focused the world stage on what actions, if any, the United States was going to take. President Bush plainly stated: “This will not stand.”

The occupation of Kuwait by the Iraqi army was met with international condemnation. Alarmed by this invasion, the United Nations Security Council

---


responded with an unprecedented swiftness and decided on full-scale economic sanctions against Iraq. On the very day of the invasion, the Security Council determined the existence of a breach of international peace under Article 39 of the UN Charter. To punish Iraq for this illegal act of encroaching upon and violating Kuwait’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the international community virtuously unanimously decided on the imposition of economic sanctions.

Four days later on August 6, 1990, the U.N. Security Council involved Article 41 of the Charter, deciding that all U.S. member states should prevent:

"(a) the import[ation] of all commodities and products from Iraq or Iraqi-occupied Kuwait; (b) the sale or supply to Iraq or Kuwait of any commodities or products other than ‘supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and, in humanitarian circumstances, foodstuffs’; (c) the transshipment of all commodities and products to Iraq or Kuwait; and, (d) the provision of any loans or any other financial assistance, again except for payments for medicine and food."508

The Security Council, in addition, called upon non-member states in the international community to act strictly in accordance with the multilateral decision. Major industrialized countries, such as the United States, the European Community member countries, and Japan, had already initiated their own economic sanctions to further solidify the international multilateral coercive diplomacy objectives.

In the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Kuwait, the international community coalesced to support multilateral sanctions against Iraq. However, Saudi Arabia feared Iraq’s objectives and sought more direct support on the

508 Miyagawa, 54.
ground. During the last quarter of 1990, the U.S. participated in an on the ground initiative known as Operation Desert Shield in which the U.S. alone place over 250,000 troops in Saudi Arabia in the event of an Iraqi attack. Historically, the Soviet Union had been an ally of Iraq and held a veto power over any potential United Nations military action. Since the end of the Cold War had, the Soviet Union knew they would need to gain support from the West to advance their internal political and societal reorganizations. As such, the Soviet Union did not veto the U.S. plan to address Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. AS a result, the U.N. Security Council condemned Iraq and its actions and opened the door to form a multilateral coalition to engage Saddam militarily.

The Persian Gulf War was for the first time in history a real time television event. CNN broadcast real time coverage of the war time activities and sorties as the events unfolded twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. Cameras were strategically placed on smart bombs as they struck Iraqi targets enabled the world to vicariously experience being on the front line of the air strikes. U.S. advanced military technologies also found a new stage where their capabilities could be displayed. The stealth fighter which was designed to avoid radar detection was put into combat for the first time during the Persian Gulf War. America’s military capabilities were at the center stage as well as the strategists behind the military campaigns both on the ground and in the skies as the conflict unfolded over Iraq, General Norman Schwarzkopf and General Colin Powell.

The Persian Gulf War also presented the first opportunity after the end of the Cold War to demonstrate that there was a venue for the international
community to look towards in the event of a conflict. Skillful diplomacy on the part of the United States demonstrated that the United Nations could be used as an instrument of force and international cooperation when necessary. Even though the Soviet Union did not contribute troops towards Operation Desert Shield/Operation Desert Storm, they did in fact give their tacit approval for the coalition’s attack on Iraq. The potential for multinational cooperation under the umbrella of the United Nations was clearly demonstrated during the Persian Gulf War.

The Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm crisis affords a case study encompassing how different tools of coercive diplomacy were applied in this Gulf War. This study focuses on the implementation of economic sanctions as a tool of coercive diplomacy and will examine the diplomatic actions taken by national leaders in an attempt to avoid a full scale conflict with the opponent. In evaluating the Iraq and Gulf War crisis, the study will use the three prong analytical framework to identify the theoretical approaches of coercive diplomacy and the implementation of economic sanctions undertaken by George Bush and the international community in order to stem further escalation of military action by Saddam Hussein. The comparative methodology used in the three prong analytical framework draws upon the theories of coercive diplomacy, as well as the practical aspects of implementing economic sanctions. Theorists assert that policy makers must individually tailor those strategies to suit the crisis at hand. It is asserted that unless sanctions are deployed in a calculated and

---

internationally cohesive manner designed to cripple the target government, they will not be successful. This case study will attempt to demonstrate that based upon the elements of the three prong analytical framework being applied in this study, the implementation of economic sanctions as a strategy of coercive diplomacy will not be effective unless both leaders:

1. Receive the same quality of intelligence and information from their advisors;

2. Have an insight and understanding into the operational code of their opponent; and,

3. Are willing to diminish the pace of escalation in an effort to achieve a resolution.

Section II: George Bush: The Operational Code of the U.S. President

George Bush: His Family, Early Life and Education

George H.W. Bush served as the 41st President of the United States from 1989-1993. Bush brought to the White House a reinvigorated focus and dedication to traditional American values. He also conveyed a determination to making the United States “a kinder and gentler nation” in the face of a dramatically changing world and political landscape. Bush hailed from a family dedicated to public service and he felt a personal responsibility to make his contribution to the United States in both times of peace and war.

---


George Herbert Walker Bush was born to Senator Prescott Sheldon Bush and Dorothy (Walker) Bush in Milton, Massachusetts on June 12, 1924. Shortly after his birth, his family moved to Greenwich, Connecticut from Milton. From his early years, Bush established himself as a leader among his peers. He first began his formal education at the Greenwich Country Day School and later enrolled at the Phillips Academy in Andover, Massachusetts in 1936. At the Phillips Academy he quickly shined as a leader. He held a number of leadership positions ranging from the president of his senior class, to the secretary of the student council and a member of the editorial board of the school newspaper. He was also involved in serving his local community by becoming the president of the community fund-raising group. Bush demonstrated his skills in sports as well when he achieved becoming the captain of both the varsity baseball and soccer teams.

Bush had applied and was accepted to Yale University, but after graduating from the Phillips Academy in 1942 he decided to enlist in the armed forces to serve his country. The attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 ignited his patriotism and we wanted to join the Navy and become an aviator to protect and serve his country against hostile forces. Bush joined the U.S. Navy after six months after he graduated from Phillips Academy in 1942.

---

George Bush: Education and Military Service

Bush enlisted in the Navy on his 18th birthday. He began his preflight training at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Bush was commissioned as an ensign in the U.S. Naval Reserve at Naval Air Station Corpus Christi on June 9, 1943 after having completed the 10 month course and a few days before his 19th birthday. George H.S. Bush became the youngest naval aviator in the U.S. Navy.\(^{513}\) He was the youngest naval aviator in the Navy when he received his wings, and Bush went on to fly 58 combat missions during World War II.

In September 1943 Bush was assigned to Torpedo Squadron (VT-51) as a photographic officer after finishing his flight training. In the spring of 1944, as part of Air Group 51 his flight squadron was based on the USS San Jacinto. Fellow crewmembers nicknamed him “Skin” because of his lanky physique. The USS San Jacinto was part of Task Force 58 that participated in operations against Marcus and Wake Islands in May, and then in the Marianas during June. During this time period, Task Force 58 was victorious in one of the largest air battles of World War II known at the Battle of the Philippine Sea.\(^{514}\) As he was returning his aircraft from the mission during this battle, Ensign Bush’s plane was forced to make a water landing. The destroyer USS Clarence K. Bronson was operating in the theater and was able to rescue the crew, but the airplane was lost. As a result of that sortie, Ensign Bush and another pilot received credit for sinking a

\(^{513}\) “George Herbert Walker Bush,” Naval History, date of access: March 1, 2015.

\(^{514}\) “Bush,” Naval History.
small enemy cargo ship. Several of those pilots and crewmen shot down during the attack were executed and eaten by their captors.

Bush was promoted to Lieutenant Junior Grade on August 1 and shortly thereafter the USS San Jacinto received its orders to commence operations against the Japanese in the Bonin Islands located approximately 600 miles south of Japan. Bush was a torpedo bomber pilot on one of the four Grumman TBM Avenger aircraft from VT-51 that attacked the Japanese radio installations on Chi Chi Jima on September 2, 1944. During this mission over the Pacific, Bush’s aircraft encountered intense antiaircraft fire form the Japanese and his aircraft was hit resulting in his engine catching on fire. He completed his mission and released the bombs over his target scoring several damaging hits to the Japanese. However, with his engine on fire, Bush flew his aircraft away from the target zone and he the other crewmen had to parachute out of the aircraft. One of his crewmembers fell to his death when his parachute did not open. Bush and the other two crewmembers waited for over for hours in an inflated raft awaiting the arrival of help. He was rescued from the water by a lifeguard submarine, the USS Finback. During the month Bush remained onboard the USS Finback, he participated in the rescue other pilots. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for bravery in action.

---


Later in November 1944 Bush returned to the USS Jacinto and continued to serve in operations in the Philippines. When the USS San Jacinto and the squadron returned to Guam from the theater of action, it had suffered 50 casualties of its pilots. The squadron was replaced and returned to the United States. Bush throughout 1944 had flown 58 combat missions for which he received the Distinguished Flying Cross, three air Medals, and the Presidential Unit Citation which was awarded to the San Jacinto.519

Bush gained valuable combat and field experience during his assignment on the USS San Jacinto and while serving as part of VT-51. As a result, upon returning to the U.S. he was reassigned to Norfolk and placed in a training program wing for new torpedo pilots. He was later assigned as a naval aviator in a newly formed torpedo squadron, VT-153, which was based at Naval Air Station, Grosse Ile Michigan. After the Japanese surrendered, in 1945, Bush was honorably discharged in September of that year.

George Bush: Post War Life, Politics and the Presidency

In January 1945, while Bush was still in the Navy he married Barbara Pierce in Rye, New York whom he had met in 1941 during the Christmas holidays at a country club dance in Greenwich, Connecticut. They lived in a small rented apartment located near Bush’s Navy assignment at NAS Grosse Ile, Michigan. George and Barbara Bush had six children: George Walker Bush (born 1946), Pauline Robinson “Robin” Bush (1949-1953, died of leukemia), John Ellis


After his discharge from the Navy, Bush resumed his education by enrolling in Yale University who had accepted him prior to him enlisting in military. He was part of the surge of World War II veteran who returned to universities after the war. He was able to enroll in an accelerated academic program that enabled him to graduate in two and half years instead of the usual four year program. Bush majored in economics and successfully graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1948. While at Yale he was active and very involved on campus in many areas, including becoming a member of the Delta Kappa Epsilon and being elected its president. Bush also excelled in sports and captained the Yale baseball team, and like his father, Prescott Bush, was a member of the Yale cheerleading squad. He also followed in the footsteps of his father when he was initiated into Yale’s secret society, the Skull and Bones. The most famous secret society in America, Skull and Bones was co-founded at Yale in 1832 and has come to represent everything that attracts and repulses the public about the elite. Members are tapped for membership in their junior year for admission each fall by some measure of leadership, influence and breeding.

Prescott Bush’s political and business network served to open doors for George H.W. Bush as he began his career. He used his father’s connections as he moved his family to West Texas and ventured into the oil business. Bush began to work as a sales clerk with Dresser Industries, a subsidiary of Brown Brothers Harriman where his father Prescott had served on the board of directors.
for 22 years and an old family friend owned. While employed for Dresser, Bush moved to different company offices to various places including Odessa, Texas; Ventura, Bakersfield, and Compton, California; and Midland, Texas.

In late 1950, Bush and a friend formed an oil development company, the Bush-Overbey Oil Development Company in Midland. Bush was so successful that in 1953 he merged with another company to create Zapata Petroleum Corporation, an oil company that drilled in the Permian Basin in Texas. Later in 1954 he was named president of the Zapata Offshore Petroleum Company, a subsidiary which specialized in offshore drilling. Shortly after the Zapata Offshore Petroleum Company became independent, Bush then moved the company and his family from Midland to Houston. Bush was so successful in the oil business that he became a millionaire. He continued to serve as the president of the company until 1964, and later chairman until 1966, but he aspired to a political career like his father.

Prescott Bush set holding public office as a cornerstone for advancement and power for his son. Like his father who had been elected a U.S. Senator from Connecticut in 1952, Bush became interested in public service and politics. Bush began his political career by serving as the Chairman of the Republican Party for Harris County, Texas in 1964. During his tour as Chairman, he developed grassroots connections and strengthened his image as a conservative. Bush had always been able to relate to people and as Chairman he cultivated critical relationships in the Republican Party that helped him throughout his career. He ran unsuccessfully for a U.S. Senate seat in Texas twice. After the first Senate
loss, he was elected in 1966 to a House of Representatives seat from the 7th District in Houston and was reelected to a second term in 1970. At Richard Nixon’s insistence, he relinquished his House seat to run for the Senate again this time against a moderate Democrat and former Congressman, Lloyd Bentsen and lost.

His sacrifice for the Republican Party did not go unnoticed and then President Nixon appointed him Ambassador to the United Nations in 1971 and served for two years. Later in the midst of the Watergate scandal, then President Nixon asked Bush to become Chairman of the Republican National Committee in 1973. Bush weathered the Watergate scandal, defending the Republican Party while still maintaining loyalty to Nixon. It was Bush, as Chairman of the Republican National Committee that asked Nixon to resign for the good of the party.

Then Vice-President Gerald Ford ascended to the presidency after Nixon’s resignation and appointed Bush to be Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in the People’s Republic of China on Taiwan. The Liaison Office did not have the official status of an embassy since the U.S. at the time did not have full diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China, only on Taiwan, so Bush did not formally hold the title of “ambassador” although he performed those duties. The 14 months Bush spent in China served to enhance U.S. – Chinese relations.

Ford had contemplated nominating Bush as his Vice-President, but on the advice of White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, nominated Nelson
Rockefeller. Bush was again passed over for the Vice-Presidency to replace Vice-President Rockefeller on the 1976 Republican presidential ticket. Instead of Bush, Ford nominated Senator Robert Dole to replace Rockefeller. Later in 1976 Ford nominated Bush to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Bush served from January 30, 1976 through January 20, 1977 during a time when the CIA was under significant scrutiny and investigations by the Church Committee alleging illegal and unauthorized activities. Bush was credited with helping to restore the agency's morale.

George H.W. Bush garnered extensive experience in his political career, holding several key posts impacting both domestic and foreign policy. Throughout the years he had cultivated an extensive network of governmental and private sector connections that had served him well throughout his political career, most prominently the associations with world leaders he had established during his tenure as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. He later served as a member of the House of Representatives and later as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency during a critical time when the CIA was being subjected to significant scrutiny because of its covert operations. Indeed, the network he initiated and established as Director of the CIA was later reinforced during his eight years as Vice-President under President Ronald Reagan from 1981 to 1989. Succeeded Ronald Reagan as President from 1989 to 1993.

---


521 Post, Leaders, 12.
While in transition from his post as Director of the CIA, Bush became chairman on the Executive Committee of the First International Bank in Houston after the Democrats won the election and took power in 1977. Bush worked as a part-time professor of Administrative Science at Rice University’s newly opened School of Business in 1978. Then from academia Bush served as director of the Council on Foreign Relations, an internationally known foreign policy organization.

In 1980 Bush campaigned for the Republican nomination for President. He lost the nomination to Ronald Reagan who then chose him as his running mate. As Vice-President under Reagan, Bush had responsibility in several domestic areas, including Federal deregulation and established the national joint Drug Enforcement Administration and U.S. Customs Service Joint Task Force on Drugs to address the increasing drug trafficking problem impacting the U.S. During his tenure as Vice-President he visited scores of foreign countries. In 1988 Bush won the Republican nomination for President and along with Senator Dan Quayle as his running mate, he was able to defeat Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis in the general election.

Indeed the relationships President Bush had established prior to his election as Commander in Chief enabled him to use his personal persuasion which at times was quite forceful, to bring together a remarkable assemblage of Western and Middle Eastern state leaders.\textsuperscript{522} During his tenure as President, Bush ordered military operations in Panama under Operation Just Cause, and

\textsuperscript{522} Post, Leaders, 12.
later in the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm to coerce Saddam Hussein into withdrawing Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Working through the international maze in the United Nations, Bush directed the political and military strategy ultimately led to the expulsion of Saddam Hussein’s military forces from occupied Kuwait. His political savvy to coalesce the multilateral forces that implemented the sanctions and then unified in the military engagements against Saddam are an example of tactical gamesmanship in this delicate chess match.

Section III: Saddam Hussein - The Operational Code of an Iraqi President

Saddam Hussein: His Family and Early Life

Saddam Hussein has been considered by many behavioral analysts to be a leader with one of the most traumatic backgrounds.\textsuperscript{523} Indeed, Dr. Jerrold M. Post, the founder of the Center for Analysis of Personality and Political Behavior at the C.I.A. asserts that Saddam’s troubles can be traced back to the womb of his mother.\textsuperscript{524} Saddam Hussein was born in the town of Al-Awja, to a poor peasant family of shepherds from the Al-Begat tribe. Al-Awja is located near the town of Tikrit which is about 100 miles north of Baghdad in the north central part of Iraq. Saddam’s father died of cancer while his mother, Sabda Tulfah al-Mussallat, was pregnant with him, and his twelve year old brother also died of cancer when his mother was in her eighth month of pregnancy. Saddam’s mother


\textsuperscript{524} Bumiller, “Was a Tyrant Prefigured by Baby Saddam?”
was so distraught by her circumstances after losing her husband and son and finding herself pregnant without means, that she attempted to commit suicide.\textsuperscript{525} Her desperation was so severe that she attempted to abort Saddam, but she had been taken into the home of a Jewish family that saved her and her unborn son. Sabda named her newborn son, which in Arabic means “one who confronts.” Saddam’s mother was suffering with depression and could not deal with her circumstances in life nor with her newborn son, so she sent Saddam to live with her brother, Kharaillah Tulfah, in Tikrit.

When Saddam was three he returned to live with his mother and his stepfather whom she had married. Saddam now had three half-brothers through his mother’s new marriage. Saddam’s step-father, Ibrahim al-Hassan was reportedly very abusive both physically and psychologically. Jerrald Post asserts that:

“The first several years of life are crucial to the development of health self-esteem. The failure of the mother to nurture and bond with her infant son and the subsequent abuse at the hands of his step-father would have profoundly wounded Saddam’s emerging self-esteem, impairing his capacity for empathy with others, producing what has been identified as ‘the wounded self’.”\textsuperscript{526}

Indeed, it was this abusive environment that prompted Saddam to flee his stepfather’s home and return to live with his uncle who had since moved from Tikrit to


\textsuperscript{526} Jerrod M. Post, M.D., “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile,” originally presented in testimony to hearings on the Gulf Crisis by the House Armed Services Committee on December 5, 1990, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 12, 1990.
Baghdad. The abusive environment, however, was not the only factor that prompted the 10 year old Saddam to flee his mother’s home. When he had just turned 10 years old, the family was visited by a cousin who had been to school and knew how to read and write. Saddam, “the one who confronts,” challenged his family with his desire to go to school like his cousin and become educated. His step-father and mother were unable to grant his wish because there were no schools in his parents’ village, so he fled his home to live with his uncle Kharaiilah Tulfah.

Saddam Hussein: Education and the Ba’ath Party

Saddam’s uncle, Khayrallah Tulfah (also known as Kharaiilah Tulfah), was to become not only Saddam’s father figure but also his political mentor. He had fought against the British in the Iraqi uprising in 1941 and as a result was incarcerated for five years as a political prisoner for his nationalist agitation. Khayrallah became Saddam’s role model as his de facto father, as well as his political mentor. As Saddam’s father figure, Khayrallah, recounted the heroic tales of his great-grandfather and two great-uncles who had died for the impassioned cause of Iraqi nationalism,

---

527 Post, Psychological Assessment, p. 337.

fighting the foreign invaders of their lands. These vivid tales of battles fought by his family filled young Saddam’s head with epic accounts of heroism. Saddam’s uncle instilled in him the responsibility to continue with the family tradition of fighting for Iraqi nationalism. By the same token, his uncle conveyed to Saddam that he was destined for greatness and would follow in the steps of his ancestors and achieve prominence.

Saddam’s uncle first served as his tutor teaching his young nephew his view of Arab history entrenched with the ideology of nationalism and the Ba’ath party. The Ba’ath party was founded in 1940 by Michel Aflaq, and focused on the history of oppression and the division of the Arab world throughout the centuries, first under the Ottoman Empire and then at the hands of Western interests that ultimately led to the establishment of the Zionist state. The Ba’ath party imagined the formation of a new Arab nation that would defeat the imperialist and colonist powers that had encroached on their nationalism and would ultimately achieve Arab independence, Unity, and socialism.

The dreams of historical glory was instilled in Saddam as his mandate for his future. Saddam traveled with his uncle Khayrallah to Baghdad to pursue his secondary education. It was his uncle that mentored and guided him into attending a nationalistic school in Baghdad. Indeed the school was a center of Arab nationalism which only served to nurture Saddam’s political leanings. When Saddam was fifteen in 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser led the Free Officer’s

---


530 Post, *Psychological Assessment*, 337.
revolution in Egypt and instantly became a hero to Saddam and his peers.\footnote{Post, \textit{Psychological}, 338.}

Saddam went to attend secondary school and then studied Iraqi law but dropped out when he was 20 years old in 1957 to join the revolutionary pan-Arab Ba’ath Party, of which his uncle Khayrallah was an avid supporter. Saddam continued to be under the tutelage of his uncle who later went on to become the governor of Baghdad. Saddam’s uncle inculcated in him his deep-seeded hatred and distrust of foreigners which stayed with Saddam throughout his life.\footnote{Post, \textit{Psychological}, 337.}

Saddam who had been inspired by Nasser, joined the Ba’ath socialist party in the late 1950’s. Saddam was so driven with ambition that he quickly impressed key party officials with his dedication to the Ba’ath ideologies and causes. Saddam was quickly known as a “street thug” among part officials because he willingly used violence in the service of the party, and as a result he was rewarded with rapid promotions.

