Suarez and Meinong on beings of reason and non-existent objects
Date of Award
Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)
First Committee Member
Ramon Lemos, Committee Chair
The central purpose of this dissertation is to compare Suarez's treatment of beings of reason with Meinong's treatment of non-existent objects. The dissertation is divided into three parts. In the first part I analyze Suarez's view of beings of reason. I do this first by giving a general overview of Suarez's philosophy (Chapter 2); second, by explaining Suarez's notion of real being (Chapters 3 and 4); and finally, by analyzing Suarez's notion of beings of reason (Chapter 5). In the second part I analyze Meinong's view of non-existent objects. I do this first by giving a general explanation of the relevant parts of Brentano's philosophy (Chapter 6); second, by explaining Descartes' and Twardowski's epistemology as background for Meinong's (Chapter 7.A.); third, by explaining Meinong's view of metaphysics (Chapter 7.B.); and finally, by analyzing Meinong's Theory of Objects (Chapter 7.C.). In the third part I compare Suarez's treatment of beings of reason with Meinong's treatment of non-existent objects. I argue that, as a consequence of their similar epistemological views, their metaphysical treatments of beings of reason and non-existent objects are similar. Finally, as an appendix, I discuss how Suarez and Meinong compare with Russell on the problem of denoting.
Cantens, Bernardo J., "Suarez and Meinong on beings of reason and non-existent objects" (1999). Dissertations from ProQuest. 3654.