Publication Date

2019-07-22

Availability

Open access

Embargo Period

2019-07-22

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PHD)

Department

Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

Date of Defense

2019-07-05

First Committee Member

Brendan Balcerak Jackson

Second Committee Member

Elijah L. Chudnoff

Third Committee Member

Simon J. Evnine

Fourth Committee Member

Gene Witmer

Abstract

The purpose of this dissertation is to offer an account of metaphysical grounding based on property theory. In Chapter 1, I explain the motivation behind the project. In Chapter 2, I propose a property theory, and argue that true real definition statements show property constitution. In Chapter 3, I relate true grounding claims with true factive real definition statements. This suggests that defining metaphysical grounding in terms of property constitution and property instantiation might be promising. To carry out the project, I define the notion of determinant assignment on the basis of the property theory proposed in Chapter 2. Then, I offer an account of metaphysical grounding by appealing to the notion of determinant assignment and its factualization. Since these two notions can be defined in terms of property constitution and property instantiation, metaphysical grounding can also be defined in terms of property constitution and property instantiation. With my account of metaphysical grounding, in Chapter 4, I argue that metaphysical grounding is a strict order, and that both the entailment principle and the internality principle are false. Finally, I address the meta-grounding problem.

Keywords

Metaphysical Grounding; Property Constitution

Share

COinS