Saddam was exposed to the overthrowing of Faisal II of Iraq in the July 14 Revolution by General Abd al-Karim Qasim (also known as Abd Karim Qassem). In 1958, Qasim emulated Nasser and led a coup to oust the monarchy. Unlike Nasser, however, Qasim did not follow the Ba’ath party ideology of socialism and instead turned against the party itself. Qasim’s cabinet was composed of mostly Ba’ath Party members, but they soon turned against him when he refuse to align himself with Gamal Abdel Nasser’s United Arab Republic.\footnote{Con Coughlin, \textit{Saddam: His Rise and Fall} (New York: Harper Perennial, 2005), 24-25.} The concept of pan-
Arabism was at the heart of the Ba’ath Party and Qasim had failed to meet their expectations as a leader to unify the Arab nation so they were planning to assassinate him.

The majority of the Ba’ath Party members were either educated professionals, academics or students and Saddam who had supported himself during this period as a secondary school teacher acclimated easily into this environment. The party, however, needed someone with the street savvy and ruthlessness to assassinate Qasim so they turned to the street thug Saddam. Twenty-two year old Saddam was called to Ba’ath Party Headquarters and tasked with the mission of leading a five man team to assassinate Qasim. Saddam wanted to become a full member of the Ba’ath Party and he achieved it by participating in the attempted assassination of Qasim. Saddam’s loyalty to the cause gave him credibility to be granted full membership in the party by Michel Aflaq, the party’s founder.534

The assassination mission failed allegedly because of an error in judgement in executing the mission.535 After the failed assassination attempt, Aflaq expelled key Iraqi Ba’ath Party members on the grounds they had acted without the sanction of the Party and should not have initiated the attempt on Qasim’s life. As a result, Aflaq realigned the Ba’ath leadership and imbedded loyal supporters in key seats, one of them being Saddam. Although many of the participants in the assassination plot were arrested and incarcerated pending

534 Coughlin, 33.
535 Post, p. 338.
their execution, Saddam managed to flee to Syria and then to Egypt in 1959 and continued to live there until 1963.\textsuperscript{536} His initial escape to Syria, first by horseback across the vast desert and then by swimming a river, has been elevated to a legendary, if not mythical status in Iraqi history.\textsuperscript{537}

During his time in exile, Saddam returned to Egypt to study law and associated himself again with the Ba’ath Party and rose to the leadership ranks of the Egyptian Ba’ath Party. When Saddam returned to Iraq in 1964 after Qasim was ousted and killed by the Ba’aths, he was imprisoned shortly thereafter. He escaped from prison in 1967 and revitalized the Ba’ath Party with his nationalist fervor.\textsuperscript{538} Saddam quickly found a role in the new regime by becoming the interrogator and torturer in the ‘Palace of the End’, Qasr-al-Nihayyah, that had been named as such because it was where King Faisal and his family were gunned down in 1958. The Ba’ath Party now used the palace as a torture chamber and Saddam was the principal executor of the activities.\textsuperscript{539}

His involvement in reviving the party efforts led to his appointment as the Deputy Secretary of the Regional Command, his first official post. Although Saddam was a deputy, he was clearly a strong behind the scenes party catalyst and politician. Even though the Secretary of the Regional Command Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr was the more prestigious politician and had appointed Saddam

\textsuperscript{536} Coughlin, 34.

\textsuperscript{537} Post, 338.

\textsuperscript{538} Charles Tripp, \textit{A History of Iraq} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 183.

as his Deputy, Saddam had clearly become the moving force in the Ba’ath Party by 1969. Michel Aflaq who was the ideological father of the Ba’ath party, admired Saddam and designated him as his successor in the Iraqi Ba’ath Party who Aflaq declared as the finest in the world. Saddam, who had supported Aflaq during the party split, was rewarded when Aflaq sponsored him for a position in the Ba’ath regional command, the highest decision making body in Iraq.\(^{540}\)

Saddam continued to become more entrenched in the political activities of the Ba’ath Party. His political career continued to advance through the late 1960’s and early 1970’s where, as the vice chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council, he began to establish a reputation as a reformist and effective leader, albeit cruel. Saddam faced a continual rivalry with the Syrian Ba’ath Party leadership and perceived himself as the only true Arab nationalist leader. Saddam planned and lead a successful military coup in 1968 with the assistance of military intelligence chief Abdul Razzaz al Nayef. To demonstrate his appreciation for his loyalty and for assisting him in mounting the coupe, Saddam orchestrated the capture, exile and ultimate assassination of the military intelligence chief Abdul Razzaz al Nayef. Indeed, Saddam ensured his place in the government by eliminating potential threats to his advancement, whether through assassinations, torture or exile.

**Saddam Hussein: Politics and War**

Throughout his political career and his involvement with the Ba’ath Party, Saddam has been perceived as a paradigm for the manner in which he rewarded

\(^{540}\) Miller, 23.
loyalty from his inner circle and adhered to the commitments he made. The maxim that best describes the political world of Saddam Hussein is that he has a flexible conscience and that commitments and loyalty are simply a matter of circumstances, and circumstances are subject to change.

“If an individual, or a nation, is perceived as an impediment or a threat, no matter how loyal in the past, that individual or nation will be eliminated violently without a backward glance, and that action will be justified by the ‘exceptionalism of revolutionary needs.’ Nothing must be permitted to stand in ‘the great struggler’s’ messianic path as he pursues his (and Iraq’s) destiny.”

Indeed, his perception of being the messiah to support Arab nationalism was further underscored in his “Victory Day” message of August 8, 1990 where he proclaimed:

“...August has come as a very violent response to the harm that the foreigner had wanted to perpetrate against Iraq and the nation....Honor will be kept in Mesopotamia so that Iraq will be the pride of the Arabs, their protector, and their model of noble values.”

Saddam concentrated his efforts on addressing the many tensions impacting Iraq which included, ethnic, religious, social and economic. This is when Saddam’s disdain grew for what he viewed as oppressing Iraq. He sought to improve living standards in his country by containing the spread of factionalism and opposing forces through massive repression. Saddam established a resilient power structure and inner circle that would support and foster the modernization

---

541 Post, 339.


543 R. Stephen Humphreys, Between Memory and Desire: The Middle East in a Troubled Age (Oakland: University of California Press, 1999), 78.
of a very rural and stagnant society. By creating a powerful security apparatus Saddam sought to contain subversive groups and prevent potential insurrections arising from within the Party itself as had happened in the past.

As early as the Gulf Crisis, Saddam saw himself as the touchstone of Iraq. Saddam was the face and the personality emitted by the country of Iraq. So entrenched was Saddam in demonstrating his influence and control of the people and country of Iraq, that he used his personality to reflect the traditions of the Muslims to unite a nation. The clothes Saddam would wear depicted that many facets of Iraqi and modern life that he stood for which ranged from the robes of the Bedouin, to the traditional clothes of the Iraqi peasants and Kurds to the more modern Western attire to project a modern and urban leader in the international community. Saad al-Din Ibrahim, a notable Egyptian political scholar, assessed that Saddam in spite of the support of the Ba’ath Party, the popular committees, and his self-assertion that he is one of the people, he still did not place any trust in any of this. In his eyes, the only people he can trust are: 1) the members of his family; 2) the tribe and, 3) the sect which in sum are the neo-monarchies of the Arab nation.\footnote{Saad al-Din Ibrahim cited in “The Rise of Saddam Hussein”, Judith Miller and Laurie Mylroie, in Sifrey and Cerf, editors, The Iraq War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, 25.} Even though Saddam would appoint relatives to key positions in the Party, he was keenly aware that he would have a personal accountability for any transgressions they would commit and it would be a direct reflection on him and his judgement in relying on them.

Saddam knew that to establish a stable political apparatus he needed to have the financial resources to execute his nationalistic plans for Iraq. From the
inception, Saddam relied on the security services as his foundation. He used the security services to control and manipulate the Ba’ath Party. Having the financial autonomy to support his power base was critical for Saddam. Although he saw himself as the messiah of the Arab nations, he did not hesitate to deviate from religious beliefs when they furthered his cause. Islam forbids gambling but horse racing had been a popular sport under the monarchy. When Qasim assumed power, he banned horse racing. Saddam reintroduced them and the funds the gambling generated provided him with an unrestricted, independent flow of financial resources.\textsuperscript{545} Saddam’s resources augmented significantly when the price of oil quadrupled in 1973. The proceeds from the horse racing gambling gave him the seed money for investments around the world, including later bartering oil for arms and munitions list articles from the United States.

Saddam Hussein had not always been perceived as an enemy to the U.S. The first political interaction with Saddam came in the last years of the Carter administration. The U.S. had received a couple of setbacks in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the eruption of the Islamic Revolution in Iran. There were no illusions about the Iraqi dictator. Intelligence reports had drawn the same conclusions and analysis from the information: Saddam was an assassin and a street thug that had come into power after a brutal and bloody political struggle in Baghdad.\textsuperscript{546} In spite of all the derogatory information gathered


\textsuperscript{546} Deborah Amos, \textit{Lines in the Sand: Desert Storm and the Remaking of the Arab World} (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1992), 52-54.
on Saddam, he was the dictator in place at the time that could support Washington, D.C.’s interests in the region. President Carter’s National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, mirrored the administration’s posture when he declared that “[W]e see no fundamental incompatibility of interests between the United States and Iraq.”

The Reagan administration further linked the relationship when it tilted its support towards Iraq against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. The U.S. had already been plagued by the 444-day hostage crisis in Tehran, Iran which had undermined that presidency. Even though Saddam’s record on human rights was ruthless, the U.S. considered it to be more reprehensible to have the possibility of an Iranian victory which would take control of Iraq’s vast oil reserves. Also at risk were the conservative Gulf allies that Washington had in the region. The U.S. was not the only nation indirectly supporting Iraq. The U.S. along with the rest of the United Nations Security Council voted to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Iranian territory, the Security Council did not call for a withdrawal making the message clear that although both Iran and Iraq were considered aggressors, Iraq was the favored bully.

Later the Reagan administration in 1983 embarked on a foreign policy initiative that would associate U.S. agricultural business and their powerful lobbies with the Iraqi regime. Reagan advocated for capitalism in the service of foreign relations. The conduit to facilitate this new business between the U.S.

---

547 Amos, 52.
548 Amos, 52.
549 Amos, 53.
and Iraq would be through a loan guarantee program administered by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The program allowed for Iraq to purchase American commodities with loans from U.S. banks which were financially guaranteed by the Department of Agriculture. As a result, Iraq eventually grew into one of the major importers of U.S. grain. Then in November 1984, the U.S. restored diplomatic relations with Iraq after a seventeen year interruption.

These political and financial transactions eventually opened the door for the U.S. government to guarantee loans that were approved by the Department of Commerce. These loans, however, were not for grain or other related commodities, but rather for over 500 million dollars’ worth of high technology, at times, dual use equipment, to Iraq. This equipment was sold to Iraq despite the many protests of the Pentagon and Intelligence Community agencies. Intelligence sources would later confirm that much of the high technology equipment sold during this time period was used to build Saddam’s war machine. This pattern would continue up through the Persian Gulf conflict and would result in stringent sanctions and embargos for the illegal procurement of U.S. licensable technologies, both dual use commodities and munitions list articles.

Section IV: Bush & Hussein - Operational Codes and Perceptions

In analyzing the Gulf crisis it is fruitful to consider the impact of the two leader’s operational codes and personalities, specifically to contemplate what factors might have determined their respective attitudes towards the crisis. It is significant to recognize that the President of the United States is locked into a
democratic system which entails that his freedom of action is limited by the incumbent’s ability to convince the American electorate of his competence and sound judgment. The constraints operating on an American president at any one time are a function not only of the political system itself, but in addition a whole myriad of contingent factors, including the relevant political leaders involved, the constellation of domestic political and economic forces operating at any given time, as well as the external international factors impacting U.S. foreign policy objectives.

However, both democratic and authoritarian leaders have the task of balancing the domestic and international political forces within which they operate in order to give them the greatest freedom of action. The major difference between them is the mechanisms which are available in order to determine the balance. The instruments of coercion, intimidation and violence that many authoritarian leaders avail themselves of in their domestic politics ensure the maximization of their freedom of action. The democratic leader has to deploy a range of more subtle political skills to maneuver and implement the political agenda for his administration. The chess game that ensured during the Gulf War was played on the same international board, but as approached from two completely different worlds and perspectives which little common ground.

George Bush and Saddam Hussein were constantly at odds with each other. Both leaders were on opposite sides of a coin. If Bush confronted a fork in the road, then it was Saddam who had created it. Bush was a reactive leader who was accustomed because of his diplomatic and intelligence background to
address issues in a subdued manner behind the scenes. Saddam, on the other hand, was an ostentatious and flamboyant leader that was prone to orchestrating events that would thrust him in to the limelight. The fork in the road was indeed created by Saddam when he encroached into Kuwaiti sovereignty by invading it with his forces. Bush reacted to the breach of sovereignty the only way he knew how which was by cultivating multilateral support and dealing with the egregious behavior directly in the international political arena. It is undeniable that the crisis in the Gulf is marked by the two leaders that challenged each other every step of the way, George Bush and Saddam Hussein. This study argues that their operational codes directly impacted how the conflict unfolded and its ultimate results.

To gain a deeper understanding into the dichotomy of both leader’s operational codes, a side by side analysis must be conducted. Bush was born into a life of privilege and power. His father was a U.S. Senator. Saddam, on the other hand, was born in a poor Iraqi village and he never knew his father because he died before he was born. He de facto father that formed his upbringing was his uncle, a revolutionary. Bush was educated in elite private schools, Andover Preparatory School and Ivy League Yale University. Saddam dropped out from school during his teenage years and did not finish high school until he was much older. He never completed a college degree but did attend several law classes during his time in exile in Egypt.

Bush and Saddam also differ when it comes to their military records. Bush was a highly decorated pilot who served in the U.S. Navy during World War II,
participated in 58 air combat missions, and was recognized for his bravery under fire with a Navy Cross. Saddam, to the contrary, never served in the military. Instead when he had attempted to gain entry into the Iraq Military Academy he was denied admission. The Iraq Military Academy was one of the few paths available for poor Iraqis attempting to gain some upward mobility and opportunities for advancement in their society. This door was closed to Saddam.

Bush’s public service afforded him exposure to and engagement in international relations. Bush had traveled extensively and had served as the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office on the People’s Republic of China, a post comparable to that of an Ambassador, as the Ambassador to the United Nations and as the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. Saddam had worked exclusively within the domestic arena within the Ba’ath Party where he first served as an organizer, then as an assassin, and later as the head of a party security where he gained the formidable reputation of having executed thousands of insurgents.

Bush entered into public service as a politician elected by the people where he served as a U.S. Representative, the Chairman of the Republican Party in Texas and later as the Chairman of the Republic Party National Committee, and was finally elected as Vice President and President of the United States. By 1990, Bush had already campaigned and won five elections on his

---

way to the pinnacle of the U.S. political system when the Persian Gulf crisis arose. Saddam had not taken a legitimate path into power. Instead, Saddam terrorized and bullied his way along his climb to the top of the Iraqi political system. Whereas Bush had won elections legitimately to achieve becoming the President of the United States, Saddam had never won an election until after he seized the Presidency of Iraq in 1978.\textsuperscript{551} It has been alleged that it is highly probable that all political determinations after 1978 were rigged as Saddam slowly constructed his terroristic political state.\textsuperscript{552} Saddam established a feared regime where he was the sole foreign policy and defense decision-maker in Iraq. Saddam self-proclaimed that ‘Saddam was Iraq and Iraq was Saddam from the standpoint of policymaking decisions. Indeed, the C.I.A. concluded that “Saddam so dominated the Iraqi regime that its strategic intent was his alone.”\textsuperscript{553}

Saddam had survived as the leader of Iraq for many years since 1979 in a very volatile environment. He was a dictator driven by his dreams of glory with a political perspective that was distorted and narrow minded. Saddam had keenly developed a shrewd ability to achieve his goals with hostile and aggressive tactics bathed with an incredible sense of patience. He was able to justify extreme aggressive actions to further what he characterized as revolutionary needs. Yet, if he perceived that the aggressive acts were counterproductive to his overall goals, Saddam ‘has shown a pattern of reversing his course when he

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{551} Schneider, “Deterrence and Saddam Hussein.”
\textsuperscript{552} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
has miscalculated, waiting until a later day to achieve his revolutionary
destiny."\(^{554}\)

The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq was a shock to the Bush Administration. The invasion not only represented an encroachment on the sovereignty of Kuwait, but from a U.S. perspective it was a serious threat to America’s principal objectives in the Persian Gulf region, which was to ensure the free flow of oil and prevent a hostile leader from establishing a hegemony over the region.\(^{555}\) If Saddam retained control of Kuwait and its oil supply, he would have approximately 9% of the world’s oil production capability. That would result in Saddam amassing economic influence that would rival the clout leveraged by Saudi Arabia which amounted to about 11% of the global production of oil. Saddam could effectively manipulate the global price of oil and in an extreme could withhold Iraqi oil and threaten to undermine the global economy.\(^{556}\)

Saddam Hussein could have never been perceived as a moderate force in the region. The use of physical force to advance his political agenda had been the hallmark of the Iraqi leader’s career from its inception. For example, his rise to power in July 1979 was followed by a bloody purge in which hundreds of party officials and military officers across the ranks, some of whom were friends and associated, perished.\(^{557}\) The invasion Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was an eye opener

\(^{554}\) Post, Psychological Assessment, 345.

\(^{555}\) Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The United States and Iraq; the crisis, the strategy, and the prospects after Saddam (New York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2002), 36-39.

\(^{556}\) Pollack, 36.

for the Bush Administration and demonstrated that the U.S. policy of constructive engagement with Iraq was erroneous.

The CIA and the National Security Council assessed that the invasion of Kuwait was a stepping stone that would ultimately lead to the invasion of Saudi Arabia. The internal movement and deployment of Iraqi military forces from western Kuwait towards Saudi Arabia was quickly analyzed as the preliminary steps towards an imminent attack by Iraq. The U.S. assessment that Saddam was “pragmatic” and “moderate” in his political messianic goals in the region was mistaken. In an effort to safeguard the region, Bush sent then Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney to Saudi Arabia to convince Saudi King Fahd to allow the United States to defend their kingdom. This meeting opened the door for the United States to deploy 250,000 troops in to defend Saudi Arabia into what became to be known as Operation Desert Shield. Bush declared to the international community that “Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait ‘would not stand’, and that after meeting with [Secretary of Defense] Cheney, King Fahd agreed to Operation Desert Shield, bringing 250,000 American troops in to defend Saudi Arabia.”

Bush was keenly aware that by sending the troops into Saudi Arabia to defend it against Iraq, many Americans may draw a parallel with Vietnam. Remembering the lessons learned from the Vietnam War, Bush sought domestic public support. The conflict was seen as reprehensible by the better part of the

---

558 Pollack, 37.

559 Pollack, 37.
international community, including domestically in the U.S. The vast majority of the U.S. population and a narrow majority of Congress supported the actions being taken by President Bush. When Bush had gained all the support he needed, domestically and internationally under the umbrella of the U.S. Security Council, the United States issued an ultimatum to Saddam Hussein: leave Kuwait by January 15, 1991 or face a full attack by a multinational coalition of military forces; i.e. Operation Desert Storm. Saddam was resistant to the idea that there could be an international coalition that would actually agree to take him on militarily. The deadline of January 15, 1991 came and went with no action on the part of Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The next evening Operation Desert Shield became Operation Desert Storm and the multinational coalition under the sanctioning of the U.N. attacked Iraq.

The Gulf crisis to Saddam was a target of opportunity for him to defy the hated Westerners and outsiders which would align him with the strong values of the Ba’athist ideology. Intelligence indicated that Saddam did not intend to immediately proceed with the invasion of Saudi Arabia. Historical analyses indicate that instead, Saddam’s actions were meant to deter an American counterattack. Saddam was performing like a blowfish, he was puffing himself up to look big and tough, to try to convince the Bush Administration that if the U.S. wanted to retake Kuwait of from him, they would face a significant battle.\textsuperscript{560} In reality, Saddam feasted on the perils of the Gulf crisis as a means to feed his appetite for greater notoriety and political control in the Middle East. Saddam

\textsuperscript{560}Pollack, 38.
publicized the Gulf crisis as a direct “struggle between two gladiators, Saddam Hussein versus George Bush.”

Saddam understood the dangers of the Gulf crisis and saw it as an opportunity to further his Ba’ath ideology by defying hated outsiders. Saddam wanted to elevate the importance of the Gulf crisis in the eyes of his Arab brothers and viewed the engagement as a direct struggle between the United States and Iraq. On a more personal and narcissistic level, Saddam viewed the Gulf crisis as a struggle between two gladiators fighting it out in the Persian Gulf coliseum, one evil President George Bush and one savior President Saddam Hussein. Saddam viewed this personal one-on-one struggle with Bush as an opportunity to set him apart as a “courageous strongman willing to defy the imperialist United States.”

Bush, on the other hand, portrayed the Gulf crisis as a conflict between the unified civilized international community against the brute, Saddam Hussein. This characterization reduced the conflict into a personal struggle between both leaders. Bush characterized this conflict as a chapter in history that must not be repeated. In a speech before Congress immediately after implementing the U.S. bilateral sanctions against Iraq and Kuwait, Bush openly criticized Saddam’s veracity as the President of Iraq. Bush declared before Congress:

“…But if history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy our freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was the case in the 1930’s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbors. Only 14 days ago, Saddam Hussein promised his friends he would not invade Kuwait. And 4 days ago, he promised the

---

561 Post, Leaders, 220.

562 Post, Psychological Assessment, 346.
world he would withdraw. And twice we have seen what his promises mean: His promises mean nothing.”

