Doctor of Philosophy (PHD)
Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)
Date of Defense
First Committee Member
Mark Rowlands (co-chair); Simon Evnine (co-chair)
Second Committee Member
Third Committee Member
Fourth Committee Member
What are we? According to the two most common answers we are either psychological beings or biological organisms. In my dissertation I develop a novel account, which combines the advantages of these views while avoiding their main pitfalls. I start by arguing against the most developed theory of organism persistence, according to which human organisms persist in virtue of their brainstems persisting. Next, by drawing on the literature on natural properties and biological laws, I argue that biological organisms can persist through death. While organisms don’t necessarily cease to exist when they die, we normally do: according to my New Bodily View we are bodies that are bundles of physical and mental tropes, whereas organisms are bundles of exclusively physical tropes. This account not only solves various metaphysical problems about the relation between persons and organisms, but can also handle a novel puzzle I raise for rival views concerning the relation between bodily and self-awareness.
body; bodily awareness; personal identity; self-awareness; organisms; properties
Tzinman, Rina, "Reviving the Body" (2016). Open Access Dissertations. 1592.