Publication Date

2019-12-06

Availability

Open access

Embargo Period

2019-12-06

Degree Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy (PHD)

Department

Philosophy (Arts and Sciences)

Date of Defense

2019-08-29

First Committee Member

Berit Brogaard

Second Committee Member

Simon Evnine

Third Committee Member

Elijah Chudnoff

Fourth Committee Member

Brendan Balcerak Jackson

Fifth Committee Member

Casey O'Callaghan

Abstract

Can we literally see and hear meanings? In my dissertation, I argue first that we have a conscious understanding experience which is (1) non-inferential, (2) cognitively impenetrable, and (2) with a specific sensory modal. Under the characterization of the experience, I conclude that the experience is literally perceptual. Thereafter, I argue that this characterized understanding experience is conceptual by virtue of being a high-level perceptual experience, and then plays the role of epistemic justifier for the belief of what an utterance means just as high-level perceptual experience in general performs as a justifier for perceptual belief.

Keywords

Perceptual Experience; Understanding; Phenomenal Contrast Argument; Semantic Perception

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