Saddam viewed this depiction on a personal level as a means to demonstrate he was the courageous leader in the Middle East who was willing to defy and take on the imperialist United States. However, by correlating Saddam’s demeanor as uncivilized and deceitful, it struck him profoundly because he had tried to overcome his destitute beginnings where he eventually scraped his way into politics and elevated himself to leader of Iraq. Saddam dreamed of his place in history where he would be viewed as the savior of the Middle East and was very sensitive to the opinion held of him by the international community. How he was viewed in the international community and his status as a world leader were of vital importance to Saddam. Any state or any political leader that would threaten his position would immediately be viewed as having limiting effects on his regime.

Saddam was extremely obsessed with his perception that he was the savior of the Arab world. He was so consumed with his self-anointed messianic mission that he most likely did not accurately gage the degree of the support he would receive from the rest of the Arab world. Saddam assumed that many in the Arab world, especially the downtrodden, shared his views as the messiah and viewed him as their savior. Indeed, it was this political personality comprised of messianic ambition for unlimited power, an absence of conscience,


564 Post, Psychological Assessment, 345.
unconstrained aggression, and a paranoid outlook that made Saddam so
dangerous in the Gulf War.\textsuperscript{565}

The commencement of Operation Desert Storm came with Iraq being
bombarded with daily air strikes targeting their military complexes and key critical
infrastructure. Iraq in turn responded by launching Scud missiles at U.S. military
barracks in Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saddam intentionally targeted Israel as a
means to cultivate the support of the neighboring Arab states to follow suit and
align themselves with Iraq. After intense diplomatic pressure and negotiations
brokered by the U.N., the Arab states remained in opposition to Iraq supporting
the multilateral coalition efforts.

Theorists have conceptualized Saddam’s personality as malignant
narcissism. His personality framework could be construed as that of a destructive
charismatic individual who strives to unify and rally his downtrodden supporters
by displacing the blame on external enemies who pose a threat to their way of
life. Saddam, however, is not charismatic in the traditional interpretation of what a
charming and magnetic personality would be in the tradition of JFK. Instead, his
thug-like style ‘charisma’ is what many have argued has made him appealing to
the Palestinians who see him as a strongman who shares their intense anti-
Zionism and someone who will champion their cause.\textsuperscript{566}

Indeed, Saddam’s personality traits led him into a lack of rational behavior
that extends beyond the day to day political decisionmaking. His anti-Zionist

\textsuperscript{565} Post, \textit{Psychological Assessment}, 344.

\textsuperscript{566} Post, \textit{Psychological Assessment}, 344.
disdain was so ingrained that he allowed his decisionmaking during the war to be directly impacted by it. Intelligence analysis unclassified after the end of the Gulf War indicated that Saddam was also symbolically attempting to humiliate Israel on both a political and religious level. During the Gulf War, Iraq had deployed and launched SCUD missiles at Israel with the warheads containing concrete which created a mystery among intelligence agencies. In delving into Saddam’s history and operational code, he was an individual that had to make a grand statement in every facet of his life, especially in his self-appointed role as the savior of the Arab World.

After extensive in depth research, CIA analysts concluded that Saddam wanted to show solidarity with his Arab brothers by ‘throwing stones’ at Israel.\(^{567}\) This action stemmed from Saddam witnessing the Palestinian’s bravery during the uprising against Israel when unarmed demonstrators threw stones at the much better equipped Israeli army. Saddam’s most hostile beliefs in his operational code concerned Israel. Although he publicly expressed a greater ability to have some control over them and publicly manifested actions towards Israel such as the symbolic casting of stones by cement war heads, in private he perceived a lower ability in influencing their actions which created a deep frustration in him.\(^{568}\)

\(^{567}\) Timothy Walton, Challenges in Intelligence Analysis: Lessons form 1300 BCE to the Present (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 203.

Irrespective of any grand illusions that Saddam may have fostered prior to his invasion of Kuwait, he quickly recognized that the United States was not going to acquiesce and accept his conquest. Saddam initially tried to mask his aggressive action of annexing Kuwait by asserting that Iraq was solely responding to a request by ‘popular forces’ in Kuwait. Saddam asserted that the military action was maintained secret because of Kuwait’s request. This falsehood was quickly unmasked by Kuwait. When it was clear the Iraq was acting on its own impetus, Saddam boldly announced that he had annexed Kuwait as Iraq’s nineteenth province, citing historical land boundaries. It was at this time that U.S. forces had started to arrive in the Persian Gulf as part of Operation Desert Shield.

George Bush and Saddam Hussein never understood each other, their motives, or their political objectives.\(^{569}\) The two leaders came from different worlds, and when they spoke of diplomacy and of war, they were each speaking in a different language. Bush was a “patrician product of private schools and country clubs,” who was indoctrinated to firmly believe in face-to-face diplomacy.\(^{570}\) He was a World War II veteran whose view of the world was shaped by the Cold War and reacted emotionally to Saddam and his overt aggression against Kuwait. Bush felt that if he could only get through to Saddam and make him understand his message, he would be able to sway him enough to ultimately withdraw his troops from Kuwait.

---


\(^{570}\) Sciolino, 228.
However, if Bush was the “blue-chip warrior, Saddam was the guerilla.”

Saddam, who was raised in an environment of poverty and suspicion, viewed Bush as the leader of the global conspiracy to destroy him. Saddam was a man without a formal education, who had fought a brutal eight year war, and who was ready and willing to fight another.

Both Bush and Hussein believed that they were engaged in a clear contest between right and wrong. They played a game of public diplomacy that was designed as much for their respective audiences back home in their domestic arenas as it for each other in front of the international community. Bush charged that Saddam Hussein was like Hitler, or worse than Hitler, associating the political figure with a model that was easily understandable to the American people, if not altogether accurate. Saddam threw the epithet back at Bush. They called each other a liar and a man without honor or integrity. They both tried to intimidate each other by describing at length the strength and capability of their military, the arsenal stockpiles, and ultimately the destruction and death that they would cause. For all intents and purposes, each of the leaders prompted and inadvertently fostered misperceptions of each other in order to rationalize their positions to themselves and to their audiences back home.

Saddam was a ruthless calculating dictator who would go to whatever lengths were necessary to achieve his political goals. His priority is to survive and maintain his seat of power with his dignity intact. Where other leaders have

---

571 Sciolino, 228.

572 Sciolino, 228.
sacrificed themselves for the good of their country, Saddam never envisioned himself as a martyr, but rather a survivor. Saddam was a “self-proclaimed revolutionary pragmatist [that] did not wish a conflict in which Iraq would be grievously damaged and his stature as a leader destroyed.”

In order to analyze a crisis and the progression or coercive diplomacy through the implementation of sanctions, one must look not only to the overt political and military motivations, but also to the internal composition and operational codes affecting the leaders engaged in the conflict. In further analyzing the psychological impressions of each leader and the impact they could have on a crisis at hand, Alexander George does address the significance of how stress can impair the normal decision making process. In turn, these psychological and physical elements can in turn detrimentally effect the decision making process creating analytical problems which can indirectly escalate the confrontational situation into a full scale conflict. In the Gulf crisis, both heads of state performed under an exorbitant amount of stress that was generated as a result of the pressure from their political and military advisors, the international community, as well as the critical public opinion. Underlying these variables in the implementation of coercive diplomacy is the assumption that the opponent is rational and that he will surely see it in his best interest to acquiesce to the demands being made.

---

573 Post, Psychological Assessment, 345.
Section V: Intelligence

The greatest challenge faced by U.S. intelligence agencies was the extent to which the U.S. had facilitated the arming of Iraq over the years and what type of arsenal did Saddam have at his disposal. The CIA was keenly aware the U.S. had supplied Iraq with billions of dollars in U.S. government financing and hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of technologically advanced electronic equipment and machinery in the years leading up to the Gulf War in 1991. From the Iran-Iraq War up to the Gulf War, the U.S. provided critical technological resources that were utilized to establish Iraqi programs for the development of missiles, conventional bombs, and the advancement of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.\(^{574}\) In spite of numerous objections by Congress and government agencies, the Reagan and later the Bush administrations gradually provided the critical funding and technology that aided Saddam in amassing one of the most powerful arsenals in the Gulf region and the world.

The relationship with Saddam dated back to the Iran-Iraq War where he was perceived as the lesser of two evils: Saddam Hussein’s dictatorial regime in Iraq versus the Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist regime in Iran. The U.S. supported Saddam against a regime that had already engaged this country with the hostages under Carter’s administration. It was this slant towards supporting Saddam that prompted U.S. officials into approving the loans and technology transfers to Iraq that would ultimately be utilized to further Saddam’s ambitious and treacherous armaments programs.

The U.S. had also structured a plan to liberate American hostages being held in Lebanon by a group with Iranian ties connected to the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution. The plan called for Israel shipping weapons to Iran, and then the U.S. would resupply Israel and receive payment for the weapons supplied to Israeli. At the time there was a U.S embargo against the sale or shipment of arms to Iran. The Iranian recipients promised to do everything in their power to achieve the release of the U.S. hostages. However, the initial plan was modified by Lt. Colonel Oliver North who was posted to the National Security Council in late 1985. The updated plan called for a portion of the proceeds from the weapon sales to Israel to be diverted to support fund anti-Sandinista and anti-communist rebels, or Contras, in Nicaragua. This plan turned into a political scandal for the Reagan administration known as Iran-Contra.

Saddam made steady progress in establishing his arms programs covertly, obtaining financing and technology from the U.S., while procuring actual weapons systems from other Western sources. The Soviet Union, France, Italy and other nations supplied Saddam with tanks, fighter aircraft, helicopters, and other basic armaments that constitute a modern military apparatus. The most critical U.S. contribution to the Iraqi weapons program was accomplished indirectly through government-guaranteed loans and ‘dual-use’ technology such as advanced equipment such as computers or machine tools that had both commercial and military applications to build and guide modern weapons systems.575 This intelligence would be crucial in later assessing the military

575 Hartung, 223.
capabilities that Saddam had built and would use against the multilateral coalition forces in the Gulf War.

The first indication of the extent of Saddam’s establishment of his arms program arose through the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) investigations. Search warrants executed by federal law enforcement in the Atlanta branch of the BNL revealed that senior bank officials were making billions of dollars’ worth of illegal loans to Iraq. An analysis the transactions indicated that the funds had been applied towards the purchase of dual use technologies that could be used for military applications. Indeed, Attorney General Dick Thornburgh, FBI Director William Sessions, Commissioner of Customs Carol Hallett and representatives of the Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Reserve Bank in a joint press conference characterized the BNL scandal as:

“… an international white collar scam with dire global consequences. [and] this case should serve notice … that law enforcement is now prepared to deal with criminals who seem to neither know, nor fear, nor respect international borders.”

The press release was made the same day that the cease fire was announced in the Gulf War, February 28, 1991.

The investigation and intelligence analysis would later reveal that transactions were conducted between U.S. Atlanta based BNL and across financial institutions and international companies in Rome, London, and Baghdad.  

Christopher P. Drogoul, who was manager of the tiny Atlanta

---


branch of the BNL illegally facilitated billions in loans to Iraq and other countries and companies without the approval of the bank's headquarters in Rome. He made the loans despite the fact that Iraq's credit rating was so bad that the parent bank was rejecting Iraqi requests for money, even those for only a few thousand dollars. The bank’s financing operation was a critical element in Iraq's military programs and the bank was fully aware that much of the money Drogoul was lending to Iraq paid for Iraqi arms and weapons technology.

The FBI investigation revealed that Drogoul had a close relationship with Safa al-Habobi, the Iraqi head of Iraq's procurement network, and with Rafa Hassan Ali, the director general of Iraq's ministry in charge of procurement and technology development. Drogoul met repeatedly with Habobi and other Iraqi officials involved in buying arms and technology for Iraq. During a visit by Drogoul to a military fair in Baghdad in April 1989, for example, Habobi took him on a tour of a military installation and showed off the various projects paid for with his bank's money. One of the items was the modified Scud-B missile which was eventually used against the American-led coalition in the Persian Gulf War. The main concern for the U.S. Intelligence Community in assessing the capabilities and strategies Saddam would implement during the Gulf War was gaining reliable insight into the weapons systems that had been built by U.S. backed loans and technologies that could potentially be used against U.S. and allied troops in the Gulf War.

The other source of tactical and operational intelligence available to the U.S. was derived as a result of another criminal investigation. One of the most
damaging leaks of advanced U.S. arms technology involved the transshipment of
dual use technologies and munitions list articles to Iraq. Carlos Cardoen, a U.S.
educated Chilean arms dealer, supplied cluster bombs and the technology for
producing them to Saddam in barter for crude oil barrels and monies laundering
through foreign accounts in Europe, England and the Caribbean. Cardoen was a
trained engineer and metallurgist at the University of Utah, one of the leading
universities in the technical field of munitions. Cardoen who had a doctorate in
metallurgy had advanced the munitions industry in Chile with the knowledge and
expertise he had gained in the United States by setting up his own arms
company, Industrias Cardoen (INCAR).

Cardoen had achieved mirroring the technology he had learned in the U.S.
and from associations with other international arms dealers in Chile for the
manufacturing of cluster bombs. Cardoen and James Guerin, another notorious
international arms dealer, had agreed to divide the world cluster bomb market in
early 1983 in half with Cardoen supplying Latin America and proscribed countries
such as Iraq and South Africa, and Guerin targeting U.S. allies in the Middle East
and Asia. As part of this territorial splitting of the world cluster bomb market,
Guerin provided Cardoen with the engineering technology to manufacture the
fuzes for the cluster bombs which are the most difficult component to build.\(^{578}\)

In 1986 Cardoen had applied to the U.S. Patent Office for a patent to
create his own version of the cluster bomb which incorporated several

\(^{578}\) Hartung, 234-235.
modifications of the original U.S. design for the system.\textsuperscript{579} Cluster bombs are an advanced conventional explosive composed of hundreds of tiny “bomblets” that are capable of dispersing across an extensive radius scattering shrapnel and fire as they detonate. The cluster bombs were originally a U.S. designed weapon that was used by U.S. forces to produce devastating effects in Vietnam and by the Israeli air force during the 1982 invasion of Lebanon.\textsuperscript{580} Cardoen began producing U.S. style cluster bombs with the technology that had been supplied to Saddam by the U.S. Philadelphia based philanthropist, James Guerin, who later became a major international arms dealer through his defense electronics firm, International Signal and Control (ISC).

The Intelligence Community was tied to both Guerin and Cardoen. In Guerin’s case, the National Security Agency orchestrated a classified operation in 1975 that used Guerin’s company, ISC, to sell South Africa the technology for listening posts that could be used to monitor Soviet naval activities in and around South Africa. The Intelligence Community continued this relationship with Guerin which enable them to have resources and assets on the African continent. The CIA was also allegedly involved in the sale of cluster bomb technology to Iraq by Cardoen because it had an interest in the covert operation that both Guerin and Cardoen were assisting U.S. intelligence agencies fulfill. The scheme was to transfer missile technology to South Africa in exchange for military intelligence

\textsuperscript{579} Hartung, 234-235.

\textsuperscript{580} Hartung, 234.
and cooperation from the South African regime, but these transfers were a direct violation of U.S. and U.N. sanctions against the apartheid regime.

As a result, Cardoen sold approximately $400 million worth of cluster bombs to Saddam and the technology for Iraq to build its own cluster bomb factory without interference from any U.S. agencies. Guerin’s company, ISC, also engaged in the illicit shipments of munitions list and dual use technologies to South Africa which included telemetry tracking equipment, sophisticated gyroscopes and photo-imaging equipment that could be used to analyze and design missile guidance systems. Although the CIA was aware of these shipments and that they had also transferred some of this technology to Iraq, they turned the other way.  

581 Guerin was indicted in November 1991 along with 17 other. Guerin asserted that U.S. intelligence officials approved the shipments. Former CIA Deputy Director Bobby Ray Inman acknowledged that Guerin provided important intelligence information on South Africa. The Department of Justice would not comment on any CIA connection except to say the CIA and many other government agencies cooperated in this case. Cardoen was later indicted on August 29, 1995 for the illegal exportation of zirconium and fuze components to Chile which were sold and transshipped to Iraq for the manufacturing of cluster bombs.

The U.S. Intelligence Community had been involved in supporting and supplying licensable and controlled technologies, equipment, and munitions list articles indirectly to Iraq through some of their operatives under the umbrella of

581 Hartung, 192-193.
sanctioned at the time classified operations. Once the operations ceased, the arms dealers were no longer protected by the cloak of the CIA or other Intelligence Community members. Instead, the U.S. proceeded to reap the intelligence that had been cultivated through these operations on the military capabilities, arms and munitions supplies, and the motivations of Saddam himself because these arms dealers had developed personal relationships with him and senior Iraqi officials. The quality of intelligence afforded the U.S. and multilateral coalition the ability to strategically target critical infrastructure, military complexes, and covert arms and alleged chemical biological warfare (CBW) manufacturing sites. This level of reliable intelligence was not available to Saddam and his military or intelligence apparatus. Indeed, the irony in the U.S. Intelligence Community relationship with these arms dealers is that in 1991, the multilateral coalition air force assets were provided specific coordinates of the Saad 38 factory located south of Baghdad as one of their first targets. The plant that had been producing U.S. style cluster bombs with the technology that had been provided to Iraq by Guerin and Cardoen was the first target destroyed by the coalition.\(^{582}\)

Iraq had attempted to cultivate intelligence that would provide greater insight and situational awareness into U.S. strategies, military capabilities, level of engagement and motivations. Saddam never envisioned that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait would trigger such international cohesion to address the encroachment on a sovereign state in the Persian Gulf. Preliminary assessments clearly

revealed to Saddam that Iraq was locked in not only a political but potentially a
military confrontation with the United States and that his Arab brother, Saudi
Arabia, had allowed the Bush Administration to position itself within the Persian
Gulf Region. As a result, Saddam and his political advisors altered their initial line
of attack and reformulated a new strategy and framework built around four key
assumptions: the multinational coalition was inherently weak; the United States
would not be willing to undergo high costs, especially sustain significant
causalities; the United States would endure serious losses in a war with Iraq over
Kuwait; and, that military air assets would only play a minor role with the
coalition.\textsuperscript{583}

First, a central element in Iraq’s calculations of the crisis was that the
United States would in fact play a major role in any confrontation. Iraq’s
intelligence and military services had assessed that the United States had
assembled a multinational coalition that was politically fragile. Iraqi strategists
also assumed that the multinational coalition would deteriorate and collapse if
pressure were applied to the Arab members of the coalition who they perceived
to be the weakest links.\textsuperscript{584} Saddam had not anticipated his Arab brothers,
specifically Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to take such strong positions against Iraq.
Saddam had attempted to coerce their governments into terminating their
cooperation with the United States through threats, media campaigns and even
appeals to their populations to create an uprising against their own governments.

\textsuperscript{583} Pollack, 36-40.

Ultimately, Iraq’s intelligence analysis and their underlying assumptions proved to be incorrect. In spite of a heightened sense of caution during the initial stages of engagement, the multinational coalition developed a cohesion that jelled as the crisis evolved. A key component during the crisis that helped alleviate some of the Arab concern that the Israelis would retaliate, was the use of the Patriot missile system against the Scud and cluster bombs being used by Iraq. The use of Patriot missile technology reduced the concern that the Saudi’s expressed during the crisis. Subject matter experts directly involved in the creation and ultimate deployment of the Patriot missile used the media to ensure that concerns in the Persian Gulf were addressed with assurances of the success afforded by the deployment of Patriot missiles:

- “The Patriot’s success, of course, is known to everyone. It’s 100 per-cent so far, of 33 [Scuds] engaged, there have been 33 destroyed.”

- “42 Scuds engaged, 41 intercepted. Thank God for the Patriot missile!”

- “[I]n Saudi Arabia, just under 90% of Scud missile engagements resulted in destruction of the Scud’s warhead … In Israel, about half of Scud engagements by Patriot resulted in confirmed destruction of the Scud warhead, as assessed by Israeli Defense Forces.”

The second element of Iraq’s strategy involved the extent to which the United States was willing to sustain economic costs or loss of life during military

---


engagement. Saddam anticipated that the United States would be unwilling to
risk the loss of American lives to liberate occupied Kuwait from Iraq. In addition,
Iraq resumed that the U.S. would not be willing to invest significant resources in
the Persian Gulf crisis in turn would not want to subject itself to tolerate high
economic costs to sustain the military engagement. Iraqi strategists based their
analysis on the assumption that Kuwait was not significant to the Western
powers, particularly if Iraq assured that it would continue to provide the same
quantify of oil to the West.

This perception was later solidified after the meeting between Saddam
and Ambassador Glaspie on July 25. Saddam who was a selective reader of
history, had reviewed some literature on the U.S. involvement with Vietnam and
had deduced that the U.S was soft. S88 This was the political lesson that Saddam
had derived from the Vietnam War. In addition, statements were made by various
Bush Administration that the U.S. had no formal commitments to Kuwait S89
These public statements may have contributed to Saddam's perception as to
how the U.S. would react if he invaded Kuwait.

Indeed, on August 2, 1990, the Iraqi press commented on one of
Saddam's hardline speeches which he had delivered earlier that year concluding
that: “…We know that Washington’s threats are those of a paper tiger. America is

589 Haass, War, 58.
still nursing the disasters from the Vietnam War, and no American official, be it
George Bush, would date to do anything serious against the Arab nation.  

The perception the at the U.S. would be apprehensive in proceeding with a
military engagement so far off its shores was imbedded in lessons that Iraq drew
from the Vietnam War. Iraqi strategists believed that the Vietnam scenario could
be replicated with Iraq. The U.S. could be once again ‘defeated’ at the hands of a
small but determined developing country, Iraq, and that the U.S. resolve would
eventually erode after prolonged fighting.

