Publication Date
2017-11-20
Availability
Open access
Embargo Period
2017-11-20
Degree Type
Dissertation
Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PHD)
Department
Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)
Date of Defense
2017-11-09
First Committee Member
Michael Slote
Second Committee Member
Harvey Siegel
Third Committee Member
Elijah Chudnoff
Fourth Committee Member
Berit Brogaard
Fifth Committee Member
Allan Hazlett
Abstract
This project is an examination of epistemic evaluation, of what it is and how we should think about it in our overall normative theories. The overarching goal of this dissertation is to argue that it is theoretically fruitful to frame epistemic evaluation in a specific way, as a kind of “critical domain” or evaluative practice that takes the constitutive goals of inquiry to be fundamentally valuable. In due course, I argue that knowledge and not mere true belief is fundamentally valuable from the epistemic perspective and that, when we see epistemic evaluation in this way, a number of difficult theoretical pieces fall into place, including answers to questions concerning the so-called “value problem of knowledge” and to questions raised about the value of epistemic justification. Some may object to seeing epistemic evaluation as a critical domain on the basis of considerations arising out of the ethics of belief, considerations concerning what we all-things-considered ought to believe. I provide a framework for thinking about these issues and argue that, at the end of the day, any worries about the adequacy of the critical domain picture with respect to the ethics of belief are ill-founded and that the view presented is a live theoretical option.
Keywords
epistemic evaluation; inquiry; knowledge; epistemic justification; ethics of belief
Recommended Citation
Aschliman, Lance, "Reconsidering Epistemic Evaluation" (2017). Open Access Dissertations. 1979.
https://scholarlyrepository.miami.edu/oa_dissertations/1979