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In two recent papers, I criticized Ronald N. Giere's and Larry Laudan's arguments for 'naturalizing' the philosophy of science (Siegel 1989, 1990). Both Giere and Laudan replied to my criticisms (Giere 1989, Laudan 1990b). The key issue arising in both interchanges is these naturalists' embrace of instrumental conceptions of rationality, and their concomitant rejection of non-instrumental conceptions of that key normative notion. In this reply I argue that their accounts of science's rationality as exclusively instrumental fail, and consequently that their cases for 'normatively naturalizing' the philosophy of science fail as well.


The following article appeared in Philosophy of Science 63 Supplement. Proceedings of the 1996 Biennial Meetings of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers (Sep 1996) Pages: S116-S124. Philosophy of Science © 1996 Philosophy of Science Accociation. Published by The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Accociation. The original publication is available at