Saddam’s calculations hinged on the belief that prolonged war with the
U.S. would ultimately result in a victory for Iraq because the U.S. would lose its
resolve. According to the Iraqi press the will to fight of the US military has
deprecated steadily over the years.  

Indeed, Saddam fully expected that as the
U.S. deployment escalated, morale among the troops would suffer because of
the exposure to the hard conditions of the desert and would ultimately desert
their posts or refuse to be deployed resulting in a victory for Iraq. The Iraqi
correlation of the immediate conflict with the U.S. and the Vietnam experience
was a frequently used analogy by Saddam. He would constantly warn that any
involvement by the U.S. in the Gulf conflict would result in ‘another Vietnam’ for
the United States.  

---

590 Cigar, 2-8.
591 Cigar, 4.
592 Cigar, 4.
The third element in the Iraqi strategy stemmed from a belief that the U.S. and West would suffer serious losses in a war with Iraqi forces to free Kuwait. Once again, Iraqi intelligence sources failed to accurately assess the vast disparity in the quality of equipment, military preparation of personnel and tactics between the Iraqi and Western militaries. Saddam was in agreement with this assessment because it only underscore the base nature of his military tactics. Saddam based his optimism on the strength of Iraq’s ground forces based upon the results he achieved in the Iran-Iraq War when other forms of warfare had proved marginal. He was convinced that his army would be able to inflict a bloody battle that would lead to a stalemate and force the Western powers to the bargaining table, if he would not initially prevent a full scale war by shattering the political cohesion of the multinational forces.593

Iraqi analysts had based their calculations purely on the numbers of military personnel on the ground and the equipment they had at their disposal rather than the effectiveness of the technology they had in those weapons. This in effect lulled Saddam into a false sense of military superiority on the ground. He never took other methods of applications of technology that had advanced far beyond what had been available during the Vietnam War. His intelligence information was dated and extremely inaccurate. Prior to the commencement of Operation Desert Storm, Saddam was still reassuring his countrymen in public speeches that “[w]e are confident because our arms are modern and very numerous,” and that for the U.S. to go on the offensive in battle they would have

---

593 Cigar, 14-18.
to generate three times the amount of Iraqi forces.\textsuperscript{594} Iraq relied heavily on their beliefs that ultimately engaging in a ground battle would provide a military strategic and quantitative lead as well as a theater advantage.

Saddam, although he recognized that the U.S. may have a technology advantage in the technology they used for military weaponry, he still viewed it as a paper advantage. Iraq seriously underestimated the technological superiority of the military equipment and weaponry possessed by the U.S. Iraq did not have the critical intelligence apparatus to assess the viability and effectiveness of current U.S. technology once deployed in the Persian Gulf. For example, Saddam drew upon his experience in the Iran-Iraq War, and asserted that the older equipment which they possessed would still be effective because

\begin{quote}
\text{"... [W]hen the battle begins, not all advanced weapons can be applied in every part of the battlefield. Rather [than such technology] what will have the decisive role in operations in the field, as far as infantry and artillery are concerned, will be the artillery pieces [themselves] and tanks."}\textsuperscript{595}
\end{quote}

What is critical to underscore is that not only was Iraq’s calculations of the military capabilities erroneous, but more importantly it did not have the most critical asset in battle – the integrated U.S. intelligence capabilities.

The fourth element of the Iraqi strategy is the role that the air force would play in the conflict. Intelligence resources in Iraq concluded that military engagement with air forces would only play a minimal role with the multinational coalition. Even if there was an escalation of airpower, Iraqi analysts deemed that

\textsuperscript{594} Cigar, 14-15.

\textsuperscript{595} Cigar, 15.
the results would be comparable to that which occurred in Vietnam with the U.S. Iraq believed that even extensive bombing and aerial command of the skies were insufficient to defeat a disciplined and determined country which is what occurred in Vietnam.\textsuperscript{596}

Iraq grossly underestimated the dominance that airpower would inflict during a conflict of this nature. Even though Iraq recognized that the U.S. led coalition of multinational forces would have not only a numerical, but most importantly, a technological advantage in airpower against Iraq, Saddam still believed that he could limit the damage inflicted by air strikes. Saddam falsely believed that he could cause sufficient attrition of troops in the air and on the ground to directly impact the coalition’s resolve in battle. He acknowledged and accepted that Iraq’s critical infrastructure would be severely hampered by air strikes, but assumed that the air campaign would be an initial engagement of short duration prior to the conflict transitioning to a ground operation.

Overall, Iraq appears to have made strategic miscalculations by underestimating the resolve that the United States would have in the overall conflict. Saddam clearly underestimated the level of integrated resolve by the multinational collation led by the U.S. and the damage that could be inflicted by air strikes on Iraq’s ground military troops. The Persian Gulf War also served to illustrate the impact that a country’s political and military apparatus can have on the development of strategic assessments and the application of intelligence. Saddam must bear responsibility for Iraq’s policy, both for his own

\textsuperscript{596} Cigar, 18.
miscalculations and for fostering a system which distorted the decisionmaking process.

**Section VI: Coercive Diplomacy: Strategies in the Gulf War**

The theory and application of coercive diplomacy embodies the essence of the art of diplomacy. It is one of the most intriguing and common practices of conducting inter-state relations whose ultimate goal is achieving political objectives and fostering a state’s national interest without waging a war.\(^{597}\) To gain better insight into the variables involved in the application of coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions, there needs to be a baseline understanding of the different techniques applied in statecraft.\(^{598}\)

1. Propaganda refers to influence attempts relying primarily on the deliberate manipulation of verbal symbols.
2. Diplomacy refers to the influence attempts relying primarily on negotiation.
3. Economic statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on resources which have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.
4. Military statecraft refers to influence attempts relying primarily on violence, weapons, or force.

Indeed, the various forms of statecraft are the environment in which coercive diplomacy is implemented.

Coercive diplomacy has been outlined in this three prong analytical framework as a defensive strategy to achieving to political goals without resorting

---


to conflict and is distinguished from other related diplomatic concepts. It needs to be highlighted that coercive diplomacy is not a form of blackmail which is an offensive scheme undertaken to intimidate a target into giving up a strategic position or something of value without resisting. In the same vein, coercive diplomacy is distinguished from deterrence in that coercive diplomacy is focused on stopping an action already undertaken by an adversary, whereas deterrence utilizes threats to discourage an opponent from undertaking an action which has not yet been initiated against one's interests. Coercive diplomacy, however, has been associated with compellance which is a strategy that employs threats to make an adversary halt an action already undertaken. Theorists have suggested that a difference exists between the two concepts asserting that the application of “compellance” involves exclusive reliance on military intimidations and means to weaken the opponent’s resistance and ultimately change their position.

The significance of applying coercive diplomacy is that states have a broader span of tools and methods to employ. As a result, the threats of punishment are coupled with positive inducements and assurances in an attempt to influence the opponent and change the adverse behavior, and this type of coercive diplomacy is known as the “carrot and stick” approach. The task of implementing coercive diplomacy can be relatively easy or quite formidable, depending on what one demands of the opponent and how strongly he is motivated not to do what is asked of the leader. The policy maker must,

---


600 George, Forceful, 7-8.
therefore, find a combination of a carrot and stick approach that will suffice to overcome the opponent’s disinclination to yield. The demands made of the opponent must be less attractive to him than the threatened consequences if he does not acquiesce. Further, if the threatened consequences are not strong enough for this purpose, then concessions must be offered to the opponent as well so that the combination of negative and positive inducements directed towards the leader will outweigh the attractiveness of what is being demanded.

Coercive diplomacy affords a strategy in international relations that creates an avenue to achieve political objectives without having to resort to military force which could lead to unnecessary bloodshed, psychological and significant political costs. In analyzing cases of historical international conflict, coercive diplomacy has proven to be a particularly efficient tool that when applied under the right circumstances will intimidate weaker opponents with little risk. An additional benefit to using coercive diplomacy is that a crisis resolved through its application is also less likely taint future political relations between the two adversaries. When and how to apply coercive diplomacy can be challenging to leaders. Many factors need to be considered so that coercive diplomacy does not further aggravate a crisis. The two most critical factors impacting the political decisions in whether or not to implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy include first, the process of determining or not whether coercive diplomacy may be a

601 George and Simons, Limits, 16-21.
602 George and Simons, Limits, 15-16.
603 George and Simons, Limits, 9.
viable strategy in a particular situation and, second, attempting to design and implement an effective version of the strategy for that situation.\textsuperscript{604}

The framework used in this study is specifically geared towards analyzing the political crisis at hand and whether coercive diplomacy is the best course of action to undertake. If a leader does not take into consideration the operational code of the adversary, the quality of the intelligence surrounding the crisis and ultimately what tools of coercive diplomacy could be applied, then it could not go as planned and result in an escalation of the conflict into an unanticipated war. For example, applying the tools of coercive requires a delicate balance between coercing a change in the aggressive behavior and allowing the opponent an avenue to save face in the eyes of the international community, specifically any allies. Indeed, the leader considering whether or not to implement a tool of coercive diplomacy must assess the adversary’s reluctance to conform to the request and be in tune with the sensitivity surrounding the opponent’s acquiescence to the coercion. A leader must assess whether the opponent be able to save face in political arena and will the coercer be able to negotiate politically with the adversary or will there be latent aggression still brewing. Coercive diplomacy is a skillful game of chess that must allow for a draw in the game, rather than a checkmate which can lead to an escalation into a full scale conflict.

Finally, there are instances when coercive diplomacy is chosen by the leader, not solely for its political precautions, but rather because no other viable avenues exist to stem the opponent hostile behavior. This was the situation in the

\textsuperscript{604} George and Simons, \textit{Limits}, 14-15.
case study at hand where the Bush Administration responded to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait with coercive diplomacy because at the inception of the crisis, there was no political or diplomatic support by the international community to engage in a military response. The essence of coercive diplomacy is that it provides a viable alternative course of action instead of relying on a military response. The threat of force, rather than the actual use of force, is at the crux of coercing the aggressor into changing the unpalatable political behavior and complying with one’s demands.

Coercive diplomacy is a psychological instrument of political force that is more flexible and diverse as opposed to the tactical, physical and decisive actions deployed in a military engagement. In addition, coercive diplomacy requires having clear communication in conjunction with the threat and use of political force being implemented in a crisis. The step by step political moves in this game of chess, with the move/counter moves of signaling for a de-escalation and withdrawal from the adverse behavior must indicate a willingness to some degree of bargaining. By clearly communicating expectations throughout the crisis, and ensuring that what is articulated is mirrored by the leader’s actions, establishes credibility and a willingness for negotiations. Clear communications, followed by consistent actions, will in most circumstances motivate the opponent to take steps towards complying with the request and engage in negotiations. However, the framework used in this study stresses that only by integrating the analysis of the operational code of the leaders involved in the crisis together with

---

605 George and Simons, Limits, 10-11.
quality and accurate of intelligence, can a determination be made whether coercive diplomacy will truly be an effective tool to stem a conflict.

Immediately following the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq on August 2, 1990, the Bush Administration knew that a direct reaction from the United States was critical. An effective sanctions strategy should consider five critical elements:

- First, it must assess the target’s strengths and weaknesses;
- Second, it must define an objective;
- Third, it must determine which tactics to follow;
- Fourth, it must evaluation and ensure implementation; and,
- Fifth, it must subject sanctions to periodic review.  

The U.S. imposed strong bilateral economic sanctions on Iraq and Kuwait. The reaction to the invasion had be tactical in order to impose a direct impact on the crisis at hand. With hours of the White House learning of the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) took steps to freeze all of Kuwait’s assets under U.S. control anywhere in the world to prevent their acquisition by Iraq. In addition to freezing Kuwait’s assets, the U.S. also froze Iraq’s assets held by this country and further imposed a comprehensive economic embargo on both Iraq and Kuwait. The thrust of the sanctions was to create sufficient economic pressure and hardship in Iraq to stem further aggression. In addition, the U.S. was attempting to deny Saddam access to the financial resources and services that would allow his abhorrent behavior to continue in the region. From the U.S. perspective,

---

sanctions were the most direct action that could be taken with the most apparent effect on Iraq.

The President, under these exigent circumstances, does not have to wait for Congressional vetting and approval. To implement the sanctions and embargo, President Bush invoked his authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act, the Export Administration Act (EAA), and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). These laws provided the immediate vehicle for the United States to allow the Present to exert broad authority over imports, exports, and most importantly financial transactions. The key Executive Departments that implemented the sanctions and embargo were the:

- Department of Commerce (DOC) and the Export Administration Act (EAA): DOC, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is a licensing, regulatory, and enforcement agency that advances U.S. national security, foreign policy, and economic objectives by ensuring an effective export control and treaty compliance system and by promoting continued U.S. strategic technology leadership and a strong defense industrial base. BIS administers and enforces the Export Administration Act (EAA) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which regulate the export and reexport of commercial commodities and technology, as well as less sensitive military items, i.e. dual use commodities. DOC/BIS administers the EAA and EARs through the issuance of licenses for the exportation of dual use commodities; i.e. those sensitive technologies that have both
civilian and military applications, and is responsible for controlling the Table of Denial Orders which prohibits sanctioned companies and/or governments from engaging in trade with the United States.\textsuperscript{607}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Department of State (DOS), Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC): DOS/AVC implement policy and controls to further arms control, verification, and compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament agreements or commitments. DOS/AVC advances national and international security through the negotiation and implementation of effectively verifiable and diligently enforced arms control and disarmament agreements involving weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery as well as certain conventional weapons. DOS/AVC administers the Arms Export Control Act and the Munitions List by overseeing the issuance of licenses for the exportation of munitions list articles, and is responsible for debarring companies and/or governments from engaging in trade with the United States, or military sales who have violated applicable laws and regulations.\textsuperscript{608}
  \item Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC):
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{607} Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security (https://www.commerce.gov/bureau-industry-and-security), date of access: March 15, 2015. DOC/BIS was formerly known as the Bureau of Export Enforcement (BXA) during the timer period of the Gulf conflict.

\textsuperscript{608} Department of State, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance (AVC) (http://www.state.gov/t/avc/), date of access: March 15, 2015. DOS/AVC was formerly known as the DOS Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) during the Gulf conflict.
OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on US foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries and regimes, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and other threats to the national security, foreign policy or economy of the United States. OFAC’s authority stems from Presidential national emergency powers, as well as authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on financial transactions and freezing of assets of the target state under US jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments.609

The sanctions imposed by the United States were covered by four key Executive Orders (E.O.) signed by President Bush, two of which were issued on the day of the invasion itself, and the others were drafted in direct response to United Nations (U.N.) Resolution 661. The execution and enforcement of these four E.O.’s resided within the DOC, DOS, and OFAC. The four instruments and the assets they targeted are as follows:

- Executive Order 12722, issued August 2, 1990, blocked the property and interests of Iraq held in the United States or by U.S. persons world-wide. The E.O. prohibited the importation of any Iraqi goods and services, and the export of any U.S. goods, services, technology, an technical data or

609 Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx), date of access: March 24, 2015.
other export-controlled information to Iraq; all transport and travel to Iraq (except to depart from Iraq or by professional journalists); the reexport of Iraqi goods to any country; and the grant of extension of credits, loans, or guarantees to the government of Iraq or any institution or entity affiliated with it.\(^\text{610}\)

- Executive Order 12723, also issued August 2, 1990, blocked all assets of the government of Kuwait held in the United States or by a U.S. person worldwide.\(^\text{611}\)

- Executive Order 12724, issued August 13, 1990, prohibited the performance of any contract, including financial contracts, in support of industrial, commercial, public utility, or Iraqi government contracts. It also prohibited any financial or economic transaction with the Iraqi government or its representatives.\(^\text{612}\)

- Executive Order 12725, issued August 9, 1990, prohibited any import of Kuwaiti origin; any export of goods, services, or technology to Kuwait; any financial transaction with Kuwait, and any travel to Kuwait (with exceptions for humanitarian, official, and media travel).\(^\text{613}\)


The ratifying of Public Law 101-513, the Iraq Sanctions Act of 1990 strengthened the underlying sanctions and embargo against trade, economic, or financial transactions with Iraq or Iraqi occupied Kuwait and strengthened enforcement by increasing both civil and criminal penalties.\footnote{Interviews conducted with R. Richard Newcomb, Director, OFAC, Department of the Treasury, and Merete Evans, Senior Policy Advisor – Sanctions and Embargo Enforcement, OFAC, Department of the Treasury, by A.M. Perez. Interviews were conducted between August 1990 and May 1993.}

President Bush and the U.S. reacted immediately to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait by imposing strong bilateral economic sanctions on both Iraq and Kuwait. Within hours of the White House being informed of the Iraqi invasion on August 2, 1990, the U.S. took steps to freeze all of Kuwait’s assets under U.S. control anywhere in the world to prevent the ability by Iraq to acquire or access those assets. The flip side of the bilateral sanctions included the U.S. freezing Iraq’s assets within the control of U.S. financial institutions and imposing a comprehensive economic embargo on both Iraq and Kuwait.

These economic sanctions were imposed by the U.S. in an environment of substantial uncertainty because neither intelligence nor military sources could positively confirm what the situation was on the ground in Kuwait. Some of the key areas of concern evolved around what Saddam’s immediate intentions were regarding the Persian Gulf Region and whether he intended to seize the oil fields in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province.\footnote{Haass, 109-110.} The U.S. recognized from recent investigations and the intelligence is had generated that time was of the essence in targeting Iraq’s assets and freezing them. Otherwise, there was the significant
risk and probable certainty that Saddam could acquire those assets to further his military campaign. At this stage of the conflict, it was critical for Bush to send unmistakable message to Saddam himself and to the international community that the U.S. would not accept the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq as a fait accompli and more importantly that it intended to protect Saudi Arabia and the other Persian Gulf States.

Bush wanted to send a clear message that the U.S. was in a position to immediately respond to the invasion, as well as contemplate the critical next steps in order to deal with Saddam. It can be argued that the immediate implementation of the bilateral sanctions triggered the domino effect that cascaded the rallying of the international community to respond to the invasion. It was not important what the immediate impact the imposition of bilateral sanctions would have on Saddam or his strategy. In assessing the conflict, military action seemed premature and was impractical given the time it would take to mobilize U.S. assets and other military forces to engage in the region.616

Bush later addressed a joint session of Congress on August 8, 1990, to outline the actions taken by him exerting his executive power, laying out the four immediate objectives, and seeking an authorization to engage in military action should the need arise to pursue air and land attacks.

“... Less than a week ago, in the early morning hours of August 2nd, Iraqi Armed Forces, without provocation or warning, invaded a peaceful Kuwait... This aggression came just hours after Saddam Hussein specifically assured numerous countries in the area that there would be no invasion. There is no justification whatsoever for this outrageous and brutal act of aggression. A puppet regime imposed from the outside is

616 Haass, 110.
 unacceptable. The acquisition of territory by force is unacceptable. No one, friend or foe, should doubt our desire for peace; and no one should underestimate our determination to confront aggression."

"Four simple principles guide out policy. First, we seek the immediate, unconditional, and complete withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Second, Kuwait’s legitimate government must be restored to replace the puppet regime. And third, my administration, as has been the case with every President from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the security and stability of the Persian Gulf. And fourth, I am determined to protect the lives of American citizens abroad."617

Bush wanted to underscore that his actions were to maintain peace in the Middle East and that the U.S. must resist aggression or it would destroy not only our freedom, but the peace for all people.

To further emphasize that he was not acting alone, he shared with Congress that he had spoken with political leaders from the Middle East, Europe, Asia and the Americas. To further solidify his resolve, he also stated that he personally met with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of England, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada, and NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner. All these leaders agreed that Iraq could not be allowed to benefit from its invasion of Kuwait. With the U.S. Security Council opposed to Iraq’s violent invasion of Kuwait, Congress authorized the use of military force with a clear objective of return control of Kuwait to the Kuwaiti government, and protecting U.S. interests abroad.

Enforcement of the various United States E.O.s and related laws required an integrated enforcement posture with UN sanctioned Task Forces to enforce United Nations Resolutions 661, 674, 686, 687 and 699 against Iraq as a result

617 “President Bush: Address on Iraq’s Invasion of Kuwait,” August 8, 1990, date of access: June 8, 2015.
of the invasion of Kuwait. Proper implementation of the sanctions and embargo required a specific identification of Iraqi firms, front company’s and specially designated nationals (SDNs). Later a comprehensive analysis of the implementation plan and related enforcement actions was briefed to the Kuwait Economic Society in February 1992 describing how OFAC enforced the economic sanctions.

VII. The International Community

Historically the western nations had been courting a relationship with Saddam Hussein, including the United States, France, Germany and England, as a means of creating a balance in the Persian Gulf region. Both the Reagan and subsequently the Bush Administration had a consistent foreign policy of cultivating some type of relation with Iraq. Saddam. However, there was always an underlying tension in the relationship as a result of the outrage in Congress over Saddam Hussein’s human rights record, especially his repression of the Kurds to the point of use chemical and biological weapons. U.S. Intelligence agencies had always voiced their concern over establishing a political alliance with a country that advocated such reprehensible practices. Indeed, recent history had demonstrated how Saddam had turned on the Kurds with inordinate


620 Freedman and Karsh, 25.
brutality when the cease-fire came into effect with Iran when the Iran-Iraq war was coming to an end. Saddam had even resorted to deploying chemical weapons on the Kurd population as a means to commit genocide.

Both the Reagan and Bush Administration had arrived at the same conclusion that measures needed to be taken against Iraq to prevent further genocide. There was enough corroborated intelligence available to the Administration and the international community that left no doubt of Saddam’s use of chemical weapons and his brutal human rights offenses. Indeed, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee found little opposition in successfully passing *The Prevention of Genocide Act in 1988* through the Senate in spite of the Reagan Administration’s resistance to the implementation of sanctions. The Act, however, was stalled until after the 1988 presidential election when Bush was elected into office. The newly elected Bush Administration arrived at the same conclusion as its predecessor that strategically it would be in the best interest of the United States to maintain U.S.–Iraqi relations and its current foreign policy stance.

“…By 1990 Iraq loans under the agricultural credit scheme had exceeded $1 billion, while annual trade between Iraq and the United States had grown from around $500 million in the early 1980s to over $3.5 billion.”

This political stance by the United States was informally supported by friendly Arab states, including Saudi Arabia and Egypt, who believed that in spite of Iraq’s violent record, it could be swayed to a more moderate posture.

---

Law enforcement (LE) and financial regulatory agencies in the United States, specifically the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Federal Reserve Bank Examiners, uncovered an illicit money laundering and diversion scheme as a result of a search executed at the Atlanta Branch of the Italian Banca Nazionale Lavoro (BNL) in 1989. Analyses conducted by the FBI, FRB and Intelligence Community (IC) in collaboration with the Italian government confirmed that the Atlanta branch of the Italian BNL made over $4.5 billion of unauthorized loans to Iraq. Investigations exposed that loans which were guaranteed by the United States under the Department of Agriculture’s Commodity Credit Corporation program and were intended to finance agricultural exports to Iraq were illegally being used. In reality, the monies from the unauthorized loans were being diverted to purchase weapons, dual use technologies and other munitions list articles. The criminal indictments stemming from these enforcement actions were not filed until February 28, 1991 which incidentally was the same day that President Bush announced the cease-fire in the Gulf War. The criminal indictments were filed against the branch manager, a Turkish national, four Iraqi officials and two Iraqi banks, alleging a five-year scheme to extend more than $5 billion in loans and credits to Iraq and other countries and companies for the procurement of weapons and other proscribed articles.

---

622 Hartung, 223.
623 Hartung, 223-229.
In an attempt to balance U.S. strategic financial interests in the Persian Gulf with Iraq and address the heightened concerns expressed by the CIA and the State Department as a result of the BNL investigations, President Bush signed the National Security Directive 26 (NSD-26) on 2 October 1989, *U.S. Policy Toward the Persian Gulf (U)*, stating that:

“...Normal relations between the United States and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States Government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq. At the same time, the Iraqi leadership must understand that any illegal use of chemical and/or biological weapons will lead to economic and political sanctions, for which we would seek the broadest possible support from our allies and friends. Any breach of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] will result in a similar response.”

NSD-26 was intended to use economic and political incentives to try and moderate the erratic and violent actions of Saddam who had been described in a 1988 State Department document “...as a dictator who believes that power comes from the barrel of a gun.” The Directive was the Bush Administration’s attempt to bring Saddam within the fold of international nations and expectations.

The need for reaching out to international support in dealing with Iraq was clearly messaged by Bush in NSD-26. The IAEA is an international organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to proscribe the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, including a nuclear weapons

---


program. The reference to the IAEA in the NSD-26 served to highlight that the purpose for creating such an international body was two-fold; first, to promote the peaceful use of nuclear (atomic) power and secondly to regulate the industry.

Bush further stated in NSD-26 that:

“We should pursue, and seek to facilitate, opportunities for U.S. firms to participate in the reconstruction of the Iraqi economy, particularly in the energy area, where they do not conflict with our non-proliferation and other significant objectives. Also, as a means of developing access to and influence with the Iraqi defense establishment, the United States should consider sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e.g., training courses and medical exchange, on a case by case basis.”

Intelligence Community assessments predicted that at the time Iraq was so drained by recent Iran-Iraq war that there was little risk of it becoming aggressive toward it Middle East neighbors for at least 2 to 3 years.

Historically, it was also significant that the IAEA was a proposal that had been presented by President Dwight D. Eisenhower in his notable Atoms for Peace address to the international community at the UN General Assembly in 1953 in which he called for scientific experts to be “mobilized to apply autonomic energy needs of agriculture, medicine and other peaceful activities” rather than exploit the energy source for purely military applications. This was proposed

---


628 Freedman and Karsh, 26-27.

during the Cold War when it was clearly apparent that the Soviet Union would reject any international control of nuclear fissile material but eventually became a signatory to the IAEA.

Bush also addressed the political and human rights concerns of the Middle East region when he also articulated in NSD-26 that:

“… Human rights considerations should continue to be an important element in our [US] policy toward Iraq. In addition, Iraq should be urged to cease its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process.”

Indeed, although the overall tenor of NSD-26 was positive and extended opened a bridge to further relations, the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz visited Secretary of State James Baker in Washington, D.C. in October just a few days after NSD-26 was signed into effect. Aziz accused the Bush Administration of having a disturbing policy towards Iraq, especially in the allegations of bribery and corruption stemming from the BNL loan scandal. In an attempt to appease Aziz, Secretary Baker advocated for the more than $1 billion in loan guarantees which if not granted Iraq would view as a direct vote of no confidence in the Iraqi debt policy. To further U.S. financial and political interests in the Middle East the Administration argued that Iraq’s war with Iran was over and that it was time for domestic reconstruction of Iraq which would provide good business opportunities. This was the same argument being echoed in the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The United States, as well as other members of the international community turned a blind eye to the extensive and far reaching efforts by Iraq to

procure the most sensitive and controlled military technologies not only from the United States but most prominently through Europe.

However, after Iraq invaded Kuwait the United States and the international community now saw Saddam as a significant threat to the stability of the region. President Bush comprehended from early on that even though the U.S. would take the lead and act unilaterally to address the invasion, he would need to gain the critical multilateral support to have a significant impact on the conflict.\textsuperscript{631} Theorists have argued that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of bipolarity cultivated a permissive condition that would allow for the U.S. to intervene in the Persian Gulf War.\textsuperscript{632} If the Soviet Union had not collapsed bringing the Cold War to an end, it would have been too risky for the U.S. to intervene in Iraq. The end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union presented a unique opportunity to invoke the use of the U.S. Security Council. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq presented an opportunity for the United Nations to address the first post-Cold War crisis with the international community.

In addition, this situation presented an opportunity for Bush to personally engage the leaders of the member countries of the U.N. Security council to support U.S. efforts against Iraq. This type of leadership engagement, known as ‘summitry’ is the primary method of personal diplomacy, but not the only


\textsuperscript{632} Crocker, 24-27.
avenue. Bush publicly condemned the invasion of Kuwait by Saddam and then began cultivating a unified opposition against Iraq in the U.S. and among European, Asian and most importantly Middle Eastern allies.

Since the aftermath of the Cuban Missile crisis, a dedicated phone link or a ‘hot-line’ was established as early as 1963 between the U.S. and the Soviet Union so that the heads of state could readily communicate. Basically, the telephone over the years has become the most direct and increasingly popular mode of communication between heads of state not only to maintain regular contact, but most importantly to address immediate concerns, issues, or manage a crisis. This telephone diplomacy came into its own when Bush, knowing he had to cultivate the support of the international community against Iraq, used it to rally the collation against Saddam.

Bush clearly understood that in order for the U.S. to invoke the support of the U.N. and gain the backing of member states it would have had to have been historically participating and supporting other states and their programs even though they may not have met the immediate needs or strategic priorities of the United States.

“...Multilateralism is a process of quid pro quos, of trade-offs that are the substance of compromise and consensus. These trade-offs and compromises, of course, are the source of considerable worry to those skeptics who fear that the United States will give up too much for too little

---

634 Lord, 156.
gain. But to others, this is a process of accumulating political savings for a rainy day when one will need others’ support.\textsuperscript{635}

Indeed, such was the case that was brought to fruition in the war with Iraq when the U.S. used its political clout at the U.N. Security Council to gain the support of the member states. On August 2, 1990, the U.N. Security Council under Resolution 660, unanimously condemned Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait at the urging of the United States. The UN took forceful steps in Resolution 660 by demanding the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi military forces from Kuwait and entreating that both countries negotiate their differences. Regionally, the Gulf Cooperation Council and the Arab League followed suit and also condemned the invasion which was unanticipated by Saddam who did not consider that his Arab brothers would align their sentiments with the West.

The European Community also engaged and its individual members enacted measures similar to those implemented by the U.S. Great Britain took comparable steps on August 4 and other countries, including Japan, Canada, Australia and Norway did so as well. It was critical that a united front be presented and the Soviet Union as well as China supported these measures and also suspended all military aid to Iraq. Saudi Arabia and Turkey played key roles in the implementation of the international measures when they both closed oil pipelines crossing their geographic territories. With the closing of these two

critical pipelines together with the naval blockade of the Persian Gulf, Iraq lost over 95 percent of its oil exports.\footnote{636}

Later on August 6, the individual actions taken by the United States and other countries were transitioned into a multilateral embargo under the umbrella of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 661. The U.N. Security Council immediately followed this action by adopting Resolution 665 which authorized the necessary appropriate measures to enforce Resolution 661. The adoption of Resolution 665 by unanimous vote, with abstentions by Cuba and Yemen, enabled the multinational coalition to integrate and move forward with the blockade of Iraq and Kuwait. The only exemption to the blockade was for humanitarian food supplies to Iraq. Most countries followed the U.N. sanctions against Iraq. A total of 122 out of 159 member states of the U.N. supported the Security Council Resolutions directly or adopted comparable measures to support the U.N. The two countries which most notably refused to cooperate with the U.N. sanctions were Libya and Cuba.

Multilateral forces quickly coalesced from a tactical battle perspective. Air forces could build up and engage much faster than ground forces. A concept of a phased military campaign to liberate Iraq was readily accepted by the coalition forces because consideration had to be given to the deployment of ground forces in that theater. The plan orchestrated by General Schwarzkopf included a period of preliminary bombardment by the Coalition air forces in conjunction with other deep-strike assets that would serve to prepare the battlefield for a ground

\footnote{636 Melby, 111.}
This concept of operations, known as Checkmate, allowed for the flexibility in adjusting operational plans to meet the possible fluctuations during combat, especially in the deployment of air assets.

Public support escalated after U.S. military and political clout together with U.S. political authority and legitimacy teamed up to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait. More significant was the ability for the U.N. to impose a far reaching arms monitoring and economic sanctions regime on the defeated Iraq after the Gulf War. Iraq’s aggressive actions towards Kuwait provided a target of opportunity in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union to give rise to a new world order and trend towards multilateralism.

VIII: Economic Sanctions as Tools of Coercive Diplomacy

One of the most prevalent strategies of coercive diplomacy is the implementation of economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are considered punitive in nature and are meant to isolate the target state to change unacceptable behavior. Economic sanctions are tailored to the political situation and range from a mere refusal to renew trade agreements to a total export and import embargo against the target state. Economic sanctions may include trade embargoes or boycotts, freezing of assets, bans on cash transfers, bans on technology transfer and restrictions on travel. Sanctions are a tool used by

---

637 Knights, Cradle of Conflict, 41-43.
638 Maynes, 40.
countries or international organizations to persuade a particular government or group of governments to change their policy by restricting trade, investment or other commercial activity.

The implementation of economic sanctions has also been infused with what economists have labeled the “donkey psychology” of economic diplomacy. The analogy is that the use of sanctions need to have a positive incentive in order to move the stubborn state from its fixed position much like a donkey who refuses to budge. The application of positive and negative sanctions, i.e. the “carrot and stick”, strategically implemented at calculated intervals during a crisis can motivate the obstinate donkey state into moving in a more desirable political direction. The withholding of economic or trade advantages in conjunction with the offering of financial or economic rewards is a classic use of economics as an instrument of politics and diplomacy. Economic sanctions serve as vital instruments to coerce another state in the international community into doing what they would not otherwise do in order to avoid an escalation into a conflict.

Economic sanctions are considered a cornerstone of economic statecraft. Positive sanctions refer to the various incentives, levied as enticements in conjunction with the negative sanctions, as inducements to alter the adverse behavior up to and including the lifting of sanctions. The inclusion of positive sanctions is presented in the form of an actual or promised reward if the

---

640 Bergeijk, 19.
641 Baldwin, 11.
adversary changes the unacceptable behavior. However, the donkey psychology also points out that sanctions can be counterproductive if the donkey beater pulls a donkey by the tail and in turn the animal runs in an opposite direction. In the case of Saddam Hussein, Iraq sat on Kuwait and refused to move. The challenge for the United States was to implement sanctions that would coerce Saddam into removing his troops from Kuwait without lashing out even more.

Negative sanctions are the best known economic instruments of coercive diplomacy. A negative sanction functions as a direct punishment or disincentive. There are three types of distinctive negative sanctions that can be implemented as a tool of coercive diplomacy: boycotts, embargoes and capital sanctions. A boycott restricts the demand for certain types of commodities, if not all, to the target economy. An embargo may only be partial in nature, restricting only specific products and technology items. Even though a total embargo may be implemented, the government will create a special window to allow the export of certain humanitarian goods with the issuance of a special export license granting a waiver to the exporter.\footnote{Under U.S. law, the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) administers the statutes and regulations promulgated in connected with an embargo. OFAC has the grant of authority to issue a service provided license to a limited number of applicants for the sole purpose of providing a special waiver to enable them to export medical supplies, certain foodstuffs, and on occasion facilitate travel for immediate family members. \url{http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Office-of-Foreign-Assets-Control.aspx}, date of access: 9/13/2014.}

Capital or financial sanctions restrict or suspend lending and investments in the forms of loans, credits, grants, etc., to the target economy. The initiating state may also impose additional restrictions on international payments in order to hinder sanction-busting and trade diversion.\footnote{Bergeijk, 80-81.}
Positive sanctions are conducted under umbrella or domain of silent diplomacy. Many kinds of positive sanctions belong to day-to-day practices and are hardly ever distinct enough from the constant flow of international interactions to stand out in comparison to the more highly publicized negative sanctions. Positive sanctions can include economic aid or military cooperation.

Another powerful economic sanction is the freezing of a target state’s assets. The United States enacted the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in 1977 and it provided the legal framework for the imposition and implementation of the freezing of assets. Under the IEEPA,

“[T]he U.S. President is vested with extensive powers to restrict the mobility and transfer of financial assets and properties of foreign sovereign states and individuals held under the jurisdiction of the United States.”

The Congress of the United Stated passed the IEEPA in 1977 as an amendment to section 5(b) of the Trading with the Enemy ACT (TWEA). The TWEA was a law that was designed as a tool of economic warfare and its main purposes was to define, regulate and punish economic activity with an enemy state. In its original form, the TWEA could only be invoked during a war officially declared by the U.S. Congress. The president of the United States is afforded a broad authority under these statutes enabling the imposition of sanctions in response to national security and foreign policy objectives. The Export Administration Act of 1969 (EAA), TWEA, and most importantly the IEEPA, enable the president to prohibit some or all

---

trade and financial transactions with foreign countries, groups, organizations, or individuals.\textsuperscript{645} It should be noted that historically the president has imposed most sanctions under the broad discretionary authority vested under the TWEA or the EAA, the majority prior to 1970. However, Congress has had a vital role in the imposition of sanctions to further foreign policy objectives after that era.

Multilateral sanctions are viewed by many theorists to be the most effective form of coercive diplomacy in attempting to alter the target state’s behavior. Over the past decades, international sanctions have featured prominently in state practice.\textsuperscript{646} As a result, international sanctions have received considerable attention and study in the news media, public debate, and in scholarly writings. However, the actual defining of economic sanctions in an international arena has created much debate. It has been asserted that the international community must deploy the sanctions in an integrated manner focused on the economic or governmental sector that would most cripple the adversary so that they will be successful.\textsuperscript{647} The general consensus is that there are three common meanings of the term \textit{economic sanctions} when applied to the implementation by the international community:

\begin{quote}
“The first a rather narrow concept referring to the use of economic measures to enforce international law; the second refers to types of
\end{quote}

\begin{flushright}
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{646} Doxey, \textit{International Sanctions}, 47-49.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{647} Hufbauer, \textit{Economic Sanctions}, 92-105.
\end{flushright}
values … intended to be reduced or augmented in the target states; the third corresponds to the concepts of economic techniques of statecraft… these techniques are defined as governmental influence attempts relying primarily on resources that have a reasonable semblance of a market price in terms of money.”

The key to the successful implementation of economic sanctions by the international community is cohesiveness, unity of purpose and objectives, and the multilateral internal domestic enforcement in order to avoid circumventions of the prohibitions.

Economic sanctions have been deployed in support of numerous foreign policy objectives, most of them which were relatively modest in comparison to the pursuit of war, peace, and political destabilization. For example, sanctions have been used the United States on behalf of efforts to protect human rights, to halt nuclear proliferation, to settle expropriation claims, and to combat international terrorism. In recent years, controlling the proliferation of chemical and biological warfare, as well as ballistic missile technology, has become an important goal for implementing sanctions among advanced industrial societies.

Section IX: The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions during the Gulf Crisis

The question of the effectiveness of economic sanctions is addressed in two works on economic statecraft where each offer a new approach to analyzing economic sanctions and provide some perspective on their utility as an

---

648 Baldwin, 30 and 35-36.

instrument for executing foreign policy objectives. Baldwin’s primary goal in his study is to challenge the conventional wisdom that the use of economic embargoes as instruments of statecraft do not work. In contrast, Hufbauer, Schoot and Elliott, are more skeptical about the utility of economic sanctions and embargoes. Their approach suggests that economic sanctions will be effective in only certain circumstances. They recognize the potentially high cost of military force as an alternative, yet their concern with the economic cost and the political effectiveness of economic sanctions ultimately leads them to suggest conditions in which sanctions are most likely to achieve a positive benefits at a bearable cost.

The use of economic sanctions and of economic power as a response to conflict and as a deterrent to escalation of a crisis is not wholly without value. In one accepts the argument that increasing international interdependence as the transition from a geo-political to a geo-economic order will increase the value of economic interaction for all states in the system, once can speculate that the use of economic sanctions will increase in importance. But economic sanctions are hard to target and enforce, and it takes a significant amount of time for them to demonstrate their impact. It can be inferred that economic sanctions were

---


651 Baldwin, 4.

never given the necessary amount of time during the Desert Shield phase of the Gulf crisis to detrimentally impact Iraq and coerce Hussein into withdrawing from Kuwait. But therein lies the problem. Time is the critical factor which most states are not willing to or are not in a politically stable position to grant.

To induce Hussein to withdraw his troops out of Kuwait, the UN Security Council employed the strategy of coercive diplomacy. At first, the U.S. led coalition backed its demand the Iraqi forces withdraw from Kuwait by imposing economic sanctions and by progressively tightening the embargo of Iraq’s imports and exports. This is an example of the variant of coercive diplomacy that has been labeled the gradual turning of the screw. The threat to resorting to military force remained in the background. It was understood from the beginning that economic sanctions, even though unusually tight in this case, would require considerable amount of time to achieve maximum effectiveness and that it was uncertain whether and when they might induce Hussein to comply with the UN demands. Whether the embargo might have succeeded, if given more time, became a controversial and divisive issue in the United States after the U.N. Security Council authorized the use of military force.

Theorists have also concluded that the cost of implementing the economic sanctions are a key consideration for states and organizations in the international political arena. Major conclusions reached by theorists include: 1) sanctions are most effective when they are quickly imposed; 2) cases that inflict heavy costs on the target country are generally successful; and, 3) the more it costs a source

653 George, Forceful, 60-61.
country to impose sanctions, the less likely it is that sanctions will succeed. Other interpretations of those conclusions assert that if the target country is politically weak and unstable, sanctions are most likely to work. Economic sanctions seem most effective when directed at allies and close trading partners. Finally, the consensus among the literature holds that the greater the number of countries needed to implement the sanctions, the less likely the sanctions will be effective. This premise directly addresses the problems faced by the international community in the enforcement of sanctions and embargoes in an attempt to prevent their circumvention.

Many dilemmas were faced by the leaders of the coalition force in implementing the sanctions against Iraq. One critical factor was having successful verifiable results had to almost be achieved immediately and decisively to maintain the necessary public support or it would erode and eventually disappear. The longer the conflict and the countermeasures dragged on, the greater the likelihood that the popular support would begin to fade. This in turn could lead to either an impatience for action that would bring direct results like military intervention, or a lack of response to pursue the objectives further. President Bush faced the possibility of losing public support inasmuch as the Gulf Crisis had been compared to Vietnam. He faced the pressure of moving quickly

---


655 Lenway, 425.
by engaging in military action and simply “cutting bait and letting Hussein off the economic hook.”

The implementation of economic sanctions in the Gulf Crisis tended to contradict the traditional economic arguments against sanctions as a potentially useful instrument in further foreign policy objectives through coercive diplomacy. It can be argued that the UN sanctions against Iraq have shown that achieving this level of political unity many be considered a necessary condition for a forceful embargo which would be difficult to circumvent, can be effected in a matter of days. The Gulf Crisis was a unique case inasmuch as the international community was able to impose severe and almost watertight sanction measures within an extremely short period of four days. In addition this was such a significant undertaking that the traditionally neutral state of Switzerland participated for the first time in history in such a multilateral effort. It is likely that the end of the strict bipolar world and Cold War era made it possible for the grand coalitions to evolve and provide the key elements which many theorists consider a prerequisite for successful economic sanctions.

Another component of economic sanctions utilized in the Gulf crisis was the financial freezing of Iraq’s assets. Indeed, the blocking of Iraq’s assets was effective primarily because of the international application of the freeze. About two-thirds of Iraqi and most of Kuwaiti assets were outside U.S. jurisdiction. It has been argued that if the freeze had been applied solely by the United States, 

---

656 Dorff, “Conflict,” 179.

657 Bergeijk, 42-43.
its objectives would not have been achieved.\textsuperscript{658} In the event of another U.S. freeze, the reaction key stakeholder governments and the responses of the target country in such a volatile international arena will be very crucial in determining the degree of effectiveness of such a potentially financially crippling measure.

The sanctions and embargo implemented against Iraq did achieve several positive results after the Persian Gulf War which included:

- Saddam’s acceptance of the initial U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM) inspections at the end of Desert Storm in 1991, which were intrusive and continued for many years after the Gulf War;
- A creation of a safe have, or protected zone, in northern Iraq; and,
- The creation of no-fly zones in northern and southern Iraq.\textsuperscript{659}

Indeed, as a result of the UN sanctions imposed on Iraq and Saddam’s agreement to subject Iraq to intensive UNSCOM inspections, investigators were able to reveal that because of successful denial and deception operations, Iraq had been able to conduct biological weapons programs of which U.S. Intelligence agencies had not been able to directly confirm. In addition, Iraq had been able to move forward a nuclear weapons program that was much further advanced that had initially been estimated.\textsuperscript{660}

The validation by the UNSCOM inspections were significant because they shed light on a critical gap that existed in U.S. intelligence analysis regarding

\textsuperscript{658} Alerassool, 189.

\textsuperscript{659} Daniel L. Byman and Matthew C. Waxman, Confronting Iraq: U.S Foreign Policy and the Use of Force Since the Gulf War (Santa Monica: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2000), xii-xvi.

\textsuperscript{660} Walton, 201-207.
Iraq’s nuclear program. As early as the 1980s, Iraq was one of the nations whose nuclear program was closely watched by U.S. experts. The question that concerned the Intelligence Community was not whether the program existed, but rather how far advanced it was. On the eve of the transition from Operation Desert Shield to Operation Desert Storm with the coalition forces, the intelligence analysis concerning the Iraqi nuclear program estimated that Saddam was a lease five years away from having nuclear capability. After the end of the Persian Gulf War, UNSCOM inspection teams uncovered direct evidence that Iraq was much closer to establish nuclear capabilities than had originally been estimated. This was a substantial revelation because the U.S. Intelligence Community has based some of their operational and strategic assumptions on the actions taken by Israel when they had attacked and destroyed some of Iraq’s facilities years earlier.

**Section X: Conclusions**

The Gulf War which spanned August 1990 to February 1991 is a good case study for the implementation of coercive diplomacy during a volatile crisis. Bush and Saddam came from different levels of society and from different ends of the earth. Their cultures were as diverse and different as their life experiences. Bush was an American blueblood who started his life from a very advantageous position and then through education, military service, family connections, and hard work attained reaching the top of the U.S. political system as President. Saddam was a mafia-like dictator that was born in poverty and manipulated his

---

661 Lowenthal, 291.
way to the top of the Iraqi political system through murder and political connections. Saddam saw the world of politics as a constant struggle for survival. He viewed survival as the ultimate goal and achieving power justified whatever means were necessary to attain it.

When Bush and Saddam confronted each other in the Gulf War they were looking at this chess game from two very different positions and perspectives. Bush was the leader of the free world, the richest country in the world and was the commander in chief of the most powerful military force ever deployed. On the other side of the board was Saddam who oversaw a million man army which was the fourth largest in the world and now was controlling 19 percent of the world’s oil supplies since he occupied Kuwait.662

Bush and other senior leadership in the U.S. quickly recognized that Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait was more than a regional crisis and actually had international implications. This was the first opportunity to assess how states would behave and cooperate with each other in a conflict of this nature and potential magnitude in the post-Cold War era following the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism. The U.S. was sensitive to the reality that if Iraq were allowed to proceed with this behavior, it would only pave the way for others to believe that they could ignore the norms of behavior in the international community. The post-Cold War world was transitioning from a clear division between the east and west and potential evolving in to unstable world where the leadership and political influence of the U.S. may be challenged.

662 Schneider, “Deterrence and Saddam Hussein.”
Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait prompting the U.S. and the United Nations to implement a multilateral sanctions regime in the form of an economic embargo against Iraq. The threats outlined by the implementation of coercive diplomacy were credible because thirty five states united as a coalition and became signatories to the economic sanctions that were imposed against Saddam Hussein and Iraq for invading Kuwait. The threats of military force were communicated and physically manifested when Bush deployed military forces to Saudi Arabia. In November of 1990, the U.N. issued resolution 678 which called on Iraq to comply with the request to withdraw their forces and occupation of Kuwait by January 15, 1991.663

The primary objectives of the international economic sanctions program were to prevent Iraq from annexing Kuwait and from benefiting from Kuwait’s substantial oil and financial resources. The multilateral sanctions were implemented with the direct purpose of imposing sufficient duress on Saddam so that he would be coerced into withdrawing from Kuwait. If enough economic pain was imposed on Iraq, the expectation was that Saddam would find a strong incentive to withdraw his troops from Kuwait and reverse his political objectives in the region.

The initial U.S. bilateral sanctions were meant to underscore and achieve both political and economic objectives not only to stem Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, but also to send a message to other political actors in the Persian Gulf region that may support Saddam or be contemplating similar action or behavior. The

goals of the bilateral sanctions included demonstrating that U.S. would not tolerate such aggressive behavior from rogue actors to the detriment of the stability international community. Later the U.S. and U.N. multilateral sanctions were meant to realize the following objectives:

- “Sending a clear and unambiguous signal of U.S. (and a few days later, of global) condemnation of Iraq’s military aggression against Kuwait;

- Encouraging Iraq’s immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait;

- Preserving Kuwait as an entity by preventing the looting of its financial assets;

- Restoring the legitimate government of Kuwait to power; and

- Buying time to assess further Saddam’s intentions and to design additional strategies as necessary (such as deploying military forces to the Gulf.” 664

Iraq’s grand strategy was clearly built upon faulty intelligence, defective historical premises, and a gap between its actual military capabilities and the ultimate goals it sought to achieve. Iraq’s interpretation of the Vietnam War and the Iran-Iraq War helped to shape its strategic plan, but it also prompted Saddam to assimilate key assumptions surrounding the coalitions resolve and military capabilities in the Persian Gulf theater. Saddam’s self-delusions and miscalculations only served to underscore the significance of lessons that can be learned from past experience if a country has the leadership to embrace it.

The application of coercive diplomacy in the form of multilateral economic sanctions in the first Gulf War has received mixed assessments as to whether or not they were effective in coercing Saddam Hussein to leave Kuwait. In spite of all the multilateral economic sanctions and measures that were imposed by the international community, Saddam Hussein refused to concede and comply with the request to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. Indeed, it was only after a multilateral military campaign was mounted against Saddam where he was defeated that he finally withdrew his troops from Kuwait and withdrew back to Iraq. It can be argued, however, that it was not the application of coercive diplomacy in this crisis that failed to compel Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait, but rather a lack of understanding of Saddam’s operational code and how he would react in light of such international pressure.

Saddam Hussein wanted to establish his credibility in the eyes of the Arab world. He was convinced that in the event of a war, the Arab countries would align with him because of their ethnic and cultural origins and come to his aide against the United States, the great infidel. In spite of the clear communications set forth by the U.S. and the United Nations since early August 1990 describing their intentions if Saddam did not withdraw his troops from Kuwait, Saddam did not believe the multilateral coalition would follow through on their threats. Saddam underestimated the level of resistance that his aggressive military actions would have on the international community by annexing Kuwait. Saddam’s misperceptions of the support he would receive from the Arab world

---

were in direct contract to the actual international support that the U.S would receive. Saddam was in fact left alone where he had expected that is would be the U.S. fighting alone, suffering significant casualties, and not being able to obtain domestic support to continue engaging in battle in Iraq.

Saddam’s external misperceptions of the support he would receive from the Arab countries originated from his own beliefs and propaganda where he had depicted Iraq as the emerging political power in the Middle East after the end of the Cold War. By extension, Saddam viewed himself as the undisputed Arab leader that would be at the helm of uniting the Arab world against the West. From this perspective, a deeper understanding into the political game that Saddam was waging during the Gulf War posturing in the Arab world and how his operational code would impact the coercion that he was being subjected to by the international community, political decision makers would have more accurately been able to predict that he would not be backed into any corner. Saddam could never see himself as a weak leader and acquiescing to the U.S. and the United Nations in his mind would have irreparably damaged his political image as a defender of Arab and Muslin interests in the Middle East. As a result of his personal expectations and images of himself as the champion of Arab interests, he did not withdraw from Iraq after the onset of the multilateral economic sanctions and allowed the conflict to escalate to a full scale war.

If one solely assesses the analytical framework used in this study and specifically the prong of coercive diplomacy, it has been argued that the events in the initial Gulf Crisis were not conclusive as to the role of the United Nations,
economic sanctions, and multilateral military action in the new world order. It is asserted that coercive diplomacy was not effectively applied in the Gulf Crisis because it lacked clear analysis and understanding of the operational code of the primary political leaders engaged in the conflict. This lack of clarity, it can be argued, was also due to deficient and reliable intelligence that could have provided greater insight into the motivation behind Saddam’s actions in the Persian Gulf.

One would like to believe that the fateful question of war or peace is not determined or influenced by psychological variables having to do with the personalities, or operational code, of the leaders in a crisis. But history has demonstrated that the leaders’ operational code did indeed have a critical impact in bringing the Cuban Missile Crisis to a successful resolution without a military confrontation. Even through there were initial misperceptions by Khrushchev of Kennedy as a weak President, JFK immediately resolved himself to disproved his image in Khrushchev’s eyes. As a result, Khrushchev learned to appreciate the determination and resolve of JFK’s foreign policy objective and he himself furnished the quid pro quo for the resolution of the crisis. However, where JFK limited his type of coercive diplomacy to a naval blockade and an eventual ultimatum with a political quid pro quo as a carrot, although it was not publically broadcast, the type of coercive diplomacy the Bush administration employed relied almost exclusively on the stick with the ultimatum. There was not carrot, or

---

666 Dorff, “Conflict,” 183.
positive inducement, that would allow Saddam to save face and withdraw his troops from Kuwait.

It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that in case the strategy of coercive diplomacy and the implementation of economic sanctions was stretched to its limits. It is not surprising that it could not produce a peaceful settlement of the crisis because the dangerous chess game was not one that would have allowed for a stalemate because it only sought a checkmate. When conflict is viewed or approached in stark zero-sum terms, then there is little interest from either adversary to work towards a mutually acceptable compromise solution that would diffuse the conflict and allow for diplomatic engagement after the crisis ended. Indeed, this is a perception that both Bush and Saddam perpetuated throughout the crisis which in essence impeded the possibility of introducing positive sanctions to allow for a non-military solution. In contrast, JFK and Khrushchev did not see their disagreement over the missiles in Cuba as a zero-sum conflict. Rather, they both believed that the United States and Soviet Union shared a mutual interest in avoiding war and they acted rationally and proceeded accordingly.

Additional issues arose at the time surrounding whether sanctions should be continued. One of the two most troubling questions surrounding the peace settlement with Iraq was the determination of when economic sanctions should be lifted and what Iraq should be required to do in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. The United Nations had published various reports addressing the food scarcity in Iraq and recommended that the ban on food and other basic supplies

667 George, Forceful, 64.
be lifted immediately in order to avoid an imminent catastrophe. This is especially significant inasmuch as Iraq at the time imported about three-fourths of its food supply, especially wheat. In response, the U.N. lifted the ban on food and medicine, but the situation remained unchanged. The problem was that Iraq had no monetary means of paying for imports of any kind. Iraq requested that the U.N. committee monitoring sanctions permit it to sell $1 billion in oil to buy food and medicine, but the request was denied because of Hussein's alleged ulterior motives. The Western countries imposing the sanctions, namely the United States, Britain, and Switzerland which held most of Iraq's assets frozen in bank accounts, also refused to release the funds for fear that Hussein would distribute the food in a manner that would strengthen his political posture and base.

The U.N. specified that in order for the remaining sanctions to be lifted, Iraq must satisfy two demands set forth by not only the U.N. as an international organization, but as important by the individual states within the international community.

“First, it must dismantle its chemical and biological warfare facilities, its ballistic missile stockpile, and the facilities that gave it a potential for developing nuclear weapons. Second, it must agree to use 30 percent of its future oil reserves to pay reparations to Kuwait, an increase of 5 percent over the 25 percent payments previously called for by the U.N.”

---


669 Alerassool, 171-175.

Bush, however, went further by stating that the United States would oppose lifting sanctions until Hussein no longer remained in power. Since the power to lift the sanctions rested with the U.S. Security Council and since the United States had a veto power in the Council, sanctions would presumably remain in effect until Saddam Hussein no longer was in power.

Economic sanctions had helped Iraq to deal with the Kurds, to promise a kind of democracy for its people, and to show a readiness to comply with U.N. demands for the destruction of its chemical and biological warfare plants and its potential for making nuclear weapons. It can be argued, however, that the sanctions had no effect on Saddam’s power and position in the Iraqi government. The question to be posed was whether continuing the sanctions would have persuaded the Iraqi elite to finally address Saddam and the position he had placed Iraq in with the international community. Another concern to generally consider in implementing economic sanctions is whether maintaining the sanctions in place would only bring about yet more hardship to the civilian poor in the target country while only causing a modest inconvenience to the rich and powerful elite.

If the use of economic sanctions is being contemplated to address and attempt to contain the escalation of crisis situation, then it is asserted that by applying the three prong analytical framework an integrated analysis of the crisis can be achieved. If any of the elements in the three prong analytical framework is missing, namely the elements of coercive diplomacy, the operational code of the leaders in the conflict, and the intelligence being provided, then the jury will
remains out on the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a means for resolving conflicts and behavior among states because the analysis will be incomplete. Iraq immediately before and during the Gulf crisis was usually vulnerable to the economic embargo that was imposed by the United Nations and the international community, which was unprecedented in terms of participation and scope. It can be argued that more favorable conditions to implement a successful embargo could not have existed. However, it will never be known if the sole implementation of the economic embargo in the form of economic sanctions and the freezing of assets, would have succeeded in persuading Iraq its military troops from Kuwait, since military deployments were ultimately used to force the withdrawal of Iraqi troops.

What is known is that the economic embargo did have direct bearing on the combat effectiveness of Iraqi military forces. A modern military force requires a dependable logistical base and conduits for supply lines to replenish stockpiles as they are used. The embargo greatly reduced the availability of spare parts for the Iraqi military, which over the span of the Gulf Crisis resulted in fewer operational systems for deployment. The economic embargo also had a psychological impact in the Iraqi military leaders must have understood there would be fewer, if any, replacements for those systems that were destroyed in battle or for munitions once they had been used.\(^{671}\) Essentially, they were confronted with fighting, winning or losing with the munitions and armaments that they had on hand. As a result, the available combat capabilities of the Iraqi

military were becoming more and more depleted with each passing day with each altercation, while those of the coalition forces were increasing daily as more troops and supplies arrived in the region.\(^{672}\)

It should also be noted that Iraq's war machine had been greatly supplemented through Intelligence Community support covert means and through Saddam’s illegal procurement methods when he was considered an ‘ally’ during the Iran-Iraq War. This fact caused great trepidation not only for the U.S. but for many of the members of the coalition forces that had also been drawn into Saddam’s international illegal procurement network. The concerns arose not only from ability to acquire traditional munitions and weaponry, but more importantly the acquisition of technology that helped Saddam to perfect his own manufacturing of Scud missiles and cluster bombs which were used against coalition forces, as well as the methodology for producing fissionable material for a nuclear program.

To manufacture the fissionable material that Iraq needed for its nuclear program, it chose a method that had been abandoned by the U.S. in the nascent stages of its own nuclear program after World War II. The method was found inefficient by the U.S. because it was a slow and tedious way to produce fissionable material. For Iraq, however, the method proved extremely efficient because foreign analysts had discarded it as a viable means to produce fission material.

“The method allowed Iraq to procure materials that were more difficult to associate with a nuclear program, to mask its status. A

\(^{672}\) Helms, “Conclusions,” 187.
program of this sort was also more difficult for Western analyst to spot because they largely dismissed the approach out of hand, assuming Iraq would want – just as the United States and others had – to find the fastest way to produce fissionable material.\footnote{Lowenthal, 291.}

This was a critical analytical flaw for U.S. intelligence agencies. But for the direct validation by UNSCOM inspection teams, the international community would have still been under the misperception that Iraq had a nascent nuclear program.

The Persian Gulf War also had a direct impact on modern warfare and the global demand for advanced technologies and arms.\footnote{Patrick J. Garrity, “Why the Gulf War Still Matters: Foreign Perspectives on the War and the Future of International Security,” Report No. 16 (Los Alamos, New Mexico: Center for National Security Studies, Los Alamos National Laboratory, July 1993).} The war revealed to Saddam the vulnerabilities of existing infrastructure in modern societies to surgical strikes in the form of precision bombing. Saddam had underestimated the technological advanced capabilities of the coalition forces. He had not envisioned that the new technology improved both the precision and survivability of airstrike aircrafts and cruise missiles. The Iraqi military strategy was based upon aged concepts and perceptions that were no longer applicable in the post-Cold War era.

It is significant to note that in assessing the rationality of one’s opponent and his psychological motivations, it does not suffice to make a confident prediction as to what the adversary will do when subjected to an ultimatum. As was seen with Saddam’s actions, the assumption of rationality on which the strategy of coercive diplomacy relies must somehow take into account...
psychological, cultural, and political variables that can affect the opponent’s response to an ultimatum. Iraq’s strategic objectives reflected both Saddam’s personal ambitions and the desires of his core supporters. In this case, Saddam’s personal motivation and judgment, as well as his many miscalculations, were influenced by an inflated image of himself as a hero with a mission to transform the Arab world.\footnote{George, \textit{Forceful}, 65.} Saddam motivation was to demonstrate that he could go to battle with Bush and somehow would prevail, elevating his worth before his Arab brothers.

In dealing with Bush, however, Saddam most likely interpreted Bush’s words through a Middle Eastern filter.\footnote{Post, \textit{Leaders}, 221.} Saddam did not interpret Bush’s intent when he communicated, but rather construed his words as having a hidden motive. When Bush expressed a public statement of resolve and operational intent, Saddam discounted the expressed intent to carry out his declared actions. What was clearly lacking in the Persian Gulf War between Bush and Saddam was a clear channel of communication between the two leaders, whether direct or indirect as had been the case between JFK and Khrushchev. What underscored the direct intentions of the United States and the multilateral coalition was Secretary of State James Baker’s mission. The message carried by Baker was intended to underscore the strength of resolve by the U.S. and coalition to take military action against Iraq if it did not withdraw from Kuwait.
In the aftermath of Iraq’s defeat, Bush’s political ratings were at their peak. However, many argued that he political fell from grace because he did not proceed to topple Saddam when he was at his weakest.\textsuperscript{677} This is a question for other international relations scholars to ponder. For example, when is it appropriate to destroy a fallen enemy and when is it advisable to cease and help rebuild the defeated state. The Persian Gulf War was given legitimacy as a result of the U.N. Resolution and the multilateral involvement of the coalition. As Secretary of State James Baker noted, realpolitik or realism, prevailed when Saddam’s power was subdued and drastically reduced.\textsuperscript{678} The multilateral sanctions were employed a key strategy in the Persian Gulf War and the economic pressure sped the collapse of Saddam’s will to resist and his military capacity to continue engaging in the war. The Persian Gulf War provided the opportunity to implement multiple types of economic sanction which extended to the outright prohibition of trade and financial transactions, the severance of transportation and communication links, the seizure of assets, and the blacklisting of corporations and individuals who circumvented these restrictions.\textsuperscript{679}

The multilateral sanctions retarded the growth of Saddam’s national power in Iraq, which allowed the international community to implement other tools of diplomacy and instruments of statecraft to take effect against the rogue


\textsuperscript{678} Blumenthal, 107.

\textsuperscript{679} Freeman, Arts, 47-50.
state. The diplomatic efforts to rally the international community to form the multilateral coalition against Iraq and the engagement of the U.N. Security Council to sanction the efforts is considered by many as the greatest accomplishment of President Bush.
Chapter 5

The Three Prong Analytical Framework: Is it an Effective Recipe?

Sun Tzu, the Chinese military general, strategist, and philosopher, drafted the earliest known treatise on war centuries ago, offering strategies and tactics that could perceptibly be applied to every type of human conflict. The crux of Sun Tzu's treatise was not that you could claim success by obtaining one hundred victories in one hundred battles, but rather you achieve success over your enemy when you have not had to fight. Central to Sun Tzu's philosophy is the concept of using superior intelligence and operational tactics to minimize risk.

Sun Tzu's viewpoint clearly encapsulates the aim and purpose of coercive diplomacy delineated by Alexander George in recent history which is to pressure an enemy into stopping or undoing an action or unacceptable behavior without having to resort to military action, i.e. minimizing your risk. This change in behavior can be achieved through the issuance of a specific demand reinforced by a threat of punishment for not complying with the initial demand. Coercive diplomacy is a game of chess and the use of tactical patience to achieve the political and strategic goals in a crisis. The key to this chess game is that the first move, the demand, must be backed by a credible threat that will coerce the

---


681 George, Forceful, 23-25.
opponent into complying with the demand without having to resort to the actual execution of the threat.

This study has highlighted that coercive diplomacy initially hinges upon two key factors. The first factor is the level of credibility that the coercer displays and how the target state will react to the threats being made by the coercer. The level of credibility directly affects whether the target state believes that the coercer will in fact execute its threats. The second factor is the persuasiveness that the threats will have on the target state. Specifically, if the coercer does execute on the threats then how great an impact will those threats have on the target state. The greater the perceived threat and result is by the target state, the more likely it will be persuaded into changing the adverse behavior.\(^{682}\)

Coercive diplomacy has served as one of the key tools in the in a leader’s foreign policy toolkit to address a crisis situation. It is, however, one of the most intriguing practices and at the same time one of the most common methodologies applied in international relations to stem the potential escalation of conflict. Coercive diplomacy exemplifies the art of diplomacy by utilizing the initial use of coercive measures to apply pressure with the threat of use of force to achieve diplomatic goals. The cases analyzed in this study present three elements which are enveloped under coercive diplomacy, namely deterrence, interventions and economic sanctions.

Coercive diplomacy in its most basic practice encompasses the threat or use of force is response to an action already taken to ultimately achieve

---

diplomatic goals. Deterrence, on the other hand, is a strategy that employs threats intended to dissuade an opponent from committing an action that has not yet been initiated. Another characteristic of coercive diplomacy is the application of sanctions to serve as a punitive measure to react against unacceptable behavior. The final element of coercive diplomacy that can be applied in extreme situations, or as a last resort, is military intervention. Military intervention can be manifested in either overt or covert use of military forces against the aggressor to change the abhorrent conduct.

This study emphasizes that the use of coercive diplomacy in and of itself will not create the necessary situational awareness to allow the leader to make an informed and integrated decision as to what is the best foreign policy tool to apply in a crisis to prevent an escalation. In order to have the necessary information to establish the necessary situational awareness to properly engage in this political chess game, the analysis for the crisis must also weigh the quality of the intelligence that has been cultivated. Further, it is also necessary to consider how the operational code of the opposing leader will influence how he will react to the tools of coercive diplomacy that are being implemented.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Persian Gulf War cases presented situations where the leaders were faced with a variety of political, economic and military objectives. From one end of the spectrum JFK faced the challenge of making Khrushchev stop an action that had already been undertaken, namely the initial construction of the missile sites in Cuba and the placement of active warheads on the island. The extreme end of the spectrum is a more ambitious
one that places Bush, and the U.N. Security Council, at odds with Saddam where the international community is attempting to have Iraq reverse what it has already accomplished which is the invasion of Kuwait. In this instance, not only is the opponent being forced cease and desist from further encroachment into Kuwait or potentially other states in the Persian Gulf region, but more significantly Iraq would need to withdraw its troops and control of Kuwait and its oil resources.

The Cuban Missile Crisis and the Persian Gulf War were selected because they present a hybrid of successes, failures and intermediate results. These two cases involve political leaders with very pronounced operational codes. The operational code of the leaders engaged in the negotiations can trigger a positive outcome, or adversely influence the crisis situation and steer it into a military engagement. In both case studies with JFK vis-a-vis Khrushchev and Bush vis-a-vis Hussein, it was demonstrated that the leaders’ operational codes did in fact have a direct effect on how the crisis unfolded and how it was ultimately resolved. Each leader through either direct or indirect actions or communications demonstrated that the historical, cultural, educational, and political context from which the leader emanates is of central importance as to how the conflict will evolve.

The case studies were directly analyzed against the three levels of intelligence: tactical, operational and strategic. The sources and reliability of the intelligence directly influenced the decision maker’s situational awareness and inadvertently enhanced the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis, whereas as poor intelligence detrimentally impacted Saddam’s strategy during Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The nature of intelligence is that there are never any guarantees in the quality of the information or the analytical product because of the bias of the analyst interpreting the data. Nonetheless, intelligence is a critical element in any crisis situation and it must be weighed deliberately and in an integrated fashion. All source intelligence was integrated by the U.S. in the Cuban and Iraqi case studies. The leaders exploited and fused the intelligence cultivated from HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT and OSINT, which enabled JFK, Bush and the multilateral coalition to focus their resources and identify which tools of coercive diplomacy would have the greatest impact on the crisis.

In each of the cases, different elements of coercive diplomacy were implemented to dissuade the ‘enemy’ from pursuing a course of action or further aggressive acts. In the Cuban Missile Crisis a naval embargo was employed around Cuba. The Persian Gulf Crisis provoked an unprecedented cooperation among the members of the UN National Security Council to implement multilateral economic sanctions. The embargo was a physical presence effected by JFK to demonstrate to Khrushchev his resolve in stopping their placement of missiles in Cuba, a mere 90 miles from the shores of the U.S. The multilateral economic sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council and enforced by its members were meant to cripple Iraq’s economy and stability while forcing Saddam to withdraw his troops from Kuwait. The sanctions were common tools of coercive diplomacy and presented an alternative to military force. The sanctions were also imposed as punitive actions to retaliate for Saddam’s
objectionable aggression against Kuwait which violated the sovereignty of Kuwait and the norms of international behavior.

The three prong analytical framework builds upon the concept of coercive diplomacy and highlights the most prominent aspects of this tool of diplomacy. Although many have argued that coercive diplomacy bears distinctive characteristics that may not be applicable in all crisis situations, the analytical framework introduced in this study enables the decision maker to better identify the specific tools that may be available in a particular situation. Most significantly, by integrating the operational code of the leaders and the quality of the intelligence, the decision maker can determine if coercive diplomacy or what tools of coercive diplomacy can realistically be applied to bring about the desired results. The framework is tested in two case studies which demonstrate that coercive diplomacy can be a viable tool to achieve foreign policy objectives under certain circumstances.

**The Cuban Missile Crisis**

The Cuban Missile Crisis unfolded as the race for the technology and production of strategic nuclear weapons and delivery systems was never more prominent. From a U.S. perspective, the ability to accurately assess the Soviet’s strategic weapons capabilities and the threat they could pose was at the forefront during the Cold War era. In addition, the ability to measure Khrushchev’s and the Presidium’s intentions was never more paramount than during the Cuban Missile Crisis. The Soviet Union was concerned about the technological disadvantage
they faced against the U.S. In addition, Khrushchev was keenly aware that the U.S. had been able to surpass the Soviet Union in its technological capabilities to produce strategic nuclear weapons and related delivery systems.

The USSR had learned of the U.S. deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems to strategic sites beyond the United States and its territories, specifically in Western Europe and Turkey. With the strategic placement of these weapons around the USSR, Khrushchev viewed his country as being surrounded by a direct U.S. threat. The U.S. had attempted to overthrow Cuban dictator Fidel Castro in a failed intelligence operation in 1961 and Khrushchev saw that Cuba, the only communist outpost in the Western Hemisphere, was also being threatened.

In response to these concerns, Khrushchev launched a covert and massive undertaking in Soviet political circles to gain support to solidify their stronghold in Cuba by supplying Castro with large quantities of conventional weapons which included fighter aircraft, patrol boats, tanks, surface-to-air-missiles (SAMs), and radar equipment. Khrushchev wanted to find some parity in the deployment of missiles in the immediate proximity of the U.S. to mirror their positioning of missiles in Europe and Turkey close to the USSR. The Soviets secretly deployed several dozen medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) to Cuba. These nuclear weapons were under the direction of the USSR and within an arm’s length of reaching U.S. shores.

---

683 Walton, 143-147.
Khrushchev justified his actions by stating two primary purposes, one defensive and one offensive: the defense of the Castro regime in Cuba, and the desire to put pressure on the Kennedy Administration by dramatically changing the strategic balance of power. Khrushchev assumed that after the missiles had been deployed to Cuba and the site installations were functioning, it would be too late for the U.S. to stop the process. Khrushchev believed that once the presence of the missiles in Cuba was exposed, Moscow would have a stronger bargaining stance with Washington, D.C., especially as it related to Berlin which was a critical issue to the USSR.

On October 14, 1962 the aerial reconnaissance mission flown over Cuba captured over 900 images that showed direct evidence of Soviet missile sites in Cuba. The preliminary findings were presented to JFK by National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy. JFK and his advisers were later briefed by the CIA on the photographic evidence of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba. The photographic analysis had identified the missile launch sites as well as the presence of MRBMs. The missiles had a target range of approximately 1,000 miles which included Washington, D.C., Dallas, Texas, and Cape Canaveral, Florida within that range. That intelligence briefing and the 13 days that followed brought the U.S. and the Soviet Union to the brink of thermonuclear war and the possible end of civilization as we had known it.

Intelligence played a crucial role in the Cuban Missile Crisis. CIA analysts were able to accurately measure the conventional weapons that had been deployed to Cuba. A Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Soviet

---

684 Bredhoff, 16.
military assistance was published on September 19, 1962 and proved to be controversial with senior leadership because of its conclusions. The SNIE raised the possibility of missiles being transported from the USSR to Cuba, but quickly dismissed the concept as implausible. Due to the provocative finding, the head of the Office of National Estimates, Sherman Kent, personally reviewed the document and eventually recommended it be allowed to be published and disseminated to other agencies. Kent concurred with the analytical findings that providing missiles to Cuba was unlikely because it was unprecedented, much too risky a venture for the USSR, and that there was no credible evidence that missiles were actually present.

The Director of the CIA, John McCone, did not agree with the SNIE because he believed that the only reason for an extensive deployment of Soviet air defense missiles would be to protect critical military assets such as MRBMs or ICBMs. In spite of his reservations he allowed it to be published and disseminated across government agencies. However, McCone provided his personal assessment and view to JFK. Subsequent analyses of the aerial photographs taken by the U-2 on October 14, enabled DIA analysts to highlight that some of the SAM sites were laid out in a patterns similar to those used in the USSR to protect their long range missile sites and confirmed that Soviet MRBMs were present in Cuba. Initial intelligence threat assessments reflected that the analysts did not believe that the missiles were operational but they estimated that they could be active and ready to launch within two weeks.
The intelligence reports were for the most part accurate regarding the deployment of the missiles to Cuba. Intelligence gaps existed, however, regarding the perceptions and intent of Khrushchev vis-à-vis U.S. capabilities and those of the USSR. Intelligence reports initially published by the IC fell short in that they did not aggregate all source intelligence and did not capture the extent to which Khrushchev personally believed that the USSR was falling behind the U.S. The IC also fell short in determining the extent or willingness of the USSR to take extreme risks in an attempt to remedy their perceived defense gap. The IC did not incorporate the Khrushchev’s operational code, or the political land mines he was facing with the Presidium prior to the Missile Crisis. The IC threat assessments focused on the empirical data and not on the subjective information which provides the insight into how a leader may react to threats under coercive diplomacy.

The USSR took extreme and elaborate measures to conceal the shipment of their missile to Cuba through denial and deception. To further mask their elaborate scheme, Soviet officials ‘officially’ reported to their U.S. counterparts that the USSR would not provide long range missiles to Cuba as part of its military assistance package. There had been clear indications of these activities, but IC analysts did not consider them credible and arbitrarily dismissed them. Some of the intelligence was cultivated through HUMINT and IMINT reporting and indicated that sources on the ground in Cuba reported that there were Soviet missiles on the island, but the CIA discounted it because the similar intelligence had been reported by Cuban exiles. CIA analysts lent no credibility to the
intelligence because they believed that the Cuban exile community had their own motives for making Castro appear as dangerous as possible.\textsuperscript{685}

Early aerial reconnaissance photographs of Soviet ships traveling to Cuba reflected vessels that had large hatches and were riding high in the water which indicated that the although the cargo was bulky, it was lightweight. Upon arrival into port, the vessels would only be offloaded at night under tight security. Once again, HUMINT sources corroborated the information, but was dismissed because the individuals were connected to the Bay of Pigs operation.\textsuperscript{686}

The early phase of the Cuban Missile Crisis was marked by several intelligence gaps and mistaken analysis even though the intelligence produced to support the Cuban Missile Crisis was considered an excellent example of collection synergy and successful. There were a few cognitive distortions on the part of CIA analysts who did not fully integrate the intelligence analysis being performed by DIA analysts. Intelligence analysts should be aware of their reasoning process. They need to assess how they make judgements and reach conclusions, not just concern themselves with the judgements and conclusions themselves.\textsuperscript{687} Some of the analytical discrepancies surrounding cognitive distortions included mirror imaging, the rational actor model, and being too entrenched into the status quo of Soviet – U.S. relations and engagement. The priority intelligence requirements and collection efforts did not fully consider the operational aspects of Khrushchev or his political environment. As such, the IC

\textsuperscript{685} Walton, 144.

\textsuperscript{686} Walton, 144.

\textsuperscript{687} Heuer, 31-32.
reporting failed to penetrate Moscow’s denial and deception campaign, as well as the preliminary Soviet deployment activities in Cuba.

It can also be argued that these analysts were ‘stovepiping’ intelligence and presenting raw intelligence without proper context or analyses incorporating all source information. It is asserted that had the IC attempted to produce all-source intelligence, they would have been able to fuse intelligence based upon as many collection sources as possible in order to compensate for the shortcomings of each and to profit from their combined strength. Even though it can be asserted that the lack of context can be attributed to the specialized or technical nature of the subject matter, there were sufficient independent sources of information and intelligence that was collected that could have been integrated into a threat assessment to provide better situational awareness regarding the state of affairs in Cuba. Alternatively, the lack of context could have also come from a particular group in the national policy structure, selectively presenting only that information that supports certain conclusions.

JFK convened an inner circle of advisers, Ex Comm that could assess the tactical operational intelligence being generated by the IC, while incorporating the other information being received through diplomatic and political channels. The process of decision making in the Cuban Missile Crisis illustrates a set of checks and balances that for the most part goes uncommented by the Constitution.\textsuperscript{688} The President of the U.S., his Cabinet, and senior advisors are mutually dependent. The needs of each official and the goals of their respective agencies

\textsuperscript{688} Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W.W. Norton & Company), 124-125.
can be incompatible and rarely do they align themselves to fulfill each other’s needs without some level of difficulty. However, during the Cuban Missile Crisis JFK needed information, analysis, and control to match his burdensome responsibility.

The ExComm provided a forum for candid discussions, a referee for arguments, assurance of having a voice and being heard, and ultimately receiving a judgement on disputes.\textsuperscript{689} The ExComm provided JFK a body of key senior leadership in a secure forum to address critical issues, minimize parochialism and ultimately find a common goal for them to work towards with JFK at the helm. Ex Comm’s purpose was to aggregate the key intellectuals in senior positions that would take action and find a solution to the crisis. The tactical nature of the Cuban Missile Crisis required the ability for information to be received, analyzed, debated and ultimately lead to either diplomatic or military actions. The ExComm was comprised of Vice President Lyndon Johnson, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Assistant Defense Secretary Paul Nitze, Chief Counsel Ted Sorensen, National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maxwell Taylor, U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, former Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Although the protocols set forth by JFK for ExComm so that decision making would be executed solely at the top levels of government proved to be invaluable during the thirteen days of the crisis, many subordinate officials

\textsuperscript{689} R.F. Kennedy, 124-125.
considered the compartmentalized nature of ExComm as exclusionary and detrimentally impacting day to day government functions. Indeed, in the early days of inception of ExComm there were two distinct power groups that formed within the circle. The first group, ‘the hawks’, led by Taylor (Secretary JCS), with Nitze (Assistant Defense Secretary), and Acheson (former Secretary DOS), favored immediate military action in the form of a surgical air strike to destroy all the Soviet missile sites in Cuba and if necessary resort to a full scale invasion. The other power group, ‘the doves’, led by McNamara (Defense Secretary), with Rusk (Secretary DOS), Sorensen (Chief Counsel) and Robert Kennedy (Attorney General), proposed a less inflammatory course of action. The less provocative alternative was the implementation of a naval blockade or quarantine of Cuba to prevent further shipments of munitions or supplies into Cuba to advance the Soviet missile sites and presence on the island.

JFK was faced with the deployment of Soviet medium range ballistic missiles in Cuba and relying on the intelligence being provided, controlled and interpreted by the IC which had already generated defective analyses even though the raw intelligence was available. JFK’s options were somewhat limited to begin with and were further constrained by the fact that his military advisers were urging him to invade Cuba and finish the job the CIA had started the year before. His military advisers were openly dismissive of utilizing any type of

---

690 Valois, 9-11.
691 Ibid.
692 Widmer, 147-155.
diplomatic channels to address the crisis. In essence, JFK had to negotiate around adversaries at home as well as abroad. Khrushchev was in the same predicament in Moscow in dealing with the Presidium. JFK was feeling direct pressure of his own when the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay, attempted to coerce the President into attacking Cuba when he compared his delay in action to the appeasement of Hitler at Munich.  

JFK, contrary to the initial advice of his military advisers, adopted a strategy of coercive diplomacy in dealing with Khrushchev as a means to avoid the last report option of using military intervention. JFK’s strategy of coercive diplomacy involved the deliberate and highly visible naval blockade to demonstrate his resolve in ordering an invasion of Cuba should Khrushchev not acquiesce and remove the missiles from Cuba. JFK adopted the ‘try-and-see’ method of coercive diplomacy as he incrementally implemented the structuring of the naval blockade and the build-up of military forces in order to wait and see what Khrushchev’s reactions and next move would be. Both leaders adhered to the principles of crisis management. John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev were extremely cautious and clear in delivering signals and messages of their intentions. This enabled both decision makers to unmistakably articulate their political objectives and express their mutual desire to find a peaceful resolution to the crisis instead of resorting to the alternative.

A point to consider is that leaders and their advisers within a target government may react differently to coercive measures because their political survival may be at risk. This is why the introduction and analysis of the leaders’

---

693 Widmer, 147-155.
operational code as a prong of the analytical framework is so critical for situational awareness and strategic planning. The political reality and self-perception is of great importance in planning how to implement coercive diplomacy and strategically anticipating what reactions that leader may have.

The coercing state must consider the political realities and expectations of the target leader and the target state’s government. As such, the coercing state must carefully implement a strategy of coercive diplomacy by having a deep understanding of the leader’s operational code and what reactions will be generated by that leader as a result of the coercive actions. This would include assessing the target state’s political composition, internal political struggles, and the leader’s operational code and how that leader will react to political pressure and threats from an external state. Because of the intricacy in an individual’s operational code and the psychological filters it may mirror on a crisis, the coercing leader cannot conceptualize his opponent as a rationale actor.

There were a few incidents during the crisis that could have readily escalated the steady standoff state into a full scale war. One of those events included the shooting down of the U.S. U-2 spy plane over Cuba that had been capturing photographic intelligence to validate the progress of the Soviet missiles sites. Once this hostile act occurred, JFK responded by deciding to exert more pressure on Khrushchev by conveying what can be correlated with an ultimatum to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, D.C.

The ultimatum to the Soviet Ambassador was juxtaposed with another instrument of coercive diplomacy, the ‘carrot and stick’ approach. JFK accepted a
quid pro quo from Khrushchev and agreed to the secret removal of the U.S. Jupiter missiles that have been positioned in Turkey. Khrushchev maintained the move, countermovement engagement in the chess game. This steady momentum allowed the deliberate actions and demands to be weighed by each leader ultimately leading to a successful resolution to the Cuban Missile Crisis and opening up channels of communications for negotiations eventually leading to an agreement on the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty between the U.S. and Soviet Union.

The diplomatic game board was played on the operational and strategic levels and focused solely on the crisis at hand. The only tactical move involved the downing of the U-2 spy plane by the Cubans, but instead of escalating the crisis into a military engagement between the U.S. and Soviet Union, it only served to further rely on diplomatic means to resolve the crisis and prevent a war. After a recent record of repeated attempts by the U.S. to trigger the collapse Castro’s Communist regime and expel Soviet influence in Cuba which was spreading to other parts of the Americas, JFK went against some of the suggestions made by his senior leadership and rejected the Cuban Missile Crisis as an opportunity to destabilize Castro. Instead, JFK slowly paced the diplomatic engagement and implementation of coercive diplomacy which allowed Khrushchev the opportunity to weigh the actions taken by the U.S. and evaluate what the costs and risks would be to the USSR if they failed to adhere to the threats and comply with the positive inducements that had been offered as enticement, i.e. the carrot and stick.
Khrushchev clearly comprehended the delicate nature of the diplomatic efforts that were being extended by JFK, the threats vis-à-vis the inducements for a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Khrushchev was keenly aware of the significance it was for the U.S. to remove the missiles from Cuba. It was more important for the U.S. to remove the missiles from Cuba than it was for the Soviet Union to keep them there. Khrushchev needed to demonstrate that the Soviet Union had also exerted some type of pressure against the U.S. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey presented the perfect option for both states. JFK had asked that the military remove the Jupiter missiles months before but the action had never been executed. The Jupiter missiles in Turkey which were pointed at the Soviet Union presented an opportunity for Khrushchev to use as a bargaining chip. The removal of the missiles from Cuba by the Soviet Union for the removal of the missiles from Turkey by the U.S. presented the acceptable quid pro quo for Khrushchev to accept and bring the Cuban Missile Crisis to an end.

In retrospect, the Cuban Missile Crisis is considered an excellent example of intelligence collection synergy. Even though CIA analysts were slow to comprehend that Khrushchev was willing to risk and undertake such a brazen action as deploying MRBMs and IMBMs in Cuba, the IC ultimately incorporated a variety of intelligence sources and collection methods to generate actionable intelligence to support the crisis. Anti-Castro Cubans on the island and members of the Cuban exile community provided the first reliable evidence that the USSR was deploying missiles to Cuba. A HUMINT source provided the information that targeted the U-2 flights over a trapezoid shaped area surrounded by four towns
in western Cuba. IMINT then provide the crucial tactical intelligence which revealed the status of the missile sites as well as the approximately time frame to completion. Soviet spy and defector, Oleg Penkovsky, who was providing intelligence to the U.S. and Great Britain, had furnished Soviet technical manuals which allowed the IC to estimate the stages left before the missile sites were fully operational.

From an operational code perspective, JFK and Khrushchev came from very difference backgrounds. In spite of the differences and experiences in their upbringing, education, military service and political careers, they both came to develop a profound understanding of each other. More importantly, JFK and Khrushchev were keenly aware that they held the future of mankind in their hands and a peaceful resolution to the conflict was the only solution that would prevent them from triggering a nuclear war.

The man JFK had first encountered at the face-to-face summit meeting in Vienna in 1961 presented himself as an intransigent and combative leader unwilling to negotiate or yield a point. Khrushchev had left JFK with an ultimatum regarding the future of Berlin. Khrushchev was trying to strengthen the Communist Party and his credibility after rising to power after Stalin’s death. As a direct result of Khrushchev’s belligerent inflexibility in Vienna, JFK took precautionary measures and authorized the deployment of Jupiter intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) in Turkey within proximate launch range of the USSR.
Even though Khrushchev had the appearance and reputation of being an impetuous, simpleminded and brusque man, the Cuban Missile Crisis provided the opportunity for him to reveal his true nature of being a rational and sensible man that would not risk a nuclear war. Khrushchev possessed a shrewd native intelligence, combined with an agile mind, and determination of purpose that enable him to exercise the same level of discipline and patience that JFK was exhibiting. Khrushchev quickly learned that he had incorrectly perceived JFK as an inexperienced leader that he thought he could intimidate into allowing the missiles to remain in Cuba. The initial impression Khrushchev had of Kennedy in Vienna that he was a young and inexperienced leader was quickly erased during the crisis. The resolve exhibited by JFK demonstrated to Khrushchev that he was neither too weak, nor was he too rational to risk taking on the USSR to get the missiles out of Cuba.

In spite of all his anti-communist rhetoric, JFK exercised extreme restraint in dealing with Khrushchev. Kennedy viewed Khrushchev as a rational actor, and intelligent man who would not overact in this delicate engagement. JFK correctly assessed that if he demonstrated to Khrushchev his unwavering resolution of purpose and gave Khrushchev enough time to gracefully agree to a mutually acceptable solution, the Cuban Missile Crisis could be deescalated. JFK’s choice of the strategy of coercive diplomacy and his steady determination to give it the opportunity to succeed enabled the crisis to come to a peaceful conclusion. History has demonstrated that JFK conducted the negotiations with discipline
and delicacy, balancing cold resolve with pragmatic statesmanship. The peaceful resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis through coercive diplomacy is considered to be one of the Administration’s greatest achievements. What is ironic is that whereas Kennedy was lauded for his resolution of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Khrushchev was ultimately removed from power in 1964 for his misjudgments and mishandling of the Cuban missile sites.

The Persian Gulf War - Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm

The Persian Gulf War was a unique amalgamation of sovereign states in that it created a united UN front to address and change unacceptable behavior which went against the norms of the international community. On one side of the crisis, there was Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm which encompassed 34 coalition governments that united against Iraq and Saddam Hussein to oust him from Kuwait after its invasion. This was not a simple negotiation between two governments, or two heads of state, attempting to address a crisis, but rather it was a delicate engagement by the U.S. and the U.N. Security Council with the international community to gain multilateral support. The Persian Gulf War was a delicate diplomatic game where 34 coalition leaderships had to be coordinated and military assets and resources from 34 independent military services had to be coalesced into fighting force with unity of command that would be effective.

---

694 Bredhoff, 1.

695 Schneider, 8.
The two principal leaders in the conflict, Bush and Saddam, came from two diametrically opposed worlds. Bush was an American blue blood whose life and career began from a favorable position at birth. His climb up the U.S. political system was achieved through a ladder created by birth, education, military service and political connections through his father the senator. Saddam, on the other hand, was born in poverty and operated as a ruffian and assassin who maneuvered his way up the Ba’ath political party into power and ultimately as the head of state. When the two leaders engaged each other during the Persian Gulf Crisis, Bush was the leader of the richest and most powerful state in the international community with the most commanding military capabilities. Saddam, having invaded Kuwait, was attempting to confront Bush, and later the international community, with his million man conventional army, the fourth largest in the world. What was most significant about Saddam’s position was that he now controlled 19 percent of the world’s oil supply. This situation did not place the international community at ease because Iraq was in a position to now manipulate and control the much needed oil supply.

From Iraq’s perspective, the engagement for this diplomatic entanglement was much simpler. To put the situation in perspective, many have argued that ‘Saddam was Iraq and Iraq was Saddam’ from the standpoint of policy decisions.\footnote{Jerrold M. Post, M.D., “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile”, presented in testimony to hearings on the Gulf crisis by the House Armed Services Committee, December 5, 1990 and the Foreign Affairs Committee, December 12, 1990.} Saddam as the head of state was fundamentally acting alone in the decision making process. Saddam independently analyzed and made all critical diplomatic and military decisions. He reviewed any intelligence that was
cultivated by Iraqi intelligence services and derived his own conclusions without further analysis or discussion. He was essentially acting alone in his capacity as Iraq’s President and head of state. Saddam was the sole foreign policy and defense policy maker and strategist in Iraq.

The Persian Gulf War was an international chess game that was played essentially between two extremely different men. Bush and Saddam had extremely different operational codes with political, diplomatic and military philosophies that were at odds with each other. Bush and Saddam were on polar opposites when it came to their education, culture, upbringing, values, language and exposure to the world as a whole. Each of these leaders also faced an extremely different set of domestic, regional, and international political and economic pressures. In addition, they each carried historical baggage which they brought with them to the engagement during the Persian Gulf War. This included the commitments which may have been made by their political predecessors which they now had to sell to a new audience which may not be as receptive to those concepts. At the crux of this war, were George Bush and Saddam Hussein who engaged in the Persian Gulf War from very different perspectives and extremely different backgrounds.

Saddam was depicted in many circles as being a rogue madman who operated in an unpredictable manner in the Middle East. Psychologists have asserted that this diagnosis was not only inaccurate but rather dangerous. This construct depicts Saddam as unpredictable, when in reality an evaluation of his

---

leadership record in Iraq clearly demonstrates that he is a calculating political leader that is not irrational but rather very deliberative in his actions. This in and of itself makes him not an irrational political leader, but rather a dangerous one. It was not uncommon to see Saddam reverse his initial course of action if it would detrimentally impact his persona and image as the savior of the Arab states. This is especially significant in that Saddam justified all of his actions in furtherance of the Arab world and the common good in the Middle East. He saw himself as the Messiah of the Persian Gulf which in his mind justified the brutality of his actions.

Saddam’s world was contained within the Persian Gulf region. His only political or military exposure to the outside world came through his engagements with other states. The U.S. supported his regional political and military activities or conflicts through covert intelligence operations and economic assistance for his people to further its own political interest. This was also the case with other countries. Saddam’s service in the Ba’ath party was what triggered his involvement with the Iraqi military and it was still contained within the region. Saddam’s other exposure with the external actors was through his illicit activities with international arms dealers that facilitated his access to munitions, equipment, and licensed technologies that he used to further Iraq’s WMD program. For Saddam, politics was a continual struggle for survival and the acquisition of power justified whatever means he employed to attain it.

Saddam did not possess the insight into the U.S., its capabilities or its President in order to engage in a chess game of the magnitude of the Persian Gulf War. Even though Bush was not an expert on the Middle East, he had
enough operational experience to know that he had the critical tools at his disposal. What he neglected to do was use that information to gain the necessary situational awareness for this conflict. In essence, Bush dealt superficially with Saddam’s operational code and did not attempt to delve deeper to gain better insight into how he would react during the crisis. George Bush and Saddam Hussein never understood each other, their domestic challenges, their intentions or motives, much less their political objectives.

The Persian Gulf War provided all the key ingredients for the implementation of multilateral international sanctions under the umbrella of the U.N. Security Council. After Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait, the international community rallied to an unprecedented degree and united in condemning the flagrant act of aggression by Iraq. The sanctions that were imposed targeted the financial stability of Iraq and its ability to continue executing any further military action in the region. Because Iraq’s economy was highly dependent upon oil exports, the imposition of multilateral sanctions would in reality diminish Iraq’s ability to sustain itself, as eventually the expectation was that Saddam would acquiesce and withdraw from Kuwait without having to resort to military intervention.

The Director of the CIA, William Webster, was called to testify before the Senate Armed Services Committee on December 4, 1990 to provide an assessment of the impact the international sanctions were having on Iraq and its economic stability. Webster testified that based upon U.S. intelligence and foreign intelligence from allies, it was estimated that the multilateral sanctions
had cut off more than 90 percent of Iraqi imports and approximately 97 percent of its exports.\textsuperscript{698} As a result of the multilateral sanctions, Iraq’s assets abroad were seized, and food prices domestically were significantly inflated due to the importation restrictions. The multi-faceted sanctions targeted every aspect of the Iraqi economy and stability.\textsuperscript{699} The international sanctions prohibited trade and financial transactions, the seizure of assets, the curtailing or severance of communication and transportation infrastructure, and ultimately the blacklisting of corporations or individuals who attempted to circumvent these restrictions either directly or through third parties to conceal the illicit activity.

In his testimony, Webster outlined the findings of the IC estimates which indicated that at the current rate of depletion Iraq will have nearly drained its available foreign exchange reserves by the following spring. Based upon this analysis, it appeared that the multilateral sanctions were have the intended effect of seriously constraining the Iraqi economy. The gradual effect the restrictions were having on Iraq led many to believe that the multilateral implementation of the economic sanctions and embargo under the auspices of the U.N. would eventually coerce Saddam into withdrawing Iraq’s military troops from Kuwait if given enough time to be fully effective.

It can be argued that Bush exhibited little patience in allowing the sanctions to take effect. Instead, he clearly demonstrated his lack of resolve in believing that sanctions alone would coerce Saddam into retreating from Kuwait.


\textsuperscript{699} Cortright and Lopez, \textit{Economic Sanctions}, 133.
The sanctions had only been in effect for about two months when Bush began to argue with senior leadership that in order to force Saddam out of Kuwait, the U.S. and the international community would have to resort to military force. General Colin Powell who was Bush’s principal military advisor advocated for allowing the sanctions a reasonable amount of time to work before the U.S. resorted to military force. It was also not clear whether Saddam would proceed to invade Saudi Arabia after seizing Kuwait, and if so how soon. As a result, Bush contrary to the advice he was receiving, became the biggest advocate in the administration behind the scenes for proceeding to take military action against Iraq to expel Saddam from Kuwait.700

Bush historically had operated in tactical environments seeking immediate and demonstrated results. When he was recruited to serve as Director of the CIA to reorganize the agency, combat the previous management issues, and change the morale of its ranks, Bush took immediate action to bring about results in a short time frame that were quickly transparent to the White House. Although he exhibited extreme patience in his political career and ultimate rise to the White House, his operating style was one to seek speedy noticeable results.

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and the apparent hastening by Bush towards military intervention beg several questions to be asked. Would the implementation of the sanctions and their continued support result in the expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait? Or, as it has been argued, was the implementation of the sanctions regime a showing of a good faith effort to

exhaust all diplomatic avenues prior to soliciting the support of the international community for military intervention? In light of the historical relationship between the CIA and Iraq, and the recent investigations, it is perceivable that Bush wanted to address the Saddam issue in the Persian Gulf prior to any disconcerting information surfacing.

Information was available to outline the historical practices of Saddam’s operational code. However, unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis where ExComm analyzed and discussed with JFK the strategic implications of Khrushchev’s intent and possible actions they could take, Bush superficially dealt with Saddam’s operational code in assessing possible actions the U.S. could take in the Gulf crisis. The control of information and how it is presented allows permits a leader to depict a threat situation in the best possible light to garner support for that particular position. The intelligence was available to have supported taking a slower pace in the crisis to better assess what Saddam’s reaction could be to the impact of the multilateral sanctions. The Persian Gulf War also highlighted the level of intelligence sharing among the coalition states and how critical it was to the successful implementation of the multilateral sanctions and ultimately the military engagement.

Conclusions

The Cuban Missile Crisis proved to be a successful application of application of coercive diplomacy. When applying the three prong analytical framework introduced in this study, JFK and Khrushchev indirectly applied its
elements in the Cuban Missile Crisis. The thirteen day crisis engaging the U.S.,
the Soviet Union, and Cuba almost lead the world into a full scale nuclear war.

During the Cold War, opposing sides would engage in brinksmanship and appear
to seemingly be on the verge of war in order to persuade one's opposition to
retreat. Although the Cuban Missile Crisis reflected elements of brinksmanship, it
was the use of coercive diplomacy in the form of a ‘carrot and stick’ manifested
through a naval blockade and ultimately a quid pro quo that brought the U.S. and
the Soviet Union back from the brink of war. The mutual understanding that JFK
and Khrushchev had developed of each other’s resolve and intentions further
supports that the operational code of a leader is crucial to any crisis situation.

Finally, the use of integrated and reliable intelligence must be made available to
a leader so that information decisions can be rendered in a crisis. Both JFK and
Khrushchev played the Cuban Missile Crisis as a game of chess which
successfully resulted in a stalemate and not a checkmate by either side which
would have meant war.

Desert Shield/Desert Storm in August 1990 is considered a success on
many levels and a conflict which was unprecedented in many aspects. Operation
Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the first major foreign crisis for the United States
after the end of the Cold War. The Persian Gulf War was the first conflict that
received round-the-clock television coverage of as events unfolded. Americans
saw footage from cameras placed on smart bombs as they struck Iraqi targets.
The key elements were present to mobilize the international support necessary to
hold Saddam accountable for his invasion of Kuwait and have with withdraw.
After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. garnered the necessary support from the U.S. and the international community to form a multilateral coalition to implement a tight sanctions regime against Saddam.

It should be noted, however, that even though the sanctions were gradually demonstrating the impact on the target state of Iraq, the crisis was ultimately successfully resolved through military intervention. Although the multilateral sanctions were effectively halting the Iraqi economy and restricting Saddam's financial stability, they were only in place for approximately two months before it was escalated to military engagement by the coalition forces. Ultimately, the U.S. passed its first test of the post-Cold War world skillfully applying diplomacy and proving that the United Nations could be used as an instrument of force when necessary. The potential for international multilateral cooperation using both diplomatic tools and military assets was demonstrated.

President Bush promptly declared that the “new world order had begun”.

This study can create a new analytical framework to consider when using coercive diplomacy. Nonetheless, incorporating the analysis of other cases would prove fruitful to compare and gain further insight into this type of analytical framework. A case that would serve as a good counterpoint to the Iraq case is Libya. It can be argued that Iraq and Libya are most similar in certain circumstances such as the cultural, geographic and religious implications indicators, and least likely in other scenarios because of the level of involvement of the international community, the time span associated with each case, and the
level of aggressive external behavior exhibited by each, i.e. numerous terrorists acts by Libya and encroachments in the Persian Gulf region by Iraq.

In comparing the cases of Iraq and Libya, they lend themselves to highlight how the operational code of the leaders directly impacted their actions and behavior against the backdrop of intervention by the international community. Whereas it can be argued that Saddam’s behavior in the international community outside the region was stemmed, the imposition of sanctions did not change his repressive treatment of the Iraqi people nor his aggressive behavior toward countries in the immediate region, namely Kuwait. In the Libya case limited sanctions represented an acceptable middle course of action against Qaddafi who was seen by many as an irrational actor in the international community. The 1980’s situation in Libya underscores the difficulty of crafting a successful policy of coercive diplomacy where the cooperation of the international community is lacking. Ultimately, over the long term the sanctions helped to curb proliferation as well as to get Libya to end its support of terrorism. In the Libyan case, the U.S. sought the cooperation of its allies in using sanctions in order to change the behavior of an intransigent target.

Another case to consider analyzing in another part of the world is that of Nicaragua where the Reagan administration sought to destabilize and replace the existing Sandinista regime through the imposition of economic sanctions and the subsequent creation of Contra army to fight it. Reagan was seeking to prevent the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua from shipping arms and munitions to the guerilla forces in El Salvador. The U.S. unilateral efforts at implementing a
strategy of coercive diplomacy lacked clear objectives in its policy toward Nicaragua. As a result, the coercive pressure applied by the U.S did not generate the anticipated outcomes. Even though the U.S. acted unilaterally, the coercive sanctions imposed by the U.S. unintendedly cultivated a collaborative effort by Central American states. The Nicaragua case could be analyzed to determine what factors limited the effectiveness of coercive diplomacy when contrasting Reagan and the leaders of the Sandinista regime, as well as the reliability of the intelligence being used to formulate the coercive strategy.

Another case in the Western Hemisphere to consider examining against the three prong analytical framework could be Haiti in 1994 where the goal was oust the repressive military regime and reinstate the freely elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The intelligence in this case demonstrated that the exiting Haitian government was facilitating narco-trafficking and arms trading in the region and impacting the southern tier of the U.S. The case lends itself to the analytical framework to evaluate the operational codes of President Clinton and Raoul Cedras, as well as the reliability of the intelligence that each used during the engagement. Although there was military intervention, this case can be compared with Iraq in that the sanctions were having an effect on the Haitian economy and like Iraq the leadership did not acquiesce to the coercion until military intervention occurred.

A final case that is considered a successful implementation of economic sanctions is South Africa when the international community sought to end Apartheid. Trade and financial sanctions imposed against South Africa were
very limited and had numerous loopholes and exception clauses. However, the international sanction movement against the South African government was the final push that brought the Afrikaner-backed National Party to near bankruptcy and brought them to the negotiating table with the African National Congress (ANC). While each factor of total onslaught of multilateral sanctions played a role in changing the South African government, the global anti-apartheid movement was a significant dynamic in causing the turning of the tide against the white-minority government and eventually bringing to power a true democracy on the southern tip of the African continent. This case would be interesting to analyze against the three elements of the framework to assess how the level of engagement by the international community can impact the outcome of a crisis.

These cases can be assessed through the new analytical framework outlined in this study focusing on the trends and patterns that can be identified in using coercive diplomacy once each factor is specifically examined. For example, intelligence is an instrument of power and when it is properly collected, analyzed and applied can be the most critical resource for a leader and decision maker. Intelligence can be incomplete, out of date, inaccurate and at times even contradictory. However, the integration of all source intelligence diminishes the risk of having these information gaps. It is incumbent upon the leader to require the intelligence collection to be executed in an integrated manner and not fragmented as is usually the case. Only the decision maker is responsible for his actions or decisions and requiring a higher quality of intelligence gathering and
analysis across agencies and with international stakeholders can only serve to enhance the decision making process in a crisis.

A leader comes to a crisis with his operational code. The operational code cannot be checked at the door when the crisis ensues. The operational code encompasses not only the family, education, and background of a leader, but also the political leader’s beliefs and views about the nature of political relationships. The operational code of a leader shapes the tone and tenor of a crisis, how the processes for decision making are established and ultimately decides who the key stakeholders are. Personal beliefs effect decisions and act as causal mechanisms in making foreign policy decisions. A leader and his operational code are inextricably intertwined and those traits and perceptions interpret a crisis through those individual lenses.

Coercive diplomacy or "forceful persuasion" in the words of Alexander George is an attempt to get a target state or actor change its objectionable behavior through either the threat of force or the actual use of limited force. This study has set forth hypothesis and maintains that without considering the leaders operational code and the quality of intelligence, the application of coercive diplomacy and its success is less than certain. There are no guaranteed outcomes in international relations which is always an uncertain chess game to be played. However, the rate of success in applying coercive diplomacy can be exponentially increased if the three prong analytical framework introduced in this study is applied: operational code, intelligence and coercive diplomacy.
Selected Works

Coercive Diplomacy, Conflict Theory & Operational Code


Keck, Shelli. “The Operational Code of Nikita Khrushchev Before and After the Cuban Missile Crisis”.


**Economic Sanctions & Embargoes**


Intelligence


**CASE STUDIES**

*Cuba*


Blight, James G., Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, with the assistance of Davis Lewis, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993),


Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Box 36 Cuba, General 10/15/62-10/23/62. JFK Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.


Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Box 47 Cuba, Subjects, Composite of Exchange of Correspondence between President and Khrushchev/U Thant and Castro, through 10/28/62. JFK Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, JFK Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Box 51 Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, 11/13/62 – 11/30/62. JFK Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Box 315 Cuba, Executive Committee Meetings, Meetings 1-5, 10/23/62 – 10/25/62. JFK Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.


Imagery Intelligence: MRBM Field Launch Site, San Cristobal NO 2, 14 October 1962 (Detail), Cuban Missile Crisis, National Security Files. Cuba, Subjects, Intelligence Material, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.


“A Program of Covert Action against the Castro Regime,” approved by President Eisenhower at a meeting in the White House on March 17, 1960. White House, Office of Staff Sec. International Series, Box 4, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.


“Telegram of President Kennedy’s message to Premier Khrushchev,” October 28, 1962, received by the State Department and released to the press at 5:03 p.m., John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, Boston, Massachusetts.


**Iraq**


Baghdad Radio, August 8, 1990.


Iraqi News Agency (INA) 7 August 1990 and 28 August 1990.


Post, Jerrold M., M.D. “Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile”, presented in testimony to hearings on the Gulf crisis by the House Armed Services Committee, December 5, 1990.


Schneider, Barry R. “Deterrence and Saddam Hussein: Lessons from the 1990-
1991 Gulf War.” The Counterproliferation Papers, Future Warfare Series
No. 47. USAF Counterproliferation Center, August 2006, unclassified.

Schraeder, Peter J., ed. Intervention into the 1990s: U.S. Foreign Policy in the

Sciolo, Elaine. The Outlaw State: Saddam Hussein's Quest for Power and the


Sifry, Micah L. and Christopher Cerf, editors. The Iraqi War Reader: History,


Stork, Joe and Ann M. Lesch, “Background to the Crisis: Why War?” Middle East
Report, No. 167 (Nov. – Dec., 1990) On the Edge of War, (Washington,

George Bush Center for Intelligence,” https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/todays-
cia/george-bush-center-for-intelligence/index.html; last accessed August
5, 2014.

“The Glaspie Transcript: Saddam Meets the U.S. Ambassador,” in The Iraq War
Reader: History, Documents, Opinions. Micah L. Sifrey and Christopher

“The World - A Budding Scandal, in Brief: A Primer on the 'B.N.L. Affair,'” The
a-budding-22scandal-in-brief-a-primer-on-the-bnl-affair.html, last
accessed April 2, 2015.

Tripp, Charles Tripp. A History of Iraq. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010.

U.S. Department of Justice, “Officers of Italian Bank in Atlanta Charged with
Making Fraudulent Loans to Iraq ‘Totaling More Than $4 Billion,’” press


